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ABOUT THE DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES (GADS) AND PJGD

Department of Governance and Development Studies (GaDS) is one of the pioneer departments of Jimma University established in September 2007 and functioning as a constituent unit of the College of Law and Governance since September 2014. Since its establishment, the Department of GaDS is playing a vital role in the transformation of society and empowering the government institutions by producing professionals in the area of development and governance. Currently, the Master Program of GaDS has three specializations: (i) Governance and Development; (ii) Development Management; (iii) Peace and Conflict Studies whereas two more specializations (Gender Studies and Federal Studies) yet to be introduced.

The Post-Graduate Program of the Department clearly states its vision as "The Master of Arts Program in Governance and Development Studies (GaDS) institutionalizes a dynamic and strategic vision to provide an interdisciplinary, advanced, research-based and practical education in contemporary issues of national and international governance and development". This stated vision at the same time echoes the vision of the Jimma University which "aspires to be one of the premier universities in Africa and renowned in the world by 2025".

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The Effects of Neocolonialism on Africa's Development

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Abstract

This article examines the effects of neocolonialism on Africa's development and explores potential strategies to counter its negative impact. The legacy of colonialism has cast a long shadow over the continent, with neocolonial practices posing significant obstacles to sustained socio-economic growth and self-determination. This study aims to extensively understand neocolonialism's multifaceted impacts on Africa's economic growth and development by employing a qualitative approach and analyzing secondary data sources. The analysis highlights the intricate dynamics of neocolonial control in Africa, including economic dominance, political interference, cultural subjugation, and power imbalances. Moreover, it sheds light on the role of foreign aid and trade, multinational corporations, and international financial institutions in perpetuating neocolonial practices. These means and mechanisms enable the former colonial powers to exert indirect influence over Africa's economic and political landscape, impeding genuine progress. Findings reveal that Africa's nominal and flag independence following decolonization has not translated into genuine autonomy and self-sufficiency. Instead, the continent continues to face economic dependence, corruption, and stunted development due to neocolonial exploitation. The exploitation of Africa's vast natural and human resources, unequal trade relationships, and support for authoritarian regimes have all contributed to the continent's ongoing struggles. To address these challenges, the article proposes tentative strategies and solutions. These include promoting fair trade practices, empowering African nations to regain control over their resources and economies, promoting regional integration and cooperation, strengthening governance and institutions, and fostering a more equitable global economic order. Africa can achieve genuine economic growth, social progress, and self-determination by countering neocolonial practices and fostering sustainable development. Acknowledging the complex web of neocolonial dynamics is crucial for formulating effective strategies and policies to dismantle neocolonial structures and promote sustainable development.

Keywords: *Development, Neocolonialism, Underdevelopment, Dependency, and Exploitation*

Introduction

Colonialism ravaged Africa, but neocolonialism is thwarting the seed of African growth and development. Many scholars, as well as historians who wrote on colonialism, focused more on the facts that Africa was and is inordinately exploited of their human (slavery) and natural (raw materials) resources as well as endure brutal and tyrannical control of the imperialist's power,

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but this is one aspect of it. The other part is the Berlin Conference of 1885, which divided the African continent into political units and colonies and merged people who were not supposed to be together.

The Europeans scrambled Africa without consulting Africans, created artificial boundaries without due consideration of traditional boundaries, displaced Africans and separated language groups from each other, merged independent villages and communities, and turned African colonies into plantations and mineral mines. This is why one ethnic group in Africa can be located in various African countries. For instance, the Yoruba tribe can be found in Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, and Togo; the San tribe can be found in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Botswana, Namibia, and Angola; the Berbers tribe can be found in Morocco, Algeria, and Libya; Somali tribe can be found in Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya; Hutu tribe can be found in Rwanda, Burundi, and DR Congo; and Chewa tribe can be found in Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Saylor, 2011).

The scrambling of Africa explains, to a greater extent, the reason behind many internal conflicts and development crises within African countries to date. To be specific, most of these conflicts circulate around tribal and ethnic struggles as well as state boundary crises. While there may be other reasons, this explains the rationale behind Africa's stunt development. The Berlin conference, which was disguised under the cloak of abolishing the slave trade and modernizing Africa, was intended to achieve "European's economic greed which manifested in their occupying territories and developing their trade at the expense of Africans and African resources and avoiding conflicts which had increased due to their contests to occupy the West African coasts and settle in these coasts. The long-term result of the conference was the re-design of a new political, racial, and national map for Africa" (African Union, 1995, p.7).

After the Second World War that ravaged the European economy, colonial governments became increasingly aware that colonial rule could not continue. They were under pressure to defend why they were keeping African societies under their rule, notwithstanding the United Nations' declaration of the right to self-determination. While they responded that Africans were being prepared for future self-government, the truth remains that they were not ready to hand over rule to African people. The wave of African independence, which started in the late 1950s, saw countries like South Africa, Egypt, Malawi, Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania, Lesotho,

Swaziland, Botswana, and others gain independence peacefully. At the same time, colonies like Angola, Mozambique, Algeria, and Kenya were forced to fight wars to win their independence from their colonial masters (South African History Online, 2019).

The changing scenario of world politics saw the collapse of former imperialist powers (i.e., Germany, Belgium, France, Britain, Portugal, Spain, and others.) and the emergence of new imperialist powers (i.e., the erstwhile Soviet Union and the United States). The influence of the new imperialist power in the decolonization of Africa was not unintentional; the Cold War between the two superpowers and the quest to preach US-dominated capitalism and former USSR-dominated communism are the motivating factors behind their support (Shafiqur et al., 2017). After the wave of independence, the expectations of most those seeking freedom and independence from colonialism were dashed into the whirlwind as most African countries were politically independent but economically and socially dependent, hence nominal and flag independence. Many African countries were given independence on asymmetric terms that favored the ex-colonists at the expense of the colonized.

Furthermore, the colonialists handed power over to the comprador bourgeoisie - "the wealthy, educated and exploitative native elites or classes that unconditionally submit to the colonial dictations both in political and economic relations" (Aamir, 2015, p. 6). Also, the major political, economic, and sociocultural ideas, beliefs, norms, values, practices, institutions, and structures introduced by the imperialists were not dismantled at independence - this paved the way for the new form of colonialism in post-colonial African states. Neocolonialism does not require physical, direct control or manipulation by the imperial power; rather, it is through means and mechanisms like foreign aid, foreign trade, multinational corporations, foreign direct investments, international financial organizations, media, and literature. As a result, African countries have remained at the mercy of their former colonial masters and imperialists' design and in the shackles of poverty, corruption, economic dependence, and stunted development with little or no hope of progressing soon.

This article uses a qualitative approach and secondary data sources to argue that neocolonial practices have hindered Africa's economic growth and development. It also highlights the role of foreign aid, foreign trade, multinational corporations, Bretton Wood Institutions, corrupt African elites, and others in perpetuating neocolonial control and the negative effects of neocolonialism

on Africa's economic growth and development. Additionally, it proposed tentative strategies and solutions to counter these effects. It concludes by emphasizing that the end of formal colonialism in Africa did not signal the end of foreign control over the continent and that neocolonialism continues to pose significant obstacles to African countries' economic growth and development. The exploitation of natural resources, dependence on foreign trade and investment, and support for authoritarian leaders have all contributed to the ongoing struggles of the continent. While African nations should empower themselves to take control of their resources and economies, the international community should also recognize and help address these issues to facilitate sustainable growth and development in Africa.

Statement of the Problem

The legacy of colonialism continues to cast a long shadow over Africa's development trajectory. Despite gaining political independence from their colonial masters several decades ago, many African nations still grapple with numerous challenges that hinder their progress toward sustained economic growth, social advancement, and self-determination. A phenomenon known as neocolonialism has emerged as a critical obstacle, characterized by indirect forms of control and exploitation by former colonial powers. Neocolonialism in Africa takes various forms, including economic dominance, political interference, cultural subjugation, and unequal power dynamics. This article aims to analyze the multifaceted effects of neocolonialism on Africa's development and propose tentative strategies and initiatives to counter its negative impact, empowering African nations to achieve self-sustaining and equitable growth.

Research Objectives

- To analyze and evaluate the effects of neocolonialism on Africa's economic growth and development.
- To examine the role of foreign aid, foreign trade, multinational corporations, and international financial institutions in perpetuating neocolonial control in Africa.
- To identify and assess the negative consequences of neocolonialism on Africa's economic growth and development.
- To propose strategies and solutions to counter the effects of neocolonialism and promote sustainable development in Africa.

Research Questions

- What are the effects of neocolonialism on Africa's economic growth and development?
- How do foreign aid, foreign trade, multinational corporations, and international financial institutions contribute to neocolonial control in Africa?
- What are the negative consequences of neocolonialism on Africa's economic growth and development?
- What strategies and solutions can be proposed to counter the effects of neocolonialism and promote sustainable development in Africa?

Review of Literature

Conceptual Review: Neocolonialism

To define neocolonialism properly, it is important to define colonialism, and in this article, neocolonialism and imperialism will be used synonymously. Etymologically, colonialism is derived from the Latin word ***colonus***, meaning farmer or inhabitant. Sarah Trembath stresses that "*colonus* as an etymology of colonialism is a subtle reminder that the practice of colonization usually involved the transfer of population to a new region, where the arrivals lived as permanent settlers while upholding political, economic, and social allegiance to their country of origin" (Trembath, 2022). Hence, colonialism according to English Oxford Dictionary is "the policy or practice of attaining full or partial political control over another country, dwell in it with settlers, and exploiting it economically." It involves subjugating people to another, and the subordinated society and its population are legally inferior (Ulrike, 2012).

Colonialism can be in the form of settler, exploitation, plantation, surrogate, and internal colonialism - all of which are exploitative and oppressive (Oko et al., 2022). Neocolonialism, on the other hand, is a new form of colonialism. The French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre coined the term in 1956, but Kwame Nkrumah first used it concerning the decolonization of African countries (Ardant, 1965). Stressing this, Oseni Taiwo affirms:

> Neocolonialism is the subtle propagation of socio-economic and political activity by former colonial rulers aimed at strengthening capitalism, neo-liberal globalization, and cultural suppression of their former colonies. In a neocolonial state, the former colonial rulers ensure that the newly sovereign colonies remain dependent on them for economic and political direction. The dependency and exploitation of the socio-economic and political lives of the now

> sovereign colonies are executed for the economic, political, ideological, cultural, and military gains of the colonial masters' home states. This is usually carried out through indirect control of the economic and political activities of the newly sovereign states instead of through direct military control, as in the colonial era (Oseni, 2022).

Echoing the above, Serequeberhan (1998) affirms that "neocolonialism in Africa is that which internally replicates in a disguised manner what was carried out during the colonial period. This disguised form constitutes the nature of the European neocolonial conquest as it concerns the politics of economic, cultural, and scientific subordination of African states" (ibid., p. 13). Through the guise of developmental aid and support and technological and scientific aid, the ex-colonial masters enforce their hegemonic political and cultural control in the form of neocolonialism. In Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, Kwame (1965) affirms that "neocolonialism is the worst form of imperialism. For those who practice it, it means power without responsibility; for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress. The essence of neocolonialism is that the State subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty but, in reality, its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside" (p. xi). Neocolonialism can manifest in various forms, such as influencing government policy decisions, providing funding for the State, placing individuals in positions of power, exerting control over foreign exchange, and imposing a banking system controlled by the imperial power (Northrop, 2012).

The fight against neocolonialism is not about preventing developed countries from investing in less developed countries but rather about ensuring that their financial power is not used to exploit and make these countries poorer (Kwame, 1965). In The Face of Imperialism, Michael (2011) affirms that imperialism perpetuates the strongest influence in world history, as nations with imperialistic tendencies take resources, markets, land, and labor from other countries for their gain. Neocolonialism, perpetuated by more technologically advanced nations, ensures that these low-income countries cannot develop and grow. It is worth underscoring that countries that were never colonized can also become neocolonialist states. Practical examples are Liberia and Ethiopia. These African countries have never experienced colonialism but have become neocolonial states by relying on international finance capital due to their weak economy (Attah, 2013). When African countries gained their independence, the imperial and colonial powers could no longer control them directly and physically and, therefore, devised new means and

mechanisms to control them indirectly. According to Mark Langan (2017), the concept of neocolonialism warns us of "the potential regressive impact of unregulated forms of aid, trade, and foreign direct investment in relation to poverty decrease and well-being in African countries."

Development

Development in human society is a multidimensional process. There is a human, historical, economic, and social dimension of development (Walter, 1973). The term development was first used in 1756. Etymologically, it was derived from the French "***développement***, and from Old French ***desvelopemens***, which means- unroll, unwrap, unfurl, unveil, reveal the meaning of, explain, etc." (Wiktionary, 2022). Development is the "process of expanding and growing; a gradual unfolding, a full working out, or disclosure of the details of something" (Online Etymology Dictionary, 2022). Development in the human context includes personal and social group development. Personal development refers to an individual's growth in skills, abilities, freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility, and material well-being. Social group development, on the other hand, refers to the interactions and interdependencies of individuals within a group working towards common goals. In this context, development indicates an increasing ability to manage internal and external relationships (Walter, 1973). In modern studies, development has been used synonymously with economic development. According to Walter Rodney (1973), the justification for this is that the economy is an index of other social features.

Economic development, therefore, refers to the transformation of an economy by implementing technological advancements, industrial upgrades, and improvements in infrastructure and institutions. These changes increase labor productivity and reduce transaction costs (Yifu, 2017). The primary objective is to cater to the welfare and well-being of the people. Supporting this, Walter affirms that economic development in a society is linked to the collective ability of its members to interact with their surroundings. This ability is influenced by their understanding of natural laws (science), the use of that understanding to create tools (technology), and the organization of work (Walter, 1973). On the historical dimension of development, Karl Marx and Walt Rostow wrote extensively on different stages of development in society. Karl Marx identified five stages: communalism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and communism.

The communal stage is a basic stage in which properties are collectively owned, men primarily engage in hunting, women engage in domestic work, and goods are shared equally.

The second stage is slavery, where class society develops as the population increases and some individuals within families and groups become dominant. The third stage is feudalism, in which land becomes more important than human labor, and agriculture is the main source of survival. Conflicts exist between land ownership and those who own land become powerful in society. The fourth stage is capitalism, which brings about new forms of exploitation, and the Industrial Revolution led to the spread of scientific ideas and values. Wealth is produced by machines in factories and mines and is concentrated in the hands of a few individuals known as the bourgeoisie. Karl Marx believed capitalism would eventually give way to socialism, where the State controls the means of production, and eventually to a stateless, classless society known as communism (Mohit, 2017; Felluga, 2011; Walter, 1973).

Discussions on development will not be complete without mentioning underdevelopment. However, it is vital to note that some scholars prefer using the term "developing" to avoid negative connotations. A thorough look at the theories of the development and evolution of human societies shows that every human society has developed in one way or another. Underdevelopment is a relative and controversial concept that looks at the differences in levels of development among societies based on per capita income, poverty, literacy, life expectancy, and infrastructure. Additionally, underdevelopment can refer to the exploitation of one country by another. This second sense made the concept of underdevelopment a paradox, as countries rich in resources are poor and vice versa. Eurocentric scholarship has portrayed Africa's underdevelopment as a divine fate. However, according to Rodney Walter (1973), a bigger issue is that Africans have internalized a belief that they cannot transform and develop their natural environment. While Africans must take responsibility for driving their growth and development through strategic planning, it is important to acknowledge that imperialist exploitation, unequal trade, and production relations have hindered Africa's development.

Theoretical Framework: Dependency Theory

Raul Prebisch, an Argentine economist and statesman, proposed the dependency theory in the late 1950s. Authors like Andre Gunker Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Claudio Katz, Ruy Mauro Marine, Samir Amin, and others also wrote on dependency

theory. The major argument of dependency theorists is that metropolis or wealthy nations accumulate and retain wealth at the expense of poor or periphery nations due to wide-ranging effects like labor and raw material exploitations, unfavorable policies, unequal terms of trade, beside others, or due to exploitative relationships that exist between their economic, social, political and other factors (Christian, 2022). Developing countries, especially in Africa, offer cheap labor and raw materials internationally. These resources are sold to industrialized and developed economies, which have the means to convert them into finished goods. Developing countries purchase those manufactured goods at very high prices, depleting the capital that should be invested in their productive capacity. According to Andre Munro (2022), the above result is "a vicious cycle that perpetuates the partition of the world economy between a rich core and a poor periphery." Dependency can be symmetric or asymmetric.

Symmetric dependency entails a situation where economic, social, political, and other endeavors between two or more countries are symbiotic, mutual, and equal. Symmetric dependency can be explained further using Stefan Linder's Country Similarity Theory, which holds that countries at the same level of development (i.e., per capita income, technological capacity, and others) are more likely to have a smooth and mutual interdependency. Hence, developed nations depend on each other more symmetrically than developing nations. For instance, three-quarters of the United States' trading partners are developed economies (MBA Knowledge Base, 2021).

On the other hand, asymmetric dependency entails an exploitative relationship with no mutual benefit and a loss of auto-centric capacity and capability to develop. The core-periphery relationship (i.e., relationships between wealthy and developing nations) is a perfect example of asymmetric dependency. Immanuel Wallerstein's version of dependency theory, also known as world system theory, holds that while colonized or peripheral nations can progress economically and for ex-colonists to decline, the global capitalist system still necessitates the existence of developing countries or regions that can be exploited. He shifted the focus of analysis from a country-to-country system of dependency and exploitation to a global system. According to Wallerstein, focusing solely on individual countries is incorrect, as global capital and corporations are more powerful than nation-states and operate beyond national boundaries. He argues that the world system is defined by relations between three types of capitalist zones: the

core, semi-periphery, and periphery, and that countries can move up or down the economic ladder within this system (Karl, 2015).

Material and Methodology

To critically expose the effects of neocolonialism on Africa's growth and development, this article employs a qualitative approach and uses secondary data sources to explore and analyze the effects of neocolonialism on Africa's development. This will address the "how" and "why" of the research question and enable deeper interpretation and understanding of experiences, phenomena, and context of the research problem" (Jennifer, 2017, p. 61). The method of analysis is adopted in this paper to ensure a critical and comprehensive evaluation of information, proving the validity of theories and determining the truth (Sanjida, 2022). The study does not involve primary data collection or empirical research but relies on existing literature, historical accounts, and scholarly analysis. The researchers review relevant academic works, books, journal articles, reports, and other scholarly sources discussing neocolonialism in Africa. These secondary sources provide the necessary data and information to understand the historical context, the impact of neocolonial practices, and the challenges African countries face in their development efforts.

Methodological Framework: Mechanisms and Methods of Neocolonialism

Foreign Aids and Trade

Foreign aid has a rich historical background, with military assistance being the predominant form of aid in ancient times. During the colonial era, European powers allocated significant funds to their colonies, primarily focusing on infrastructure improvement and economic growth. The aftermath of World War II witnessed the implementation of the Marshall Plan and the establishment of international organizations like the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. These institutions have played crucial roles in distributing international funds, determining aid eligibility criteria, and evaluating the impact of foreign aid (Williams, 2022). However, it is essential to acknowledge that foreign aid was also exploited after World War II as an economic and political instrument to control and manipulate developing nations. The United States, the former Soviet Union, and their allies employed foreign aid as a diplomatic tool during the Cold War to foster political alliances and gain strategic advantages (Williams, 2022). While the Marshall Plan successfully rebuilt Europe, recent foreign aid efforts

have faced criticism for their excessive amounts and hindrance to growth and development in recipient countries.

Proponents of aid argue that the success of the Marshall Plan could be replicated in Africa by implementing appropriate policies. However, they often overlook the fact that the Marshall Plan was a short-term and specific intervention, unlike the ongoing and open-ended commitments that exist today. Such long-term aid commitments can foster a sense of entitlement among governments, hindering innovation and progress (Dambisa, 2009). Akinola (2012) emphasizes that providing financial aid to poorly-functioning governments will likely result in wasted funds and increased reckless spending. The prevalent practice of aid provision has led to increased debt, higher inflation rates, currency market instability, limited attractive investment opportunities, and heightened risk of civil conflict and turmoil in African nations.

Consequently, foreign aid is ineffective in alleviating poverty in African countries (Kieran, 2022). Furthermore, foreign aid has perpetuated corruption in countries with rampant corruption. Corrupt government officials can misuse aid resources, acquire military equipment, initiate unimportant projects, and expand the government workforce without contributing to growth or development. Rather than uplifting people experiencing poverty and promoting progress, aid money can fuel corruption. The African Union estimates that corruption costs the continent $150 billion annually, and international donors often disregard the inadvertent contribution of aid money to graft (Adeniyi et al., 2016). Consequently, many African governments have become heavily dependent on foreign aid, leading to minimal human development and insignificant per capita income (Dambisa, 2009).

Despite the negative impact of aid on African growth and development, aid continues to flow into the continent. This aid distribution is often driven by the political and strategic interests of donor nations rather than the actual needs of recipient countries, resulting in a new form of colonialism. African countries become dependent on donor countries and end up indebted to them, perpetuating profit maximization and private gain for the donor nations (Nna et al., 2011). The success and effectiveness of the Marshall Plan were attributed to several factors, including substantial funding, a defined time limit, open market conditions, and recipient-led plans. The key factor was that the recipients created the plans, focusing on restoring private sector-led

growth and avoiding economic instability (Westcott, 2022), which the African recipient countries lacked.

In addition to foreign aid, foreign trade can contribute to African neocolonialism through imbalances in bargaining power, unequal access to information, and unfair trade agreements. Commodity trade mispricing, for example, allows multinational corporations to undervalue goods or services, leading to substantial losses for African countries. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) often use mispricing to artificially shift profits from higher-tax to lower-tax jurisdictions, reducing the overall tax burden (Irene & Elisabeth, 2022). African nations heavily rely on exporting agricultural and raw materials, frequently sold below market prices, resulting in significant revenue losses. For instance, Ghana's gold and cocoa exports were significantly undervalued, leading to approximately $2.2 billion in tax revenue loss between 2011 and 2017 (Irene & Elisabeth, 2022).

Similarly, Ethiopian coffee growers receive minimal compensation compared to foreign companies and investors who earn substantially more from Ethiopian coffee (Rosa, 2020). The combined effects of foreign aid and unfair trade practices perpetuate a cycle of dependency and hinder economic growth in Africa. It is imperative to reevaluate and reform these approaches to promote sustainable development and equitable economic partnerships on the continent. The success of the Marshall Plan highlights the importance of recipient-driven plans and a focus on private sector-led growth and stability (Westcott, 2022). African nations must prioritize self-determined strategies that address their unique challenges and effectively leverage their resources to foster sustainable development. By addressing the issues of foreign aid and unfair trade practices, Africa can strive toward greater self-sufficiency and prosperity.

Net Official Development Assistance Received (US$) by Sub-Saharan Africa and Trade (% of GDP) of Sub-Saharan Africa from 1991-2021		
Year	**Net Official Development Assistance Received in Billions (Us Dollars)**	**Trade (% of GDP) of Sub-Saharan Africa**
1991	**17.82**	**38**
1992	**19.24**	**40**
1993	**17.35**	**39**
1994	**19.19**	**41**
1995	**18.64**	**43**
1996	**16.35**	**43**
1997	**14.9**	**45**
1998	**14.48**	**46**

1999	**13.23**	**46**
2000	**13.06**	**51**
2001	**14.29**	**50**
2002	**19.05**	**49**
2003	**24.88**	**51**
2004	**24.49**	**55**
2005	**32.84**	**57**
2006	**41.2**	**59**
2007	**36.17**	**59**
2008	**40.26**	**61**
2009	**44.31**	**52**
2010	**44.36**	**57**
2011	**47.33**	**60**
2012	**46.76**	**60**
2013	**47.7**	**59**
2014	**46.46**	**58**
2015	**44.77**	**56**
2016	**44.32**	**54**
2017	**49.57**	**56**
2018	**50.89**	**58**
2019	**53.08**	**56**
2020	**66.89**	**52**
2021	**62.29**	**57**

Source: World Bank Open Data 2023

The table above shows the ODA received by Sub-Saharan Africa over the years. A general upward trend suggests that foreign aid has continued to increase and flow into the sub-Saharan African region. The table also reveals fluctuations in the trade as a percentage of GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa. The trade percentage remained relatively stable between 1991 and 2005 but increased in the subsequent years, peaking in 2008 and fluctuating afterward. This suggests a growing reliance on trade as a driver of economic activity in sub-Saharan Africa. The economic implication of the above data is a dependency on external assistance, limited economic diversification, inefficient resource allocation, potential debt issues, missed growth opportunities, and vulnerability to external shocks.

Multinational Corporation (MNC)

According to Lazarus (2001), "a multinational corporation is a business organization whose activities are located in more than two countries and is the organizational form that defines foreign direct investment" (p. 10197). The African continent has the tendency to accelerate

overall development and become the richest continent, considering that it harbors more than 30% of the world's mineral reserves and approximately 10% and 8% of the world's oil and natural gas, respectively (World Bank, 2017). Despite ample natural resources in many African nations, the continent grapples with poverty, economic stagnation, and underdevelopment issues. The question that arises is, what factors have prevented African countries from effectively utilizing these resources, and who controls or benefits from them?

Examining Africa's colonial history posits that multinational corporations largely operate within the continent and are a major contributing factor. The nature and context of these corporations' operations in Africa necessitate regulation, as they often represent the interests of their colonial predecessors and are characterized by the alienation of natural resources and the imposition of centralized political authority over land and resources previously controlled by localized institutions. This effectively removes concession rights from local communities and transfers them to the government. Oyier (2017) writes that local communities and the public traditionally held control over natural resources in Africa, but colonial powers disrupted this by transferring control to the government. Subsequent African governments have maintained this model, with the management of natural resources being the responsibility of the state machinery and minimal involvement from citizens.

This exclusion of those whose livelihoods depend on the activities of multinational corporations from the decision-making process about natural resources is a significant concern. Semata observed that certain African governing officials collude with multinational corporations to exploit resources, gain personal wealth, and exploit their citizens through unethical means, such as corruption and providing foreign corporations with excessive tax breaks, to the disadvantage of local businesses and industries (Semata, 2019). Multinational corporations engage in corrupt practices, such as bribing government officials, to pass laws that benefit their illegal activities. Mark Langan (2018) writes that in 2016, the Anglo-Irish oil company Tullow used the United Kingdom's Department for International Development to influence the Ghanaian government to pass a new Oil Exploration and Production Bill. This Bill allowed oil companies to operate under a "Hybrid System," avoiding stricter regulations. The department got the support of organizations such as the Ghana Petroleum Commission, the Natural Resource Governance Institute, and the African Centre for Energy Policy by providing funds. Studies have found that investors of multinational corporations often seek out nations with inadequate governance to

increase profits, bypass complex and time-consuming regulations, and tailor rules to their advantage (OXFAM International, 2013).

Through trade mispricing, tax avoidance, and tax evasion, multinational corporations refrain from paying their fair share of taxes. According to UNCTAD, "developing countries lose an estimated US $100 billion a year through another set of tax avoidance schemes involving tax havens" (UNCTAD quoted OXFAM International, 2015). Oxfam report (2019) also estimated that 75% of the wealth of Africa's wealthy individuals is held in offshore accounts, resulting in a loss of $14 billion annually in uncollected taxes for the continent. This decline in revenue is caused by factors such as globalization, high levels of debt, tax evasion, and the global financial system. Taxes are crucial in funding development and providing public services such as clean water, energy, transportation, healthcare, social security, and education in Africa. However, the ease of moving capital through the global financial system and the ability of multinational corporations to exploit loopholes in tax laws to avoid paying their fair share or opting out of the corporate tax system has become a major problem.

An example of how multinational corporations steal from Africa through tax havens and tax avoidance is the case of Associated British Foods, a company operating in Zambia that was accused in 2015 of not paying any taxes in Zambia despite its local affiliate, Zambia Sugar, earning profits of $123 million. The revenue lost to tax havens by the Zambian government was ten times greater than the amount given to Zambia by the U.K. in educational subsidies. Similarly, in Nigeria, the Shell Group, through its affiliate Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, had a special sharing arrangement with another affiliate, Shell Petroleum International Mattschappij BV, which allowed it to make no profit for eight years, resulting in a loss of £20.09 million in tax revenues for the Nigerian government.

According to the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, many African countries are vulnerable to tax avoidance due to high volumes of intra-company trading, the secrecy surrounding foreign investment activities, loopholes in treaties, and inadequate resources to effectively address the outflow of wealth. (The Conversation, 2022) Tax avoidance and tax havens are rooted in unequal economic relationships, trade agreements with multinational corporations and their Western allies, outdated tax treaties, and colonial legacies. This has resulted in Africa receiving less benefit in comparison to the aid it receives. Developing African

economies have been persuaded to deregulate and privatize their economies to attract foreign investment. While this may seem logical in terms of attracting necessary inward investments, it has primarily served the interests of multinational corporations. Poor African nations will continue to be exploited as long as developed nations continue to gain financial benefits from declaring themselves tax havens. Without reforming the tax laws in Africa, the rule of law and effective tax administration will not be strengthened. Gugu (2021) writes:

> Multinationals and foreign governments from developed countries have long histories of low tax payments in Africa through unequal economic partnerships, trade terms, and benefits from colonial regimes. Tax avoidance effects are more pronounced on the continent because many African countries still have the unequal bargaining power to effectively reform their tax regimes, authoritarian incumbents who benefit from brokering special secret deals with businesses, and weaker tax administration capacities to investigate and enforce tax compliance properly. The result is that Africa loses more money through unequal and outdated tax treaties and trade terms than what it receives through aid.

Bretton Wood Institutions

The Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944, backed mainly by the U.S. and the U.K., gave birth to the Bretton Woods institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the International Trade Organization (later renamed the World Trade Organization in 1995). The agreement established a new monetary system, making the U.S. dollar the dominant global currency instead of gold. The U.S., the only country able to print dollars, became a leading power in the world economy (Amadeo, 2022; Peet, 2009). The main aim of the Bretton Woods Institutions was to rebuild the European economy post-World War II. However, over time, the focus of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund shifted from lending money to economic development projects in emerging capitalist countries. The creation of the World Bank and IMF was presented as a halfhearted attempt to restore the global economy after WWII. However, it also served to advance and defend capitalist interests and ideologies in developing nations and counter socialist movements in those countries.

The Structural Adjustment Program, which hurt African economies, was based on the Washington Consensus that primarily promoted free-market policies such as stabilization, trade liberalization, privatization, currency devaluation, deregulation, and reduced government

intervention. This allowed the Bretton Woods Institutions to exert control over the economies of developing countries, particularly in Africa (Bretton Woods Project, 2019). Poverty in Africa persisted due to the negative impact of the Structural Adjustment Program. According to Fatton (1992), the Bretton Woods Institutions manipulated and controlled African states through the loan conditions and requirements for repaying them. Most African states implemented the reforms not because they were necessary for their development but because they were a condition for aid. The Structural Adjustment Program was ineffective not because it was intended to provide assistance but because it aimed to control the economy. Thomson (2010) writes that after implementing the reforms, export prices decreased, import prices increased, national industries were privatized, local investment was hindered, and agricultural and non-agricultural sectors aligned with external needs, increasing dependency.

Fraser Logan (2015) argued that the effectiveness of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in African development was evaluated based on two parameters: effectiveness and necessity. At first, SAPs were considered effective in adjusting inefficient economic policies and promoting a more open and diverse market, leading to economic growth. The necessity of adjustment was seen as necessary for counteracting African debt and promoting political stability through cooperation and interdependence. However, later, the effectiveness of SAPs was rejected as African countries experienced increased debt and economic stagnation. The blame was placed on internal factors such as civil wars, the colonial legacy, disease, and drought, but mostly on inefficient, irresponsible, and corrupt African governments. This left SAPs as necessary but inevitably ineffective due to African states' inability to repay loans, suggesting they may not be suitable for the African context. The failure of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in Africa can be attributed to the requirement for solutions tailored to the African context. Scholars have put forth multiple perspectives on the reasons behind this failure, with some attributing it to the inefficient implementation or lack of commitment by African leaders.

However, others like Heidhues and Obare (2011) posited that the primary issue lies with the limited capacity and capability of SAPs to promote market and institutional development in Africa effectively. This demonstrates the importance of considering cultural, economic, and political factors when implementing development programs in different regions. The governance of the Bretton Woods Institutions is also a matter of significant concern due to the persistent

power imbalances between the global North and South. The legacy of colonialism has resulted in developed nations having a disproportionate influence on international trade and finance policies, often prioritizing their interests at the expense of developing nations.

The World Bank and IMF's governance structure is flawed and undemocratic, with limited representation for developing nations in decision-making. Despite reforms, leadership positions are still appointed by the U.S. and Europe, and voting power is heavily skewed in favor of developed nations, particularly the U.S. and E.U. The global South, which makes up 75% of the world's population, has a minority of voting power, with disparities in allocation, and the average person in the North has more power than the average person in the South. These institutions also perpetuate racial prejudice, exacerbating power imbalances and inequalities in the global economy. Jason Hickel (2020) affirms:

> The votes of people of color are worth only a fraction of their counterparts, which is considered normal. In some cases, the differences between countries are particularly striking. Take Bangladesh and Nigeria, both of which were British colonies. In the IMF, a British person's vote today is worth 41 times more than a Bangladeshi's vote and 23 times more than a Nigerian's vote. Voting power in the World Bank is allocated according to each country's financial shares. In the IMF, it is primarily according to gross domestic product (GDP), with some consideration also given to a country's "market openness". As a result, the countries that became rich during the colonial period now enjoy extreme power when determining the rules of the global economy.

While some may defend the unequal power distribution in these institutions as appropriate for larger economies to have more control over global economic decisions, it contradicts the principles and values of the World Bank and IMF, which purport to promote democracy. This is why these organizations have been able to implement harmful neoliberal structural adjustment programs in the global South, benefiting multinational corporations and Western investors at the expense of the South. Despite calls from civil society and political leaders in the global South to democratize the World Bank and IMF through implementing a Double Majority, where significant decisions would require both shareholder and member-state majority, these calls have been ignored (Hickel, 2020). The World Bank and IMF have also violated their rules by supporting dictatorships for their political and economic interests. For example, in 1982, an IMF official, Erwin Blumenthal, wrote a report on Mobutu's administration in Zaire, warning foreign lenders of non-repayment as long as Mobutu was in power. Despite the Zairean government

borrowing 5 billion dollars and having 2.25 billion dollars in debt subject to four Paris Club rescheduling measures between 1976 and 1981, the IMF and WB continued to provide aid, even increasing it, despite Mobutu's gross economic mismanagement and misuse of loans. During the Cold War, Mobutu's regime was a strategic ally of the U.S. and other powerful countries in the Bretton Woods Institutions. In the 1990s, World Bank aid declined because Mobutu's regime was no longer considered valuable (Bretton Woods Project, 2020).

Media and Literature

Media and literature serve as prominent sources of socialization in contemporary society, having the ability to shape and influence people's perceptions and interpretations. When used effectively, they can contribute to forming harmonious relationships within society. However, when misused, they have the potential to distort public images and contribute to societal dysfunction. During colonialism, colonial agents such as missionaries, merchants, and administrators spread negative ideas and images about Africa. Currently, this is perpetuated through media and literature, with Western news agencies and international cable networks dedicating a significant proportion of their coverage to developing countries, particularly Africa. Through such coverage and literature, Africa is often portrayed as a homogenous entity plagued by war, human rights violations, corruption, disease, poverty, and violence, with no history or culture, as a wild jungle, and a place suffering from hunger and starvation (Michira, 2002).

The negative perception and stereotypes of Africa are rooted in its historical association with slavery and colonialism, which positioned Africa and Africans as culturally, intellectually, politically, and technologically inferior. The Western journalists, editors, and academics who write about Africa often perpetuate these ideas, viewing Western cultures as superior to those of developing nations. Nana Bonsu (2008) argues that "Western media often employ a generic label of Africans when reporting about events involving individuals from African countries, such as Ghana and Senegal, while accurately identifying citizens of Italy or Portugal as such." Furthermore, African news is frequently overshadowed by negative events, with Ama Biney (1997) noting that misinformation about Africa has become prevalent in the West. The Western media often uses metaphors and euphemisms, such as "black-on-black violence," when writing about events in Africa while failing to employ similar language when reporting on similar events in Western countries.

The media serves as a neocolonial tool that selectively reports on Africa, emphasizing crises and neglecting African progress, advancements, and contributions to the global community. The principles of journalism, including objectivity, accountability, credibility, fairness, and impartiality, have been compromised. Western media often portrays Africa, a continent with over 10,000 ethnic groups, 2,000 languages, and 54 countries, as a single country and presents a skewed image of Africa as a failed, unstable, economically underdeveloped, famine-stricken, disease-ridden, and culturally primitive continent. Western media coverage fails to address the historical context and the West's role in contributing to Africa's underdevelopment. In reality, Africa plays a vital role in global economic growth and development, producing over 20% of the world's petroleum, 50% of diamonds and gold, more than 50% of cocoa and palm products, and the computer chips driving the high-tech economy (Hawak, 1992; Olujobi, 2006). Supporting the above view, Rod Chavis (1998) writes:

> The media portrays a negative image of Africa, focusing on its problems and ignoring its contributions and significance to the world. This perpetuates the belief that Africa is an inferior and underdeveloped continent. The media also fails to acknowledge the importance of African resources to industrialized nations and the profits generated from the exploitation of African art and culture. The media is primarily controlled by Western corporations whose primary motivation is profit, leading to a skewed representation of Africa in the global community. The lack of recognition of African achievements and the exploitation of African resources further perpetuates this negative image.

Paul Johnson's statement in the New York Times Magazine in 1993 about the revival of colonialism in a new form being encouraged on practical and moral grounds, particularly in Africa where governments are breaking down, is a refined colonial viewpoint that conceals the reality of the situation in Africa. While Africa had and still has corrupt and incompetent leaders, this viewpoint ignores the underlying causes of the African states' disintegration, which is the West colluding with corrupt African elites to bleed African economies through Western-imposed neo-liberal economic reforms. Rod Chavis (1998) writes, "There are very good reasons for concealing reality since the maintenance of the existing domestic and international power structures are at stake." For instance, the U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1992 had a hidden purpose, contrary to the media portrayal of a neutral humanitarian mission. Before the overthrow of the pro-US government led by Siad Barre in 1991, oil development rights were granted to U.S. companies Conoco, Amoco, Chevron, and Philips by Barre's regime. These companies

stood to profit from vast oil reserves, but the media ignored this aspect during the crisis (Amy, 1997).

The New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) initiative by UNESCO in the 1970s aimed to address the unequal distribution of communication resources that favored industrialized nations, the imbalance in the flow of information from North to South, and the monopoly of transnational corporations was countered and sabotaged by the industrialized North (especially U.S., U.K., and Singapore) who withdrew their membership from UNESCO, causing a major reduction in its budget as they were its main funders, and ultimately ending the NWICO debate (iResearchNet, 2019). The Western Media has devoted a lot of its resources and energy toward painting the continent of Africa in a bad light. The fact is that Africa is presented as a failed and poor continent that needs aid and development assistance by the West and its allies around the world to mask their excessive exploitation and economic interest in African resources on which they depend for their development and economic growth.

Effects of Neocolonialism on Africa's Development

Pseudo-Sovereignty

Since African countries gained independence, none have experienced true or empirical sovereignty. Although they have the legal status of international sovereignty (i.e., juridical sovereignty), their economies and political systems are controlled by outside powers from the Global North through aid and development assistance. Ishwor Thapa (2020) affirms that states under the influence of neocolonialism are, in theory, independent and have all the recognized legal features of international sovereignty. However, in reality, their economic and political systems and policies are manipulated and directed from outside. Some scholars like Brown (2013) dispute the idea that foreign powers are taking away Africa's sovereignty, claiming that the aid relationship does not challenge the right of African states to govern. While this may be factitious, the contention is that African leaders are always placed in a dilemma or difficult position where they have to make decisions that benefit foreign interests over their citizens, resulting in the denial of true sovereignty.

Countries like France still hold control over former colonies through forced colonial pacts, with leaders who refuse being punished while those who comply are rewarded. This results in African

independence being nominal and an illusion. Mark (2018) writes, "Critical scholars argue that external elements denude genuine, empirical or de facto sovereignty. While legal sovereignty is certainly present, African elites and political leaders regularly find themselves in a 'catch twenty-two' where they are often forced or compelled to capitulate genuinely decision-making to foreign benefactors or else to repudiate foreign aid and impose austerity on already impoverished peoples" (ibid., p. 210).

Corruption

Foreign aid is intended to improve the living conditions of the populace and strengthen its institutions and the rule of law, but the reverse is the case in Africa. It has incapacitated the African economy and has encouraged corruption among African leaders by creating an environment to misuse foreign aid for personal gain with no accountability. The weak governance system in Africa has also contributed to this. For example, strong institutions and effective systems are lacking to ensure that aid is being used for its intended purpose. This presents an opportunity for corrupt leaders to divert some of the funds for personal gain. In 2011, reports surfaced that a substantial amount of money intended for the Somali government and donated by Arab countries had gone missing. A subsequent investigation by the U.N. found that a large portion of development funds from 2009-2010 had been mishandled and that most of the funds held in the Somali Central Bank were taken for personal gain (Ibrahim, 2017). In Angola, the President's family and close associates have been accused of using their control over state-owned companies and banks to siphon off money from foreign aid and oil revenues (Krawczyk, 2020).

Commodity Trade Mispricing

The mispricing of commodities (i.e., oil, metals, plant proteins, grains, and more) in Africa is a significant economic issue, resulting in governments losing revenue and contributing to global trade imbalances. Multinational corporations and developed countries exploit natural resources in developing countries by paying low prices for resources and charging higher prices in developed countries, resulting in a transfer of wealth from developing countries to developed countries. This can occur through trade policies, which favor industries in developed countries and influence commodity prices in developing countries. Mispricing arrangements such as misinvoicing and offshore money transfers also contribute to the problem. African countries

affected by commodity mispricing include Ghana, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, South Africa, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad, and Benin (Irene & Elisabeth, 2022). Addressing this issue requires fair pricing mechanisms, preventing exploitation by corporations and developed countries, and efforts to prevent mispricing arrangements.

Overdependence and Debt Accumulation

African countries' budgets have been increasingly financed by foreign aid. Neocolonialism encourages overdependence and debt accumulation in Africa in several ways. One of the ways is through trade policies that favor developed countries and limit the ability of developing nations to develop their economies. This leads to a situation where developing nations are forced to rely on exports of raw materials to developed countries rather than developing their industries. According to the African Development Bank report, "Africa's dependence on exports of primary commodities has increased over the past few decades. In 1980, primary commodities accounted for around 60% of Africa's exports, while in 2017, they accounted for around 80%.

This suggests that African countries increasingly rely on exporting raw materials and crude minerals rather than developing their industries" (AFD quoted in UNDP, 2016, p. 10). Additionally, developed countries may also use their economic and political power to influence the policies of developing nations, leading to the implementation of economic policies that benefit industrialized countries at the expense of emerging nations. For instance, Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) require certain conditionalities from African countries as a criterion for receiving loans from international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). These programs often require countries to cut government spending, devalue their currencies, and open their economies to foreign investment, favoring foreign investors over domestic industries and over-reliance on exporting raw materials. Hence, since the resources are not used to develop the African economy, the African governments depend on borrowing to finance their development projects. This leads to a situation where developing nations cannot sustain their economies and become heavily dependent on foreign aid and loans.

This dependence on foreign aid and loans can lead to a cycle of debt, as developing nations are forced to borrow money to meet their basic needs. A report from UNCTAD (2019) shows that

Africa has the highest level of external debt as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product of any region in the world. In 2019, Africa's average external debt as a percentage of GDP was around forty-five percent (45%).

Environmental Degradation

Neocolonialism facilitates environmental degradation through the over-exploitation of resources in Africa for the advantage of the developed nations. Over-exploitation leads to the depletion of resources, loss of biodiversity, and damage to ecosystems. For instance, in Angola and Nigeria, foreign oil companies have been extracting oil for decades, leading to air, water, and soil pollution, as well as harm to wildlife and the destruction of habitats (Baumüller et al., 2011). Additionally, neocolonial economic policies prioritize economic growth over environmental protection, leading to pollution and other environmental hazards. Furthermore, neocolonial power structures can limit the ability of colonized peoples to advocate for and protect their land and other natural resources, leading to their degradation. In Ethiopia, foreign companies are leasing large areas of land for commercial agriculture, displacing local communities and destroying natural habitats (Asebe, 2020).

The Collapse of Indigenous Industries and Investment

Multinational corporations in Africa use their economic and political power to exploit resources and labor for profit, often at the expense of local industries. This results in the collapse of many indigenous industries, loss of jobs, and marginalization of local entrepreneurs. MNCs engage in practices such as dumping, receiving subsidies, dominating supply chains, and influencing regulations, further undermining local industries. They also extract natural resources without properly compensating local communities or considering environmental impacts, further damaging the viability of local industries.

Cultural Homogenization and Forced Assimilation

Neocolonialism caused cultural homogenization and forced assimilation, where developed countries impose their culture on less developed countries through various means such as trade agreements, foreign aid, and media. This results in losing traditional cultures, values, and feelings of alienation and inferiority. In Africa, Western fashion, beauty standards, and education systems have been imposed on traditional societies, leading to the devaluation of local cultures and languages and alienation among students.

Human Rights Violation and Abuse

Neocolonialism has also resulted in the abuse of human rights or human rights violations. Developed and imperialist nations have employed their economic power to exploit the resources of less developed African countries, leading to poverty and a lack of access to necessities for the local population. For instance, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), foreign companies have exploited the country's vast mineral resources, such as cobalt and coltan, without adequately compensating the local population. This has led to widespread poverty and human rights abuses, including forced and child labor (Ida, 2022). Additionally, powerful Northern countries have employed their political influence to support oppressive governments in less powerful countries, leading to human rights abuses such as political repression and violence against political opponents. In the 1960s, the United States supported the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko in the DRC, despite his widespread human rights abuses because he was seen as a bulwark against communism. This support helped to prop up his regime for decades, leading to widespread human rights abuses and economic collapse (Stephen, 2014).

Conclusion

This article explores the phenomenon of neocolonialism in contemporary Africa and its impact on the continent's development. The article argues that despite the end of formal colonialism in Africa, outside forces continue to control many African nations through economic and political means, perpetuating poverty and inequality.

The control of Africa's natural resources by foreign powers has had significant negative effects on the continent's progress, leading to the depletion of resources and environmental degradation. Additionally, the manipulation of African economies through foreign aid and loans has resulted in a lack of economic growth and development. Moreover, the erosion of Africa's agricultural and industrial sectors by trade policies that benefit industrialized countries has further hindered its economic development. The legacy of colonialism has also significantly impacted Africa's social, cultural, and political development, suppressing indigenous languages, cultures, and traditions and leading to a lack of representation and accountability in political systems imposed by the colonizers. Despite these obstacles, there have been some successes in development in certain regions of Africa, indicating the potential for sustainable and equitable growth with the

right policies and support. The article argues for recognizing and addressing neocolonial practices that hinder Africa's development by ending the exploitation of its resources and supporting policies that promote fair trade and debt relief. Additionally, African nations must be empowered to take control of their resources and economies to achieve sustainable and equitable growth.

Recommendations

Planned Development

To achieve sustainable economic growth and empirical sovereignty in Africa, there should be intentionally planned development led by African governments and communities. This involves conducting research, developing strategic plans, and implementing and monitoring progress over time. Indigenous knowledge and technology can significantly promote sustainable development and prevent neocolonialism by addressing specific local needs and challenges in a culturally appropriate and sustainable way. Traditional agricultural practices and water management techniques can improve soil health, increase crop yields, conserve water, and protect the environment.

Regional and Continental Integration

Regional and continental integration in Africa can prevent neocolonialism, increase self-sufficiency, and improve development by creating a larger market for African goods and services, facilitating the sharing of resources and expertise, and improving infrastructure development. This can lead to increased trade, investment, and reduced business costs in Africa.

Selective Import Substitution Industrialization

Selective import substitution industrialization is an economic policy that aims to promote domestic production and consumption of goods and limit the importation of certain goods. This can potentially prevent neocolonialism and boost economic development in Africa. Protection of domestic industries through policies like import tariffs or subsidies can reduce dependence on foreign companies and promote economic autonomy. Additionally, promoting domestic production can reduce outflows of resources and capital and keep wealth within the country, promoting sustainable development.

Economic Diversification

Economic diversification in Africa involves reducing reliance on a single commodity or industry by developing new industries such as technology, renewable energy, and tourism and promoting investments in a wider range of sectors. Successful examples include Kenya, Rwanda, and South Africa's technology industry, Morocco and South Africa's investment in renewable energy, and Egypt, South Africa, and Tanzania's thriving tourism industry. Diversifying exports can also increase the resilience of African economies to fluctuations in international or global commodity prices.

Afrocentric Education

Afrocentric education is an approach that emphasizes the perspectives and experiences of African people and aims to challenge Eurocentric biases in traditional education systems. It involves including more African-centered content in the curriculum, using African-centered teaching methods, and promoting a sense of self-worth and pride in African heritage among students. This approach seeks to empower students to become agents of change in their communities and is intended to supplement and complement traditional education systems rather than replace them.

Selective Foreign Direct Investment (SFDI)

Selective foreign direct investment targets specific sectors or regions that align with the host country's needs and priorities. It aims to promote sustainable and responsible business practices, skills transfer, and technology transfer to support the host country's economic and social development.

African governments should implement policies and regulations that attract FDI in infrastructure, renewable energy, education, agriculture, health care, and rural development. Selective FDI is often characterized by a strong emphasis on sustainable and responsible business practices, skills transfer, and technology transfer to prevent neocolonialism and promote economic growth and development.

Attaining Self-Reliance in Basic Needs

Attaining self-reliance in basic needs such as defense, food security, water, and energy can benefit Africa in several ways. Countries like Kenya, South Africa, and Senegal have invested in renewable energy and implemented policies to reduce dependence on fossil fuels. Morocco and

Egypt have implemented policies to increase water efficiency and reduce dependence on external water sources. Ethiopia, Malawi, and Rwanda have implemented policies to increase domestic food production and reduce import dependence. Self-reliance in these areas can help Africa become more independent, self-sufficient, and resilient, which are critical steps toward overcoming the legacy of neocolonialism in Africa.

People-Centered Governance

People-centered governance prioritizes the needs and well-being of citizens, particularly marginalized and underrepresented groups. It seeks to address unique challenges African countries face, such as poverty, inequality, and underdevelopment. It involves transparent and accountable government, citizen participation in decision-making, policies that promote inclusive economic growth, and addressing root causes of poverty and inequality. People-centered governance also considers the historical legacy of colonialism and neocolonialism and seeks to empower citizens and communities to take control of their development. The goal is to create more equitable and sustainable development outcomes for all citizens by ensuring their voices are heard and their needs are met in decision-making.

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A Comparative Analysis of Collaborative Natural Resource Governance in Two Protected Areas in Zambia

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Abstract

In Zambia, early models of natural resource governance were based on state-centric approaches to conservation and later, to some degree, based on Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) models. Both of the models delivered poorly in terms of improved biodiversity management, enhanced rural livelihoods, and rights-based benefits. A lack of productive dialogue, involvement, and participation of local communities in natural resource governance resulted in considerable conflicts between protected area managers and local communities, with substantial local political and socio-economic costs. Through a mixed-methods approach using a questionnaire, focus group discussions, and key informant interviews, the Environmental Governance Systems (EGS) framework was applied to compare how interactions among political, economic, and civil society actors influence resource use and the state of resources in the state-led Kaingu chiefdom and the community-managed Kaindu Community Conservancy. Results show limited communication, cooperation, and coordination among the actors in both cases. Conflicting interests over the use of land, wildlife, forests, and fisheries among actors have led to strained relationships, limited interactions, and many negative outcomes in both cases. Both protected areas exhibit a top-down structure of natural resources governance with limited community participation, conflictual relationships among actors, corruption, lack of transparency, and low accountability. The CBNRM structures and processes need to be changed legislatively to improve local ownership and a sense of responsibility and legitimacy by restructuring the constitutions of CBNRM organizations and developing their human resource, financial, and logistical capacities. The study proposes a proactive transformative model for mitigating negative impacts on the state of resources and resource use.

Keywords: *Environmental Governance, Interactions, Participation, Conservation*

Introduction

There is no single accepted definition of "governance", but as a concept, it can be described as the structures and process of how power and authority are established, exercised, and distributed, how decisions are made, and to what extent citizens participate in decision-making processes (Wingqvist *et al*., 2012). The quality of governance determines the quality of its outcomes, i.e., good governance and bad governance can be distinguished based on the outcomes they produce.

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Good governance ensures inclusive participation of all stakeholders, aims to make governing institutions more effective, responsive, and accountable, and respects the rule of law (Wingqvist *et al*., 2012). By contrast, bad governance is characterized by an acrimonious relationship between those who govern and those being governed due to inequitable decision-making, violation of accepted norms of liberal democracy, and unfair economic policies (Rose & Peiffer, 2019).

The governance of natural resources in protected areas can be termed as being good or bad based on the conservation and socio-economic outcomes. Natural resources governance (NRG), a subset of environmental governance, consists of the rules, practices, policies, and other institutions and organizations that shape how humans interact with the environment (water, soil, physical properties, and interrelationships that exist between them and humans and other living organisms) (Haque, 2017). Good environmental governance links and harmonizes policies, institutions, procedures, and information to allow equitable participation among public, private, civil society, and community actors in managing conflicts, establishing consensus, fundamental decision-making, and ensuring accountability for actions taken (Haque, 2017).

Table 1: The IUCN Governance types for protected areas (Borrini-Feyerabend *et al*., 2013)

Governance types	Sub-types
Type A. Governance by government	• Federal or national ministry or agency in charge • Sub-national ministry or agency in charge (e.g., at regional, provincial, municipal level) • Government-delegated management (e.g., to an NGO)
Type B. Shared governance	• Transboundary governance (formal arrangements between one or more sovereign states or territories) • Collaborative governance (through various ways in which diverse actors and institutions work together) • Joint governance (pluralist board or other multi-party governing body)
Type C. Private governance	• Conserved areas established and run by: - individual landowners - non-profit organizations (e.g., NGOs, universities) - for-profit organizations (e.g., corporate owners, cooperatives)
Type D. Governance by indigenous peoples and local communities	• Indigenous peoples' conserved territories and areas – established and run by indigenous peoples • Community-conserved areas and territories – established and run by local communities

In the context of this study, environmental governance takes place in protected areas, which are defined as "*clearly defined geographical spaces recognized, dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective means to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural value"* (Dudley, 2008). Good environmental governance is thus important because it can improve the implementation of environmental legislation and other environmental measures, is needed to manage large flows of environmental and climate change finance, and ensures access to information and public participation (Wingqvist *et al*., 2012). It has the greatest potential to affect coverage, is the main factor that enhances the effectiveness and efficiency of management, determines the appropriateness and equity of decisions, and can ensure that protected areas are better embedded in society (Borrini-Feyerabend *et al*., 2013). The IUCN classified the governance of protected areas into four different types (Table 1). From the descriptions of governance above and the classification by IUCN, it is evident that governance involves the interactions of actor organizations and, at its core, exchanges between human beings.

Most of the state-centric NRG systems in Africa are premised on the 'fortress conservation approach' (Hutton *et al*., 2005). This type of governance seeks to preserve common-pool resources, such as wildlife and their habitat, through the forceful exclusion of local people who have traditionally relied on the environment in their quest for livelihood outcomes (Brockington, 2002; Lunstrum, 2016). The fortress conservation approach has been critiqued for its failure to deliver well on biodiversity management and even less on livelihoods and rights-based benefits (Vedeld *et al.*, 2012). Many cases where there is a lack of compensatory measures for local people living close to protected areas and who experience the high costs of wildlife raiding, loss of crops, livestock, and land, and reduced access to various natural resources have been reported. The fortress conservation approach also suffers from a general lack of real and productive dialogue, involvement, and participation of local communities. The resultant effects involve considerable conflicts between authorities and local communities, with substantial local political, economic, and social costs (Vedeld *et al*., 2012).

To achieve enhanced environmental sustainability and improved governance, several variants of Community-Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) programs have been tested by developing countries, especially in southern Africa (Cocks *et al*., 2001). The creation or restoration of local resources' proprietorship to local people, devolution of choices and

management to people who live with the resources, the internalization of resource costs and benefits, and the removal of market failures were principal elements of CBNRM (Child & Barnes, 2010). Despite theoretically sound principles, CBNRM initiatives experienced more failures than successes. This was due to heavy resistance to the approach from various economic and political actors, partly revealing different economic and political interests, dissimilar perceptions of rights and duties, and, generally, that CBNRM had been introduced in areas with asymmetric power relations and complex landscapes of institutional layers or bricolage (Dressler *et al*., 2010; Cleaver, 2012).

Statement of the Problem

The governance of natural resources through the state-led system of CBNRM proved challenging due to the heavy top-down political structures, organizations, and institutions in Zambia. The power and responsibility for natural resource management is concentrated in a few strong and macro-oriented governance institutional structures and mechanisms (Bandyopadhyay & Tembo, 2010). This has constrained the inclusion of new actors and structures in governance, especially regarding local NRG and local communities (Child & Barnes, 2010). In Zambia, the principal ownership and control over wildlife, forests, and fisheries resources is not vested in the local communities but with the republican president, *res nullius* (GRZ, 2011; GRZ, 2015; GRZ, 2015b).

Weak legal mechanisms have failed to regulate the in-migration of non-local people attracted by the availability of land, firewood, timber, bushmeat, and fish in many protected areas (Luaba, 2021). Lindsey *et al*. (2014) report that the weakly enforced NRG policies are ineffective in preventing deforestation, habitat losses, and illegal settlements due to land clearing for agriculture and increased charcoal and fuel-wood production. The Department of National Parks and Wildlife (DNPW) in Zambia retains most of the income from consumptive tourism. It only remits 20% of the income from concession fees and 50% of animal trophy license fees to the communities through the Community Resource Boards (CRB) (Lindsey *et al*., 2014). Moreover, the payments are generally not transparent, remitted late, erratic, and presented and paid as hand-outs without showing local communities that these are compensation payments made for local

communities to accept losses of resource access and costs accrued by living close to the protected area (Lindsey *et al*., 2014).

Significance and Limitations of the Study

The significance of this study is that it proposes a solution to the challenges faced by both the state-led NRG system and the CBNRM. The challenges of both the fortress conservation approach and CBNRM, coupled with shifts in the distribution of power, knowledge, and resources in the global economy, have led to the emergence of new, and in many cases, more legitimate, participatory, and multi-actor environmental governance models (Newell *et al*., 2012; Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). Furthermore, the growth in power and influence of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has facilitated non-state actors' increased enrolment and cooperation in environmental governance (Tarrow, 2005). Agrawal and Lemos (2007) show that diverse actors, including the state, the market, and the community, have become legitimate and necessary players in managing a range of environmental resources.

Objectives of the Paper

The main objective of this paper is to formulate a transformative, collaborative, and multi-actor governance model for wildlife, forests, and fisheries resources in the Kaindu and Kaingu conservation areas of Zambia.

Specific Objectives:

- To determine how the patterns of interaction among actors in NRG could be improved to ensure positive conservation and livelihood outcomes.
- To determine the incentives for and against participation
- To ascertain what should be done to improve communication, cooperation, coordination and ease competition for natural resources
- To identify which actors should provide facilitative leadership in each case

Main Concepts and Theoretical Framework

The Environmental Governance Systems Framework



Figure 1: ***The Environmental Governance Systems Framework for Analysing Institutional Networks (Sourced with permission from: Vatn, 2015)***

Environmental governance concerns regulatory processes, mechanisms, and organizations through which political and other actors influence environmental actions and outcomes (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). It is, thus, not a function of the state as a single actor; otherwise, it would be referred to as government or an international law related to private standards or a formal civil regulation process (Newell *et al*., 2012). Traditional state-centric models of environmental governance often have an inadequate reach, low effectiveness, lack of legitimacy, and/or even the authority to solve complex global environmental problems because they fail to accommodate non-state actors (Newell *et al*., 2012). We apply the Environmental Governance Systems (EGS) framework (Figure 1), developed by Vatn (2015), to describe similarities and differences in the two cases as they relate to key components of NRG systems.

Participation Theory

The complex nature of environmental problems and their effects on multiple actors and agencies demand the incorporation of transparent stakeholder participation in environmental decision-making processes (Reed, 2008; Voinov & Bousquet, 2010; Vedeld, 2017). Participation

emphasizes the improvement of the legitimacy of public rule and ensures that policy objectives are met through the devolution of power and resources from the public to local governments and communities (Vedeld, 2017). Although not a panacea for all environmental problems, the participatory approach stimulates a "people-centered" development agenda (Burkey, 1993; Cleaver, 1999; Nussbaum, 2000). It is important to link participation to transforming the existing political, economic, and social structures (Samndong, 2017).

Participation and governance are inseparable components of social-ecological systems (SESs) because they relate to the content and distribution of power, resources, and influence through organizational and institutional structures and processes (Vedeld, 2017). At the local level, participation is intimately connected to the local governance of natural resources because it can empower local communities, transform governance structures, increase accountability, and ensure all stakeholders' inclusiveness in decision-making in the best cases (Samndong, 2017).

Lockwood *et al*. (2010) suggest that inclusive governance only occurs when all relevant stakeholders in the governance process can engage each other equitably and provide opportunities to participate in and influence the decision-making processes. There must be a high level of trust among actors to achieve inclusiveness. Trust facilitates collective action and provides legitimacy to public, private, and civil society institutions (Tsang *et al*., 2009).

Vatn (2015) notes that social interaction among actors in an SES is based on their direct communication, cooperation, coordination, and competition. *Communication* occurs when there is a sharing of meaning because of an exchange of information between individuals or institutions (Castells, 2009). However, actors must also be willing to *cooperate* to gain mutual benefits. Cooperation entails that the actors can self-organize and resolve any conflicts among them (Ostrom, 2009). Selfishness among actors can result in losses for some or all parties involved (Axelrod, 1997). This necessitates the need for coordination to achieve mutually favorable outcomes among stakeholders.

Coordination may ensure equity, effectiveness, and fairness in the decisions made. Hovmand (2014) explains that the lack of coordination is a larger determinant of the outcomes than the accuracy and alignment of problems with the "correct" technical solutions. Many rigorously thought-out scientific and technically sound solutions are often rejected due to a lack of consensus among stakeholders (Hovmand, 2014). The lack of consensus reflects different and

competing interests among stakeholders regarding natural resources and their management within SESs (Vedeld, 2020).

Ratner *et al*. (2018) showed that the *competition* for renewable resources, such as land and water, can cause significant conflicts among actors at the local level. They showed that social contexts characterized by intense competition for resources, high poverty levels, high dependence on natural resources for food security and livelihoods, and a limited ability of local stakeholders to influence decision-making processes and policies effectively can broaden social conflict if not addressed.

This study is anchored on the hypothesis that improved conservation and livelihood outcomes can be achieved if all the stakeholders (including the local communities) inclusively and equitably participate in the NRG process. In this paper, the participatory theory is applied to decipher the inclusiveness, communication, coordination, and competition processes that link the different components of the EGS framework. After that, the outcomes of the two NRG systems at the two study sites are compared and discussed based on the patterns of interaction among political, economic, and civil society actors as influenced by the attributes of environmental resources.



Figure 2: Theoretical Framework (Source: Authors)

Materials and Methods

A comparative research methodology with similar data collection and analysis methods was used to explore the NRG systems in the two case studies. The study sites were selected on the criteria that they are both under a CBNRM system of NRG. Kaingu is the archetypal protected area for state-centric NRGs in Zambia, while the Kaindu Community Conservancy (KCC) in Kaindu chiefdom is a novel model of NRG and one of the few community-owned protected areas in Zambia.

Study Areas



Figure 3: The locations of Kaingu (Namwala GMA) and Kaindu Community Conservancy (Source: Authors)



Figure 4: The Natural Resource Governance Models in Kaingu and Kaindu, Zambia (Source: Authors)

Kaingu

The Kaingu chiefdom is situated in the Namwala Game Management Area (GMA) in central south-western Zambia (Figure 3). It lies in the Itezhi-Tezhi district on the eastern border of the Kafue National Park (KNP). Mixed forests of Miombo and Mopane woodland are common habitats for various important wildlife species that include elephant (*Loxodonta africana*), buffalo (*Syncerus caffer*), and lion (*Panthera leo*) (DNPW, 2013). Lake Itezhi-Tezhi and the Kafue River are important fishery areas. Itezhi-Tezhi district has a population of about 90,000 (CSO, 2012). Kaingu is divided into seven Village Action Groups (VAGs), where most people are subsistence farmers involved in cattle rearing and growing maize, cassava, and groundnuts (ITTDC, 2015). Ila is the dominant ethnic group among a diversity of in-migrant ethnic groups (Lillehagen, 2016).

The local governance of natural resources is headed by the state in partnership with the traditional authority (the chief) through a typical top-down approach (Figure 4). Government departments, such as the DNPW, Forest Department (FD), and the Department of Fisheries (DoF), hold the overall formal power and decide on the objectives and what structures, processes, measures, and instruments should be applied to pursue the objectives. Each of these government departments has, over time, integrated some form of CBNRM within their structures (DNPW, 2018). They institute government policy receive, and distribute incomes from natural resources through a top-down approach from the central government to the communities *via* the Kaingu CRB.

Kaindu Community Conservancy (KCC)

The KCC is a community-owned protected area in the northeastern part of the Mumbwa district (Figure 3). It is a CBNRM joint venture between the Kaindu local community and a private outfitting company. The conservancy covers 13,900 hectares bordered by private farms (game and cattle ranches) and the Kafue River. The area is predominantly covered by Miombo, Termitaria, Riparian woodland, Baikiaea forest, and grassland (DNPW, 2013b). The conservancy is in prime habitats for prominent wildlife species, including elephants, buffalo, and lions. The human population of Kaindu stands at 15,477 individuals, who are mostly subsistence maize (*Zea mays*) and groundnut (*Arachis hypogaea*) farmers (TNC, 2015). Soya beans (*Glycine max*) and cotton (*Gossypium herbaceum*) are important cash crops in the area (TNC, 2015).

The Kaindu community and the outfitter earn incomes from hunting and photo tourism based on wildlife. An elected board of trustees, the Kaindu Natural Resources Trust (KNRT), manages the conservancy on behalf of the Kaindu community. The KNRT obtains hunting licenses from the DNPW and sells them to trophy hunters for a profit as a source of income. The KNRT board allocates the proceeds from hunting to five VAGs to implement community projects (TNC, 2015) (see Figure 4). The outfitter retains the earnings from lodging logistics and equipment. The KNRT also receives the state's financial, logistical, and material support through the DNPW and NGOs. The board and outfitter are also responsible for ensuring resource protection and working with the responsible government departments (Luaba, 2021).

Data Collection Protocols

The study applies a mixed-methods approach for triangulation and a simplified comparison of the two cases. The qualitative methods aimed to uncover the goals, actions, and interactions of the political actors, the preferences and actions of economic actors, and the values, actions, and interactions of civil society actors. The qualitative methods used were focus group discussions (FGDs), semi-structured key informant interviews (KIIs), and a questionnaire.

A total of 27 key informants (10 in the Kaingu and 17 in Kaindu) from the CRB, KNRT, traditional authorities, government departments, private companies, and NGOs were selected through a snowball sampling procedure. The FGDs were held with community members, including men, women, and youths in each VAG. Proportionate stratified sampling (using VAGs as strata) was used to select households in the survey. Data were obtained from 191 households in Kaingu and 290 in Kaindu.

The primary quantitative data were collected using a semi-structured questionnaire covering specific aspects of the CBNRM system in each case. Free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) was sought from key informants and heads of households (>18 years old). The questionnaire was programmed onto the Open Data Kit® (ODK) platform and administered using tablet computers that stored data on a password-protected server.

Results, Analysis and Discussion

The qualitative data generated from this study were analyzed using thematic content analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 20 was used to analyze the quantitative data. Descriptive statistics were used to describe community members' general attitudes towards participation in the CBNRM arrangement.

Results and Analysis

Environmental Resources, Processes, and Their Attributes

Table 2: A comparison of the status of environmental resources in Kaingu and Kaindu, in Mumbwa and Itezhi-Tezhi Districts, respectively Zambia, 2016

Case study	Kaingu	Kaindu
Environmental resource	**Conditions and trends of natural resource**	
Land	• Relatively clear and undisputed geographical boundaries • Community restricted to the development zone of GMA	• Unclear disputed boundaries • Reducing land area
Wildlife	• Increased poaching • Reducing wildlife stocks	• Reduced poaching • Increasing wildlife stocks
Forests	• High deforestation rates	• High deforestation rates
Fisheries	• Declining fish stocks	• Declining fish stocks

The results revealed both differences and similarities in the stocks and flows of wildlife, forests, and fisheries. Table 2 compares some key characteristics of environmental resources in the two study areas.

Political Actors

Four of the six FGDs in Kaingu regarded the government departments as the overall authority because the chief was also subject to statutory law. The other two FGDs concluded that the chief was the most influential actor because his officials (unlike the government officers) were permanently based in their locality. In Kaindu, two of the five FGDs regarded the chief as the most powerful actor, as he was the *de facto* head of NRG. One FGD ascribed the greatest influence to the economic actors (*i.e.*, the surrounding private game ranchers). Key informants reported that government departments are the *de jure* actors overall responsible for achieving resource conservation goals, sustainable utilization of natural resources, and rural development by enforcing policy - in both cases. The DNPW informant stated the following:

> "*We as the DNPW are mandated by the Zambia Wildlife Act to manage wildlife in partnership with the local community. We work with the CRBs to manage the wildlife."*

Economic Actors

There is a difference in the perception of economic actors in the two cases. The private safari companies in Kaingu were third-level actors in terms of influence but regarded as the top level of

influence, equal to the state and the chief in Kaindu. The main professional economic actors in Kaingu were private hunting and tour operators. In Kaindu, the KNRT and its outfitting partner utilized for profit the wildlife resources that migrate from KNP to the KCC in cooperation with adjoining private game ranchers.

Ordinary community members in both cases were informal, small-scale but rather extensive economic actors deriving profits from the sale of charcoal and fish, while others engaged in illegal wildlife poaching for trophies and meat. Local people claimed that the private companies were overstepping their authority by restricting the communities' access to resources. The local communities' interests were mainly related to the subsistence use of these resources in both cases, but without clear customary rules and boundaries, this descended into resource degradation and vandalism. The private tour operators attribute resource and habitat destruction to community members, creating animosity between the two actor groups. The safari companies in Kaingu and the outfitter in Kaindu have both formed a Resource Protection Unit (RPU) to supplement the efforts of government departments.

Civil Society Actors

Civil society actors in Kaingu included several international NGOs addressing environmental degradation challenges, including wildlife poaching, deforestation, soil erosion, and habitat destruction. In both cases, NGOs cooperated with the government, traditional authorities, and private actors to achieve their objectives. In many ways, the harmonization of actors' different interests had not been attained.

Patterns of Interaction

Communication

All FGDs asserted that government departments, chiefs, the Kaingu CRB, and the KNRT do not in any way consult the communities when developing plans, setting goals, and making decisions about managing natural resources.

In both case studies, discussants stated that decisions were imposed on them through a "biased, corrupt, and dictatorial process". The results from the FGDs were corroborated by the household survey in which 93% of respondents in Kaindu did not know when the last AGM was held. This

figure was significantly lower in Kaingu (*i.e.* 48%), (χ^2 = 92.708, df = 1, p<0.001). Little information regarding key aspects of NRG, e.g., finances, wildlife value, and use, was provided to the communities in the preceding year.

Cooperation



Figure 5: Cooperation between community and their CBNRM agents in Kaingu and Kaindu, 2016 Zambia

There were low levels of cooperation between the community and their agents for CBNRM in the two study sites (Figure 5). Cooperation was measured *via* the community participation level according to the CBNRM guidelines in Kaingu and the KNRT constitution in Kaindu. The CRB in Kaingu explained the CBNRM guidelines to significantly more households than the KNRT had in Kaindu (χ^2 = 34.785, df = 1, p<0.001). Additionally, more respondents in Kaingu indicated that they had been consulted during the constitution-building process (χ^2 = 15.320, df = 1, p<0.001).

Table 3: Conflictual issues between different actors in Kaingu and Kaindu, Zambia, 2016

Conflict type Case study	Community *vs.* government departments	Community *vs.* traditional leaders	Community *vs.* private safari companies
Kaingu	• Restrictions on subsistence hunting, forestry and fishing • *De jure* intent in resource conservation does not match *de facto* action/scenario • Expensive licences for access	• Dictatorial decision-making • Elite capture of benefits	• Abrogating terms of contract agreements with CRB • Prevent access to resources • Safari companies

	to natural resources • No compensation for damage caused by wildlife (human-wildlife conflict) • Elite capture of benefits by members of CRB • Low revenue from the CBNRM system led by DNPW through the CRB.		only offer casual employment as opposed to permanent jobs, as agreed with the community through CRB.
Kaindu	• Restrictions on subsistence hunting, forestry and fishing • *De jure* intent does not match *de facto* action/scenario • Expensive licences for access to natural resources • No compensation for damage caused by wildlife (Human-wildlife conflict) • Elite capture of benefits by KNRT board • Low revenue from the CBNRM system led by the KNRT	• Selling of community land and its associated resources to investors • Dictatorial overturning of communal decisions • Elite capture of benefits	• Abrogating terms of contract agreements with KNRT • Prevent access to resources • The outfitter only offers casual employment as opposed to permanent jobs as agreed with the community through KNRT.



Figure 6: The Quality of Management of CBNRM in Kaingu and Kaindu, Zambia 2016

While a majority (63%) of the respondents in Kaingu indicated that they trusted the CRB with their financial accounts (Figure 7), most of the household heads in Kaindu (96.4%) thought that

the KNRT board did not manage their interests appropriately and did not properly account for the finances (Figure 6). There was thus a significant difference between the attitudes in Kaindu and those in Kaingu (χ^2 = 81.436, df = 5, p<0.001) and (χ^2 = 55.850 df = 4, p<0.001) respectively. Table 3 shows the conflict relations between the different actors identified by FGDs in the two cases. Despite the conflicts in Kaingu almost mirroring those in Kaindu, the Kaingu community's attitudes towards the CRB were significantly different (χ^2 = 146.408, df = 4, p<0.001).



Figure 7: Levels of trust by the community towards their CBNRM boards, Kaingu and Kaindu, Zambia 2016

Most of the local community in Kaindu did not trust the KNRT to handle their finances (Figure 6). In contrast to the local community in Kaingu, the Kaindu community indicated that the chief, acting together with the KNRT, had sold portions of land to commercial farmers without consulting or even informing them.

Coordination

All FGDs in the two case studies concluded that there was a lack of equity, effectiveness, and fairness in the decisions made in their respective NRG systems. The key informant interviews revealed many, often different, and even opposing opinions among the actors. In both cases, the traditional authority and local government considered their decisions in the community equitable, effective, and fair, while the local community did not. The FD and DoF in Kaindu indicated that limited community engagement on their part hindered equitable decision-making. The FD and

DoF informants emphasized that the lack of financial and logistical resources constrained coordination with the community and other actors. The key informant from DoF stated that:

> *"The fisheries department will go to the community and say this, forestry will go and say that, and wildlife will also go and say something else. The tour operators also have their own way. Each one is pulling the same community in different directions".*

Competition

In the two areas, the different types of interests towards wildlife, forests, and fisheries among the actors caused competing actions and land uses. All the FGD participants were small-scale farmers. Most of the household heads in Kaindu (88%) and Kaingu (76%) indicated they had harvested between one and 30 hectares of maize in the preceding farming season. In both cases, there were reports of elephants and buffaloes destroying maize fields, leading to hunger and poverty for some households. Human-wildlife conflicts contribute to the communities' hostile attitude toward wildlife, especially since no compensation exists.

The state, private safari companies, and NGOs had different attitudes towards wildlife regarding trade-offs between conservation and sustainable use. The primary interest of the outfitter in Kaindu and the safari companies in Kaingu was to resuscitate and conserve the wildlife estate for tourism. In Kaindu, both the outfitting company and the community attributed most of the problems of NRG to poor leadership by the chief and his headmen and headwomen. The manager of the outfitting company stated the following:

> *"The communities are having problems with the chief and some headmen here. For instance, despite this being an environmental area, the chief is given and is receiving money from a miner to come here, although the Ministry of Lands-Trust document forbids such activities".*

Outcomes: Resource Use and the State of the Resource

Land Ownership and Alienation

The land use regime in Kaingu was both customary land and state-owned land in protected areas. Thus, the chief could not demarcate and sell any of this land. He can, however, allocate land to

prospective settlers in the development zone of the GMA. The 'open area' status of the land in Kaindu gave the chief more flexibility regarding rights and sales transactions. However, the FGDs reported that they were unaware of the land alienation processes that *de facto* are taking place. Thus, the local governance structure embedded in the CBNRM model in the KCC seemed to exclude ordinary members of the local community from taking part in decisions to sell and share the benefits from sales of land and other resources, such as wildlife.

Wildlife Stocks and Flows

There was a difference in community members' perceptions regarding wildlife abundance (χ^2 = 159.848, df = 4, $p<0.001$) in the two protected areas. About 30% of respondents in Kaingu indicated a decline in the numbers and species of wildlife despite the reportedly competent wildlife management system by DNPW. In Kaindu, most respondents (63%) perceived an increase in wildlife, as seen by the increasing incidences of elephant crop-raiding and an effective anti-poaching program that had boosted wildlife stocks. The local people in Kaingu reported a higher occurrence of poaching than in the KCC (χ^2 = 45.573, df = 3, $p<0.001$). As such, the two cases differed regarding wildlife, with the state-controlled protected area (Kaingu) reportedly having had less wildlife raiding than the communally owned KCC.

Forest Abundance and Flows

In both areas, the community members perceived the number of trees declining over the last 12 months (61% in Kaingu and 71% in the Kaindu community). According to the Global Forest Watch (2022), the average deforestation rates for the Itezhi-Tezhi and Mumbwa districts were 1.06% and 0.50% between 2015 and 2021, respectively.

Increased illegal logging and poor protection of trees were the main reasons for a perceived decline in tree abundance in both cases. The scope of illegal logging in the area yielded different perceptions for the two areas, with higher reported deforestation in Kaingu than in the communal Kaindu (χ^2 = 57.853, df = 3, $p<0.001$). Both communities indicated a declining trend in the status of non-timber forest products (NTFPs), *i.e.*, mushrooms, honey, and edible tubers.

Fish Stocks and Flows

The communities in Kaingu reported a higher rate of decline of fish stocks than the decline reported from Kaindu (χ^2 = 10.618, df = 3, $p<0.001$). Both communities attributed the drop in

fish catches to increased fishing efforts (number of fishers), which resulted in overfishing. This could also be observed in the lower availability of fish in the markets, higher demand, and increasing fish prices. Similar results were found in all categories of food fish species. A significantly higher occurrence of illegal fishing was reported in Kaingu than in the KCC (χ^2 = 35.517, df = 3, $p<0.001$).

Discussion

Environmental resources, processes, and attributes

Land

The more distinct geographical boundaries in Kaingu were due to the formal processes of separating human settlements from wildlife habitats that were explicitly carried out at the establishment of Namwala GMA in 1972 (DPNW, 2013a). These boundaries were generally recognized and adhered to by actors, albeit with the exceptions of illegal encroachment on protected land and poaching. In Kaindu, the relatively small size of the chiefdom and conservancy and unclear boundaries, coupled with an increasing human population, had increased the demand for land and added more pressure to the local natural resources and their management.

Attributes of Wildlife Stocks

The community in Kaingu reported increased poaching based on the reduced stocks of wildlife. In Kaindu, the community reported contrasting results of reduced poaching and increased wildlife stocks. The NRG structures and processes in Kaingu were more bureaucratic and rigid because of their state-centric nature. The lack of a sense of ownership among community members may explain the higher rate of poaching in Kaingu compared to Kaindu, where the chain of command is shorter and headed by a community-owned organization, the KNRT, which has financial incentives for conserving the wildlife stocks.

Attributes of Forest and Fish Stocks

High rates of deforestation and overfishing were reported in both areas. Deforestation is related to land clearing for agriculture. Overfishing is linked to increasing demand for fish and increased

harvesting efforts. The FD and DoF with their associates, try to regulate charcoal production and the excessive harvesting of NTFPs in both areas. The KNRT-outfitter partnership in Kaindu has prioritized wildlife conservation and consumptive tourism over forest and fishery conservation due to the higher profits in those activities.

Interactions of the Political, Economic, and Civil Society Actors with the Environmental Resources

In both cases, there was a passive community participation profile in planning and decision-making as stipulated by Vedeld (2017), as local communities are mostly told what will happen or what has happened without involving the communities. This policy adversely affected the patterns of interaction between the government departments, private safari companies, and the local community. The passive community participation generated hostility and mistrust between the community on the one side and the government departments and safari companies on the other. Various co-management projects initiated by local government agencies, such as market stalls and boreholes for water, did not persist because of the communities' limited or total lack of involvement and participation.

The Kaingu community had neutral or indifferent attitudes towards DNPW staff. This may be attributed to the more formal zonation of Namwala GMA, unlike in Kaindu, where the boundary between the protected area (the KCC) and the rest of the chiefdom – was quite unclear and had not been created through a formal demarcation process. Vedeld (2017) asserted that the extent to which local communities were involved and the willingness and capabilities of the community to uphold what was introduced are crucial for the continuity of projects or institutional interventions. In the case of Kaingu, the community members were not part of the resource regime as they did not have the right to access, withdraw, manage, nor exclude others and thus alienate the resources (Ostrom, 2009b).

The disparity among VAGs as to who were the most influential actors may also indicate differential impacts of the powers held by political actors in different geographical locations. This also led to a patchy pattern of perceptions, attitudes, and, eventually, choices among community members. Consequently, the conflicts between economic actors and the communities increased, as was the KCC, where the local communities fished within the designated hunting grounds for aquatic trophy species, such as crocodiles and hippos. The situation was compounded by DoF's lack of effective monitoring and enforcement and led the private game

ranchers (including the outfitter) to enforce *ad hoc* regulations and action. Reports of local community abuse, corruption of local leaders, and violent confrontations among actors were rampant.

The main underlying cause of social conflicts in Zambia, as observed in Kaindu, was the land control and allocation process, which, according to Munshifwa (2018), is marred by inertia, confusion, and corruption. The state purposefully generated a situation of inertness by instituting an extremely slow land tenure reform process during the 1990s, which has also led to inconclusive land policy formulation processes whose drafts are constantly rejected by traditional leaders. Further, this inconclusiveness led to a 'tug-of-war' between the president and the traditional leaders over who should oversee land alienation. Inaction and confusion, coupled with different levels of transparency and accountability, have created an ideal environment for corruption (Munshifwa, 2018).

Some private safari companies in Kaingu took advantage of the situation and manipulated the rules, granting access to resources and interactions. In the Kaindu chiefdom, so-called investors offered various gifts with promises to traditional leaders to build schools and clinics in exchange for land (Mushinge & Mwando, 2016). Traditional leaders sold land to whomever they wanted without consulting the community as was formally required through the customary laws (Mbinji, 2012). In addition, Mushinge and Mwando (2016) show that corruption negatively impacted local customary land users by generating economic and social instability, enforced by undemocratic leadership structures and a lack of appropriate legislation.

Most local NGOs operated at the intersection of their interests and those of the political and economic actors, and as such, were also directly and indirectly affected by the corrupt decisions and actions taken. Thus, there was limited success, especially in anti-poaching, forest conservation, and fisheries conservation. Some members of the civil society in the recent past demonstrated against corruption in public institutions (Zambian Watchdog, 2018).

The Kaingu and Kaindu communities were not provided with appropriate platforms for communication with authorities and were negatively impacted by various policy measures. Effective communication and interaction across and among stakeholders would enhance social

capital; facilitate the efficient functioning of environmental collaborations, and help households to accumulate other productive capital, such as education (Musavengane & Simatele, 2016). Stakeholder analysis and redesign of the resource regime to ensure patterns of interaction that yield positive outcomes seem warranted (Vedeld, 2020). This also implies changing the current communication system among actors to a more equitable one that allows the community members to express their opinions in the planning and management.

The quality of CBNRM is, in both cases, negatively affected by limited levels of cooperation. An indicator of this is that most community members were not consulted during the constitution-building process and did not have the constitution presented or explained to them. This communication gap was worsened by the lack of accountability in reporting financial accounts and managing community affairs. As a result, the Kaindu community has little trust that the government and its partners would deliver any benefits to them. Mutual trust among actors, especially between various agencies and the communities, is a critical factor for a successful CBNRM program as it influences the social acceptability of resource access and natural resources management (NRM) (Thakadu, 2004; Sharp *et al*., 2013; Sharp & Curtis, 2014).

Davenport *et al*. (2007) show that institutional trust depends on the processes (input) and the outcomes of NRM strategies. They highlight unclear communication, limited community engagement, limited community power, and historical resentment as constraints to improved trust related to the institutions. Conflicting values and slow progress were found to be the main factors affecting the outcomes of NRM interventions in both cases. The higher levels of trust in the Kaingu CRB can be attributed to the more formalized and democratic procedure for electing the CRB, which further legitimizes office-bearing, as opposed to the KNRT board in Kaindu.

Limited cooperation among actors drove the lack of coordination among the different actors and even between different government departments. The perception by the local communities that they were denied access to and use of resources fuelled social conflicts, especially with private safari companies and government departments in both cases. The distribution of problems associated with competing uses of natural resources, such as using land for tourism versus agriculture, was asymmetric and, in practice, favored the private and state actors. This resulted in negative attitudes by the local communities, who view the NRG processes as illegitimate and untrustworthy. Input legitimacy is ensured by efficient coordination through a better exchange of

information, opportunities for feedback, the arbitration of conflicts, and the establishment of joint priorities (Metcalfe, 2001). Government departments should coordinate their programs and intervention projects when they implement policies because poor coordination constrains sustainable planning and implementation, especially among agencies with overlapping and competing development mandates (Mallarach, 2008).

Outcomes of the Resource Regimes: Resource Use and State of the Resource Land Ownership and Alienation

Both the Kaingu and Kaindu chiefdoms were governed by the Lands Act No: 29 of 1995. Located entirely within Kaindu, the KCC is governed as a trust according to CAP 186 of the Lands (Perpetual Succession Act) No: 25 of 1964. Thus, Chief Kaindu and the board of trustees (the KNRT) had stronger ownership in the protected area, *i.e.*, the right to access, withdraw, manage, exclude, and alienate the natural resources (Ostrom, 2008) than is the case for Chief Kaingu and the CRB. While Kaingu had a governance by-government system, the KCC is a private and shared governance regime stipulated by Borrini-Feyerabend *et al*. (2013).

The land allocation processes in both chiefdoms were unclear and considered illegitimate by many local community members. Customary rules regarding land allocation are not documented, and chiefs are guided by knowledgeable advisors ("indunas") with oral knowledge and histories of past and present allocations. The villagers in Kaindu were suspicious of new visitors because they experienced much displacement when commercial farmers bought land from the chief without their knowledge. The lack of transparency and accountability in decision-making regarding land allocation, land management, and conflict resolution mechanisms in Zambia are key drivers of tenure insecurity and lack of outcome trust (Hall *et al*., 2017).

Wildlife Stocks and Flows

The differences in perceptions about the state of the wildlife resources between the two cases indicated the importance of the *de facto* actors' interests and the protected area's size regarding conservation. The RPU was more effective in wildlife protection in the KCC because it focused on and allocated more resources towards ensuring the conservation of wildlife because its main income is from tourism. Additionally, its conservation efforts may be more effective because they cover a relatively smaller protected area compared to the much larger Kaingu area. Kaingu

was six times larger than Kaindu and required more financial and logistical resources to protect effectively.

The KNRT, outfitter, and DNPW continued to face challenges in monitoring the resource, controlling resource users, and enforcing rules despite forming the RPU. In Kaingu, the DNPW and Game Rangers International (GRI), through the Special Anti-Poaching Unit (SAPU), monitor and protect wildlife resources through field foot and aerial patrols and roadblocks, albeit with limited logistical and human resources (Game Rangers International, 2023). The unit has, since 2008, arrested more than 700 poachers, seized 361 illegal firearms, rescued 15 live pangolins, and seized 372kg of ivory in KNP, including Kaingu but excluding the KCC (Game Rangers International, 2023).

Forest Stocks and Flows

In both cases, local communities relied on subsistence agriculture and various environmental resources for food and income. As such, there was a conflict regarding the basic human needs and conservation of forests. Vinya *et al*. (2012) reported that agricultural expansion, wood extraction, and uncontrolled bushfires were the proximal drivers of forest cover loss in the Mumbwa district and accompanying effects on wildlife stocks. Despite somewhat higher agricultural yields using Conservation Farming (CF) methods reported in both cases, there were, in practice, low levels of adoption among small-scale farmers (Haggblade & Tembo, 2003; Arslan *et al*., 2013). A higher rate of logging in Kaindu was expected because Mumbwa district had both greater forest cover (315,000ha) and the more commercially important *Baikiaea* tree species compared to Itezhi-Tezhi (4400ha) (DNPW, 2013b; Global Forest Watch, 2022).

Fish Stocks and Flows

The declining fish stocks in the main water bodies in Kaingu (*i.e.*, Lake Itezhi-Tezhi and the Kafue River) are well documented (Kefi & Mofya-Mukuka, 2015). The fish catches in Lake Itezhi-Tezhi declined from 6,000 tonnes in 2010 to below 4,000 tonnes in 2015 (DoF, 2013: Kefi & Mofya-Mukuka, 2015). The higher rates of decline of fish stocks in Kaingu can be attributed to the commercial scale of the fishery, which comprises the entire Lake Itezhi-Tezhi compared to the few kilometers stretch of Kafue River bordering the KCC that supported a more extensive but subsistence fishery. The successful efforts of the RPU in the KCC also positively impacted the regulation of fishing activities.

A low level of community participation and involvement fuelled hostility, mistrust, and non-compliance to CBNRM directives by the communities in both cases. This hampered the state's and traditional authorities' ability to regulate the exploitation of environmental resources. The well-defined geographical boundaries for land use in Namwala GMA isolated the local communities and showed a limited willingness to uphold state-centric collaborative NRG projects. The lack of compliance by the local communities and other economic actors had detrimental effects on the natural resources, and in some cases, it compelled the realigning of government policies.

A Transformative Natural Resources Governance Model for Kaingu and Kaindu



Figure 8: A Natural Resource Governance Model for Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Livelihoods in Kaingu and Kaindu, Zambia

Given the similar geographical, cultural, and socio-economic issues in the two case studies, the model presented here can be useful in mitigating the negative outcomes of both local NRG models at work in the cases (Luaba, 2021). The model highlights the actors' actions necessary to evolve NRG structures and processes from the current situation by describing the desired or

targeted situation. It should be noted, however, that the processes highlighted in the model are non-linear and iterative (Figure 8). The key actors and their recommended roles include:

Central and Local Government: Amendment of National Legislation and Policies

The amendment of the present legislation by the central government with inputs from other stakeholders is important and the basis for all other components of the proposed new model. The amended legislation should devolve clearer property rights and decision-making powers to the community. This entails realigning or reformulating policies to integrate community opinions and interests in the planning and implementation of NRG strategies. Suppose the communities around the protected areas are not legally empowered to become equitable and long-term legitimate/responsible partners in NRG. In that case, they are likely to continue to degrade and destroy the natural resources in their proximity. It is also vital that the amended legislation is in harmony with customary rules concerning the governance of natural resources.

Traditional Authorities: Formalizing Customary Rules for the Allocation of Land and Other Natural Resources

The chief and his palace committees must facilitate drafting customary rules, develop detailed criteria for resource users and resource boundaries, and prescribe acceptable land uses in consultation with the community. In doing so, they will provide guidelines and checks and balances to in-migrants and indigenous individuals regarding resource management. Thus, the customary rules must be formalized concurrently with the amendment of the national legislation and policy recommended above to synchronize both statutory law and customary rules to achieve common goals. The rules must be documented, gazetted, and implemented by village headmen and women. This way, the traditional authority will contribute to NRG more effectively than today.

Local Government and Community-Based Organizations: Streamlining a Clearly Defined Revenue Generation Process

Since the Lands (Perpetual Succession) Act No: 25 of 1964 at work in the KCC allowed the community to utilize natural resources for their benefit and upgrade their socio-economic status, this point is more pertinent to Kaingu, where there are no such provisions at present. This is the responsibility of the local NRG agents, *i.e.*, the councils, the CRB in Kaingu, and the KNRT in Kaindu. Trust among actors must be built through transparency, monitoring, and accountability.

This can be expedited through more formal and informal face-to-face dialogue between the community and other stakeholders.

Backed by strong policies, all the actors (especially the community) must be privy to financial information and the value of the resources before they are harvested. Information such as the annual budget and hunting quotas must be easily accessible to ordinary community members. This information must be provided by the CRB and VAG committees. The state and private companies should improve their integrity by fulfilling their commitments to the communities following the established procedures.

Community-Based Organizations: Creation of Bottom-Up, Transparent, and Equitable Processes of Disbursement of Revenues

Decisions on utilizing revenue from the sale or lease of natural resources within the protected area should be made from the bottom-up, transparent, and equitable. This is vital because there must be a balance between providing better livelihoods and ensuring sustainability by allocating a portion of the revenue to natural resource conservation. The VAG committees must provide communities with information on how many animals were shot, the prices paid by safari companies, expenditures, and the progress of community projects in a clear manner. The community would then be empowered to monitor the quantity of available resources, the benefits that can be derived from them and lead the audit of financial transactions of the CRB and VAG committees. This would also reduce the elite capture of benefits by the local leadership.

Local Government and Civil Society: Building the Capacity of Community–Based Organizations and Institutions

Capacity building must be ingrained in the local NRG constitutions so that local villagers can be involved in the financial management of NRG programs. The CRB and KNRT are weakened by the lack of well-trained and competent personnel. These institutions can only be managed and sustained by capable people who understand the concepts and contexts in which the CBNRM is taking place. Initially, capacity-building must be led by the state and NGOs but sustained by the community after being established. Key areas that require capacity-building include NRM skills, accounts (bookkeeping), law enforcement (law expertise and enforcers), and investments (business/entrepreneurship).

Conclusion

The existing patterns of interactions among actors in the governance of environmental resources in Kaingu and the KCC have contributed to unsustainable use and a degraded state of wildlife, forest, and fisheries resources. This investigation was directed at deciphering the outcomes of interactions among actors and between actors and the environment in two case studies of seemingly egalitarian communities with somehow dissimilar NRG systems. The study analyzed the outcomes of the pattern of interaction *vis-à-vis* communication, cooperation, coordination, competition, and the levels of community participation.

The results of this study revealed that the NRG systems in the two case studies shared many common governance-related features, but they also have differences that impact the level of sustainable resource use and equity. The two NRG models are both heavy and top-down structures despite the KCC being communally owned. However, they differ in terms of physical and institutional contexts regarding the land area, actor interests, and community perceptions and attitudes towards NRG. The NRG structure in Kaindu had the potential to yield better outcomes in terms of biodiversity conservation and livelihoods since it placed the community in a more powerful position. The KNRT had greater governance flexibility than the GMA in Kaingu but required more community participation and increased community capacity to be more effective. The careful re-alignment of the present institutions and organizational structure may improve resource outcome quality, livelihood impacts, and overall participation, trust, and legitimacy of the governance system.

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Critical Assessment of Geostrategic Infiltration in UN Peacekeeping Operations Deployed in Intra-State Armed Conflicts in Africa: The Case of ONUC in DRC in 1960

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Abstract

This study focuses on the deployments of UN peacekeeping operations within intra-state armed conflicts in Africa. The statement of the problem and objective of the study is to demonstrate amidst the significant roles that UN peacekeeping operations deployed within intra-state armed conflicts in Africa have played and are still playing, nonetheless growing geostrategic infiltration from hegemonic states as well as other member states from where troops are drawn from to constitute different operations to mitigate the armed conflicts. This is very important for the successful consolidation of the mandates of different UN peacekeeping operations deployed within intra-state armed conflicts in Africa. The study incorporated both primary and secondary sources of data. The qualitative descriptive analysis and its instruments are the research method that fits the study. The results of the findings were parallel to the problem statement and objective, which proved that geostrategic infiltration aimed at guaranteeing the interests of hegemonic and other member states of the UN that are proved apparent. The study's conclusion and recommendations were proffered to mitigating geostrategic infiltration in UN peacekeeping deployments faced with intra-state armed conflicts in Africa after an in-depth analysis of the case study under review in this study. That is, the United Nations Operations in the Congo deployed in view of the intra-state armed conflict that hit Congo in 1960, where the end of that mission was a debacle. A debacle explained largely by geostrategic infiltration. The Security Council is making every effort to mitigate the numerous challenges that have been and are still impeding the UN peacekeeping operations from successfully consolidating their mandates in different intra-state armed conflicts in Africa where they have been deployed. This study seeks to draw the attention of the international community to a veritable challenge that has become a pertinent stake (geostrategic infiltration), impeding the successful consolidation of the different UN peacekeeping mandates deployed within intra-state armed conflicts in Africa.

Keywords: *Geostrategic, Infiltration, Peacekeeping Operations, Stakes, Mandate*

Introduction

Conflict among organized human groups is as old as human society itself. UN peacekeeping missions enjoy growing popularity as the international community's tool of choice for conflict containment in different parts of the world (Utley, 2006). Distinctive organs embody the UN, and the organ that champions the putting in place of the peacekeeping mission is the Security

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Council (SC). The Security Council is involved primarily with political issues among states and, to be more concise, conflict-related issues, which could either be inter-state and/or intra-state armed conflicts. The Security Council is comprised of five permanent member countries that enjoy veto rights. The Security Council also has ten non-permanent member countries without veto rights over procedural and substantive decisions. The five permanent members thought it wise to install peacekeeping operations that could be deployed in the eventuality of armed conflicts among and within states. The idea of vesting veto powers to five members in 1945 still continues in 2023, though many efforts are put into reforming and democratizing it. The UN does not have a standby army of its own that could be deployed immediately in the event of an armed conflict. Most importantly, the failure of the concept of collective security made the creation of peacekeeping inevitable. Consequently, these two major setbacks accelerated the birth of peacekeeping operations (Abi-Saab, 1995).

Since the inception of the UN peacekeeping operations, there has been a series of the evolution of peacekeeping from the first generation peacekeeping, second generation peacekeeping, and the third generation peacekeeping that took effect in 1993. Some scholars are even switching to fourth-generation peacekeeping. The first and second peacekeeping generations were attached to Chapter VI of the UN Charter, based on three doctrinal principles. They include inter alia: the consent of the parties in conflict, impartiality, and the non-recourse to force, except in the case of legitimate self-defense to defend their mandates. However, with the advent of the 1990s that came with the collapse of the adversarial decades of the Cold War, there was a conspicuous mutation of armed conflicts that came with a tremendous decline of inter-state armed conflicts to the unprecedented upsurge in intra-state armed conflicts (Malan, 1998). Apart from the first, second, and third peacekeeping generations highlighted above, a fourth-generation peacekeeping emerged distinct from the first, second, and third-generation peacekeeping. This was articulated under the framework of chapter VII of the UN Charter, coined "peace enforcement." This fourth-generation peacekeeping is based on the use of force violating the consent of the protagonists and/or parties in conflict for humanitarian reasons, which must be backed up with authorization from the Security Council. Although enforcement is inscribed in the Charter, it is costly in terms of money and lives. While the members of UN peacekeeping operations have exploded in recent years, many countries are unwilling to pay the bill or send troops to a conflict zone (Collins,

C.J, 1993). The setting up of the UN peacekeeping mission decades ago as the international community's tool for maintaining international peace and security in conflict-ridden spots across the globe was a lauded initiative. It should be underscored that the continent of Africa is experiencing an exponential rate of failure of the UN peacekeeping operations in consolidating their mandates faced with the upsurge of intra-state armed conflicts where they are deployed. This again makes thinking inevitable in the direction of whether the theoretically developed peacekeeping mandates are followed by the same spirit by the peacekeepers faced with implementing the mandates on the field. In other words, the question that arises goes thus; are the field operations not a mere façade as geostrategic infiltration from hegemonic powers and other member states appears to have overtaken the rules of engagement to all the troops, which is holistically directed towards the consolidation of the different mandates? In other words, making all efforts towards combatting challenges under normal circumstances like; inadequate finances, inadequate troops, inchoate mandate, belated intervention, and inadequate logistics, which equally act as stakes impeding the successful consolidation of the disparate mandates of UN peacekeeping operations that deployed in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa. Nonetheless, geostrategic infiltration of hegemonic and other member states appears preponderant.

Background of the Study

In view of the exponential increase in intra-state conflicts in Africa, especially during the post-Cold War decade, alongside the inability of host governments and non-state armed groups to arrive at a pacific consensus towards bringing these heinous conflicts to a peaceful end, made these conflicts to constitute threats to international peace and security. This has given way for the deployments of the UN peacekeeping missions to find veritable solutions towards charting the path to peace and serenity among the belligerents in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa. The United Nations, an international world body with over 193 member states, has a universal mission: to maintain international peace and security among and within member states. The peacekeeping mission was established to be deployed in conflict-ridden spots across the globe to achieve this fundamental objective. The role of the UN peacekeepers

is supposed to be proportionately equitable, universal, and altruistic in saving the lives of vulnerable populations in conflict-stricken zones.

Moreover, the role should also be able to explore all possible means of reconciling the protagonists for the reconstitution of peace and stability in all continents. However, when we critically look at the UN peacekeeping deployments in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa from the earliest deployment in 1960 to several others during the post-Cold War decade, and consequently those of the 21st Century, we find every reason to ask. Furthermore, that pertinent question to ask is if the UN peacekeeping deployments in Africa match with the altruistically constructed mandates faced with intra-state armed conflicts, or are the deployments of the UN peacekeepers faced with intra-state armed conflicts in Africa not heavily influenced by geostrategic infiltration? That is, are UN peacekeeping deployments in Africa, not a vehicle behind which the five permanent members (P-5) in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), as well as other member states, passed through to entrench their geostrategic agendas through taking advantage of intra-state armed conflicts in Africa? It is rational to think this way, given that almost all the UN peacekeeping deployments in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa are characterized by failure, with their mandates hardly being consolidated successfully.

In other words, African countries' geography and natural and mineral resources endowments have become a principal bone of contention to hegemonic states and other member states from where troops are drawn and deployed to intra-state armed conflicts in Africa. This is a vehicle via UN peacekeeping operations far more than under bilateral and multilateral foreign policy relations among states. Moreover, though the theoretical mandates drafted by the Security Council reflect every genuineness of the UN peacekeeping missions, nonetheless, among several challenges confronted by the UN peacekeeping operations to successfully consolidate their mandates in zones of intra-state armed conflicts in Africa, geostrategic infiltration has been incorporated resulting to the gross failure of UN peacekeeping operations following their deployments in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa.

There is no universally binding consensus as regards the definition of the peacekeeping mission. Thus, this makes the concept a nebulous one. However, various definitions propounded by different organizations and scientific authors as to the concept could be held

on. According to the UN Document (1992), an Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, 17 June 1992. This document defines the UN peacekeeping operation as "The deployment of the United Nations presence on the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both preventing conflict and making peace" (Boutrous-Ghali, 1992; Para, 20). FT Lui defines UN peacekeeping as essentially a practical mechanism used by the UN to contain international conflicts and facilitate their settlements by peaceful means (Levine, D.H, 2001).

According to the Charter of the United Nations (1945), the Security Council is invested with the principal responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. In exercising this responsibility, this organ decided to implement peacekeeping operations. Each peacekeeping operation of the UN is created and deployed on the basis of specific mandates defined by the Security Council. A mandate is an official authorization that allows for the deployment of the UN peacekeeping operation, carrying the details of the precise tasks that the peacekeepers have to fulfill in the deployed zones of armed conflicts. The mandates vary depending on the situation, the nature of the conflict, and the particular challenges presented. Furthermore, the mandates are influenced vis-à-vis the nature, and the content of the accord concluded between the protagonists in conflict.

Grosso modo, according to their mandates, the peacekeepers are called for the following purposes:

- To prevent the start of a conflict or stop a conflict from escalating beyond the frontiers;
- Stabilize the situation of conflict after a cease-fire and at the end, create a suitable environment for the disputants to reach an accord of durable peace;
- Assist in putting to work the global accords of peace;
- Accompany the states or the territories during the transition towards a stable government based on democratic principles inter alia; good governance, respect for the rule of law, respect of human rights, and economic development;

- Ensure Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of ancien combatants (DDR);
- Strengthen the Security Sector Reform (SSR) and other activities aimed at restoring the state of the law;
- Protect and promote human rights;
- Surveillance in elections.

The mandate that the Security Council confers to peacekeeping will reflect one of the aforementioned points outlined. Furthermore, in as much as the Security Council has to create and deploy the peacekeeping mission in the maintenance of international peace and security in war-torn countries, the creation of the peacekeeping missions has to respect the following criteria fixed by the UNSC:

- The existence of the situation must be one that poses a danger or, rather, constitutes a threat to international peace and security;
- If the sub-regional and regional arrangements exist and are ready to aid the regulation of the situation as well as the measures to be taken;
- If a cease-fire is in full force and if the parties are committed to the peace process;
- If the political objective is clearly defined and if it finds its expression in the mandate;
- If a precise mandate may be formulated for the operation of the UN;
- If the security of the UN personnel may be assured and the factions have guaranteed the security of the UN personnel (Théophile Owona).

From the above analysis of the purposes for which the peacekeeping operations are created and deployed and the criteria under which they are deployed, it becomes apparent that the Security Council has to, aside from ensuring that the elements that constitute the mandate and the criteria are intact, it also needs to give consideration on the geostrategic context of Africa. This is because the geostrategic context of Africa has influenced hegemonic states and other member states away from the rules of engagement and the altruistic character of the operations to consolidate the mandates and to ensure peace and stability in conflict zones in Africa. Instead, we see the preponderance of the realist traits among the peacekeeping contingents as well as the hegemonic powers overshadowing the veritable intent of the

deployments of UN peacekeeping operations. This has further compounded the conflict hot spots in Africa through the loss of lives, increased humanitarian crises resulting in unprecedented internally displaced persons, and refugees seeking haven in neighboring countries. In the subsequent sub-themes below, we will be zooming through an intra-state armed conflict of the 20th century to demonstrate how geostrategic infiltration appeared to be a major impediment to the successful consolidation of the UN peacekeeping operation deployed in that 20th century intra-state armed conflict in Africa. That was in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) following the outbreak of the Congolese civil war in 1960, where the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was deployed.

The body of this study is organized chronologically as materials and methods, results and discussion, conclusion and recommendation, and references.

Statement of the Problem

The intent for which the UN was set up with an obligatory responsibility to maintain international peace and security among member states is, to a greater extent, being usurped. This is spearheaded particularly by the US and her Western allies for their distinctive geostrategic interests through creating and deploying peacekeeping. These peacekeepers are deployed with uncommitted roles influenced by rather geostrategic considerations at the expense of human lives, particularly in Africa. The UN gives the world community the impression that it is a genuine world body aimed at arresting intra-state armed conflicts that could threaten international peace and security by ensuring the human security of the population in war-torn zones.

On the contrary, the veritable role of maintaining international peace and security through creating and deploying peacekeeping missions is a facade, as the five permanent members of the Security Council are not influenced by the moral compulsion to do good. However, they are likely being influenced by geostrategic considerations that point largely to their individual geostrategic and economic interests to grasp in war-torn settings instead of focusing on consolidating their mandates for preserving human lives. This has been exaggerated following

the UN peacekeeping deployments in Africa (Diamond, 2005). Some authors even wonder if really the P-5 in the UNSC valued African lives.

It is against this backdrop that this title was selected to critically assess how geostrategic infiltration is considered a serious stake in the successful consolidation of the mandates of the UN peacekeeping operations deployed in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa, with the specific case study under review being the intra-state armed conflict that hits the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1960. The African, Asian, and Pacific continents, all in the southern hemisphere, top the chart with an increasing rate of intra-state armed conflicts. The height of the upsurge in intra-state armed conflicts became exponential during the post-Cold War decade, with an unprecedented increase in countries in the global south, especially countries in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific (De Waal, A, 2005).

Research Objectives

The objective of this study is to critically assess the penetration of geostrategic infiltration in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa deployed in intra-state armed conflicts with particular attention on a 20th century UN peacekeeping operation United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) deployed in the intra-state armed conflict that hits the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1960. With the increasing occurrence of intra-state armed conflicts in the early nineties, the continents of Africa, Asia, and the Pacific are topping the chart. Therefore, in a nutshell, the main objective of this study is to investigate analytically the penetration of geostrategic considerations in UN peacekeeping deployments in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa with precision on the UN peacekeeping operation ONUC deployed in DRC in 1960. The second objective is to demonstrate how geostrategic infiltration constitutes a grave stake in the successful consolidation of the UN peacekeeping mandate of ONUC in DRC in 1960 and subsequent UN peacekeeping deployments of the 20th century and even those of the 21st century.

Literature Review

Geostrategic Infiltration into the UN Peacekeeping Operations Deployed in Africa

The geostrategic position of African countries and the natural and mineral resources endowed therein are veritable undercurrents that have influenced hegemonic states and the different

member states from where troops are drawn to constitute the UN peacekeeping operations. This influence has in no small way contributed adversely towards the successful consolidation of the UN peacekeeping mandates in the deployed zones of intra-state armed conflicts in Africa. While UN peacekeeping operations have scored a certain proportion of success in other continents, UN peacekeeping deployments in Africa have been characterized as a debacle. Though it is unarguable that there are challenges that have been accounted for the failure of the UN peacekeeping operations to successfully consolidate their mandates like; inadequate funding, inadequate and lack of trained troops, inadequate logistics, belated intervention, inchoate mandates and to mentioned only but these few, nonetheless the above-mentioned challenges could be ranked secondary, as the geostrategic and economic interests of hegemonic and other member states appear preponderant. The geostrategic and economic entrenchment of hegemonic powers and other member states instigated due to the rich sub-soil of the African countries as well as the most strategic position seems to constitute a veritable stake behind the unsuccessful consolidation of UN peacekeeping operations deployed in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa.

The preponderant influence of the geostrategic positioning of Africa and its overwhelming influence towards the unsuccessful consolidation of the UN peacekeeping operations deployed in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa cannot be underestimated. One of the intra-state armed conflicts drawn from the 20th was reviewed analytically to demonstrate how geostrategic stake contributed extensively towards the unsuccessful consolidation of the peacekeepers' mandate in that country. That is the United Nations Operation in the Congo in 1960.

In light of the topic under review in this study, the theory of organized hypocrisy could be considered. The theory of organized hypocrisy is not very common among many scholars; hence, the political and diplomatic dynamics associated with this concept are little known to students and practitioners of global politics and diplomacy. These dynamics have direct implications for the conduct of UN peacekeeping missions and global governance. According to Lipson (2007), organized hypocrisy is a phenomenon espoused by organizational behavioral theorists to explain how organizations respond to conflicting and challenging

pressures emanating from external environments by adopting contradictory actions and statements to mislead the public deliberately. In the same trajectory, organized hypocrisy is manifested by inconsistencies and contradictions between publicly pronounced organizational expressions and aspirations to respect norms such as state sovereignty. Yet, in real practice, these norms are violated. Krasner (1999) argued that organized hypocrisy explains the enduring and routine violation of veritable roles of the UN peacekeepers faced with the consolidation of their mandates in situations of intra-state conflicts in Africa.

Brunsson (1989), one of the leading theorists on organized hypocrisy, argued that organized hypocrisy refers to organizational responses to "conflicting logics of consequences and appropriateness." It also refers to parallel structures that organizations set as what happened during UN peacekeeping operations in Congo during the early 1960s. This occurred when Secretary General Hammarskjold established a secretive cabinet of American special advisers and himself known as the “Congo Club” to run the affairs of the UN peacekeeping mission, whose aim was to entrench US hegemony in Africa after dislodging Belgian post-colonial influence in that country. Brunsson concluded that "organized hypocrisy is a fundamental type of behavior" in most political organizations, such as the UN.

Geostrategic Infiltration Stake in the Consolidation of ONUC's Mandate in DRC

The Democratic Republic of the Congo, placed within a geostrategic positioning, makes it very constructive to examine the stakes in the consolidation of the mandate of the United Nations Operation in the Congo, explained largely beyond endogenous limitations but largely due to the infiltration of geostrategic exogenous consideration. In its early years of independence (1960-1964), Congo failed to offer its citizens peace and security despite the deployment of UN peacekeepers in the country. This was fostered through the manipulation of the internal political power dynamics in Congo by some senior UN officials in violation of Congo’s autonomy. This automatically resulted in the mission's failure to accomplish the desired objectives of bringing about durable peace and security in the Congo. The UN peacekeeping mission in Congo ONUC served as a proxy force to legitimize a regime change agenda that culminated in the installation of a pro-Western government that did not serve the interests of the Congolese population (Al-Qaq, 2009). The United Nations Operation in the Congo ONUC was originally deployed to preserve the autonomy of the country following

Belgian military intervention. It succeeded in securing the withdrawal of the invading Belgian forces, and it also succeeded in reversing the disintegration of Congo into fiefdoms. However, it dismally failed to restore the nascent democracy in Congo and equally failed to bring about long-term self-determination political and economic stability in the host country (Collins, 1993).

Firstly, according to Al Qaq (2009), ONUC was by far the largest peacekeeping mission to be deployed during the Cold War period, and it was the first mission to have non-military members tasked with the responsibility of re-building and administering key aspects of a host country's public institutions inclusive of security sector reform, activities that interfered with the autonomy of Congo. Moreover, it was the first UN peacekeeping mission to be authorized to use force to facilitate the execution of its mandate (Al-Qaq). Secondly, the mission was the most advanced and sophisticated experiment in international cooperation ever attempted by the world. Thirdly, ONUC was the most complex and most controversial mission because it violated all the rules and principles of peacekeeping, especially the "holy trinity" of UN peacekeeping, namely: consent of the host nation, impartiality and non-use of force except in legitimate self-defense that applied to previous peacekeeping missions. Fourthly, ONUC served as a "watershed" peacekeeping operation in UN interference in the internal affairs of an autonomous member state in violation of the UN Charter (Abi-Saab). ONUC overwhelmingly demonstrated the extent to which the UN, through its Secretary General and his advisers, could determine the course of political events in the host country without paying due attention to the wishes, interests, and aspirations of citizens of the host nation. Considering its size, cost, and controversy in mandate interpretation, ONUC was a precursor to the peacekeeping missions that were to be undertaken by the world body in the post-Cold War era; hence it was "a watershed in the development of international peacekeeping" (James, 1996).

On 12 July 1960, President Kasa Vubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba jointly appealed to the UN Secretary-General, urgently requesting military assistance to deal with the invading Belgian forces. The Congolese appeal was succinct and unambiguous as it stated, "The purpose of the requested military aid was to protect the national territory of the Congo against

the present external aggression which was a threat to international peace" (UN, 1960). President Kasa Vubu and Prime Minister Lumumba jointly dispatched another cable to the Secretary-General, correcting the erroneous message sent earlier by their three ministers while they were out of the capital, Leopoldville. According to the UN (1960), the central government's follow-up message to the UN was meant to clarify further and elaborate the exact nature of the urgent request to remove any ambiguities. Essential aspects of the message were as follows:

i) The purpose of the aid requested is not to restore the internal situation in Congo but rather to protect the national territory against acts of aggression posed by Belgian metropolitan troops. ii) The request for assistance relates only to a UN force consisting of military personnel of neutral countries and not of the US, as reported by certain radio stations. iii) If the requested assistance is not received without delay, the Republic of the Congo will be obliged to appeal to the Bandung Treaty Powers. iv) The Republic of the Congo has requested aid in the exercise of its sovereign rights and is not in agreement with Belgium as reported.

Clearly, the Congolese central government wanted military assistance to effectively engage the invading Belgian troops and ensure their withdrawal from Congo as a precondition for restoring the status quo ante. Considering that the US had declined a request for military assistance from the same Congolese government, the legitimate government of Congo sought to cast its net wider by approaching the Soviet Union for military assistance in the event that there was no speedy response from the UN to their request for military assistance. From this point of view, it can be ascertained that ONUC's deployment in DRC could not have been instigated by veritable roles aimed at addressing the root causes of the conflict by treating the unambiguous message sent by the legitimate government of the Congo but rather a geostrategic entrenchment of economic interests far from primarily addressing the root causes of the conflict-but much more to install the cynical interests of the western powers and the US against a legitimate autonomous government. As stated in the speech of the Congolese President and Prime Minister, recognized legitimate authorities in the Congo seeking assistance from an international body having as overall objective to maintain international peace and security, the UN was supposed to have respected the exact context under which the Congolese government was requesting for its intervention. However, other geo-strategic and

economic interests of the US and her Western allies over the DRC alternated all of that. Thus, this accounted for the unsuccessful consolidation of its mandate.

Similarly, Hoskyns (1961) observed that the two Congolese leaders concurrently dispatched a cable to the Soviet leader requesting him to be on standby while closely monitoring the developments in the Congo. The request for Soviet assistance was sent on 14 July, the day the Security Council authorized the deployment of ONUC through Security Council Resolution 145 dated 14 June 1960 (Higgins, 1980). Abi-Saab (1978) believes the request to the Soviet Union was probably an initiative "Conceived as a lever inciting the UN and the Western powers to exert pressure on Belgium to withdraw." This view cannot be substantiated. However, it is important to note that it was well within the powers of the Congolese leadership to invite international assistance to bolster the country's self-defense when faced with foreign military aggression. Equally, it cannot be ruled out that the invitation extended to the Soviet Union was a desperate attempt at influencing the Western powers to speedily influence their NATO counterpart (Belgium) to withdraw from Congo. ONUC officials sadly interpreted the initiative differently as they believed this was enough proof that Lumumba was pro-Soviet and that he wanted to set the two superpowers against each other, a development they resolved to thwart at all costs. The viewing of Lumumba as a pro-Soviet revolutionary significantly influenced the decision-making process of the Secretary-General and his close advisers, who were predominantly American citizens (O'Brien, 1962).

Grovogui (2002) argues that the US, Belgium, and their Western allies wanted to preserve their access to Congo's strategic and rare minerals and other natural resources to offset Soviet advantages in access to raw materials. Thus, the need to explicitly reverse the unilateral intervention by Belgian troops, the fear of Soviet involvement in Congo, and the determination to deny the Soviets access to strategic minerals and deprive them of any pretext for unilateral or covert involvement in the Congo influenced the deployment of ONUC. Thus, the purpose of deploying UN peacekeepers was not necessarily based on veritably consolidating the mandate to assist the Congolese in re-asserting their independence and autonomy as requested by the central government following external aggression by Belgian troops and foreign mercenaries. Similarly, it was rather geostrategic considerations to

facilitate the smooth withdrawal of Belgian metropolitan troops that were to be replaced by peacekeepers that had come to guarantee the safety of the Congolese white population and other foreigners (Collins, 1992).

The full strategic implications of deploying peacekeepers in Congo were not apparent to the Soviet Union, which voted to favor the deployment in Congo while Britain and France abstained. Moreover, James (1996) believes that the idea of deploying UN peacekeepers in Congo was widely embraced "although its implications were less than fully understood" by most nations that believed such missions were meant to address international crises in an impartial manner. Taking advantage of the wisdom of hindsight, it is now apparent that the Secretary-General and his American-dominated advisory team had sinister and malicious strategic designs to ensure that Western interests were preserved and promoted at the expense of the well-being of the Congolese population and government as long as Western interests, particularly American interests were safeguarded. The Congolese initial request for “technical assistance” from the UN was with a view “To reorganizing and retraining the Congolese National Army" as a component of security sector reform that was meant to be part of the larger scheme of peace-building measures advocated by the Secretary-General (Urquhart, 1987).

Important to note is that the Congolese Government’s appeal for UN assistance came after the US had declined a similar request from three Cabinet Ministers, namely: Gizenga, Bamboko, and Nyembo (1961), at a time when the President and the Prime Minister were away touring the country. The US advised the Congolese authorities to approach the UN for assistance as they publicly declared that it was “undesirable” for any country to unilaterally come to the aid of Congo (Higgins, R 1980).

Ball (1961) argues that on receipt of the Congolese request for military assistance, the US considered three options for their response: to do nothing; it could agree to the Congolese request for American troops, or it could encourage the Congolese to approach the UN. As a result, the US authorities feared that the Soviets would influence the Congolese leadership towards adopting communism as a "Form of chaos to communism syndrome." As such, the US opted to use the UN peacekeepers as an "umbrella" for its anti-communist policy in Congo that would achieve desired results at a far lower cost compared to direct military

involvement. The American strategic interests in Africa were driven by a desire to secure valuable natural resources and political influence that would guarantee the longevity of America's capitalist system, Military Industrial Complex (MIC), and global economic superiority while denying the same to the Soviet Union (Housen, R.T, 2002).

It is, therefore, apparent that the Americans suggested channeling the Congolese Government's request to the UN for two reasons. Firstly, they wanted to keep the Soviets out of the Central African region; hence, they ensured that the Soviets would not have any plausible pretext for unilateral intervention in Congo once international peacekeepers were in the country performing their tasks. Secondly, the US knew fully well that the American-dominated UN peacekeeping political structure would safeguard American national strategic interests without its direct involvement. This view is supported by the composition of the UN Security Council in 1960 when Taiwan held the Chinese seat in the Security Council, and the domination of the General Assembly by the pro-Western Latin American countries.

Weissman (1974) observed that during the early 1960s, the UN acted as a satisfactory vehicle for the promotion of American policy through its domination of key and strategic organs of the world body. In the Security Council, the West had four out of five permanent seats with the power of veto (Taiwan represented China) and three out of six elected seats. In the General Assembly, the Western and Latin American states only needed 12 Afro-Asian votes to secure the two-thirds majority. A high percentage of staff that manned the Secretariat was basically Western in orientation and outlook, where Americans, British, and French staff members held 49 of the 102 senior appointments *(ibid)*. Weissman highlights the fact that the closest advisors to Secretary-General Hammarskjold were all Americans, namely: Ralph Bunche, under Secretary for Special Political Affairs; Andrew, the Executive Assistant; and Heinz Wieschoff Bunche's Deputy and the Secretariat's African expert (Bellamy et al., S*)*. This point is important because critical strategic decisions made regarding ONUC were handled by the Secretary-General and his close American advisers.

During the early 1960s, before most colonies attained independence, the UN membership had a predominantly pro-Western bias. Added to this scenario was the fact that the Secretary-General had an American-dominated advisory team for peacekeeping in Congo. It is,

therefore, prudent to conclude that the drafting of the mandate and controversial interpretation of Security Council resolutions on the Congo crisis was influenced by the geostrategic pro-Western bias of critical institutions of the UN to the detriment of the Congolese people and Government, thereby rendering the Congolese Government ineffective and incapable of serving the interests of its citizens.

Geostrategic Influence at the Core of the Deployment of Pro-Western Troops and US Civilians in Congo

In the words of Brigadier General Pumzile James Mackakaire of Zimbabwean nationality, "You do find veritable conduct by deployed contingents and individual peacekeepers. The respondent further continued to say, however, that in the geopolitical environment, a veritable role is far fetch as there are strategic national interests that each state strives to protect. He went further to say that power dynamics also influence the outcomes. He said the one who has the power or money calls the shot. He compared this with the law by saying that the law is put in place to protect the powerful where the less powerful suffers despite the fact that the issue at stake that triggers legal intervention speaks in favor of the less powerful. However, because the other party is powerful, that party ends up the winner because the party has financial and political powers, which distorts the character of the law. The respondent affirmed that the mandates of the UN peacekeeping missions are altruistic. However, once the different countries from which troops are drawn to deploy in the conflict-ridden countries, they step in with their individual national interests in the war-torn country. This drives the undercurrent of the geostrategic infiltrating role.

The respondent even went as far as saying, "During one of his missions to the Democratic Republic of the Congo being our case study in this study, especially the part that is close to Rwanda, it was reported that some of the UN peacekeeping contingents especially those from India demonstrated some misconduct. As such, once the information was reported to the Headquarters, little or nothing was done. What exacerbated the situation, which the Brigadier General recounted, was that some DRC soldiers were complicit. Instead of pre-empting any form of geostrategic behavior from the mixed UN peacekeepers on their territory, they helped the UN peacekeepers by granting them access to exploit the natural resources of their country illicitly and received compensation in return. Therefore, he said, while visualizing the

geostrategic role solely through the prism of the peacekeepers, it should be made emphatically clear that the Africans are complicit in helping the UN peacekeepers in carrying out geostrategically related activities."

He went further to say, "Still in the DRC, there are many international non-governmental organizations present and are classified as humanitarian agencies. This multiplicity of international NGOs from different countries is involved in activities that are far from the humanitarian reasons of improving the standards of living and alleviating the plights of internally displaced persons and other persons of concern. This is because there are benefits that they are deriving from the DRC. By and large, they do not do these things on their own. They use the nationals to gain access to those resources. For instance, cobalt, a mineral resource used in cell phone fabrication, is enormous in the DRC. As such, which international NGOs would not want to get into DRC under the banner of humanitarianism but act illegally to extract such rich product, and has it smuggled out of the country? The respondent said all these international multinational corporations and/or non-state actors that produce cellphones get the product cobalt hugely from DRC.

Moreover, how did you think this product reached them if the geostrategic behaviors of the UN peacekeepers were not used and without the help of international NGOs that penetrated there under the guise of humanitarian assistance and claimed that they were there for humanitarian action, which is a façade? A façade in the sense that they are there to extract cobalt and other rich mineral deposits illegally, the DRC is endowed with using even the Congolese nationals to smuggle the natural resources out of the country. Each of the UN peacekeeping contingents has its agenda given to them by their member state to drive their national interests. That is, if everybody is doing it, why can't we do it too? Unfortunately, these are not things you can openly say this country is doing this, that country is doing that, except they are legally apprehended and exposed. Regrettably, money comes into play here as people always buy out their illegalities. So, in a nutshell, to a very large extent, Africans themselves are complicit to the geostrategic infiltration of the UN peacekeepers on the field, as opined by Brigadier General Pumzile James Mackakaire, one time President of the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA)."

The figure below depicts examples of some deployed UN peacekeeping operations:



UN Peacekeeping Map from the UN Cartographic Section, April 2018: <www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/P_K_O.pdf>.

Results and Discussion

The results and discussion revealed that ONUC's failure to tackle the crisis triggered challenges that the Congolese Government had requested the UN military force to deal with. During the first year of its deployment in Congo, ONUC did not engage itself in any robust diplomatic and military offensive operations to evict the foreign invading forces. Instead, the leadership of ONUC became embroiled in the power politics of Congo, which resulted in the assassination of Lumumba with ONUC's connivance. Ultimately, ONUC became the legitimizing force of an unelected and undemocratic dictatorial regime installed to serve Western interests and not the self-determination and aspirations of the Congolese people (Saksena, 1974).

During the first few weeks of deployment, ONUC failed to immediately engage the invading Belgian troops and secessionist Katangese troops, as requested by the Congolese authorities.

As a result of this failure, the UN force was harassed and rebuked rather than being assisted by the Congolese Government, as tribal and ideological considerations fuelled by outside forces were tearing the Congolese government apart (*ibid*). The role of the outside military and political forces in transforming ONUC into a US proxy force is fully explained by the selection and appointment of key decision-makers in the affairs of ONUC. Additionally, most pundits have articulated that it should not be surprising as UN peacekeeping missions were designed as political games played at the grand strategic level among the competing world powers with little consideration for the ultimate effects on the local population (Tsagourias, 2006).

The first UN guiding principle in the selection of troop-contributing countries for ONUC was that no military unit or staff officer from any of the permanent members of the Security Council was to participate "given the potential…to escalate rather than reduce cold War rivalries" (Annan, K. A, 2012). The second principle was that the concept of regionalism in resolving international conflicts was to be upheld, hence the appeal to African leaders to provide the bulk of the peacekeeping troops (Simmonds, 1968). These principles were both violated at the onset of the operation. The appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Congo, Ralph Bunche, a seasoned American diplomat who was also the overall commander of ONUC in the field during the early days of its deployment, was in violation of the first principle that prohibited staff officers and troops. This is rational, especially for staff of permanent Security Council members participating in UN peacekeeping operations. It also contributed to the violation of the peacekeeping principle of "impartiality." The principle of impartiality in this study is defined as follows: "Peacekeepers will be expected to serve universalistic interest and must not serve the parochial interests of specific foreign powers, which seek to project their influence into the conflict in question" (Gibbs, 2000, p. 360). The critical importance of impartiality has been emphasized by several scholars. James (1996) emphasizes that "it is impartiality which gives peacekeepers its distinctiveness as it is the lifeblood of peacekeeping."

To sum up, this article has spotted imperative areas following the UN peacekeeping deployment in DRC following the outbreak of an intra-state armed conflict in 1960. That is

the United Nations' Operations in the Congo. The researcher envisaged how geostrategic infiltration and other challenges contributed enormously to curtailing the consolidation of ONUC's mandate in the DRC in 1960. This is explained by the overwhelming concealed geostrategic interests incorporated behind UN peacekeeping operations deployed in conflict-ridden spots in Africa with the case study of DRC. Summarily, the study's results corroborate with the study's objectives as well as the statement of the problem established apriori in the introduction and body of the study.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Here, the conclusion and recommendations of the study have been brought out succinctly, as well as other suggested areas for more research in this domain of UN peacekeeping operations and their deployments in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa.

Conclusion

The fundamental objective of this study was to critically assess how geostrategic infiltration constitutes a great stake in the successful consolidation of the UN peacekeeping operations deployed in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa, with the case of UN peacekeeping operation ONUC deployed in the DRC in 1960. To attain this objective, salient facts were brought out and argued logically. The study results show that geostrategic infiltration of Congo's internal politics by some high-ranking ONUC officials significantly contributed to the host government's failure to exercise its autonomy towards advancing the aspirations of its people as UN officials promoted American and Allied Powers' interests. Moreover, as argued above, this was done at the Congolese people's expense. The Congo crisis (1960-64) marked a significant watershed in the evolution of peacekeeping. For the first time, the UN got embroiled in the domestic affairs of the host country, thus setting a major precedent for future UN interventions in the domestic affairs of host countries. The geostrategic challenge in UN interventions in civil conflicts is that the world body risks becoming embroiled in internal conflicts, compromising its "Ostensible role as a non-partisan mediator." The result also revealed that the UN intervention in Congo served as a "midwife to the arrival of the Cold War in Africa, and it inadvertently aborted…Congo's transition from colonial to democratic rule" (Collins, 1993). This abortion was a deliberate and successful attempt to promote American interests during the Cold War at the expense of Congolese wishes and aspirations

for political and economic self-determination that were thwarted in favor of promoting Western neo-liberal political and economic interests.

Furthermore, the result further demonstrated that it is false to argue that peacekeeping operations are primarily designed to bring peace and tranquility to the host nation-state. The UN mission in Congo was meant to facilitate the introduction and entrenchment of American hegemony in Central and Southern Africa in replacement of the departing colonial powers during decolonization. This view is confirmed by Wedgwood (1995), who noted that the US likes peacekeeping operations because they are "The denouement, the winding down of old battles for influence in the Third World between strategic opponents" in which the American hegemony replaces departed colonial powers. This is what transpired in Congo, where the peacekeeping mission was used to effect a well-calculated and executed regime change agenda. Lastly, the result further revealed that UN peacekeepers deployed in the Congo during the early 1960s did not serve the interests of the Congolese people they purported to have gone to serve and protect. The peacekeepers were used as a proxy force to advance the geostrategic interests of the US and its Western allies.

Recommendations

From this study on the "Critical Assessment of Geostrategic Infiltration in UN Peacekeeping Operations Deployed in Intra-State Armed Conflicts in Africa: The Case of ONUC in DRC in 1960," the following actionable recommendations could be proffered:

- Reforms aimed at reinstating the veritable role of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa faced with intra-state armed conflicts are paramount. While this study took into account the fact that altruism is at the inception of the creation of the UN peacekeeping operations as revealed in this work, coupled with the non-coherent role on the part of the peacekeepers in the deployed countries hit by intra-state armed conflicts, geostrategic infiltration has a preponderance effect on the successful consolidation of the mandates of the UN peacekeepers.
- Also, it is recommended that the UN should rather reinforce regional economic communities and the African Union with logistic support and allow them, uninfluenced,

to orchestrate charting the path to peace and stability in the consolidation of the mandate of restituting peace and stability in the countries hit by intra-state armed conflicts in Africa. For instance, should the UN had rather reinforced the culpability of the Congolese troops requested and/or sub-regional bodies and regional bodies like the then Organization of African Unity today known as the African Union with logistic support due to the incapacitation of these African-owned bodies and allowed them broker peace in DRC, it could have delivered better results over the UN peacekeepers ONUC. This position could not have been taken because it would have pre-empted geostrategic infiltration of the US and its allies in operation. Therefore, the UN should engage in a reform of reinforcing African Regional Economic Communities and the African Union, otherwise referred to as south-south reinforcement; it would not only have rekindled its veritable role but, most significantly, go a long way to accelerate the quelling of not only the protracted intra-state armed conflict in the DRC in 1960 but also several other intra-state armed conflicts during the post-Cold War decade and those in the last two decades of the 21st Century threatening peace, security, and development in the African continent. Additionally, it will serve as a spearheader of international peace and security.

- Third and lastly, it is also recommended that the hybrid nature of the intervention, that is, UN-AU intervention as happened in Darfur Sudan (double command otherwise taking the name fourth generation peacekeeping), should be given an ardent place. This hybrid intervention will enable the detection of any non-altruistic tendency in the UN peacekeeping missions by AU presence compared to third-generation peacekeeping that is exclusively UN without AU involvement.

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Contribution of Microfinance Institutions in the Growth of Small and Medium Enterprises in Tanzania: Evidence from Trade Enterprises in Moshi Municipality

Prosper J Kimaro*

Abstract

Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in developing and developed countries play a vital role in economic development. Despite their crucial role in the economy, SMEs continue failing in large numbers due to various problems that Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) claim to offer solutions such as access to finance. This study intended to assess microfinance institutions' contribution to SMEs' growth. Precisely, the study aimed at examining the contribution of credit to SMEs, determining the extent to which entrepreneurial training contributes to the growth of SMEs, and examining the contribution of MFIs technological innovations to the growth of SMEs. The study used a cross-sectional research design with a sample size of 231 respondents to collect the information required. Multiple Regression Analysis (MRA) and descriptive statistics were used in data analysis, whereas graphs and tables were used to present the results. It was found that MFIs play an important role in providing services to SMEs. With access to credit, the adjusted R^2 was 50.3%, indicating a highly positive relationship between access to credit and SMEs' growth. The results of entrepreneurial training also showed an adjusted R^2 of 38.8%, implying a normal positive relationship between entrepreneurial training and SMEs' growth. It can, therefore, be concluded that MFIs play an important role in facilitating the growth of SMEs. However, it was also revealed that the SMEs were still struggling to have a high pace of growth due to unfavorable credit terms, less entrepreneurial training, and low awareness of technological innovations. The study recommended that the MFIs improve the credit terms, and the government should also intervene in the activities of MFIs by creating policies aiming to favor the SMEs to improve the sector.

Keywords: *MFIs, SMEs Growth, Trade Enterprises, Moshi Municipality, Tanzania*

Introduction

SMEs are very important due to their role in eradicating poverty and their contribution to the economic growth of many developed and developing countries (Abara & Banti, 2017). In 2018, the European Union (EU) estimated to have about 25.1 million SMEs, whereby over 94 million people, equivalent to 66% of the total workforce, were employed in this sector with an average of 56% value-added contribution to the European economy (Clark, 2020). A study by Rotar *et al.* (2020) on the contributions of SMEs to employment in the European Union countries found that

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in Malta, SMEs contributed 81% of the national income in the economy. On the other hand, in India, the SME sector contributed about 8% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2015, whereas 45% of the total manufactured goods and 40% of the total exports came from SMEs (Mohanty & Patel, 2015). Furthermore, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) found that Brazilian SMEs accounted for 55% of the GDP and 62% of the total employment in 2019, with 79% of trade-based employment derived from SMEs (OECD, 2020). This implies that the majority of the SMEs in Brazil are involved in trading activities.

In the African context, SMEs have been contributing a large share of the economy in different countries. For example, a study carried out in 2017 showed that SMEs accounted for more than 90% of business enterprises while contributing about 50% of the national income of the responsible countries (Muriithi, 2017). For example, in Ghana in 2016, the Ghana Bank reported that SMEs have been contributing about 57% of the country's GNP (Kasimu *et al.*, 2017). Additionally, 50% of the GDP in Kenya and Nigeria came from SMEs in 2020 (Salifu, 2020). In South Africa, SMEs account for 57% of the GDP but also create employment opportunities for about 60% of the total population of the working class in 2017 (Tsatsenko, 2020; Kasimu *et al.*, 2017).

In Tanzania, SMEs are regarded as a pivot of economic growth (Ajose, 2010). The majority of citizens in the country are engaged in this business, and it is acknowledged that about 80% of the population have low incomes, compel them to focus mainly on SMEs, which involves businesses such as kiosks and retail shops (Itemba, 2014). Financial Sector Deepening Trust (2017) reported that the SME sector in the country was contributing to over 27% of the national income, and it employed more than 5.2 million people.

Although SMEs are crucial for economic development, they have been struggling with growth, as many tend to collapse within a year after being established (Hyder & Lussier, 2016). According to the OECD (2020), 21.5% of small businesses fail in their first year, and only 50% of them are able to remain in operation after the first five years. In addition, only about a third of them do manage to reach ten years worldwide. For example, about 80% of businesses in the United Kingdom collapse within the first ten years of existence. In South Africa and Kenya, about 70% and 46% of SMEs, respectively, do not last for more than five years, and about 76.4%

of SMEs that managed to survive more than a year operating under a very low or zero growth rate (Clark, 2020).

In search of solutions to the financial constraints faced by SMEs, MFIs become the plausible alternative. The MFIs were established to serve individuals who could not access bank services (Gambacorta & Marquez-Ibanez, 2011). Some of the services MFIs provide include issuing microcredit, saving facilities, and microinsurance (Lieberman *et al.*, 2020). Furthermore, Lieberman *et al.* (2020) suggested that MFIs have been very important in promoting the growth of SMEs, not only in providing financial services but also in providing them with various entrepreneurial training. In order to ensure improvement in the SME sector, the government of Tanzania introduced the National Microfinance Policy in 1996, intending to increase and promote microfinance services (URT, 2017).

Several studies (Fahandunsi, 2012; Claude, 2020; Itemba, 2014) have attempted to undertake similar studies on the growth of SMEs. Fandahunsi (2012) studied the growth of small businesses in the United States and established that the main cause of SMEs' failure was little or poor access to finance. A study by Claude (2020) on the relationship between access to finance and the performance of SMEs in Rwanda found that the SMEs that accessed financial support had higher growth in terms of revenues. The study by Itemba (2014) on MFIs and financing of micro and small enterprises conducted in Hai District-Tanzania established that challenges facing small enterprises apart from financial constraints include technological, marketing, tax-related policies, and government regulations.

Despite their attempts to address the constraints to the growth of SMEs, they generally addressed the relationship between small business performance and financial support, which is a narrow perspective in evaluating factors that influence the growth of SMEs. None of the acknowledged studies attempted to investigate the contribution of MFIs to the growth of SMEs, which the study at hand is all about.

In Tanzania, SMEs play a vital role in solving the problems of job creation, income generation, and growth of the economy (URT, 2017). This is because SMEs require small capital investment compared to large firms, but also, they are labor intensive, hence solving the unemployment

problem in the country (Ajose, 2010). After recognizing the participation of SMEs in the economy, the government of Tanzania shaped its strategies toward facilitating the improvement of SMEs (BOT, 2019). Therefore, the government has embarked on promoting SMEs by strengthening them through service providers such as the MFIs, conducting different entrepreneurial trainings, and amending its policies and regulations to support the SMEs (Mmari, 2012). For example, the National Microfinance Policy 2017 emphasizes promoting fair and affordable microfinance services.

Despite the government and MFIs' incentives and efforts to ensure the growth of SMEs in the country, many SMEs are still registering low returns, failing to expand, and most of them collapsing within the first five years of operation (Nkwabi & Mboya, 2019). Although many studies have tried to address the challenges, still little consideration has been employed in assessing the factors for SMEs' growth. Most of these studies have dealt mainly with assessing the performance of SMEs; for example, Itemba (2014) found that many SMEs needed to perform better due to different constraints such as technological, marketing, tax policies, and government regulations. Claude (2020), on the other hand, found that the SMEs that could obtain finance performed better than those that could not access financial support. The study further established that the growth rates of SMEs were too low, but still, there is inadequate information on the extent to which MFIs contribute to their growth. To fill this knowledge gap, this study aimed to assess the contribution of MFIs to the growth of SMEs in Moshi Municipality.

The intended study assessed the contribution of MFIs to the growth of SMEs in Moshi Municipality, Tanzania. Specifically, it determined the contribution of credit from the MFIs in the growth of SMEs, examined the extent to which entrepreneurial training offered by MFIs influences the growth of SMEs, and determined the contribution of MFIs' technological innovations on the growth of SMEs. The study is expected to provide insight into the role of MFIs towards the success of SMEs in Tanzania as follows: It will enable the MFIs to improve the provision of financial services to SMEs. The findings from this study are anticipated to be useful to SMEs as they enable them to be aware of the financial services provided by the MFIs. In addition, the study provides an opportunity for SMEs to address their thoughts on the services rendered by MFIs toward improving SMEs. On top of that, the study is useful to the Ministry of Finance to provide knowledge and skills required to support them in assessing the success of MFIs and SMEs' policies and to improve them if necessary. Thus, the findings were deemed

important in facilitating the growth of small and medium-scale entrepreneurs through financial institutions.

The Theory of Change guided the study (Costley & Fulton, 2018). The Theory of Change was developed in the 1990s by Huey Chen, Michael Quinn Patton, and Carol Weiss. According to Costley and Fulton, the theory tends to fill the gap between the existing state and the desired state by identifying the desired goals and then working backward toward developing the necessary interventions for its achievement. For the sake of this study, one intervention, the Access to Credit Theory of Change, is used to explain the role of MFIs in the growth of SMEs. The Theory of Change has also been applied by Cook and Olafsen (2016), who examined the development of small businesses. Ayyagari *et al*. (2017) also applied the theory of change in explaining the creation of employment through SMEs' development.

Cook and Olafsen (2016) illustrate that access to credit theory of change suggests that if more SMEs receive more and cheaper credits, their profits will eventually increase as well as employment. Through the credits, the SMEs will be able to purchase the needed services and equipment, which will facilitate the improvement in the productivity and sales of the SMEs. Thus, owing to the increase in productivity and sales, the profits will increase, which implies the enterprise's growth that may lead to an increase in employment opportunities. A simple diagrammatic representation of the theory is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Diagrammatic Representation of the Theory of Access to Credit



Source: Adopted from USAID (2019)

Under the above intervention, the theory is built under the following assumptions: SMEs need loans or credit to purchase services or equipment, lenders have improved information on SMEs' credit-worthiness, SMEs want to use their movable assets as collateral, regulations allow secured transactions and movable collaterals, SMEs owners use the borrowed funds wisely for investment and existence of credit guarantors to reduce the lender's risk (USAID, 2019). The theory has been criticized on the grounds that not only credits will lead to increasing firms' sales or efficiency and a high risk of loan default due to credit guarantees, but the SMEs' owners may use the borrowed funds to meet other demands apart from investing. SMEs may not have movable collaterals, and lenders do not have improved information on the credit worthiness of the SMEs.

The contribution of MFIs to the growth of SMEs was assessed by considering the independent and dependent variables, respectively. Therefore, the study's independent variable was the contribution of MFIs with its indicators as access to credit, entrepreneurial training, and technological innovations. The dependent variable was the growth of SMEs with its indicators as profit margin capital size of the business, while the intervening variable was inflation (Fig. 2). Figure 2: Conceptual Framework on the Contribution of MFIs in the Growth of SMEs in Tanzania



Source: *Researcher's Own Framework (2022)*

Research Methodology

In this study, a cross-sectional study design was employed during data collection. The design involved the collection of data from a population at one specific point in time. The study design facilitated the researcher to observe multiple variables without influencing or intervening in other variables. Thus, owing to the nature of this study and the time limitation, a cross-sectional study design stood out as the most appropriate design for the study as it enabled the researcher to obtain adequate data in the required time frame.

This study was conducted in Moshi Municipality, Tanzania. The Municipality lies between the coordinates 3° 20' 5.5788" South and 37° 20' 25.3752" East. Moshi Municipality is among the seven districts of the Kilimanjaro Region, located at the center of the region, bordered by the Moshi and Hai Districts. According to the 2012 census, Moshi Municipality had a population of 184,292 people; in 2017, the population in Moshi Municipality was estimated to be 201,150 people (URT, 2018). The study was based in Moshi Municipality due to its abundance of SMEs, and most of the MFIs in the region are located in the Municipality; thus, it was the best area to obtain the right and sufficient information concerning the study on hand.

The targeted population for the study included trading SMEs in Moshi Municipality, which consisted of 7000 micro-enterprises, 2630 small enterprises, and 1020 medium enterprises, making a total of 10650 enterprises as identified by the Moshi Municipal Council (2021). The sample size in this study consisted of 231 respondents. The number of respondents was obtained using the Yamane (1969) formula for computing the sample size. This formula was applied in the study as it is the best fit in the circumstance whereby the population is known, and it is regarded as an accurate method of obtaining a sample as it does not include estimates, which may disrupt the reliability of the sample obtained. It has been calculated under a confidence interval of 95% and a margin of error of 5%.

Due to the limitation in time for conducting the study and homogeneity in characters of the SMEs as observed from the pilot study, the researcher resided to 231 respondents, which were 60% of the calculated sample, as it was compatible to obtain sufficient and appropriate data. To

obtain the appropriate number of respondents from each category, the population ratio of each category was established and then multiplied by the sample size, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Distribution of Respondents (n=231)

Respondents	Population	Population Ratio	Sample (n)	Sample size (n)
Micro enterprises	7000	(7000/10650) = 0.7	231	(0.7*231) = 162
Small enterprises	2630	(2630/10650) = 0.2	231	(0.2*231) = 46
Medium Enterprise	1020	(1020/10650) = 0.1	231	(0.1*231) = 23

The researcher employed a stratified random sampling technique whereby the population was divided into three strata: micro enterprises, small enterprises, and medium enterprises. The respondents were then selected randomly from each stratum. This method enabled the researcher to obtain a more reliable sample and prevented bias in obtaining respondents. Data were collected from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data were obtained directly from the respondents in terms of qualitative and quantitative information, whereby data pertaining to the access to credit by MFIs, entrepreneurial skills, and technological innovation offered by MFIs on the growth of SMEs. Secondary data were obtained from relevant documents, SMEs' performance reports, MFIs' lending policies, and other relevant documents.

Different techniques were used in data collection methods, including surveys, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and documentary reviews. The survey method consisted of a questionnaire with a number of questions formulated to obtain information from the SMEs' owners (respondents). The questionnaire contained both open and closed-ended questions.

The study also used key informant interviews to obtain information through a guiding checklist that could not be obtained otherwise. In this method, ten key informants have included: five managers from microfinance banks, commercial banks with microfinance windows, and five SACCOs managers. Using these key informants facilitated the researcher in obtaining the necessary information to complement the information from the questionnaire. The researcher selected the informants purposively with regard to their knowledge of SMEs and reachability and know-how.

Further, the study employed focus group discussions in order to obtain information from the SMEs that would support other collected findings of the study. Two FGDs were conducted, which were composed of males and females. The group contained eight subjects, and each subject got a chance to participate fully in the discussion. The study also obtained secondary data from various documents so as to supplement the primary information. These documents included SMEs' policy and strategic plan, MFI's lending policies, and any other relevant documents assessing the contribution of MFIs to SMEs' growth.

The questionnaire was subjected to a reliability test on the internal consistency using Cronbach's Alpha coefficient. The Cronbach's Alpha coefficient is the most widely used measure of reliability in social and organizational sciences (Mallete & Duke, 2020). Based on the rule of thumb of George and Marllery (2003), the reliability is measured as follows: > 0.9 (excellent), > 0.8 (good), > 0.7 (acceptable, > 0.6 (questionable), > 0.5 (poor) and < 0.5 (unacceptable). When the questionnaire was tested, the coefficient revealed that the internal consistency of the measuring instrument was sufficient to provide reliable data with an alpha coefficient of 0.7 and above, which is acceptable (Table 2).

Table 2: Reliability Test

Variables	Cronbach's Alpha	Comment
Access to credit	0.765	Reliable
Entrepreneurial training	0.712	Reliable
Technological Innovations	0.877	Reliable
Average	0.785	Reliable

Further, in measuring the validity, content validity was determined as it refers to the extent to which the test fully represents what it aims to measure (Saunders *et al*., 2019). In order to ensure the validity of the data collected, a pilot study was carried out on 23 questionnaires based on 10% of the sample size rule of thumb for the pilot test, as declared by Cooper *et al.* (2018). The pilot study was carried out to test the data collection instruments, assess time for data collection, test procedures for data processing and analysis, and examine if the findings would be sensible.

Content analysis was used to analyze qualitative data by putting together the themes that resembled, that is, emphasizing pinpointing, examining, and recording patterns within data to describe phenomena and how they relate to a specific research question. The qualitative data included issues such as the sex of respondents, education level, and preference of respondents to a specific SME activity.

Quantitative data were analyzed through the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS), whereby data from each questionnaire was cleaned, coded, and entered into the SPSS. Descriptive statistics was used in data analysis; frequencies and percentages were employed throughout the three study objectives. The first and second objectives were also analyzed using Multiple Regression Analysis (MRA), which measures the relationship between independent and dependent variables. In contrast, the third objective was analyzed through content analysis. The MRA equation for the first and second objectives is presented below:

$$Y = \beta 0 + \beta 1X1 + \beta 2X2 + \beta 3X3 + e \quad (2)$$

Where Y= Growth of SMEs (Dependent variable), B0= Y-intercept (constant term), β1, β2 and β3 = Coefficients of independent variables, X1, X2, and X3 = Independent variables (which are the rate of interest, loan size, and repayment duration for objective one, managerial training, marketing training and networking training for objective two) and e = Random error term.

The MRA assumptions were tested for each objective to evaluate if there exists a linear relationship between the independent and dependent variables. The multicollinearity of independent variables was not too high, and a normal distribution of the residual existed. The multicollinearity of independent variables was tested using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) whereby, if the correlation was between 1 and 5, it was considered moderate. It did not require adjustments, but if it was higher than 5, adjustments were made on highly correlated variables to fit in the model. After data analysis, the outcomes were presented using tables and figures.

Findings and Discussions

An Overview

This chapter presents and discusses the findings obtained from the data analysis based on the research methodology and the objectives in assessing the contribution of MFIs to the growth of small and medium enterprises**,** evidence from trade enterprises in Moshi Municipality. The

findings are divided into four subsections, whereas the first section discusses the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, followed by a discussion of the research findings in line with the three research objectives.

Socio-demographic Characteristics of Respondents

Studying the general socio-demographic characteristics of individuals who participated in SMEs' activities was vital. This was due to the fact that their special socio-demographic characteristics would have an impact on the growth of their SMEs. Therefore, the socio-demographic characteristics studied by the researcher included the sex of respondents, marital status, occupation, and educational level (Table 3).

Table 3: Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents (n=219)

Variable	Frequencies (n)	Percentages (%)
Sex		
Male	96	43.8
Female	123	56.2
Total	**219**	**100.00**
Age		
18 – 23 years	11	5.0
24 – 40 years	152	69.4
Above 40 years	56	25.6
Total	**219**	**100.00**
Marital Status		
Single	68	31.1
Married	132	60.3
Divorced	6	2.7
Widowed	13	5.9
Total	**219**	**100.00**
Education:		
Non-formal	5	1.4
Primary	61	27.9
Secondary	100	45.7
Certificate/Diploma	23	10.5
Degree	32	14.6
Total	**219**	**100.00**
Type of business		
Retail Shop	82	37
Second-hand clothes	61	28
Food vendors	37	17
Mobile banking agents	13	6

Wholesale traders	20	9
Mini – supermarkets	6	3
Total	**219**	**100.00**
Duration in business		
1 year	-	-
1 – 2 years	60	27.4
3 – 5 years	114	52.1
Above 5 years	30	13.7
Total	**219**	**100.00**

From the analysis, the majority of the respondents were female (56.2%), while the male was 43.8% of the respondents. This implies that women are more interested in engaging in entrepreneurship activities than men. It is also found that the involvement of women in small financing groups 'VIKOBA' and 'VIBATI' have also increased their ability to engage in entrepreneurship. On the other hand, social-cultural attitudes could be another reason to explain the high participation of women in SMEs. Gupta (2018) revealed that most of the roles in the enterprises are dictated by gender stereotype, which explain why female frequency is high in SMEs. The study was in line with the findings obtained by Mukulu (2017), which indicated that 69% of the respondents in business were female and 31% were male.

The study findings revealed that most respondents (69.4%) ranged between 24 and 40 years, 25.6% represented 40 and above, and the rest were 18 to 23 years old. This implies that most of the participants in the SME sector are youths and early adults; the researcher found that these youths and early adults tend to engage in entrepreneurship to meet their increased responsibilities, as most of them begin families at this age. The findings confirmed the study by Nkwabi and Mboya (2019), who found that most people engaged in SMEs are middle-aged, ranging from 20 to 45.

The study findings revealed that 60.3% of the respondents were married, 31.1% were single, 5.9% were widowed, and only 2.7% were divorced. In the follow-up question, the researcher understood that most married individuals were compelled to engage in entrepreneurship to meet their families' responsibilities, such as school fees and providing basic needs for the family. The findings also revealed that married respondents could access start-up capital easily as the wife and husband both contribute to the start-up of the business. The findings were in line with Ernest (2016) and Mbowe (2020), who revealed that most entrepreneurs were married and entered into entrepreneurship due to family responsibilities.

Academic and professional qualifications are vital aspects in the prosperity of businesses and SMEs worldwide. Surprisingly, the majority of individuals engaged in SMEs are not highly educated, with secondary education being 45.7%, whereas primary education was 27.9%, university education was 14.6%, certificate, and diploma were 10.5%, and non-formal education was 1.4%, respectively. This implies that the majority of entrepreneurs possess just basic education at primary and secondary levels. This, in turn, shows that these groups are mostly motivated to conduct entrepreneurship. However, most of them tend to have low business growth as they do not possess adequate entrepreneurial and business management skills. The number of degree owners engaging in entrepreneurship has also been increasing over the years as many graduates tend to resort to entrepreneurship as a source of employment due to failure to acquire formal employment. These results were also in line with Mbowe (2020), who found that most SME owners possess ordinary secondary-level education.

The research findings included three categories of trade businesses: sales of services, goods, and those who used to sell both. Of all respondents, 51.6% were engaged in sales of goods, 39.7% dealt with services sales, and only 8.7% combined services and goods. Within the three categories, the findings also indicate that 37% dealt with retail shops, 28% were second-hand cloth retailers, 9% were wholesale traders, 3% were mini supermarkets, 17% were food vendors, and 6% were mobile banking agents. Including these groups enabled the researcher to obtain sufficient and appropriate data.

Experience in the occupation was another important factor that the study intended to know from the respondents as it highly influences business growth. The findings indicated that the majority (52.1%) of the respondents are in their third to fifth year in the business, 27.4% had 1-2 years of existence, while those with more than five years account for only 13.7% and those with the youngest duration had 6.8% respectively. This implies that most respondents possess wider experience in business undertakings such as business operation skills and networking. The experience of the SME owners in the industry is vital as it may contribute directly to the growth of the SMEs. The findings were in line with Kige (2013) and Salifu (2020), who found that the majority of the respondents fell under 3 -5 years of operation.

Contribution of Credit from the MFIs to the Growth of SMEs

Growth in SMEs was determined through a variety of factors, among which access to credit is among them. The study intended to find out whether SMEs were able to obtain credits from MFIs and to evaluate if the credit terms offered by MFIs to SMEs were favorable for the growth of their business. In pursuit of this, it was necessary to know if the respondents took credits from MFIs; thus, Table 4 depicts the sources of funds used by the SMEs in running their businesses.

Table 4: SMEs Sources of Finance (n=219)

Source of Fund	Frequency (n)	Percentages (%)	Percentage of cases (%)
Personal savings	205	50.1	93.6
Loans from friends and family	37	9.0	16.9
Credits from MFIs	167	40.8	76.3
Total	**409**	**100.0**	**186.8**

The study findings revealed that 93.6% of the respondent obtained funds to run their businesses through personal savings, whereas 76.3 declared to have taken loans from MFIs, and only 16.9% took loans from friends as one of their sources of business finance; this implies that loans from MFIs play a major role in ensuring the survival of the SMEs. With respect to this objective, the study also wanted to know whether the terms of credit were favorable toward enhancing growth in SMEs. To examine this, the study mainly focused on three factors: loan size, interest rates, and loan repayment period (Fig. 3).



Figure 3: Interest rates offered by MFIs to SMEs

In examining the extent to which credit terms influenced SMEs' access to credit, it was necessary to obtain information on the amount of interest that the MFIs have been charging the SMEs (Fig. 3). The findings revealed that 51.1% of the total respondents claimed that interest rates charged to them by MFIs ranged between 18 – 24%, 23.3% claimed 14 – 18%, 19.2% claimed 8 – 13% and only 6.4% claimed that the rates were above 24%. This shows that the majority (51.1%) of the respondents are being charged high rates when acquiring loans from MFIs, which may have a profit reduction effect and, hence, a low pace of growth.

Loan size is a vital factor influencing SMEs' growth. Other factors include the borrower's credit worthiness, the value of collateral, and the borrower's qualifying ratios. It can be seen in Figure 8 that many enterprises fell in the category of small loans, whereby 64% of them were taking small loans, 26% medium loans, and only 10% took large loans. This indicates that most SMEs, especially small enterprises, experience a low growth pace because they can only access small loans due to failure to meet the requirements for obtaining medium or large loans. The 26% and 10% of the respondents constituted a small part of the SMEs that access medium and large loans. This is due to the ability to meet the requirements, such as having large value collaterals and submission of formal documents, such as a budget showing the business's worthiness and ability to pay (Fig. 4).



Figure 4: Size of Loans accessed by SMEs from MFIs

Furthermore, the study examined the period to which the MFIs offer to SMEs for repayment of the loans. The findings in Table 4 indicate that most respondents (55.7%) said 7 to 12 months, 26% said 1 – 6 months, 14.6% said 1-3 years, and only 3.7% said more than 3 years.

Table 5: Duration of Repayment of Credits from MFIs (n=219)

Range of Repayment duration	Frequency (n)	Percent (%)
1 month – 6 months	57	26.0
7months – 12months	122	55.7
1 year – 3 years	32	14.6
more than 3 years	8	3.7

This is in line with what one key informant from CRDB Moshi Municipality pointed out:

> *"…we (CRDB) often offer 1-year loan to the SMEs …In rare occasions, the duration may be increased to more than that period, but in most cases, if the period is added, it normally reaches only two years"* (Key informant, CRDB Moshi Branch, 16 Jul 2021).

In this circumstance, it is difficult for SMEs to generate reasonable profits from the loan they obtain due to a very short period to induce the money into operation and earn returns. For some businesses, the returns tend to accumulate very slowly in such a way that SMEs' repayment period may fall due before they can generate profits from their investments in such a manner forcing them to use some of the loan amounts in repaying the loan, which in turn slows down the growth of the business.

Relationship between Access to Credit and Growth of SMEs

There is a close relationship between access to credit and the growth of SMEs, as depicted in Table 6**.**

Table 6: Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	0.721[a]	0.52	0.503	0.872	0.52	31.016	3	86	0

a. Predictors: (Constant), Rate of interest, Amount of loan, Loan duration
b. Dependent Variable: Growth of SMEs

From the model, the coefficient of determination R^2 was 0.52, which explains a fairly strong positive relationship between the dependent and independent variables, as it shows that the

variation in the dependent variables strongly influences the dependent variables. Statistically, the R^2 indicates that variation in the dependent variable is contributed 52% by interest rates, loan amount, and the loan repayment period. The remaining 48% may be contributed by other factors not included in the model, such as economic state and business experience.

The ANOVA Test

Table 7: ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	70.676	3	23.559	31.016	0.000[b]
	Residual	236.479	86	0.760		
	Total	136.000	89			

a. Dependent Variable: Growth of SMEs
b. Predictors: (Constant), Rate of interest, Amount of loan, Loan duration

The ANOVA results indicated a level of significance of 0.000, which helps to conclude that the model was highly significant with $P \leq 0.05$. The F value was 31.016, indicating that the entire model was significant and hence the obtained results were correct. This implies a significant relationship between the credit terms and the growth of SMEs, which in this study includes capital size and profit increase. The coefficients for the multiple regression were obtained, as presented in Table 8.

Table 8: Coefficient for Multiple Linear Regression Equation (n=219)

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig. (2. tailed)	Collinearity Statistics	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	1.459	0.416		3.512	0.001		
Rate of interest	-0.341	0.102	0.283	3.337	0.001	0.753	1.328
Amount of loan	0.485	0.105	0.364	4.633	0.047	0.647	1.546
Repayment duration	0.585	0.141	0.342	4.143	0.039	0.571	1.751

The results from the study showed that there was no multicollinearity problem as the VIF values for the predictor variables were all below 5, implying that there is a low percentage of one variable explaining the other variable, for example, in the above table only about 25% (1-Tolerance) of the rate of interest can be explained with loan amount and loan duration combined.

The results also indicate that the predictor variables were all statistically significant, with values below 0.05. The coefficients of the independent variables were -0.341, 0.485, and 0.585 for the rate of interest, amount of loan, and loan duration, respectively. In order to show the extent to which each predictor variable influenced the dependent variable, coefficients have been entered into the multiple regression equation 3.

$Y = \beta 0 + \beta 1X1 + \beta 2X2 + \beta 3X3 + e$……. (3)

$Y = 1.459 - 0.341X_1 + 0.485X_2 + 0.585X_3$

Where Y is the growth of SMEs, X_1 is the interest rate, X_2 is the loan amount, and X_3 is loan duration. The interest rate has a fairly negative relationship with the growth of SMEs, implying that for a one-unit decrease in rates of interest, there will be a 34.1% increase in the growth of SMEs. This is because lowering the interest rates will enable the SMEs to have higher residual profits after paying the interest; in such a manner, the interest may be used for the expansion of the size of the business. During a focus group discussion at the Moshi bus stand, when the owners of small enterprises were asked to explain how favorable were the rates of interest offered by MFIs, they said:

> *"...the rates of interest are too high…. that it is as if the profits received from the business are mainly being utilized in repaying the loan interest because very little amount remains for expansion of the business…"* (FGD, Moshi bus stand, 15 Jul 2021).

Furthermore, the model shows that a unit increase in the amount of loans will lead to a 48.5% increase in the growth of SMEs (capital size and profits increase). The analysis showed that most respondents (53%) took medium loans, 36% took small loans, and the remaining 11% took large loans. Most SMEs take medium loans (TZS 2,000,001 – 10,000,000) because they do not qualify for large loans; they do not possess the required attributes for such loans, including collaterals and business plans. Some may possess the requirements but do not acquire large loans due to the fear of default or failure to repay the loans, which may lead to the loss of their properties that they tie as collaterals in acquiring the loan. From the model, the relationship between the repayment period and the growth of SMEs is explained by coefficient β=0.585, which means a unit increase in the repayment period, the SMEs will grow by 58.5%.

Contribution of Entrepreneurial Training on the Growth of SMEs

Reachability of Entrepreneurial Training from MFIs to SMEs

In analyzing the extent to which entrepreneurial training issued by MFIs contributes to the growth of SMEs, the study intended to know the percentages of which respondents have ever received entrepreneurial training from MFIs. Among the total respondents, 71% acknowledged receiving training from the MFIs. This shows that the MFIs contribute significantly to disseminating entrepreneurial knowledge to SMEs (Fig. 5).

Figure 5: Frequency of the Entrepreneurial training received from MFIs



Thus, the findings show that MFIs' training had an important role in the growth of SMEs. In pursuit of examining the extent to which MFIs training contributes to SMEs' growth, the researcher used the Multiple Regression Analysis to establish the relationship training has on the growth of SMEs, and the summary results are presented in Table 9.

Table 9: Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.637[a]	0.405	0.388	0.479	0.405	46.245	5	339	0

a. Predictors: (Constant), Managerial training, Marketing training, Networking training
b. Dependent Variable: Growth of SMEs

Regression model results indicate an R of 0.637, which shows a fairly significant relationship between entrepreneurial training and the growth of SMEs. Thus, R^2 was 0.405, which implies that entrepreneurial training offered by MFIs influences the growth in SMEs by 40.5%. This is also complemented by Kyale (2013) and Mashenene and Rumanyika (2014), who got an R^2 of 40% in their study on the impact of MFIs on the growth and development of SMEs in Machakos town. The remaining 59.5% may be contributed by other factors not examined in the model. The model summary also indicates $P< 0.05$, which indicates that the data fit the model and the results are significant, but also the F-statistic of 46.245 shows the overall fitness of the estimates (Table 9).

Coefficients of Multiple Regression

Table 10: Relationship between entrepreneurial training and SME growth (n=219)

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig. (2tailed)	Collinearity Statistics	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	0.524	0.416		1.241	0.001		
Managerial training	0.184	0.123	0.583	4.779	0.015	0.645	1.55
Marketing training	0.361	0.151	0.586	1.382	0.056	0.765	1.307
Networking training	0.125	0.141	0.51	3.288	0.043	0.718	1.393

The results show VIFs of 1.55, 1.31, and 1.39 for managerial, marketing, and networking training, indicating no multicollinearity problem between the predictor variable. It also indicates that the magnitude of the coefficient for managerial training is significant, with a significant level of 0.015, while having a beta value of 0.184, implying that an increase in one unit of managerial training would lead to an increase of 0.184 to the growth of the SMEs. Furthermore, the study indicates the magnitude of the coefficient for networking training as significant at 0.043. It also shows a coefficient of 0.125, indicating that for a unit increase in networking training, the growth of the SMEs will increase by 0.125.

According to the third predictor variable, the findings show that marketing training contributes to the growth of SMEs. The model indicates that marketing training has a positive relationship with the growth of SMEs, with a beta value of 0.361, indicating that a unit increase in marketing training will lead to a 36.1% increase in the growth of SMEs. However, the result was not statistically significant, with P value of 0.56; hence it cannot be used for any inferences. The magnitude to which each predictor variable contributes to the dependent variable is shown clearly in the multiple regression equation 4.

$Y = \beta0 + \beta1X1 + \beta2X2 + \beta3X3 + e$…… (4)

$Y = 0.524 + 0.184X_1 + 0.361X_2 + 0.125X_3$

Whereby Y is the growth of SMEs, X_1 is managerial training, X_2 is marketing training, and X_3 is networking training. The results are in line with the study by Nneji and Akpan (2015): Mashenene (2015), and World Bank (2020), who found that managerial training, especially pre-loan training, increases profits by 6.24% while networking training increases profits by 45%. This shows that apart from financial assistance provided by MFIs, non-financial services also play a vital role in enhancing the growth of SMEs.

Contribution of Technological Innovations toward the Growth of SMEs

Awareness of Technological Innovations

The modern world has been dominated by technological innovation, and technological advancement has affected the operations of different activities in the world, especially business operations. This study intended to evaluate how technological innovations implemented by Microfinance Institutions in providing services to SMEs have contributed to the growth of SMEs. First, the researcher was eager to know whether the respondents were aware of Technological innovations (Fig. 6).

Figure 6: SME awareness toward technological innovations



Figure 6 indicates that 85.4% of the respondents were familiar with technological innovations, whereas only 14.6% declared unfamiliarity with terms. This shows that a significant number of respondents could provide insight into the contribution of technological innovations. When asked about their awareness of mobile banking services offered by MFIs, 83.6% of the respondents were unaware, while 16.4% were unfamiliar with the service. Furthermore, the study wanted to know whether respondents were aware of agency banking services provided by MFIs. In this case, 70.8% were aware, while 29.2% were unaware of the service. Hence, it can be concluded that most of the technological innovations utilized by MFIs in providing services to their clients are well-known by SMEs.

Utilization of the Technological Innovations

In pursuit of understanding how these SMEs benefited from the innovations, the researcher sought to establish the frequencies of the respondents that had been utilizing these services in their businesses. When assessing the utilization of mobile banking services, it was found that 52% of the respondents had been using the services often, 32% very often, 14% rarely, and 2% never utilized it at all. This indicates that mobile banking services have been one of the important tools for SMEs in performing their duties. On the other hand, utilization of agency banking had

the following results; 46% were using it often, 22% very often, 22% rarely, and only 10% never used the service at all (Fig. 7).

Figure 7: Frequency of Utilization of Technological Innovations



With these results, it can be seen that the majority of SMEs were utilizing these services in undertaking their daily activities. This was also revealed in the FGD conducted at the bus stand in Moshi Municipality whereby, one discussant said:

> *"…the use of mobile banking facilities and agency banking has enabled the customers to easily pay for activities and services….it has helped us in paying our suppliers and operations have become easy…. at any time we need supply we just transfer money to suppliers, and the goods are delivered hence we do not need to close our businesses so as to go to the bank to access funds…"* (FGD, Moshi Bus Stand, 15 Jul 2021).

Further, when the respondents were inquired about the contribution of technological innovations in the growth of SMEs profits, 56% replied high, 28% said it was moderate, 12% said it was low, and 4% said they had no change. This implied that most respondents utilizing the technological innovations were more likely to increase their profitability than those not using the service (Table 11).

Table 11: Contribution of Technological Innovations towards SME Growth (n=219)

Parameter	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
High	123	56
Moderate	61	28
Low	26	12
No change	9	4

Growth of SMEs

In this study, the growth of SMEs was measured by the growth in size of capital and profits. Growth on capital size shows that 46.6% increased their capital ranging from 1,000,000/= to 5,000,000/=; 26.5% increased their capital from 5,000,001 – 10,000,000/=; 13.7% increased their capital from 10,000,001 – 20,000,000/=; 6.8% increased their capital more than 20 million and only 6.4% had increased by a range of 0 – 1,000,000/=. This implies that the majority of SMEs are still experiencing moderate growth in their capital. This was complemented by a statement from a key informant from FINCA who said:

> *"...majority of our clients who are categorized under the SME umbrella, especially the small enterprises, tend to stay in that capital range for a long period, therefore indicating a slow growth in their capital sizes which may be due to lacking the necessary skills to run their businesses..."* (Key informant, FINCA loan manager, 2 Aug 2021).

An increase in profits was another indicator to measure the growth of SMEs. In line with this proposition, it shows that 41.1% of the respondents had increased profits from 1,000,000/= to 5,000,000/=, whereas 33.8% increased from 1,000,001 – 5,000,000 shillings, 12.8% increased from 10,000,001 – 20,000,000 shillings, 5% increased more than 20 million and only 7.3% had increased by a range of 0 – 1,000,000/=. This implies that most SMEs increase profits from 1 million to 5 million annually and 100,000 to 1,000,000/=TZS, respectively.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

The study assessed the contribution of MFIs to the growth of SMEs and revealed that MFIs significantly impact the growth of SMEs. It has been noted that access to credit, which has been a significant challenge to SMEs, has been reduced to a large extent through the MFIs' operations and conditions. The findings also indicate that significant improvement in the growth of SMEs is influenced by non-financial services such as managerial training and networking provided by the MFIs. Another important factor that has been observed to contribute to the growth of SMEs has been the mobile and agency banking services which have reduced the fund accessibility of the SMEs.

The study shows that the loans provided by the MFIs are the key to the financing problem of SMEs. However, the credit terms have not been regarded to be unfavorable for the growth of SMEs; for instance, interest rates have been regarded as too high to support growth that requires the intervention of the government by reducing the Bank of Tanzania lending rates to the financial institutions that may lead to a reduction in the interest burden for SMEs which will enable them to grow. The repayment period and loan amount are still unfavorable to the SMEs.

It is also critical to highlight MFIs' challenges in dealing with SMEs. The study shows that most respondents provided with credits by the MFIs are reluctant to repay the loans. This leads to a risk of default repayment of loans, which affects the operations of the MFIs. Thus, it results in the formulation of the conditions that limit access to finance from the MFIs. Also, the misperceptions of some respondents toward utilizing mobile banking and agency banking facilities can be considered a drawback toward microfinance services utilization.

Lastly, the study concluded by enlightening the impact of financial and non-financial services on SMEs. Most MFIs tend to focus more on financial services and ignore the non-financial factors contributing to SME growth. The study shows that non-financial factors such as entrepreneurial skills contribute highly to the operations of businesses; thus, emphasis should be placed on

providing non-financial and financial services to ensure effective development in the small and medium-scale entrepreneurship sector.

Recommendations

Based on the research title, objectives, findings, and conclusions, the following are the recommendations for improvement for both MFIs and SMEs:

i. The study recommends that the MFIs should come up with a better means to improve financial services to SMEs; for example, they may improve the techniques for providing credits without the need for collaterals and also provide knowledge to the public on the procedures of acquiring financial services from the institutions. It is important that some SMEs are not taking credits from the financial institution not because they are well placed financially but because they do not know the procedures for acquiring credits.

ii. The study also recommends that financial institutions review the terms and conditions for financing SMEs. For example, the interest rates given to the SMEs should be favorable in order to encourage the SMEs to take credits from the financial institutions, and the attached conditions should be made simpler, flexible, and user-friendly to enable a larger spectrum of SMEs to acquire credits.

iii. The MFIs should provide knowledge to the public on how to utilize the technological innovations as well as provide them with assurance of safety in utilizing the innovations. For example, CRDB offers a mobile banking app where individuals can access their funds instantly, take loans, receive payments, and make payments instantly. The majority of SMEs are utilizing the service, yet some are not aware of the app and how they can benefit from it, so it is necessary to increase the promotion of such facilities.

iv. Lastly, the government should create conducive policies to ensure MFIs provide services to SMEs in a favorable manner. For example, it should ensure that with the reduction in BOT interest, the act is reflected by other MFIs toward their clients. The government should create policies ensuring that SMEs get a more extended loan repayment period and also hold seminars on entrepreneurial trainings, such as loan management skills, to enlighten the SMEs on managing their businesses.

Areas for Further Studies

Owing to the limitation in time, the study could have been more comprehensive. Thus, there is a need for further research on some key issues. Issues such as how SME growth affects the livelihood of the SME's owners and the alternatives to eradicating the challenges of countering the SME's financial and non-financial problems need to be further addressed.

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Assessing the Effectiveness of Government Communication on Public Policy in Ghana: The Case of Planting for Food and Jobs Policy

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Abstract

This paper examined the effectiveness of government communication on public policy in Ghana using the Planting for Food and Jobs (PFJ) policy as a case. Data was obtained from 412 inhabitants from the Western Region who responded to a set of questionnaires and a structured interview guide. Means, standard deviation, Mann-Whitney U-test, and Kruskal Wallis test were employed for data analysis. The study established that though respondents perceived the PFJ policy as highly relevant to job creation and food production, the overall effect of the policy on job creation was low. No significant differences existed in the views of male and female respondents regarding the perceived effect of the policy on job creation and food production. Government communication strategies to promote awareness, public dialogue, shared understanding, and public support towards the policy were all perceived as moderately effective. However, government communication activities to explain the policy details to the public, mobilize citizens and communities to support the policy, and promote positive behavior change for the policy were perceived as lowly effective by the respondents despite the differences in their ethnic backgrounds. Government press releases and press conferences on the progress of the policy were lowly effective. Though government communication at the implementation stage of the policy was effective, it was generally ineffective during the formulation, monitoring, and evaluation stages of the policy. Measures suggested to sustain the policy include increased commitment from state authorities, increased participation by all stakeholders, improved communication on the policy, grassroots ownership, and de-politicization of the policy.

Keywords: *Communication, Government Communication, Policy, Planting for Food and Jobs*

Introduction

Communication is critical to the success of every policy. Public policies find acceptance and support from the public when stakeholders effectively communicate the policies to the citizens. Communication is one avenue where policy is openly considered, often in hearings and debates, in the editorial pages of newspapers and magazines, radio and television talk shows, political weblogs, and social networking sites (Peterson, 2008; Young, 2000). Communication is the subject of public policy, most notably in laws and regulations on forms of speech, mass media, and telecommunication. It is also the object of policy, as witnessed in the efforts by government

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and non-government agencies to inform and educate various publics about societal problems (Peterson, 2008; Young, 2000). Indeed, the democratic legitimacy of public policy depends partly on the state institutions being sensitive to the communication process surrounding the policy. The ethical force of the processes of communicating public policies, then, rests in part on a requirement that such communication needs to be both inclusive and critically self-conscious (Young, 2000).

Communication is essential to the success of all organizations, including government organizations (Mu, Li & Fu, 2018). Communicating government policies, programs, and activities has become even more critical now than ever before due to increasing citizens' expectations. This, therefore, highlights the value of government communication (Canel & Sanders, 2016; Howlett, 2009). According to Canel and Sanders (2016), government communication is a field of practice and communication studies directed to the core public in pursuing both political and civic goals. Government communication is a type of communication carried out by *executive* politicians and officials, often in a controlled way, working for public institutions that are created based on citizens' overt or covert consent and are charged to enact their will (Canel & Sanders, 2016).

In essence, government communication focuses on *executive* communication and is broadly defined as seeking not only *political* but also *civic goals*. Government communication has a political dimension, often largely controlled by the executive arm, and can focus on achieving civic goals. Government communication activities should address various complexities in terms of goals, structures, and resources (Canel & Sanders, 2016). Ho and Cho (2017) opined that due to legal restrictions, political pressures, or fiscal constraints, many governments tend to invest their limited resources in service delivery without paying attention to communication. Given the political nature of the concept, government communication is sometimes viewed as political communication (Mu *et al.*, 2018). However, government communication is different from political communication. The latter often tends to focus on political party or electoral communication, whilst the core preoccupation of government communication is towards the broader public good (Canel & Sanders, 2016; Mu *et al.*, 2018).

The field of government communication has not received considerably adequate research attention (Ho & Cho, 2017; Mu *et al.*, 2018). Very few scholars have attempted to investigate government communication activities with the target group that can affect policy performance (Ho & Cho, 2017; Howlett, 2009). Falasca and Nord (2013: 41) contended that research in the field of government communication requires much attention. In their study in Sweden, Falasca and Nord (2013: 41) concluded that the government communication activities and their strategies are still very fragmented. They are not well-organized and clearly structured. It is very difficult to coordinate a government communication strategy for the different ministries and departments as well as between political and civil servant communicators. Though attempts have been made by scholars to contribute to the literature on government communication, scholarly attention on the field of government communication is scanty, especially in the areas of policymaking and implementation (Liu, Horsley & Yang, 2012). Particularly in Africa, Johansson and Raunio (2019) asserted that there is a dearth of literature on the field of government communication in the continent. It is largely believed that much of the literature on government communication focuses on the Western world, with very little focus on Africa (Johansson & Raunio, 2019).

Policies are essential for improving organizations and the larger society. Governments across the globe have and continue to institute policies to improve the lives of their citizens. Particularly in Ghana, successive governments embark upon various policies to help make the lives of the citizens better. In recent times, policies such as Free Maternal Care, Free Senior High School (SHS), Free School Uniforms, and Free Textbooks have been implemented by successive governments to improve the lives of the citizens. Policies, including the School Feeding Policy, the Free Technical, Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Policy, and the Electronic Levy (E-Levy), have been instituted by the current government with the view to promoting development in the country. However, the implementation of public policies in Ghana is often met with several challenges. A case in point has been the E-Levy policy, which faced and continues to face mounting opposition from across the Ghanaian public. Again, the School Feeding and Free SHS policies have been met with various challenges, such as low public commitment and low public support, political interference, and inadequate sustainability mechanisms. Other concerns relate to low public awareness about the policy details and poor stakeholder engagement in designing and formulating these policies (Ghana News Agency, 2018; Mabe *et al.*, 2018).

The *Planting for Food and Jobs* (PFJ) policy is one notable public policy Ghana has implemented in recent history. The PFJ policy, which has been in operation since 2017, aims to increase food production and ultimately achieve food security in line with the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 2. As a flagship policy of the current government, PFJ seeks to modernize the agriculture sector to improve food production, reduce poverty, and enhance employment creation (FAO, 2020; Ministry of Food and Agriculture [MoFA], 2021). Despite the relevance of the PFJ policy, there are growing concerns about the policy. Concerns include low public awareness about the policy details, low commitment and support from the public, low stakeholder engagement, and political interference (Ghana News Agency, 2018; Mabe *et al.*, 2018). These concerns raise doubts about the effectiveness of government communication regarding the policy. This is because effective government communication should lead to increased public awareness about the policy details, public support for the policy, etc. (Mu *et al.*, 2018). Effective government communication helps to explain policies. It promotes the legitimacy of public policy decisions at all levels and helps to maintain social bonds (Pasquier, 2012). Though some studies (FAO, 2020; Pauw, 2022; Tanko *et al.*, 2019) have been done on the PFJ policy, none of these studies looked at government communication around the policy. In essence, there is no empirical evidence on the level of effectiveness of government communication with respect to the PFJ policy.

This study is motivated by the fact that there is the need to effectively communicate public policy (Pasquier, 2012) because public policies will fail if stakeholders fail to effectively communicate them to the public (Buaku, 2017). From the perspective of the Western Region, this study assessed the effectiveness of government communication on public policies in Ghana using the PFJ policy as a case. The researchers chose to focus on the PFJ policy given the potential the policy has in terms of promoting food security amidst increasing prices of food produced in the Ghanaian markets, which threatens the realization of SDG 2. The rationale for focusing on the PFJ is further strengthened by the potential the policy has in contributing to job creation in the face of increasing unemployment in Ghana, which constitutes a major threat to the peace and stability of the country.

Research Objectives

- To ascertain the views of inhabitants of the Western Region on the relevance of the policy to job creation and food production.
- To examine the perceived effects of the policy on job creation and food production.
- To examine the perceptions of inhabitants on the level of effectiveness of government communication on the policy.
- To identify the measures to promote the sustainability of the policy.

Literature Review

Conceptualizing Government Communication

Communication is core to the success of every organization. At the organizational level, communication refers to the organizational mechanisms and behaviors to convey information between the various internal and external stakeholders. It helps organizations to achieve their goals (Mu *et al.*, 2018). Communication is also key to the success of government institutions. Howlett (2009, 2011) opined that communication helps the government and its actors to reach policy goals and maintain mutually beneficial relationships between governments and the various publics on whom policy success or failure relies. Government communication has, therefore, become an important component of communication approaches. As a concept, government communication is a well-planned process of releasing or withholding information or knowledge-based resources from policy target groups to influence and direct their behaviors, attitudes, and actions regarding the policy (Garnett & Kouzmin, 1997). This means that government communication activities entail organized processes of providing or keeping information or messages about planned or ongoing policy to influence and direct behaviors, attitudes, and actions in respect of the policy.

According to Pasquier (2012), government communication mainly involves all forms of activities within the public sector institutions and organizations which aim at conveying and sharing information, largely for the purpose of presenting and explaining government decisions and actions, promoting the legitimacy of these interventions, defending recognized values and helping to maintain social bonds. In the views of Canel and Sanders (2013), government communication consists of several activities and possibilities. To clearly capture the full range of

the possibilities of government communication, Canel and Sanders (2013: 4) defined it as consisting of the *role*, *practice*, *aims*, and *achievements* of communication as it takes place in and on behalf of a *public* institution(s). Canel and Sanders (2013) added that the primary end of public institutions in the context of government communication is towards the executive arm in the service of a *political* rationale. These are constituted based on the *people's* indirect or direct *consent* and are charged to enact their *will*.

Dimensions, Forms, and Relevance of Government Communication

Government communication is viewed from two different levels. The first is by looking at government communication in terms of what it does (its actions). The second is by looking at government communication in terms of what it is (Canel & Sanders, 2013; Howlett, 2009). Based on what it does, government communication is understood as a policy tool or instrument that is intended to give effect to policy goals. Here, government communication focuses on the use of government informational resources to influence and direct policy actions through the provision or withholding of 'information' or 'knowledge' from societal actors. Typical examples of such policy tools are information and advertising (Howlett, 2009). Again, government communication is based on what it involves what government communication actually entails. It is about what makes up government communication and how such communication manifests itself.

There are various types of government communication. First, there is government-wide communication involving the structures for communication under the auspices of heads of government or ministers. Second, there is communication emanating from the administration. While administrative communication, in theory, is highly factual, "it can also acquire a political quality depending, for example, on when the information in question is released" (Pasquier, 2012). Other types include communication activities pertaining to public policy, effectively constituting policy instruments. Also, there is institutional communication, which involves enhancing the visibility and influence of the organization, as well as crisis communication. Again, government communication research typically employs a multilevel analysis by looking at micro, meso, and macro levels in the organizational structure (Canel & Sanders, 2014; Esser & Pfetsch, 2004).

Government Communication and Public Policy

Government communication and public policies are closely related in many ways. No public policy is successfully designed and implemented without effective government communication. Government communication facilitates policy understanding toward issues. In support of this assertion, Mu *et al.* (2018) have identified three dimensions of government communication, including prior consultation, policy marketing, and policy training. Policy understanding not only focuses on the overall level of policy understanding but also distinguishes between subjective and objective policy understanding. In their research, Mu *et al.* (2018) discovered that government communication can facilitate policy understanding and that the different dimensions of government communication play varying roles in fostering different aspects of policy understanding. Only prior consultation and policy training significantly influence policy understanding, while policy marketing does not significantly affect improving policy understanding. Mu *et al.* (2018) added that the role of policy training in fostering policy understanding is stronger than that of prior consultation.

In the views of Hiebert (1981), an effective government communication framework should involve making many different decisions that fit together. The framework should ensure that decisions are made upon one or more of four different strategies: withholding, releasing, staging, and persuading. In each of these communication strategies, a variety of communication techniques can be used, each to a different effect. The framework should also cover policy considerations and political structures (Graber, 2003; Hiebert, 1981). Since the 1990s, there have been diverse efforts to develop communication capacities across various parts of government organizations. This development is informed by a natural reflection of the increased information demands from the media and the public. The development is also underpinned by an independent expansion of capacities in order to maintain influence in the public debate and keep the initiative in the political agenda-setting process alive (Falasca & Nord, 2013: 41).

Generally, two types of government communication activities can be identified. The first type concentrates on communication activities before policy implementation, including the stages of policy design and policy release. The function of this type of communication lies in better designing the policy by incorporating the practical situations of the target group and giving more useful information and assistance to the target group to help them understand the policy before

implementation. The second type deals with government communication activities after policy implementation. The purpose of this type of government communication activity is to collect data in the form of feedback on policy performance, conduct policy evaluation, and ultimately promote policy learning and adaptation (Mu *et al.*, 2018).

Ghana's Agricultural Sector: The Planting for Food and Jobs Policy

The agricultural sector of Ghana remains a significant aspect of the country's economy. For decades, the sector has played an essential role in the socioeconomic development of the country in various ways, including promoting food security, improving the livelihoods of the rural inhabitants, and an avenue for the industrial growth of the country (Abebe & Alemu, 2017). Besides, various opportunities exist in the agricultural sector for addressing unemployment among the country's large youth population. The sector also has the potential to increase domestic production of marketable, nutritious foods. Indeed, in recent decades, the issue of food security has been on the agenda of the country (FAO, 2020).

Successive governments have and indeed continue to implement policies aimed at improving the agricultural sector in view of the far-reaching impact of the sector. A critical part of the focus has been on food security. Achieving food security has become part of the country's long-term agricultural sector-specific strategic plan elaborated in Ghana's Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP I and II). Farmers and other stakeholders within the sector all have a role to play in this regard. For example, farmers need to be supported by the government and other key stakeholders. However, supporting farmers and creating an enabling environment for agricultural investment requires useful data. Decision-makers in the sector need to access quality data to enable them in decision-making and planning (FAO, 2020).

As already indicated, the implementation of the PFJ policy began in 2017. It is one key policy initiative Ghana has adopted to increase food production and ultimately achieve food security. The PFJ aims to modernize the agriculture sector to improve food production, reduce poverty, and enhance employment creation (FAO, 2020; MoFA, 2021). The policy has five modules: Planting for Crops, Planting for Export and Rural Development, Greenhouse Technology Village, Rearing for Food and Jobs, and Agricultural Mechanization Services. Notable measures

to achieve these core goals include subsidized certified seeds, subsidized fertilizer, the promotion of e-agriculture, the enhancement of market opportunities, and the provision of free extension services (MoFA, 2021).

Materials and Methods

The study was purely quantitative and was conducted using a descriptive survey design. The research focused on the perceptions of inhabitants in the Western Region, including public policies, using quantitative methods (Sledge & Thomas, 2021; Strother & Gadarian, 2022). The Western Region covers an area of about 13,842 square kilometers and has a population size of 2,060,585. The Region is in the southern part of Ghana. Its capital is Sekondi-Takoradi. There are 14 administrative districts in the Region. There are various ethnic groups in the Region, with agriculture as their predominant occupation. It is one of the regions where the PFJ policy was implemented (Ghana Statistical Service, 2023; Western Regional Coordinating Council [WRCC], 2022).

The study population was drawn from inhabitants in the Region who were 18 years or older. The inhabitants in the Region who were above were estimated at 1,614,289 (Zhuji World, 2023). The researchers relied on a convenience sampling method to select the inhabitants. The convenience sampling method enables researchers to select respondents based on their accessibility, availability, and proximity (Saunders *et al.*, 2012). According to Suen, Huang, and Lee (2014), even though the convenience sampling method is a non-probability technique, it is mostly employed in quantitative studies. The PFJ was a public policy commonly known to Ghanaian citizens, and inhabitants in the Region could have a fair knowledge of the policy. Hassan (2022) states that in the convenience sampling method, the sampling frame is restricted to the individuals who are readily available and willing to take part in the study. A total of 412 inhabitants were selected for the study based on their accessibility, availability, and willingness to participate (Saunders *et al.*, 2012). Though the research results based on the convenience sampling method may not be useful in drawing generalizations for the larger population, they are still vital in providing insights into issues (Hassan, 2022).

Structured interviews and a set of questionnaires were used to collect data from the respondents. A structured interview was used to collect data from Ghanaians who did not have any formal education to enable them to express themselves in the English Language but had agreed and

were willing to participate in the study. The structured interview, also called a researcher-administered survey, is a quantitative data collection instrument used to collect data from respondents who cannot read or write. With this instrument, the researcher reads the questions and their corresponding answers in the survey and translates them into a language the respondent understands. The respondent then selects his or her choice based on the options provided, and the researcher ticks or underlines the option chosen by the respondent in the survey. Structured interviews are like questionnaires. However, the distinction between structured interviews and questionnaires lies in how the two instruments are administered. The former takes relatively more time to administer than the latter (Ashfaq, 2016). The research team spent a little over an hour with each interviewee who responded to a set of questions during the structured interview sessions.

For respondents who could read and write, a self-administered questionnaire was used to obtain relevant data from them. Both the structured interview and the self-administered questionnaire had the same set of items. The items were all closed-ended and were mostly on a five-point Likert Scale. Respondents who filled out the questionnaire were encouraged to complete the questionnaire for retrieval by the research team in two weeks' time. A number of them were able to complete the questionnaire within a week. After two weeks, the research team went round to retrieve the filled questionnaires from the respondents. The questionnaire and the structured interview were pilot-tested in the Central Region. Central Region was chosen because the region shares similar geographical, economic, social, and cultural characteristics with Western Region. Descriptive statistical tools such as frequencies, percentages, means, and standard deviation were used for the descriptive analysis. However, for the inferential analysis, Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests were used. Mann-Whitney U-test analysis was done to determine whether differences existed between the overall mean scores of perceived effects of the policy on job creation and food production for male and female respondents. Again, the Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to examine the differences between the ethnic backgrounds of respondents and their overall views on government communication activities and strategies on the policy. Tables and a graph were used to present the study findings to clarify the issues investigated. Ethical issues such as voluntary participation, confidentiality, anonymity, and data privacy were all

adhered to when conducting this study. Before data collection, ethical clearance was obtained from the Directorate of Research, Innovation and Development of University of Media, Arts and Communications (UniMAC Institute of Journalism Campus).

Results and Discussion

Demographic Features of Respondents

In presenting and discussing the results, the researchers first focused on the demographic features of the respondents, as shown in Table 1. It is clear from the table that 54.8 percent of the respondents were males, while 45.2 percent of them were females. This shows that more (54.8%) males took part in this study. The result on gender seems to affirm the literature (Brinkhoff, 2022), which shows that there are more male inhabitants in the Western Region than female inhabitants.

On age distribution, it can be seen in Table 1 that 8.3 percent of the respondents were below 26 years, 18.2 percent were between 26 and 30 years, whereas 31.1 percent were between 31 and 35 years. The table further shows that most (76.5%) respondents were between 26 and 40. This implies that most of the respondents were youth within the country's active labor population. Again, these age groups form a considerable proportion of the population of Ghana. It is also clear in Table 1 that most (72.1%) of the respondents had educational qualifications not below secondary level, with about 40 percent of them having tertiary education as their level of education. The finding on level of education of respondents departs from earlier study (Brinkhoff, 2022) which reported that there are more inhabitants in Western Region who are literate than illiterate inhabitants.

Table 1: Demographic Features of Respondents

Sex	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Male	226	54.8
Female	182	45.2
Total	412	100.0
Age (years)		
Below 26	34	8.3
26-30	75	18.2
31-35	128	31.1
36-40	112	27.2
Above 40	63	15.3
Total	412	100.0

Educational level		
No formal education	38	9.2
Basic Education	77	18.7
Secondary Education	130	31.6
Tertiary Education	167	40.5
Total	412	100.0
Status		
Single	216	52.4
Married	186	45.1
Divorced	6	1.5
Widow	4	1.0
Total	412	100.0

On marital status, it is seen in the table that more than half (52.4%) of the respondents were single, while 45.1 percent of them were married. Though the majority (52.4%) of the respondents were single, a good number of them (45.1%) were married. Nonetheless, the finding on marital status contradicts a report by Sasu (2021), which suggested that more than fifty percent of Ghanaian men and women were married or in union. Finally, the ethnic background of the respondents showed that Akan is the dominant ethnic group (69.4%). This is followed by the Ewes (17%) and the Dagombas (9%) as the third largest ethnic group (Figure 1). The result on ethnic backgrounds is not surprising because the Region is predominantly Akan-dominated. However, it is gratifying to note that there are other ethnic groups who have become settlers. This shows the diversity of people in the study area, which is a common phenomenon in Ghana.



Figure 1: Ethnic composition of respondents

Research Objective One: To ascertain the views of inhabitants of the Western Region on the relevance of the policy to job creation and food production

The study first ascertained the views of respondents on the relevance of the policy to job creation and food production in Ghana (Table 2).

Table 2: Views of respondents on the relevance of the policy to job creation and food production

Module	Mean	Standard Deviation
Job creation		
Food Crops	4.18	0.52
Planting for Export and Rural Development	4.59	0.86
Greenhouse Technology Village	4.05	0.92
Rearing for Food and Jobs	4.01	0.91
Agricultural Mechanization Services	3.37	1.25
Total	4.04	0.89
Food production		
Food Crops	4.33	1.08
Planting for Export and Rural Development	4.71	0.54
Greenhouse Technology Village	3.18	0.72
Rearing for Food and Jobs	4.09	0.86
Agricultural Mechanization Services	4.05	0.90
Total	4.07	0.82

The researchers focused on the various modules under the policy and how respondents perceived their relevance to job creation and food production in Ghana. Means were calculated for the responses obtained from the fieldwork, where 4.50-5.0 represents Very High Relevant (VHR), 3.50-4.0 represents High Relevant (HR), 2.50-3.49 represents Moderate Relevant (MR), 1.50-2.49 represents Low Relevant (LR), and 1.00-1.49 represents Very Lowly Relevant (VLR). In terms of job creation, the policy was perceived as highly relevant (M=4.04). For example, the various modules such as Food Crops (M=4.18), Planting for Export and Rural Development (M=4.59), and Rearing for Food and Jobs (M=4.01) were all regarded as highly relevant to job creation. The findings on food production agree with the literature (Pauw, 2022), which found that the PFJ policy has contributed to food production in the country. The results on the relevance of the policy to food production further strengthen Fearon, Adraki, and Boateng (2015), who argued that such policies help to improve food production and security in Ghana.

Additionally, the policy was perceived as highly relevant to food production in Ghana (M=4.07). Modules including Food Crops (M=4.33), Planting for Export and Rural Development (M=4.71), Rearing for Food and Jobs (M=4.05), and Agricultural Mechanization Services (M=4.05) were all regarded as highly relevant to food production in Ghana. The findings of this study validate

that of Akologo (2018), who observed that PFJ policy is relevant to food production. The value of food production has been highlighted in SDG 2, which lays emphasis on food security as a critical strategy needed to end hunger across the globe. Despite the importance of the PFJ policy to food production and job creation, Pauw (2022) believes that the implementation of the policy can be improved upon to increase its investment returns. Overall, the results on the relevance and perceived effect of the policy on food production and job creation appear to minimize the concerns about the public choice theory, which states that elected officials and bureaucrats make decisions that only promote their interests and do not always facilitate progress in society (Longley, 2021).

Research Objective Two: To examine the perceived effects of the policy on job creation and food production

The second study objective determined the perceived effects of the policy on food production and job creation in Ghana. The researchers focused on the various modules under the policy and how respondents perceived their effects on job creation and food production in Ghana (Table 3). Means were calculated for the responses obtained from the fieldwork, where 4.50-5.0 represents Very High Effect (VHE), 3.50-4.0 represents High Effect (HE), 2.50-3.49 represents Moderate Effect (ME), 1.50-2.49 represents Low Effect (LE), and 1.00-1.49 represents Very Low Effect (VLE). Table 3 shows that the overall perceived effect of the policy on job creation was perceived as low in Ghana (M=2.01). All the various modules apart from Food Crops (M=3.14) were perceived as having either low or very low effect (Table 4). Moreover, the overall perceived effect of the policy on food production in Ghana was moderate (M=2.64). In particular, the perceived effect of Food Crops (M=4.43) on food production was perceived as high. However, the perceived effect of other modules, such as Planting for Export and Rural Development (M=2.47) and Agricultural Mechanization Services (M=2.49), was low, with Rearing for Food and Jobs (M=1.38) recording a very low perceived effect on food production in the country. The results on the perceived effects of the policy on job creation and food production Aberman, Kufoalor, and Gilbert (2021) found that the PFJ is contributing to job creation in Ghana.

Table 3: Perceived effects of the policy on job creation and food production

Module	Mean	Standard Deviation
Job creation		
Food Crops	3.14	0.22
Planting for Export and Rural Development	2.09	1.22
Greenhouse Technology Village	2.06	0.24
Rearing for Food and Jobs	1.32	1.21
Agricultural Mechanization Services	1.45	0.21
Total	2.01	0.62
Food production		
Food Crops	4.43	1.13
Planting for Export and Rural Development	2.47	0.73
Greenhouse Technology Village	2.44	0.06
Rearing for Food and Jobs	1.38	1.32
Agricultural Mechanization Services	2.49	1.33
Total	2.64	0.91

A further inferential analysis using Mann-Whitney U-test was done to determine whether differences existed in the mean scores of perceived effects of the policy on job creation and food production for male and female respondents at a significance level of 0.05 (Table 4).

Table 4: A Mann-Whitney U-test analysis of mean scores of perceived effects of the policy on job creation and food production for male and female respondents

	Sex	N	Mean rank	Sum of Ranks	Mann-Whitney	Wilcoxon W	Z	Sig. (2-tailed)
Job Creation	Male	226	217.03	54692.00	22294.00	38404.00	-2.055	.838
	Female	182	214.55	38404.00				
	Total	412						
Food Production	Male	226	217.03	54692.00	22294.00	38404.00	--2.053	.662
	Female	182	214.55	38404.00				
	Total	412						

The Z values of -2.055 and -2.053 with p-values of 0.838 and 0.662, which are higher than the alpha value of 0.05, suggest that no significant differences existed in the views of male and female respondents with respect to the overall means on perceived effects of the policy on job creation and food production respectively. This means that the gender of respondents did not affect their views on how the policy affected job creation and food production, which seems to contradict the literature (Profeta, 2020) suggesting that gender influences public policies.

Research Objective Three: To examine the perceptions of inhabitants on the level of effectiveness of government communication on the policy

The third objective focused on examining the perception of Ghanaians on the effectiveness of government communication on the policy. To address this objective, the researchers first ascertained from the respondents whether, in their views, there was government communication on the policy. With this, most (86.7%) of them admitted that the government undertook some communication activities and strategies on the policy. Only 13.3% of them were not sure if the government undertook some communication activities and strategies on the policy.

Communication Activities and Strategies

The researchers also found out from the respondents the kind of communication activities and strategies the government engaged in regarding the policy. Various communication activities and strategies were employed by the government on the policy. Specifically, awareness creation (62.5%), public education (65.5%), advocacy (53.7%), and community mobilization (52.8%) were used in communicating the policy. Other communication activities and strategies found are behavior change communication (53.4%), persuasive messages (61%), field visits (50.6%), and stakeholder engagement (51.2%). The results imply that various communication activities and strategies were used for communicating the Planting for Food Policy in the country, which contradicts earlier research (Bowen, 2010), which showed that Ghana relies heavily on newspapers and radio programs for communicating policies. The findings also reinforce Howlett's (2009, 2011) position on the importance of government communication to national policies. Government communication activities and strategies are essential in influencing public policy decisions because they help to maintain mutually beneficial relationships between governments and the various publics on whom policy success or failure rests (Howlett, 2009, 2011).

Views of respondents on the effectiveness of communication activities and strategies

Having ascertained government communication activities and strategies used on the policy, researchers further examined the effectiveness of communication strategies adopted. Here, respondents were asked to rate the level of effectiveness of communication activities and strategies government undertook with respect to the PFJ policy based on a five Likert scale of 1 to 5 [where: 4.50-5.0=Very Highly Effective, 3.50-4.49=Highly Effective, 2.50-

3.49=Moderately Effective, 1.50-2.49=Lowly Effective, and 1.00-1.49=Very Lowly Effective] (Table 5). For instance, the study revealed that communication activities and strategies to create awareness about the policy initiative were perceived as moderately effective (M=3.16).

Table 5: Respondents' views on the effectiveness of government communication activities and strategies

Government activities and strategies	Mean	Std. Dev.
Activities and strategies to create awareness about the policy initiative	3.16	0.42
Activities and strategies to educate the public about the policy goal	4.01	1.25
Government activities and strategies to explain the policy details to the public	2.41	0.23
Activities and strategies to advocate the benefits of the policy	4.03	0.14
Government activities and strategies for mobilizing citizens and communities to support the policy	2.44	0.34
Activities and strategies to promote positive behavior change for the policy	2.12	0.82
Activities and strategies to promote public dialogue on the policy	3.02	1.36
Government activities and strategies to generate shared understanding and public support for the policy	3.42	1.33
Activities and strategies to empower citizens towards the policy	3.01	0.51
Government activities and strategies to advertise the policy to the public	2.21	0.55
Press releases and press conferences on the progress of the policy	2.00	0.43
Activities and strategies to persuade the public in support of the policy	2.01	1.16
Government activities and strategies to promote stakeholder engagement on the challenges of the policy	1.20	1.22
Government activities and strategies using new media platforms	1.03	0.14
Government communication using stakeholder engagement to promote the sustainability of the policy	1.23	1.02
The use of local media and interpersonal communication on the policy	2.01	1.32
Total	2.46	0.76

The finding on communication activities and strategies to create awareness about the policy initiative resonates well with that of Azumah (2020), who maintained that awareness creation is critical to the success of PFJ policy. Azumah (2020) further argues that there is a need for intensified efforts to create awareness about the benefits of the PFJ policy. Again, Table 5 shows that government communication activities and strategies to educate the public about the policy goal were highly effective (M=4.01, SD=1.25). The finding on government communication activities and strategies to educate the public about the PFJ policy validates earlier studies (Peterson, 2008; Young, 2000) which showed that communication helps to inform and educate various publics about policies in society. Activities and strategies to inform and educate the public on government policies are essential to the success of the overall policies. Such activities

and strategies help to promote effective provision of information on the existence of the policies (Birkinshaw & Varney, 2011; Jung, 2014).

Moreover, Table 5 shows that government communication activities and strategies to promote advocacy on the benefits of the policy (M=4.03, SD=o.14) were highly effective ,supports previous studies by Birkinshaw and Varney (2011) and Jung (2014), which observed that effective government communication activities and strategies should help to explain the benefits of the public policies to the citizens. Also, activities and strategies to promote public dialogue on the policy (M=3.02), shared understanding and public support for the policy (M=3.42), and to empower citizens towards the policy (M=3.01) were all perceived as moderately effective. The result of a shared understanding of the policy is relevant because, according to Mu *et al.* (2018), government communication facilitates policy understanding.

On the other hand, government activities and strategies to explain the policy details to the public (M=2.41, SD=0.23), activities and strategies for mobilizing citizens and communities to support the Policy (M=2.44, SD=0.34), activities and strategies to promote positive behavior change for the Policy (M=2.12, SD=0.82), and activities and strategies to persuade the public in support of the Policy (M=2.01, SD=1.16) were all perceived as lowly effective. This suggests that though there were communication activities and strategies by the government on the policy to explain, persuade, mobilize citizens, and change their behaviors, they were poorly conducted. A careful look into the government communication activities and strategies around the PFJ policy indicates that professional communicators were not actively involved in the communication. It is very difficult to clearly distinguish between the communication activities of civil servants and political appointees in respect of the policy. This could largely account for the lowly effective nature of government communication activities. In places such as Norway, Figenschou *et al.* (2017), there is no clear distinction in communication involving politically appointed staff and communication experts who are civil servants and are subjected to rules regarding non-partisanship. This makes it extremely difficult to properly discharge the task of government communication. Figenschou *et al.* (2017) concluded that there is a need for the professionalization of government communication activities.

Further, Table 5 indicates that communication activities in the form of press releases and press conferences on the progress of the policy by government officials are lowly effective (M=2.00, SD=0.43). This shows that government communication via press releases and press conferences to inform the public of the progress of the policy has not been very effective. This observation deviates from Hiebert's government communication framework, which depicts that press releases are part of the techniques for communicating government policies (Graber, 2003; Hiebert, 1981). Similarly, communication to ensure stakeholder engagement on the challenges of the policy (M=1.20) and the use of local media and interpersonal communication (e.g., field visits) about the policy (M=2.01) were very lowly effective. By implication, activities and strategies to promote stakeholder engagement on the challenges of the policy and the government's usage of new media platforms on the policy were not as effective as had been expected. This result departs from that of Bowen (2010), which established that stakeholders largely rely on radio programs for communicating public policies in Ghana. The find on the use of local media and interpersonal communication agrees with Tanko *et al.* (2019), who argued that the use of local media is an important strategy to promote the success of the PFJ policy in the country.

In addition, communication using new media platforms (M=1.03) was very lowly effective. This implies that government communication activities and strategies using new media platforms on the policy were not as effective as the respondents had expected. The potency of the new media, including social media, in public issues and policies has been stressed by scholars (Burgess & Green, 2018; Dobson *et al.*, 2018). New media is very engaging and encourages citizens to share their opinions (Dobson *et al.*, 2018) and actively participate in creating and circulating relevant information and messages (Burgess & Green, 2018). What is more is the fact that the overall mean score (M=2.46, SD=0.76) of respondents on the effectiveness of government activities and strategies on the policy implies that they were lowly effective. The findings on overall communication align with Buaku's (2017) observation, which stated that one major challenge faced by public policies in Ghana is poor communication. Similarly, Anaszewicz and Dobek-Ostrowska (2013) found that the poor government communication hampers policies and programs of government in Poland. Inefficiency in policy communication in Poland is due to the absence of clear management structures and guidelines (Anaszewicz & Dobek-Ostrowska, 2013).

An inferential analysis was further conducted on the differences between ethnic backgrounds of respondents and their overall views on the level of effectiveness of communication activities and strategies on the policy. It is clear from Table 6 that the significance level (P=0.062) is higher than the alpha value of 0.05. This suggests that no significant differences existed between the ethnic backgrounds of respondents and their overall perception of the level of effectiveness of government communication activities and strategies on the policy. In short, all the respondents perceived government communication activities and strategies on the policy as very lowly effective, irrespective of differences in their ethnic backgrounds. This finding is not surprising because Azumah (2020) suggested that the government should undertake massive awareness creation on the PFJ policy to garner public support and commitment for the policy.

Table 6: A Kruskal-Wallis test of the ethnic backgrounds of respondents and their overall views on government communication strategies on the policy

Ethnic Background	N	Mean Rank	X^2	Df	Sig. (2-tailed)
Akan	286	165.53	8.657	3	.062
Ewe	70	148.61			
Dagomba	37	171.23			
Others	19	152.31			
Total	412				

(Statistic is significant at 0.05): *df = degree of freedom;* X^2=chi-square

To conclude the issues on the third research objective, respondents were asked to indicate their overall views about the effectiveness of government communication activities and strategies at various stages of the policy. Percentages were used to analyze the views of respondents where 'E' represents effective, 'N' represents Neutral, and 'NE' represents Not Effective. From Table 7, respondents perceived government communication during the planning (63%) and formulation (58.9%) stages of the policy as not effective. These results show that there were concerns with government communication during the planning and formulation stages of the policy. This suggests that not much consultation was done prior to the design and formulation of the PFJ policy. This revelation falls short of previous studies (Crowley & Scott, 2017; Glenn, 2014), which identified prior consultation as vital to government communication strategies on policies.

Table 7: Views of respondents on the government communication on the policy

Stage	E	N	NE	Total (%)
Planning stage	25.5	11.5	63	100.0
Policy formulation stage	32	9.1	58.9	100.0
Policy implementation	54.7	12.3	33.0	100.0
Policy monitoring	26	10.4	63.6	100.0
Policy evaluation	19.3	8.0	72.7	100.0

Again, apart from government communication activities and strategies during the implementation stage of the policy, which the majority (54.7%) saw as generally effective, government communication activities and strategies during the evaluation stage of the policy were all seen as ineffective. This situation seems problematic because effective government communication activities and strategies help to present and explain government policy decisions and actions at all stages of the policy (Mu *et al.*, 2018; Pasquier, 2012).

Research Objective Four: To identify the measures to promote sustainability of the policy

The final objective of this study looked at measures to help sustain the policy (Table 8).

Table 8: Measures to help sustain the policy

Measure	Agree (%)	Neutral (%)	Disagree (%)
Increased commitment from state agencies and authorities towards the policy	75.5	11.5	13
Adequate participation by all stakeholders	79	2.1	18.9
Improved communication on the policy goal	71.7	5.3	23.0
Improved communication on the benefits of the policy	81.7	5.3	13.0
More citizen engagement and consultation on how to sustain the policy	69.3	8.7	22.0
Supportive relationship among stakeholders of the policy	75.5	11.5	13
Grassroots ownership of the policy	69.3	8.7	22.0
Increased accountability throughout the delivery of the policy	71.7	5.3	23.0
Transparency in the implementation of the policy	81.7	5.3	13.0
De-politicization of the policy	89	2.1	8.9
Local authorities should be fully responsible for the design and implementation of the policy	59.3	18.7	22.0
Increased efforts to empower citizens towards the policy	74	7.1	18.9
More research on the overall policy	56.3	11.7	32.0

The measures include adequate participation by all stakeholders (79%), improved communication on the policy goal (71.7%), improved communication on the benefits of the policy (81.7%), and improved citizen engagement and consultation (69.3%) on how to sustain the policy. The finding on participation agrees with that of Admassu *et al.* (2002), who contend

that stakeholder participation is crucial to the sustainability of development policies and projects. Involving citizens in policies and projects starts at the planning stage when decisions are being made about the type of project required (Fowler, 2000). The finding on engagement and consultation accentuates Akologo's (2018) call for collaboration as vital in maximizing the benefits of the PFJ policy in the country. The value of the result on participation is evinced in the participation theory, which calls for the involvement of the public in decision-making processes to enhance ownership, empowerment, and self-confidence (Sen, 2012).

Other measures to sustain the policy are supportive relationships among stakeholders of the policy (75.5%) and grassroots ownership of the policy (69.3%). The finding on local ownership supports previous observations (Junne & Verkoren, 2005; Nalubiri, 2010), which suggest that grassroots ownership is essential to the sustainability of development policies and projects. Ownership entails a change from dependency to local community responsibility, strengthening local structures, securing a pool of local expertise, and suitable leading mechanisms (Junne & Verkoren, 2005). More so, transparency in the implementation of the policy (71.7%) and empowerment of citizens (74%) were seen as vital to the sustainability of the overall policy framework. The result on transparency agrees with previous research (European Commission, 2021), which identifies transparency as an essential measure to improve the implementation of the PFJ policy in Ghana. Similarly, the revelation on empowerment strengthens Nalubiri's (2010) contention that empowerment largely improves the sustainability of development policies and interventions.

Besides, increased commitment from state agencies and authorities towards the policy (75.5%) and de-politicization of the policy (89%) were seen as critical measures to sustain the policy, which agrees with previous observations (Azumah, 2020; Ghana News Agency, 2018; Mabe *et al.*, 2018) which suggest that challenges faced by PFJ policy include low commitment and political interference. Azumah (2020) suggests that curing political interference is an important step toward realizing the PFJ policy's expected benefits. Finally, citizen empowerment is seen as vital to sustaining the PFJ policy (74%). The result on citizen empowerment reflects Michael's (2004) claim that empowerment is critical to the sustainability of policies and projects. Empowered individuals and communities are likely to exercise their influence on processes that

affect them in setting their priorities and agendas (Michael, 2004). Empowerment promotes self-confidence and increases a sense of personal or group efficacy.

Conclusions

A number of conclusions can be drawn from the findings of the study. First, the respondents saw the PFJ policy as highly relevant to Ghana's job creation and food production. The various modules, including Food Crops, Planting for Export and Rural Development, Rearing for Food and Jobs, and Agricultural Mechanization Services, were all perceived as highly relevant to job creation and food production in Ghana. However, the overall effect of the policy on job creation was perceived as low. All the various modules, apart from Food Crops, were perceived as having either low or very low effects. On the other hand, the overall perceived effect on food production in Ghana is moderate. However, the perceived effect of Planting for Export and Rural Development, Agricultural Mechanization Services, and Rearing for Food and Jobs modules was low. No significant differences existed in the views of male and female respondents concerning their overall perception of the effect of the policy on job creation and food production.

Government communication on the policy generally focused on awareness creation, public education, advocacy, community mobilization, behavior change, persuasive messages, field visits, and stakeholder engagement. Communication activities and strategies to educate the public on the policy goal and the benefits of the policy were highly effective. Also, government communication activities and strategies to create awareness about the policy initiative, promote public dialogue on the policy, promote shared understanding and public support for the policy, and empower citizens towards the policy were fairly effective. On the other hand, communication activities and strategies to explain the policy details to the public, mobilize citizens and communities to support the policy, promote positive behavior change for the policy, and persuade the public to support the policy were less effective.

Moreover, government communication in the form of press releases and press conferences to inform the public on the progress of the policy was lowly effective. Further, government communication on the policy using stakeholder engagement, new media methods, and interpersonal communication were ineffective. Apart from government communication activities and strategies during the implementation stage of the policy perceived as effective, government communication activities and strategies during the policy's planning, formulation, monitoring,

and evaluation stages were all seen as ineffective. The overall level of effectiveness of government communication on the policy was low regardless of the differences in their ethnic backgrounds. Measures to sustain the policy include increased commitment from state agencies and authorities towards the policy, adequate participation by all stakeholders, improved communication on the policy, and increased citizen engagement and consultation. Other strategies to sustain the policy are supportive relationships among stakeholders of the policy, grassroots ownership of the policy, transparency in the implementation of the policy, de-politicization of the policy, and more studies on the overall policy framework.

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Governance, Recycled Politicians and Recycling Politics in Nigeria

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Abstract

The politics of recycling, a political system where the same set of people continue to dominate the political affairs of a given country, is one of the challenges undermining political development and good governance in Nigeria. The study, therefore, analyzes the effects of the politics of recycling on Nigeria's governance and administrative system. The qualitative study covers Nigeria's Second Republic from October 1, 1979, to Nigeria's Fourth Republic, which commenced on May 29, 1999 – 2022. The data for the study were gathered from primary and secondary sources. Primary data were gathered through interviews with a number of respondents comprising a Journalist, Engineer, Lecturer, Doctoral Student, Administrator, Lawyer, Human Rights Activist, and Businessmen. A convenience sampling technique was used to select the available and willing respondents to participate in the study. In addition, the researcher's close observations of events in Nigeria form part of the data for the study. The secondary data were gathered through official documents, textbooks, journals, and internet sources. The data collected were analyzed using the content analysis method. The study adopted the Recycling Theory of Abiku to analyze recycled politicians and their antecedents in Nigeria's political activities. According to African mythology, Abiku personifies a child who dies and is reborn repeatedly into the same family and causes pain to its hosts each time the child comes. Nigeria's political class, in a similar manner to Abiku, has continued to play recycling politics without offering anything towards the progress and development of the country, thereby repeatedly leaving a cycle that causes pain to Nigerians. The study concluded that recycling or parading the same set of politicians in the governance and administrative affairs of the country is inimical to the country's political, social, and economic development. The study recommended that the electorates must rise to crush the recycled politicians' antics and tactics and vote for new-breed politicians with impeccable character and proven integrity. Pressure should be mounted on the Independent Electoral Commission by journalists, civil society, national and international observers, as well as other stakeholders on the need to conduct free and fair elections in the country.

Keywords: *Governance, Recycled Politicians, Recycling Politics, Abiku and Development*

Introduction

One of the challenges that have continued to undermine Nigeria's political development and good governance, like many other African countries in contemporary times, is the politics of

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recycling. The politics of recycling is a political system where the same set of people continues to dominate the political affairs and activities of a given country. It is a system where the same clique continues to rotate or rule from one office to the other or, at times, stays glued to a particular office for a long time. To this extent, Msughter (2018) sees the politics of recycling as:

> a game that is played by the same players without substitutes, a game without new tactics. It is a system of using and rebranding old products to suit the present market situation. It is simply a strategy of packaging old products that cannot yield any result or satisfaction to the consumers (Msughter, 2018, para. 1).

Due to their insatiable appetite for power and unrelenting political ambition, Nigeria's politicians deploy all arsenals within their influence to stay in power perpetually (Adegbami & Uche, 2016). It is not surprising, therefore, that the political setting of Nigeria is filled with the same set of people who have continued to dominate and subjugate its governance and administrative activities. A thorough view of the composition of the country's managers and management in the Fourth Republic, which commenced on May 29, 1999, reveals a number of those who participated in Nigeria's Second Republic from October 1, 1979, to December 31, 1983. It also reveals a sizeable number of those involved in the aborted Third Republic, which was said to have commenced from June 12, 1993, when the general elections were conducted, to June 23, 1993, when the same elections were annulled. For example, Mr Audu Ogbe in 1979 was the deputy speaker in the Benue State House of Assembly; he was appointed in 1982 as the Federal Minister of Communications and later Minister of Steel Development. His tenure of office ended with a military *coup d'état* that brought Major-General Muhammadu Buhari to power. Mr Ogbe later became the Minister of Agriculture between 2015 and 2019. There are also a preponderant number of retired military officers who have directly or indirectly plotted a coup at one time to truncate Nigeria's constitutional government. For instance, Major-General Muhammadu Buhari served as Nigeria's military head of state between December 31, 1983, and August 27, 1985, after taking power in a military *coup d'état.* In the Fourth Republic, he was elected as President and served two terms in office from 2015 to 2019. In large number, however, are those that came to the political limelight some twenty-three years ago at the onset of the country's Fourth Republic. While some of these categories of people have continued to maintain and sustain themselves in different political posts and positions, others have continued to move from one

political office to the other. Thus, they have continued to ride on Nigeria and Nigerians like a colossus (Adegbami & Uche, 2016; Agbese, 2022).

The uniqueness of recycled politicians in Nigeria is that they may or may not have the same political inclinations; they may or may not have the same political ideology or no ideology at all. However, a common thing to most of them is "a similar mindset." Most of these politicians engaging in the politics of recycling are interested in making a profit for themselves and their cliques because governance to them is a business venture (Adegbami & Ganiyu, 2019). It was to this extent that the Sahara Reporters affirms that:

> A number of Nigerian politicians and political leaders with corruption cases hanging on their necks have found a haven in the ruling party, All Progressives Congress (APC). The defection of such political leaders to the APC has automatically stalled the prosecution of their corruption cases (Sahara Reporters, 2021, para. 1).

Given the twenty-three years of unbroken democratic governance in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, one would have expected that the country would have witnessed a great deal of development in its core sectors of the economy. One would have also expected the dividends of democracy to reflect in the generation of employment, poverty reduction, and improvement in the standard of living. All these would have gone a long way to curb some of the challenges facing the country, such as bandits' and insurgents' activities, kidnapping/hostage takings, incessant killings, and armed robbery, among other social vices, that is shaking the country to its very foundation (Adegbami & Uche, 2015; Adegbami & Uche, 2016; Adegbami & Adepoju, 2017).

A conscientious look at the political landscape of Nigeria shows that the same crop of politicians responsible for its current precarious economic situation and the suffering of the masses are still in charge of the governance and administrative affairs of the country. The sets of politicians have refused to leave the political scenes; they have continued to oscillate among the dominant political parties, which serve as stepping stones to gain access to public offices, from where they continue with their veritable political businesses. The self-indict statement made by a two-time

Governor, two-time Senator, and former Senate President in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, Bukola Saraki, bore eloquent testimony to this. According to him:

> We have all been here since 1999 up to the recent past when things were not done right; we are all part of it. I was there, you were there, and every other political officeholder in different capacities was there as well (Saraki, cited in Premium Times, 2016, para. 5).

The fact that Bukola Saraki made this statement while in office makes the statement potent and valid and confirms that those who have been recycling themselves in the political offices in Nigeria have contributed in no small measure to the underdeveloped state of the country.

The politics of recycling and the continued application of the same old values, ideas, and ideologies to Nigeria's governance and administrative activities will produce nothing new but the same usual outcomes. Given the foregoing, the study analyzes the effects of the politics of recycling on Nigeria's governance and administrative system. This is with a view to determining factors halting Nigeria's political and socio-economic development.

Theoretical Framework: Recycling Theory of Abiku

The study adopted the Recycling Theory of Abiku. The development of the theory was necessitated by the study's setting, Africa. Appropriately applying an apt theory from the African perspective to the study informed the development, adoption, and application of the Recycling Theory of Abiku.

Abiku is a Yoruba coinage, which means Ogbanje in Igboland, Mfumfum in Efik, and Igbakhun in Edo, parts of Africa. According to African mythology, Abiku personifies a child with a mysterious power of controlling or regulating death. "An Abiku is any child who dies and is reborn several times into the same family" (Mobolade, 1973, p. 62). Abiku is also referred to as children "who are believed to cycle rapidly and repeatedly through birth and death" (Ilechukwu, 2007, p. 239). Abiku's audacious power can be better understood in the words of Soyinka: "In vain your bangles cast charmed circles at my feet, I am Abiku, calling for the first, and the repeated time" (Soyinka, 1976). In other words, Abiku retains the ability to have recurrent earthly lives to the detriment of their earthly hosts. To this extent, Clark describes Abiku as "coming and going these several seasons, do stay out on the baobab tree" (Clark, 1976).

The African mythology had it that, for a Abiku to have its first earthly life, it only needed to sight a desirable pregnant woman. Whenever a pregnant woman is sighted, an Abiku knows the best way to get to the woman's womb. Accordingly, Abiku will eject the already-formed fetus from the womb and place itself instead. Abiku is able to find an appropriate pregnant woman by hanging out in the neighborhood, including forests, market areas, bush paths, and roads. Abiku also stays inside trees, like the iroko, baobab, and silk cotton. Abiku came out during the day breaks, at night, and under hot and sunny weather, waiting for an innocent pregnant woman to make her mother.

Abiku is assumed to possess an evil spirit that allows it to die multiple times and be reborn repeatedly. Similarly, it was believed that the spirit inherent in Abiku empowered its permanent attachment to the family it taunts. According to Eze (2020), Abiku lives a life of cycle like everybody. Nonetheless, Abiku dies to come back through the same womb and family, thereby continually leaving a cycle that causes pain to the host family. In other words, with the inherent spirit in Abiku, it returns to the same family it has once tormented each time it has to return. For that reason, Abiku is considered to be a dangerous and powerful being who intentionally plagues its immediate family with misfortune, as well as constitutes a threat to anyone who dares to come its way.

Furthermore, it is said that no one can determine the life cycle of Abiku; it is Abiku itself that can do so. Put differently, every Abiku decides how long it plans or wishes to stay on earth. Therefore, an Abiku will always stand against anything or person that may want to prevent or hinder its staying up to or beyond its predetermined time. Abiku enjoys its game of comings and goings, which it likes to play with the same mother and in the same family repeatedly until such a mother can no longer bear the fruit of the womb.

In the course of their stay in the earthly world, one Abiku seeks the company of the other and relates well, although nocturnal. The Abikus usually converge as soon as the whole household sleeps off. To attend the nocturnal meeting, all infant Abiku have to transform into adults, switch back to infants, and find their way back to their different mothers' sides before dawn.

Abiku usually puts its parents in a financial mess because every parent of Abiku offers everything they have to keep or prevent Abiku from dying. Parents spent their fortune to get their children (the Abikus) treated for the self-inflicted and incurable illnesses they placed on themselves. These parents go from one herbalist to the other to get treatment for the Abikus, during which they spend a lot of money. All the money spent on Abiku is always in vain because it cannot prevent Abiku from dying. Beyond this is the joy Abiku derives from seeing its parents crying. It is believed that tears shed to mourn Abiku are collected and sold to make money by Abiku in the spirit world. This explains why Abiku always die young so that parents and families can shed more tears for them to trade with and make money (Edoro, 2014).

The recycling theory of Abiku is premised on the following:

- Abiku is a child considered to recycle itself repeatedly through birth and death.
- Although Abiku appears as a child, it is ageless, too, and no one determines its life cycle. Abiku decides how long it plans or wishes to stay on earth.
- Abiku brings untold hardship and pain to its parents and repeats the agonizing process.
- Abiku seeks the company of other Abiku and relates well with them through nocturnal meetings.
- Abiku normally puts its parents and families in a financial mess, as parents spend their fortunes to get Abiku treated for self-inflicted and incurable illnesses.
- Abiku ejects the already-formed fetus from the womb and places itself instead.
- Abiku is recalcitrant, full of tricks, and challenging to deal with or handle, as it can camouflage.

The politics of hanging on or staying glued to political powers perpetually by the political class in Nigeria can be viewed from the "Recycling Theory of Abiku" lens. Like Abiku, many of the current political officeholders in Nigeria are the same set of politicians that have been hanging on and stayed glued to political powers since Nigeria's Second Republic over forty years ago. The crops of politicians are repeatedly revolving themselves in the country's political scene and ridding Nigeria and Nigerians like a colossus.

In a likely manner of Abiku, most of these politicians appear younger but are ageless. Some continue to adjust and amend their ages, and some rely on a forged certificate of birth and a fake declaration of age. Some of them are fond of using affidavits to cover up the irregularities surrounding their ages to be able to fit into political offices they are seeking or aspiring to. Moreover, as no one determines the life cycle of Abiku, so also no one decides how long a particular politician will stay on to political power and public office. Some of them, having discovered that their ages can be easily determined through their primary and secondary school certificates, claim that they have lost them. For instance, while he wanted to contest the presidential election in 2015, Muhammadu Buhari should have included his academic credentials in the documents submitted to the Independent Electoral Commission (INEC), the body in charge of conducting elections in Nigeria.

Similarly, in 2022, during the screening exercise for the 2023 general elections, Bola Tinubu, the All Progressives Congress presidential candidate, failed to present his certificates. Also, the People's Democratic Party presidential candidate, Atiku Abubakar, deposed to an affidavit that he used a different name on his school leaving certificate. At the same time, his running mate, Ifeanyi Okowa, claimed that his secondary school certificate got lost. All these claims were part of the ploy to cover up for the discrepancies in age on their different certificates (Morgan, 2022).

Thus, recycled politicians are always desperate to hang on to power by deploying all the powers in their possessions to achieve that. Recycled politicians use the money to induce gullible citizens, hijack the political party structures, and manipulate electioneering processes; all these are done in order to enjoy continued political relevance in the country (Adegbami & Makinde, 2018). Apart from the strategies mentioned above, from the researcher's observations, recycled politicians use magical cum spiritual powers to cajole, coarse, and intimidate the electorates, as well as political opponents. In essence, recycled politicians go the extra mile and use every available means, either by hooks or crooks, to achieve their inordinate ambitions (Adegbami & Uche, 2016; Ogonnaya, 2016). Intermittent political killings in the country are likely part of the ploys to get to power by all means, as well as to retain political power.

Proper observation of Nigeria's political environment reveals that the politics of recycling the same set of politicians in Nigeria's governance and administrative affairs have continued to bring

untold hardships to the citizenry. The continued recycling of this set of politicians is tantamount to repeatedly subjecting the populace to agony, just like Abiku does typically to its host family. The country's agonizing security challenge and its effects on the masses is another disturbing issue of lousy governance facilitated by recycled political leaders. In essence, the stagnant posture of Nigeria's political, social, and economic affairs testifies to the fact that recycled political leaders have nothing to offer again for the betterment of the country. As such, their continued staying in power signifies their determination to torment the citizenry repeatedly.

Similarly to Abiku, the politicians hold nocturnal meetings, where the country's fate is being determined. Most of the time, "serious meetings" are held at night when everyone is fast asleep. In essence, every nocturnal meeting is always for the benefit of the political class and to the detriment of the masses. In this type of meeting, they decide on who gets what, when, and how of political offices and, of course, the country's resources. Clearly, every cordial relationship among politicians is always for their interests; they unite to share powers and national resources.

Like Abiku, who normally puts its host in a financial problem, most of the political leaders who have governed and those who are currently in political offices in Nigeria could be seen as plunderers who lack the hallmarks of authentic leadership (Achebe, 1983; Ola, 2011). This set of politicians has continued to plunder the national resources, successfully put the country in a financial mess, and inflicted the country with an incurable illness. It is unsurprising that the country's debt rose to N33.11 trillion as of March 31, 2021 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2021), while a more recent figure has not been made available by the National Bureau. More recent data reveals that Nigeria's debt as of the first quarter of 2022 was N41.6 trillion (Nairametrics, 2022). It is evident that most of the country's political leaders are taking advantage of their offices to enrich themselves and their cliques (Herbst & Olukoshi, 1994), while Nigerians continue to suffer excruciating economic hardship inflicted on them by the political class. Whenever there are elections, the country normally budgets a huge sum of money to conduct the elections. All the resources, both human efforts and money expended to procure elections, could be considered a waste because, at the end of it all, the recycled politicians still find themselves in public offices. In essence, all efforts and resources expended are nothing but a means to legalize the return of reprocessed politicians to office. This practice is equated to time, effort, and resource wastage.

The ganging up of recycled politicians has led to the ejection and sidetracking of leaders who have good intentions and could have piloted the country toward its greatness. Like the Abiku, this set of politicians coerces, intimidate, or kill any perceived politicians with good intentions of developing the country. Some good leaders who managed to get to one political office or the other were not given breathing space to perform their constitutional duties appropriately; they were later frustrated out of the government offices. It is to this extent that a former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, reasons thus, "Good men were shunned and kept away from the government while those who should be kept away were drawn near" (Obasanjo, 1999, cited in Adegbami & Adepoju, 2017, p. 7).

As a result of their moribund ideas, which have put the country in stagnation, the citizenry wanted recycled politicians to quit the political stage so that a new set of people with fresh ideas could be injected into the system. With their tricks and recalcitrant disposition, similar to that of Abiku, recycled politicians always thwart the plans of the populace. They instead prefer to stay glued to power and milk-dry the country until it becomes bankrupt. This is the stage or the situation the country is currently in, to the extent that the country is being referred to as the poverty capital of the world (Kharas et al., 2018).

It is disheartening, therefore, that the same challenges that have constituted a bane to the country's growth and advancement are persisting due to politics of comings, goings, and repeats played by Nigeria's political class. Till now, nothing has changed positively as far as the political, social, and economic affairs of the country are concerned. The masses considered to be the hosts of Abiku (the recycled politicians) remain helpless and hapless, as the political Abikus maintained their hegemonic posture on them in what could be likened to internal or domestic colonialism.

Recycling Politics in Nigeria: To Whose Benefit?

The quest for the improved economic development of a country largely depends on the quality of the leaders in charge of governance and administrative activities of such a country. The quality of leaders in terms of ideas, integrity, and exposure, among other qualities, goes a long way to assist in the development of the country. Any political system that allows varying or

interchanging political leadership is a political system with the capacity to influence the growth and development of a country. This is because different leaders possess different characteristics, which can impact the country's development outcomes differently (Sackey, 2021). Hanging on to political powers and political offices by recycled politicians cannot positively impact the country because the same old ideas will still be applied to the country's governance system.

The problem with Nigeria's polity, as rightly observed by Agbese (2022), is the fact that the same group of politicians who put the country into its current mess are still permitted by the law of the land to aspire for political offices or remain in political offices with pretentious promises to fix the distressing country. Therefore, it is unsurprising that a set of recycled politicians is again jostling for political offices in the coming 2023 general elections.

Given the strong allegation against the politicians who have been in one political office or the other in Nigeria's Fourth Republic as being among those that have contributed to the stagnant development of the country (see Saraki cited in Premium Times, 2016), one would have expected the so alleged politicians to quit the country's political scene. Contrary to this, most of these politicians remain in public offices. Not only that, some of them are aspiring for the same offices they are currently serving, while others are desiring juicier offices in the forthcoming general elections of 2023. The set of politicians has started moving up and down to confuse, cajole, and do all sorts of manipulations in order to realize their unquenchable and inordinate ambitions.

The statement made by the incumbent President of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari, recently also bore eloquent testimony to the fact that recycled politicians have no other motives than to steal public funds. According to him:

> Our society is a bundle of contradictions. People display external religiosity without fear of God; they make life difficult for others; money becomes their god; leaders abandon their oaths of office by taking money meant for the welfare of the people and diverting it to their private pockets (Buhari, 2022, cited in Premium Time, 2022, para. 5).

In his report, Kwen states, concerning the ongoing calculations, permutations, and scheming of Nigeria's politicians:

> Ahead of the 2023 general election, some members of the National Assembly in both the Senate and the House of Representatives are making moves to take over the mantle of leadership in their states, especially where the governors are serving out their second terms. This practice has been in place since 2007 when many governors completed their second terms. Some National Assembly members succeeded them while other former states' chief executive officers moved to the National Assembly, especially the Senate, which some pundits described as a "retirement home" for ex-governors (Kwen, 2022, para. 1-2).

However, the situation took another dimension during the primary elections conducted by different political parties to elect the flag bearers for different elective posts in the 2023 general election. For example, some of the Senators who contested during the primary elections in their different states lost the elections, and so their hope of returning to either the Senate Chamber or becoming the Governor was dashed. Given the fact that political offices are business offices, this set of politicians felt aggrieved because the hope of recycling them to power got dimmed. To this extent, some of them dumped their previous political parties and crossed to other political parties where they hoped to contest to guarantee their continuity in the political offices.

From the above, it is evident that the struggle to stay glued to political offices by politicians is not for other things but for their selfish interests and to continue sharing the “national cake”. In supporting the argument, Felter states, "Kleptocratic incumbents have even more incentives to stay in office; they could lose their wealth if they were to lose power and potentially face prosecution" (Felter, 2022, para 4). This crop of politicians sees political offices as investments that regularly need special attention and focus in order to get regular profits. Hence, they considered politics a do-or-die affair, and getting into political offices by hooks or crooks meant nothing to them. For that reason, the recycled politicians' benefits have become the masses' loss, while their gains have become the masses' pains.

The damaging effects that the politics of recycling had on the politics and economy of the country and the only way out of the conundrum can be inferred from Olawepo-Hashim's outburst. According to him:

> What we need now is a new generation of leaders. We no longer need the cabal anymore. We cannot accept a situation where we accommodate multiple pension-receiving individuals. I mean those who have been living on government expenses for ages. It is good to retire these people, and the time to do that is now. It is time to retire them from politics and drive Nigeria on the new part of creativity (Olawepo-Hashim cited in Vanguard 2018, para. 4-7).

In essence, recycled politicians only benefit themselves, their cliques, and cronies, and later pass the remnants and crumbles from the table to hungry and helpless masses, whom they have subjected to severe pain and penury. Passing the remnants and crumbles from the table to the masses is not out of love or care but to secure their loyalty and keep them alive until when they will be used again like readymade tools to recycle themselves back to political/public offices. It is not surprising that every four years, recycled politicians would once again remember the hapless masses, induce them with pecuniary gifts, get their votes, and get back to political offices unhindered.

Politics of Recycling and Good Governance

One of the propelling forces of good governance is a political ideology. However, in Nigeria, most political parties and politicians operate without ideology. The lack of political ideology on the part of the political parties has to do with their mode or manner of formation, and this is affecting the political parties in their choice of candidates frequently presented for elections. Most of the political parties in Nigeria present candidates without integrity and with a battered image for different political offices during the process of election (Adegbami & Makinde, 2018).

Ordinarily, the formation of political parties in a democratic setting is supposed to be based on ideals and ideologies, such that any member or aspiring member must key into the ideologies of the party before joining the party. Given the fact that most politicians in Nigeria are not driven by ideologies but by greed to acquire wealth and plunder the national resources, they join those parties where their inordinate desires can be easily met (Omotola, 2009; Nnamdi & Ogan 2019).

Politicians in Nigeria move from one political party to the other without restriction; as such, the operation of political parties is without guiding principles, political ideology, and philosophy (Adegbami, 2023).

Some cases of indiscriminate cross-carpeting among the Senators include that of Senator Ehigie Uzamere. He was initially representing the Edo South constituency under the People's Democratic Party (PDP) platform. Senator Uzamere later dumped the People's Democratic Party (PDP) on whose platform he got to office and decamped to the Action Congress of Nigeria shortly before the 2011 elections, where he was successively re-elected. Similarly, there were eleven PDP Senators that moved the group to another party, the All Progressives Congress (APC). They were - Mohammed Shaba Lafiaji (Kwara North), Bukola Saraki (Kwara Central), Umaru Dahiru (Sokoto South), Ibrahim Abdullahi Gobir (Sokoto East), Magnus Ngei Abe (Rivers South-East), Wilson Asinobi Ake (Rivers West); Bindawa Muhammed Jibrilla (Adamawa North); Mohammed Danjuma Goje (Gombe Central); Aisha Jummai Alhassan (Taraba North); Mohammed Ali Ndume (Borno South); and Abdullahi Adamu (Nasarawa West), (Ebere, 2014, cited in Adegbami, 2023). Some of these Senators who are unable to fulfill their ambitions have decamped to their former political parties, while others whose ambitions are met stay back in their new parties. The pattern of behavior of most politicians in Nigeria is aptly captured by George thus:

> In Nigeria today, the level of maturity of our politicians can be likened to a playground of kids who, at the slightest quarrel or distortion of interests, join another group to play with sand, kick balls, or probably fiddle with insects. This is a blatant show of 'politics of reshuffling.' A case of the same old leaders blaming political parties as if the political parties weren't pioneered by human beings…The recent trend of constant defection, even on the day of the election, only shows the level of selfishness and unseriousness on the path of our so-called 'leaders' the younger generation looks up to. This is an expression of a lack of vision as well as conscience. It depicts the fact that our political parties are not bound by different ideologies, and the

> members can't boast of a single political philosophy that will guide their administrations when they get into office (George, 2015, para. 4).

In essence, a country that parades such politicians so described cannot have the desired governance because the kind of politicians in question cannot offer quality governance that will affect the lives of the citizenry positively and bring about national development.

In a similar vein, the poor governance in Nigeria was due to the declining capacity of recycled political leaders to realize systemic risks of the faulty electoral process, especially election fraud, as well as to discern the damaging effects of terrorists' activities, insurgents, and banditry attacks, herder-farmer skirmish, and police brutality among others, and thereby, put every machinery of government in motion to curtail the menaces (Okoi & Iwara, 2021). The fact that they were involved in creating the groups and benefited immensely from the groups in navigating themselves to political offices makes it difficult for them to go after such groups that have once rendered useful services to them (Alemika, 2013). Therefore, to have a system of governance that caters for the security and welfare of its citizens, as well as to bring about all-around development to the country, such governance must be founded on political leadership with vision, integrity, commitment, and transparency. Since 1999, when the country returned to democratic governance, the country has not been blessed with the kind of leaders mentioned above. According to Okoi & Iwara:

> Since 1999, the democratic space has been dominated by political elites who consistently violate fundamental principles associated with a liberal democratic system, such as competitive elections, the rule of law, political freedom, and respect for human rights…This challenge is an indicator of the systemic failure of Nigeria's governance system. A continuation of the current system will only accelerate the erosion of public trust and democratic institutions (Okoi & Iwara, 2021, para. 2).

In essence, for good governance to take place in Nigeria, those at the helm of the affairs of the governance system in the country must be willing to offer it in the case they fail to offer good governance, which they have done and continue doing, the onus lies on Nigerians to demand it.

This is because most of the politicians involved in the game and politics of recycling are political profiteers who generate profits from being in public offices where they have access to public resources. As far as this set of politicians continues to hang on to power, good governance cannot take place. Their continued hanging on to power is to continue to make a profit from public offices, enjoy a sort of privileges, and save themselves from being exposed for the various atrocities they have perpetrated while in office. Some of them, thus, prefer to die while in office than to be out of the office and be exposed and questioned for any misdeed. The excerpt from Peterside, while reviewing the last presidential primary elections in Nigeria, further sheds light on why it will be difficult to have good governance in Nigeria while parading the same crops of politicians in power. According to him:

> At the end of my review, these past conventions or presidential nomination processes revealed everything wrong with our politics – the weak ideological foundation of the parties, the attitude of our people to a democratic culture, the influence of poverty or the lack of economic empowerment on political choices, the absence of citizenship rights and responsibilities in our politics, the vanishing moral values and desperation of the elite to hang on to power as the only means of survival and wealth in an economy that is very hard to create wealth privately within (Peterside, 2022, para. 12).

From the foregoing, it is obvious that any nation that is yearning for political, social, and economic development will not rely on recycled ideas but inject new ideas into its polity. For any country to make positive or meaningful changes in its political, social, and economic affairs, such a country will have to conduct its affairs in a new and different way. As such, Nigeria as a nation undoubtedly needs fresh hands with fresh ideas to pilot its governance system to achieve a better political, social, and economic system. A better system that will usher in political stability, social services delivery, generation of employment, poverty reduction, and improved standard of living for the citizenry. And a better system that will maintain adequate security of people's lives and their properties, as well as enhance unity and corporate existence of the country, which the crops of politicians playing politics of recycling appear incapable of doing.

Recycling Politics: Implications for Governance and Administrative Affairs of Nigeria

Recycling and parading the same set of politicians in the governance and administrative affairs of Nigeria without mincing words has continued to have far-reaching implications on the country's political development and social and economic growth. To this extent, the Nobel laureate, Professor Wole Soyinka maintains that the political setting of Nigeria depicts a political system that is under siege as a result of the actions, inactions, and reactions of the recycled political drivers, which has continued to tell on the quality of policy formulation and its corresponding implementation (Soyinka, cited in Adeyemi, 2021). When the quality of the policy is low, it can cause contradictions within the organization, thereby affecting its purpose and strategic direction. It can also cause restrictions in the framework for quality objectives and the commitment to meet people's basic needs (Huckabone, 2020). In essence, a low-quality policy is tantamount to no policy, and a government without policy is a government without direction; a government without direction is a failing and dangerous government.

Soyinka's assertions regarding the activities of the recycled politicians brought to the fore the dangerous dimension the politics of recycling is taking in Nigeria. In his lecture delivered to commemorate the 80th posthumous birthday of Chief Gani Fawehinmi (SAN), a lawyer and human rights activist, themed, "Democracy for the masses through proper and effective governance," held in Lagos, Nigeria, Soyinka refers to recycled politicians as those that took part in destroying the country, and now portraying themselves as messiah. For this reason, Soyinka warns Nigerians thus:

> Do not allow yourself to plunge into a zone of amnesia in which you conveniently forget unpleasant realities. We've had a President who actually supervised the sacking of a democratic government...in another instance, thugs actually entered the House of Assembly, sacked the legislators and installed their candidates. And they call themselves the God-designated watchmen over the fortunes of this nation. And suddenly, here they are, and I see Nigerians flocking to them and asking them once again to lead…Even if they do not individually put themselves back in the position of power, they are already smoothening the way for their surrogates, their stooges, so

> that they can continue to misrule from their cozy farmsteads. So, all I'm urging is to be very vigilant (Soyinka cited in Ramon, 2018, para. 9-11).

Some of those interviewed for this study were of the same view as Soyinka on the adverse effects recycled politicians had on Nigeria and Nigerians. For instance, one of the interviewees [8]:

> Recycling, to me, is tantamount to repeating. It is when you fail that you repeat. When you fail again, you repeat. When you pass and succeed, you don't need to repeat. Our politicians have continued to fail and, as such, fail us as a nation. They are repeating because they have failed; they are repeating in order to cover up their misdeeds in public office. Keeping themselves in Nigeria's public offices continually has been a bad omen for the country. Until serious, selfless, and committed politicians come on board, the omen will remain; this is not good for the country.

Another interviewee has this to say[9]:

> The damaging effect of parading the same old politicians in Nigerian politics is incalculable. It has brought about mass corruption to the extent that corruption has been institutionalized in Nigeria. It has also led to infrastructure decay and social vices. Recycling the old political class has created what can be called a "Political Monarchy." Unchecked recycling of the old political class without integrity has resulted in the country's woefully economic failure. It has discouraged foreign investors and has cost the country its reputation before the international community. Recycling of the old political class has led to security challenges and the underdeveloped nature of the country.

[8]- a journalist from Nigeria's newspapers based in Lagos states

[9] An Engineer with the Nigerian Ports Authority, Port Harcourt, Nigeria.

Furthermore, another interviewee unequivocally states thus:[10]

> Recycling the same set of politicians prevents the injection of new ideas, the effect of which is the inhibition of new policies for the improvement and development of the state. Regarding income redistribution, the same politicians connote the same set of people usurping the state's patrimony to themselves and their cronies. Regarding the deepening of institutions, as evidence from the Nigerian state has suggested, the same politicians maintain the same rules of engagement, i.e., doing things outside of the laid down rules. If there were a new set of people, the public officials would understand it is not as business as usual. Recycled politicians have cunningly banned new blood from coming to politics. They have barred new hands from politics with financial difficulty to contest elections. Recycled politicians have monetized the whole political process, and with their exclusive financial ability, they have made the political offices theirs. This reduces the choices available to the electorates to choose from. This whole charade has continued to force a lot of citizens who could have assisted in building the nation's economy out of the country. Yes, the best brains are leaving the shore of the country daily. This is too bad.

In a similar vein, another interviewee states[11]:

> Recycled politicians have instituted injustice and maladministration in Nigerian society. The country is currently permeated with unemployment, poverty, insecurity, and economic degeneration. This shows that Nigeria's economy has been left in the hands of scavengers who fed fat on the country's resources and are hell-bent on continuing in the business. They are bereft of ideas, put in place obnoxious

[10] A Lecturer and doctoral student of the Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria.

[11] A Deputy Registrar, Federal University of Agriculture, Abeokuta, Nigeria.

> economic policies, and created a hostile economic environment that has kept away foreign investors. The dollars have continued to appreciate to the detriment of the naira. How can one explain the hostile social environment of Nigeria, where kidnapping has become incessant, ritual killings occur daily, armed robbery becomes the order of the day, and other social vices continue unabated? When they have no capacity to govern, why are they hell-bent to remain in public offices? Nigeria needs a new set of political leaders with the ideas, visions, and capacities to turn its economy around and improve the people's standard of living.

Another interviewee stressed as[12]:

> The current trend of recycling old politicians to elective positions in the country poses a roadblock to young Nigerians' chance to exhibit themselves. As a result of the recycling of politicians, we have endured the drop in the standard of education, the subjugation and emasculation of the power and dignity of the traditional institution, the crass high-handedness, and brazen financial recklessness on the part of executives. We have witnessed a sustained retrogression in all spheres of activities in the country — an unprecedented capital flight occasioned by a lack of security and the very deplorable state of our infrastructure, especially roads. The people we elect now use hunger and hardship as tools of control. They keep the masses in perpetual lack so that they are worshipped whenever they dole out crumbs to the people they have deliberately kept hungry. It has put the country in dire need of a paradigm shift in education and other Human Development Index capable of putting it on the road to greatness. The explanation here is that the recycled politicians have been doing the

[12] A journalist based in Lagos, Nigeria.

> same thing, expecting different results. The whole world is tilting towards progress and development, which is demonstrated by voting for young, vibrant visionaries. France, Austria, Ethiopia, and, lately, El Salvador's 37-year-old Nayib Bukele are all examples of this trend. Nigeria's recycling of old money bags is off track with modern trends. People might refer to the United States, but Nigeria's political culture and stage of development are not the same as that of the United States.

Another interviewee stressed as[13]:

> There is no way Nigeria can get out of its present socio-economic challenges and underdevelopment with the same set of politicians in its governance and administrative affairs. Parading the same set of old politicians in the country's governance and administrative affairs has resulted in poor governance, leading to a high incidence of resistance in social crises like insurgence, civil disobedience, kidnapping, lack of patriotism, etc. Recycling the same set of politicians in the country's administrative affairs will continue to give these leaders opportunities to enrich themselves at the expense of the masses. It has made Nigeria a place where the rich are getting richer, and the masses are getting poorer. Beyond this, the political system has foreclosed the benefits of enjoying an alternative set of leadership in the young ones, who are described as leaders of tomorrow. Such an act of recycling is a catalyst for national crises in not far time.

Another interviewee informed as[14]:

> For decades, many of the political officeholders in Nigeria have been in power with little or nothing to show for it. We cannot continue to do things the same way over and over again and expect different results. People are wallowing in poverty; they have no access to basic

[13] A Lawyer and human rights activist based in Abuja, Nigeria.
[14] A doctoral student at the Department of Public Administration, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria.

> needs, yet we keep repeating the same set of politicians. Repeating these people is repeating problems and hardships. Good and inclusive governance will continue to elude us as much as these sets of politicians remain in power.

One of the interviewees, who is a businessman, stresses that[15]:

> The bulk of politicians in modern-day politics are self-centered; they do not have the capacity to develop the country. They do not have what it takes to be a leader, nor do they know what leadership entails. Parading or recycling these same politicians can only compound the problems of the masses because of their poor economic policies and other obnoxious policies that have continued to discourage investments in the Nigerian economy. Their continuing stay in power encourages corruption and does not give room for innovations as things are being done in the same routine.

From the responses gathered it can be inferred that recycling the same set of politicians to govern Nigeria is tantamount to operating the governance and administrative affairs of the country under siege. This is because recycling is synonymous with failure; it is when one fails that he or she repeats while those who pass progress. By implication, Nigeria is not progressing because it handed over its affairs into the hands of failed politicians who hang on to power without any good things to offer for the country.

From the response, it is evident that recycled politicians perpetrated all sorts of irregularities and atrocities in public offices, including institutionalization of corruption. This has cost the country its much-needed development, and as such, the country's infrastructure is declining steadily. The recycled politicians have no capacity and capability to transform the nation's economy. They are bereft of economic ideas, so they put in place obnoxious economic policies and created a hostile economic environment that has kept foreign investors away. For that reason, the country is

[15] A businessman based in Lagos, Nigeria.

facing a significant challenge of a high unemployment rate; the poverty level continues to rise while the standard of living continues to fall. All these challenges further induce social vices such as kidnapping, ritual killings, bandits and insurgents' activities, as well as other security challenges.

Recycled politicians are hell-bent on remaining in power in order to continue to make a business from Nigeria's public offices. The politics of recycling the same set of politicians in Nigeria's public offices is preventing and hindering the injection of new ideas and innovations into the country's governance. This also has an effect on income/wealth redistribution as the same set of politicians continues to sit tight on the state's "commonwealth." Recycled politicians have monetized the whole political process, and with their exclusive financial ability, they have made the political offices theirs, thus reducing the choices available to the electorates to choose from. In essence, the effects that recycling or parading the same set of politicians had on the governance and administrative affairs of the country are innumerable.

The results of the general election 2023 in the country showed that most of those vying or aspiring mainly for the executive position, that is, presidential and gubernatorial posts, are recycled politicians, and so are those aspiring for legislative posts. They have already secured the tickets of their various political parties to run during general elections. Going by the antecedents of the recycled politicians, it is easily predictable that Nigeria's future, in terms of political, social, and economic advancement, is bleak.

Summary, Conclusion, and Recommendations

Hanging on, or staying glued to political powers perpetually by the political class in Nigeria in a similar manner to Abiku, who dies to come back and continually leaves a cycle that causes pain to the host family, is a problem Nigeria is contending with recurrently. The same set of politicians who have been hanging on to political powers since Nigeria's Second Republic, over forty years ago, without offering anything towards progress and development of the country, are still desperate to cling on to power and deploy all the powers in their possessions to achieve that. They have continued to bring untold hardships to the citizenry. As a result, the citizenry is not only facing an excruciating economic situation but also an agonizing security challenge. Therefore, their continued recycling is tantamount to repeatedly subjecting the populace to agony.

The general election of 2023 is the testimony of recycled politicians. They had secured the tickets of their various political parties to run during general elections. Going by their antecedents, it is predictable that Nigeria has a bleak future concerning its political, social, and economic advancement. This is because the challenges that have constituted a bane to the country's growth and advancement in the past decades persist. In other words, nothing has changed positively as far as the political, social, and economic affairs of the country are concerned. The masses, who are the hosts of the recycled politicians, remain helpless and hapless as the 'political Abikus' maintain their hegemonic posture in what could be likened to internal colonialism.

The study, therefore, concluded that recycling or parading the same set of politicians in the governance and administrative affairs of the country is inimical to the country's political, social, and economic development. The study recommended that the electorates must rise to the challenge, crush the recycled politicians' antics and tactics, reject their money, and vote massively against them in the next general election. They should vote for new-breed politicians with impeccable character and proven integrity. Pressure should be mounted on the Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) to be neutral, independent, and accountable in the conduct of elections. To this extent, journalists, civil society, national and international observers, as well as other stakeholders, should be up and doing at monitoring the electioneering process under the watch of the INEC. They should be bold to expose any irregularity noticed in the electioneering process. This is the only way a new set of leaders can be injected into the governance and administrative affairs of the country.

Key Informants Interviewees (KIIs) Checklist

- Interview: A Journalist with one of Nigeria's newspapers based in Lagos state, Nigeria, January 6, 2022.
- Interview: An Engineer with the Nigerian Ports Authority, Port Harcourt, Nigeria, January 17, 2022.
- Interview: A Lecturer and doctoral student of the Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria, January 5, 2022.
- Interview: A Deputy Registrar, Federal University of Agriculture, Abeokuta, Nigeria, January 5, 2022.
- Interview: A Journalist based in Lagos, Nigeria, January 6, 2022.

- Interview: A Lawyer and Human Rights Activist based in Abuja, Nigeria, January 22, 2022.
- Interview: A Doctoral Student at the Department of Public Administration, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria January 8, 2022.
- Interview: A Businessman based in Lagos, Nigeria, January 6, 2022.

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The Overview and Analysis of the Practice of Human Rights Education and Advocacy in Central Equatoria State and Further: Post 2005 to Present

Chaplain Kenyi Wani*

Abstract

The practice of human rights education and advocacy is to improve knowledge of human rights activities for communities in post-conflict. Central Equatoria State is where the human rights organizations have the base for their offices for operation in South Sudan. Coordinating the recovery and development process after civil war requires human rights principles, but it was neglected in Central Equatoria State. This research paper aims to assess the impact of the practice of human rights education and advocacy in Central Equatoria State and further in post-conflict in South Sudan. The practice of human rights education and advocacy is one of the pillars of the process of peacebuilding. Understanding the practice and advocacy on human rights education helps in assessing its impact on post-conflict communities. It contributes to knowledge of how effective the peacebuilding process was in preventing the resumption of conflict. The outbreak of intra-conflict in December 2013 in Juba shows that the peacebuilding process was ineffective. A qualitative method was applied for data collection. The stratified purposive interview was conducted in Juba and Kajo Keji Counties. Secondary literature was obtained from various academic and policy sources. The information was analyzed using ethnography, discourse, interpretation, observation, and interaction. The lack of interpreters for people who use sign language caused limitations in data collection, but disability is not an inability. Two focus group discussions were held: one in Juba and the other in Kajo Keji. Secondary data from various academic and policy institutions were supplemented with primary data. Coordinating the recovery and development processes requires principles for the practice of human rights education and advocacy. Development partners have underestimated the challenges they would face in the practice of human rights education and advocacy. The process for practice of human rights education and advocacy contributed less effective effort to the peacebuilding process to prevent the reoccurrence of conflict in Central Equatoria and the other states of South Sudan. The process would require the practice of good governance.

Keywords: *Human Rights, Education, Advocacy, Civil Society, Governance*

Introduction

Studying the practice of human rights education and advocacy in South Sudan raises the question of whether the country respects human rights. This paper reviews and analyzes the practice of human rights education and advocacy in Central Equatoria State and other states of South

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Sudan.[16] The paper covers two periods: the Interim Period (2005-2010) and the period after independence (2011 onwards). The paper examines the effectiveness of the practice of human rights education and advocacy as envisioned in the process of peacebuilding. The government's policy for the practice of human rights education and advocacy, which was set in Central Equatoria State, applied to all the ten states in the country. The Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) was administering Southern Sudan during 2005-2010, while the National Government of South Sudan was administering the newly independent country of South Sudan during the second period.

The aim of this paper is to investigate how the practice of human rights education and advocacy was conducted in Central Equatoria and other states of South Sudan. It explores whether the practice was effective or ineffective and the factors that made it ineffective. The practice of human rights education and advocacy is one of the pillars of the peacebuilding process, and it is important for achieving the goal of post-war recovery. It is a part of conflict resolution and can contribute to the reduction of poverty in the communities affected by conflict. Its effectiveness will relieve distress in post-conflict communities and mitigate violence and conflict (Weissman, 2004, 310).

The conceptual framework for the study outlined in Figure 1 shows that the analysis of the findings would lead to development theory.

[16] While the interviews on Central Equatoria State were conducted on the ground in the counties of Juba and Kajo Keji, information on the other states was obtained in Juba from working officials, university students and interviews with civil society organizations from those states, including meeting with panelists in 9 workshops.

Figure 1: Conceptual framework



Success in the process of peacebuilding in South Sudan requires the capability of the National government to provide core functions of security, law and order, public services, and revenue mobilization. These core functions are to facilitate the National government in establishing the policies required for National Development, which includes effective practice of human rights education and advocacy. A failure in the process of peacebuilding increases the chances for the renewal of conflict and the continuity of a system of fragile government, as it is at the time of this study. The paper sheds light on this concern (OECD, 2008, pp. 11-12).

Materials and Methods

This study gathered information from people affected directly and indirectly by conflict in South Sudan, particularly at the local community level. The study lasted for five months. It was on and off because of insecurity. The study gathered information by notes-taking on observed and encountered situations, noting events (conversation and meetings) and written information (documents, products, and artifacts), in common with what is proposed by (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Alexander *et* al., 2014).

Primary sources included interviews with administrative institutions of the government, peacebuilding actors such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) in Juba, including members of the local and international organizations who have experience in activities of peacebuilding, the staff of human rights institutions and educators on human rights, including members from the women union, youths, civil society organizations, and community leaders.

The secondary literature was drawn from the resource centers of the University of Juba, electronic libraries, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and the United

Nations Development Program (UNDP). The data collection involved making comparisons and asking questions throughout the sampling process (Berg, 2001).

The interviews were aimed at supplementing secondary literature. Interview and analysis helped the researcher get first-hand information and have insight from the key informants directly engaged in the issues being studied and in the processes of decision-making in both the government of Southern Sudan (GOSS, 2005 - July 9, 2011) and the National government of South Sudan (July 9, 2011).

Respondents for this study were selected from the stakeholders involved in peacebuilding activities. This includes samples of age 18 and above groups, males and females, working and non-working-class of different occupations, and office holders. Among them included academics, community leaders, members of civil society organizations, church members, women and youth associations, and staff in the Peace and Reconciliation Commission, among others. One focus group discussion was in Juba, and another was in Kajo Keji Counties. Workshops were conducted to serve as a means for triangulation for the reliability and validity of the collected data and for plugging in the gaps of the information from the other states of South Sudan during the fieldwork. The researcher conducted 12 interviews and attended nine workshops during the fieldwork.

The limitation encountered in this study was the denial by the National security for the researcher to have access to interviewees. There was also fear of providing information to interviewees because national security prevents freedom of expression. More research would be necessary in an environment with no conflict and restriction of freedom of information.

Results and Discussion

The Practice of Human Rights Education and Advocacy

This section discusses whether the practice of human rights education and advocacy, as one of the pillars in the process of peacebuilding in South Sudan, was adequate. This paper shows that communities in the country are supposed to know aspects of human rights and what those rights entail so that they acquaint themselves with the process of documenting abuse of human rights. Understanding the values of human rights requires education and raising awareness of the communities involved. Communities in Central Equatoria State and other states need to know

about issues in violations of human rights, including the provision of human rights in the Interim and Transitional Constitution of the respective States and of the Republic of South Sudan. Human rights are the rights that human beings must have (Flower et al., 2000; Hurights, 2013).

Empirical data shows that communities cannot be separated from humans. The fundamental freedom of human rights entails freedom ascribed to a citizen in relation to the State, as claimed, for example, by the Human Rights Charter of the United Nations in 1945 and the African Charter on the Human and the Rights of People in 1981. The communiti**es** of Central Equatoria State, as well as those of the other states, have been experiencing human rights abuses. This includes unresolved cases of torture, violation of personal liberty, and interference with the privacy of individuals. This is because both the civil administration and the law enforcement agencies have not been in complete control of the abuses of human rights. Currently, the Human Rights Commission in Central Equatoria State and the other states of South Sudan lack activists' assistance in the human rights field. It also lacks the effective human rights organizations available to support the applications of human rights principles (Shamsaddin, 2007, pp. 74-81). The breakdown of human rights education and advocacy includes the following objectives: knowledge, skills, and values. The broad goal is to build a universal culture of human rights.

Knowledge	**Skills**	**Values**
• Learn about human rights. • Promote the awareness and understanding of human rights issues so that people recognize human rights violations. • They know that every human being is born with inalienable human rights listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.	• Learn about human rights. • Develop the skills and abilities necessary for the defense of human rights. • Active listening and communication: to be able to listen to different points of	• Learn through human rights. • To develop an attitude of respect for human rights so that people do not violate the rights of others. • To have a sense of responsibility for one's own actions and a commitment

- To know key concepts such as freedom, justice, equality, human dignity, non-discrimination, democracy, sustainability, poverty, universality, rights, responsibilities, interdependence, solidarity, and peace.
- To have the idea that human rights provide a framework for negotiating and agreeing on good standards of behavior in the family, school, community, and the world.
- To know the interdependence of civil/political and economic/social/ cultural rights.
- To recognize the root causes of human rights issues/concerns.
- To understand the terms and concepts of human rights.

view, to advocate one's own rights and those of other people.

- To critically think: To find relevant information, critically appraise evidence, be aware of preconceptions and biases, recognize forms of manipulation, and make decisions on the basis of reasoned judgment.
- To have the ability to work cooperatively and to address conflict positively.
- To have the ability to participate in and organize social groups.
- To act to promote and safeguard both local and global human rights.

to personal development and social change.

- To be curious and have an open mind and appreciation of diversity.
- To have empathy and solidarity with others and a commitment to supporting those whose human rights are violated.
- To have a sense of human dignity and of worth and of others' worth, irrespective of social, cultural, linguistic, and religious differences.
- To have a sense of justice - the desire to work towards the ideals of freedom, equality, and respect for diversity

Source: The Advocates for Human Rights, 2018

There will be no effective process for peacebuilding without respect for human rights. As noted above, these are the issues that the communities in South Sudan have been facing. Human rights education and advocacy (HREA) is a learning process that aims to develop human rights knowledge, skills, and values to establish a universal culture of rights. Communities in South Sudan at large need to know issues of their rights; they are to be concerned with issues of their rights so that they can defend perspectives of human rights and incorporate those concepts of human rights into their personal values, for example, in processes for the provision of humanitarian aid.

Efforts for raising human rights awareness were immediately considered in Southern Sudan after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. However, no further attempt has been made for full implementation and effective continuation to raise awareness (interview with community leader Kajo Keji, 2017).

The objective of human rights education and advocacy includes knowledge; people are to learn human rights to promote awareness and understanding of human rights issues and to make communities able to recognize the violation of human rights. The question would be: Have these objectives been met through effective practice for human rights education and advocacy in Central Equatoria State and further?

To answer the question in the paragraph above, respect for the values of human rights in South Sudan at large has been practiced to some extent during the interim time (2005-July 9, 2011), partly because everybody was concerned about the need for secession from Sudan, but not after July 9, 2011, because of the intra-conflict in December 2013 (Rens, 2016). As part of the post-conflict process for recovery, communities in the country need to understand that every human being was born with inalienable values of human rights listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: the rule of law, sustainable development goals, prevention of genocide and responsibility to protect children in armed conflict, etc. That is why human rights are considered inherent in all human beings, regardless of nationality, habitation, sex, national or ethnic origin.

The practice of human rights education and raising awareness were limited to areas with moderate security. There was increasing repression and intolerance, a lack of accountability for

committed atrocities by all parties to conflict, unlawful killing of civilians, torture, sexual abuse and gender-based violence, looting, destruction of properties, and forced displacement of communities in South Sudan. These are the issues of concern in the practice of human rights education and advocacy (Mutesa & Virk, 2017). These violations of values of human rights have impeded effective practices for human rights education and advocacy and the efforts to protect the civil population. Mutesa and Virk (2017) estimated that there were 4.9 million people classified as food insecure and 1.9 million classified as Internally Displaced People (IDP) because of the intra-conflict in 2013 (Mutesa & Virk, 2017). This makes the formal status for the practice of human rights education and advocacy practically ineffective but fairly good on paper.

Freedom of expression has been very limited in South Sudan at large. For example, the newspaper's editor-in-chief, 'The Monitor, Alfred Taban Logune, was arrested for suggesting that the President and his deputy resign because of their failure to implement the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement of August 2015. Freedom of movement and association was limited; holding meetings and workshops required a letter of acceptance from the office of the police. As such, fear and mistrust of the National government's policies have complicated the sharing of information (Mutesa & Virk, 2017). One of the factors for ineffective processes for the practice of human rights education and advocacy relates to the gaps in the practice of 'good governance' in the search for development.

Human Rights Education and Advocacy, Governance, and Development

The practice of good governance can only be satisfactory when all citizens can fully and effectively enjoy all the fundamental rights, a human rights approach based on equity, universalism, and no discrimination (Levy & Fukuyama, 2010). The practices of human rights education and advocacy, governance, and development have three common purposes: to secure people's freedom, the wellbeing of people, and the dignity of all people everywhere in the world.

The researcher considers that the practice of human rights education and advocacy in Central Equatoria State can only be effective when special consideration is taken on the following: Universality, indivisible, inter-dependence and inter-relatedness, accountability, participation and inclusion, and equality (Morten & Hans, 2018).

The five principles for the practice of human rights education and advocacy below require consideration in Central Equatoria and other States to produce effective results, depending on the

approach applied and the conducive environment during the implementation (Morten & Hans, 2018). First, an effective practice of human rights education and advocacy needs donor support and the effort of the duty bearer to fulfill the obligation of human rights education and advocacy in the country, the realization of the rights entitlement of the recipient, where a recipient is conceptually transformed from passive to active of the rights holder. Such realization of the entitlement of rights is currently limited in the communities of South Sudan, making the practice of human rights education and advocacy ineffective (Morten & Hans, 2018).

Second, the practice of human rights education and advocacy can only make sense in South Sudan when a party with the rights can assert the rights to a party who holds a duty to mirror the rights. The rights holder has to be capable of enforcing these rights against the duty bearer; the rights holder has to have access to services in public authorities, court, police, and political representation at Local and National levels of the governments. These services are gained through human rights education and advocacy practices, but they are limited in South Sudan because the working environment is not conducive. The national security apparatus does not permit effective practice for human rights education and advocacy that will reveal their activities for violation of human rights (interview with a member of a civil society organization, Juba, 2017; interview with staff, Central Equatoria Human Rights Commission, Juba, 2017)

Third, citizens are entitled to have the ability to think and to act freely in making decisions and to fulfill their own potential as full and equal members of society. An objective of this approach would be to give individuals and groups political, social, and economic power so that they are able to take care of their own rights. As mentioned in the second principle above, these rights are frequently denied by the influence of the national security apparatus in the country (interview with a member of the Law Society, Juba, 2017).

Fourth, the researcher is convinced that the practice of human rights education and advocacy is supported by the idea that discrimination and inequality are some of the causes of poverty in communities. As such, effective practice of human rights education and advocacy would prevent poverty related to discrimination and inequality. (Adam *et al*., 2013).

Fifth, the practice of human rights education and advocacy is also about activism and advocacy, a targeted practice for respect of fundamental human rights to influence decision-making and communities at both Local and National levels in South Sudan at large. It seeks to establish and guide the political, economic, cultural, and social processes and decisions regarding the improvement of living conditions of the communities. The practice of activism and advocacy is based on the principle of participation and inclusion, and it is important during the implementation of the practice of human rights education and advocacy. It turns the practice of participation and inclusion into reality by strengthening the capacity for autonomous action, where activism and advocacy become important elements in the practice of human rights education and advocacy. In essence, the increased practice of activism and advocacy from the bottom up would lead to the institutionalization of cooperation between the communities and the National government in South Sudan at large.

With the other four areas for effective practices of human rights education and advocacy above, respect for fundamental human rights through activism and advocacy influences the process of decision-making in communities because there has been a lack of 'will' by the elites in the National government to fully respect values of human rights (Morten & Hans, 2018).

Practice for human rights education and advocacy and human development are interdependent. There can be no fulfillment of human rights development in education and advocacy, and there can be no development without respect for the values of human rights, whose practical success is determined by the practice of good governance. This discusses the causes of ineffective processes for the practice of human rights education and advocacy in the next section.

Reasons for Ineffective Human Rights Education and Advocacy Practices in Central Equatoria State and Other States

Human rights education and advocacy practices have been ineffective in South Sudan. The National Security applied the following: (a) humiliation and degrading treatment of the political opponents of the national government, (b) arbitrary arrest, (c) detention of people without trial, (d) banning of public meetings, (d) exclusion of the minority people, (f) uneven access to national resources, (g) discrimination in employment opportunities, and (h) lack of participation in public affairs (Parlevliet, in Dudouet & Schmelzle (eds), 2010).

The five different dimensions of human rights values that have not been effectively met in the practice of human rights education and advocacy included the following: First, the practice of human rights education and advocacy as a rule, the legal aspect of rights, on the standard that outlaws some behaviors as contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Second, the practice of human rights education and advocacy, being structures and institutions, is the structural division of power and resources in communities. It emphasizes the need to address the underlying causes of problems and examines community structures regarding power resources that determine access to and decision-making over such resources. This reflects the need for the practice of human rights education and advocacy not to be limited to the paper but to be practiced for the development of legitimate, independent, and capable institutions to support the realization and orderly expression of the rights of the communities in South Sudan at large (interview with a member of Law Society, Juba, 2017; Parleviet, in Dodouet & Schmelzle (Eds), 2010).

Third, the practice of human rights education and advocacy involves relationships and the relevance of the rights for organizing and governing the interaction between the National and State governments and the citizens so that it constructively develops a non-violent manner and allows for respect for human rights values. This is where legitimacy and effective mechanisms exist, where individuals or groups raise their discontent when denied their rights. The presence of institutions for checks and balances would be needed to prevent the use of force by the National government. This is particularly true for the rule of law, which is sometimes upheld, subverted, or manipulated (Interview with a member of Law Society, 2017, Juba; Parleviet, in Dodouet & Schmelzle (*ed.*), 2010).

Finally, human rights education and advocacy as a process are taken into account. This relates to how the National and State governments have addressed access, protection, and identity issues. Human rights education and advocacy practice is to give meaning to fundamental values: inclusion, protection of minority and marginalized voices, and accountability. These are to be integrated into the activities of the communities. They specify criteria for acceptability and highlight the need to include civil society organizations to sustain peace. It will lay the ground for pluralism and encourage a sense of ownership needed by the communities in the country, for

example, as in the case of South Africa in the transition in the early 1990s, bringing together many actors, political parties, police forces, members of trade unions, businessmen and members from churches. These are not currently practiced in South Sudan at large (Parleviet, in Dodouet & Schmelzle, (*ed*.) 2010).

The elites in the National and State governments have neglected the potential for the practice of human rights education and advocacy to benefit the citizens. This includes the rights to alleviate the suffering people and uplift their standards of living, which could have contributed to the acceptance by the citizens of the values of human rights and for development in the process of policy-making, the social contract between the governor (elites in the government) and the governed (citizens). The social contract is an agreement among the people; people have to agree on the rules of engagement with their government, and the rights holders also have a duty to enable the enjoyment of the rights of others. The social contract with respect for human rights facilitates the realization of various agendas: protecting vulnerable people in society, children, women, and the aged group (interview with a member of Law Society, Juba, 2017).

These groups of people need special forms of support through practices of human rights education and advocacy. For that, human rights education and advocacy entail practices for non-discrimination, free access to public resources, and independent protection of people (Rens, 2016). All these have not been practically effective, as indicated above**.** The rule of law has been defined by Coetee (2004, in Rens 2016) as follows: "*It is a principle of governance in which all people, institutions, and entities, public and private together with the government itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated and which are consistent with the international human rights norms and standards"* (Coetee, 2004, in Rens, 2016, p. 87). To uphold the rule of law, the researcher argues that the advocates for human rights, together with the donor community working on human rights issues, need to hold the perpetrators responsible for human rights abuses. The culture of abuse and impunity has characterized the system of government engagement with the communities because of ethnic biases, and it has weakened the social contract between the State and the communities.

The system has been applying the legacy of 'force and imposed order' (**i**nterview with a member of a civil society organization, Juba, 2017). Such a system has made the communities rely on retributive justice when the authority of law enforcement does not address human rights abuses

in the communities. It has led to dissent and grievance in the communities of South Sudan over unemployment issues, the availability of arms in the hands of civilians, and the practices of marginalization by the National government. The lack of an effective process to practice human rights education and advocacy has given rise to armed mobilization and internal security problems, including the weak system of policing and sentencing and the inadequate capacity of the judiciary to deal with cases of abuses of human rights accurately.

The government of South Sudan at large relied much on suppressing dissenters in order to maintain law and order. As noted by Lauren (2014), these violations of human rights have occurred because there has been no effective practice of human rights education and advocacy (Lauren, 2014, p. 26).

The idea of national reconciliation was made difficult because of a lack of knowledge in respect for human rights, which can be gained through human rights education and advocacy, on how to claim rights from the criminals who have been responsible for politically motivated violence when there are no winners. It has caused the suffering of many people through trauma because of inter-communal violence and the intra-conflict. As such, the practice of human rights education and advocacy has been characterized by the use of power over the subject.

The National government has been biased to implement the practice of human rights education and advocacy. This justifies a respondent's comment during the fieldwork*: "On March 25, 2014, some 120 men who committed crimes in Juba managed to escape detention, and many others remain free"* (interview, member of Youth, Juba,2016). As such, from the outbreak of the intra-conflict in December 2013, there has been growing arrest for dissent and routine harassment of journalists and groups of civil society organizations by the forces of the National Security Service. This could be because of a lack of enforcement of human rights practices to try to prevent malpractices (interview with a member of civil society organization, Juba, 2017).

The non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations responsible for democratization, good governance, and practices of human rights education and advocacy sometimes do not agree with the policies of the National government (Lauren, 2014).

Elites in the National government have forgotten to understand that there is a need to professionalize and change the country to a modern State rather than to continue to behave as a movement that seeks to weaken and overthrow a regime. The institutions of governance, the practical process of the authority of the public, and the management of public resources have shown the need for elites in the National and State governments to pay attention to the process of social and political activities that require a complete change (Interview with a member of civil society organization, Juba, 2017).

It can be argued that elites in the National government have failed to establish an effective system of civil administration in the country other than the civil-military authority, where appointments for employment are made through the process of having seniority in the military hierarchy, a system that has negatively resulted on the system of administration. Such a legacy of the negative administration system has led to abuse of human rights, corruption, and ethnic conflict. The donor communities tried to prevent the practice through sanctions on individuals in the National government for violating human rights. However, it failed because those who are sanctioned are still actively working in the government. However, heroes come, and heroes go. There is a natural limit to such behavior. What can be tried is the current process of peace revitalization of the Inter-Governmental Authority and Development (IGAD) peace agreement and the implementation of its Chapter Five (which includes a trial of war criminals), which has not been implemented at the time of this study.

There was a paradigm shift in the National government slogan, 'peace through development' in Central Equatoria State (interview with an army member, Juba, 2017). First, the concept of development as a need, the work of development as a gift, the work of development as a right, and the goal for practice of human rights education and advocacy for development as an obligation for the government to assist in the fulfillment of entitlement for individuals in the country. Second, the National government does not seem to realize that development as a right is measured by the internationally agreed standards or the treaty of international human rights so as to have progress and accountability, including the non-state actors. When development is a matter of fulfillment of human rights, the National and State governments have an obligation to protect and promote the rights of the citizens, for example, to food, health care, education, and basic rights through developmental ways that will appropriately meet the rights of the citizens.

Third, theoretically, the practice of human rights education and advocacy extends obligations from the National and State governments in South Sudan to the international responsibility of the rich countries in the world. This is through the funding opportunities; the international community shares the responsibility for the attainment of human rights in the context of National and State governments. The Treaty of the International Human Rights stipulates that: "other *governments and agencies share development in highly-indebted-poor- countries "(*Paul & Dorcy, 2003, p. 214). If such a principle was practically implemented in an accountable and transparent manner, communities in South Sudan could practically have effective activists in advocating for human rights education.

Finally, the obligation of the National and State governments, in particular, and the international community, to respect the values of human rights has to start with the fulfillment of the obligation to respect the practice of human rights in the country, South Sudan, irrespective of economic availability, the absolute obligation to protect and to fulfill the rights of every individual (Morgan, 2005), but the National government prevented the effective fulfillment of such obligation by the start of the intra-conflict in December 2013. The next section discusses human rights education and advocacy and development.

Human Rights Education, Advocacy, and Development in Central Equatoria State and Other States

There can be controversy in the practice of human rights education and advocacy if the benefits in the practices for respect of the values for human rights are not securing long-term peace. When practices for human rights education and advocacy are effective, and citizens feel safe and secure in their respective environments, civil unrest will be less. It is important to consider, for example, the culture and traditions of the post-conflict affected society (Central Equatoria State and other states) in solving disputes through traditional and family courts (Gasatcha in the case of Sierra Leone (Morgan, 2005).

The local communities need to get involved in the process of practicing human rights education and advocacy to determine how the National and State governments implement the processes for respect of human rights. They need to have a say in how the processes are being implemented.

The problem this study identified in the implementation of the practice of human rights education and advocacy was that, first, there was difficulty in considering the local knowledge and resources as a major strategy for input during the practice of human rights education and advocacy, as part of the process of peacebuilding. Second, the intervention process by outsiders has not been enforcing the local processes in activities for the practice of human rights education and advocacy as part of the peacebuilding process. Finally, the relationship between the civil society organizations and the outside agencies for intervention did not match the methodological approach, and this has weakened the effectiveness of the practice for human rights education and advocacy (**i**nterview with a member of civil society organization, Juba, 2017; Salma & Woodham, 2012).

The activities of the international agencies for intervention in the practice of human rights education and advocacy, as part of the process for peacebuilding, are to be applied based on the clear understanding that the providers (international human rights advocates) are willing to be held responsible and to account for their work, in the same way, the local communities (Aid recipients) are expected to account for theirs. Suppose the intervening agencies expect the communities in post-conflict situations to hold themselves accountable for failing to protect practices for respect of human rights values. In that case, they are also to expect themselves to be accountable when their own action has neglected the respect of the values of human rights of the local communities so that they, together with the National government, gain legitimacy from the local communities. This is important for achieving effective practices of human rights education and advocacy.

Introducing ideas of respect for human rights to communities in post-conflict South Sudan has to occur through a sensitive approach to local culture and traditions. This is to benefit the communities in the newly rebuilt government. It is to fully integrate the community through respect for the values of human rights and for the communities to live in harmony with each other, for example, in Tanzania at the time of President Julius Nyerere, between 1964 and 1985 (Mesaki & Mrisho, 2011; Marie-Aude, 2014). The obligation to meet development in economic, social, and cultural rights is to ensure people are able to meet their basic human needs. Fulfillment of these rights requires improvement of the economy of the country.

A framework for the practice of human rights education and advocacy that consists of provision for comprehensive protection for human rights in access to health, education, and employment would help in achieving physical and mental wellbeing of the communities in the country so that communities are able to maintain peace and security, and this is possible when the practice of human rights education and advocacy is considered effective. It will help to prevent a return to civil unrest. There will be access to emergency and daily medical treatment, including programs for immunization of children, which will help reduce illnesses. This will also help in maintaining peace because when communities are suffering from ill health and disease, they are more likely to feel discontented with their government. The creation of healthy national and state governments through effective practice of human rights education and advocacy will benefit the country's economy. A sick government will be unable to work, and it will be unable to generate wealth. Hence, development provision for the protection of the right to health is crucial for the alleviation of poverty and for the encouragement of development in South Sudan at large. Practitioners in areas of health are to bear in mind that facilities for health care are available to all communities without discrimination. It will help avoid a return to civil unrest. Health practitioners work to encourage the development of healthcare infrastructures so that they can be easily accessed by even the most marginalized groups of people in the communities (Salma & Woodham, 2012).

The right to education is similarly important for the economic development of a country, as mentioned earlier in the objectives of human rights education and advocacy. Education allows citizens to develop new skills, leading to an opportunity to generate higher income. When citizens are able to earn more income, the economy of the country will improve, and that also will lead to the likelihood of satisfaction of the communities and prevent frustration. This can considerably contribute to building connections with communities from different sub-states in South Sudan. Investment in the system of human rights education and advocacy can improve the government's economic outlook for the long term. Such an investment will prevent unrest in the short- to medium-term because when the communities have realized that progress is being made and that they have the opportunity to improve their own standard and quality of living in their country, they are less likely to agitate and return to conflict. Investment in this aspect of the

practice for human rights education and advocacy has not been effective in Central Equatoria State and the rest of the country.

Protection of the right to employment can potentially improve the country's prosperity. However, it requires an effective workforce to grow the government's economy. When people are given the opportunity to work, they will be able to go out and earn more money, some of which can be channeled to the government as revenue. Therefore, the post-conflict government should be able to provide protection for working rights to the people, and it can be gained through the practice of human rights education and advocacy. This provides the communities with the best chance to improve their economic status, which, in turn, will reduce economic unrest (Salma & Woodham, 2012).

Communities in the states of South Sudan have not been in administrative agreement with elites in the National government and state governments. The National and State government elites do not practice the 12 principles of good governance. These principles are: Participation, Representation, Fair Conduct of Elections; Responsiveness; Efficiency and Effectiveness; Openness and Transparency; Rule of Law; Ethical Conduct; Competence and Capacity; Innovation and Openness to Change; Sustainability and Long-Term Orientation; Sound Financial Management; Human Rights, Cultural Diversity and Social Cohesion; and Accountability (Baudoin, et al., 2015). This is not only in the practice of human rights education and advocacy but throughout the processes of peacebuilding (Interview with a member of staff, Department of Education, Kajo Keji 2017).

The practice of human rights education and advocacy is a right for every community, regardless of gender and occupation. The National government advocated for human rights laws in both interim and transitional constitutions without full implementation. There is no free public meeting for advocacy in human rights, and there has been no free meeting on human rights education, unless with permission from the police office, where sometimes a member of national security will be attending to monitor the discussion. There are limitations in the practical process of human rights education and advocacy. As such, practices for human rights education and advocacy will continue to be violated and continue to be ineffective unless there is a political 'will' from the policy-makers and implementers.

There is a need for effective practices of good governance and a participatory and transparent process for implementing the measures for human rights education and advocacy. More actors in the work of human rights, together with the communities, are to create more awareness. The need to raise awareness in the practice of human rights education and advocacy also applies to law enforcement and security organs, which are frequently viewed as violators of the rights of communities.

The researcher would consider it will help in the long-term goal if the practices for human rights education and advocacy, which are not currently in the system, are included in the curriculum for secondary education in South Sudan. Further, the process for reconciliation would require a mechanism for good coordination between actors in human rights and staff in the Peace and Reconciliation Commission. This is because what has been in practice was a politicized process of reconciliation by the politicians (observation during a workshop on reconciliation in South Sudan, Juba, 2016).

The researcher considers that the work of the Human Rights Commission in Central Equatoria State is ineffective due to a lack of respect for human rights values, and it has made the work of the Human Rights Commission unrealistic. What also contributed to the ineffective work of the Human Rights Commission is the lack of working experience because of the practices of corruption in procedures for employment and the interference by the politicians in the duties of the Human Rights Commission. Such lack of working experience and interference by politicians has significant effects on the work of the Human Rights Commission. It created fear of enforcing law and order because of intimidation by the national security forces in the process for effective practices of human rights education and advocacy so that it does not expose practices for violating human rights.

The office of the Human Rights Commission in Juba remains powerless to carry out effective work, but that also requires respect for law and order. Thus, law enforcement organs are required to design and implement laws where the principles of good governance are the norms in their duties. The researcher would argue that where there is a 'will,' there is a way to conduct effective work. The communities in the country require sensitization on the activities of the Commission for Human Rights so as to respect practices of human rights education and advocacy. The

Commission for Human Rights needs to engage the elites in the National and State governments and the officials who violated human rights to conduct workshops to raise awareness, document cases of abuses of human rights, and to take action on the documented cases.

Further, the Commission for Human Rights should be able to advocate and design policies that are operated independently, without political leaders' interference. For all that to take effect, the Commission for Human Rights requires enough budget to reform the system and to implement its activities (interview with a member of Staff, South Sudan Human Rights Commission, Juba, 2017).

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in 1948 included among its many pillars of the system of human rights freedom, equality, and solidarity. Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including expression of opinion, are all protected under the law of human rights. The human rights law also guarant**ee**s equality, such as equal protection against all forms of discrimination and solidarity to protect economic and social rights, social security, wages, and an adequate standard of living, health, and education. These are all considered political, civil, economic, social, and cultural values of human rights that require advocacy (The Bill of Human Rights).

The explanation above can guide what the Human Rights Commission in Juba need**s** for effective achievement in practicing human rights education and advocacy to empower individuals and communities to fully realize all the activities for respect of the values of human rights. Conflicts need to be resolved by peaceful means and on the basis of the rule of law and within the framework of human rights. Everybody (women, men, youth, disabled people, and children) needs to know and understand their rights in relation to their issues of concern and the aspirations that can only be achieved through effective practices for human rights education and advocacy in both formal and informal manner of learning.

The practice of human rights education and advocacy is to be undertaken by all actors in their work, for example, civil society organizations, government representatives, inter-governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations. As noted by Walfang (2006), human rights education and advocacy is part of the work of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 26 says that; "everyone *has the right to education….Education shall be directed to the*

full development of human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedom….." (Walfang, 2006, p. 205).

The researcher would ask: Are the communities in South Sudan currently able to effectively practice human rights education and advocacy? The answer is no. As mentioned earlier, the process of practicing human rights education and advocacy also relates to all the learning that develops the knowledge, skills, and values of human rights in communities. It promotes fairness, tolerance, and dignity, the respect of the rights and dignity of other people in the communities. Human rights education and advocacy have a role in the management of conflict through conflict transformation in the process of peacebuilding. Human rights education and advocacy have a role in knowledge transfer, skills building, and shaping attitudes, constituting the basis of a genuine culture for preventing conflict. Human rights education and advocacy are key concepts for building good governance and for practices of democracy in government. It provides the basis for addressing societal problems through active participation and increases practices for transparency and accountability in the communities. These are aspects of the practice of human rights education and advocacy, which need implementation in Central Equatoria State and further to make the practice effective.

Building capacity in practices for good governance in the practice of human rights education and advocacy has two complementary forms in state building and development in society. First, state building provides democratic security, facilitating effective reconstruction and rehabilitation after conflict. Second, societal development includes broad-based practices in human rights education and advocacy to empower people to claim their rights and to show respect for the rights of others. It has been stated by Kofi Annan that; "d*evelopment without security and security without development both of them cannot be enjoyed without respect for human rights* "(Annan, 2005, in Walfang, 2006, p. 29).

Implementing human rights education and advocacy in Central Equatoria State is the responsibility of both National and State governments, including the United Nations aid agencies and civil society organizations. These actors have duties to protect and to fulfill the respect for human rights. For example, authorities at the National and State governments are to respect the rights to privacy or expression of civil and political rights. This includes economic, social, and

cultural rights. The process requires positive activity for fulfillment by the National and State governments to provide services to communities to ensure certain minimum standards of living are met. The concept of gradual accomplishment to capacity building has to be applied to promote the process of economic, social, and cultural rights (Walfang, 2006).

The view of one respondent during this study was that the impact of development on post-conflict communities of Central Equatoria State and South Sudan, in general, can only be realized when there is reality rather than rhetoric in the development of policies by the National Government (**i**nterview with a member of civil society organization, Juba, 2017). Certain fundamental steps are required, including land reform, ownership, and control of livelihood and natural resources by the affected communities. Literacy and education, health, shelter, and nutrition are some basic requirements for post-conflict communities. Otherwise, the rhetoric aspect would be, as pointed out by an interviewee (civil society organization, Juba, 2017) during this study, the offering of hybrid cows instead of land to the landless, provision of exclusive loans for buying land for agriculture, without addressing other infrastructural needs in a situation where crops are dependent on irrigation and providing flexible schools for child laborers rather than ensuring their full attendance at school. These are all rhetorical issues that will not effectively work. This implies that what is said and written must be practically and correctly implemented, rather than being lip service, and should not remain on the written paper. The main factors in human rights education and advocacy are lack of political 'will' and fair redistribution of resources. Efforts for effective practice of human rights education and advocacy for conflict-affected communities in the country can only be possible through the system of local communities and decentralization, where subjects and not objects of the processes for development are to generate human development equitably (Walfang, 2006).

Some gaps have resulted from disrespecting the practices for principles of good governance, leading to differences in opinion in the administration between elites in the National and State governments and the local communities. Moreover, it has enormously affected the communities in the country. Elites in the National and State governments have disrespected the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, Article 25, which says that; " *everyone has the rights to a standard of living adequate health and wellbeing of himself and his or her family, including; food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services…..”* (Walfang, 2006, p. 125). Further, Article 26(2) stated that; "*……education shall be directed to*

the full development of human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedom….." (Walfang, 2006, p. 212). This quotation makes the practice of human rights education and advocacy an empowerment right for individuals and groups to control not only over the course of their lives but also to have control over the effect of the actions of the governments on the individual or group. Practices of the rights of empowerment enable a person to experience the benefits of the other rights, enjoyment of civil and political rights, freedom of information, freedom of expression, the right to vote and to be elected, etc. However, they are not fully implemented in South Sudan to make the practice of human rights education and advocacy effective (Walfang, 2006).

Elites in the National and State governments have also disrespected the Universal Declaration of Human Rights principles. Article 19 says that; "*everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression - this right includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of borderline"* (Walfang, 2006, p. 297). The freedom of opinion and expression includes freedom to receive and impart information and ideas through any media, regardless of borderline, and it is one of the fundamental civil and political rights laid down in all respective instruments of human rights. However, it has not been effectively practiced in South Sudan. Further, **A**rticle 21 states that; "*everyone has the right to take part in the government of his or her country, direct or through freely chosen representatives. Everyone has the right to equal access to public services in his or her country. The will of people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will / shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secrete vote or by equivalent free voting procedures* "(Walfang, 2006, p. 317). For that, actors in the peacebuilding process would also need to consider that the constitution of the International Labor Organization in 1919 clearly stated that; "*…..universal and lasting peace can be achieved only if it is based on social justice…"* (Walfang, 2006, p. 273).

The communities in Central Equatoria State and, further (the human rights holders), have lost their respect for elites in the National and State governments because of the 2013 intra-conflict in Juba, making communities in South Sudan at large the victims of conflict from the duty bearers

(elites in the National and State governments). The duty bearers have been expected to have a responsibility to denounce the violation of human rights and to call for measures of accountability from the violators of human rights, but there have been no serious steps taken to pursue the violators of human rights to meet justice. This has also made the practice of human rights education and advocacy not effective in South Sudan. The only effort made by the duty bearers has been the establishment of various committees to look into the abuses of human rights, including the formation of an investigation committee in the National government, on the abuses of human rights, a process that does not signify reality than rhetoric, as there has been no much progress in its work.

Conclusions

This paper reviewed and analyzed information on the practice of human rights education and advocacy in Central Equatoria State and other states of South Sudan. The study applied purposive sampling to gather primary data, including literature from various sources. The practice of human rights education and advocacy represents the commitment to support vulnerable communities. The work requires sustainable provision of assistance and knowledge of human rights values to improve the quality of life of the affected communities. Workers in practices for human rights education and advocacy play different roles, but mostly under a single universal principle to protect vulnerable communities by decreasing their suffering, including enhancing their wellbeing during post-conflict recovery.

The practice of human rights education and advocacy was more effective during the Interim Period (2005 - July 9, 2011) compared to the period (July 9, 2011 to 2021), especially after the outbreak of the intra-conflict in December 2013. Long-term peace can be consolidated by building the capacity and the legitimacy of the authorities in the governments. This can be by the provision of security, good policing, and the rule of law to have sustainable stability.

The National government did not put its house in the right direction to give examples for the practice of human rights education and advocacy to produce effective results. That would be the main reason why the practice of human rights education and advocacy was not effective enough to contribute to efforts to prevent the reoccurrence of conflict in South Sudan. There will be no effective practice of human rights education and advocacy when there is conflict.

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Ethical Leadership and Effective Management of Public Resources in Africa: The Tanzanian Experience of a Missing Link?

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Abstract

This work explores the nexus between ethical leadership and the effective management of public resources. The major force is that any nation's performance, seeking to achieve its goals, depends on its leadership. This is especially true when ethical leadership translates into wise public policy design and implementation and good public service delivery to meet citizens' needs and ambitions. Unfortunately, the post-independence period in Africa has been characterized by a never-ending quest for the depressing trajectory of African economies. This paper employs a literature review of various sources. The objective is to better understand ethical leadership and effective management of public resources for African development by bringing out the Tanzanian experience. This study is based on findings from the literature review. Further studies are needed to include findings from Africa and elsewhere to give an informative work from a global perspective. This work is expected to inform researchers and all stakeholders concerned with leadership and development to get crucial information on the theoretical and policy gaps that must be addressed when dealing with ethical leadership. Topical gaps in the literature are suggested as prospective research areas.

Keywords: *Public Resources, Transformed Leadership, Sustainable Management, Ethical Leadership, Development*

Introduction

As early as 1938, Barnard (1938) noted that one duty of the executive is to establish a moral framework for the organization because leadership without ethics and integrity can be detrimental to both the organizational stakeholders and society. Integrity and honesty have long been recognized as significant determinants of leadership effectiveness (Ahmad & Gao, 2017). Many analysts attribute the continent's "Dutch disease," prolonged economic crises, and sluggish recovery to the crises in ethical leadership of both politicians and bureaucrats in various political regimes because there is a connection between ethical leadership and a country's economic performance (Brady et al., 2010; Bedi et al., 2016). Due to this, organizational researchers have

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recently started to use a systematic method to define ethical leadership and look at the causes and effects of ethical leadership in companies (Brown & Trevio, 2006; Shahidul Hassan et al., 2014).

This work is opined on Pigeot's theory of moral development and the theory of social learning. Moral development theory stresses that ethical leaders are the most crucial source of moral guidance as followers look to leaders for indications about what appropriate and inappropriate behaviors leaders influence their followers by way of modeling processes (Carpendale & Jeremy, 2009), while the social learning theory is based on the belief that ethical leadership has the most substantial influence to followers to be ethical since the good values, attitudes, and behaviors are transmitted from the top leaders to the bottom ladder followers (Brown et al., 2005).

There are many ways to describe ethical leadership. According to Kanungo (2001), moral leaders act in a way that benefits others while abstaining from actions that can endanger them. According to Khuntia and Suar (2004), moral leaders should infuse moral principles into their values, beliefs, and deeds. A more thorough definition of ethical leadership was offered by Brown et al. (2005), who defined it as "the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such conduct through two-way communication, reinforcement, and decision-making."

According to these perspectives, three essential attributes of ethical leadership are: firstly, being an ethical role model to others; secondly, treating people fairly; and lastly, actively managing ethics in the organization (Brown et al., 2005; Brown & Treviño, 2006). The first two characteristics capture the moral character component of ethical leadership. Leaders who uphold ethical principles such as honesty, integrity, and altruism (such as giving up personal gain for the good of others) act morally at all times, regardless of the circumstances, risks, or pressures they may be confronted with (Treviño et al., 2003; Brown et al., 2005; Brown & Treviño, 2006). Additionally, moral leaders act as examples for others. These leaders establish themselves as viable role models by acting consistent with social norms and respecting others (Brown et al., 2005; Brown & Treviño, 2006; Shahidul Hassan et al., 2014).

This work emphasizes that transformational leadership is needed in Africa to effectively manage public resources and enable countries to achieve the objectives of the 2030 Sustainable

Development Goals (SDGs) and the Africa Agenda 2063. This is because transformational leaders are ethical leaders who have strong personal character, a passion for doing right, are proactive, consideration of stakeholders' interests, are role models for the organization's values, are transparent, and ensure active involvement in organizational decision-making, and a holistic view of the institution's ethical culture.

Many studies have been conducted on ethical leadership, antecedents, and effects. For example, Miceli and Near (1988) found that personal and organizational factors influence employee reports of unethical conduct in federal agencies. Consistent with public service motivation theory, Brewer & Selden (1998) showed that public employees with a higher regard for the public interest are more likely to report illegal or wasteful activity in their agencies; other scholars examined the prevalence of different leadership practices and ethical codes and their effects on employee ethical behavior in public organizations (Cowell et al., 2014; Hegarty & Moccia, 2018); recently, there were also public sector studies looking for a connection between ethical leadership and integrity violations (Erakovich & Kolthoff, 2016; Zeng et al., 2020; Hamoudah et al., 2021) and affective commitment(Shahidul Hassan et al., 2013; Abuzaid, 2018; Shakeel et al., 2020).

Although ethical leadership and its associated antecedents and effects have received considerable attention, there is still a dearth of relevant case studies on ethical leadership challenges that systematically review the literature and look at the trend over a long period of time (Shahidul Hassan et al., 2014; Roque et al., 2020; Sharfa Hassan et al., 2022). Moreover, while research on the consequences of ethical leadership in public organizations is limited, the existing studies suggest that this can be a productive area of research (Shahidul Hassan et al., 2014).

In order to discuss the likely trends that will raise the bar on improving governance in managing public resources in Africa, this work seeks to raise important issues by addressing the question of ethical leadership and effective management of public resources in Africa by clearly bringing out the Tanzanian Experience. Specifically, the objectives of this article include Exploring the needed transformative leadership to effectively manage public resources and enable a country to achieve the objectives of the SDGs and Africa Agenda 2063; examining development trajectories in Africa, success and ethical leadership challenges; illustrating experience from Tanzania on the missing link of ethical leadership as well as to provide suggestions on how best leadership ethics

should be dealt with in order to have a transformed leadership that would ensure effective and sustainable management of public resources in Africa.

This article aims to contribute to research in public administration by analyzing how ethical leadership is related to the effective management of public resources and development. With this objective, the current study systematically reviews the existing body of work on (un)ethical leadership and multi-level understanding of the academic developments in this field. Studies were organized according to various themes focused on antecedents, outcomes, and boundary conditions of ethical leadership. The study also explains knowledge gaps in the literature that could broaden the horizon of (un)ethical leadership research. Scholars and practitioners will find this study helpful in realizing the occurrence, consequences, and potential strategies to circumvent the adverse effects of unethical leadership.

Background of the Study

This work explores the nexus between ethical leadership and effective management of public resources. The primary force is that the performance of any nation to achieve its set goals depends, to a large extent, on its leadership. This is especially so as ethical leadership translates into responsible public policy formulation and implementation, alongside effective service delivery, to meet the needs and aspirations of citizens. A never-ending quest for the depressing trajectory of African economies has characterized the post-independence period in Africa.

The reason why many African countries are rich in natural resources, although this has not always been a blessing, could be better explained by the fact that some African countries are said to have leadership gaps in many sectors. Therefore, African countries, being development-focused, have a strong need for transformative leadership, that is, ethical leaders who effectively mobilize resources and possess a vision and related strategies to build capable institutions that will pertain beyond the single leader (Brown & Treviño, 2006). Therefore, African countries must need leaders endowed with strong political will and an engagement toward development results. This strong commitment is often recognized as lacking in African political leadership and contributes to slowing down development processes and development-focused policies and initiatives.

Furthermore, the trend that cropped in Africa in the 1990s toward kindling hopes that political reform could lead to economic regeneration seems to fall short of its prediction (Gapa et al., 2017; Estrin & Pelletier, 2018). It was hoped that if governments become more accountable, transparent, and rule-driven, politicians would find stronger incentives to furnish public goods, expand the economy, and enhance citizens' well-being and livelihoods and institutions of accountability, fight against corruption and malfeasance by rulers in order to ensure their political survival (Mejía Acosta, 2013). Hence, public ethical leadership cannot be over-emphasized for this to be realized.

The quest for ethical leadership as an ideal way of ensuring effective management of public resources in Africa has been one of the major desires since independence. The term 'public resources' is used to refer to any property or asset possessed by the state or any local agency, including, but not limited to, natural resources, facilities, supplies, vehicles, equipment, buildings, computers, funds, travel, telephones, and state-compensated time (Boe & Kvalvik, 2015). The challenges in governance in the continent of Africa are since the early years of the independence of its countries. African leaders began working for the development vision of Africa at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s. They convened to work as a unique and common group to overcome the crucial challenges facing Africa and its fragile states. Some met at the Bandung Conference (Indonesia) in April 1955, where the non-aligned movement was born (Chakrabarty, 2005). The need for ethical leadership is, in essence, an answer to the long-lasting debate on action for development in the African context. Such concern can be traced to Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah, who believed in strengthening the African continent and making it less vulnerable to outside influence; the continent should be united. In May 1963, the African leaders created the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The African continent entered a new era when the African Union (AU) was formally inaugurated in Durban, South Africa, on July 9, 2002.

African governments have adopted several strategies to mitigate the deepening economic problems and restart economic growth by having solid political and administrative institutions that promote the values of good governance. Against this background, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) emerged, whose functional focus areas are ethics and anti-corruption. The launching of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in 2002 aimed to promote the policies' adoption, standards, and practices for political stability, high economic

growth, and sustainable development. It also hastened sub-regional and continental economic integration by identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity-building and sharing of successful practices. It is also one of the signposts of the need for effective management in Africa that ensures sound management of public resources (Hope, 2006).

This work emphasizes that transformed leadership is needed in Africa to effectively manage public resources and enable a country to achieve the objectives of Africa Agenda 2063 on the one hand and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) on the other by promoting economic development and long-term sustainability of natural resource-based activities. This is because transformational leaders are ethical leaders who have strong personal character, a passion for doing right, are proactive, consideration of stakeholders' interests, are role models for the organization's values, are transparent, and ensure active involvement in organizational decision-making, and a holistic view of the institution's ethical culture (Brown & Treviño, 2006; Ahmad & Gao, 2017).

In order to discuss the likely trends that will raise the bar on improving governance in managing public resources in Africa, this work seeks to raise important issues by addressing the question of ethical leadership and effective management of public resources in Africa by clearly bringing out the Tanzanian experience.

Specifically, the objectives of this paper include exploring the needed transformative leadership to effectively manage public resources and enable a country to achieve the desired development agendas; examining the relationship between ethical leadership and effective management of public resources; exploring ethical leadership challenges; illustrating experience from Tanzania on the missing link of ethical leadership as well as to provide suggestions on how best leadership ethics should be dealt with in order to ensure effective management of public resources in Africa and Tanzania in particular.

Research Methodology

The standard systematic literature review methodology recommended by (Brereton et al., 2007; Hohenstein et al., 2014 and Massaro et al., 2016) was used for this research. A literature review was chosen because it facilitates the assessment of collective evidence in a particular area

(Whittemore & Knafl, 2005; Snyder, 2019). Snyder (2019) argues that a literature review provides a "firm foundation for advancing knowledge and facilitating theory development." Moreover, the systematic literature review is considered the best option for this study as it facilitates the construction of a unified body of knowledge in the given area of study (Whittemore & Knafl, 2005) and enables researchers with guidelines to highlight a young stream of research by exploring the main research trends contributing to it (Tortorella et al., 2020) and integrates multiple methods and enables the researcher to collect several multidisciplinary publications from high-ranked sources and multidisciplinary journals and prevents bias (Dumay et al., 2015; Secundo et al., 2020).

To perform a systematic, transparent, and replicable study, Massaro et al. (2016) present that the systematic literature review protocol needs to follow these specific steps:

Definition of Research Questions

Main research questions were formulated regarding how the literature is developing, the literature's focus on the issue, and the implications of research. Regarding this, the research questions in this study are formulated as follows:

> RQ1. How is the literature on the nexus between ethical leadership and effective management of public resources according to the Global Agenda 2030 and Africa Agenda 2063 perspective?
>
> RQ2. What is the focus of the literature on ethical leadership challenges?
>
> RQ3: How is the literature developing within the trend of ethical leadership and development in Tanzania?
>
> RQ4. What is the research on ethical leadership implications in SDGs and African aspirations?

The first research question is intended to provide specific literature on the issue, explaining the extent to which the literature is considering the argument; the second research question is more linked to defining the perspective from which literature has been developed so far and which main issues on development paths-ethical leadership divide emerge from the literature; the third research question is more inferential, meaning that it helps the researchers to discuss and provide insights and the fourth research question intends to contribute to knowledge gained from the

literature and provide more profound understanding of emerging issues and areas to be explored in future.

Finding Relevant Researches

Finding relevant literature for the paper's topic was carried out in Google Scholar and the Scopus database, which provides 20,000 peer-reviewed journals (Mishra et al., 2017). Therefore, the Scopus database is a suitable data warehouse for a structured literature review. The papers were first selected based on keywords, then according to the title, then according to the abstract, and finally according to the conclusion. The keywords used to search for papers are: natural resources, public resources, transformed leadership, effective management, ethical leadership, and ethical leadership challenges.

Regarding the criteria for inclusion and exclusion of studies

The first criterion the studies had to meet refers to the time. Therefore, this research included those studies that were published in the period 1961-2020. The time horizon was selected to capture the Tanzanian experience as a case study from the first phase of government to the fifth phase of government, which ended on March 17, 2021, following the untimely death of President John Pombe Magufuli who had just started the second term of the fifth phase of government. The second criterion the studies had to meet was that they were scientific, professional, or review papers published in a scientific journal or proceedings from conferences, books, or doctoral dissertations.

Articles reviewed were those which linked ethics-related leadership styles and effective management of public resources. The paper considered ethics-related leadership styles, ethical challenges that leaders face, the impact of culture on ethical leadership and management in the African context, and ethical dilemmas in Africa.

All papers with the specified keyword were downloaded. The criteria for article inclusion in the review were that the articles needed a central theme that linked the various forms of ethics-related leadership styles with effective management of public resources. An abstract must contain at least one keyword for a journal article to be selected. Further to this, the watchword "Ethical leadership" in the article abstract search process in conjunction with at least one of the

keywords; for example, “transformed leadership” or “public resources." The purpose was to pinpoint possible articles in the pre-selected journals that might have been unexplored. The outcome of this was an initial sample of 1,210 articles.

The abstracts were reviewed to evaluate the appropriateness of the journal articles to ethical leadership and effective management of public resources. Articles that were found irrelevant to the criteria of this article were eliminated to ensure consistent focus and reduce bias and duplications (Rashman et al., 2009; Hohenstein et al., 2014). For example, the search by keyword revealed 857 papers for the set "Ethical leadership" and "Effective Management." However, most did not meet the criteria since they did not specifically focus on ethical leadership and effective management of public resources in Tanzania. Thus, papers had to show a clear connection between ethical leadership practices and challenges in the management of public resources in Tanzania between 1967 and 2020.

In total, 384 appropriate scientific articles were identified. By scanning the citations and bibliographies, multiple journal articles that could be of high relevance but which were published under a different term were identified. According to Brereton et al. (2007), standard abstracts related to “Ethical Leadership” and “Effective Management” is not sufficient to conclude on their basis whether the study is relevant. It is necessary to read the conclusions. After reading the conclusions, 41 relevant studies on ethical leadership and management challenges in Tanzania from 1961 to 2020 were selected. These articles were included in the literature review to ensure this paper's high quality and comprehensiveness. A full-text review of the 41 followed the systematic approach of (Rashman et al., 2009).

Search strings were defined by querying a set of relevant keywords to select appropriate papers to include in the study. The keywords and combinations identified and used for the paper search were “ethical leadership” and "management challenges" in the title, abstract, author keywords, author(s), and number of citations, year, affiliations, source, and document type.

Qualitative Evaluation

A qualitative assessment of the relevance of selected papers was performed using criteria developed at York University, Center for Reviews and Dissemination (CDR) Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effects (DARE), using Mendeley software.

Figure 1: Summary of article selection process adapted from Rashman *et al*. (2009) and Hohenstein *et al*., 2014



Theoretical Underpinnings of Results

The purpose of this section is to present the results of our study of the bodies of literature under investigation.

Africa's Ethical Leadership Challenges in Managing Public Resources

The performance of any nation depends on its leadership in seeking to achieve its set goals, to a large extent, because ethical leadership translates into prudent public policy formulation and implementation, besides good public service delivery. Some Asian economies (South Korea and Malaysia) that were in some decades past faced with similar development challenges are currently being hailed as "economic miracles" (Akyüz & Gore, 2001), while the situation in Africa is being described as a "disaster" and a "tragedy" (UNCTAD, 2004 as cited in Kuada, 2010).

The reasons cited for such poor performance in Kuada's (2010) study include institutional and structural weaknesses (Killick et al., 2001), limited attention to private enterprise development (Fafchamps et al., 2001), management incompetence (Iheriohanma & Oguoma, 2010) and limited staff motivation (Hameduddin & Engbers, 2022). Indeed, according to Dartey-bath (2014), despite its vast wealth and resources, Africa's poor economic development is a result of weak leadership.

Africa is rich in natural and human resources and is a continent in transformation. However, due to bad leadership, Africa remains politically, economically, and socially underdeveloped, with a legacy of poverty and hunger, civil wars, and violent conflicts (Agulanna, 2006). To substantiate this claim, i*n* 2009, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2018, and 2019, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation Prize Committee, after an in-depth review, did not select a winner. This reveals the severity of Africa's leadership crisis and governance (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020). Many African leaders lack ethical commitment to good governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and responsibility and accountability - all of which could guarantee that Africa's resources are harnessed towards healthy living for all citizens (Asefa & Huang, 2015).

Africa's leadership crisis is manifested by trends where powerful political elites feed on the state, prey on the weak, use public resources for self-aggrandizement, and deprive citizens of collective goods such as medical care, good education, and employment.

When people's human needs are unmet, protracted social conflicts and wars are inevitable (Beriker, 2008).

A snapshot of the ethical leadership crisis in Africa is now provided to give an overview of the situation that must be addressed to realize the global, regional, and local development agendas. The study findings indicate that nearly 75 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa were estimated to have paid a bribe in the past year for varied reasons. While some did so to escape punishment by the police or courts, others were forced to pay to access the basic services they desperately needed (Pring, 2015). In a similar vein, in 2019, the Global Corruption Barometer, which surveyed 35 African countries between 2016 and 2018 by Afrobarometer, revealed that more than one out of four people, or approximately 130 million citizens, paid a bribe to get essential public services (Pring & Vrushi, 2019). This hampers inclusive and responsive government, and thus, if not curtailed, the realization of sustainable development goals in Africa is left at a crossroads. Furthermore, in the African governance report, the African average score of 35.3 in *Transparency and Accountability* remains the lowest of all 14 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) sub-categories (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019).

This situation is a signpost that corruption and poor governance are the primary origin of the increasing underdevelopment in Africa. Ethics and public service principles are essentially the "body and soul" of public administration (Menzel, 2003), and ethical principles should equally pervade all organizations (Nicolaides & Tornam Duho, 2019). Good leaders are thus needed to bridge the divide between the past and, to an extent, the present, and the forging of a future ethical climate is vital.

Dynamics of Tanzania's Ethical Leadership in Managing Public Resources (1961-2020)

Public administration scholars have long discussed the importance of ethical leadership from a normative perspective by specifying what public servants (Senior, middle-level, and junior) should do or how they ought to behave (Rabin, 2001; Bashir & Hassan, 2019). Hart (1984), for example, proposed that public servants should be prudent, trustworthy, and considerate, and their actions should be consistent with public values and interests. Given this emphasis on the moral person, it is not surprising that so many public sector organizations rely on their senior leadership

to establish and support an ethical climate (West & Berman, 2004). Empirical evidence also supports the importance of ethics for good governance and democracy (Cowell et al., 2014) because it predicts satisfaction with government services, trust in government, and the magnitude of citizen participation (Villoria et al., 2013). That is why, at this juncture, a detailed literature review on the ethical leadership trends in Tanzania is presented to better understand the situation by comparing the leadership phases of government.

Though Tanzania is one of few African countries endowed with extensive and different types of natural resources (Mkonda & He, 2017), her economy experienced a slowdown in the pace of poverty reduction in which the incidence of basic needs decreased only from 28.2% in 2012 to 26.4% in 2018 with an increase in the number of poor people in absolute terms, from 12.3 million people in 2012 to 14 million people in 2018 (Aikaeli et al., 2021). Part of the problem is the growth and spread of the greed and selfish syndrome, specifically among the leadership across the board-politicians, public servants, professionals, academia, the media, civil society organizations, and even faith-based organizations something which has affected the tax collection system, legal contracts, provision of permits and areas related to socio-economic aspects (Mkonda & He, 2017; Nkyabonaki, 2019).

An overview of the trend of the effectiveness of ethical leadership in managing public resources in Tanzania encompasses the period from the first phase of government guided by the philosophy of the Arusha Declaration through the fifth phase of government. The first phase was that of Julius Kambarage Nyerere (1962-1985), followed by the liberalization of the second phase of President Ali Hassan Mwinyi's government regime (1985-1995). The third and fourth phases of government regimes were of President Benjamin William Mkapa (1995-2005) and President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete (2005-2015), respectively. The fifth phase was under President John Pombe Magufuli (2015-2021) (Andreoni, 2017).

The First Phase of Government under President Julius Kambarage Nyerere

One of the causes of the leadership crisis is the vanishing of societal values and ethics contrary to the vision of the founding fathers of the nation of Tanzania. In a policy booklet published in March 1967 on "Education for Self-Reliance," Nyerere spelled out the values and objectives of the society he envisioned as follows:

> *"... we want to create a socialist society which is based on three principles: equality and respect for human dignity; sharing of the resources which are produced by our efforts; work by everyone and exploitation by none. We have set out these ideas clearly in the National Ethic, and in the Arusha Declaration and earlier documents, we have outlined the principles and policies we intend to follow*" (Nyerere, 1967).

In 1967, the government inaugurated the Arusha Declaration as a breakthrough to fight corruption and revive the ethics of public leadership. According to the Declaration, four constituents were essential and critical for spearheading social development: land, people, progressive politics, and good leadership. With this spirit, the Declaration specifically developed the code of ethics for ruling party leaders, which was to be adhered to bring about inclusive and sustainable social development (Shivji, 2017). Under the Arusha Declaration, party and government leaders were disallowed to earn two incomes, hold shares in private firms, and rent out houses (Tripp, 2019).

The first regime had a staunch approach to ensuring positive results by observing the leadership code of ethics. The efforts began in 1966 when the government established the Permanent Commission of Enquiry (Ombudsman) to check on the abuse of powers by government officials and agencies. To complement the work of the Commission, in 1971, the Government passed a Prevention of Corruption Act, which enabled the formation of the Anti-Corruption Squad in 1975 (REPOA, 2006).

In order to make it a reality, the first phase of government under Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere ensured that the conditions of the Leadership Code were not only party policy; they were made into an amendment to the country's constitution in 1967 (Tripp, 2019). When the Leadership Code was first implemented, it was aimed primarily at senior party and government leaders and high- and middle-ranking civil servants, but gradually, it came to apply to all leaders and party members who received a salary of more than TSh 1,060.70. The sum was fixed in 1973 and included all government and parastatal employees at high and middle levels at that time, and by the mid-1980s, the Leadership Code affected all employees in government or government-owned enterprises because the minimum wage exceeded the 1973 income figure that stipulated who had to abide by the code (Tripp, 2019).

Under Nyerere's regime, policymakers were concerned about amputating corruption and maintaining ethical leadership since corruption was viewed as a form of oppression that undermined egalitarian values. Although one cannot claim that there was no corruption during Nyerere's era due to the burgeoning government structure caused by the establishment of the cooperatives and parastatals to accommodate the state's economic role, corruption incidences were kept minimal (Heilman & Ndumbaro, 2002). Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere is remembered for his economic achievements, and he will also always be remembered for his unwavering ethical leadership in creating a united and politically viable, just, ethical, stable, peaceful, cohesive, and sustainable nation, where at independence, there was none (Tripp, 2019).

The Second Phase of Government under President Ali Hassan Mwinyi

The second phase of Government marked a significant turning point in the struggle that emerged in the 1980s between the government and the party over policies affecting the informal economy. The party sought to restrain domestic and foreign pressures to liberalize, while the government wanted to implement liberalization. Finally, this forced revising the Leadership Code of the Arusha Declaration by adopting what came to be known as the Zanzibar Declaration of 1991, which fundamentally modified the 1967 Arusha Declaration and challenged the original objectives of the document by adopting the Zanzibar Resolution (Tripp, 2019). With the Zanzibar Resolution, leaders were freed from the political conditions of the Arusha Declaration. This marked the beginning of the divergent and lost path that eroded all fundamental principles set by Nyerere's regime as it led to the disappearance of values such as efficiency, accountability, transparency, and God in the lives of top political leaders, decision-makers, and sadly enough even among the people of God (Heilman & Ndumbaro, 2002; Lameck, 2018).

Following the abandonment of the ethical principles laid down by the first phase of government, the end of the second phase of government in 1995 was characterized by the blurred and fluid boundary between personal and private life, low level of citizen competence, and the public often encouraged, or at least accepted, corrupt behavior; weak government unable to provide public services or to effectively implement the policies; rampant patronage and kinship networks and prevalent misuse of public resources.

The situation could be described briefly as Julius Nyerere publically condemned public leaders for embracing corruption and aptly said that the country "reeked of corruption" (Heilman &

Ndumbaro, 2002). Corruption was widespread, and there was little effort to curb such practices within the workplace or on the part of the police. Confidence in the police was so low that vigilante groups called *'sungusungu*' were formed nationwide to deter crime. People widely believed that if a case was brought into the judicial system, the likelihood of a fair trial was slim as bribes could be utilized to undermine the process at a number of links in the legal chain of the police, court officials, prosecutor, witnesses, and judge/magistrate. This created an uncertain environment for business, as contract enforcement was highly problematic. Fraudulent land title deeds were issued, taxes were avoided, and the inspections of goods leaving and entering the country were easily circumvented (Heilman & Ndumbaro, 2002).

Under the economic liberalization policies of the second regime, corruption spiraled out of control, prompting donors to freeze aid for Tanzania, which was named one of the most corrupt nations (Heilman & Ndumbaro, 2002). Linking these features to the socio-economic problems that beset the country, the study concludes that much of this suffering of grand corruption, embezzlement of funds, poor management of public resources, and red-tape bureaucracy in government offices (Rahman, 2019) have all acted as barriers to good governance, this work posits that such a u-turn of the second phase of government might have laid a new path leading to a missing link between ethical leadership that was considered during the first regime and the practices that followed in the subsequent regimes in the country.

The Third Phase of Government under President Benjamin William Mkapa

Owing to this situation, the third phase of government realized that the existing code of ethics was still fragmented into different laws and regulations, and such fragmentation made it difficult for public servants to understand what is expected of them in terms of ethics. To address this problem, in 1995, the government enacted one code of ethics for public leadership (Lameck, 2018). The code defines what is expected of public leaders in terms of ethical conduct. In a nutshell, it instructs public leaders to declare their properties and avoid conflict of interest by avoiding personal interest and conflicts with their leadership responsibility (Lumbanga, 2005).

Apart from the leadership code of ethics, the code of ethics for public servants was established in 2005 to regulate the behavior of other public servants. This defines all types of unethical acts and

conduct which are not allowed in the public service. This ethical conduct includes, among other things, respecting all human rights, avoiding any discrimination based on sex, tribe, nationality, ethnicity, or marital status, and avoiding sexual harassment at the workplace. Secondly, to perform their duties diligently and in a disciplined manner through obedience to the law. Thirdly, to perform their duties efficiently and to observe punctuality by observing the dress code, teamwork, and pursuing service excellence. Fourthly, to exercise their responsibility and good stewardship by acting within the boundaries of a given authority. Finally, to observe transparency, accountability, and the principle of meritocracy and integrity in discharging their functions (Lumbanga, 2005).

Furthermore, the third phase of government took a pragmatic approach to restoring ethical leadership and instituting measures of curbing corruption, which entailed calling attention to the problem through a publicity campaign, strengthening anti-corruption institutions, and purging in the 'public interest' of several state employees. Mkapa urged professional bodies to become more involved in reducing corruption and overseeing the activities of their members (Lyimo, 2000, cited in Heilman & Ndumbaro (2002)). Watchdog institutions were established to ensure the restoration of public integrity. Beginning in 1998, the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) was revitalized, and its budget dramatically increased to perform several functions, including investigating corruption offenses, conducting research on corruption matters, raising public awareness of corruption, prosecuting and giving advice to any entity in the fight against corruption in the country (Heilman & Ndumbaro, 2002).

In addition to the PCB, an Ethics Secretariat was established in 1995 by the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act No.13 of 1995. It was created to curb the misuse of public office by top public officials. All high-ranking elected and non-elected officials were or are required to declare their assets and liabilities. It was designed to deal with breaches of ethics by public officials, which may or may not be corruption-related. In 2001, the Permanent Commission of Inquiry was, through an Act of Parliament, transformed into the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRGG) to coordinate the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan to monitor the public leaders' ethics and abuse of power (REPOA, 2006). Moreover, at the grassroots level, the government instituted opinion polls designed to yield information on corrupt civil servants at the local, district, and regional levels (Heilman & Ndumbaro, 2002).

Despite instating such legal frameworks, Mkapa's third phase of government can be considered to have marginally improved the enforcement of some anti-corruption measures because elements of misuse and abuse of power and authority, lack of transparency and accountability; mismanagement of taxes, revenues, and payments to the government; lack of care and concern for the public interest, trust, ethics and welfare of weaker members of society were not stamped out (Heilman & Ndumbaro, 2002). The country still suffered from what (2016) described as destructive practices, namely working by not considering others, not bothering about the interests and rights of others, supersonic speed by individuals in the struggle to actualize their own interests, goals, and objectives; the myth that although unethical conduct may not precisely be the right thing, it is not bad either and mentality that encourages and propels self-centered interests. Under the third phase of government, the missing link between ethical leadership and effective management of public resources was not reversed.

The Fourth Phase of Government under President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete

Ethical leadership was put to a litmus test during the fourth phase because there was a general trend toward a free press, active civil society, and a relatively empowered national assembly (Cooksey, 2018). In 2005, Tanzanians elected Jakaya Kikwete to the presidency with 80% of the popular vote, and the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi Party (CCM), gained a majority of representatives by securing 96% of mainland parliamentary constituencies (Andreoni, 2017). This phase of government was popularly referred to as the grand corruption and competitive clientelism phase (2005-2015) (Phillips, 2010). The main reason may be that mechanisms that led to ascendancy to the leadership of this phase were ethically questionable. The last phase of the third government regime, for political advantage, legalized unethical practices for people to be elected as political leaders, thereby leading to the erosion of moral authority to enforce ethical practices within the public service.

There was the legalization of the *Yakima* (meaning "hospitality") practice in April 2000 (six months before the presidential election), which favored the increasing reliance on political money. It turned out to be known as the "harvesting season" for politicians for "exchanging votes for gifts of money, meals, and party apparel referred to colloquially as food, sofa, sugar, or tea"(Phillips, 2010). This created a notion that leaders had bought voters, and thus, this

compromised the downward accountability. From 2006, popular demands for accountability (PDAs) in Tanzania from workers, students, and ordinary citizens were on the rise during Kikwete's administration (Killian, 2009). This situation may have been exacerbated partly by having the majority of the parliamentarians from a single party who came to power through unethical political decisions, and thus, they became crippled to stand firmly in exercising an oversight role. The hallmark of accountability in a democracy centers on the way the elected parliament holds the executive to account, whereby if the parliament does not perform its oversight role effectively, lower authorities would have fewer incentives to do the same vis-à-vis local executives (Katomero et al., 2017).

The reported increased bureaucratic and political corruption tendencies can be evidence of the waning ethical leadership during the fourth phase of government. For instance, Kikwete's years in power were blighted by growing scandals and a generally loose approach to Public Finance Management, culminating in the Escrow scandal (2014-15), which saw Kikwete aligning with the perpetrators in the face of massive evidence of their culpability(Cooksey, 2018).

The Fifth Phase of Government under President John Pombe Magufuli

Tanzania, during her fifth phase of government regime, seriously and dutifully embarked on the important task of implementing JK Nyerere's well-known stance on the all-important question of leadership ethics, which is what actually moved him to include the "Leadership Code of Ethics" in the Arusha Declaration of 1967. In an effort to restore the lost values in public service, the fifth phase started the removal of 32,000 ghost workers and those public servants holding fake academic certificates in the payroll, something which led to saving Tshs 378 billion; there were efforts to create anti-grafting court and dismissal of dishonest public officials and increased control on the protection on the natural resources such as minerals by signing three mineral laws and changes which have laid reforms in the extractive industry (Paget, 2020). It is reiterated that, having noticed the missing link of leadership ethics, the fifth regime of government gave priority to three ethics-related governance areas, namely, eliminating wasteful and unnecessary public expenditures, fighting impunity in the public service, and tackling corruption, which is the evil that mercilessly had plagued the nation (Paget, 2020).

Results and Discussions

Performance of the second phase of third government regime (1995-2005) and fourth Phase of government (2005-2015)

In 2005, towards the end of the third phase, the government got relatively good marks, with 62% indicating that the government was doing "fairly" or "very well" at this task. This represents a considerable increase over ratings in 2003 and 2001, and negative evaluations of the government dropped by an even larger margin (REPOA, 2006). Moreover, the World Bank Institute's governance indicators, which look at changes in the quality of governance in Africa from 1996 to 2004 with respect to control of corruption, voice and accountability, and governance effectiveness, placed Tanzania among countries that experienced significant improvements (REPOA, 2006).

However, during the fourth phase of government, this seemed to be on a decrescendo tone. Unlike the preceding phase, the country was ranked 111th out of 177 in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, with a score of 33 out of 100. The 2013 Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) indicated that 69% of respondents in Tanzania perceived the level of corruption to have increased (Deborah Hardoon, 2013). Regarding citizens' experience of corruption, 61% of respondents in the GCB 2013 stated that corruption was a severe problem in the country (Deborah Hardoon, 2013).

Comparison of Level of Corruption between the Fourth and Fifth Phase of Government

Two-thirds (66%) of Tanzanians said the level of corruption increased between 2013 and 2014. The extent of corruption was perceived to be most significant among the police, tax officials, judges, and magistrates. Majorities of citizens in 2012 and 2014 rated the government's performance in handling the fight against corruption as "fairly bad" or "very bad." However, there was a slight improvement (8 percentage points) in 2014 compared to 2012.

Unlike the situation in the fourth phase of government, during the fifth regime, the results were promising, given the less savory aspect of Magufuli's administration. In 2017, more than seven in 10 respondents (72%) said the level of corruption in Tanzania has decreased "somewhat" or "a lot" over the past year. This is a sharp reversal from 2014, when only 13% reported a decrease.

Similarly, in 2017, seven in 10 Tanzanians (71%) said the government is fighting corruption "fairly well" or "very well" – almost twice the level of approval in 2014 (37%) (Lulu & Msami, 2017). At the international ranking, the Corruption Perceptions Index, which was first launched in 1995, ranked the country 96 out of 180 in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 2019, with a score of 37 out of 100, while in 2015, the Corruption Perceptions Index was 30 out of 100 (Pring, 2015; Pring & Vrushi, 2019).

Implications of Ethical Leadership in the Fields of SDGs and African Aspirations

Ethical analysis can take one or more of three basic approaches: descriptive, prescriptive or normative, and metaethical (Khayesi, 2021). While the descriptive aspect presents or narrates a moral situation as it exists, the prescriptive or normative aspect presents the required or expected moral behavior and its source. The three approaches are utilized in this discussion to determine the ethical positions implicitly advanced or assumed in the SDGs, going beyond description to identify the core principles and values and ethical standards pursued or implied in these goals (Nicolaides & Tornam Duho, 2019).

The objective of promoting peaceful and inclusive societies and building effective and accountable institutions is reflected in both Agendas. While peace and institutions are merged in SDG 16 of Agenda 2030, Agenda 2063 puts a stronger emphasis on both areas, with Aspiration 3 being dedicated to an Africa of Good Governance, Democracy, Respect for Human Rights, and the Rule of Law (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019). Thus, SDGs and Africa Agenda have ethical, social, ecological, economic, and governance dimensions (Villeneuve et al., 2017).

Accountability is another area of SDG implementation calling for an ethically grounded implication. Accountability is not only about determining who is answerable when things go wrong but also about establishing and adhering to a mechanism for owning a decision and taking responsibility for executing actions toward achieving the SDGs and the African Agenda (Khayesi, 2021). The ethical issue being raised here is how responsibility and accountability can be handled to ensure that the SDGs are translated into national and local development aspirations and practices. Maintaining responsibility and accountability is at the heart of ensuring ethics of practice in the implementation of the development agendas.

Conclusion

It can be epitomized that any country's performance in seeking sustainable development largely depends on its leadership. Sound leadership translates into careful public policy formulation and implementation, besides good public service delivery, to meet the needs and aspirations of citizens. In order to achieve effective management of public resources and achieve people-centered development, concerted efforts of governments, the business sector, society, and individual citizens are needed to ensure ethical leadership sustainability.

Nonetheless, the world needs effective leadership for sustainable development, and this leadership requires an inner process in which a leader must first be grounded in an understanding of self and a relational view of the world in order to work with others to make change effectively. Achieving coherence between the global vision and the local context is necessary. Development goals could easily become another lost opportunity without a sustained ethical reflection that guarantees realistic translation and responsible stewardship of their implementation at national and local levels. This reflective process allows for feedback loops and cycles of growth and change. The findings strongly suggest nurturing leadership in Africa should be internalized as an inclusive, collaborative, and reflective process rooted in values and ethics.

Moreover, ethical leadership can be realized by involving various stakeholders and not merely legalistic approaches. A transformational approach is required to change people's mindsets, values, and beliefs, which in turn changes people's behavior and actions; ethical leaders must be appointed to positions of authority to start influencing people and education programs to raise the level of awareness and the importance of ethical practices in a society must be established and the war against unethical practices must adopt a systemic approach rather than a legalistic one.

Lastly, to achieve the Global and African Development Goals, leadership at both the national and organizational levels should adopt a leadership style that engenders a sense of shared responsibility toward the attainment of the Goals, one that is focused on the long-term and thus would establish systems that persistently ensure the pursuance of this goal in the future; one that understands the need for collective effort (at both the national and organizational levels) toward the attainment of the development goals and thus would impress upon followers the need to behave in a like manner by refraining from rent-seeking behavior.

Implications for Future Research

Like any research, the present study has limitations. This study used a systematic literature review focusing on the interrelationships of ethical leadership and effective management of public resources in Tanzania. This limited in-depth understanding of the topic and related knowledge in different African contexts. Further exploration of the topic may aid in its development. In addition, academics may find this paper a valuable resource for understanding the state of nature of this field in Africa, in general, and Tanzania, in particular, and justifying future research. Therefore, future research may employ a suitable number of case studies. Furthermore, it would be informative to implement comparative analyses across geographic areas and countries to identify distinct variables related to the study.

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"One Health Approach" Towards Effective Health Services Delivery in Sixty Years of Independent Tanzania

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Abstract

The year 2021 marked sixty years of Tanzania's independence. Tanzania passed through different phases of development and attempted innumerable interventions, including a series of "development alternatives" to fight poverty, hunger, and infectious diseases. These efforts towards effective health services provision treated humans, animals, and environmental health separately. Due to the increase in human, livestock, wildlife, and environment interactions, the efforts did not result in the anticipated health outcomes. This prompted the government to search for an alternative approach. Cognizant of this, the government introduced the "One Health Approach (OHA)", which recognizes health as one, without a dividing line between humans, animals, and environmental health. This paper, therefore, analyzes (i) the debates for advancing effective health services delivery sixty years after independence; (ii) an emerging approach for interdisciplinary collaboration for human, animal, and environmental health, which is considered to have the potential for effective delivery of health services; and, (iii) the relevance of the OHA towards minimizing the undesirable impacts of human, livestock, and wildlife interactions on health. A documentary analysis (documentary research method) was employed to gather the information for the study. OHA is at its infancy stage, though this initiative signifies an essential landmark towards dealing with health-related challenges reflected at the convergence of humans, animals, and the environment. The milestone is outstanding as it leads to building fundamental capacities concerning public health, particularly regarding preparedness and response as per International Health Regulations. The OHA underscores the need for collaborative working efforts involving human, livestock, wildlife, and environmental health professionals for optimal human, animal, and environmental health attainment. There is a need to upscale the OHA and further understand the consequences of the interactions for optimum human, animal, and environmental health. Therefore, it conveys the idea that it is necessary to expand and enhance the OHA and the importance of comprehending the implications of the interactions for the well-being of humans, animals, and the environment.

Keywords: *Human-Livestock -Wildlife Interaction, Human-Animal -Environment Health, One Health Approach, Interdisciplinary Collaboration, Tanzania*

Introduction

Tanzania's mainland attained independence from the British colonialists in 1961. The country, right at the beginning of independence, was found at the yoke of several challenges, which necessitated the need to get rid of these challenges and drive towards national prosperity. Since then, Tanzania has passed into different development pathways, attempting innumerable

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interventions, discourses, and approaches. These included a series of "development alternatives" to fight poverty, hunger, and diseases (Mwabukojo, 2019; Mujinja & Kida, 2014; COWI *et al.*, 2007).

The government in Tanzania, towards the attainment of development goals, had to prioritize the interventions, with priority directed in the health sector. This was important for national development since adequate health services provision was expected to contribute significantly to creating a society with limited incidence of diseases. Unquestionably, *ceteris paribus*, national development attainment, *inter alia*, relies on population quality, a crucial parameter for economic development. The quality of the population is determined, leaving alone other factors, by good health. It remains uncontested that good health is a foundation stone of development in all societies (World Bank, 1993; Lennock & Ehrenpreis, 2003; URT, URT, 2003a, b; 2007a; IMF, 2004; WHO, 2010; WHO, 2012a; 2012b; Levin-Zamir *et al.,* 2017). This rests on an understanding that the health status of a society is viewed in the context of holding the potentiality of impacting the other sectors in the society in a given polity (politics, society, and the economy inclusive) (Baruch & Clancy, 2000; Bloom *et al.*, 2004; Kickbusch, 2005; Williamson, 2008; Sørensen *et al.,* 2015; Riegelman, & Wilson, 2016; World Bank, 2021; Ridhwan *et al.,*2022; Bloom *et al.,* 2019, 2014, 2010, 2004; Boyce & Brown, 2019; Saltman, 2018; Rubenstein, 2020; Dawes *et al.,* 2022; Hargrove *et al.,* 2022; Muhanga & Mapoma, 2019).

The livelihood is intensely in the existence of good health that labor productivity can be boosted, educational goals can be attained, and efficient income can be generated; all will have a cumulative effect on poverty reduction (Udoh & Ajala, 2001; Bloom *et al.*, 2004). Inversely, the society, politics, and the economy of a particular society likewise impact the health status of individuals in a particular society (Sayah & Williams, 2012; Edwards *et al.*, 2012). It should be noted that in the context of ill-health and diseases, the chances for economic growth and transition to national development in least-developed countries seem to be illusive (Bloom & Canning 2000, 2004; Strittmatter & Sunde, 2011; WHO et al., 2013). In view of this, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have recognized the relevance of health towards prosperity and well-being and hence set aside an independent goal to deal with health; this is SDG 3 on "good health and well-being". Even the achievement of the rest of the sixteen (16)

goals depends on good health. This is also what the architects of national development in Tanzania recognized right after independence; hence, their vision had to focus on the fact that achieving development goals calls for improving the health status of a nation's population.

In the efforts to fight diseases and improve the health of the population in the country, the government of Tanzania had to massively invest in primary health care services provision, which was mostly by then under the ownership of the government (Kanyabwoya, 2021; Mboera, 2012). It is reported by Wangwe *et al.* (1998) that around the 1980s, Tanzania experienced a severe economic crisis, which significantly affected the management and financing of basic social amenities and inclusive healthcare services. After experiencing the crisis, the government of Tanzania found it worthwhile to involve the private sector in health services delivery. It should be noted that Tanzania has attempted countless efforts in the realization of effective health services delivery since its independence in 1961 (Dominicus & Akamatsu, 1989; MOHCDGEC, 2016; Yahya & Mohamed, 2018). However, throughout the observed period, concerning health services, aspects of humans, animals, and environmental health were treated as independent entities; humans, animals, and environmental health were not recognized as one.

Undeniably, there have been innumerable developments in the health services provision environment since Tanzania attained political independence in 1961. These developments resulted in new demands which ultimately necessitated dramatic changes in the delivery of health services in Tanzania within the sixty years of independence (Renggli *et al.,* 2019; Kessy *et al.,*2008; Boex *et al.,* 2015; Kanyabwoya, 2021*;* Kapologwe *et al.,* 2020). This notably includes the changes brought by the circumstances that unfolded in the past decade, forcing a broad shift in approach and policy. The shift in approach, *inter alia,* was observed from the former, which focused on treating health services provision aspects separately for animals, humans, and the environment, to an interdisciplinary collaborative approach, which recognizes health as one. It is well documented (Woodroffe *et al.,* 2005; Magige, 2012; Verdade *et al.,* 2014; Nicole, 2019) that there has been a notable increase in human, livestock, environment, and wildlife interactions which significantly contributed to the shift in approach. Despite the reported unavailability of national or regional statistics on the magnitude of human-wildlife conflicts (HWCs) and human-wildlife interactions (HWIs) in particular (Conover, 2002), observations made confirm the increase in terms of the magnitude of the phenomenon globally and Tanzania in particular.

This escalation in HWIs is largely tied to innumerable consequences. The highly recognized consequences include those on biodiversity conservation and economic development globally, *inter alia*, the most notable being on humans, animals, and environmental health. These consequences are connected to human practices/behaviors exhibited by individuals living near nature, and these are the areas with livestock holdings and crop fields forming a significant proportion of people's livelihoods (CDC, 2017; Muhanga & Malungo, 2018a; 2018b; Muhanga, 2019). Human practices such as killing wildlife to get bush meat for household consumption, consequently, exchange of disease between livestock and wildlife (Shemweta & Kidegesho, 2000; Nyahongo, 2007; Saru, 1999 cited in Shemwetta & Kideghesho, 2000) have been reported to have health impairing outcomes to both humans and animals (Muhanga, 2019). This context led to a need for alternative development in the health sector to fight infectious diseases.

Mindful of this, the government of Tanzania had to introduce One Health Strategic Plan (2015–2020). It is by this plan that the need to treat "health as one" was recognized. This is an attempt to accommodate the changes that unfolded in the health services provision environment in the past decade. One Health Strategic Plan (2015–2020) responds to the need for a broad shift in approach and policy in health services delivery. It facilitates, among others, the shift, which involves moving from treating health services delivery aspects separately for animals, humans, and the environment to an interdisciplinary collaborative approach, namely *"One Health Approach (OHA)*", which recognizes "humans, animals, and environmental health as one". Though the approach is still in its infantile stage, there is logic in "*OHA*", convincing enough for this approach to be the most potent in minimizing the undesirable consequences of human, livestock, and wildlife interactions on human, animal, and environmental health. The purpose of this paper is to introduce, debate, and analyze the OHA and its relevance towards effective health services delivery in Tanzania. It aims to provide insights into the potential benefits and challenges associated with implementing OHA in the context of the changing health services landscape in the country. Specifically the paper focused to: (i) Critically examine the debates surrounding the effective delivery of health services in Tanzania, sixty years after independence, considering the various development interventions and their impact on poverty alleviation, hunger reduction, and control of infectious diseases; (ii) Analyze the OHA as an emerging

approach of interdisciplinary collaboration, and as a potential solution for addressing the interconnectedness of human, animal, and environmental health in Tanzania's context; (iii) Assess the relevance of OHA in minimizing the adverse effects of human, livestock, and wildlife interactions on health outcomes; (iv) Conduct a documentary analysis to gather information and insights on the current status of OHA implementation, its achievements, challenges, and future prospects in Tanzania; (v) Highlight the significance of OHA in building essential capacities for public health preparedness and response, particularly in addressing health-related challenges at the convergence of humans, animals, and the environment; (vi) Emphasize the need for collaborative efforts among professionals in human, livestock, wildlife, and environmental health sectors, underscoring the importance of upscaling the OHA to achieve optimal human, animal, and environmental health outcomes.

Research Methodology

This review employed a documentary analysis (documentary research method) to gather relevant information for the study. This method is useful in a desk review study. Through this method, the researcher managed to categorize, examine, and interpret written publications. The method involves examining the documents comprising information on or associated with the subject studied (Haule & Muhanga, 2021; Mshingo & Muhanga, 2021). The documentary analysis research process was used to collect information from books, conference proceedings, and peer-reviewed journal articles from different search engines. Key search terms were "health services in Tanzania," "history of health provision in Tanzania," "human-wildlife interactions," "human-wildlife conflicts," "one health approach in Tanzania," and "the relevance of one health approach". Publications both in Kiswahili (Tanzanian language) and English languages were reviewed. Quality assessment and data extraction were conducted for those articles which met the specified criteria. During the search, 1012 publications were identified; thereafter, 991 qualified publications were involved in abstract screening, and only 440 full-texts of the identified publications were screened for eligibility, whereby 71 articles mirrored the theme under the review.



Figure 1: Articles selection process

Interactions between Humans, Livestock, and Wildlife: Consequences, Disease Transmission, and the Relevance of "*One Health Approach*" in Tanzania

Innumerable studies (Dickman, 2010; Gebreyes *et al*., 2014; Pimentel *et al.*,2005; Barlow, 2009; Thirgood et al., 2005; Perez & Pacheco, 2006; Loe & Roskaft, 2004; Packer et al., 2005) have reported the consequences, and intensity of humans, livestock, and wildlife interface at the global level. Due to what has been observed in the biologically diverse areas resulting from the growth of human populations and modern development, plus the emerging competition for resources with wildlife, notable incidences of environmental destruction, degradation, and fragmentation have been registered (Lamarque *et al.*, 2009). The literature reports countless negative consequences of both wildlife on people and people on wildlife. These include but are not limited to, the exchange and transmission of diseases involving humans, livestock, and wildlife at their interfaces (Nyahongo, 2007; Kazwala, 2016). The most commonly reported diseases resulting from the interaction between humans and animals include human brucellosis, rabies originating from both traditional and dairy animals (Kambarage *et al.*, 2003; Karimuribo *et al.*,

2007; Kayunze *et al.,* 2012). It is reported by Gamassa (1998) that there are related incidences around Lake Manyara National Park and Ngorongoro Conservation Area which have also been observed. Similar observations have been made by Saru (1999), as cited by Shemwetta & Kideghesho (2000), in a study at Arusha National Park. Transmission of diseases remains the main problem in areas with the coexistence of pastoralism and agropastoralism activities. In a report by ILRI, as cited by Grace *et al*. (2012), zoonoses have been identified as the key obstacles to poverty alleviation, which affect a substantial population of livestock keepers.

If left unattended, disease transmission stands a good chance to impact human and livestock health negatively. Evidently (URT, 2003a; URT, 2003b; IMF, 2004; URT, 2007a; WHO, 2010; WHO, 2012a; 2012b) posit that good health is a keystone toward societal development. Undeniably, the health status of a particular society can significantly affect the rest of the sectors in that society, including the political, social, and economic aspects (Sayah & Williams, 2012; Muhanga, 2020). It is in this context that good health is seen to have the potential to influence the quality of a population in society, much as it is very clear that the quality of the population is an essential parameter for economic development (URT, 2003b; URT, 2007a; Lutz, 2014). In light of this, it should remain apparent that good health boosts labor productivity, educational achievement, and income, hence lessening poverty (Bloom *et al.,* 2004). Diseases and ill health are considered obstructions to economic prospects, growth, and national development worldwide (Strittmatter & Sunde, 2011; WHO *et al.,* 2013). It is therefore apparent that attaining the development goals requires significant enhancement on the health status of the population in a respective nation; however, it is evident several challenges exist towards the attainment of good health (Mamdani & Bangser, 2004; Sanders & Chopra, 2006). HWCs stand among the challenges in attaining good health despite the inherent benefits.

The possibility of fully discouraging or limiting the HWI remains elusive; what looks feasible is accommodating positive interactions while dealing with the materialization of HWC. Imagine what kind of interventions could be institutionalized to prevent an interaction between humans and wildlife in places such as Doma in Mvomero in Morogoro Region, where the Mikumi National Park is less than 20 kilometers from the village. In such circumstances, the concern should be reviewing some interaction aspects involving human-wildlife; this goes hand in hand with devising a modality to improve livelihoods and wildlife sustenance appropriately. In dealing with issues to improve livelihoods, health, and related aspects will have to be considered since

good health is a mother to all. HWCs seem to have the potential to lead to ill health and diseases if serious interventions are not put in place. Such interventions will only be effective, and optimal health will be attained if conceptualized based on recognizing the fact that an inextricable link exists between the health of the people, animals, and the environment (CDC, 2017; Muhanga & Malungo, 2018a; 2018b). It is against this that OHA in Tanzania is considered relevant in reducing the impacts of HWCs on humans, animals, and environmental health.

Balancing Interactions between Humans, Livestock, and Wildlife: Mitigating Consequences and Advancing the "*One Health Approach*"

The notable increase in the world's population has been going hand in hand with the growing demand for resources and space; hence, the population extends to wild animal habitats and displaces their natural wildlife territory (Sillero-Zubiri & Switzer, 2001; Magige, 2012). It is obvious that governments all over the world have been preferring and struggling to minimize the interactions between humans and wildlife by imposing numerous restrictions or just thinking about the best ways such interactions could continue, but the consequences are minimized. The main observation is that the restrictions imposed have not always been translated into success for community-based conservation. There could be various explanations for the failure of community-based conservation. One of the observations here is that people living around the protected areas may not be allowed to continue facing challenges in the quest for their livelihoods at the expense of the prospects of wildlife. This tells us that HWCs cannot be eliminated in some ways, but rather, the consequences should be mitigated since there are also some positive consequences. The health-related consequences can be minimized by advocating the One Health Approach as the most potent approach to lessen the negative effects of human, livestock, and wildlife interactions on human, animal, and environmental health.

The governments have taken recent initiatives to legalize the bush meat trade to deter poaching activities in protected areas (Bowen-Jones *et al.*, 2002; Wilkie *et al., 2006*). Such initiatives, despite having observed that potential, if not properly monitored, are likely to lead to the extinction of wild animals, creating imbalances in the ecosystem. It will also, if not well regulated, open up a chance of further transmission of infectious diseases through a lively black market for cuts of meat from these animals. Certain practices/behaviors related to eating habits,

food preparation, and consumption can lead to zoonotic diseases. There is an obvious possibility for these cases of zoonoses to be reduced through "*One Health Approach"* based interventions. It will be difficult to ensure that bush meat brought to the market has veterinary clearance.

The need for stakeholders' involvement and readiness to implement conservation-based behaviors is one of the most important debatable aspects under the HWCs. This aspect remains important as it has been realized that HWCs have both positive and negative impacts. The destruction caused by native wildlife is reported to be considerable, but the associated benefits have not sometimes been underlined. Sillero-Zubiri and Switzer (2001) have observed the development of negative attitudes with respect to protected areas, wildlife, and conservation in general. Numerous perspectives are attached to this negative attitude. Some have developed this attitude based on the destruction experienced on their crops made by wild animals, while others have emanated from the fact that they feel denied access to certain resources found in the protected areas, i.e., firewood, wild fruits, etc. To others, those health-related negative consequences have made them develop negative attitudes toward wildlife, protected areas, and conservation.

Stakeholders' involvement can enable understanding of the existing health issues generated from the convergence of environmental, human, and animal domains. This has to consider the concept and practice of One Health. It matters a lot when society shares with the professionals views on the conflicts and ways to moderate such conflicts. Community views and opinions have a vital role in wildlife management and planning. Information with respect to attitudes of the community on wildlife has to be unceasingly considered as an essential aspect in designing optimal management strategies. The same has been underlined by Brown & Decker (2005) and Wambuguh (2008).

Minimizing Consequences of Human-Wildlife Conflicts (HWCs): Advancing the "*One Health Approach*" for Health and Environmental Well-being

HWCs have numerous consequences (Parker *et al.*, 2007; Messmer, 2009; Nyahongo & Røskaft, 2011; Noe *et al.*, 2022; Bollig, 2022). Since HWCs are reported to exist with the emergence of human civilization, the phenomenon is currently observed to contribute to severe environmental and human health challenges. HWCs are there to stay despite the efforts by governments all over the world to minimize the interactions between humans and wildlife by imposing numerous restrictions. Given the factors that promote HWCs, it is evident that the best alternative is to

think about how the consequences could be minimized, starting with those negatively impacting health. The main observation is that the restrictions imposed have not always translated into success for community-based conservation. The failure of community-based conservation is significantly linked to the fact that people living around the protected areas may not be allowed to continue facing challenges in the quest for their livelihoods at the expense of the prospects of the wildlife. One Health Approach, if thoughtfully implemented, has the potential to minimize health-related consequences while the coexistence of humans, livestock, and wild animals is promoted.

The Theoretical Context of "*One Health Approach*"

Embracing "One Health Approach": A Collaborative Solution for Global Health Challenges

One Health Approach is a modern global movement promoting collaborative efforts between different health-related professionals (medical doctors, veterinarians) and other scientific, environmental, and related disciplines. One Health approach recognizes that various disciplines cutting across numerous sectors will likely provide solutions to the complicated problems confronting public health. This approach employs a holistic approach toward addressing animal, human, and ecosystem health. It emphasizes multi-sector, transdisciplinary action across professions to warrant well-being within human, animal, and ecosystem interfaces (Papadopoulos *et al*., 2011).

One Health is defined by AVMA (2008:3) as the "collaborative effort of multiple disciplines working locally, nationally, and globally to attain optimal health for people, animals, and our environment". The efforts to control the transmission of infections to animals and humans face numerous challenges, and the absence of or limited joint approach across professions has mostly been cited (Muhanga, 2018a, 2018b). Thus, the need for joint action with a combination of technologies and collaboration between both medical and veterinary professionals is paramount (Mbugi *et al*., 2012). According to the World Bank (2010), zoonotic diseases are reported to have a direct cost, estimated to stand at more than $20 billion over the last decade, while indirect losses to affected economies are reported to stand at over $200 billion. FAO (2002) reports that 70% of the rural poor globally livelihoods rely on working animals and livestock; given this

situation, animals cannot be excluded from the solutions. Zoonoses control is unique in that effective interventions may lie outside the health sector, much as transmission frequently does not occur between humans but only from animals to humans in rabies or brucellosis (Zinsstag, 2005). The term One Health is used to denote the inextricable link between animal health, human health, and the health of the ecosystems they populate.

The Benefits and Competencies of a "One Health Approach": Advancing Collaboration for Global Health Challenges

According to AVMA (2008, p.3), a One Health approach has several benefits, including "(i) improving animal and human health globally through collaboration among all the health sciences, especially between the veterinary and human medical professions to address critical needs, (ii) meeting new global challenges head-on through collaboration among multiple professions - veterinary medicine, human medicine, environmental, wildlife, and public health, (iii) developing centers of excellence for education and training in specific areas through enhanced collaboration among colleges and schools of veterinary medicine, human medicine, and public health, (iv) increasing professional opportunities for veterinarians, and (v) adding to our scientific knowledge to create innovative programs to improve health." One Health competency has the potential to contribute to the development of skills toward effective and efficient collaboration among disciplines for solving shared health challenges; this may include food and nutrition security. Food and nutrition security stands a good chance of improving the population's quality, which is vital to national development. The skills targeted here comprise sharing knowledge, information, and data, strengthening the relationships and interdependencies between human health and other health-related disciplines such as social sciences, animal health, and ecosystem health.

Strengthening One Health in Tanzania: A Landmark Initiative to Address Health Challenges at the Human-Animal-Environment Interface

The Government of Tanzania, on February 13, 2018, inaugurated the One Health Coordination Desk and the National One Health Strategic Plan. This signifies an essential landmark in dealing with health-related challenges reflected in the convergence of humans, animals, and the environment. This particular landmark highlights the commitment of the government to reinforce mechanisms for outbreak detection, prevention, and responses. The milestone is outstanding in

that it leads to the building of fundamental capacities concerning public health events, particularly when it comes to preparedness and response as per International Health Regulations.

This step is cognizant that over 60% of emerging, re-emerging, and endemic human diseases originate from animals. It is now that humans are at higher risk of contracting diseases of animal origin. This situation is amplified by an extensive range of interconnected variables, comprising large-scale livestock production, mass urbanization, and increased travel. Given the circumstances, initiatives to bond the sectors that protect animals, humans, and the ecosystem remain vital. It is within the concept of One Health Approach (OHA) that this idea is embodied; here is where public health events are addressed at the animal, human, and environmental interface.

Using a One Health Approach, the government of Tanzania made countless efforts to identify zoonotic diseases of utmost national concern. In this task, representatives of livestock, human health, wildlife, agriculture, research, higher education, and environment sectors availed their inputs. Through this exercise, zoonotic diseases relevant to Tanzania were identified, followed by defining the criteria for prioritization. A tool was prepared for identifying Tanzania's priority zoonotic diseases, named the OH Zoonotic Disease Prioritization tool. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) developed and coordinated this semi-quantitative selection (Rist *et al.,* 2014; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2017). According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2017), national representatives identified zoonotic disease prioritization; this was the first step in addressing public health challenges emanating from zoonotic disease threats using an OHA. This was followed by training organized by CDC for nine local partners from the animal, human, and environmental health sectors. The training is meant to create in-country capacity to facilitate future OH prioritization workshops. The in-country facilitator training was conducted on March 20–22, 2017. The workshop on OH Zoonotic Disease Prioritization employed a multisectoral OH approach in prioritizing endemic and emerging zoonotic diseases of public health and animal health concern. The target is identifying diseases that may be jointly addressed using an inter-ministerial partnership involving human health, agriculture, livestock, wildlife, environment, research, and higher education partners. A total of 6 zoonotic diseases of the highest priority to Tanzania were

identified. The identified diseases are to be used to advocate for and build capacities in numerous areas, including surveillance and laboratory detection systems, improving prevention and control across the key OH sectors in the country (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2017).

Unveiling the Complexities of Human-Wildlife-Environment Interactions: Embracing a "*One Health Approach*"

The incidences of HWCs are much more registered as more and more people crowd onto less land. The convergence of humans, animals, and our environment has resulted in a new dynamic whereby inextricable interconnectedness is observed for the health of each group. The challenges connected to such a dynamic are profound, demanding, and unprecedented. It was anticipated that there would be an increase of 50% by 2020 in terms of the need for animal-based protein; while this was anticipated, animal populations were almost subjected to intensified pressure for their survival. It was further anticipated that there would be a significant loss of biodiversity (Gibbs, 2005; AVMA, 2008).

On top of that, Graham *et al.* (2008) report that out of 1,461 incidences of diseases found in humans, nearly 60% have been resulting from multi-host pathogens that move across species lines. AVMA (2008) reports that over the last three decades, zoonotic diseases have accounted for roughly 75% of new emerging human infectious diseases. Humans growing interdependence on animals and their products could be the most serious risk factor to human health and well-being regarding infectious diseases.

There is an intensifying worry that the world's latest generation will be the first in history to face a decline in life expectancy and health in general. Despite that worry, veterinary and human medicines are currently regarded as isolated entities and even worse when the apparent links between these disciplines are often disregarded. It has been observed that the traditional approaches, levels of knowledge, and past obligatory skills may not conform to the fast changes, new demands of food-animal industries, and the shifting requirements desirable for corporate and public opportunities in the future (AVMA, 2008).

Simultaneously, contamination and pollution of our environment have significantly reduced the health and sustainability of our environment. Environmental degradation encourages the increase of infectious diseases and non-infectious threats. In events of environmental degradation, it is anticipated that favorable settings for the growth of existing infectious diseases will be created;

along with this, an apparent increase in acute and chronic non-infectious disease events harmful to animal and human health is expected. Similarly, this may include non-infectious threats comprising toxins and chemical contaminants (endocrine-disrupting chemicals in the environment) (Colborn *et al.,* 1996). These also comprise fire-retardant carpet chemicals resulting in adverse effects in pet cats, the melamine contamination of pet foods, and marine toxins in manatees (Gardner, 2007). Transmission of certain diseases (i.e., malaria) is attributed to environmental conditions; in this context, regulating such conditions is likely to ease the disease burden. In the views of Randell, (2008) draining stagnant water and eliminating mosquito breeding habitats as environmental management practices for disease control if implemented at the community level have the potential to complement other malaria control methods.

One strategy to understand and perfectly deal with the existing health issues emanating from human, animal, and environmental interactions is the concept of One Health. Humans' increasing interdependence on what is produced by animals has prompted the medical and veterinarian professions to promote a need for a holistic, collaborative approach. This approach encourages local, national, and global joint efforts involving multiple disciplines working to attain optimal health for people, animals, and our environment (AVMA, 2008; Zinsstag *et al.*, 2005).

Assessing the Progress and Challenges of Implementing "*One Health Approach*" in Tanzania: A Pathway to Enhancing Health Services Delivery

Despite having OHA successfully established in Tanzania (Karimuribo *et al.,* 2012; Ladbury *et al.,* 2017; Muhanga *et al.,* 2019; Kitua *et al.,* 2019; USAID, 2018; WHO, 2019). It should be, however, noted that the health sector within the sixty years of Tanzania's independence has registered both advancements and hindrances. Notably, the OHA itself has encountered numerous challenges in its implementation and operationalization (Kayunze *et al.,* 2014; Kitua *et al.,* 2019; Muhanga *et al.,* 2019). Nevertheless, this should not be treated as very specific to Tanzania but rather exist in other countries where the same has been implemented. Similarly, neighboring Kenya and Uganda have been noted to have faced various challenges (Munyua *et al.,* 2019; Buregyeya *et al.,* 2020).

At any rate and standards, Tanzania, after sixty years of political independence, cannot claim to have fully maximized the inherent advantages connected to the "One Health Approach" toward effective health services delivery. There is room for Tanzania to expand the horizon and the way forward. This can be captured by taking advantage of the recommendations made through "Multisectoral Coordination that Works" by the USAID Preparedness and Response (P&R) project (Kitua *et al.,* 2019). The recommendations identified five dimensions most critical to creating effective and sustainable OH platforms: "joint planning and implementation, management and coordination capacity, political commitment, institutional structure, financial and technical resources (Kitua., *et al.,* 2019, p.2)". The case study designates Tanzania's experience using these dimensions to establish a functional One Health platform. This indicates that Tanzania has made significant progress in institutionalizing the OHA, though there is room to implement the approach further.

Conclusion

This paper aimed to shed light on the effective delivery of health services in Tanzania, particularly in the context of the country's six decades of independence. It critically examined the debates surrounding the various development interventions implemented to combat poverty, hunger, and infectious diseases. It became evident that previous efforts, which treated humans, animals, and environmental health separately, could have achieved the desired health outcomes due to the increasing interactions among humans, livestock, wildlife, and the environment.

The Tanzanian government introduced the "*One Health Approach*" (OHA) to address this challenge, recognizing health as a unified concept without dividing lines between humans, animals, and the environment. The paper analyzed the OHA as an emerging approach for interdisciplinary collaboration, presenting it as a potential solution to deliver health services effectively. By adopting a holistic perspective that considers the interconnectedness of human, animal, and environmental health, the OHA holds promise for mitigating the adverse effects of interactions between these domains on health outcomes.

Through a documentary analysis, the paper provided insights into the current status of OHA implementation in Tanzania, including its achievements, challenges, and future prospects. While the OHA is still in its infancy, it represents a significant milestone in addressing health-related challenges at the convergence of humans, animals, and the environment. Notably, the OHA plays

a crucial role in building essential capacities for public health preparedness and response, aligning with international health regulations.

The paper emphasized the necessity of collaborative efforts among professionals in human, livestock, wildlife, and environmental health sectors to optimize the outcomes of the OHA. It underscored the importance of upscaling the approach to achieve optimal human, animal, and environmental health outcomes. To achieve this, recommendations were proposed, including strengthening collaboration, promoting awareness and education, enhancing capacity building, establishing multisectoral coordination mechanisms, conducting research and surveillance, integrating One Health into policy and planning, securing funding and resources, and monitoring progress.

The paper highlighted the significance of the One Health Approach in Tanzania's journey towards effective health service delivery. By recognizing the interconnectedness of human, animal, and environmental health, the OHA offers a framework for addressing complex health challenges. Expanding and enhancing the OHA will be vital in comprehending the implications of these interactions and promoting the well-being of humans, animals, and the environment. With concerted efforts and a multisectoral approach, Tanzania can maximize the benefits of the OHA and pave the way for improved health outcomes for all.

Based on the analysis of the "*One Health Approach*" (OHA) and its relevance in the context of human, animal, and environmental health interactions in Tanzania, the following recommendations are proposed:

i. Strengthen Collaborative Efforts: Encourage and facilitate collaboration among human health professionals, veterinary professionals, environmental experts, and other relevant stakeholders. Foster interdisciplinary partnerships and joint initiatives to address health challenges at the interface of humans, animals, and the environment.

ii. Promote Awareness and Education: Raise awareness about the One Health concept among policymakers, healthcare providers, researchers, and the general public. Implement educational programs emphasizing the interconnectedness of human, animal, and environmental health, highlighting the potential benefits of a holistic approach.

iii. Enhance Capacity Building: Invest in training and capacity-building programs to develop a skilled workforce capable of effectively implementing the One Health Approach. This includes providing education and professional development opportunities for professionals from diverse disciplines, such as human medicine, veterinary medicine, environmental science, and public health.

iv. Establish Multisectoral Coordination Mechanisms: Create dedicated platforms or committees at national, regional, and local levels to facilitate coordination and information sharing among different sectors involved in health, agriculture, environment, and wildlife. These mechanisms should encourage dialogue, collaboration, and joint decision-making to address health challenges comprehensively.

v. Conduct Research and Surveillance: Support research initiatives investigating the complex interactions between humans, animals, and the environment, focusing on identifying and mitigating health risks. Foster robust surveillance systems that enable early detection, monitoring, and response to emerging infectious diseases and other health threats.

vi. Integrate One Health into Policy and Planning: Incorporate One Health principles and strategies into national health policies, plans, and frameworks. Encourage government agencies to adopt a multisectoral approach in their decision-making processes, ensuring that health interventions consider the interconnectedness of humans, animals, and the environment.

vii. Secure Funding and Resources: Allocate sufficient financial resources to support implementing and expanding One Health programs and initiatives. Seek partnerships with international organizations, donors, and development agencies to secure additional funding and technical support for capacity building, research, and infrastructure development.

viii. Evaluate and Monitor Progress: Establish mechanisms to assess the effectiveness and impact of One Health interventions. Regularly monitor and evaluate the implementation of One Health programs, policies, and strategies, ensuring that they achieve their intended outcomes and positively contribute to human, animal, and environmental health.

Therefore, by following these recommendations, Tanzania can advance its efforts towards effective health services delivery, mitigate the undesirable impacts of human, livestock, and wildlife interactions on health, and enhance the overall well-being of humans, animals, and the environment.

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