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PJGD

PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development

Volume 3 No.1 February, 2022

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ABOUT THE DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES (GADS) AND PJGD

Department of Governance and Development Studies (GaDS) is one of the pioneer departments of Jimma University established in September 2007 and functioning as a constituent unit of the College of Law and Governance since September 2014. Since its establishment, the Department of GaDS is playing a vital role in the transformation of society and empowering the government institutions by producing professionals in the area of development and governance. Currently, the Master Program of GaDS has three specializations: (i) Governance and Development; (ii) Development Management; (iii) Peace and Conflict Studies whereas two more specializations (Gender Studies and Federal Studies) yet to be introduced.

The Post-Graduate Program of the Department clearly states its vision as "The Master of Arts Program in Governance and Development Studies (GaDS) institutionalizes a dynamic and strategic vision to provide an interdisciplinary, advanced, research-based and practical education in contemporary issues of national and international governance and development". This stated vision at the same time echoes the vision of the Jimma University which "aspires to be one of the premier universities in Africa and renowned in the world by 2025".

It is in pursuance of these stated visions of GaDS and Jimma University, the Center for PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development (PJGD) is established to offer a platform of expression of new scientific inquiries to all intellectuals/academicians/scholars of the world in general and Africa & Ethiopia, in particular, to reflect on how governance and development can be promoted, strengthened and consolidated. As the nature of the journal is multi-, inter-, and trans-disciplinary, the scope of the journal ranges from the disciplines of political science, governance, development, leadership, national and international law, globalization, human rights, economics, environmental science, public policy, international relations, international organizations, gender, peace and conflict management, international political economy, multiculturalism, civil society, and related areas.

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Analysis of Economic Structural Transformation and Leading Sectors in Bali, Indonesia

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Abstract

This research aims to analyze the shifts in the economy's structure and the leading sectors used as economic prospects in the developmental sector other than tourism in Bali. The study of theories and concepts used includes the theory of economic growth. The data were analyzed using economic sector contribution techniques (Location Quotient), GRM (Growth Ratio Model), and Overlay Analysis. The results show a shift in the economy's structure from the primary to the tertiary sector. The leading sectors in Bali are transportation and warehousing; provision of accommodation and food and beverages; information and communication; financial and insurance services; real estate; education services; health services and social activities; and other services. The government needs to develop a base sector to encourage economic movements and create a multiplier effect. This research is expected to be an input for the government in the form of policy advice in preparing regional development plans and policies.

Keywords: Economic Structure, Economic Growth, Leading Sectors
JEL Classification: F63, O41, R11

Introduction

Economic development is an ongoing process of economic growth. Growth will be directed by policies to increase economic growth and living standards. According to Arsyad (2010, p.10), economic development is a process that causes an increase in the real per capita income of a country's population, in the long run, accompanied by an improvement in the institutional system. While Todaro (1995) defines development as a multidimensional process involving significant changes in social structure, community attitudes, national institutions, and accelerated growth economy, reducing inequality and eliminating absolute poverty.

Sukirno states that economic development in developing countries relates to the term usually associated with (amongst other things) rising incomes and related increases in consumption, savings, and investment (Sukirno, 2010, p.4). From an incremental perspective, economic

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growth is observed at different levels, followed by output and economic structure distribution changes. The increased contribution of the industrial sector and services and an increase in education and labor force skills can be realized well. Structured economic development will increase per capita income, while an increase does not necessarily follow economic growth in per capita income. Mahesa states that increasing economic growth and optimal distribution are directed toward a systematic and structured development process. One indicator that can be used as a benchmark for the success of regional development is increased economic growth. Economic growth is a measuring tool of development because economic sector activities can also be measured through economic growth (Mahesa, 2013).

The processes of economic growth are influenced by two types of factors, namely economic factors and non-economic factors. Economic factors that influence economic growth include natural resources, human resources, business capital, and technology. Non-economic factors can support the process of economic growth, which consists of social institutions, cultural attitudes, moral values, political conditions, and institutional aspects. Economic development in the spatial context basically aims to overcome poverty, unemployment, inequality, and scarcity. These problems will be solved through economic development by determining specific targets.

Regional development is an inseparable part of national development. Regional economic development is the implementation of national development planning in an area adapted to the ability of Human Resources (HR), social conditions, economic levels, and applicable regulations (Purnomo & Istiqomah, 2008). Radianto (2013) and Nugraha (2007) mention that developmental regional economies aim to increase the rate of economic growth and changes in structure. Changes in the structure can be a transition from agriculture to non-agriculture, industry to services, changes in productive units, and changes in labor status. Before discussing regional development, as for the understanding of the area in terms of economic aspects, the region has three meanings, namely: i) Homogeneous area is an area where economic activities occur in various parts of the area, and there are similar characteristics, in terms of per capita income, social culture, and geography, ii) Nodal area is an area as a space economy controlled by one or several centers of economic activity, iii) Planning or regional areas administration is an area as a space economy which is under one particular administration such as one province, district, and sub-district (Arsyad, 2010).

Regional development is a manifestation of the implementation of a shift in the government system in Indonesia in the reform era from a centralized government system to decentralization known as regional autonomy, which implies the transfer of most decision-making processes in planning, implementing, and evaluating government administration from the center to the regions (Nudiatulhuda, 2007). The more complex issues concerning economic development and the size of Indonesia from district, provincial and national development raises the idea that with the implementation of the regional autonomy system, economic development can be carried out more optimally. With the implementation of the regional autonomy system, the regional government is demanded to be creative in developing the economy. The roles of private investment and regional-owned companies are significant as the main driver of economic growth and development. Pamuji (2011) viewed that the region has to develop the natural resource as capital to develop the region, whereas Arsyad believed that every development plan aims to increase job opportunities for the community (Arsyad, 2010, p.15).

Implementation of regional autonomy is not optimal in accordance with the central government's objectives to give local governments authority to manage their regions. The main problem in regional development lies in the emphasis on development policies based on the peculiarities of the region concerned by using the potential of human resources, institutions, and local physical resources. This orientation leads to taking initiatives from the region in the development process that aims to create new employment opportunities and stimulate increased economic activity. To realize the regional government's goals and the community's participation in using available resources, it must identify the potential resource available in the region as a force for regional economic development. The government is required to formulate sectoral and regional measures that are mutually synergistic (Prasetyantoko *et al*., 2012).

Economic growth has resulted in changes in the structure of the economy. According to Kusreni (2009), economic growth that occurs continuously will lead to a shift in the structure of the economy in an area. The structural transformation that occurs over a long time is a process of changing the economy's structure from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector and from the industrial sector to the trade and services sector, and each economy will undergo a different

transformation. In general, the transformation that occurs in developing countries is a transformation from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector (Guntara, 2017).

Indonesia implements a decentralized government system from the center of government to rural districts and municipalities. Decentralization is the most suitable institutional mechanism for increasing local participation in politics and the economy. The regional autonomy law as implementing a decentralized system gave authority to two regional government levels. Bali is an autonomous region that is given the authority to manage and develop its area in accordance with the policies of the Regional Government of the Province of Bali. The Province of Bali is divided into one municipality: the municipality of Denpasar, and eight regencies: Badung, Buleleng, Tabanan, Gianyar, Kelungkung, Karangasem, Jembrana, and Bangli. The differences in geographical conditions will cause different responses and treatments for the economy (Arisoy, 2015), and then analyzing the geographical condition of these regencies is important.

Table 1: Gross Regional Domestic Product of Bali According to the Business Field Based on the Constant Price of 2010 Period 2000-2017

Year	GRDP (Million IDR)
2000	58.332.112
2001	60.398.212
2002	62.236.816
2003	64.455.414
2004	67.435.812
2005	71.182.713
2006	74.939.812
2007	79.373.111
2008	84.114.132
2009	88.599.110
2010	93.749.349,70
2011	99.991.631,90
2012	106.951.465
2013	114.103.580,80

2014	121.787.574,70
2015	129.126.562,20
2016	137.286.328,10
2017	144.964.204,10

Source**:** BPS Bali Province on various publications (data processed)

Bali's economic structure has unique characteristics compared to other provinces in Indonesia. The economic pillars built through the excellence of the tourism industry as a leading sector have opened up various opportunities to encourage economic activity and the development of society's work ethic. The dimension is reflected in the improvement of employment opportunities, the high opportunity level of community income, a better working network. The tourism sector has made other directly related sectors, such as investment in hotels and restaurants, transportation, finance, and services, which cumulatively provide a substantial contribution to the Bali GRDP (Antara, 2007). Bali Province has made the tourism sector the primary support, but tourism activities will not always support the uncertain situation. With these conditions, it needs support from other sectors directly or indirectly related to the tourism sector.

The development of tourism in Bali has started in 1970 and reached its peak in the 1980s. Furthermore, it grew and developed from 1980 to 1992 (Wijaya, 2015). The rapid development of tourism has put pressure and threats on Bali. In 2001 and 2003, the Bali bombing event had a very significant impact on the development of tourism in Bali. The Bali bombing tragedy was an event carried out as a revenge plan due to the events that occurred in Ambon and Poso and its explode near crowded bars in Kuta, killing 202 people, including tourists and locals. Because of this tragedy, foreign visitors fell about 80%, devastatingly affecting the tourism industry (*Ibid*). Nevertheless, after the Bali bombing, the growth of the tourism industry experienced a recovery, and until now, it served as a sector that is expected to be the foundation of the economy in Bali. However, the rapid development of tourism as the leading sector in Bali has not guaranteed the development in Bali to run well.

Fachrurrazy (2009) argued from knowing the leading sectors that are able to provide indications for the economy nationally and regionally. Local governments that already know and utilize

these leading sectors will be able to increase regional economic growth in a better direction. Development of the potential of leading sectors that provide the most outstanding contribution to regional economic progress is a priority policy that must be carried out (Rini, 2006). The research about the shift of structure and the leading sector is crucial for regional economic development planning. It needs publications and studies in the form of information about the region's economic potential to support regional economic development policies.

Prospects for the leading sectors must be analyzed regularly every year because of the possibility of a shift in sector contribution. The leading sector research in the Province of Bali last used the 2000 base year, so that research using the 2010 base year with a range of data from 2010 to 2017 is a renewal of information on prospects for the leading sector of Bali Province. Renewal of research information aimed at addressing the problems of inequality of information regarding the leading sectors so that the policies applied are not in line with regional potential. The development of Bali Province to realize economic growth from the base sectors will be better to develop and realize the Sustainable Development Goal which is a global agenda. It is very important to the Provincial Government of Bali to know about that condition to make regulations so that economy can run well.

Literature Review

The key to economic development success is quickly taken from the concept of development priorities in geographical advantages and regional characteristics and various economic policy strategies that spur increased investment activities (Steven *et al*., 2001). Nehen states that changes in economic structure begin with transition income from the primary sector to the secondary sector and then switch to the tertiary sector. Changes in the structure of an economy are usually characterized by the significant contribution of each sector to national income or GDP. Changes to the general economic structure are primary – secondary – tertiary (Nehen, 2012, p.258).

The structural shift of a sub-system economy was formulated by an economist named W. Arthur Lewis (Kuncoro, 2010, p.59), known as the theory of labor surplus of two sectors. The main problem studied by Lewis is to assume that a country's economy will basically be divided into two economic structures (Subandi, 2014, p.52). Arthur Lewis's theory explains that a country's economic growth and development can be done by increasing the industrial growth sector.

Excess labor in the agricultural sector causes labor productivity to be zero. The growth of the industrial sector will cause the movement of labor from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector, but this movement will not reduce output in the agricultural sector because workers in the agricultural sector are very abundant (Rahardja and Manurung, 2008, p.335). As a result, the economy's structural transformation will become a reality, and the economy will eventually shift from a rural economy cantered on the countryside to a modern industrial economy oriented to the pattern of urban life (Jhingan, 2010, p.62).

Figure 1: The Growth Model of the Modern Sector in the Economy of Two Sectors that Surplus Labor Results in the Lewis Formulation



Source: Jhingan (2010, p.158)

Hollis B. Chenery's theory of shifting economic structures is known as the analysis of development patterns (Kuncoro, 2010, p.65). Chenery's theory, known as the pattern of development theory, focuses on changes in structure in the stages of the process of economic change in a developing country, which has undergone a transformation from traditional agriculture to the industrial sector as the main engine of economic growth (Kuncoro, 2010, p.66). Development pattern theory explains that structural changes in the process of economic change from developing countries that are experiencing a shift from traditional agriculture have shifted to the industrial sector as the main engine of economic growth. Increasing the role of the industrial and service sectors in the economy is in line with increased income per capita which is closely related to capital accumulation and improving the quality of human resources.

The base economic theory believes that the economic growth rate of a region is determined by the magnitude of the increase in exports from the region. Exports in the regional economic sense

are selling products or services outside to other regions within a country or abroad (Tarigan, 2012, p.28). Regional economic activity is divided into basic activities that produce goods and services for export outside the region and non-base activities that produce goods and services to meet local needs (Richard and David, 1996). The essence of the economic base model explains the relationship and regional economic growth that is influenced by regional exports (Fattah and Abdul, 2013). The economic base theory states that the primary determinant of economic growth in a region is directly related to the demand for goods and services outside the region (Arsyad, 2010, p. 35).

The growth of industries that use local resources, including labor and raw materials, to be exported out of the region will produce regional wealth and create new employment opportunities for the region concerned. The base economic model is divided into two sectors, namely the export sector that is able to meet the needs of external regions and local sectors that only meet internal needs (Isserman, 1977). Arsyad defines the base sector as an economic/industrial sector that serves the market in that area alone or outside the area concerned (Arsyad, 2010, p.43). Sjafrizal argued that the base sector is the sector that is the backbone of the region's economy because it has a high competitive advantage. Commodities that are classified as base commodities must be regulated in such a way by government policies, especially in the field of development, so that they are more focused on the specialization of production and development of these commodities which are produced using local materials to be more efficient and effective (Sjafrizal, 2012, p.55).

Research on the superior economic sector or base sector is carried out to determine the potential of the economic sector that can be developed in regional development planning. Base sector research conducted by Winda Savitri and Mahendra Yasa (2018) shows that the determination of the base sector as a sector to be developed can accelerate the rate of economic growth. This research was conducted in Karangasem Regency using LQ and Shift Share analysis. Research on the shift in economic structure and base sector analysis using the LQ and Shift Share analysis tools carried out by Wiwekananda (2016), as for the results of the study are four sectors that become the leading sectors in Buleleng Regency, namely the service sector, agricultural sector, industrial sector, and the mining sector.

Research Methodology

This research is explanatory research based on quantitative and qualitative data or findings that are achieved using statistical procedures or other ways of quantification (Sugiyono, 2013) along with qualitative data. This research is conducted by using a descriptive paradigm. The researcher analyzed the shift of economic structure during the period of 2000-2017 divided into two for analysis: structural transformation of 2000-2010 and 2010-2017, the potential and base sector of the regional economy to support the economy of Bali.

The type of data used in this study is quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative data is represented in numbers, whereas qualitative data is assumed for triangulation (Sugiyono, 2013, p.13). The data source used in this study is secondary data. Secondary data is data in the form of documents or records that have been collected and processed by relevant parties so that they can be used for the benefit of data analysis (Sugiyono, 2013, p.129). Secondary data used in this study was obtained from the publication of data that relevant agencies had collected from the BPS of Bali Province. The data used in this study was collected using documentation techniques.

Documentation techniques are data collection techniques by retrieving data from various documentation or publications from relevant agencies. The data analysis technique used to analyze the shift of economic structure and the potential of the regional economy in Bali Province is the following quantitative analysis techniques:

Location Quotient (LQ) Analysis

Location Quotient Analysis is an analysis that is easy to understand and has the proper accuracy in describing the economic conditions in an area (Davis, 1992). Identification of leading sectors in Bali Province uses location quotient (LQ) analysis techniques. LQ analysis is a mathematical technique that measures economic indices through regional output comparisons with a broader reference area output. LQ analysis is also often used to identify industrial areas in a region (Guimares *et al.*, 2008). The LQ formula used is:

$$LQ = \frac{Si/S}{Ni/N} \quad \ldots\ldots(1)$$

Note:

LQ : *Location Quotient* Index

Si : GRDP sector i Bali Province

S : Total GRDP of Bali Province

Ni : GDP sector i Indonesia

N : GDP total of Indonesia

Growth Ratio Model (GRM) Analysis

The Growth Ratio model has a value greater, smaller, or equal to one. This model is a research instrument used to compare the internal growth of the sector in the study area and externally between the same sectors with the reference area. The data used is the Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) in two time periods, namely the beginning and the end. This model is divided into two parts (Utama, 2010, p.63-64):

1) Reference Area Growth Ratio (RP_r)

$$RPr = \frac{\Delta Y_{in}/Y_{in(t)}}{\Delta Y_n/Y_n(t)} \quad \ldots\ldots(2)$$

Note:

ΔY_{in} : The changes of GDP sector i in the reference area (Indonesia)

$Y_{in(t)}$: GRDP sector i in the reference area at the beginning of the research (Indonesia)

ΔY_n : The changes of GDP in the reference area (Indonesia)

$Y_{n(t)}$: GDP in the reference area at the beginning of the research (Indonesia)

2) Growth Ratio of the Study Area (RP_s)

$$RPs = \frac{\Delta Y_{ij}/Y_{ij}}{\Delta Y_{in}/Y_{in(t)}} \quad \ldots\ldots(3)$$

Note:

ΔY_{ij} : The changes of GRDP sector i in the study area (Bali)

$Y_{ij(t).}$: GRDP sector i in the study area in the beginning of the research (Bali)

ΔY_{in} : The changes of GDP in reference area (Indonesia)

$Y_{in(t)}$: GDP sector i in the reference area at the beginning of the research (Indonesia)

RPs : Comparison between the income growth rate of the i sector in the study area with the total growth rate (GRDP) activity i in the reference area

Overlay Analysis

Overlay analysis analyzes potential economic activities based on growth criteria and comparative advantages (Utama, 2010, p.67). Overlay analysis results have four possibilities:

1) RPs (+) and LQ (>1) indicate a very dominant activity both from growth and comparative advantage.
2) RPs (+) and LQ (≤1) indicate an activity that has dominant growth but does not have a comparative advantage.
3) RPs (-) and LQ (≥1) indicate an activity that has small growth but has a comparative advantage.
4) RPs (-) and LQ (<1) indicate an activity that is not potential both from growth and comparative advantage.

Results and Discussion

The shift or transformation of the structure of the economy is one of the phenomena that arise because of the ongoing economic growth as a result of increased economic activity at the regional or national level. The transformation of the economic structure must be examined every few years to show that there has been a shift in contributions from economic sectors so that the government can form policies that are appropriate in the economic field.

In Bali Province, data regarding the shift in the structure is very limited even though this data is important for the community and local government. The community needs this information to avoid any inequality of information regarding the proper business field to run, while the government needs it to design regional development programs and formulate development policies. Economic growth in Bali certainly indicates a shift in the economy's structure. The researcher analyzed the shift in the structure of the economy in aggregate from 2000 to 2017 and the shift in the sector or business sector based on 17 existing sectors.

Based on data from the BPS of Bali Province, from 2000 to 2010, there were nine business sectors recorded for contributing to the GDRP, including i) Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry, and Fisheries, ii) Mining and Excavation, iii) Manufacturing Industry, iv) Electricity, Gas and Clean Water, v) Buildings, vi) Trade, Hotels, and Restaurants, vii) Transportation and Communication, viii) Finance, Leasing and Company Services, ix) Services. In 2010, these nine business fields were developed into seventeen sectors or business fields.

Sukirno states that based on the business field, the economic sector in Indonesia is grouped into three main groups, namely the primary sector, the secondary sector, and the tertiary sector. Primary sector consisting of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries; mining and excavation;

secondary sector consisting of manufacturing industries; electricity, gas and clean water; building; and tertiary sector consisting of trade, hotels, and restaurants; transportation and communication; finance, leasing and company services; and services (Sukirno, 2010, p.143). The condition of the economic structure of an area can be determined through calculation and analysis based on the output produced by these economic sectors (Imaningsih, 2011).

The shift of the contribution of the economic sector is according to the field of business based on constant prices in 2000 of 2000-2010 in Bali. The primary sectors, including agriculture, mining, and excavation, keep declining yearly. In 2000, the contribution of the primary sector to GDRP was 22.35 percent and continued to decline until 2010 by 19.08 percent. The secondary sector or manufacturing did not experience significant growth during the year of observation. However, it experienced fluctuations during 2000-2010 because the number of manufacturing companies in Bali is only a few firms and has no potential to develop this sector. The tertiary sector or service continues to experience a significant increase yearly because of the tourism sector related to the tertiary sector.

Figure 2: The Shift of Economic Structure based on Contributions Gross Domestic Regional Product of Bali Province on the Constant Price 2010 of 2010-2017 (in percent)



Source: BPS of Bali Province on Various Publication (data processed)

The shift in economic structure that occurs from the agricultural sector (primary) to the tertiary sector indicates that many workers move to the tertiary sector because of the opening of existing business opportunities in that particular sector. The agricultural sector has decreased from year to year, and this is not only the effect of the lack of agricultural land but also more unemployment in agriculture. The added value of labor in agriculture is relatively high, but the value of agricultural production is low. It indicates the amount of the existing unemployment or farmers who cannot produce agricultural products. According to Antara (2007), the decline in the

contribution of agriculture was also due to the low human resource management of agriculture in Bali and the low investment in this field. The rapid expansion of tourism infrastructure development (hotels, villas, bungalows, restaurants, shops, golf courses, and others) has resulted in a drastic narrowing of agricultural land area. BPS Bali estimates that over six years (1997-2003), rice fields in Bali have decreased from 87.85 hectares to 82.64 hectares. It means the conversion rate of paddy fields reaches 870 hectares (1.0%) per year.

Table 2: The Result of Location Quotient Analysis of Bali Province 2010 – 2017

Sectors	**Year**								**Average**
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries	1.23	1.19	1.18	1.14	1.13	1.11	1.10	1.08	1.15
Water Supply, Waste and Recycling Management	3.00	2.86	2.83	2.86	2.87	2.70	2.74	2.68	2.82
Transportation and Warehousing	2.07	2.06	2.02	2.00	1.94	1.88	1.87	1.80	1.95
Provision of Accommodation and Food and Beverages	6.55	6.52	6.54	6.54	6.49	6.55	6.55	6.74	6.56
Information and Communication	1.68	1.66	1.58	1.50	1.44	1.42	1.40	1.37	1.51
Financial and Insurance Services	1.12	1.10	1.09	1.12	1.14	1.10	1.08	1.05	1.10
Real Estate	1.68	1.62	1.59	1.58	1.62	1.61	1.60	1.59	1.61
Government Administration, Defense, and Mandatory Social Security	1.47	1.73	1.69	1.63	1.74	1.78	1.80	1.72	1.69
Education services	1.63	1.69	1.56	1.63	1.68	1.68	1.75	1.79	1.67
Health Services and Social Activities	2.05	1.99	1.94	2.00	2.05	2.07	2.11	2.13	2.04
Other services	1.07	1.05	1.04	1.00	0.98	0.96	0.95	0.94	1.00

Source: Own Computations based on the Data of BPS of Bali Province on various publication

There are eleven sectors which are the base sectors, namely the agriculture, forestry, and fisheries sector (1.15); water supply, waste management and recycling (2.82); transportation and warehousing (1.95); providing accommodation and food and beverages (6.56); information and communication (1.51); financial and insurance services (1.10); real estate (1.61); government administration, defense and mandatory social security (1.69); education services (1.67); health services and social activities (2.04); other services (1.00). Bali Province has eleven sectors, which are base sectors, meaning that eleven sectors have comparative advantages. The eleven outputs of this sector are able to meet the needs within the region and export outside the Bali Province. Eleven leading sectors or bases owned by Bali Province based on LQ analysis must be a priority for economic sector development plans in Bali Province.

Table 3: The Result of Growth Ratio Model Analysis of Bali Province 2010 – 2017

Sectors	Rpr	Rps	Rpr Code	Rps Code
Construction	1.30	1.50	(+)	(+)
Transportation and Warehousing	1.48	1.22	(+)	(+)
Provision of Accommodation and Food and Beverages	1.10	1.45	(+)	(+)
Information and Communication	2.18	1.63	(+)	(+)
Financial and Insurance Services	1.50	1.48	(+)	(+)
Real Estate	1.04	1.08	(+)	(+)
Company Services	1.67	1.16	(+)	(+)
Education services	1.15	1.76	(+)	(+)
Health Services and Social Activities	1.46	1.88	(+)	(+)
Other services	1.54	1.33	(+)	(+)

Source: Own Computations Based on the Data of BPS of Bali Province on Various Publication

Based on the results of the MRP analysis, the sector that has the potential to be developed is the construction sector; transportation and warehousing; accommodation and food and beverages; information and communication; financial and insurance services; real estate; company services; education services; health services and social activities; and other services. These sectors have dominant growth, which is able to grow well in Bali Province (study area) and Indonesia (reference area). It is in line with the discussion of the shift of the economic structure of Bali that the developing sector is currently the service sector or tertiary. The current problems of the primary sector have only been produced for its own needs, and this sector has not been produced for sale so that the contribution of business fields that fall into the non-base category is minimal in value and growth year after year.

Table 4: The Result of Overlay Analysis of Bali Province 2010 – 2017

Sectors	RPs	LQ	RPs Code	LQ Code
Transportation and Warehousing	1.22	1.95	(+)	(+)
Provision of Accommodation and Food and Beverages	1.45	6.56	(+)	(+)
Information and Communication	1.63	1.51	(+)	(+)
Financial and Insurance Services	1.48	1.10	(+)	(+)
Real Estate	1.08	1.61	(+)	(+)
Company Services	1.16	0.69	(+)	(-)
Government Administration, Defense, and Mandatory Social Security	1.31	1.69	(+)	(+)
Education services	1.76	1.67	(+)	(+)
Health Services and Social Activities	1.88	2.04	(+)	(+)
Other services	1.33	1.00	(+)	(+)

Source: Own Computations Based on the Data of BPS of Bali Province on Various Publication

The interpretation of the overlay results depends on the value of RPs and LQ analysis above. Based on the results of the Overlay analysis, the potential sectors to be developed are the transportation and warehousing sector; the sector of accommodation and food and beverages; information and communication sector; financial and insurance services sector; real estate sector; government administration, defense, and mandatory social security sectors; education services; health services and social activities; and other services.

Based on the analysis of LQ, GRM, and Overlay, it is known that the sector which is the base sector is based on the results of LQ analysis, which means that the sector has been able to meet the needs of the sector in Bali and is able to bring income to Bali, not necessarily a sector that has good growth and comparative advantage. Suppose agriculture, forestry, and management is one sector that is a base sector according to the LQ results but based on the GRM and Overlay analysis, this sector has a small growth but actually has a comparative advantage. The result of LQ, GRM, and Overlay analysis is resumed in Table 5 below to indicate which sector has dominant growth and comparative advantages.

Table 5: The Category of Economics Sector Based on the Result of Overlay Analysis of Bali Province 2010 – 2017

RP_s \ LQ	(+)	(-)
(+)	(DOMINANT IN GROWTH AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE) • Transportation and warehousing sector • Provision of accommodation, food and beverages sector • Information and communication sector • Financial service and insurance sector • Real Estate sector • Government Administration, defense, and mandatory social security • Education service sector • Health service sector and social activities • Other services sector	(DOMINANT IN GROWTH BUT NOT SUPERIOR) • Provision of electricity and gas sector • Construction sector • Wholesale and retail, car and motorbike reparation sector • Company service sector.
(-)	(SMALL GROWTH BUT HAS COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE) • Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries sector • Provision of water, waste management, and recycling sector.	(NO POTENCY) • Mining and Excavation Sector • Manufacturing Sector.

Source*:* The Result of Growth Ratio Model Analysis of Bali Province (2010-2017)

The agricultural sector in Bali tends to have a low growth rate because the level of value-added products in this sector is also minimal. Even though this sector absorbs much labor, agricultural productivity should increase. However, in reality, the production value of this sector is low, which indicates that many workers in the agricultural sector do not produce good production. According to Antara (2007), the decline in the contribution of agriculture was also due to the low

human resource management of agriculture in Bali and the low investment in this field. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (2005) estimates that over a period of 6 years (1997-2003), the area of rice fields in Bali has decreased from 87.850 hectares to 82.644 hectares. It means the conversion rate of paddy fields reaches 870 hectares (1,0%) per year. The rapid expansion of tourism infrastructure development (hotels, villas, bungalows, restaurants, shops, golf courses, and others) has resulted in a drastic narrowing of agricultural land area. Another study found that Bali's agricultural land is reduced to 1,000 hectares every year.

Sectors that are base sectors based on LQ results were re-analyzed to see their growth and comparative advantage in the study area and reference area. The analysis used is LQ, GRM, and Overlay to make sector conclusions about Bali Province's leading sectors. The result might be a new conclusion of the potential sector. After all, the base sector of LQ will not be potential because the sector's growth is not dominant and has comparative advantages. Several sectors are feasible to develop by the Bali Provincial Government, namely transportation and warehousing; accommodation, food, and beverages; information and communication; financial services and insurance; real estate; education service; health service and social activities, and other services. The priority sectors that can be developed to support the economic development in Bali are accommodation, food and beverages; transportation and warehousing; and real estate related to tourism as the leading sectors of Bali.

Conclusion

Economic Structure Shift occurred in Bali Province and was different in 2000 and 2010. The shift from 2000 to 2010 was very volatile because of economic shocks, such as the first and second bombing at the center of tourism besides the monetary crisis in 1997-1998 and the fuel crisis. In contrast, the results showed that those in 2010 to 2017 were comparatively stable. The Superior or Base Sectors according to the results of the comparison of LQ, MRP and Overlay analysis, which includes the leading sector categories in Bali Province that have dominant in growth and comparative advantage and the value of RPs and LQ $\geq$ 1are transportation and warehousing (RPs: 1.22 and LQ: 1.95); provision of accommodation and food and beverages (RPs: 1.45 and LQ: 6.56); information and communication (RPs: 1.63 and LQ: 1.51); financial and insurance services (RPs: 1.48 and LQ: 1.10); real estate (RPs: 1.08 and LQ: 1.61); education services (RPs: 1.76 and LQ: 1.67); health services and social activities (RPs: 1.88 and LQ: 2.04;

and other services (RPs: 1.33 and LQ: 1.00). The two analyses on different base years conclude that the economic structure of Bali has shifted to the tertiary sector from the primary sector, while growth in the secondary sector is minimal below the primary sector.

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The Process for Provision of Humanitarian Aid and Sustainable Peace and Development in Central Equatorial and the Other States in South Sudan: Post 2005 to 2020

Chaplain Kenyi Wani*

Abstract

Humanitarian aid aims to mitigate the suffering of people, alleviate poverty, and lay a firm foundation for sustainable peace and development. This research paper aims to assess the impact of humanitarian aid in two counties of Central Equatoria State of South Sudan. The provision of humanitarian aid is one of the pillars in the process of peace-building. Understanding the provision of humanitarian aid helps assess the impact of humanitarian activities on post-conflict communities. It contributes to understanding the practical process of peace-building to prevent a resumption of conflict in post-conflict communities. The outbreak of intra-conflict in December 2013 in Juba shows that the process of peace-building was not effective. A qualitative method was applied for data collection and analysis. Primary data was gathered through in-depth interviews of key informants, including selected community leaders, civil society organizations, national and international non-governmental organizations, staff of UN agencies, and key national and state officials. Stratified purposive interviews were conducted in Juba and Kajokeji Counties. Two focus group discussions were held in Juba and the other in Kajokeji. Secondary data from various academic and policy institutions were used to supplement the primary data. The data were analyzed using methods of ethnography and discourse interpretation, observation, and interaction. Coordinating the processes of recovery and development requires humanitarian principles. Development partners, host communities, policymakers, and others underestimated the challenges in delivering humanitarian aid. The democratic system that the national government of South Sudan advocated was not based on principles of good governance and on the engagement of civil society organizations, which are the custodian of the social contract between the citizen and the national government. The process for the provision of humanitarian aid did not relieve much suffering in communities. It contributed less effective effort to the process of peace-building to prevent the reoccurrence of conflict in Central Equatoria and the other states of South Sudan. The process would require the practice of good governance.

Keywords: Humanitarian Aid, Civil Society Organization, Governance, Protection, Policy

Introduction

This paper analyses the process for the provision of humanitarian aid in the process of peace-building in Central Equatorial State - South Sudan.[1] Central Equatorial is one of the Ten States in South Sudan. It is located south of the country. The importance of this study is to improve the process for the provision of humanitarian aid. The paper is divided into two time periods: interim

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[1] while the research focused on Juba and Kajo Keji counties of South Sudan as case studies. Its findings can be generalized to the whole country as the context is more or less similar.

(2005-2010) and post-independence (from 2011-2020). The outbreak of conflict in December 2013 in Juba-South Sudan shows a failure in the process of peace-building. Therefore, the paper aims to investigate how the activities in the process for providing humanitarian aid were conducted in Central Equatoria State.[2]The paper investigates whether the process for the provision of humanitarian aid was effective in alleviating poverty and laying a solid base for sustainable peace and development. The finding in this study reflects the situation in South Sudan. Policies made in Central Equatorial in Juba affect communities in the whole country. Adequate provision of humanitarian aid is vital for achieving the goal of post-war recovery. It can lead to the reduction of poverty in the communities affected by conflict. Its effectiveness will relieve distress in post-conflict communities and help to ease the management of violence, exclusion, and conflict (Weismann, 2004, p. 310).

This study aims to understand how the process for the provision of humanitarian aid was conducted and to know if it was effective in contributing to peace-building. Based on the findings, the paper is to help improve the process for the provision of humanitarian aid in the process of peace-building to prevent the resumption of conflict. The failed process of peace-building increases chances for renewal of the conflict, and the continuity of a system of a fragile government, as is the case at present. Success in the process of peace-building in Central Equatorial and other States will also be determined by the capability of the National Government in providing core functions of security, law, and order, public services, and mobilization of revenue for sustainable development. The humanitarian aid is to facilitate the better performance of the function of the National Government in establishing the policies required for its agenda of National Development, which includes an effective process in the provision of humanitarian aid.

[2] South Sudan was known as Southern Sudan until it became an independent country from Sudan on July 9, 2011. GOSS = Government of Southern Sudan. GOSS administered Southern Sudan from July 9, 2005, to July 9, 2011. This was the Interim Period of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which prepared Southern Sudan for the referendum that led to the separation of Southern Sudan from Sudan.

Conceptual Framework

Figure 1:



The conceptual framework for the study outlined in figure 1 shows that the analysis of the finding is expected to lead to theory development. Humanitarian aid agencies play a vital role in providing food, water, sanitation to returning refugees and internally displaced persons, and securing their protection (The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Dispute (ACCORD), 2013, pp. 87-92). Provisions of humanitarian aid in South Sudan have been mainly the work of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Program (WFP), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC), United Nations International Children Education Fund (UNICEF), Catholic Relief Service (CRS), Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) and the other Non-governmental and church organizations such as the American Refugee Committee (ARC), Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC) and the Islamic Relief Agency (IRA), among others.

These groups of actors in the process of peace-building have their organizations working closely with the agencies of the South Sudan government and International and National non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in carrying out their assistance. The broad series of their activities included the provision of temporary accommodation, tracing of missing persons, and providing medical assistance, besides the organization of assistance for reconstruction and economic support to returnees. Humanitarian agencies were expected to provide recovery services such as food, water, sanitation, return of refugees and internally displaced people, and to secure their protection (Accord, 2013, pp. 87-92). There can be no development in a country when there is conflict. Development also requires the practice of good governance.

Methodology

According to the nature of the set objectives, the paper delimited to investigate the problems from interim time (2005- 2010) to post-independence South Sudan in 2011. A qualitative method

was applied for data collection and analysis for this study. Purposive sampling was applied for the data on the process for the provision of humanitarian aid, and the secondary sources of data were reviewed and analyzed to have the result. This study gathered information from people affected directly and indirectly by conflict in South Sudan. In addition to personal experience, more data was collected by notes-taking on observed and encountered situations, recording events from conversation and meetings, and written information (documents, products, and artifacts), in line with what is proposed by Miles and Huberman (1994, pp. 6-10; Alexander *et al*.,(2014, pp.7-9). Primary sources included interviews with government administrators and peace-building actors such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) in Juba. Interviews were also conducted with members of local and international organizations who have experience in peace-building activities. These included members of women unions, youths and civil society organizations, and community leaders. The interviews have helped the researcher get first-hand information and have insight from the key informants directly engaged in the issues and decision-making processes in the National government (total number of interviewees: male 83, female 31).

Literature from secondary sources in the process for the provision of humanitarian aid was drawn from the available resource centers such as the University of Juba library, electronic libraries, United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and in Agencies such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and (Accord) in Juba. The process also involved comparing and asking questions throughout the sampling process (Berg, 2001, pp. 30-35).

Before data gathering, a letter of ethical clearance from the University of Hawassa, Ethiopia, and the University of Juba was obtained to undertake the study for academic purposes easily. Respondents for this research were selected from participants and stakeholders involved in humanitarian aid activities in the process of peace-building. This involves a sample of different groups of age 18 and above, males and females, working and non-working-class of different occupations and officeholders. Among them are academics, community leaders, members of

civil society organizations, church members, women and youth associations, and staff in the peace and reconciliation commission. Data was also generated and validated by one focus group discussion in Juba County (11 participants) and one in Kajokeji County (7 participants). Workshops were held to serve as a means of triangulation for reliability and validity of the collected data and for plugging in information gaps from the other states of South Sudan (9 Workshops were conducted).

Limitations to this study were the fear by interviewees to provide information because national security prevents freedom of expression. More data would have been obtained in a conducive security environment. However, the researcher tried to convince them by producing the letters.

Results and Discussion

The provision of humanitarian aid is one of the requirements in the pillars of peace-building. The objective of the process for the provision of humanitarian aid is to ensure that basic human needs are met in South Sudan. Empirical literature (UNHCR, (2020); Bagshaw, (2012); Sphere project, (2004), show that the process of peace-building requires the effective application of the provision of humanitarian aid through the following four humanitarian principles: (i) humanity - issues of human suffering are to be addressed to protect the life of people and for respect of human beings; (ii) neutrality – humanitarian workers, in theory, are not supposed to engage in any political activities, but conditions in work environment sometimes make this principle challenging to obey; (iii) impartiality – activities for humanitarian aid are to be carried out based on priority and not on nationality, religion, race, and gender, or differences in social class; (iv) independence – activities for humanitarian aid need to be free from politics, economic interest, and military influence.

Based on the Organization of Economic Corporation and Development (OECD, 2008, pp. 11-12), there is a concern in Central Equatorial and other States in South Sudan in peace-building. The following section will look at the process of humanitarian aid for post-conflict recovery in Juba and Kajo Keji Counties of Central Equatorial State. It includes the process to deliver humanitarian aid - how the process was conducted, the choice of the institutions or sectors to work with through practice of good governance, the activities that need support, and the sequencing of the activities for the delivery of humanitarian aid, and the impact of such processes on communities in Central Equatorial and other States.

Provision of Humanitarian Aid for Post-Conflict Recovery in Central Equatorial and other States in South Sudan

Empirical literature (Cedric de Coning & Mateja, 2019) shows that in the Interim period (2005-2010), the (UNDP) made an effort to support activities for post-conflict recovery through the dissemination of information and engagement of communities in activities for conflict transformation. UNICEF provided support for social services such as infrastructure, activities for local NGOs and civic education, promotion of humanitarian principles, and compliance to human rights values. The UNDP, UNICEF, and many other UN agencies were working in collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP) before the outbreak of intra-conflict in December 2013 (Agensky, in Cedric de Coning & Mateja, 2019, p. 288; Cochrane, 2020). The Government of Southern Sudan's (GOSS) priorities for funding post-conflict recovery are indicated in table 1 below. Between the years 2008 to 2010, both GOSS and the donor communities were engaged in budget planning to meet the priorities of GOSS for post-war reconstruction. The views of the donor communities in 2010, based on analysis of conflict in Southern Sudan in post Comprehensive Peace Agreement, were that conflict was possible in Southern Sudan because of some of the following issues: (i) historical under-development, (ii) lack of inclusivity in the process of decision-making for policies (iii) urban-rural bias, and (iv) the system of centralization in the National Government (Bennett *et al.*, 2010).

According to the Overseas Development Institute (ODI, 2010; Bennett et al., 2010, pp.47-55), the National Government revised its priorities for post-war reconstruction in the year 2010 to include the following areas: first, security is to develop effective and efficient armed forces to safeguard the security of the country and to implement the resolutions of Comprehensive Peace Agreement fully. Second, construction of road is to rehabilitate and to promote development in socio-economic recovery activities and private sectors. Third, primary healthcare provides primary healthcare units to improve the status of health of communities. Fourth, primary education is to provide equitable access to facilities for education. Fifth, water is to increase access to clean water and facilities for sanitation. Six, production is to improve livelihood and income of communities who live in rural areas of Central Equatorial and other States. Priorities such as security and roads are connected to activities for humanitarian aid. They facilitate easy

access on an urgent basis to provide humanitarian aid to people in need of recovery from the effect of conflict.

This paper observes differences in opinion between GOSS in Juba, and the donor communities, over the budget to pay for the priorities required for post-conflict recovery in South Sudan (see Table 1). The National Government in the year 2010 and the donors estimated the required funding as listed in table 1.

Table 1: Priorities and Estimates of Required Fund by GOSS and Donors

Priorities	**GOSS estimates**	**Donor's estimates**
Security	US$ 438 million	US$ 12 million
Road	US$ 184 million	US$ 39 million
Primary Healthcare	US$ 52 million	US$ 94 million
Basic Education	US$ 99 million	US$ 27 million
Water	US$ 28 million	US$ 25 million
Production	US$ 29 million	US$ 47 million

Source: (Bennett & Pantuliano *et al*, 2010)

There are differences in demand between the government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and the donor countries over the estimated budget in table1. This was based on the priority of demanded items. Those items were based on assumption than field assessment, and the donors were concerned with priorities. More explanation of the differences in GOSS and the Donors' estimates is shown in Table 2, which shows the donor countries contributed to the budget in Table 1.

The level of expenditure of the budget varies by donors - from Belgium's high of 93% to 58% for the United States. The percentage of grants by the United States expended has been low because of the many substantial multi-year projects with complex phases of design funded by the United States (Bennett *et al*., 2010).

The table shows variation in the way donors respond to funding for humanitarian aid, based on the high demand for humanitarian needs, priorities, and interests of the donors. As many of these large projects were carried out using contractors, the disbursement rate (contractors are paid in arrears while the UN agencies paid in advance) is considerably slower than grants. This makes

funding for humanitarian aid limited, which does not lead to an effective process for providing humanitarian aid.

Table 2: The Donor Countries That Contributed For the Budgeted Amount For Southern Sudan (2005-2009)

Donors	Budget for Southern Sudan (US$ Million), excluding US$ 1 billion for UNMIS	As the percentage of the total by donors	Percentage of which reported expended
USA	1,730	42.7%	58%
EC	487	12.0%	90%
Netherland	486	12.0%	70%
UK	480	11.9%	88%
Norway	277	6.8%	99%
Canada	230	5.7%	69%
Sweden	158	3.9%	88%
Denmark	103	2.5%	79%
Germany	94	2.3%	79%
Belgium	8	0.2%	93%
Total	4,052		73%

Source: Bennett & Pantuliano *et al*, 2010

The impact of large projects on overall expenditure reduced the US's share of expended funds to just over one-third of the expended funds. Although the share of the US reduced, it was still more than twice that of any other single donor if other aid programs of the United States are taken into account. During the Interim Period (2005-2011), other prominent actors in the process for the provision of humanitarian aid in Southern Sudan at large included the World Food Program (WFP), the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations International Children's Education Fund (UNICEF), the Catholic Relief Service (CRS), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Community Leaders, Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) and other church organizations such as the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) and Islamic Relief Agency (IRA). The figure given in 2019 by the Swedish International Development Cooperation

Agency (SIDA) of the organizations operating in the whole country was 177, of which there were 84 NGOs, 77 INGOs, 7 UN Agencies, and 9 others. According to Cochrane (2020), the figure for registered organizations working in Southern Sudan later rose to 194.

Empirical literature (SIDA, 2019; Balikuddembe *et al*., 2014; OCHA, 2014) shows that humanitarian organizations, during the interim period, were providing both food and non-food items to refugees returning from the neighboring countries of Southern Sudan and internally displaced people. These numbers of organizations working in Southern Sudan were expected to significantly impact the outcome of the process for the provision of humanitarian. However, because of insecurity, where access to provide aid to people in need is denied, and natural hazards such as heavy rains and floods, their work has been slow and ineffective during the interim period. The following section will discuss literature on the return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced people in the interim period.

Return and Reintegration of Refugees and Internally Displaced People, and Those in Protection of Civilian Areas (POC)

Returnees

Data obtained from the fieldwork and the UNHCR office in 2006 had shown that, when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005, more than two million refugees and internally displaced persons returned to Southern Sudan. The number provided by UNHCR for both refugees and internally displaced people returning to South Sudan in 2006 was 366 430 (UNHCR, 2006). UNHCR and IOM overwhelmed many who were either returning refugees or internally displaced. The agencies responsible for their process of return had insufficient logistics. There was a requirement for more logistics. Apart from the World Food Program (WFP), the other agencies of the United Nations halted their support to spontaneous returnees before the end of 2008 because of a lack of funding (Duffield, 2008). However, the number of organized returnees was less than 13% compared to returnees who organized for their transport (Spontaneous Returnees). There were 60,000 organized IDPs, 482,000 spontaneous IDPs and 140,000 registered refugees returnees in 2006 (UNHCE, 2006).

The following are some priorities for providing services required by returnees and residents for them to live together cohesively: security, good services, economic and support to livelihood. However, all these required priorities had been lacking in Central Equatorial and other states of

Southern Sudan (interview with member staff of Central Equatorial State Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, 2016, Juba). Based on the UNHCR evaluation report in 2008 (Duffield, 2008), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, during the interim period, appeared not to have adequately incorporated a program of protection into its process of operation for returnees. The immediate needs of the returnees had been addressed by providing a collaborative package for three months. WFP took up the responsibility of supply of food aid. The non-food items for households were supplied by UNHCR, UNICEF, and other logistics provisions by other United Nations agencies such as the IOM. However, these services had also been poorly provided because the package's components and quality were based on assumption rather than need assessment. For example, the agencies involved in the program for the return of internally displaced persons from Khartoum and reintegration in South**er**n Sudan did not fully realize the scale and complexity of the operation situation to assist internally displaced persons in the process for return and reintegration.

A staff of UNHCR noted it, the work started well, but when staff realized the enormous amount of the work needed, with fewer logistics, many staff bowed out, leaving the internally displaced persons in a state of limbo, forcing them to find their own ways to Southern Sudan through spontaneous return (Duffield, 2008, p. 20). Before the independence in 2011, the process in stages of verification and registration of organized returnees at the point of departure took many months – bypassing timeline and predictability of the assistance needed by the returnees at the time of arrival to their final destination in different locations in Southern Sudan as such UNHCR office could have been more predictable and more engaged in the process of return and integration. This could be achieved by providing more protection input to inter-agency efforts during the planning stage, with good coordination responsibility on monitoring returnees on route to Southern Sudan and in final major locations of their return (Duffield, *ibid* p.20). In doing so, UNHCR could more significantly contribute to continuous monitoring of the outcome of the process of return and integration, the fulfillment of long-standing commitment *vis-à-vis* the humanitarian donors' community, and consolidation of its position as a prime interlocutor in search for a solution to the resettlement of returnees and internally displaced person in Southern

Sudan. Similarly, it was important to examine issues of local integration from the perspective of internally displaced persons (Duffield, *ibid*, p. 21).

The returnees were provided with non-food items such as tents and cooking utensils, while the food items included cooking oil, lentil, maize grain, and medicine during their time of arrival into transit centers. They were given food ration for three months but no medicine on departure from transit centers to their final location. The ration of food for three months was not enough to reintegrate fully into communities in their final location. Further, (Duffield, *ibid*; UNHCR, 2006 *op., cit*., p.4) wrote that the UNHCR staff rarely have a follow-up visit to the permanent settlements of returnees to evaluate if they have settled well into their final locations, as part of their requirement for protection, and whether their work was satisfactorily conducted. They only followed up when the returnees themselves requested them.

Empirical literature (Emma & Jėssica, 2019) shows a problem in coordinating humanitarian aid work between the actors, the non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, and the government agency (SSRRC) because of lack of willingness from the side of the National Government. It was due to practices of corruption by elites in the National Government significantly caused the lack of sufficient finance, denial of humanitarian aid access to the suffering population by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) forces, poor infrastructure in the road to facilitate speedy work of humanitarian aid, particularly during the rainy seasons, and that caused a delay in the process to deliver humanitarian aid to places such as Leer and Bentiu. It forced the beneficiaries to suffer from starvation. As such, there was displeasure by the National Government in the work of humanitarian aid to help the post-conflict community of Central Equatoria and other States**.** The National Government did not consider that the restrictions of access for humanitarian aid by Sudan People's Liberation Army / Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA / SPLA-IO) to the suffering communities in South Sudan violated the practice for good governance.

According to (Lauren, 2013, pp 11-12; Nyadera, 2018, p.63), the limitation to fully effective work of humanitarian aid, other than by UNHCR and IOM between 2006 and 2008, regarding the return of refugees and internally displaced people, was due to unfavorable condition that made it extremely difficult for provision of effective humanitarian aid. Returnees have suffered secondary displacement by the outbreak of intra-conflict in December 2013. As noted by Lauren

(2013), more than 63,000 took refuge in UNMIS' protection of civilians (POC), and 121,600 others were internally displaced outside the (POC). The following section discusses the process for the reintegration of the returning refugees and internally displaced persons.

Reintegration of Returned Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

The reintegration of returning refugees and internally displaced people was achieved to some extent in Central Equatorial State. However, insufficient follow-up programs exist to evaluate how well the returning refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) were resettled to their communities. In the evaluation of UNHCR in 2008, Duffield et al. (2008, pp.19-21, 29-31) noted that there were problems in the process to reintegrate internally displaced persons and refugee returnees to places such as Western and Central Equatorial State because of land mines that required clearance. The available land requires the agreement of the local communities. It was also confirmed in the interview with the staff member of South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, 2017, Juba. Therefore, the reintegration process for returning refugees and internally displaced persons was only successful to some extent. The reintegration process was unevenly distributed because some returnees were left out in the process, and there were food shortages and a lack of shelters because of the lack of enough operation funds.

The following statement by a respondent captured the reintegration problems during the field interview; *'the CPA created discrimination, disunity, tribalism, and nepotism instead of peace-building*. A female respondent commented that; *the only benefit from the CPA is the freedom of movement and the ability to meet again with relatives'*. A former soldier commented that; '*before the CPA they had high hope for the country to deliver services, but they have become disillusioned and marginalized by the National government…The expectations that men marry and provide for their families have created a feeling of frustration and stress, particularly those expectations from relatives and friends are enormous. However, there has been an inability to deliver or meet such expectations'* (interview with a member of civil society organization, Women Union, Former Combatant, 2016, Juba). The comment by these respondents shows a lack of adequate delivery of services during the process of reintegration of returnees. There was a lack of access to economic opportunities, and there was a competition over scarce resources - making it difficult to meet the expectations of relatives and friends for support. There was greater

understanding and acceptance of people from different backgrounds to settle in Juba as a capital city, mainly because of their skills for employment.

However, the community in Juba has been experiencing and reflecting economic changes in their living standards. The urban poor people with no skills for work have been slowly pushed to the outskirts of the inner city, and the well-off people with skills for work occupied the center. An increase in inequality in living standards between the well-off and poor people in the capital, Juba, has created a feeling amongst many poor people that they are not benefiting from the provision of humanitarian aid, particularly in the process of development through the reintegration of returnees. People who have been pushed into the outskirt of the city require assistance from the IOM, but the process also takes long (interview with a member of displaced person, 2017, Juba).

The process for integration of returnees during the interim period was characterized by humanitarian aid problems that continued to shape experience later on after 2011 (Ajak, 2015, p. 2). Ajak (2015) noted that one of the difficulties meeting the expectations of relatives and friends relates to a lack of coordination, leading to inadequate provision of services. Further, the government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) did not know the exact number of humanitarian aid agencies available during the interim period. Although several meeting places were established, such as the GOSS-Donor forum and NGO forum to improve coordination between GOSS and aid agencies, progress in such meeting places was slow.

Engagement of returning refugees and internally displaced people youths to work in activities for building roads would provide skills for employment and good livelihood, which will lead to the creation of useful infrastructure in communities. It could easily help in the process of integration for returnees. To (Bennett *et al*., 2010), there was also tension between the donor communities and the National Government of Southern Sudan on the policy to construct roads. Some organizations such as the German Agency for International Cooperation (GTZ) and non-governmental organization of Catholic Relief Service considered repair of tertiary roads, which are constructed with the labor of local communities (food or cash for work) suitable to respond to the more immediate problem of food security. Nevertheless, the National Government of Southern Sudan was opposed to the idea. However, empirical literature (GOSS, 2008; GOSS, 2017; Bennett *et al*., *op.cit*., p. 91) shows that the World Food Program (WFP) was given

contracts to repair and construct some feeder roads through, for example, the existing GOSS Commitments. These included the Lainya - Jambo road (costing US$ 13.5M), the WFP Contract for Road Maintenance and De-mining (costing US$ 66.0M), Kajo Keji-Juba, Faraksika-Chukudum, Wau-Kwajock-Abyei, Narus-Buma-Raad, Juba Bridge Delaunching and Launching (costing US$1.9M).

This study finds that engagement of integrated returnees to work in activities for the building of roads would provide skills for employment and to have a good livelihood, which will lead to easy adaptability for the reintegration of returnees to their new place of settlement and creation of good infrastructure, facilitating relationship between integrated returnees and the host communities. This study also finds that one of the contributing factors to a less effective process for reintegration in Central Equatorial and other states was the lack of evaluation of the work of GOSS *vis-à-vis* the process to provide humanitarian aid. It is a process that requires a willingness by the responsible stakeholders, good coordination between the actors working in humanitarian aid, and a system of practice for good governance by GOSS to ensure coordination procedure for transparency and accountability. The process also requires consideration of the importance of the full contribution by reliable civil society organizations to the work of humanitarian aid. As a result, the lack of a participatory approach, where ideas are shared in the process of providing humanitarian aid, has contributed to the ineffective work of humanitarian aid. It also fails to identify if their work was progressing well or needs further improvement (interview with a member of civil society organization, 2017, Juba; interview with staff member, Central Equatorial State Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, 2017, Juba; Duffield, *op.cit.*). The reintegration process for returnees was also made ineffective due to the limited availability of suitable geographical location (with no insecurity problems), for non-governmental organizations and agencies of the United Nations in the vicinity, to partner with the UNHCR in the effort for the reintegration of returnees.

This study also finds a lack of understanding by workers in the process of providing humanitarian aid to communities in need. Provision of humanitarian aid, as one of the pillars of peace-building, requires knowledge in the following issues: (i) the understanding by the actors in the process of peace-building that flawed process of reintegration of returnees may result in

destabilizing communities and in exacerbating tension. For example, conflicts over the issue of natural resources such as water. Such tensions in communities can be exploited by the politicians in the National and State governments for personal interests. For that, it is vital to consider activities to develop the process of peace-building with reference to recognition of the key drivers of conflict. (ii) To consider the appropriate geographical placement of the work of humanitarian aid to avoid the areas which are most prone to violence, and (iii) to have the provision of support necessary for institutions to encourage peaceful relations in communities (Bennett *et al*., 2010, p. 80).

Empirical literature (McCallum & Okech, in Pantuliano *et al*., 2013, p.16) shows that there was a high need for more provision of humanitarian aid, for example to communities in places such as Akobo and Pibor, with 200, 000 people in need, and Jonglei State, with 201,000 people in need. According to (Bailey & Harragin, 2009; Bennett *et al*., pp. 81- 82; Wageman & Langholtz, 2017, pp. 100-103), reliance on organized reintegration of returned refugees and internally displaced persons have strengthened the view of actors in the process for the provision of humanitarian aid on the ground, for the need of more logistics. The little progress that had been made in the process to deliver humanitarian aid by the United Nations (UN) agencies combined quick recovery impact in institutions for the development of the local government, paid for by donors such as Norway and Canada, but the process was not much effective (Conway, 2013). There was no relationship between the delivery of humanitarian aid to demonstrate effective work in the process of recovery and the efforts to strengthen the capacity and ownership of Central Equatorial and other State governments through the civil society organization. There was a lack of coordination. The process of recovery in humanitarian aid appeared to have undermined the credibility of the government of Central Equatorial and other States because the objectives to expand the presence and visibility of activities in humanitarian aid have not been fully met during the interim time, due to lack of coordination and capacity building (Conway, 2013, p. 24). The following section will present results and discussion on the process for the provision of humanitarian aid in post-2011 in Central Equatorial and other States.

Provision of Humanitarian Aid in the Post-Independence Period

As mentioned earlier, the primary aim of humanitarian aid is to respond to recovery problems in post-conflict South Sudan. However, this paper found that activities for the provision of

humanitarian aid did not fully benefit entire communities. It did not contribute to providing basic services such as water and sanitation, education, and health (interview with the commissioner, Kajokeji County; Village Assessment Report, 2013).

In the context of intra-conflict in 2013 (Omer, 2018, p.3), no refugees returned to the country, but there were 1.8 million internally displaced persons and 2 million people seeking refuge again in the neighboring countries. The non-governmental organizations working in humanitarian aid/agencies of the United Nations and the donor community have been concerned with the lack of progress in implementing the peace agreement in the country. The programs for funding of government building shifted to provisions of activities for protection, and that also created a bad relationship between the international community and the National Government of South Sudan (there was a lack of trust between the two). The life of internally displaced people, particularly those communities who live in the remote rural areas of Juba, became polarized further by the presence of armed groups.

According to (Balikuddembe *et al.,* 2014), the insecurity situation after December 2013 made the provision of humanitarian aid difficult. As noted by Balikuddembe *et al*. (2014), there were 26 recorded incidents of confiscation of relief assets, occupation of humanitarian premises, physical assault of the staff of different humanitarian agencies, and restriction to provide humanitarian services to reach the communities in need. Six humanitarian compounds were raided, properties were looted, members of national security beaten fourteen humanitarian staff, and the military forces occupied six schools. All of these activities against humanitarian agencies were conducted by the military and national security forces, which made the process of providing humanitarian aid ineffective.

Emma & Jėssica (2019) noted that Oxfam and other non-governmental organizations working in the provision of humanitarian aid tried to meet the immediate need of the communities affected by conflict in the Western Bahr el Ghazal region in 2017. The project provided cash transfer, food vouchers, borehole rehabilitation, and goats distribution. The project also equipped communities with skills, knowledge, and assets to earn money for themselves to build their resilience for the future. Nevertheless, it has been observed by Erol (2018, p. 2) that the program faced challenges to work because it lacked sufficient practices for coordination, collaboration,

cooperation, and communication within a framework of multi-stakeholders - States, communities (CSO), aid agencies, private sectors, NGOs, National, and Local actors. The project was forced to stop because of conflict. Further, the increasing population requiring humanitarian assistance made the provision of services not enough to cater to all people in need. There were conflicts in various areas such as Jonglei and Upper Nile States (interview with a member of civil society organization, 2017 Juba).

The work of humanitarian aid in the country, whether independently or in collaboration with the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), was supposed to coordinate with the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) to conduct their work. However, the researcher experienced during the fieldwork that when soldiers are out of their barrack on a mission, they are not easily controlled until they return to their barrack, where they will obey the rules of their commander. As noted by Balikuddembe *et al*. (2014), humanitarian aid agencies have been facing problems of denial of access to deliver aid to people in need because of the violent attitude of the SPLA and SPLA-IO against some of the workers in humanitarian aid, which consisted of harassment or intimidation, attacks, robbery, hijacking of properties, arrest, abduction, and commandeering of vehicles of humanitarian agencies (Balikuddembe *et al*., 2014).

The violent attitude of the SPLA and SPLA-IO against the humanitarian aid workers extended country-wide to places such as Jonglei and Upper Nile states. It was a violation of the United Nations resolution A/RES/82, where full access and no hindrance to humanitarian aid and other services is a precondition for an effective provision of humanitarian aid, whether in armed conflict or natural disaster. Prevention of access to humanitarian aid has led to a less effective process to deliver humanitarian aid (Balikuddembe, 2014). However, the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan has provided freedom of movement for foreign travelers and repatriation of refugees and internally displaced people.

IOM (2016) noted that the conflicts in December 2013 and July 2016 created more internally displaced persons searching for protection in United Nations compounds in South Sudan. Hence, internally displaced people by conflict included those in the United Nations Protection of Civilian (POC) camps. The report of the IOM in 2016 painted a worrying situation for the displaced number of people in POC; the number for Juba town was 38,874, Wau town was

42,384, Bentiu town was 101,570, Malakal town was 33,057, and Melut town was 700 IDPs (IOM, 2016). Yet, the SPLA and SPLA-IO hindered an activity for providing humanitarian aid. The increasing number of internally displaced people and those who received humanitarian aid is shown in figure 1 for the number of internally displaced persons by conflict and figure 2 for those who managed to receive aid. Figures 1 and 2 show the changes in the figures of internally displaced people during the first eight months of the conflict that broke out in December 2013. Figure 1 shows that the conflict intensified for the first two months, from December 2013 to January 2014, when Dr. Riek Marcher was forced out of Juba with his forces. The situation was reduced to normal. Fighting increased when the forces of Dr. Riek Marcher regained strength and President Salva Kiir gained the support of the Ugandan army, which also increased the number of internally displaced people from February to July 2014 to 2,400,000.

Figure 1: The Number of Internally Displaced People by Violence in South Sudan from December 2013 to July 2014



Source: Balikuddembe & Ejeta, 2014

Figure 2: The Number of Internally Displaced People Reached by Humanitarian Aid Agencies and Received Assistance in South Sudan from December 2013 to July 2014



Source: Balikuddembe & Ejeta, 2014

Links in Recovery, Transition, and Rehabilitation in the Work of Humanitarian Aid

This study found a link between recovery and transition to rehabilitation. Better development reduces the difficulties in future recovery, and better recovery facilitates the process of transition to sustainable development. In order to have an effective process for the provision of humanitarian aid, its workers have to structure their activities with an understanding that the

activities for humanitarian aid also reinforce respect for development. It may be more effective if humanitarian aid workers, together with Central Equatorial State and others, coordinate and collaborate their work with the private sector to leverage capacity and resources available for post-conflict recovery. However, as noted during the interview with a member of a civil society organization in Juba in 2017, there was no effective process for coordination and collaboration, making the transition in the link from recovery to rehabilitation and development not fully effective (interview with a member of civil society organization, 2017, Juba).

Oxfam (2019) emphasized that sustainable advocacy is required for reforms in economic policy, which focus on the most economically vulnerable people. In particular, the participation of women would be vital to ensure fair distribution of opportunities and activities that reduce practices of inequality and promote self-reliance through engagement in activities for the market (Oxfam, 2019, p. 23). Speedy access to provide humanitarian aid facilitates the key operations of humanitarian aid of movement of goods and aid workers where they are needed to implement the provision of health services and to conduct the needed activities for humanitarian aid to benefit the affected communities (Balikuddembe, 2014, p. 16). However, some challenges made the provision of humanitarian aid not so effective in Central Equatorial and other States.

Challenges in the Process for Provision of Humanitarian Aid After 2013

Empirical literature (Balikuddembe *et al*., 2014, p. 20) and data (interview with staff, Central Equatorial State Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, 2017, Juba) show challenges in the process for the provision of effective humanitarian aid to include the following: the bureaucratic policies of the National government created delays in getting working visas for the aid workers, approval of travel permits to affected areas and clearance of relief. For example, the National government does not fully respect humanitarian principles by allowing temporary corridors to facilitate easy access for humanitarian aid to reach the people in need. It is particularly in violation of the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Convention and the additional protocol of 1949, which South Sudan accepted in 2012.

The other challenges include rainy seasons in South Sudan. From July to December every year, roads to key locations of need for humanitarian aid are sometimes cut off. Access to such areas

becomes minimal or impossible. It is a physical challenge for humanitarian aid workers - a high cost for humanitarian aid during the rainy season. High risks of movement during rainy seasons make some humanitarian aid workers face problems of looting, ambushes, and destruction of humanitarian aid assets, leading to fluctuating prices and continued increase in cost for humanitarian operation (interview with staff, Central Equatorial State Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, 2017, Juba).

To Balikuddembe *et al*. (2014, pp. 20-23), the companies providing humanitarian freights services increased the transport charges, making it difficult for some humanitarian agencies to distribute aid to many people in need. The affected people may get cut off from receiving aid services such as health, food distribution, and education facilities. It has happened in Central Equatoria and other states such as Jonglei, Warrap, Lakes, Unity, and Upper Nile. It is because of the lack of development of a sound infrastructure system all over the country.

The insecurity problems have made humanitarian workers find alternative ways to reach people in need through local civilians. But civilians are also armed, hungry for food, lack money as salaries are not paid some time for four to six months. They need vehicles and food supplies from NGOs that provide humanitarian aid. Moreover, if they are not provided, they take it by force. It adds to the access constraints to provide humanitarian aid (interview with the staff member, Central Equatorial State Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, 2017, Juba).

Empirical literature (Cockrane, 2020) shows an urgent need by the National government in the work of humanitarian aid. Further, data from the fieldwork revealed that the National government did not consider that increase in well-being of beneficiaries, and the quality of their life, are determined by the frequent use of the following associated concepts; commonality, united effort, and partnership or harmonious teamwork for effective results (interview with a staff member, Central Equatorial State Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, 2017, Juba). These concepts are not limited to the process for the provision of humanitarian aid; it includes armed forces that hinder access for effective provision of humanitarian aid to people in need. These associated concepts have the following four characteristics, cooperation, coordination, collaboration, and communication. All the four characteristics above are vital in the effective delivery of humanitarian aid. It is argued that the quality of information that has not been shared, trusted, respected, and valued is doomed to fail. Hence, the diverse mandates that add to the four

successful concepts above require ongoing patience, diplomacy, transparency, listening, classifications, confidence, and no assumption.

These are skills that lead further to having characteristics that include; experience, academic preparedness, a clear understanding of the objectives and work of humanitarian aid at micro and macro levels. Therefore, poor cooperation, coordination, collaboration, and communication have risked working relations, and it impedes progress to meet the intended objectives for success in humanitarian aid work (Cochrane, 2020, pp. 27-29; Kopinak, 2013). Figure 3 below illustrates the required United Nations cluster of the approach for effective work in the process of providing humanitarian aid.

Figure 3: Illustration of the United Nations Cluster Approach for Humanitarian Aid Work in 2005



Source: Kopinak (2013)

Empirical literature (Kopinak, 2013) shows the cluster approach adopted by the United Nations in 2005 to improve the working relationship between stakeholders and host government (Central Equatorial and other State) in communication, cooperation, coordination, and collaboration. It is to minimize high cost, duplication, and conflicting activities in work to provide humanitarian aid. It can be through maximizing the exchange and flow of information. Although the cluster

approach has significant potential for improvement of work in activities for the provision of humanitarian aid and the well-being of the beneficiaries, the skills required for implementation have been lacking in Central Equatorial and other States in the country. It was because of elitism in the National and State governments in South Sudan at large. Elites in both levels of government took administrative responsibilities for providing humanitarian aid without technical know-how, consideration to expectations of the vulnerable communities, and respect for their rights to the provision of humanitarian aid. It raises the question; what are the rights of communities to the provision of humanitarian aid? The answer would require further research on the practice of human rights education and advocacy in Central Equatorial and other States.

Limitations in the process for the provision of humanitarian aid are due to the neglected role of civil society organizations, youths, women and religious groups, academics, and traditional authorities. All of them are stakeholders that need to be fully considered in the process to provide humanitarian aid. Some humanitarian aid challenges for easy reaching to affected communities can be transferred to civil society organizations that operate in the most affected areas. Hence, a holistic approach is needed for the different players in the process of providing humanitarian aid (Balikuddembe *et al*., 2014, pp. 24-25).

A well-researched design process for implementing humanitarian aid is a vital requirement regarding the events to be carried out, the environment in which the work is to be taken, and the location of head offices of the providing agencies, field staff, donors, and national and local government stakeholders. At the same time, successful implementation of activities in the process for the provision of humanitarian aid in post-conflict communities would require an understanding of the nature, scope, and practical relevance of the programs for recovery. Successful activities in the process for providing humanitarian aid would require the collaboration of stakeholders, time, reliability of the donor in funding for both short and long-term, and recruitment of skilled staff with required knowledge, and long-enough duration to provide for continuity of the activities in the process for the provision of humanitarian aid (Kopinak, *op.cit*.; Oxfam, 2019).

The researcher considers that the foremost step in providing humanitarian aid in Central Equatorial and other States would be promoting cooperation, collaboration, coordination, and communication between stakeholders investing in providing food, education, and health. The

process would be effective through a flexible transition to enhance sharing of ideas - a participatory approach. It will also be cost-effective to beneficiaries and the donors because participants in the provision of humanitarian aid will have a chance to learn new skills from one another. According to Prentice *et al.* (2020), the benefit of the participatory process leads to the following. First is the development of social networks - a chance to meet other people, make new friends, and increase connections. Second, learning comes in different forms - through participation, people will learn many new skills, have openness to other new experiences, and have the confidence to learn. Third, participants will develop self-efficacy - people will believe in their capability to do things that influence events that affect their lives; how people feel, think, and motivate themselves (Prentice *et al.,* 2020, p. 4). Further research would be needed on the same topic regarding freedom of movement and expression.

Conclusions

This study finds that the process for the provision of humanitarian aid in Central Equatorial and other States is not effective enough to prevent the resumption of conflict. Workers in the provision of humanitarian aid play different roles, but mainly under a single universal principle to protect the vulnerable communities, by decreasing their suffering, including enhancement of their well-being in the process for post-conflict recovery. This study shows that provision of humanitarian aid in Central Equatoria and other States was not effective because of a lack of systematic planning and evaluation at the early stages of the process. After attaining peace, careful planning is vital for the effective provision of humanitarian aid.

The provision of humanitarian aid was more effective during the Interim Period than the time after the intra-South Sudanese conflict from December 2013. The conflict in 2013 made the provision of humanitarian aid not very effective, mainly due to a lack of practices for good governance by elites in the National and State governments. It led to disrespect of human rights values, leading to an increase in conflict. The behavior of armed forces against humanitarian aid workers has prevented the effective supply of aid for recovery to people in need. The SPLA/SPLA-IO often denied access for humanitarian aid workers to provide services to people affected by the conflict. The rainy season and the poor road infrastructure also affected the process for speedy provision of humanitarian aid. If the authorities in South Sudan were

committed to the process, these other factors, such as infrastructure and natural hazards, could be easily surmounted.

Sustainable peace can be consolidated by building the authorities' capacity and legitimacy in governments. It can be done by provision of basic services, consideration of problems of security, good policing, and provision of the rule of law. The process of intervention by the international community in activities for peace-building was a high priority in Central Equatorial and other States. However, the effectiveness and sustainability of such intervention depend on elites' willingness in the National and State governments to provide reasonable security to the communities on the ground.

The process for the provision of humanitarian aid was not effective enough to contribute to the process of peace-building to prevent the resumption of conflict in South Sudan. The National government did not encourage respect for principles of humanitarian aid to produce effective results. Such a failure has prevented the efforts to deliver effective humanitarian aid for recovery.

Recommendations

The problems in providing humanitarian aid require the National and State governments and partners in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to design together programs that address short-to long-term needs and build the communities' resilience.

More efforts are needed to build a constructive relationship with authorities in the National and State governments and strengthen and rebuild trust and understanding in institutions of the governments. Good policies and principles of good governance would be necessary for effective work.

Acknowledgment

I would like to thank Dr. Logan Cochrane and Dr. Melisew Dejene for their technical support.

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Non-Governmental Organizations and Development Service Provision: A Conceptual and Empirical Review

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Abstract

Globally, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are seen as a significant driving force behind delivering development services. There is universal consensus within the development community that development service delivery will be incomplete without the involvement of NGOs. Thus, many NGOs across the globe complement governments' efforts in development service delivery, a situation that has occasioned a rapid rise in both the volume and scale of operations of NGOs. Nonetheless, there is a growing debate regarding the conceptual intentions of NGOs. While some scholars believe that NGOs effectively provide development services, others have suggested that development service delivery does not constitute a critical component of NGOs' agenda. There is also the issue of whether or not the approaches NGOs employ in development services are participatory enough. While some scholars opine that participatory development communication approaches characterize NGOs' development services, others maintain that participation is merely rhetoric value within the NGO sector. These contending views risk an obliteration of the continuing relevance of NGOs in development discourse. This paper seeks to contribute to the debate on the place of NGOs in development services and the approaches NGOs employ in contemporary development practice. The authors posit that NGOs occupy a central place in development service provision but concede that NGO operations in development services are not without challenges. The authors argue further that NGOs' role in development services can better be appreciated based on a thorough understanding of the role of participatory development communication in development service provisions. The paper presents a review of the relevant conceptual and empirical literature on NGOs' activities in development services and concludes by identifying lessons that should engage the attention of key stakeholders.

Keywords: Development, NGO interventions, Participatory Development Communication, Service Provision, Programs

Introduction

Development is about bringing quality changes in the lives of the citizenry. Its outcomes go beyond growth in the traditional economic sense to include all other human well-being aspects (Sen, 2012; Todaro & Smith, 2006). Nations across the globe strive to put in place measures to bring about quality changes in the lives of their citizens. However, it is widely acknowledged that in many developing nations, the state cannot independently provide essential social goods and services that would ensure a progressive poverty reduction and guarantee sustainable

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development (Okorley & Nkrumah, 2012). When the state cannot provide sufficient goods and services or the enabling environment to improve the lives of its citizens, alternative channels of service provision become critical. NGO interventions have constituted one such form of alternative development strategies since the 1980s (Banks & Hulme, 2012; Brass, 2010; Odoom, Yeboah, Opoku & Osei-Wusu, 2018; Odoom, 2021). In this context, the alternative development theory solidifies the apparent relevance of NGOs as frontline agents of development (Odoom, 2021).

NGO activities and services have a long history dating back into the late 1940s, just after World War II (Desai, 2002b; Winter, 2001). NGOs came into the development scene when civil society organizations became increasingly convinced about what they could do to alleviate the suffering of the many people and nations affected by the war. Indeed, World War II left many people in a state of hopelessness, starvation, and destitution globally, with many countries also experiencing a severe economic slowdown as a result of the war. Thus, NGOs around this period had humanitarianism, welfare, and relief service as their central motivation in development service delivery. However, NGOs' activities have outgrown welfare, relief, and humanitarianism over the past few decades (Desai, 2002b, Francis, 2002; Long, 2001; Nelson, 2002). NGOs now provide several services in almost all sectors of society beyond relief and humanitarian considerations due to the increasing recognition of the inability of governments to single-handedly improve the socio-economic conditions of people.

NGOs have and continue to play a vital role in delivering development services. The benevolent role of NGOs for the past three decades served as a means to bridge the gap between the poor and the rich. Consequently, NGOs are generally praised for their strengths as innovative grassroots-driven agents for social change (Banks & Hulme, 2012). NGOs are seen to have the willingness and capacity to pursue participatory and people-centered forms of development and to fill gaps left by states, especially across the developing world, in addressing the myriad of needs of their poorest populations (Banks & Hulme, 2012; Barr, Fafchamps & Trudy, 2005; Odoom, 2021).

Even though global figures are uneasy about coming by owing mainly to the absence of coordinating bodies, Epstein and Gang (2006) observed that, for all Development Assistance

Countries, official development assistance (ODA) to NGOs rose from US$928 million to US$1246 million between 1991 and 2002. This figure indicates about 34 percent rise in development assistance to NGOs within this period. Similarly, around this period, international NGOs grew by 19.3 percent. Additionally, there has been a corresponding expansion both in size and the development of thematic areas of NGOs, thus, affirming a growing interest and centrality of NGOs within the alternative development partner coincided with neoliberal tenets (Barr *et al.*, 2005; Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Odoom, 2021). In essence, there has been an overwhelming rise in the number of NGOs in the face of the various development challenges manifesting across the globe.

Several factors have contributed to the rising interest in the activities of NGOs around the world. For example, continued donor distrust and frustrations with states fuelled an interest in NGOs as viable and even desirable alternatives. Many people viewed NGOs favorably for their inclusive representation of beneficiaries and their role as innovators of new technologies and participative approaches to working with the poor (Barr *et al.*, 2005; Lewis, 2005; Murray and Overton, 2011). Africa witnessed its NGO boom starting in the 1990s (Hearn, 2007). For example, Kenya experienced a rapid increase in the number of registered NGOs from 400 in 1990 to over 6,000 in 2008 (Brass, 2011). Similarly, in Tanzania, the 41 registered NGOs in 1990 had increased to over 10,000 by 2000 (Hearn, 2007). In places such as Uganda, the public reaction to the NGO phenomenon has been characterized by mixed feelings, including a widespread suspicion that beneath the provision of the public good lie other ulterior motivations (Barr *et al.*, 2005). However, NGOs provide a much-needed helping hand in development services in Ghana, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe (Adjei, Agyemang & Afriyie, 2012; Chitongo; 2013; Enyioko, 2012). It indicates that NGOs have played a critical role in the development of communities over the years (Adjei et al., 2012; Banks & Hulme, 2012; Brass, 2010; Chitongo; 2013; Enyioko, 2012; Omofonmwan & Odia, 2009).

The exertion of political influence has been suggested as a strong underlying motivation of NGOs' presence in Africa, mainly driven by a desire to join dominant political patronage networks (Brass, 2012). However, the good governance agenda, which embraces the language of democracy, human rights, and public participation (Murray & Overton, 2011), consolidates NGOs' centrality to national development (Odoom, 2021) in the Global South. As a result, the architecture of aid has evolved beyond growth-focused neoliberalist experiments to a more

meaningful consultation between donors and recipients and increased focus on poverty and the responsibility of nation-states from the onset of the new millennium starting in 2000 (Barr *et al.*, 2005; Murray & Overton, 2011). This paper contributes to the debate around the contribution of NGOs in development service provision through a review of selected literature. The rest of the paper is written in four parts, with the first part focusing on the concept and typology of NGOs. The second part looks at the role of NGOs in contemporary development service provision, while the third part considers the empirical review. The final part concludes the paper based on the emergent issues in the review.

Conceptual Review

The Concept and Typology of NGOs

NGOs have come to be accepted as significant actors in the development landscape. NGOs are noted for delivering essential services to people in need and undertaking advocacy and public campaigns for positive social change. Their activities also focus on community improvement, poverty alleviation, capacity building, and community empowerment. NGOs also offer more specialized services, including governance and democracy, human rights, emergency response, cultural preservation, conflict resolution, environmental activism, policy analysis, research, and information provision (Lane, 1995; Lewis & Kanji, 2009).

Although NGOs' presence can be felt almost everywhere in the developing world, the challenge of understanding the phenomenon remains a startlingly difficult one. It can be attributable to NGOs' being an extremely diverse group of development actors. NGOs undertake different functions and take different shapes and forms within and across different countries and contexts. Another explanation for the nebulousness of the phenomenon is that 'NGO' as an analytical grouping is complex, often unclear, and difficult to grasp. Although NGOs are regarded in the literature as independent organizations without the control and influence of government or driven by the profit motive, some NGOs are regular recipients of huge funding from government sources. Some NGOs bear striking semblances of highly professionalized private entities also carrying a strong corporate identity (Lewis & Kanji, 2009).

The term NGO is widely used to encapsulate a number of organizations. The term is often used interchangeably with other names such as not-for-profit, voluntary, and civil society organizations. Sometimes, these terms reflect the different kinds of NGOs in operation within a given context (Lewis & Kanji, 2009; Moyo, 2000). Also, using these terms is a consequence of different cultures and histories through which NGOs emerged. For instance, in places such as the United Kingdom, the term “voluntary organization” or "charity" is often used due to a long tradition of volunteering and voluntary work attributed to Christian values and the development of charity law. Again, in the United States, the term “non-profit organization” is commonly used due to the increasing recognition of the market economy. The usage of the term in the United States is also due to appreciation for the non-commercial and non-profit-making motives of the operations of NGOs (Lewis & Kanji, 2009).

In essence, NGOs’ conceptualization may be occasioned by their diverse activities ranging from relief organizations to service provision. For example, Christian Aid, CARE International, Save the Children, environmental conservations groups such as Friends of the Earth, wildlife conservation groups, and self-help groups such as funeral associations, welfare organizations, farmers and fishermen’s associations, among others, are all lumped into the NGO designation (Lane, 1995; Mawdsley, Townsend, Porter & Oakley, 2002; Moyo, 2000). The structure, funding, and value sets also contribute to this mass classification of divergent organizations as NGOs. NGOs may be large or small, formal or informal, bureaucratic or flexible based on their structure. Concerning funding, some NGOs are externally funded, while others depend on locally mobilized resources. Some NGOs may be well resourced and command extensive network capabilities, while others may be poorly resourced. Some NGOs have the resources to engage the services of highly experienced professionals, while others necessarily have to rely on the goodwill of unpaid volunteers and supporters. From the perspective of the value, NGOs are driven by a range of motivations which may be secular or faith-based (Lewis & Kanji, 2009).

The influence of NGOs can be traced back to the late 1940s, immediately after the Second World War (Desai, 2002b; Winter, 2001). The evolution of NGOs came when some civil society organizations (CSOs) saw that they could alleviate the suffering of those affected by the war in Europe and other parts of the world and assist countries experiencing an economic slowdown as a result of the war. Scholars such as Long (2001), Desai (2002b), Francis (2002), and Nelson (2002) have argued that the activities of NGOs have grown beyond just welfare provisioning,

especially since the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the developing world, areas where government resources cannot reach due to inadequate revenue and donor support is not forthcoming, assistance from NGOs has been extremely crucial.

NGOs are typically self-governing or voluntary development organizations that focus on improving the lives of poor and vulnerable people or organizations not benefiting directly from government development initiatives (Desai, 2002a; Long, 2002; Vakil, 1997). Their agenda is based on the philosophical orientations that underpin the organization's establishment. In some cases, they work on behalf of a government, even though not operate directly under the control of any government department. In some instances, too, they become de facto providers of essential public goods that governments are either unable or unwilling to provide. Long (2002) identified some of the activities of NGOs, which include service delivery to poor individuals or communities, empowerment support work such as capacity building, technical assistance and funding to communities, advocating for the voiceless and the marginalized, and women's rights.

In some countries, some NGOs are working on behalf of governments in certain development service delivery areas, while others may choose to distance themselves from the state by implementing projects and activities that run parallel to similar interventions by the state (Clark, 2002; Desai, 2002b; Nelson, 2002; Thomas & Allen, 2000). However, some critics (Desai, 2002b; Francis, 2002) have argued that although NGOs are recognized as effective vehicles for delivering public services, the operations of some of the risk further social and political marginalization of beneficiary communities when such activities are deemed to be antithetical to the government’s plans and policies. These occasional conflicts notwithstanding, the overarching perception of NGOs is one of voluntary humanitarianism. Through this altruistic lens, NGOs are seen as indispensable non-state actors whose aim is to provide services to improve the conditions of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups or individuals in society.

Despite their contributions to development services, NGOs are not without challenges and misgivings. NGOs are often accused of getting involved in national politics to the detriment of their missions. It is widely contended that Local influential persons mainly lead NGOs with political connections, which often impedes their ability to implement adequate democratic management and decision-making structures (Andreasen, 2001). A clear case in point is what

existed in Egypt a few years ago, where most NGOs were accused of elitism because they were founded by professionals and the educated elite (Myllyla, 2001).

Again, scholars including Korten (1990) and Turner and Hulme (1997) described NGOs' approach to promoting empowerment at the local level as a political activity. The authors further downplayed the situation where NGOs claim they are non-political when they explicitly promote empowerment at the grassroots level, which unavoidably makes them political entities. Besides, Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens (2003) opine that NGOs are not entities whose operations can be welcome in the realm of perfection. Barr et al. (2003) strengthen this position by submitting that some NGOs are opportunistic and remote organizations, contributing very little to development services. Particularly, in Africa, Barr et al. (2003) believe that NGOs' contribution to development services in places such as Uganda leaves much to be desired.

Forming typologies of NGOs

Several views have been expressed by scholars, researchers, and organizations regarding the various ways of developing a typology of NGOs. For instance, Lane (1995) considered the types of NGOs from four main angles. They are welfare and relief, modernization, community development, and institution building NGOs. Relief and welfare NGOs channel their efforts to assist people affected by complex humanitarian emergencies such as drought, earthquakes, floods, and other natural disasters and conflicts. The remaining three categories have been categorized under the term "Development NGOs". These NGOs mainly help promote and improve people's lives through community and institutional development practices and empowerment and capacity-building programs that enable people to fulfill their development aspirations and attain sustainable livelihoods. One such NGO in Ghana, for example, is World Vision International (Lane, 1995).

In the opinion of Cousins (1991), NGOs can be classified into two main categories based on their orientation and level of operation. In terms of orientation, Cousins (1991) considered NGO types based on the kind of activities they undertake. The activities may include human rights, environmental issues, or developmental works. On the other hand, an NGO's level of operation shows the scale at which it works. Some operate at the local, regional, national or international level or a combination of these levels (Vakil, 1997). Also, based on the level of operation,

Cousins (1991) identified the following categories: community-based, city-wide, national and international NGOs. This categorization helps to identify the coverage of an NGO's operations.

Furthermore, based on orientation, Cousins (1991) also identified four types of NGOs: charitable, service, participatory, and empowering. Charitable NGOs' activities are directed towards addressing the needs of the poor. They primarily involve distributing food, clothing, or medicine, provision of housing, transport, and schools. Second, NGOs engage in service orientation focused on the provisions of health, family planning, or education services. Third, participatory NGOs are classified based on the self-help projects they provide to local communities where people are actively involved in planning and implementing projects (Cousins, 1991). The local people participate in the form of contributing cash, tools, land, materials, and labor. Finally, empowering NGOs to seek to help poor people better understand the social, political, and economic factors affecting their lives and reinforce their awareness of their capacity to control their lives (Dugle, Akanbang & Salakpi, 2015).

In an effort to reinforce the debate on typologies of NGOs, Willetts (2002) agrees with Cousins (1991) on the classification of operational NGOs. Willetts further explained operational NGOs as organizations that seek to promote small-scale change mainly through projects. Unlike Cousins (1991), Willetts (2002) believed that there are also advocacy NGOs that aim to achieve large-scale change facilitated indirectly through the influence of political systems. Based on Willetts' categorization, it can be said that operational NGOs implement projects while advocacy NGOs are concerned with holding demonstrations or campaigns to defend or promote a specific cause. In support of Willetts (2002), Mostashari (2005) argued that the difference between operational and advocacy NGOs lies between small-scale change achieved directly through projects and large-scale change promoted indirectly through political systems and campaigns.

Other scholars have also categorized NGOs based on several factors and positions. For example, as cited in Paul Dugle *et al.* (2015), Farrington and Lewis have characterized NGOs based on factors such as autonomy, location, and scope of activities. Thus, the degree of autonomy, location, and scope of activities of NGOs are crucial in the determination of NGO categorization. Others have also classified NGOs based on their aims and functions, as in welfare NGOs, development NGOs, service NGOs, environmental NGOs, advocacy NGOs, human rights

NGOs, women's NGOs, and religious NGOs (Gallin, 1999; Tvedt, 1998). From their legal status, NGOs have been put into four categories: unincorporated and voluntary association; trusts, charities and foundations; not-for-profit companies; and entities registered under special NGOs (Dugle *et al.,* 2015; Stillman, 2007).

There are also international and local NGOs. The term "International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO)" refers to NGOs whose operations are funded through bilateral, multilateral, or private-sector donors (Gyamfi, 2010; Helen, Cunt & Sujata, 2005; Lewis & Kanji, 2009). Chuku, as cited in Gyamfi (2010), defines International NGOs as NGOs whose policies and systems are managed and controlled from their various headquarters, often outside the country of operation. International NGOs are also sometimes referred to as Northern NGOs. The term "Local Non-Governmental Organization (LNGO)" refers to local indigenous organizations, including national NGOs, Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs), and Community-Based Organizations (CBOs). These indigenous organizations provide interventions and activities often within the functional categories of advocacy and service delivery (Helen *et al.,* 2005).

Local NGOs are owned, managed, and controlled by the nationals. They are formed based on the initiatives of the local people rather than outside forces or donors. They are formed in response to the myriad of development challenges confronting their country (Turary, 2002). Their primary desire is to identify local needs or concerns and fashion out local solutions to them. They are non-profit making, not affiliated to political parties, and generally concern themselves with working to ensure the development and welfare of communities in their operational zones (Lewis & Kanji, 2009; Turary, 2002).

It is believed that a reasonable number of NGOs do not have clear development objectives. It raises doubts about their motivations and capacity in working to address the plights of the people they claim to serve (Kamat, 2002; Mayo, 2000). Table 1 presents some of the categorizations of NGOs by Hudock (1999) and Moyo (2000). Variations in community needs and diversity in NGOs' development agenda also tend to increase the paradoxes of NGOs operating in the world today (Dugle *et al.,* 2015; Turary, 2002). Despite these challenges and the complexity of community needs and priorities, NGOs have and continue to demonstrate the ability to meet the development needs of populations worldwide. In many instances, NGOs work assiduously to fill

the gaps created by governments' inability to deliver development services, especially to the disadvantaged persons in society (Brass, 2011).

Unlike Helen *et al.* (2005), Mayo (2000) and Hudock (1999) distinguish CBOs from southern NGOs. While southern NGOs operate at the national and regional levels, CBOs operate at the grassroots and village levels (Hudock, 1999; Mayo, 2000). Other NGOs focus on rural community development. The preoccupation of these NGOs is promoting the development of rural communities (Ellis, 2000). Other features that inform NGOs' categorization are cost-effectiveness, adaptability to the local environment, innovativeness, and an understanding of the local situation. As a result, government departments and international development institutions often collaborate with NGOs by providing them the resources to deliver development initiatives on their behalf (Desai, 2002b; Thomas & Allen, 2000). This form of trust strengthens the synergy between northern NGOs and southern or community-based NGOs in the execution of development programs and interventions.

Table 1: Typology of NGOs and their areas of operations

Type of NGO	Origin and area of operation
Northern	Mostly from the developed countries; render most of their services in the developing world.
Southern	These are NGOs that originate from developing countries. They are often formed through local initiatives, and their operations are at the regional and national levels. They may operate at the grassroots/village level and collaborate with donor nations and northern NGOs to provide interventions.
Community-based/Indigenous /Grassroots	They are often promoted by government agencies, faith institutions, or community mobilization groups. They operate at the grassroots and mainly at the village level.

Sources: Hudock (1999), Moyo (2000)

NGOs constitute an important vehicle through which development intervention policies are implemented at the grassroots level (Farrington et al., 1993). The over-reliance of some governments on NGOs to spend money on their behalf gives such NGOs influence on government policy formulation and implementation. The flexible nature of the policies and

programs of NGOs their ability to work directly with the rural poor and within rural and risky conditions make them preferable to government agencies (Lane, 1995; Long, 2001). However, critics have suggested that NGOs are just gap-filling organizations (Desai, 2002b; Thomas & Allen, 2000) that sometimes operate using non-conventional policies. They often operate in areas where most government departments find it difficult to operate. NGOs would not offer a quick answer to a scale of global poverty or even alleviate it satisfactorily to ensure relative social stability (Pearce, 2000; 2001).

Characteristics of NGOs are also examined from service provision, intermediary, advocacy, and relief perspectives and their corresponding primary activities (Hudock, 1999; Mayo, 2000), as shown in Table 2. In their conclusion, Thomas and Allen (2000) posit that despite the hype about the work of NGOs towards the improvement of the lives of the rural poor and the neglected and marginalized, NGOs can never change the world.

Table 2: Characteristics of NGOs and their performance

Characteristic of NGOs	Activities
Service Providers	They provide training services, capacity building, consultancy, research, etc., at the community level; engage in service delivery for the needy, such as refugees, flood victims, etc.
Intermediary	They liaise with funding agencies and assist grassroots organizations in securing funds and other assistance for development activities.
Advocacy	They advocate for the underprivileged, disadvantaged, widows, street children, etc.
Relief	They provide relief supplies to communities or countries affected by floods, earthquakes, famine, disease outbreaks, etc. They also offer technical assistance on fundraising strategies, proposal writing, etc., to local organizations to make them self-reliant.

Source: Hudock (1999), Moyo (2000)

This conclusion raises questions on the views many people have about the activities and impacts of NGOs as development partners.

The Role of NGOs in Contemporary Development Service Provision: Key Issues and Approaches

NGOs currently play diverse roles within the global contemporary development community. NGOs' roles in the current development framework have been grouped mainly into service delivery, catalysis, and partnership (Lewis & Kanji, 2009). These three leading roles inform the approaches NGOs employ in undertaking development services. Although these roles are distinct, one particular NGO can engage in thematic areas and activities that cut across these individual dichotomies. A clear case is that an NGO may carry out service delivery to build trust in a local community, which will, in turn, create a platform for community advocacy or campaign. Also, an NGO may form a partnership with a corporation to advance its aims of campaigning for ethical and socially responsible business (Lewis & Kanji, 2009). Service delivery by NGOs, especially in developing countries, is important because many people face a wide range of development services coupled with essential basic services being unavailable or of poor quality (Carroll, 1992; Lewis & Kanji, 2009).

NGO service provision has seen a speedy growth due to the decreasing role of governments as direct service providers within the neoliberal agenda (Lewis & Kanji, 2009). The incentive for an NGO to actively provide services varies. For instance, sometimes, NGOs provide services to meet previously unmet needs, while in other instances, they are contracted by state agencies or donors to undertake the delivery of services that hitherto had been the direct responsibility of the government. Indeed, not all NGOs are directly providing services to local communities. For example, some NGOs aim to tackle poverty indirectly by providing other forms of services such as building the technical capacity of other NGOs, government agencies, or the private sector or carrying out commissioned action research (Lewis & Kanji, 2009).

Some donors have argued for a more substantial role for NGOs in service delivery work because they are believed to possess a set of distinctive organizational capacities and comparative advantages, such as flexibility, commitment, and cost-effectiveness. However, in practice, the diversity in the NGOs community means that such generalizations are often difficult to sustain (Zakaria, 2011). While some NGOs have proven to be effective service providers (Chitongo, 2013; Enyioko, 2012; Odoom, 2021) in specific sectors and contexts, others have been found

wanting in their performance. NGO service provision is often associated with problems of quality control, low sustainability, poor coordination, etc. (Robinson & White, 1997). Increasing the role of NGOs in development services also raises several concerns ranging from the quality of services and the impact of their interventions on beneficiaries (Lewis, 2005; Lewis & Kanji, 2009).

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, conservative governments in the United States, Britain, and many other countries afterward reduced the role of government in direct service provision along with the privatization of the public sector (Hulme & Edwards, 1997). It has not only led to ethical benefits but also financial gains. Since NGOs promote and rely significantly on volunteerism, their approaches can be more cost-effective than the approaches used by the government. Increased government funding channeled through NGOs for the last two decades may not be the only explanation for exponential growth in the number of NGOs, but it has undoubtedly contributed to such manifestation, especially in the advanced economies. The Global Water Initiative (GWI), for example, is an NGO that seeks to support the sustainable and equitable delivery of potable water to vulnerable rural communities in the Upper West Region in Ghana. They have invested heavily in Ghana in collaboration with other foundations and NGOs in the country in the area of water and sanitation (Hulme & Edwards, 1997; Sarfo, 2013).

Another area of significant NGO commitment in Ghana is economic empowerment through microfinance initiatives. NGOs are non-formal providers of microcredit loans to address poverty and hunger (Adjei & Arun, 2009). Sinapi Aba Trust (SAT), for example, is one of the most prominent NGOs providing such microfinance services in Ghana by giving opportunities for enterprise development and income generation to economically disadvantaged groups in the country. Services offered by SAT include loans, savings deposits, client welfare (insurance) schemes, and non-financial services, including entrepreneurial skills, with women constituting about 92 percent of the organization’s client base. However, these services do not always reach the target people in society (Adjei & Arun, 2009; Egyir, 2013; Sono, 2013). Besides, through its economic development and agricultural interventions, WVG improves people's livelihoods through access to credit, markets, technology, and information. The Organization also provides people with microcredit training and skill development (Egyir, 2013; WVG, 2017).

An important factor in NGOs' service delivery role is participation. While scholars (Bessette, 2000; Cousins, 1991) believe that NGOs generally adopt participatory approaches in delivering their development services, Streeten (1997) and Dempsey (2009) maintain that participation does not characterize NGOs' development services. Streeten (1997) adds that participation is, at best, a slogan and not a thought-out strategy within the NGO sector. Dempsey (2009) argues that no actual democratic value such as participation manifests within the NGO sector. As cited in Odoom et al. (2018), Lugar extends the discussion by submitting that some NGOs' practices generally limit the participation of community members during the delivery of development services. Such NGOs only talk about participation in terms of informing community members to provide cheap manual labor to support the delivery of development services (Lugar, cited in Odoom *et al*., 2018). Behera (2006) states that the rhetoric of participation in the NGO sector is because of the influences from the international headquarters of NGOs and other organizations.

In essence, though service delivery is generally critical on the agenda of NGOs, there are concerns regarding the nature of participatory approaches that inform the delivery of development services. According to Bessette (2000), NGOs are better placed to use participatory approaches in undertaking their development services. A critical element of meaningful participation is participatory communication, which is at the heart of effective development communication. Bessette (2000) argues that participatory communication should be embedded in NGO operations. Bessette (2000) adds that participatory communication is a viable communication strategy NGOs need to rely on in their development services. Bessette (2000), therefore, calls for the need to support NGOs to pursue and reinforce participatory development practices within the local communities they operate in. Bessette (2000) further explains the importance of participatory communication by arguing that training should be organized for NGO workers in participatory development communication to prepare NGOs to develop and implement participatory approaches appropriately during the delivery of development services. Servaes, as cited by Odoom *et al.* (2021), argues that development communication practice is only effective when it considers the interests, needs, and capacities of all stakeholders concerned. In effect, NGOs can complement awareness creation, advocacy, and behavior change communication which they commonly use when undertaking development services with

participatory communication, scholarly communication, and social mobilization strategies to achieve their set goals (Dzisah, 2019; Odoom, 2021).

NGOs' second key role in development practice is serving as a catalyst. A catalyst is an agent that causes change. From the agent standpoint, NGOs aim to bring about change through advocacy and seeking influence and innovative ways to find new solutions to development problems (Lewis & Kanji, 2009). As cited in Lewis and Kanji (2009), Jenkins defines advocacy as any attempt that seeks to influence the decisions of any institutional elite in the collective interest of society. Lindenberg and Bryant (2001) assert that advocacy work involves going beyond implementing programs to help those in need to take up and defend the causes of others and to speak out to the public on another's behalf. Here, NGOs employ an advocacy communication approach to target leadership and the powers that be to take actions to support program objectives. Leadership includes political, business, and social leaders at national and local levels. NGOs seek to inform and motivate leaders through advocacy communication to create a supportive environment for their programs (Mostashari, 2005; Willetts, 2002). Effective advocacy communication requires changing policies, allocating resources, speaking out on critical issues, and initiating public discussion (Odoom, 2020; Servaes, 2000). Lindenberg and Bryant explained further that in the performance of duties by NGOs, advocacy focuses on clearly speaking up for policy change and action that will address the core causes of development and relief problems confronting society.

Many development NGOs play the role of 'policy entrepreneurs' seeking to influence policymaking in innovative ways to support development objectives (Najam, 1999). Najam conceptualizes the policy process as one involving agenda setting, policy development, and policy implementation. Agenda setting occurs when the issues and priorities for action are agreed upon by stakeholders, whereas policy development concerns the choices among possible alternatives and the options that are made. Finally, at the level of policy implementation, specific actions are undertaken to translate policies into practice. Najam believes that NGOs are adept at influencing decisions and events within the policy formulation processes at any of these stages. Undoubtedly, NGO advocacy is not limited to influencing government and donor policies; increasingly, it is also concerned about influencing the private sector (Lewis and Kanji, 2009). Advocacy by development NGOs may entail the use of routine political channels or more confrontational acts of protests and demonstrations. It may also involve organized meetings,

public hearings, legal action, petitions, public statements, organizing seminars, monitoring, etc. (Park, 2002). An example of an NGO which uses advocacy communication is Survival International, an international NGO based in the United Kingdom that supported the Basarwa in Botswana in their resistance to protect their right to the Central Kgalagadi Game Reserve (Lekorwe & Mpabanga, 2007). Also, the Ghana Coalition of NGOs in Water and Sanitation, together with Water Aid, used advocacy communication to facilitate the creation of a national water policy for the country (Lane, 2005). Thus, advocacy communication has been a vital approach NGOs resort in their operations. In effect, advocacy communication has become a vital approach NGOs use in contemporary development practice. However, Edwards (1993) points out that the results of NGO advocacy communication can be very disappointing. It is attributable mainly to factors such as the lack of a clear strategy, a failure to build strong alliances, an inability to develop alternative measures, and the dilemmas that often characterize NGO-donor relationships.

Another example of the NGO catalyst role is that of innovation. An ability to innovate is often claimed as a special quality, or even as an area of competitive advantage of NGOs over other institutions concerned with development, especially government agencies (Bebbington *et al*., cited in Lewis & Kanji, 2009). Though not all NGOs are into innovations, the idea that NGOs contribute new approaches to poverty reduction is not in doubt. In support of this position, Clark (1991) found evidence that NGOs' staff considerably experiment, adapt, and try new approaches to problem-solving in communities. NGOs also encourage individuals to develop their ideas, experiment and take risks to address their own needs. It is argued that NGO capacities to innovate are outcomes of the quality of the relationships that an NGO can construct (Biggs & Chambers, cited in Lewis & Kanji, 2009).

Non-governmental organizations also perform the critical function of the watchdogs to monitor organizations in order to evaluate which ones honestly abide by their policies (Najam, 1999). NGOs play this role through whistle-blower networks to unearth the failure and shortcomings of institutions that may not be abiding by either the commitment to implementation or poor execution of policies. The watchdog role may also involve an environmental scanning of the policy horizon for events and activities that have the potential to obstruct future policy

formulation and implementation. Lodge and Wilson (2006) contend that NGOs act as powerful watchdogs even though they lack formal mandate or legal backing. In essence, NGOs tend to act as watchdogs of the state by ensuring that state actors work to fulfill public interests.

A critical aspect of contemporary development policy is the creation of partnerships aimed at engendering the efficient use of scarce resources, increasing institutional sustainability, and improving the quality of an NGO's interactions with stakeholders and actors in the development context. A partnership is generally defined as a relationship based on mutually defined sets of links between two or more agencies within a development project or program. It often involves the division of roles and responsibilities, sharing risks, and pursuing joint objectives (Lewis & Kanji, 2009). It is also seen as an arrangement that draws together the resources of specified partners to create capacity and act based on a defined set of goals (Kamando, 2014). Clear roles help to ensure effective partnerships (Lewis & Kanji, 2009).

Some NGOs enter into organizational relationships to gain access to external resources that are conditionally based on partnerships. Others may enter into partnerships without careful consideration of the broader implications. For instance, new roles for NGO staff may have to be created to actualize the demands of the partnership realistically. Management systems may also be required to monitor the progress of new activities within the partnership (Farrington & Bebbington, cited in Lewis & Kanji, 2009). For example, in a study of partnerships within an aquaculture project in Bangladesh, Lewis, as cited in Lewis & Kanji (2009), found that the supposed partnerships defined in the project documents occurred between NGOs and government agencies primarily to gain access to external resources. Indeed, the partnership was not based on any kind of complementarity or functional arrangements. Although there may be a consensus among the partners in such scenarios, the lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities can often create conflicts (Lewis, 2005; Lewis & Kanji, 2009). Partners may also incur additional costs such as new lines of communications, logistical burdens, new responsibilities for individual staff, and the need to share information with other agencies (Concern's Partnership Policy Document, 2007).

Additionally, NGOs need to reconsider their communication approaches to achieve their missions seriously. In support of this position, Dzisah (2019) contends that a time has come for NGOs to look for appropriate communication strategies to generate adequate resources to

undertake development services. Dzisah (2019) adds that communication approaches such as awareness creation, behavior change communication, and social mobilization can adequately be used by NGOs for mobilizing resources for development services. The importance of behavior change communication and awareness creation to NGOs' development services has also been established by Odoom (2021).

Empirical Review

This section reviews relevant studies on NGOs' development service delivery. It generally looks at the research aims, the methodological issues, and key findings of these empirical studies. We begin this review of the literature with the assessment of Islam (2015) on the contributions of NGOs to community development in Bangladesh in a qualitative research approach using a multi-method data collection procedure. The findings showed that NGOs play crucial roles in community development and encourage community participation in development processes. In this regard, again, in Bangladesh, Kabeer *et al.* (2008) found that Nijera Kori (NK), a Bangladesh-based NGO, offered development services aimed primarily at improving the livelihoods of communities. Another study conducted by Desai (2005) revealed that NGO interventions play a critical role in empowering women, men, and households to meet their basic needs. Other roles and functions of NGOs, including counseling and support service, awareness-raising and advocacy, legal aid, and microfinance services, help build community empowerment (Desai, 2005).

Additionally, a similar study was conducted in the Central Region of Uganda to study the relevance of NGOs concerning the health, education, and agriculture sectors (Nalere, Yago & Oriel, 2015). In this case study, 87 respondents were selected using a stratified sampling technique. Using a triangulated method involving questionnaires, focus group discussions (FGDs), and interviews, key informants and documentary review were used to gather data. The researcher used the probit regression model for analysis (Nalere *et al.*, 2015). The study showed that NGOs contributed to improvements in the health, education, agriculture, and rural industry sectors in the development of the rural areas of Uganda.

Omofonmwan and Odia (2009) examined some of the community interventions of NGOs in Nigeria using purposive sampling, interviews, and observations. The authors found that NGOs in Nigeria provide development interventions in essential areas such as environment, health and sanitation sensitization and awareness, and advocacy for child rights. Similarly, a study conducted by Brass (2010) sought to examine service provision in education, healthcare, agriculture, and water by internationally-funded NGOs in Kenya. The study employed a mixed-methods approach, with in-depth interviews, case studies, and other information the researcher gathered during the researcher's fieldwork in Kenya. The quantitative aspect of the study included a survey of 500 secondary school students, while semi-structured interviews involved a sample of governmental and non-governmental services providers, government officials, and ordinary Kenyans. Brass (2010) found that healthcare, education, and agriculture interventions were central to the social contract between the Kenyan state and its citizens.

A study conducted in Nigeria by Enyioko (2012) to investigate the impact of NGOs on sustainable agriculture and awareness creation in rural areas involved a sample size of 180 participants selected randomly from beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and employees of development agencies. Basic statistical tools such as frequencies and percentages were used to analyze data. The study revealed that NGOs are very effective in sustainable rural development activities in education, health, agriculture, energy, environment and waste management, empowerment, and poverty alleviation. Matsvai (2018) also evaluated the impact of various NGO interventions on communities in Zimbabwe using primary data and descriptive statistical analysis. His results showed that NGOs play a critical role in agriculture productivity and growth in income, improved sustainability of livelihoods, and general rural development. In a similar study in Zimbabwe, Chitongo (2013) conducted a study on the impact of the development interventions implemented by the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) on beneficiaries. It was observed that CRS's programs improved productivity in livestock farming and water and sanitation in the country.

Nalubiri (2010) has explored how local NGOs and community groups act towards sustaining NGO social interventions at the community level. Using an exploratory design, Nalubiri sought to investigate why it is so difficult to sustain benefits that accrue from NGO's work. The study found that local participation, empowerment, ownership, multiple benefits, and coordination among development actors positively affect the sustainability of NGO development

interventions. Hedayat and Ma'rof (2017) have also examined the contribution of NGOs towards sustainable community development. Their study focused on NGOs' roles, functions, and programs, such as microfinance, capacity building, and self-reliance. Hedayat and Ma'rof found that NGOs' interventions improve the economic well-being of communities through job creation and income generation. It leads to economic empowerment for sustainable community development.

Muchtar (2017) studied the influence of international development interventions on women's perception of empowerment using Oxfam's *Restoring Coastal Livelihoods Project* (2010-2015) in South Sulawesi, Indonesia, as a case study. The project promoted gender equality through group economic empowerment. The researcher adopted the qualitative approach using an ethnographic design. Interviews, observation, and documentary reviews were used as instruments for data collection. Thematic analysis was used for the study. The study found that women beneficiaries perceived empowerment mostly based on their experiences with the project. The study found that the degree of empowerment depended on the nature of activities and the general understanding of gender relations.

Quaicoo (2006) conducted a study to examine World Vision Ghana's (WVG) contributions to the development of basic education in the Twifo Hemang-Lower Denkyira District in the Central Region of Ghana. The study involved 469 respondents using a mixed-method that included a survey using questionnaires, interviews, FGDs, and observation as the instruments for data collection. The study found that although WVG had contributed to improvement in educational facilities, community members believed it could have done far better than performed in terms of providing development services. Another study was conducted by Dangah (2012) on the role of ProNet, an NGO based in Northern Ghana, in providing water and sanitation for the people of the Nadowli District. The study used primary and secondary data and involved 189 respondents from five communities. The respondents were chosen using simple random and purposive sampling techniques with structured interviews and focus group discussion as data collection instruments. The study found that ProNet activities in education, water, and sanitation significantly improved the communities.

Sarfo (2013) examined the impact of Plan International's educational projects on the quality of education in the Awutu-Senya District of Ghana using a qualitative research approach. The semi-structured interviews and FGDs were used to get the perspectives of officials of the NGO and 23 members of the beneficiary communities, including school children, parents, and teachers. The study found that most of the children in Plan Ghana's assisted communities had experienced improvements in the quality of their educational experience, especially in the area of the learning environment and service delivery. However, problems like high expectations from the NGO and apathy from some community members became manifest in this study.

In the context of sustainability of development interventions, however, the contribution of NGOs has been met with mixed reactions. For example, in their study of NGOs' roles in sustainable community development in Vietnam, Hibbard and Tang (2004) concluded that sustainable rural development is process-oriented and requires extensive community participation that relies on networking to share resources and knowledge, and expertise. Contrary to the Hibbard and Tang (2004) findings, Zakaria (2011) observed that many of the development services undertaken by NGOs in places such as Savelugu-Nantong District in northern Ghana often are unsustainable. Zakaria's study used a survey design and purposive and quota sampling methods with questionnaires, FGDs, and observation guides as data collection instruments. It was concluded that NGOs in the district did not exhibit enough commitment to ensuring their interventions' sustainability.

Adjei *et al.* (2012) studied the impact of NGO-led interventions in the Tain District of Ghana using a mixed-method approach. The research involved 198 respondents using the purposive sampling technique, beneficiaries of four main NGOs: Plan Ghana, ActionAid Ghana, Rural Action Alliance Program, and Social Development and Improvement Agency. Adjei *et al.* found that although the NGOs were involved in providing social services for the rural communities, they had invested much of their funding into livelihood programs to increase productivity and household income. The authors concluded that the role of NGOs in the development service provisions is indisputable. Furthermore, Sono (2013) examined the effects of ADRA's development interventions on the livelihood of farmers in the Yilo Krobo area in the Eastern Region of Ghana using a mixed-method approach. This study relied on purposive and simple random sampling techniques to select 150 respondents using a cross-sectional design, while interviews and questionnaires were used for data collection. The study found that ADRA's

intervention contributed positively to an increase in farm sizes, rising mango output, higher incomes, and improved livelihoods of most farmers.

Odoom (2021) investigated the contributions of World Vision Ghana to community development in rural Ghana. The study focused on the Cocoa Life Project interventions implemented by World Vision Ghana in the Wassa East District. The study population consisted of mostly farmers, gari processors, soap makers, and members of village savings and loans associations from beneficiary communities were considered in a sequential-dependence mixed-method research approach. 406 sample size was chosen for the study using the stratified, simple random and convenience sampling methods, with interview schedule and focus group discussion guide as the instruments for data collection. For quantitative analysis, means and standard deviation were used, whereas the qualitative data were analyzed thematically. The study found that WVG's interventions under the Cocoa Life Project were highly relevant to education, business development, financial literacy, microcredit facilities, agriculture, and livelihood diversification within beneficiary communities. Besides, awareness creation and behavior change communication were some of the strategies WVG relied upon to promote community development in beneficiary communities. Although the interventions helped to promote behavior change, there were concerns regarding the overall change in behavior within the communities. Odoom (2021) concluded that for NGOs to have a fuller understanding of the development problems of communities they operate in, they should pay attention to appropriate development communication strategies and approaches in their operations.

Key Insights and Gaps in the Selected Literature

NGOs are important stakeholders in terms of development service provisions. Their services help to improve the lives of poor and vulnerable people in many parts of the developing world, including Ghana. NGOs are credited for their advocacy and public campaign efforts to bring about positive social transformation. NGO activities, among others, also help to ensure community improvement, poverty alleviation, capacity building, community empowerment, good governance, and environmental activism (Lane, 1995; Lewis & Kanji, 2009). As an umbrella terminology, NGO generally encompasses numerous types of organizations with a multiplicity of interests, orientation, and functional foci. NGO is also often used interchangeably

with terms such as not-for-profit, voluntary organizations, charity organizations, and civil society organizations (CSOs). These different terms used to describe NGOs reflect the different forms of NGOs operating in a given setting (Lewis & Kanji, 2009; Moyo, 2000). Again, these different terms result from the different cultures and histories that have underpinned the emergence of NGOs. NGOs predominantly operate without the influence and dictates of the state. They are not-for-profit entities that provide voluntary, charity, and altruistic services to improve the vulnerable, marginalized, and less privileged lives.

In the context of constructing a typology for NGOs, it is evident from the literature review that no unified consensus exists amongst scholars and researchers, owing mainly to the vastly divergent positions from which NGOs are theorized and conceptualized. For instance, Lane (1995) sees the types of NGOs in terms of welfare and relief, modernization, community development, and institution building; Cousins (1991) and Willetts (2002) categorize NGOs based on their orientation, level of operation, and advocacy; while others classify NGOs based on autonomy, location, and scope of activities (Gyamfi, 2010; Helen, Cunt and Sujata, 2005; Farrington, Lewis, and Paul, cited in Dugle *et al.,* 2015; Turary, 2002), and their legal status (Dugle *et al.,* 2015; Stillman, 2007). While Cousins (1991) and Willetts (2002) appear silent on the difference between operational and advocacy NGOs, Mostashari (2005) maintains that the distinction between operational and advocacy NGOs manifests mainly in the choice between small-scale change and large-scale change. Despite the differences in typologies, these authors generally agree that the over-arching aim of NGOs is to improve the lives of their constituents. Kamat (2002) and Mayo (2000) acknowledge that NGOs need to have clearly defined development objectives in order to make their activities and motivations relevant to the very people they wish to serve. Also, it should be pointed out that improving people's lives can only be done effectively through a conscious understanding of the philosophical orientations underpinning the work of every NGO. These orientations form the foundational basis for the approaches used to typify NGOs. Indeed, a clear typology of NGO is useful since it helps to appropriately delineate the limits from the objectives and intentions of NGO operations.

Moreover, it is evident from the review that the role of NGOs in contemporary development practice can be categorized mainly into three: service delivery, catalyst, and partnership (Lewis & Kanji, 2009). NGOs deliver services in many parts of the world where people lack access to several vital basic services or where such services are of poor quality, which is often the case in

many areas (Carroll, 1992; Lewis & Kanji, 2009). As catalysts, NGOs bring about change through advocacy, policies, and any other forms of influence they wield. Besides, NGOs' role as catalysts in development services is manifested in how they innovate and creatively apply modern techniques and strategies to solve development problems (Lewis & Kanji, 2009). Finally, NGOs form a partnership with a plethora of organizations in order to achieve mutually beneficial goals.

The empirical review of the literature in this paper reveals that several studies have been conducted on NGO activities and services in the development arena using different research approaches and with varying results. Using a mixed-method research approach, Islam (2015) found that NGOs play a crucial role in community development and participation in Bangladesh. The findings of Islam (2015) are in line with Omofonmwan and Odia (2009), who observed, through qualitative research, that NGOs provide several community development interventions in Nigeria. Specifically, Omofonmwan and Odia (2009) found that NGOs in Nigeria provide community development services in essential areas, including environment, health; sanitation awareness creation; and promotion of child's rights law. Similarly, a study conducted by Nalere *et al*. (2015) in Uganda revealed that NGOs' services are relevant in health, education, agriculture, and improving the industry. In a mixed-method study in Ghana, Quaicoo (2006) also found that NGO activities are critical to developing education in the Central Region of the country.

The gaps in the studies conducted by Islam (2015) and Nalere et al. (2015) potentially present challenges to a better understanding of the methodological logic that informed their studies. However, unlike Omofonmwan and Odia (2009), it is difficult to grasp the specific mixed methods design adopted in the study conducted by Islam (2015). Thus, the apparent gap in Islam's (2015) study seems to be the lack of clarity in choosing the research design adopted in the research. Again, the deficiency in the study conducted by Nalere *et al*. (2015) in Uganda lies in the over-reliance on only quantitative tools for data analysis, given the mixed method nature of the research. The use of only quantitative analytical tools in the study is problematic simply because mixed methods studies are characterized by analytical techniques that suit both

quantitative and qualitative research. Thus, it is unacceptable for researchers to undertake mixed methods studies when they intend to do only quantitative analysis.

Quaicoo's (2006) study, which was conducted in Ghana, has an inherent conceptual weakness. Importantly, Quaicoo's (2006) study failed to critically explore other aspects of development vital to the operations of NGOs. The failure to interrogate other aspects of development undertaken by NGOs hinders a broader approach to bridging the gap in theory and practice in respect of the activities of NGOs in the development sector. Another flaw in Quaicoo's (2006) study manifests in his apparent failure to clearly explain the specific mixed-method research design employed for the research. In short, there are theoretical, conceptual, and methodological inadequacies in Quaicoo's (2006) study. Nevertheless, the studies by Quaicoo (2006), Omofonmwan and Odia (2009), Islam (2015), and Nalere *et al*. (2015) corroborate the position that NGOs play a crucial role in development services.

On the issue of sustainability of development interventions, a study by Enyioko (2012) in Nigeria showed that NGOs promote sustainable agriculture and awareness creation in rural areas of the country. The study further found that NGOs effectively promote sustainable rural development activities in several sectors of the economy, including education, health, agriculture, energy, environment and waste, and community empowerment and poverty alleviation. Using an exploratory design, Nalubiri (2010) also found that local participation, empowerment, ownership, multiple benefits, and coordination, among others, positively affect the sustainability of NGO development interventions. Furthermore, Hedayat and Ma'rof (2017) established that NGOs ensure sustainable community development through job creation and income generation, whereas in Vietnam, Hibbard and Tang (2004) found that NGOs promote sustainable rural development.

Contrary to the findings of Enyioko (2012), Nalubiri (2010), Hedayat and Ma'rof (2017), and Hibbard and Tang (2004), a study in Savelugu-Nantong District of Ghana by Zakaria (2011) revealed that NGOs' development activities are not sustainable. There is no consensus in the literature concerning the kind of attention NGOs give to sustainable development practices. However, despite the importance of Hibbard and Tang's (2004) findings, it should be pointed out that their study could not adequately unearth the essential issues that confront the sustainability of such development services provided by NGOs. It is a conceptual weakness that needs to be

addressed through further studies. Beyond the conceptual inadequacies, it can be seen from the empirical review that while Enyioko (2012) provided a clear methodological framework informing the study, a similar conclusion cannot be advanced in support of the studies conducted by Nalubiri (2010) and Hedayat and Ma'rof (2017). For instance, the kind of analytical tools that informed Nalubiri's (2010) study is not clear.

Similarly, the gaps in Zakaria's (2011) qualitative study include that the questionnaire was used without any sufficient justifications. Questionnaires are purely employed for quantitative studies. Thus, using a questionnaire in a qualitative study puts the methodology adopted by Zakaria (2011) into question. Despite these conceptual and methodological weaknesses, the review has demonstrated that NGOs play a key role in the area of sustainable development.

Additionally, the studies by both Adjei *et al.* (2012) and Sono (2013) in Ghana showed that NGOs provide interventions to improve people's livelihood. However, unlike Adjei *et al*., Sono (2013) failed to provide a methodological framework that was scientifically rigorous enough for the study. Specifically, Sono (2013) failed to indicate the tools for analyzing the qualitative data. Qualitative aspects of mixed methods studies help to offer additional perspectives to complement the quantitative aspects of the research. Thus, a clear identification of the qualitative tools used helps the reader to have a deeper understanding of the findings from multiple perspectives. Based on Odoom's (2021) study, it is apparent that NGOs are active agents of community development. However, it is inherent in Odoom's (2021) study that NGOs still have work to do to understand their constituents' diverse development problems. NGOs are to rethink their approaches and strategies in defining the development needs of people. For NGOs to have an adequate understanding of communities' development problems, they serve Odoom (2021) calls for them to employ appropriate and well-planned development communication strategies and approaches. Notwithstanding the importance of his findings, Odoom's study failed to explore the views of other stakeholders, such as officials of WVG who took part in the delivery of the project. Indeed, the inclusion of other stakeholders in the study could have widened and possibly improved the perspectives of the issues examined in his study.

Again, although participatory development approaches are critical to NGOs' development services (Bessette, 2000), there are concerns about the level of participation within the NGO

sector (Dempsey, 2009; Long, 2001). More efforts need to be put in place by NGOs to make participatory approaches relevant to the delivery of their development services. Bessette (2000) argues that participatory communication approaches should be the heartbeat of NGOs' communication strategies for development. However, Bessette (2000) submits that NGOs need to be supported to pursue and incorporate participatory development practices in delivering development services. For instance, capacity building for NGO workers in participatory development communication will crucially prepare NGOs to develop and implement participatory development communication approaches to deliver development services (Bessette, 2000). NGOs are also advised to look for other approaches and communication strategies appropriate for development service provisions. Also, apart from advocacy communication, NGOs can employ awareness creation, behavior change communication, and social mobilization as strategies when undertaking development services (Dzisah, 2019; Odoom, 2021). Again, due to the dwindling funds from both local and international sponsors, NGOs are to use very useful communication approaches to mobilize funds and other resources to undertake development activities (Dzisah, 2019).

Despite the contributions of NGOs to development services, there are concerns about the operations of NGOs. It is recognized that the control of local influential persons and educated elites who mostly have political connections pose a danger to democratic management and decision-making structures (Andreasen, 2001; Myllyla, 2001). Again, the opportunistic nature of NGOs tends to hinder their capacity to deliver development services (Barr et al., 2003). NGOs have been appreciated more than the public sector regarding development service provisions despite the concerns associated with their operations. Mohan (2002) strengthens this position by asserting that given donors' market philosophy; it makes more sense to have inefficient NGOs than to have inefficient states.

Conclusions

This paper reviewed concepts, themes, and previous studies related to the role of NGOs in development service provisions and the approaches NGOs adopt. The paper has established that NGOs remain indispensable in the development discourse due to the increasing inability of the state to provide adequate development services to the citizenry single-handedly. Again, the paper tried to locate the place of NGOs in society within the context of the global recognition of

people's dissatisfaction with other development approaches. NGOs are entities whose operations are not under the manipulation and control of the state. NGOs are essentially not for profit-making, and so are their activities and services. Attempts at providing services based on voluntarism, altruism, relief, welfare, and humanitarianism have become the mainstay and underpinning motivations for NGO operations. Also, there are varying terminologies used to describe NGOs due to the diverse philosophies, cultures, and histories associated with the emergence of NGOs. Though NGOs contribute substantially to the delivery of vital development services, the foci, functions, approaches, and the means they use may differ due to the vastly multifaceted nature of development. These differences tend to inform the varying conceptualizations and typologies of NGOs. It is noteworthy that various factors, including areas of operation, functions, service provision, intermediary, and advocacy, influence NGO typology, and classification. Besides, NGOs' development services are predominantly in essential areas such as education, agriculture, health, water and sanitation, and employment creation.

NGOs also provide microfinance, financial literacy, livelihood diversification, and governance services. Despite the contribution of NGOs in development service provision, there is a lack of consensus on the issue of NGOs' commitment to the sustainability of their interventions. More so, the infiltration of local influential persons and educated elites with political connections coupled with the opportunistic nature of some NGOs constitutes a major threat to the overall effectiveness of NGOs in development service provisions. Further, there are concerns with regard to the nature of participatory approaches NGOs employ in the provision of development services. It is not surprising because participatory development communication has not received adequate attention within the NGO sector.

Moreover, there are theoretical, conceptual, and methodological gaps in the literature concerning NGOs' activities and strategies. As a recommendation, NGOs are encouraged to pay increased attention to communication approaches such as participatory communication, scholarly communication, social mobilization and awareness creation, advocacy, and behavior change communication. Besides, NGOs are called upon to deeply reflect on how they can use communication approaches and strategies as vital tools for achieving their set goals. Effective use of relevant communication approaches and strategies by NGOs can help them mobilize

enough resources for development services. Finally, more studies need to be conducted from different perspectives using appropriate methodologies to bridge the gap between theory and practice in the NGO sector. It is only through such means that the continuing relevance of NGOs in development services can be firmly established.

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Land Administration: Securing Limited Resource with Skyrocketed Demand in Shashemene City of Oromia Regional State, Ethiopia

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Abstract

This study aims to assess urban land administration practices in the study area. The study has applied a multi-stage representative sampling technique to achieve this objective. The researcher has employed a descriptive research design, and both quantitative and qualitative methods were adopted. The study used 137 systematically selected sample households from four sampled kebeles. The primary data was collected from the municipal city officials and experts, focus group discussions participants as well as households by the researcher with the help of enumerators, and secondary data was collected from rules and regulations, documents concerning land and property registration system, different documents on good governance principles and official records. Five (5) key informants from sectorial offices concerning urban land administration were interviewed. The researcher has also organized two focus group discussions having six (6) purposively selected participants in each group comprising the residents of Shashemene city. The cumulative findings revealed an absence of transparency on land administration-related issues and a problem of responsiveness in the study area. Finally, the study recommended organizing meetings to take complaints as input, setting clear and uniform work procedures based on the study's findings.

Keywords: Land, Responsiveness, Urban Land, Land Administration, Good Governance

Introduction

An effective and efficient land administration system is vital for the government to manage land-related issues. In a land administration, different stakeholders raise the concepts of beneficiaries, the interaction of informal and legal framework, stakeholders involved in, the right decision-makers, and usage, utilization, transfer, and inheritance of land (Palmer et al., 2009). On the other hand, global factors like sustainable development, environmental sustainability, globalization, rapid urbanization, economic reform, and technological advancement have necessitated the adjustment of various land administration policies and models by governments (Williamson, 2001). Besides, the issue of urban land administration (hereafter ULA) becomes arguable in the current global agendas and gets recognition by international organizations like World Bank and United Nations (UN) in framing sustainable urban development (Berhanu *et al*., 2015).

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Urban centers or cities in Ethiopia struggle with the increasing demand for land for different urban development purposes, making the urban land delivery process a critical land policy matter (Lindner, 2014). Good governance in land administration is also the foundation for achieving good governance in society. However, to have successful good governance in land administration, FAO (2007) argues that there should be a need for commitment and participation from all the stakeholders involved. The statement aligns with the good governance principles, which require proper organizational arrangements and public interventions in the decision-making process.

Many countries, including Ethiopia, have poor land administration mainly due to incompetent and ineffective land institutions (UN Habitat, 2012). Having fast population growth and increasing land demand with limited capacity to administer urban land impedes the development of a city. Thus, as good governance is the backbone for city development, it is interesting to investigate the practice of urban land administration with the principles of good governance with special reference to transparency and responsiveness in the study area.

Shashemene is one of the vibrant cities in which many socio-economic activities take place, making the city to play a significant role in the development of the region and the country. As the center of multiple business attractions, the city grows fast in physical size and population. As a result of rapid population growth and rural migration to the city, many problems emerged like infrastructure problems, rent-seeking, unlawful land transaction, and land-holding that require the city administration to match its service providers with the change of demands (Compass AEPED, 2015).

The issue of lawmaking is the business of government alone. Even though the proposed law affects the lives of Ethiopians, the concerned bodies and stakeholders are rarely consulted. Ethiopia's legal framework on urban and rural land was introduced, and differentiating urban land from rural began in the 1970s by enacting proclamation number 47/1975 to nationalize all urban lands and extra-urban houses. Since then, Ethiopia has administered urban land with various legal systems and institutions, and many proclamations were repealed and replaced successively.

The Ethiopian legal system gives the right to administer land to both federal and regional governments. However, considerable autonomy over the land administration system is given to the regional governments. Regional governments try to incorporate and adjust the federal land policy and apply it according to their respective land tenure systems and socio-economic context. Regional governments lay down specific and varied provisions via their proclamations and legal framework despite the federal governments' general land policy guidelines and legal frameworks. Devolution of power to subsidiary sovereign bodies provides an opportunity and flexibility in adjusting such provisions. The land policy and lawmaking process in the three government regimes (Imperial, Derg, and EPRDF) is minimal (Berhanu A., 2015).

The existing legal frameworks include proclamation number 455/2005 (issues related compensation), proclamation number 721/2011 (urban land administration/lease law), and proclamation number 818/2014 (urban land registration). In addition, there are regional constitutions, laws, regulations, and directives of regional governments.

The FDRE constitution under Article 40 stipulates the exclusive ownership rights of rural land, urban land, and natural resources by the state and the people of Ethiopia. State ownership of land is acknowledged due to the assumed fear that private ownership of land will lead to the absorption of land in few people's hands, leading to the eviction of the poor landholders and frustrating landlessness.

According to the FDRE constitution, urban land is administered by the urban land leasehold law, established in 1993 and amended by Proclamation Number 80/1993, 272/2002, and 721/2011. Other proclamations govern urban land administrations like Proclamations No.574/2008 and No. 818/214. The legislation and proclamations aimed at facilitating good urban land administrations. However, the empirical study reveals that the practice of urban land administration in Ethiopia is at its worst stage (Y. Bekele, D. Kjosavik, 2016).

Though there are studies conducted on urban land issues in other parts of Ethiopia on land policy (Daniel B, 2011), tenure security (Hussein 2004 and Wibke Crewett et al., 2008), land rights, and land certification (Daniel W.2013 and Zemen, 2013), there is dearth attention on urban land administration practices including Shashemene city of Oromia Region. However, the transparency and responsiveness in the urban land administration from the good governance dimension at the local level of Shashemene city on the issue is yet to be studied. Thus, this study

focuses on the practices of urban land administration from the lens of two variables of good governance - transparency and responsiveness.

The general objective of the study is the assessment of urban land administration practice in Shashemene city of Oromia Regional State, and the specific objectives of the study are to examine the transparency in the accessibility of urban land information to the general public and to assess urban land development and management office's responsiveness to the demands.

Review of Related Literature

Land continues to cause social, ethnic, cultural, and religious conflict. Many wars and revolutions have been fought over land rights for many centuries. Throughout history, all civilizations have devoted considerable efforts to defining land rights and establishing institutions to administer these rights, i.e., land administration systems.

Basic Concepts Related to Urban Land Administration

Land Management

According to United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE, 1996), land management is the procedure by which we manage the resources of land effectively that includes both environmental and economic perspectives of land resources. Burns and Dalrymple (2008) also associate land management with the activities on the land and natural resources, including such activities as land allocation, use planning, and resource management. Generally speaking, the following issues fall under the umbrella of land management:

a) Property transfer, including decisions on mortgages and investment
b) Property assessment and valuation;
c) The development and management of utilities and services;
d) The management of land resources such as forestry, soils, or agriculture;
e) The formation and implementation of land-use policies;
f) Environmental impact assessment; and
g) The monitoring of all activities on land that affect the best use of that land (UN-ECE, 1996).

Land management allows everyone to understand land tenure, land value, land use, land development, how land administration institutions relate to the historical circumstances of a country, and policy decisions (Enemark, 2012).

Transparency

Bell (2007) defined transparency based on how institutions tried to improve information sharing within and between the agency and clients and how it tried to reduce rent-seeking breaks in facility provision. Transparency necessitates decisions and actions to be taken openly and the prevalence of adequate information to be assessed by any concerned body whether relevant procedures are followed or not (Gloppen *et al.*, 2003). Transparency is a critical component of a well-functioning land administration, particularly given the scarcity of clear and credible information on land availability and transactions and the poor dissemination of public information on land rights and policies.

Transparency plays a pivotal role in building trust, legitimacy, and powerful strategy to empower people. People only claim their rights if processes are transparent enough to understand them and have access to information, enabling them to participate in different arenas (UNDP, 2006).

Responsiveness

Responsiveness is a mechanism in which a power holder or decision-maker recognizes the demands of individuals or particular groups and responds to them properly (Gloppen et al., 2003). Furthermore, UNDP defines responsiveness as how development agents - both private and public - observe the will and need of the people and respond to the people's requests (UNDP, 2006). Public policy formulation, decisions, and implementation must be according to the will of the people and expectations by exemplifying satisfactory responses. It means that good governance necessitates institutions and processes of government to serve all stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe (Oviasuyi *et al.*, 2010).

Rule of Law

The FDRE constitution intended to establish a political community based on the principle of the rule of law. The main actors who participate in the draft of the constitution even show their effort to establish a constitutionally limited government by including a constitutional provision which stipulates that "any law, customary practice or a decision of an organ of state or a public official

which contravenes" constitutional provisions is ineffective (FDRE Constitution, article 9(1)). As one basic principle of good governance, the rule of law indicates a fair legal framework enforced without bias and consistent constitutional procedures (Oviasuyi *et al*., 2010). The rule of law is apprehending observation in which agents develop confidence and put up with the rules of society. The prevalence of the rule of law indicates protection of property rights, enforcement and implementation of the law, eradication of crime and violence, and peaceful resolution of disagreements (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2008). According to Palmer et al. (2009), land policy and administration should be done by elected representatives with consultation with interested and affected parties. Democratically elected politicians must approve the plans designed for land use after dealing with the public effectively.

Effectiveness and Efficiency

The land administration system should be efficient, effective, and competent. According to FAO (2007), effective and efficient administration formulates policy and implements it efficiently by delivering services of high quality. Effective and efficient land administration makes the work accurate and timely with inquiries being answered within a reasonable period; competent persons can undertake it. The programs and projects designed by the government must be committed to the benefit of the community within the guidelines of good governance principles - effective and efficient use of resources. Processes and institutions must produce results that meet the needs of the people by using resources efficiently and effectively (Oviasuyi *et al*., 2010).

Equity

Equity means fairness and impartiality deals with individuals and groups and delivers non-discriminatory benefits and services (Palmer et al., 2009). Land administration services should be provided for all without discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, religion, age, or political affiliation. For the prevalence of the principle of equity, the same service with the same standard must be accessed by all individuals independent of their political and economic status. Customers must be served as per the principles of first come, first served without undermining the interest and benefit of others (Bell, 2007). The notion behind the application of equity is moral equality in which people are treated in a principled manner.

Importance of Good Governance in Land Administration

Since sustainability includes social, economic, and environmental issues in the decision-making process, the concept of governance has become controversial. However, the debate continued in various disciplines (Olowu, 2002). Even though the concept of governance is complex, it refers to the worth of the public delivery system, and on the other hand, it deals with the development of a proper institutional framework in the political dimension (Sheng 2010). Urban land administration, according to FAO (2009), is described as the process, rules, and structures in which land-related decisions concerning the right to use land, how decisions are implemented and enforced, and how challenging interests in urban land are managed. It also deals with the state structure concerned for urban land, legal and policy frameworks, practices governing land transactions, inheritance, and conflict resolution mechanisms.

The growing maladministration practice in urban land administration necessitates the importance of governance in urban land. In many developing countries, corruption is linked to weak governance, and having power over land is a means of controlling political and economic power and privilege. Moreover, weak urban land administration is associated with the increasing insecurity level of property rights and corruption in the administration systems (FAO, 2007).

There is empirical evidence that supports the above statement. The studies conducted by Burns and Dalrymple (2008) in developing countries have witnessed that cities cannot provide affordable urban land in sufficient quantities, particularly for the urban poor, because of the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of land management. They pointed out that a weak institutional and legal framework will affect the poor in particular and may leave them to be marginalized.

Urban Land Policy and Administration

The place of land in social, political, environmental, and economic dimensions is central in every society. It is also fundamental to the level of urbanization, economic prosperity, and social stability of a country. The land is positioned at the hub of human culture and institutions, which is pivotal in producing all goods and services directly and indirectly. The land's fundamental feature is its fixed supply and immobility. Hence, land property right is essential for economic growth and poverty alleviation. According to Deininger et al. (2003), to afford incentives for

investment and sustainable resource management, to smooth the progress of the low-cost transfer of land and credit access, the right to land should be secured and well appropriately defined in a country. Thus, discussing urban land policy is essential to assess urban land administration.

Land policy is a formal government declaration and its target and strategy on land use, administration, and distribution. It also describes the political adjustments regarding the division of power and interests on land among the government and people. The land policy aims to attain equity, promote investment, reassure land developers, and foster cultural and environmental sustainability. It is not only for promoting security and social stability but also serves as a foundation for economic growth. To make the land policy effective, it needs various institutional arrangements to smooth the progress of land administration activities and land information management. Urban land policy is multifaceted and varied in different countries, as revealed by theoretical and empirical evidence (Doebelej, 1987). The primary debate on urban land policy is instigated on the issue of private versus public ownership of land. Deininger and Chamorro (2002) argued that the private ownership of land is well thought-out as convincing; however, the real incident shows an unenthusiastic result. On the other hand, public land ownership was fashionable, for instance, in numerous former socialist countries in the 1960s and 1970s (Hong and Bourassa, 2003 and Nega, 2005). The experience of many countries reveals that state ownership of land, on the other hand, is characterized by underutilization of resources, mismanagement, and corruption (Deininger, 2003).

The land rent will increase proportionally according to the people's demand for more land. One of its distinctive features of land demand is the exclusive determinant of land value that manipulates the effective administration of land on its value, the amount of price paid periodically for the exclusive rights of land and other resources. The economic rental fee is the foundation revenue for the community with no impact on the economy's productive potential. Land rent captured by the community enhances efficiency and equity in land administration. Land rights benefit from creating income rapidly and being more accessible to administer than betterment taxes, land re-adjustment systems, or universal possession dues. As to George E. Peterson (2006), many urban areas in China have funded half or more of their urban facilities investment directly from land leasing while borrowing against the value of the land on their

balance sheets to finance much of the remainder. The same is true in Ethiopia since land is owned publicly, and land leasing is considered the primary municipal revenue source.

The value of land is affected by many factors. One of the major factors includes the physical attributes of the land, including the quality of location, lots of sizes, landscape, access to basic social services and infrastructures, and environmental features. The other factor includes land administration regulations like the type and amount of taxation, zoning and building laws, planning, and restrictions. Moreover, there are social factors such as population growth or decline, changes in family sizes, typical ages, attitudes toward law and order, prestige, and education levels. Lastly, economic forces include value and income levels, growth and new construction, vacancy, and availability of land.

Land Lease System in Ethiopia

Currently, the land is described constitutionally as state-owned. The FDRE constitution states that the right to ownership of both urban and rural land is given to the state and people of Ethiopia, which facilitates the acquisition of land through a leasehold system. The land lease system is important for attaining effective land use planning, enhancing investment and investors, and getting back land from the leaseholder at a needy time. Holding land as public ownership is advantageous as land value increases; it is easy to allocate land to the community and additional use in the future.

In order to determine the value of urban land in Ethiopia and foster investment in business, residential or other purposes, many proclamations and regulations have been established. Many studies have been conducted on the land policy in Ethiopia (Alebel and Genanew; 2007a; 2007b, Yusuf 2009; Belachew, 2010; Zemen, 2013; Zelalem, 2014) and make out gaps, inconsistency, and ambiguity in the urban land lease regulations as well as the constraints and challenges that impede their effective implementations. Almost all of these studies are employed by qualitative data and review of documents which open rooms for debate since they are qualitative and subject to individual judgments. However, careful quantitative studies on the issue of the urban land system are carried out by Alebel and Genanew (2007a; 2007b) by using lease auction data to analyze investors' willingness to pay for a plot of land in Addis Ababa for the period 1994/95 – 2002/03.

Among the various proclamations of urban land lease systems of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 80/1993 is the primary proclamation. Next to this proclamation, the government endorsed Proclamations 271/2002; and 721/2011 in 2002 and 2011, respectively. The enactments of these proclamations are not only constitutional foundations, but also they have economic and social goals in their effective implementations. The objectives of these proclamations are to attain sustainable economic growth via suitable land administration, which is transparent, responsive, and efficient to the skyrocketing demand for land. Ensuring a free-market economy, responsive, transparent, and accountable land administration systems are the targets of these proclamations. The effective implementation of the proclamations can be tested in fostering investment (economic growth), housing and infrastructure (equity), revenue collection (capital mobilization), regulated expansion, and restricting the informal expansion of cities (social objective).

The land lease policy is objectively adjusted for the common interest and development of the people to use the right of urban land. Hence, the lease system is projected to overcome the urban development challenges in the country. Empirical shreds of evidence show that lack of affordable and decent houses, unemployment, infrastructure such as water supply and sanitation, and poor waste management are some of the major urban challenges in Ethiopia (World Bank, 2015). The leading cause for these key urban challenges includes land management, administration, and municipal finance (*ibid*).

The lease system should practice transparency, responsiveness, and accountability to prevent corruption and maladministration in the land delivery system. To do so, public interest should be a priority as an important element of lease policy to guarantee rapid urban development and equitable benefits of citizens.

The contents of regulations like the scope of application, property rights related to transfer, mortgaging, compensation, and associated duties, ways of acquiring new development land, manner of fixing rates and modalities of lease fee payment, and duration of lease period have a direct attachment with its practical implementation. For example, Proclamation No 721/2014 stated that the grace period is determined based on the type of development or service of the plot of land as well as the conclusion of the lease contract and completion of the construction period.

Furthermore, the same regulation also stated that a leaseholder might transfer his/her leasehold right or use it as collateral or capital contribution to the extent of the lease amount already paid. He can transfer prior to commencement or half completion of construction. However, based on the level of urban development and sector of development activity or the type of service, the year of urban land lease may differ. For example, residential plots have 99 years lease period, 70 years for the industry, 60 years for commercial use but business-like urban agriculture has only 15 years lease period.

The different proclamations are enacted with different objectives. For instance, Proclamation No. 80/1993 indicates that the regulation is being applied only to urban land permitted to be held by lease and does not include urban land held through other means before, which creates uncertainty. However, the issue has been addressed by the enactment of Proclamation No. 272/2002 by stating that any urban land held by the permit system, the leasehold system, or by any other means prior thereto should be under the lease system. More to the point, the same proclamation tried to congregate the skyrocketing demand for land, unfair allocation, and manage illegal settlements. The issues that are not enclosed by the above two proclamations are addressed by Proclamation No. 721/2011. The regulation stated that any urban land which has not been under the leasehold system is allowed to be held only via the lease system. The proclamation's goal is to encourage uniformity of the old possessions with the new ones.

In Ethiopia, the policy and institutional arrangement of the land acquisition system for investment include three modes of land access: rent from a private source, leasehold, and public allotment (Proclamation No 721/2011; Regulation No.14/2004; Regulation No.4/1994; Regulation No.3/1994). According to World Bank (2012) study, land allocation is the second most area of corruption in Ethiopia following customs services. The most corrupt activity in the land sector occurs at the implementation stage, suggesting that the level of corruption is influenced by how policies and legislations are formulated and enforced.

Material and Methods

Research Design

In this study, the researcher has employed a descriptive research design based on the ground that it helps to describe the current status of good governance practices in urban land administration of the municipality under study.

Research Approach

The researcher has employed qualitative and quantitative research approaches to fulfill the study's objectives. Qualitative research is used to answer questions about the complex nature, often to describe and understand the phenomenon from the participant's point of view, alongside quantitative research data.

Sampling Technique and Procedures

The researcher applied multi-stage sampling techniques. At the first stage, purposive sampling was used to select the Oromia region due to its rapid expansion of investment and industry compared to other regions. At the second stage, the researcher selected West Arsi Zone purposively owed to its immediacy and portion of outlet for other adjacent areas. At the third stage, Shashemene city was selected by its center of business and investment compared to other surrounding West Arsi Zone. Finally, from Shashemene city, four Kebeles were selected based on the land-holding mechanisms - predominantly high informal land transaction namely Abosto (4,464 Households [HH's]), Arada (3,384 HH's), Buchana (3,372 HH's), and DidaBoke (3,387HH's).

The sum of 14,607 households was considered as sampling frames of the study. Thus, the researcher uses the sample size determination formula developed by Jeff (2001) to determine the total sample size for this study.

$$S = \frac{x^2 NP(1-P}{d2\ (n-1)+x^2 P\ (1-P)}$$ Where:

S = required sample size.

X^2= the table value of chi-square for 1 degree of freedom at the desired confidence level (3.841).

N = the population size.

P = the population variability (assumed to be 0.10 since the population is homogeneous in terms of geography, similar social class, and similar economic activity (cash economy) as the urban economy is monetized economy).

d = the degree of accuracy expressed as a proportion (0.05).

When this formula is applied to the above sample, we get

$$s = \frac{3.841x14{,}607x0.1x(1-0.1)}{0.05^2\ (14{,}606)+3.841x0.1x(1-0.1)} = \frac{5049.49}{36.86} = 137$$

On the other hand, to determine the number of the sample (respondents) in Agosto kebele (n1), Arada kebele (n2), Bulchana kebele (n3), and Dida Boke kebele (n4); the following formula better helped.

Thus, n1 = S (N1/N) and hence

n1 = 137 (4,464/14,607) = 42

Similarly, n2 = S (N2/N), which is

n2 = 137 (3,384/14,607) = 32

n3= S (N3/N) which is

n3= 137 (3,372/14,607) = 31

n4= S (N4/N) which is

n4= 137 (3,387/14,607) = 32

Sample respondents were selected through a systematic sampling technique. The study uses both probability and nonprobability sampling designs. Probability sampling was used to select respondents for the questionnaire. From the probability sampling design, systematic sampling was used. Nonprobability sampling was used to select the key informants for the interview and focus group discussion participants.

Data Type and Source

The researcher employed both primary and secondary data. The sources of primary data were sample household respondents, head of Shashemene Urban Land Development and Management Office (hereafter ShULDMO), FGD participants, ShULDMO officials, and experts and secondary data sources have been collected from written materials including books, journals, articles, good governance principle documents, land and property recording document, government's policy and strategy documents, proclamations and regulations that were relevant to this study.

Data Collection

The primary data were gathered using structured questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, and focus group discussions.

Questionnaire: The study has designed structured questionnaires and converted them to a local language - Afan Oromo for easy understanding. The researcher employed data collectors; hence, four enumerators were trained for two days and employed for eight days to collect the data. A criterion for selecting enumerators was educational background (more than 10+2 grade).

Key informant Interview: The type of interview employed in this study was a semi-structured interview. Based on the non-probability sampling method, the researcher selected five (5) key informants, based on their position and work experience. Hence, the head of ShULDMO and four (4) officials were interviewed.

Focus Group Discussion: The researcher has organized two focus group discussions with the residents in the selected sample Kebeles. The number of individuals that participated in each focus group discussion was six (6) and selected purposefully.

Results and Discussion

This part devotes to the presentation, analysis, and discussion of the data collected from the sampled respondents through questionnaires' interviews, focus group discussion, key informants, and written documents. The data are presented in tables and graphs and analyzed using numbers, percentages, and descriptive statements.

Response Rate

The respondents were divided into households residents, and officials treated using questionnaires, FGD, and interviews. The total questionnaires being distributed for those households were 137. Out of the total questionnaires distributed for households, 129 respondents returned the questionnaire with their responses on time. The rest eight (8) respondents did not fill out and return the questionnaires. The response rate to the questionnaire distributed was 94% (129/137x100).

Furthermore, the interview was successfully conducted with five (5) key urban land sector officials. Moreover, two FGDs were arranged with residents from sampled *kebeles* by having six (6) participants in each group.

Accessibility of the Institution's Information to the Public

The land sector must be part of global trends towards fairness and openness and strive to develop sound and transparent administrative systems (UN Habitat, 2013). Transparency is one of the major principles of good governance, which enhances trust between the service delivering institution (ShULDMO) and the customer in accelerating effective urban land administration. Transparency promotes the openness of the democratic process through reporting and feedback, clear processes, and procedures. It is a management method where nearly all decision-making is carried out publicly (Enemark and Williamson, 2003). The transparency in the office of ShULDMO, accessibility of information, the openness of the office on its decisions, and clarity on the administration of urban land-related aspects were analyzed and presented hereunder.

Accessibility of Information

Good governance requires that land information systems provide relevant, accurate, and affordable land-related information to the public and that land administration services are accessible, affordable, and sustainable, as suggested by Burns and Dalrymple (2008). Policies, rules, and regulations can be effective within any specific governmental or non-governmental institution when an adequate institutional capacity exists. To assess this issue, the researcher tried to pinpoint the accessibility of land information of the city under study.

Table 1: Perception of Respondents on the Accessibility of Information

Description	Response	n	%
Information flow is free and direct and to those who be affected by the decisions	Strongly Disagree	22	17
	Disagree	66	51.2
	Neutral	15	11.6
	Agree	19	14.7
	Strongly Agree	7	5.4
	Total	**129**	**100**

Source: Own Survey Data, 2016

Table 1 above deals with the accessibility of information on land to the people/customers to enquire whether the information was accessible to those who will be affected by decisions. Respondents and FGD participants replied that the information was not open to them. From the cursory look in Table 1 and the views of FGD participants, we can understand that information was not freely and directly accessible to the stakeholders. Thus, it affects the overall administration of the urban land.

The Openness of the Office on Decisions

There are different types of decisions that might pass on urban lands, such as land delivery, land acquisition (who gets what), and areas for what purpose should be reserved. According to Figure 1, respondents were asked whether the office is open to land delivery and land acquisition decisions. The majority of respondents and key informants said that decisions made on the land and land-related property were publicized to the residents and concerned bodies; however, it is difficult to say the correct information was disseminated at the right time.

FGD participants likely confirm a lack of clear information on decisions made by the land administrators. Thus, the lack of key information in land administration is a significant obstacle for a further efficiency increase, as suggested by MoUDHC (2014). Hence, problems were found in the study area, especially with the information on the size of the land and reserved areas for different purposes.

Figure 1: Openness of the Office to its Decisions



Source: Own Survey Data, 2016

Transparency on Administration of Urban Land

For urban development projects, the basic obstacle is the lack of sufficient data. The reasons for this can be technical, personal, or institutional. Procedures for acquiring land must be transparent and open to all stakeholders (UN Habitat, 2012). The clarity of land administration procedures will help customers quickly identify the steps they pass to acquire land, which will remove the ups and downs in getting land-related service.

Table 2: Transparency in Urban Land Administration

By taking the above concept as a base, the clarity of the procedures for acquiring land was one of

Descriptions	Response	n	%
Procedures for acquiring land is clear to all stakeholders	Strongly Disagree	5	3.9
	Disagree	21	16.3
	Neutral	14	10.9
	Agree	85	65.9
	Strongly Agree	4	3.1
	Total	**129**	**100.0**
The size of land to be allocated is clear to all	Strongly Disagree	5	3.9
	Disagree	14	10.9
	Neutral	10	7.8
	Agree	93	72.1
	Strongly Agree	7	5.3
	Total	**129**	**100.0**

Source: Own Survey Data, 2016

the questions raised to assess the office's transparency in its activities. Thus, the survey result shows that most of the responses indicated that the procedures for acquiring land were clear to all stakeholders. In connection with the clarity of urban land administration, Arko *et al*. (2010) argue that getting land must be transparent and open to all interested parties. To know the office's transparency concerning the size of land to be allocated by the municipality, data collected on whether the size of land to be allocated is clear and precise or not? It shows the presence of clear information on the size of land. FGD participants and key informants also confirmed the same. Thus, based on the above data, we can understand that there is an understanding among the respondents on the size of the land to be allocated.

Knowledge on the Frequency of Land Delivery

As shown in Table 3 below, the survey result reveals that the time of land allocation was not clear to all stakeholders. The same question was delivered to FGD participants to cross-check the reliability of data collected through the questionnaire, and they replied that there were times

when the land was given in an irregular schedule in which no one was aware. Thus, it can be inferred from the above discussion that there is a gap in informing society about the time for land allocation from the municipality side. The absence of periodic (fixed) time for land allocation may cause maladministration, which affects the practice of good governance.

Table 3: Knowledge on Time of Land Allocation

Description	Response	n	%
The time of land allocation to the public is clear to all	Strongly Disagree	26	20.2
	Disagree	73	56.6
	Neutral	10	7.8
	Agree	18	14.0
	Strongly Agree	2	1.4
	Total	**129**	**100.0**

Source: Own Survey Data, 2016

Clarity of procedures related to land acquisition, land size to be allocated, and time for allocation of land simplify the practice of good governance in urban land administration. Generally, according to the survey results, procedures for acquiring land and the size of land allocated by the office were clear to all. However, the time for land allocation is not uniform and clear to all. There is a time when land is given arbitrarily without a formal schedule, which opens the door for malpractice in the study area.

Enforceability of Decisions

There should be good work in service delivery, legislation, rules, and regulations to improve land administration service. The laws and regulations should be integrated, consolidated, and updated (World Bank, 2007). In a democratic government, decisions should be made and enforced following the rules and regulations to ensure the practice of good governance. As Table 4 portrays, the survey result reveals that decisions were not taken and enforced under the rules and regulations by the study area's land development and management office.

One of the main duties and responsibilities of ShULDMO is ensuring the delivery of efficient, transparent, and equitable services; however, according to data from household respondents and FGD participants, they are not executing under rules and regulations. FGD participants support the above idea by stating that most of the time, decisions were made in a way that would benefit

the administrators, and there was also partiality in giving service to the stakeholders. For instance, during valuation, the same land size was estimated differently. Those with a relationship with the decision-makers and their relatives get target areas with low prices and protected green areas are given to business people and relatives of higher officials. Hence, corruption and favoritism cut the path of exercising rules and regulations.

Table 4: Enforceability of decisions in the ShULDMO

Description	Response	n	%
Decisions are taken and enforced in accordance to the rules and regulations	Strongly Disagree	22	17.1
	Disagree	69	53.5
	Neutral	9	7.0
	Agree	24	18.6
	Strongly Agree	5	3.8
	Total	**129**	**100.0**

Source: Own Survey Data, 2016

Institutions Responsiveness to the Needs and Preferences of the Society

In applying the principle of responsiveness, Urban Land Development and Management Office shows poor performance, and the result of the study reveals that there was no assessment of needs and preferences of society in the study area, which in turn results from loss of confidence in administration and absence of participation in the overall administration of urban land.

Table 5: Needs and Preferences of the Society

Description	Response	n	%
The office of urban land administration assess the needs and preferences of stakeholders	Strongly Disagree	14	10.8
	Disagree	82	63.5
	Neutral	6	4.7
	Agree	12	9.3
	Strongly Agree	15	11.7
	Total	**129**	**100**
Implementation of decision is according to the needs and preferences of stakeholders	Strongly Disagree	26	20.2
	Disagree	79	61.2
	Neutral	4	3.1
	Agree	12	9.3
	Strongly Agree	8	6.2
	Total	**129**	**100.0**

Source: Own Survey Data, 2016

The organized and unbroken methods should be accustomed since people's desires are vigorous (Adisalem, 2015). It is important to know the needs and preferences of the people to give priority

to which they give more attention (UNDP, 2006). However, the survey result indicates that the office does not prioritize the needs and preferences of people. Most of the key informants also indicate that there is a gap in identifying the needs and preferences of people on the city-wide distribution of coble stone due to financial constraints. Furthermore, the FGD participants argued on this issue and identified the absence of assessment of stakeholders' needs and preferences.

Incorporating different needs and preferences of people into plans and projects will not be the only matter, but its implementation should be according to these needs and preferences (Oviasuyi *et al*., 2010). Table 5 above indicates that a significant number of respondents replied that the implementation of the office is not in accordance with the needs and preferences of the people in the study area. However, a plan or policy is well based on its implementation; even a fascinating plan's effectiveness depends on its implementation. Participants of the focus group discussion also present that they were not satisfied with the exclusion of their needs and preferences since the office makes plans and projects by undermining people's real needs and preferences.

Timeliness and Appropriateness of Response

Figure 2 below presents the responsiveness of the office, and it discloses how the office gives a timely and appropriate response to the demands of society. In the FGD, participants expressed that they presented their demands to the office, but the office did not use it as input and failed to give a response to their demands on time. So from this, it can be concluded that the people in the study area are not getting a timely response and appropriately to their claimed demands, and most of the residents were not satisfied with the response given by the ULDMO.

Figure 2: Appropriate and Timely Response of the ULDM Office



Source: Own Survey Data, 2016

The responsiveness of a given institution can be evaluated in terms of the timeliness of the response given to people's demands, but this is not the only issue to be evaluated. However, the appropriateness of the response given is also an essential factor to consider (Gloppen et al., 2003). According to data obtained from FGD participants to get holding right on land-related property service, for example, after buying a house, it may take up to 2-3 years on average. However, in the study area, the office of ULDM was not giving an appropriate and timely response to the demands of people.

Responsiveness of the Employees to Their Customers

Employees of ShULDMO were not quick to respond to their customers due to the absence of getting into their job on time, unwillingness to serve society, and lack of appropriate response to the customers. The result in Table 6 reflects that most respondents, 104 (80.6%), replied as they did not believe that there were no responsive servants. They provide their reasons as follows: Firstly, the employees did not give a response on time; secondly, they did not get into their office on time, thirdly, they did not give an appropriate response, and lastly, they were not willing to serve the people. From this result, it can be concluded that the employees were not responsive to people. Discussion with FGD participants also verifies the absence of responsive employees in ShULDMO.

One of the important problems of the employees as identified by household respondents and FGD participants was a failure to give appropriate answers and the absence of the workers in getting to their office on time. Thus, if they do not give a response on time, get to their office on time, do not give an appropriate response to the demands of the customers, and added to this if they do not have the willingness to serve their customer; it is difficult to give a timely and appropriate response. It implies that the office does not have responsive workers. As a result, respondents in the study area did not have confidence in the office.

Table 6: Responsiveness of the Employees

Description	Response	n	%
There are responsive	Strongly disagree	15	11.6
Officers in urban	Disagree	89	69
land administration	Neutral	3	2.3
	Agree	17	13.2

	Strongly Agree	5	3.9
	Total	**129**	**100.0**
Reasons for Unresponsiveness of ULA Officers			
They did not get to their office on time		29	23
They did not give a response on time		37	29
They did not give an appropriate response		21	16
They are not willing to serve the people		17	13

Source: Own Survey Data, 2016

Key: *Multiple Answers were possible; the percentages calculated for the unresponsiveness of ULA Officers do not add up to 100%.*

Effective Complaint Handling Mechanisms

Public confidence may be enhanced if there is independent oversight of the complaint system and if the public can take complaints to an independent body (FAO, 2007). Customers have the right to claim and complain whenever they are dissatisfied with their service. However, there was no effective complaint handling systems in the study area.

Therefore, problems related to urban land administration should be solved on time to have good land administration (Arko *et al*., 2010). If complaints are not solved on time, people will not be satisfied with the office's service, which will affect the administration of the urban land. Then, people will tend to act out of the law because they believe that they will not get a timely response even though they present their complaints to the concerned body. FGD participants agreed on the absence of an effective complaint handling mechanism. However, most key informants deny and argue that they are trying to solve complaints. Due to the limited capacity of the office in terms of professional human resources, they failed to solve the complaints on time. It is inferred from the above discussion that a weak grievance redressing mechanism exists in ShULDMO.

Mechanisms to Get Feedback from the People

Ministry of Urban Development and Housing Construction stated that it would be unreasonable to expect the cities continued to report on the growing number of meetings and groups. Instead, it could be more beneficial to establish a general standard for meetings and other opportunities for citizens to air their views (MoUDHC, 2014). Figure 3 portrays that about 75.2% of the

respondents believe that the office has a suggestion box while the rest, 24.8% of sampled respondents, said 'No'. In addition, the researcher observes the presence of a suggestion box during the field survey. The study result indicates that the office has a suggestion box. Nevertheless, the difference in the response of the respondents may come from the critical observation of the respondents, the level of individual respondent's familiarity with the office working environment, i.e., the more he is close, the more he will identify.

By supporting the above idea, key informants and FGD participants mentioned the presence of a suggestion box in the office premises. The key informants explicated the most important problem witnessed about the issue of a suggestion box. Some of the problems were improper usage and lack of awareness about the suggestion box from the customers' side. As per the study result, most customers never use this box either due to lack of awareness or could not find out the location of the suggestion box. Contrary to this, some customers put unnecessary information upon the individuals (workers) in connection with their cases out of the issues of workplace place, opined by key informants.

Figure 3: Distribution of Respondents Awareness about Usage of Suggestion Box



Source: Own Survey Data, 2016

FGD participants also verify the existence of a suggestion box, but no one dares to use it according to their discussions. The reason is by saying; first, they doubted whether the office takes that suggestion as an input or not. Secondly, they fear to inform malpractices since they require their service and assume that might result in denial of appropriate service. Thirdly, as such, there were no suggestion boxes. Owing to the reasons mentioned, clients remain silent to use the suggestion box.

Major Findings

Good governance plays a pivotal role in enhancing the effective utilization of scarce resources in any nation of the world. The researcher tried to assess the practices of urban land administration of the area under study based on the study's objectives. Transparency is one of the major principles of good governance, which enhances trust between the service delivering institution and customers in accelerating effective urban land administration. To access transparency in ShULDMO; accessibility of information, the openness of the office on its decisions, and clarity on the administration of urban land related questions were analyzed, and the major findings were presented here as follows:

According to the survey result, ShULDMO executes its daily activity as usual. Precise, clear, and uniform standardization in their daily activities, procedures for acquiring land, and the size of land allocated by the office are found with minor challenges. However, time for land allocation is not uniform and clear; information does not freely and directly flow to those who will be affected by decisions. Decisions made by the office were not open for the majority of the customers. Thus, there is a lack of transparency (openness) from ShULDMO in serving its customers.

The responsiveness of an organization/office can be tested by how the office/organization responds to customers' demands timely and appropriately. In applying the principle of responsiveness, Urban Land Development and Management Office performed poorly, and the result of the study revealed that there was no assessment of needs and preferences of the people as customers in the study area, which in turn results in loss of confidence in administration and absence of participation in the overall administration of urban land. In the study area, the office was not giving an appropriate and timely response to the demands of customers. Additionally, employees of ShULDMO were not responsive to their customers. Customers have the right to claim and complain whenever they are dissatisfied with their service. Concerning this, however, there was an absence of effective complaint handling systems in the study area.

Conclusions

The analysis shows that urban land administration in the study area was generally weak and surrounded by a growing number of challenges. In the study area, the day-to-day activities and services related to the land and land-related property were not transparent and not clear to the public, and ULDMO was unresponsive to the community's demands and failed to handle customers compliant effectively. Although participating in urban society within urban activities is an important factor for city development, the involvement of the local community inland and land-related issues was less in the study area.

Recommendations

Based on the results, the following possible solutions as recommendations are forwarded to different levels of decision-makers, potential researchers, and ShULDMO in the study area. The study found no transparency (openness) from ShULDMO in serving its customers. Therefore, it is vital to enhance transparency in urban land administration to effectively and efficiently use scarce (land) resources. The actions suggested for ShULDMO in this regard are the followings:

- ✓ To ensure transparency ShULDMO should encourage citizens to participate in the service delivery to harness the service delivery process.
- ✓ Since the city is experiencing a fast rate of urbanization, a suitable institutional system needs to be in place to provide appropriate incentives for domestic investment, a governance system for accountability in determining the land-use type, and inland sales revenue utilization.
- ✓ Publicizing information on the notice board regularly and, using the website, preparing meetings and conferences.
- ✓ Rules governing land allocation must be clear to all stakeholders before allocating the land, and there should be a consensus on it.
- ✓ Time for land allocation must be informed to the people by giving prior information/announcements about the meetings and preparing and circulating notices, banners, and broachers and disseminating to the society and follow up is also mandatory from the community.

The findings revealed the poor performance of ShULDMO in applying the principle of responsiveness. Therefore, corrective measurements should be taken into account, including the following possible suggestions:

- ✓ There should be room for complaints that comes from society as input.
- ✓ The needs and preferences of the society should be assessed and incorporated into plans, and its implementation should be according to society's demand.
- ✓ There should be a strict controlling and evaluation system for employees.
- ✓ Shashemene City should transform from its heavy dependence on land sale revenue to modern taxation.

Data Availability

The data used to support the findings of this study are included in the article.

Financial Declaration

The College of Social Science and Humanities of Dilla University, Ethiopia, partially provided the financial support for this research work.

Conflict of Interest

The author declares that there is no conflict of interest and is responsible for any conflict of interest that may arise.

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Parents' Perception Towards Ending Girls' Early Marriage in Uyui District, Tabora, Tanzania

Angela Mcharo Jesse*

Abstract

Early marriage is a global problem facing most countries, including Tanzania and other developing countries. The government and other organizations, including Civil Society Organizations (SCOs), have made different efforts to end early marriages in different regions in the country. Despite the efforts made, the problem persists in some of the regions in Tanzania, including Tabora, where the study was conducted. The theory of change developed by Girls Not Brides was used to show the importance of parents in ending the early marriage. Thus, parents were the unit of analysis. The study employed a qualitative approach with little support of quantitative data where descriptive statistics were obtained. The study found that most respondents (74%) were not aware of marriage laws. The study also found that parents' perception in ending girls' early marriage was related to cultural upholding (norms and values) where the fornication and giving birth at the parents' homes were prohibited. Another finding was that girls were taken as a way of solving economic problems in the study area. The study recommends that the community be given awareness and appropriate education on the impact of girls' early marriage on their physical and psychological condition. The community should also be trained on intrapreneurial activities to improve their economic status. It will enable them to take care of their families and stop using their daughters as assets. The marriage laws should also be mainstreamed to all levels of the government and the communities to ensure that all people know them.

Keywords: Early Marriage, Marriage Laws, Parents and Perception

Introduction

Early marriage is a global issue affecting children, most specifically girls. Early marriage results in many effects, including death, dropping out of school, and psychological trauma (Goli *et al.*, 2015), specifically to girls. Despite the impact, different works of literature show that most communities believe that early marriage protects from early pregnancy and fornication to a girl

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child (Malhotra, 2010; Mahato, 2016; WHO, 2018). Different governments address early marriage within and outside the nation and other public and private institutions as it is perceived as among child violence (Schlecht *et al.*, 2013; United Nations, 2014). Early marriage is when a girl or a boy is married at the age where she or he is not capable of shouldering social and physical family issues happening to marriages and bearing and raising children (Plan International, 2021). According to the World Health Organization (2013), early marriage is when a girl or a boy engages in marriage before 18 years old. Among other developing countries, Tanzania is said to have the highest prevalence rate of early marriages in the world (United Nations, 2014). Tabora is among the three regions with a high early marriage prevalence with 58% (ibid). It has to be understood that young girls who are married off are more likely to have children while they are still physically immature, which puts them at a higher risk of dying from pregnancy and childbirth complications (WHO, 2018). Thus, early marriage is termed as child violence because it deprives of the rights, including the right to education, child protection, right to live, right to play, and right to participate in decision making (URT, 2008; Yüksel-Kaptanoglu & Ergöçmen, 2014). Thus, practicing girls' early marriage is one of the hindering factors to implementing the Child Development Policy of 1996.

Based on the disadvantages of early marriages, different national and international institutions have made different efforts to end girls' early Marriage. For instance, a hunger project established in Bangladesh was making campaigns to end an early marriage after realizing that it is causing physical, psychological, and mental effects on young girls (Ame, 2013). In addition to this, an article "preventing early pregnancy and poor reproductive outcomes among adolescents in developing countries" was published by the WHO to motivate and educate people on the implications of early marriage, specifically to girls who are most affected (Svanemyr *et al*., 2012). In Nigeria, CSOs such as Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs) have played a significant role in fighting against early marriage, specifically for girls (Amzat, 2020).

Different efforts to end early marriage were also made by Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and the Government of Tanzania, where they aimed to end an early marriage by 2030 (United Nations, 2014). In this line, more than 25 CSOs established a network to end early marriage in Tanzania. Moreover, different rules and regulations have been formulated to curb the situation. The established rules and regulations include: The National Plan of Action to End Violence against Women and Children 2017/18-2021/22, which addresses the issue of ending child

marriage; the Government developed a National Plan of Action on FGM/C and Child Marriage 2018; Gender and Children desks have been established in 417 district police stations in Tanzania. Child-friendly courts and child protection committees have also been established at the district and ward levels. Tanzania's Child Development Policy (2008) acknowledges that marriage at 15 deprives a child of his or her rights.

Despite the efforts done by the government and different organizations, including CSOs, towards ending the early marriage, the practice is persisting in the country. Different studies have been done to know how different groups in the community perceive early marriage. For instance, the study done in Indonesia by Susilo *et al*. (2021) reveals that society perceives early marriage to avoid social sanctions of fornication, being pregnant out of wedlock, and solving economic problems. Another study found that child marriage is associated with social beliefs where marriage is considered an instrument to acquire social status in the local community (Schaffnit *et al.,* 2019). In the same line, the adolescent's perception of early marriage was related to gender, age, level of parents' education, and the number of siblings (Duraku *et al*., 2020). In relation to this, Biswas *et al*. (2020), in their study, found that adolescence perceives early marriage as a social phenomenon of adulthood and being ready for marriage; poverty resulted in children dropping out of school and engaging in adult responsibilities, including getting married; and a dream of forming individuals' family. However, information on how parents perceive ending the early marriage was minimal whereby; studies including Agege (2018) suggested the importance of finding the information on parents' perception of early marriage. It being the case, the study strived to fill the gap by finding out how parents perceive the ending of girls' early marriage in the study area. It is because, family as a primary institution, has a significant role to play to curb the situation. After all, it is where children are raised, socialized, and equipped with informal education, including the impact of engaging in marriage acts at a tender age (Livesey, 2010; Berger and Font, 2015; Pope, 2016). The findings of this study may bring forth the knowledge to the Ministry of Health, gender, elderly, and children on the parents' understanding of the children's rights and how they implement them based on how they are stated in the revised Child Development Policy, 2008. The study also provides knowledge on dealing with factors limiting parents in ending early marriage within communities.

Moreover, the findings of this study add different strategies for implementing Child Development Policy for the benefit of the future generation. This study's findings also provide insights for educational providers to prepare relevant content based on the situation, which can positively assist in ending girls' early marriage within family levels. It has to be noted that all people in the community have a role in ending girls' early marriage within communities, as suggested by the Theory of Change on Child Marriage. The fighting against the social evil of early marriage will start at the family level and be extended to the whole community by adopting a systematic approach.

Theoretical Framework

The Theory of Change guided the study on Child Marriage developed by Girls Not Brides. The Girls Not Brides is a global partnership of more than 350 civil society organizations in more than 60 countries (Atim, 2017). The main aim is to end an early marriage and enable girls to fulfill their potential (Javel & Mughal, 2020). The theory points out that there is no single solution to ending child marriage and that everyone has a role to play. It also explains that efforts to address child marriage must respond to local contexts because of the people's different cultures. In the same line, different organizations involved in ending an early marriage through different programs and investments should take different forms in implementing their activities (Girls Not Brides, 2021). Different studies also proposed the theory of change on child marriage to end early marriage (Atim, 2017; Javel & Mughal, 2020). They propose that different actors, including parents, communities, health providers, education services, religious leaders, local and national government, and international organizations, should end the problem of early marriage (Atim, 2017).

Given that other organizations and the government have played a role in ending early marriage, the theory was used to determine the parents' perception at the family level. Finding out parents' perception also discloses how parents perceive the process of ending girls' early marriage and provide ways of engaging them. It is because parents have a huge role to play in ending early Marriage by cooperating with other actors.

Materials and Methods

Description of the Study Area

Tabora region is located in the mid-western part of Tanzania on the central. The region shares a border with the Shinyanga region in the North, Singida region in the East, Mbeya and Rukwa regions in the south, while the western border is shared with the Kigoma region (URT, 2015). According to URT (1998), the name Tabora originated from Matoborwa, meaning sweet potatoes, which was a staple food for Nyamwezi people who form the large population of Tabora. Visitors could not pronounce the word Matoborwa; instead, they called it Tabora, which later came to be known as Tabora. According to the 2012 Tanzania National Census, the population of Uyuni District was 396,623 (Census (PHC), 2012; URT, 2015). The rationale for selecting this area was because the district is among the areas with a large percentage (58%) on the issue of early marriage in the country (UNFPA, 2017).

Research Design

The study employed a cross-sectional research design where data was collected at a single point in time. According to Setia (2016), in a cross-sectional study, the investigator simultaneously measures the outcome and exposures in the study participants. In this study, the cross-sectional research design is used to assess parents' perception towards ending girls' early marriages in the study area. The study adopted a mixed approach (qualitative and quantitative). The qualitative approach took a more significant part of which respondents had to explore their concerns through open-ended questions in the questionnaire and a checklist. According to Palmer & Bolderston (2006), the qualitative approach is designed to understand people and the environment they live in and their culture and norms. This is because it provides the opportunity for the participant to explore what is happening in their context based on the issue in the investigation. On the other hand, the quantitative approach deals with collecting and analyzing numerical data for statistical analysis (Bhandari, 2020).

Sampling Procedure/Techniques

The study used probability and non-probability sampling procedures in which purposive sampling procedure was used to select key informants who were Community Development Officers, District and Ward Education Officers, District Executive Director (DED), Ward Executive Officer (WEO), and Village Executive Officers (VEO) and Village Chairpersons.

Purposive sampling techniques allow the researcher to generalize the population that has been selected and studied; however, it is highly prone to biases (Sharma, 2017). Snowball sampling techniques were used to select (23) parents in the Uyuni district council who gave a hand in marriage to girls under fifteen years old. Through the snowball technique, the researcher can easily find the respondents, and it is cost-effective, but only a small number of people will be reached because the technique is applied to the population with the same trait (Levine, 2014).

Purposive sampling was used to select 1001 parents who had girl children in the study area. Then a simple random sampling technique was used to get (100) respondents, 10% of the identified parents. Etikan *et al*. (2016) explain that the purposive sampling technique is helpful in selecting participants based on their qualities. Therefore, the selected respondents had to have girl children as they were the target population. The selected number was due to the nature of questions of which, most of which were open-ended questions that allowed the respondents to give out what they knew on the subject matter. The collected information was predicted to be homogeneity, implying that the population/data/results may be similar because the population shares similar cultures and traditions (Jager *et al*., 2017). Simple random sampling is used to discern smaller sample sizes from a larger population and research and make generalizations about the larger group. It is one of several methods statisticians and researchers use to extract a sample from a larger population (Depersio, 2018). Simple random sampling can be performed through the table of random numbers and the lottery method. In this study, the lottery method was used to select the study's respondents.

Methods and Tools for Data Collection

The face-to-face interview has different advantages to a researcher where the interviewee's voice can be heard. It is easier to learn body language, intonation, and increasing social interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee (Opdenakker, 2006). The method was very useful in this study because it provided a chance for the researcher to see the respondents' reactions based on their perception of ending early marriage. In this research, face-to-face interviews were used to collect the primary data from both parents and the key informants. The questionnaire with close and open-ended questions was used to collect information from the parents.

In contrast, a checklist was used to gather information from the key informants: Community Development Officers, Ward Executive Officers, Village Executive Officers, Education

Coordinators at the Ward Level, and Village Chairpersons. The qualitative data was recorded for triangulation with quantitative data.

Data Analysis

Content analysis was used to analyze qualitative data obtained from the key informants and respondents, specifically those obtained through open-ended questions. The process involved in the content analysis were: transcription of the recorded data; returning the transcribed data to the participants, specifically the key informants for verification; coding process; creating categories with the like codes; and reading carefully and establishing the cases. On the other hand, data obtained through closed-ended questionnaires were analyzed using Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) version 20, where descriptive results including frequencies and percentages were obtained to support the qualitative data.

Results

Awareness of Early Marriage and its Impact on Girls

Results on awareness of early marriage show that most respondents (73%) understand that early marriage is when a girl is married below the age of 18. Although they did not mention any regulatory framework, their explanation is based on the Sexual Offences Special Provision Act, adopted in 2017, which enlightens that the appropriate age of a girl to be married is 18 years old. On the other hand, 27% of the respondents understand that early marriage is when a girl gets married below the age of 15. Most of them explained that when a girl reaches puberty, she is ready for marriage. For example, one of the respondents said,

"To me, when a girl reaches the puberty level is a grown-up person already, and she is ready to get married, I also got married the year I finished standard seven" Respondent 83, Isenga Village, Ufulimwa Ward, June 2020.

Another respondent said,

"When a girl is grown up and is able to bear children is supposed to be in her husband's houses based on our traditional values" (Respondent 67, Isenga Village, Ufulumwa Ward, July 2020).

The statements from the respondents were also supported by the key informants who said;

"*Most parents in this area do not see the importance of helping their little girl reach their dreams. What they tell them when they reach puberty is that 'now you are a grown-up person, you need to get married' is sad though……*" (Key informant 2, Ufulumwa Ward, July 2020)

Table 1: Awareness of Early Marriage

Variables	Age	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Understanding of	at 18 years	73	73
Early Marriage at 15 years		27	27
	Total	100	100

Sources of Information on the Understanding of Early Marriage

Most of the respondents who fall in 73% in Table 1 said they learned about early marriage through mass media and seminars. Others said they learned about early marriage when they attended pregnancy cases handled at the ward level. Others said that they learned when they were at primary schools. For instance, one of the respondents said,

"*I heard about early marriage when I escorted my neighbor to the Ward offices where a man impregnated a girl while she was in standard six. When the Ward Executive Officer explained, he mentioned that impregnating a girl under the age of 18 was a huge mistake that led someone to jail. Through that incident, I knew that a girl is not supposed to get marriage below the age of 18*" (Respondent 26, Isenga Village, Ufulumwa Ward, June 2020).

In supporting this, some of the respondents and key informants reported the following:

"*There are different seminars conducted in this area regarding the issue of early marriage and their impacts through organizations such as TGNP, Mass Medias, and community meetings conducted by community development officers. The same issue is also taught in primary and secondary schools that most communities have attended. Therefore, practicing early marriage by the majority in this community is not related to lack of knowledge but hardship related to the economic situation and relying on traditions"* (Key informant 3, Ufulumwa Ward, July 2020).

Parents Understanding on Marriage Laws

Results show that very few respondents (26%) understood marriage laws where most of them mentioned the Law of Marriage Act of 1971, where a boy is eligible to marry at the age of 18 years old while a girl can marry at the age of 15 years old. The current laws that allow a girl to marry when she is 18 years old were not mentioned. For example, one of the respondents said,

"A fifteen-year-old girl is a grown-up person, and she can get married even the laws of our country allow that" (Respondent 39, Isenga Village, Ufulumwa Ward, June 2020).

Table 2: Parents' Understanding of the Marriage Laws

Variables (%)	**Groups**	**Frequency**	**Percentage**
Understanding on the law	Yes	26	26
	No	74	74
	Total	100	100
Sources of Information	Mass Medias	75	75
	Meetings	25	25
	Total	100	100

The remaining percentage (74%) of the respondents, as shown in Table 2, does not know any documented law which guides marriages. This was supported by most of the key informants in the study area; for example, one of the key informants said,

*"Majority of parents do not know the laws guiding marriage. To them, a girl is ready for marriage when she reaches her puberty stage. However, we collaborate with Civil Society Organizations including Non-government organizations and Faith-Based Organizations to provide education on the National laws which allow marriage at eighteen years and above specifically at schools" (*key informant 3, Isenga Village, Ufulumwa Ward, June 2020).

When responding on the issue of understanding laws guiding marriage issues, one respondent said,

"There might be some government laws, but I do not know any" (Respondent 26, Isikizya village, Ufulumwa Ward, June 2020).

Another respondent said;

"I do not think if we need any law to guide us on the issue of marrying our children, if a child is ready for marriage, she has to go to start her family. What we need to do is to find a responsible man for her" (Respondent 32, Isikizya village, Ufulumwa Ward, June 2020).

Parents Perception in Ending Early Marriage

The parents' perception in ending the early marriage was related to the factors which hinder the process of fighting against early marriage for girls, including cultural upholding (avoiding the issues of fornication and giving birth at parents' home), poor economic condition, number of family members, early pregnancy and children's desire of having their own families.

Cultural Upholding

Most of the respondents explain that, based on their culture, it is a shame for a girl to give birth at her parent's home. When this happens, parents are being blamed for their failure to raise their children in a desirable manner. For instance, one of the parents from Isikizya village explains,

*"Based on our culture, a girl is supposed to get married as soon as she reaches her puberty level because she can easily engage in a relationship with men and get pregnant at home. It will be seen as a loose parent when this happens, and it is a shame to the whole family." (*Respondent 24, Isikizya village, Ufulumwa Ward, June 2020).

The information was also supported by the key informant from Ufulumwa Ward, who said,

Most of the parents in this area believe that they are already adults when their children finish standard seven. So if they keep on holding them at home, they will start having affairs with different people, so the only solution is to marry them out (Key informant 1, Ufulumwa Ward, June 2020).

Poor Economic Condition

Parents' perception of ending an early marriage is also related to the economic situation. Based on most of the respondents, ending an early marriage can make their life difficult economically

because they get money through bride price and economic support from the sons-in-law. One of the key informants reported,

"*Majority of parents marry their children at the age of 13-14 years in order to get bride price which will boost their economic conditions as well as reducing the burden of taking care of a large family" (*Key informant 2, Isikizya village, Ufulumwa ward, June 2020).

The information was also supported by one parent, who said,

"My family is too big to take care of so many children; when a girl has grown up, she has to get married and reduce the number of people. Besides, I am blessed with many girls, so I may be lucky that those who marry them can take us out of this poverty" (Respondent 21, Isikizya village, Ufulumwa Ward, June 2020).

Another informant said,

"Most of the people believe that when a girl is married to a man who is rich, then the whole family will automatically be out of poverty life, so when a girl is capable of giving birth can be married at any time…" (Key informant 9 Ufulumwa Ward, July 2020).

Children's Desire of Having Their Own Families

Some of the parents had perceived children's desire to be free from their parents through having their own families as the issue that hinders the process of ending an early marriage in their area. In elaborating this, one of the respondents said;

"Most of the discussions of our children when they meet is having a family. This is also portrayed when they play where others act as mothers and others like fathers with their children. So, when they reach the puberty level and finish standard seven, they end up in marriage. Others go to secondary schools, but they drop out and get married or because of pregnancy." (Respondent 4, Ikenga village, Ufulumwa Ward, June 2020)

Early Pregnancy

Parents also perceive early pregnancy as a hindrance to ending the early marriage. According to them, most children do not even understand the owners of their pregnancies. At the last moment,

they are being forced to get married to whomever they mention to avoid shame within the family. When elaborating, one of the respondents said,

"*These children nowadays are highly attracted to good things like chips, good clothes, shoes, and others. In this case, they are forced to engage in relationships to get money to buy items of daily use that they like and anything they want because parents do not provide them with everything they need. As a result, they end up getting unwanted pregnancies and other sexual diseases. Most parents force their children to go to people who impregnated them the moment they realize that their girls are pregnant*" (Respondent 13, Isenga village, Ufulumwa ward, June 2020).

Discussions

Awareness of Early Marriage and its Impact on Girls

In assessing parents' awareness of early marriage, respondents were asked to respond on their understanding of early marriage to specify the age at which they think a girl is ready for marriage. Later, the respondents had to explain the answers they provided. Table 1 revealed that most respondents understand that early marriage is when a girl below eighteen (18) is given out for marriage. Those in this understanding are based on the different regulatory frameworks, including the Sexual Offences Special Provision Act, adopted in 2017, which enlightens the appropriate age of a girl to be married in 18 years. Because at this age, a girl is capable of taking care of herself and her family since she is mature and can address challenges that may arise in marriage. Also, marriage at the appropriate age (over 18) decreases the occurrence of some health problems to women, such as maternal mortality rate, since their pelvic muscles are ready to give birth. This statement is supported by Nour (2010), who reported that marriage before 18 years has many effects on girls' health, such as the increased risk for sexually transmitted diseases, death during childbirth, obstetric fistulas. Other studies reveal that getting married at a young age leads to psychological problems and suffering because a little girl or boy cannot make rational decisions regarding critical issues, including conflicts (Abdul *et al*., 2018).

On the other hand, results in Table 1 show that few respondents understood that early marriage is when a girl is married below 15 years old. According to them, when a girl reaches puberty, she is a grown-up person and ready to marry. Some of them pointed out that they experienced the same as they got married when they finished standard seven. It implies that understanding a grown-up

or attaining a girl's maturity differs from community to community. Those who term early marriage as when a girl can be married before reaching the age of 18 rely on traditional beliefs towards a grown-up person, which is different in many cultures within and outside the country without considering the act's consequences. Different literature explores that a girl who is married at a younger age (under 18) is more likely to die during childbearing or birth than a woman married at the age of 20 years and above, experiencing complications of childbirth including obstetric fistular and hemorrhaging, contracting HIV and other sexual diseases (USAID, 2012; Jones *et al.*, 2014; Jones *et al.*, 2015). Based on the literature, it is important for different communities, especially parents, to understand the impact of getting married at a tender age and end it for the betterment of their girls' future.

The findings of this study also reveal different efforts made by different organizations, including the government, to make the community aware of the impact of girls' early marriage. One of the key informants mentioned TGNP, mass media, and some of the topics taught at the primary and secondary schools, which dealt with fighting girls' early marriage. Therefore, the key informants associated the practice of early marriage with the hardship of life and relying on traditions. The explanations of the key informant were also related to the clarifications that poor living conditions of people accelerate early marriage in the study area. The provided explanations are also supported by different studies, which show that most of the poorest girls in Tanzania are getting married before the age of 18, and most of them are second or third wives (Jouhki & Stark, 2017; Stark, 2017). This implies that there is still the presence of communities that terms their girl children as assets or ways of solving their economic hardship. This situation needs to be taken care of by the responsible organizations to ensure that children's rights are being taken into consideration and the girls are assisted to reach their future dreams. This is when the theory of Change on Child Marriage developed by Girls Not Brides needs to be applied where every individual, including parents, should have a role to play in ending girls' early marriage. It has to be understood that when family, specifically parents, fail to take care of the children, they create sufferings in their future. Based on this study, giving a hand in marriage to a little girl for any reason is not what a parent should do because it affects the future life of a child.

Parents Understanding on Marriage Laws

Parents' understanding of marriage laws was investigated by asking them whether they know the guidelines on marriage issues based on the established laws of the country. Results in Table 2 show that most respondents did not know the laws guiding marriage issues in Tanzania. Based on the Law of Marriage Act of 1971, a boy is eligible to marry at the age of 18, while a girl can get married at 15. However, this law was amended on 8 July 2016. The High Court of Tanzania ruled out Sections 13 and 17 of the Law of Marriage Act, where the minimum age of marriage for girls was changed to 18 years as those of boys. This Law of Marriage Amendment information was not in the respondents' minds as they were based on the Marriage Law of 1971, which allows a girl to be married at 15. For example, one of the respondents pointed out that the law allows a fifteen-year-old girl to get married as she is already a grown-up person. The statements from the respondents provide evidence in practice of old laws of 1971 that gives the room for parents to give a hand in marriage to the girls at their young age.

In the same line, the Marriage Act of 1971 also provides other restrictions that many parents violate when allowing and forcing the children to get married because of their economic situation. For example, a section in the Marriage Act of 1971 says, *"No marriage shall be contracted except with the consent, freely and voluntarily given, by each of the parties thereto"* (The Marriage Act, 1971). The violation of this restriction is proved in the research conducted by Abebe (2014), who found out that many girl children are forced to get married. The very reason for forced marriage is for the security of their families, specifically to get rid of the economic crisis. Based on the education system in Tanzania, a fifteen-year-old girl is supposed to be at an ordinary level in secondary school; therefore, giving a hand in marriage to a girl under eighteen years old is denying her right to education. In this case, there is a need to enforce the established sanctions for those violating the marriage laws and make sure that communities are informed on the laws and consequences that can result when the laws are being violated.

The findings of this study reveal that some of the parents do not consider the age of the girl child before giving her out for marriage. The key informant explained that some of the children were married the moment they reached their puberty level. This is even worse because some girls reach puberty at the age of nine. According to (Faqua and Rogol, 2013), a girl can reach puberty from 8 to 14 years old. Marrying a girl at this age is dangerous to her mental and physical health.

The ignorance of people is also linked to other laws. For example, the Local Customary Law (Declaration) order, GN279 of 1963, allows each ethnic group to follow and make decisions on marriage issues based on its customs and traditions. This clause is particularly relevant to early marriage since communities have the power to apply their own traditions without breaking statutory laws. The community has to understand the consequences of giving a hand in marriage to a girl at her tender age. It is vital to abide by the laws of marriage, which provide a reasonable age for boys and girls that is 18 years old. At this age, a girl can be expected to be mature to handle family issues, including bearing children.

Parents Perception in Ending Girls Early Marriage

Parent perception in ending girls' early marriage was associated with cultural upholding (avoiding the issues of fornication and giving birth at parents' home), poor economic condition, number of family members, the desire of having own families, and early pregnancy. These are among the factors that hold back the whole process of fighting against early marriage to different communities.

Cultural Upholding

Data revealed that different information on fighting against early marriages to girls had been provided to many communities through mass media and seminars. Besides the communities taught at primary and secondary levels, however, most parents are still acting based on what their culture (norms and values) direct them. In other words, ending an early marriage can be considered intransigence with their culture as it can lead the little girls to engage in fornication and give birth at their parents' home. This was observed during the discussion with the parents, who explained that they marry their little girls to prevent them from engaging in a relationship and getting pregnant as it is against their tradition. Giving birth at parents' homes is a shame, and the whole family is termed irresponsible. The study done by Wilda (2020) revealed community culture as a hindrance to ending girls' early marriage. It implies that ending girls' early marriage can be possible when the community is able to know the consequences of marrying girls at their tender ages. This is when the community learns to practice traditions that lead to positive results

and abandon those harmful practices, including girls' early marriage, resulting in physical and psychological effects.

Poor Economic Condition and Big Families

Poor economic conditions and a large number of family members have been related to how parents perceive the whole process of ending early marriage. Most of the respondents term their girls as the solutions to their dire economic situation and a way of reducing the number of family members. When a girl is married, the parents benefit from their sons-in-law. At the same time, early marriage is among the ways of reducing the number of dependents to take care of. Based on the respondents, if they fight against girls' early marriage, they will always remain with their economic hardship. The respondents' thinking is supported by the study done by UNICEF (2015), which reported that parents always feel that a young girl is an economic burden and therefore wish to marry their young daughters before they become an economic liability. Another study done by Abebe (2014) reveals that people are aware of the negative impacts of early marriage but continue to practice it because of various reasons, including security for the future. This shows that female children are taken as assets by other families. As a result, a child is forced to get married to anyone who can support the family. Marrying young girls limits them from being able to decide on what is right for their life as well as failing to defend themselves where they should be. It also shows that children are less or not being protected and supported because what is in the parent's mind is the situation they are facing, not what might happen to a child getting married at a young age. This shows the importance of informing the community on different livelihood activities based on their environment, improving their sources of income. Because of that, they will focus more on the importance of education to children rather than marrying them. The study shows the importance of informing the community on children's rights as stipulated in the Child Development Policy of 1996, which was revised in 2008. Among the mentioned children's rights are the right to education, the right to be protected, and the right to participate in decision-making. Doing so can bring the best insight into implementing the Marriage Act and Child Development Policy of 2008.

Early pregnancy

Early pregnancy is one of the factors perceived as a hindrance to the process of ending an early marriage by parents where lust was mentioned as a source of it. This was found when parents

pointed out that most girl children like good items in their day-to-day life like cloth, food (chips), shoes, handbags, and others that their parents can hardly afford to buy for them. This results in early pregnancies being changed into forced marriages where the girls are sent to the men who impregnate them. According to some of the parents, the girls themselves sometimes hinder the efforts of fighting against early marriage. Studies were conducted by WHO (2011), Hidayana *et al.* (2016), and Baatse *et al*. (2018) show that early pregnancy is the most cause of early marriages in many communities, specifically in developing countries. This is because girls are being forced to follow men who impregnated them because, to many African countries, having a child at home is taboo. The situation creates much confusion, especially for a girl when she falls into the hands of a man who had no intention of marrying her. In the end, a girl is mistreated, and sometimes they are married as second wives (Hidayana *et al.*, 2016). In this scenario, a parent celebrates that a child is married while a pregnant child is physically, mentally, and emotionally suffering in a man's house. The government and other organizations need to introduce forums within communities to educate children on issues of self-understanding and the effects of engaging in a pre-marital relationship at a tender age.

Children's Desire of Having Their Own Families

The research findings revealed that most of the children in the study area prefer to be free from their parents' bondage by starting their own homes at a young age. This tendency is accelerated by the way they are being raised. One respondent provided examples of phrases that pollute young girls' minds, such as *'you have grown up, you need to get married' or 'I will find a good man for you.'* This implies that parents impact the actions of their children through the different words and comments they provide to them. Other respondents also added that having a family is among the issues discussed by children, especially those that have reached puberty. This is also portrayed when they play where others act as mothers and others like fathers with their children. In that situation, when a man approaches her for marriage, the girl gives in and ends up getting married or pregnant. Others go to secondary schools but drop out and get married or because of pregnancy. The study conducted by Biswas et al. (2018) revealed that fulfillment of romantic and erotic desire and the dream of forming own family by the adolescents hindering the efforts of fighting against girls' early marriage. This implies that serious measures, including impacting

positive thought teaching the girls on self-realization on their future basis, will enable them to meet their dreams.

Conclusion and Recommendation

Conclusion

The study concludes that providing education on the impact of girls' early marriage on their physical and psychological being can be among ways of changing parents' perception in ending an early marriage, which is currently related to cultural upholding, poor economic condition, early pregnancy, and the girls' desire of having their own families at a tender age.

The study also concludes that empowering the economic conditions of communities can be among the ways of motivating parents to fight against girls' early marriage in the study area. This study also proves that parents have a significant role in ending an early marriage with the support of other organizations. Thus, ending an early marriage is a cooperation of different actors (the government, civil society organization, and families) as stipulated in the Theory of Change on Child Marriage developed by the organization called Girls Not Brides.

Lastly, mainstreaming and enforcing the marriage laws to all levels of the government and the community will be among the ways of enforcing the issue of ending girls' early marriage to communities that are still practicing it.

Recommendations

The study recommends that the government and other organizations, including CSOs, increase efforts to educate communities on the impact of early marriage and enforce the established laws, specifically those dealing with marriage issues. Health specialists should be included in providing scientific impacts of early marriage to children and specify the appropriate age where a girl is legally and medically matured to take marriage responsibilities, including childbearing and enduring difficulties resulting from marriages. This should be implemented to the population which is yet to understand the impact of forcing their children into early marriages.

There is also a need for the community to be trained on entrepreneurial activities using the available resources within communities to enable them to improve their livelihood. This can be done through training and workshops by CSOs and the government. Doing so can help parents be able to take their children to school and solve other economic problems. It has to be

understood that the more time spent at school, the more the increase of an individual's maturity and independent level. Therefore, taking children to school will help them reach the appropriate age of taking family responsibilities.

Lastly, the government should make sure that the regulatory frameworks, including policies and Acts, rules and regulations on marriage prepared within different organs, are mainstreamed to the community through government officials available at the lower levels of the government (District Councils and Municipalities, Wards and Village).

Acknowledgment

The researcher would like to thank Eunice Michael for her efforts in collecting the valuable information which made this study possible. He would also like to thank the leaders of Uyui District for the support they provided to accomplish this study.

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Transformational Leadership and Conflict Management in Zanzibar

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Abstract

Zanzibar has had a turbulent political history for more than half a century, from the time of nationalist struggles in the 1950s. The major bone of contestation has revolved around the politics of identity with its resultant long-standing political conflict. In November 2009, the then President of Zanzibar, Amani Abeid Karume from Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), and the Civic United Front (CUF) Secretary-General, Seif Shariff Hamad met and declared their commitment in public to end the long-standing political conflict between the two main political parties on the islands. This article seeks to explain the process of reconciliation in Zanzibar with specific reference to the role of leadership in transformational change. The study was conducted between March 2015 and February 2017, involving two main data collection methods: in-depth interviews and documentary reviews. Interviews were conducted with politicians, government functionaries, academics, journalists, and leaders of civil society organizations. The study found that the only substantive achievements that were realized in the short run were power-sharing under the Government of National Unity (GNU) and some changes in attitudes among some of the key political actors, which, to a certain degree, amounted to a discourse switch from a hostile political attitude based on zero-sum politics to the recognition of the need for cooperation across party lines. The uniqueness of the power-sharing arrangement in Zanzibar was that the system was entrenched in the constitution. The constitution was negotiated and established before the election. The theory of transformational change suggests that transformational leaders tend to have a strong personal attachment to their missions. Their absence in the course of implementation may sometimes negatively impact the transformation process, even in the context where the mission has been translated within the legal and constitutional framework. The case of Zanzibar indicates a pressing need for deepening the power-sharing deal so that it becomes people-centered rather than a mere elite project entrenched in partisan politics.

Keywords: *Reconciliation, Government of National Unity, Transformational Leadership, Transformational Change, Power-sharing, Maridhiano, Muafaka, Zanzibar Politics*

Introduction

Zanzibar has had a turbulent political history for more than half a century, from the time of nationalist struggles in the 1950s to date. The prominent bone of contestation has revolved around identity politics, with competing conceptions of nationalism by contending parties and who should have the right to rule over the islands. Neither pre-independence multiparty

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elections, the 1964 revolution, and subsequent union with Tanganyika in the same year and one-party politics from 1964 to 1995, nor multiparty elections from 1995 to date have been able to resolve the long-standing tensions. In November 2009, the then President of Zanzibar, Amani Abeid Karume, and the Civic United Front (CUF) Secretary-General, Seif Shariff Hamad, met at the Zanzibar state house and declared their commitment in public to what was popularly known as *Maridhiano.*[3]The Maridhiano sought to end the long-standing political conflict between the two main political parties on the islands. That decision by the two leaders and subsequent choices and actions that followed ushered in a new era of political transformation in Zanzibar. The Zanzibar Constitution was subsequently amended in 2010 following a successful referendum that provided popular approval of an envisaged government of national unity.[4]The government of national unity survived for five years (2010-2015) but collapsed in the aftermath of the 2015 general elections. In this reconciliation initiative, one of the critical issues that seem to have attracted academic inquiry is the role of leadership in the whole process of political settlement or transformation (Bakari & Makulilo, 2012; Matheson, 2012; Moss & Tronvoll, 2015; Nassor & Jose, 2014). Therefore, this article aims to explain the process of reconciliation in Zanzibar with specific reference to *Maridhiano* by examining the role of leadership in the process.

Materials and Methods

It is a qualitative study. It was conducted between March 2015 and February 2017, involving two main data collection methods: in-depth interviews involving politicians, government functionaries, academics, journalists, and leaders of CSOs and documentary reviews of secondary and primary sources. The respondents were selected purposefully based on their involvement in the reconciliation process or knowledge of the process. The sample size had nineteen respondents. This size was considered adequate since it focused much on key informants involved in the reconciliation process in Zanzibar or those who had a vast knowledge

[3] It is a Swahili term referring to a 'gentlemen' agreement, i.e., an agreement without specific agreement terms or a formal pact signed by the parties to the dispute.

[4] See, for example, Section 9(3) of the Zanzibar Constitution (1984 as amended in 2010), which provides that the structure of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar shall be that of national unity. Section 39(1) provides that: "There shall be two Vice Presidents, the First Vice President, and the Second Vice President." The former, who shall be the Principal Advisor to the President, is appointed by the President after consultation with the party which emerged in the second position in the presidential election (Section 39 [3]). Under Section 42(2), the President is required to appoint Ministers in consultation with the First Vice President and the Second Vice President in proportion to the number of constituency seats in the House of Representatives.

of the process. In order to maintain the anonymity of respondents, respondents from different institutions were given specific codes (see Annex 1). Data were processed using content and contextual analysis. As stated previously, this study was limited up to the 2015 general elections and events that took place thereafter. This is because the government of national unity was formed immediately after the 2010 general elections, and it survived up to 2015. Although it is provided in the constitution, the period between 2015 and 2020 had no government of national unity since the opposition party boycotted the elections claiming massive vote-rigging by the ruling party.

However, after the 2020 general election, Seif Shariff Hamad, who had crossed over to another political party, namely the Alliance for Change and Transparency, popularly known as the ACT–Wazalendo, took part in the election and subsequently joined the government of national unity. Therefore, it is vital to focus much on the political dynamics of the 2010-2015 power-sharing deal and subsequent events that shed some light on transformational change. When this study was first conceived, there was quite a high degree of optimism that it represented a striking case of leadership for transformational change in Africa. However, by the time the study was concluded, the sorts of development that occurred, particularly with respect to the collapse of the government of national unity after the 2015 general elections, necessitated a re-thinking in terms of the nature and scope of transformational change itself as well as the role of leadership in that transformation.

Context

Zanzibar, a pair of islands (with several small islets) located about twenty miles off the coast of the Tanzanian mainland, consists of two main islands, namely Unguja and Pemba. Unguja is the seat of government and commercial capital. According to the 2012 Census, Zanzibar has a total population of 1,303,569 people, of whom approximately 68.8 percent reside on Unguja island, and 31.2 percent reside on Pemba island (URT, 2012). Zanzibar effectively became part of the Omani Empire in 1832, when Sayyid Said bin Sultan, the Sultan of Oman, transferred his court from Muscat to Stone Town on Unguja. Sayyid Said established a ruling dynasty and introduced clove plantations using slave labor (Ingrams, 1967, p. 163).

Consequently, as Glassman aptly puts it: "[t]he political and social categories generated by the rise of the Busaid sultanate – Arabs, Indians, indigenous islanders, and slaves – laid the foundation of modern Zanzibar's major ethnic divisions; as has often been the case, race-making was connected to state-building" (Glassman, 2011, p. 31). The political economy created by Arab rule was based on racial and class stratifications. This did not fundamentally change when Zanzibar became a British Protectorate from 1890 to 1963. Indeed, when the British assumed responsibility as a protecting power over the Sultanate, they did not interfere in the socio-economic relations that were in place. Instead, they encouraged their reproduction through a divide-and-rule policy (Bakari, 2001, p. 53).

According to the 1948 Census, the Shirazis[5] Zanzibari natives constituted 56.2 percent, the Africans (mainly recent arrivals from the mainland) accounted for 19.5 percent, Arabs made up 15.9 percent, Asians (5.8 percent), Comorians (1.1 percent), and others collectively accounted for less than 1 percent of the total population. This diverse population played out during the nationalist struggles that gained momentum in the 1950s. None of the nationalist parties could forge a common national identity and consciousness. Instead, they exacerbated the already existing social stratification with racial and pseudo-class contents (Bakari, 2001, pp. 56–58). The political parties that were formed in the 1950s had been preceded by welfare associations based on ethnic identification since the early 20th century with Arabs being the forerunners, followed by an African Association representing the urban and rural proletariat originating from the mainland and the Shirazi Association representing indigenous Zanzibaris in 1934 and 1939, respectively. When the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) was formed in 1955, many considered it an Arab party representing the upper class of the landed aristocracy (Mapuri, 1996; Mrina & Matoke, 1980; Mukangara, 2000). However, the extent to which that label was appropriate was contentious during that time and even today. Some scholars, while not completely disputing some inclination to Arab aspirations, hold that the relative success of the ZNP in political mobilization and coalition-building with the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP) rested largely in its non-racial and non-ethnic strategy by appealing to broad Zanzibari nationalism (Bakari, 2001; Sheriff, 1994; Shivji, 2008). Advancing this argument, Shivji succinctly puts it:

[5] The Shirazi refers to a native ethnic group of Afro-Arab/Persian origin which is predominantly African but distinguishes itself from recent arrivals from the mainland because of their mixed descent.

> *In its program, vision, and outlook, the ZNP sought legitimacy in the Zanzibari culture and custom rather than any form of Arabism. Therefore, one has to explore the class base of the party, its relation to the state, and other historical and political factors in determining its character, not the ethnicity of its leaders* (Shivji, 2008, p. 19).

Like the ZNP, the other parties, namely the Afro Shirazi Party (ASP) and the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP), were also perceived differently regarding their ethnic content and class distinctions. The ASP was formed in 1957 following the African Association and the Shirazi Association merger. It managed to attract many followers, particularly among recent immigrants from the mainland, and strong support from the Unguja section of the Shirazi Association representing the poor peasantry mainly in the eastern and southern parts of the island. The ZPPP was formed in 1959 following the split by the Shirazi faction from ASP. This was aggrieved by the perceived dominance of the African faction with its strong leaning towards the mainland. The ZPPP represented largely the indigenous landed petty bourgeoisie, mainly from Pemba. It favored an electoral alliance with the ZNP (Bakari, 2001, p. 61).

All pre-independence elections held (1957, January 1961, June 1961, and 1963) demonstrated that society was divided almost down the middle along with class and ethnic identities. In the last two general elections preceding independence, the ASP had secured a marginal victory of 50.6 percent and 54.2 percent of the total vote, but it could not form the simple parliamentary majority required to form a government. Instead, the ZNP and ZPPP formed a coalition government following the results of the 1963 election. Independence was granted on December 10, 1963, transforming Zanzibar from an absolute monarchy under a British protectorate to a constitutional monarchy, whereby the Sultan remained as a symbolic head of state, and the prime minister became the head of government. On January 12, 1964, the ZNP-ZPPP coalition government was overthrown by the ASP-Umma Party alliance just a month after independence. [6]Three months later, on April 26, 1964, Zanzibar united with Tanganyika to form the United Republic of Tanzania. Under the union, however, Zanzibar retained its internal government to deal with non-union matters.

[6] The Umma Party was a leftist party founded in 1963 by one of the staunch African Marxists, Abdulrahman Babu, who had defected from the ZNP.

Against the backdrop of a political economy of a highly fragmented society in terms of race, regionalism, and class differences, the nationalist movement in Zanzibar was fractured right in the middle with one faction, namely ASP, subscribing to black African nationalism and the other faction, notably the ZNP-ZPPP alliance, subscribing to Zanzibari nationalism (Bakari, 2001; Shivji, 2008). The nationalist parties that were formed invariably fitted themselves into one of the sides of the ideological spectrum, exacerbating society's social and political polarization. These different perspectives on nationalism coincided with the political parties' racial/ethnic and regional identities. Unguja generally became a stronghold of the ASP, and Pemba became a stronghold of the ZPPP and ZNP. Most Zanzibaris of Arab origin either supported the ZNP or ZPPP, and most recent arrivals from the mainland supported the ASP. The Shirazis were divided almost equally, with the better off Shirazis of Pemba and the northern part of Unguja predominantly supporting the ZNP-ZPPP alliance and the relatively poorer sections of the Shirazis of the southern and eastern parts of Unguja primarily supporting the ASP (Bakari, 2001; Sheriff, 2001).

More than half a century of Zanzibar's independence and the union with Tanganyika since 1964 have enormously altered the islands' political economy (Bakari, 2001). It is still widely believed that the past haunts the present (Othman, 1993). The union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964 did not resolve the islands' long-standing social and political polarization. Instead, it created another front on which contending parties intensified their contestation for political power (Sheriff, 1994). There has been an intense debate on the extent to which the two main parties in Zanzibar, in the wake of the resumption of multiparty politics since 1992, represent the historical divides of pre-independence politics characterized by racial class/ethnic and regional differences. Suffice it to mention in passing, the debate is polarized into two camps: those who see CCM and CUF more or less as a replica of the ASP, and ZNP-ZPPP alliance, respectively (Killian, 2008; Mapuri, 1996; Mmuya & Chaligha, 1994; Mukangara, 2000); and those who view the current parties as institutions with some remnants of the past, but significant contemporary ingredients that would fundamentally differentiate them from their predecessors (Bakari, 2001; Matheson, 2012). The latter analysis cites, among other factors, the changing political economy of the islands as well as the very genesis of the CUF, in that the core leadership of the party was almost entirely a splinter group expelled or defecting from the ruling party, CCM. Most of these individuals were former ASP members (Bakari, 2001, p. 168).

Scholars who have attempted to explain the long-standing political conflict in Zanzibar could be categorized into two different theoretical perspectives. The first perspective, which is considered as the mainstream perspective supported by a large number of scholars, as well as the ruling establishment, has placed more emphasis on explaining the conflict in terms of the racialized nature of Zanzibar politics since colonial days (Lofchie, 1965; Mmuya & Chaligha, 1994; Mrina & Matoke, 1980; Mukangara, 2000). Implied in this perspective, which could be referred to as a primordial view, is the assertion that the Zanzibar conflict is historically and structurally predetermined, and hence it can only be resolved through an incremental approach over the generations. Based on this perspective, what could be feasibly done in the short run is, therefore, an attempt to defuse the tensions and contain the situation to prevent it from further escalation.

The other perspective explains Zanzibar's politics from the vantage point of political economy, primarily in terms of social classes and the current socio-economic and political dynamics (Bakari, 2001; Matheson, 2012; Sheriff, 2001). Building upon the latter perspective, such scholars explain the current political predicament of Zanzibar largely in terms of proximate factors, including the role of leadership, policies, struggles for democratization, greater autonomy within the union arrangement, and political hostility caused by the politics of exclusion (Bakari, 2001; Sheriff, 1994). This perspective recognizes the instrumental role that leadership may play in conflict transformation processes under the existing historical and structural constraints.

Regarding the political contest between the two main parties on the islands, elections have significantly demonstrated their disagreement. In other words, "...none of the six competitive elections in the political history of Zanzibar has produced a legitimate government acceptable to the major political camps" (Bakari & Makulilo, 2012). There has never been a major breakthrough whereby the defeated party concedes defeat and vows to cooperate with the victor for the wellbeing of the islands. The aftermath of each competitive election has been characterized by not conceding defeat, increased hostility, exclusion of a significant section of the community, and suppression of political opponents (Kaiser, 1999; Killian, 2008). This suppression has included intimidation, arrests, detention without trial, imprisonment, torture, rape, looting, discrimination in public employment, demolition of houses, and murders (Bakari,

2001; Heilman, 2004). Since the introduction of multiparty politics in 1992, the political crisis reached its climax in January 2001, when the police and the Zanzibar Marine Force (KMKM) used excessive force to deal with the Civic United Front's (CUF) demonstrators. The latter held nationwide demonstrations to demand a new constitution, an independent electoral commission, and a rerun of the Zanzibar election. Thirty-one people, including one policeman, were killed, the property was destroyed, and over 2,000 people fled to Kenya as political refugees.[7] The killings and associated violent events worsened the situation.[8]In light of the deteriorating political situation, it became apparent that there was a need for negotiations between the two main political parties on the islands, namely Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and the Civic United Front (CUF).

Considerable pressure on both the Union Government and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar to initiate the negotiation process was mounted by both domestic and international forces in the aftermath of the bloody events of 26/27 January 2001. This initiative culminated in a second reconciliation accord (*Muafaka* II of 2001) which was negotiated against the backdrop of the failure of the first accord (*Muafaka* I), brokered by the then Commonwealth Secretary-General, Chief Emeka Anyaoku in 1999. Like the previous one, *Muafaka* II was not implemented. The actual terms of the agreement in both Muafaka I and Muafaka II centered on recognizing each other's existence, the need to respect human rights, and reforms of the electoral laws and election management body. The same controversies and conflicts surrounding the two previous general elections featured again in the 2005 general election leading to another initiative of political reconciliation that was headed by the two Secretaries-General of CCM and CUF, following a commitment given by the newly elected President of the United Republic in his first presidential speech to Parliament in December 2005. Like the previous ones, this initiative also failed, hence cementing the conventional view that Zanzibar was in a cyclical process of a persistent historical conflict. As Ramadhani aptly puts it that:

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[7] According to the Presidential Commission of Inquiry report led by Brigadier Hashim Mbita, the figure is still seriously contested by CUF, who maintain that the number of deaths exceeds forty-five (http://hakinaumma.wordpress.com/2008/12/17/sura-ya-saba).

[8] Relative to other political conflicts in the Great Lakes region, the number of people killed and injured may appear small. However, given the small population of Zanzibar, the impact of the protracted conflict is substantial in terms of people's rights (political, economic, and social rights) as well as overall economic development, unity, and political stability [including that of the Union Government].

> *...what appears as merely a political stand-off with post-election-rioting has, in fact, most of the characteristics of a deep-seated and protracted conflict. The political divisions are superimposed on deeper racial/ethnic divisions embedded in territorially-defined horizontal inequalities (political and economic). These, in turn, have resonances to very brutal periods in Zanzibar and African history* (particularly of the slave trade).[9]

A more critical analysis of the conflict, however, would suggest that the current conflict is not merely a replica of the past as Brown comments:

> *...despite some obvious similarities, the recent "Zanzibar Crisis" cannot be grasped as a straightforward re-emergence of earlier tensions. The social cleavages that inform this dispute have altered; they have been shaped by the social, political, and economic transformations of the independence period* (Brown, 2010).

Theoretical Framework

One of the critical issues emerging in conflict transformation literature is the concept of transformation itself and its scope and magnitude. Analytically, conflict transformation may have several aspects. The first aspect may entail what Johan Galtung would call "a discourse switch" (Galtung & Fischer, 2004) – meaning shifting discourse in terms of how the problem at hand is framed or reframed by the actors, for example, the parties to the conflict may move from a perception of viewing each other as enemies to viewing each other as contenders or competitors. The second aspect involves a situation whereby a new overarching goal is formulated. The third aspect denotes a situation whereby a conflict situation is transformed from a deadly conflict to a conflict that could be managed peacefully through different means such as adjudication, mediation, or negotiation. When any of these characteristics is obtained (i.e., not necessarily all of them) as a result of conscious human action, it is justified to credit those who championed the process as transformational (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994).

[9] See Ramadhani, Lupa "Identity Politics, and Complexities of Conflict Resolution in Zanzibar." IBIS Discussion Paper No 2, Institute for British-Irish Studies, University College Dublin. http//www.ucd.ie/ibis/publications/discussionpapers/identiypoliticsandcomplexitiesinzanzibar/L_Ramadhani.pdf. Accessed 1/7/2021.

There are three dimensions of conflict transformation, in which the term is usually used. The first is a fundamental change in the relationship between parties and a change in recognizing each other's ethnic and national aspirations (Northrup, 1989). Secondly, societies transformed when fundamental social and political changes are effected "to correct inequalities and injustice to provide all groups with their fundamental human needs" (Harrington & Engle Merry, 2018); and thirdly, when there is an attitudinal change in individuals, i.e., "consciousness and character of human beings" (Vayrynen, 1991). At any point, if the transformation in question has occurred out of the will and the capacity of an actor to act consciously to transform a particular situation in the context where the actor could have behaved differently. Then this is logically connected to the role of leadership in conflict transformation (Hay, 2002, pp. 94–95). Of course, this does not negate the fact that due to the changing nature of social reality, conflict and its components are continuously transforming in some ways (Vayrynen, 1991).

Transformational Leadership and *Maridhiano* in Zanzibar

The process leading to the reconciliation deal (*Maridhiano*) and subsequently the passing of the bill for a referendum in Zanzibar on the government of national unity brings a fundamental aspect of political dynamics beyond institutional arrangements. The first reconciliation accord of 1998 (*Muafaka* I) and the second one of 2001 (*Muafaka* II) and negotiations for the third accord (*Muafaka* III), which ultimately collapsed before striking a final deal in 2008, were all strictly speaking carried out within the existing institutional arrangements of the party structures of the two parties (Bakari & Makulilo, 2012, p. 199). Select committees composed of senior members from the two main rival parties were formed under the co-chairmanship of the two Secretaries-General. These committees engaged in structured negotiations and formal agreements in the case of *Muafaka* I and II, with clear terms, which were signed by the leaders of the two parties in official ceremonies at the House of Representatives. Likewise, the processes and procedures for Muafaka III were the same, although the process failed before the signing stage.

In the case of *Maridhiano*, however, the process was fundamentally different. The process and the agreement were basically informal and (without degrading the role of some forces behind the scene), by and large, a product of two prominent architects, notably Zanzibar's President Amani Abeid Karume and CUF Secretary-General, Seif Shariff Hamad. No clear terms of the agreement under *Maridhiano* were ever made public. The two leaders simply declared their broad statement

of intent 'to forget the past and open up a new page of Zanzibar's history after they had met in camera at the Zanzibar State House on November 5, 2009. The exact terms *of Maridhiano*, if any, were a secret between the two leaders. According to an interview with the CUF Secretary-General, Seif Shariff Hamad, there were no specific terms of the agreement between the two leaders, except some general understanding of the situation (Interview RN 1, 29/12/2015). After that, a series of measures were taken, signaling a commitment to the reconciliation agenda. The first measure was the recognition of Karume by CUF as Zanzibar's President. The second measure was the formation of a joint committee of six members, three from CCM and three from CUF, to prepare a proposal for the formation of a government of national unity (GNU) and ultimately the tabling of a private bill for the holding of a referendum on the formation of a GNU in Zanzibar after the October 2010 general election. The bill was ultimately and unanimously passed on January 28, 2010, by both parties' members of the House of Representatives.

Based on the interviews conducted with the key actors in the reconciliation process and analysis of the legal measures subsequently taken, it could be plausible to assert that *Maridhiano* did not have specific terms of the agreement between the two contending sides as such save for a general commitment to form a GNU whose composition was to be spelled out in the Zanzibar constitution (Interview RN1, 29/12/2015). This implies that the other critical issues, such as how the electoral system and processes were to be organized and managed, had not been resolved during the negotiation process and thereafter. That is to say, the 2010 general elections and even the 2015 general elections were held under the legal and institutional framework that was in place before *Maridhiano*. Apparently, it was assumed that the spirit of reconciliation would facilitate the conduct of the 2010 general elections, and the GNU formed thereafter would be in a position to initiate and implement a wide range of constitutional and legal measures that would regulate and manage political contestation (Interview RN 20, 15/05/2016). That ambition, however, did not materialize during the entire period of the GNU from 2010 to 2015. Thus, the spirit of *Maridhiano* might have been an overall mission of building a harmonious society with a common national interest. The society is characterized by social and political inclusion under the GNU, the legal system, and the structures in place to manage political competition, such as the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) to facilitate a free and fair political competition.

Thus, the only substantive achievements that were realized in the short run was power-sharing under the government of national unity, as well as some changes in attitude among some of the key political actors, which, to a certain degree, amounted to a discourse switch from a hostile political attitude based on zero-sum politics to the recognition of the need for cooperation across party lines. The uniqueness of the power-sharing arrangement in Zanzibar was that the system was entrenched into the constitution, and it was negotiated before the election, a feature that differentiated it from other arrangements of power-sharing concluded in the aftermath of post-election violence (as was the case in Kenya and Zimbabwe). While it cannot be concluded that the 2010 general election in Zanzibar was free and fair, CUF, for the first time since the inception of multiparty politics, conceded defeat (apparently in the spirit of *Maridhiano*)[10], and the new GNU was immediately inaugurated.

Under the GNU, as stated under Section 42 (2) of the Zanzibar Constitution (1984 as amended in 2010), the President was required within fourteen days after the appointment of the First Vice President and the Second Vice President in consultation with both Vice Presidents to appoint ministers. The appointing ministers must be the members of the House of Representatives and based on the proportion of the number of the constituencies of political parties. The First Vice President is appointed from the party which has won the second position in the presidential election, and the Second Vice President is appointed from the party which has won the presidency. Whereas both are considered principal advisers to the President, the latter has substantial powers as head of government business in the House of Representatives.

The GNU that was formed after the 2010 general elections had sixteen full ministers, nine from CCM and seven from CUF. It also had six deputy ministers, five from CCM and one from CUF. In addition, there were three ministers without a portfolio, two from CCM and one from CUF. Under the GNU arrangement, just like in the previous structure, the President remained with

[10] This time again, CUF leaders and followers believed that they had won the presidency just like in the previous elections. Large numbers of CUF followers had gathered around the election tallying center at Bwawani, Zanzibar Town, waiting for the declaration of results. The outgoing President, Dr. Amani Karume, played an influential role through a respected CCM elder, Mr. Hassan Nassor Moyo [Chairman of the *Maridhian*o Committee of six members], who was tasked to use his elderly wisdom to convince the CUF presidential candidate to concede defeat in the spirit of *Maridhian*o, the initiative which succeeded. See, for example, *Tanzania*, Dar es Salaam, October 20, 2014. See also, International Law and Policy Institute (2010). Elections in Zanzibar: Consolidating Peaceful Multiparty Politics. Available at: http//www.tz.undp.org/ESP/Observer _Reports.asp (accessed January 11, 2017); Archie Matheson (2012). "Maridhiano: Zanzibar's Remarkable Reconciliation and Government of National Unity." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 6 (4): 602.

extensive powers in decision-making, including powers of appointment of a wide range of senior government officials, such as principal secretaries, directors, and heads of executive agencies. This was one of the serious shortcomings of the GNU as it created the impression that the GNU was exclusively operating at the ministerial level, leaving the other layers of government operating just like in the old structures before the formation of the GNU. Despite a wide range of obstacles it faced, however, the GNU was able to survive throughout the entire inter-election period (October 2010 – October 2015).

There have been two sets of arguments regarding the functioning of the GNU. The first set of arguments, which hardliners strongly support within the ruling party, is that it was not working and therefore needed to be scrapped after the 2015 general elections.[11] The second set of arguments holds that it was reasonably working despite the numerous constraints and obstacles it faced. Some of those subscribing to this view cite the internal workings of the cabinet, particularly the way decisions were made. For example, consensus emerging from the process of bargaining and compromise between the members of the two parties represented in the cabinet, instead of the President unilaterally or by using his cabinet majority imposing his position or that of his party. Despite disagreements that happened on some occasions, on the whole, the GNU was considered to be reasonably working within the cabinet and also within the House of Representatives (Nassor and Jose 2014).

The Transformation

The GNU structure that was agreed upon by the two sides under *Maridhiano* and later entrenched into the constitution was essentially a product of a power struggle between the two major parties, the CUF and CCM. However, in terms of the scope, the agenda of the GNU was narrow. It centered on power-sharing in the government, particularly the presidency and ministerial posts (Bakari and Makulilo 2012). That is to say, the other fundamental issues causing disagreement and persistent conflict between the two sides, including the management of

[11] See, for example, the statement by Waride Bakari Jabu, Secretary of the Zanzibar Special Committee of CCMs National Executive Committee (NEC), Ideology and Publicity. "Serikali ya Umoja wa Kitaifa Yaichefua CCM", February 25, 2015. Available at: http:www.mpekuzihuru/com/2015/serikali-ya-Umoja-was-kitaifa-zanzibar.html. Accessed 13/12/2016.

electoral competition and the union issue, were not addressed under *Maridhiano*. In other words, it was virtually taken for granted that power-sharing under the GNU would be instrumental in effecting other desirable constitutional and legal reforms for the management of political contestation. Gradually, it became evident that the mere sharing of ministerial portfolios could not help much. Given that power was reconfigured under the GNU, whichever party would be the second winner in any general elections might suffer from skewed power distribution in the governing process.

With all the challenges the GNU has been facing since its inception, it survived for five years (from October 2010 to October 2015). One of the two principal architects of the arrangement, Amani Abeid Karume, had finished his term in office in October 2010 and therefore did not have an opportunity to oversee its implementation after the 2010 general election. There were still fundamental issues that the GNU had not resolved, and the October 2015 general elections constituted the first litmus test of the resilience and relevance of this new governance arrangement.

However, what can hardly be disputed is that, although the Zanzibar conflict may not have been entirely resolved, Amani Abeid Karume and Seif Shariff Hamad will always be remembered in the history of Zanzibar as two outstanding statesmen. Their contribution to the transformation of the Zanzibar political conflict is by defying the general hitherto hard-line perception to make it intractable. What is so striking about their role as transformational leaders, therefore, is not so much about the evident ultimate success of their mission, but more importantly, is about their individual's capability in transforming the nature of the conflict, or at least some aspects of it, by transcending the formidable institutional arrangements in place. Moss and Tronvoll observe that there was some transformation in intergroup relationships, which is instrumental in peacebuilding as a result of the decision by the two leaders (Moss and Tronvoll 2015). They cite, for example, an interview from one of the CUF Pemba Elders who said: "Karume is a hero and a gentleman. Karume has changed; now he has confidence. It is not easy to stand up in CCM. He is a hero and deserves praise" (Moss and Tronvoll 2015, p. 9).

The 2015 general election was the first to be conducted under the GNU in Zanzibar and was expected to be the first major test of the efficacy of the arrangement. The election was generally managed well in all the initial stages of the electoral process, save for the final stage of the

declaration of results whereby the Chairman of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission nullified the entire election and called for a rerun in a situation whereby all domestic and international observers had declared that the October 2015 general elections in Zanzibar were generally free and fair. The CUF and most opposition parties boycotted a rerun on the ground that the October 2015 general elections were free and fair and the CUF presidential candidate had won the presidential race. Following the March 2016 rerun, the CCM presidential candidate, the incumbent Ali Mohamed Shein, was declared a winner and all constituency seats in the House of Representatives and ward councilors went to the ruling party. That is to say, the government that is in place is a one-party government. In other words, the GNU collapsed in spite of the fact that it was entrenched in the Zanzibar constitution in 2010. The main opposition party, CUF, currently does not recognize the existing government as legitimate or representing the electorate's will. The spirit of GNU that was being cultivated over the period of five years seems to some extent to have waned.[12] Political hostility that was diminishing following the formation of GNU now seems to be intensified.

However, the dominant view from interviews was that the spirit of reconciliation has not completely waned. Commenting on this situation, one senior government official said:

> *The spirit of reconciliation, to some extent, is still there, there are, of course, some hardliners within the regime, but there are also a pretty large number of moderates, particularly among the youth who do not see a viable alternative under the circumstances other than a government of national unity* (Interview RN 8, 03/01/2017).

On the other side of the political spectrum, i.e., the main opposition party, CUF, the spirit of reconciliation and power-sharing is even stronger than in the ruling party, CCM. Interviews with all CUF respondents in this study confirmed their commitment to the GNU as the only viable political solution for the time being. One of the CUF respondents, for example, said:

[12] However, the hope has not been completely eroded as a result of an aborted election of October 2015 for "relative peace." The lack of violence currently exists is not simply a function of heavy military presence on the islands but also an outcome of some spirit of rapprochement that was cultivated during the time of GNU, which still exists to contribute to preventing conflict escalation into violence.

> *We do not believe that the spirit of GNU has died. We think wisdom will prevail; a lot was achieved under the GNU, it is very difficult to bring us back to where we were prior to Maridhiano* (Interview RN 21, 09/07/2017). We do not see any other viable alternative apart from the GNU in the meantime.

The critical question in light of the nullification of the 2015 general election and the collapse of the GNU is, does it make any sense to consider the two leaders who championed the reconciliation process in Zanzibar and the formation of GNU as transformational? The answer might be 'Yes' or 'No', depending on how one defines transformation. If one defines transformation in an ideal sense of getting the final outcomes that are desirable, in this case, ending the long-standing conflict between the two contending parties, the two leaders would obviously not qualify to the status of being transformational. By contrast, if one views transformation as a very complex process, then the two leaders would evidently deserve the status of being transformational. For the purpose of this study, the mere change of some of the characteristics or aspects of the conflict understudy without necessarily resolving or ending the conflict is considered conflict transformation. The schema presented in the theoretical part of this study identified three key aspects which could be subjected to transformation, namely (i) a fundamental change in the relationship between parties; (i) when there are fundamentally social and political changes aimed at correcting inequalities and injustice between parties; (iii) and when there are changes in individual consciousness and character.

As a result of *Maridhiano* and the subsequent formation of GNU in 2010, some changes have been achieved virtually, as mentioned above. However, more conspicuous changes are noticeable in the last dimension, namely changes in consciousness, attitudes, and the character of individuals among the ruling elite, the elite within the opposition, and even among the common people, the scope and magnitude of change that would amount to what Johan Galtung would refer to as "a discourse switch." The experience of working together under the GNU enabled the elite within both political camps to recognize the fact that while they may have fundamental differences on some of the political issues, they share some common interests on some of the issues. Unlike their previous perception that the conflict between them was a zero-sum game, there was now a change of attitude among some of the members of the ruling elite that power-sharing arrangements were an appropriate system of government. That could fundamentally transform the conflict situation in Zanzibar from a deadly conflict into a conflict of power

contestation that could be largely managed through a democratic process (RN17, 03/02/2017). Consequently, a significant group of moderates within the ruling party emerged, which seemed to share a broad political opinion with the opposition on the need for fighting for greater autonomy for Zanzibar.[13] As RN17 aptly put it:

> *Common ground was explored between President Karume and the CUF, Secretary-General, Seif Shariff Hamad, notably the need for greater Zanzibar's autonomy within the Union arrangement. This change of attitude by the top leadership also induced changes in individual consciousness and character among the political leadership and citizens in Zanzibar* (RN17, 03/02/2017).

The change of attitude and consciousness was also evident among most government employees. One senior government official commented:

> *The spirit of GNU is still there. Among civil servants, it is generally very strong. Most of us enjoyed working under the GNU regardless of one's political inclination. Under the GNU, there was a certain degree of harmony in the public service. Today, for example, if a civil servant from Unguja is transferred to Pemba, he/she may be worried due to the prevailing political tensions after the collapse of the GNU* (RN2, 3/3/2017).

Notwithstanding the above achievements, there was serious resistance to the idea of a GNU. Such resistance was particularly from some of the leaders of the ruling elite and some sections among the common people, particularly those inclined towards the ruling party. During the national referendum that was held on July 31, 2010, for example, whereby Zanzibaris were asked whether they supported the idea of GNU or not, with a voter turnout of 71.3 percent of registered voters, 186,699 voters (66.4 percent) endorsed the GNU and 95,324 voters (33.6 percent) rejected it.[14] That is to say, the percentage of those who did not support the idea of GNU was

[13] These include Hassan Nassor Moyo, an elder statesman, a member of the first revolutionary council and a former minister in both the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar and the Union Government, Mansour Yussuf Himid, son of the first Chief of Defence Forces of Zanzibar and Mohammed Elmugheiry (Eddy Riyami), Ali Mzee Ali, CCM Party Whip in the House of Representative who was appointed to lead a committee of six charged with voter education for the referendum, etc. These were among the individuals from CCM who were staunch supporters of the idea of GNU.

[14] Zanzibar Electoral Commission, Referendum Results, 2010.

quite significant, and this was in spite of the fact that the authorities had imposed legal and political impediments against those who would campaign for a 'No' vote. The key figures within the 'No' camp had to operate clandestinely, as the top authorities considered them a threat to peace, unity, tranquillity, and political tolerance. However, it was pretty evident that amidst those obstacles, the 'No' camp was able to mount quite a rigorous underground campaign; and in some constituencies, the results show that the 'No' vote outnumbered the 'Yes' vote.[15]

The above situation suggests that some significant sections strongly opposed the notion of a GNU among the ruling elite who could use their political influence to mobilize quite a significant number of the common people to reject the idea. At any rate, however, it is plausible to conclude that the general idea of a GNU received wide acceptance among the people who seemed to be tired of hostile politics between the supporters of the two main political camps.

In a mini-survey conducted in some of the *Shehias* of the Urban West Region in Zanzibar in September 2015 (*i.e.*, before the 2015 general elections), the GNU was still enjoying wide acceptance among the ordinary citizens. The findings of this survey indicated that the GNU was favored as the most appropriate form of government by about 66.9 percent of the respondents, given the reality of the Zanzibar political situation characterized by a persistent political impasse after every general election. Interestingly, 31.9 percent of the respondents were of the opinion that the winner-takes-all system is the most appropriate form of government for Zanzibar (Salum 2016, p.50). From these findings, those who support the GNU constitute an absolute majority. However, it is important to recognize that the percentage of those who opposed the idea of GNU is quite significant. Nevertheless, this could not be taken to represent the overall opinion of all Zanzibaris across the two main islands (the survey sample involved only the Urban West Region, a region which is believed to be a CCM stronghold based on election results).

That is to say, the five years period of the functioning of the GNU in Zanzibar provided some kind of transformation in people's minds in terms of realizing the possible merits and demerits of that form of government. Besides, despite its collapse in the aftermath of the 2015 general election, the fact that it has not been removed from the constitution creates some optimism that it is still a viable form of government in Zanzibar; therefore, it may be resurrected in the near

[15] See, for example, the results of Amani, Chaani, Chwaka, Donge, Kitope, Uzini, Makunduchi, Muyuni, Dole, and Kwahani constituencies.

future. Hence, the idea of the government of national unity and a consociational form of democracy as opposed to majoritarianism has not been completely eroded (Lijphart, 2008).

Enablers of the Transformation Process

There were several actors from both political camps who were instrumental in the process towards *Maridhiano* and subsequent decisions and actions thereof. To be sure, even the initial idea of bridging the gap between the two leaders and establishing direct communication was not initiated by any of the two leaders. According to RN 1 and Hassan Nassor Moyo[16] (an elder statesman, who was a member of the first revolutionary council, and who had served as minister in both Union and Zanzibar governments) the idea started at a funeral function of the late Shaaban Khamis Mloo in May 2009 (former national CCM leader who later joined CUF and served as Secretary-General and Vice-Chairman of the party). An informal discussion ensued between Professor Ibrahim Lipumba, Seif Shariff Hamad, Machano Khamis Machano, and Hasson Nassor Moyo (a CCM member who was a very intimate friend of the late Mloo) and CUF. According to RN1, the talk centered on "the political situation of the country." They generally agreed that it was imperative to take urgent measures to rescue the country by ending political hostility among Zanzibaris. Moyo committed himself to send the message to President Karume once he came back from Songea where he had to go for a family affair" (RN1, 29/12/2015).

Meanwhile, the Secretary to the CUF Secretary-General sought an appointment to see President Karume out of his own initiative without consulting any of the CUF leaders, as he later confirmed:

> *I initially started to informally meet Mansour Yussuf Himid, Minister for Energy and Natural Resources and brother-in-law of President Karume and discuss issues of national interest and request him to send the message to President Karume on the need to reconcile the two contending parties and work together for the good of the islands and its people* (RN4, 29/12/2015).

[16] https://zanzibariyetu.wordpress.com/2010/08/24/siri-ya-maridhiano-zbar-yawekwa-hadharani/. Accessed 10/05/2016.

Jussa and Himid met about four times. When Jussa ultimately secured an appointment to see the President, he informed Maalim Seif Shariff Hamad and got a blessing for the initiative. The first meetings between Jussa and President Karume, and the later meeting between Moyo and President Karume, were very instrumental in paving the way for the subsequent meetings between President Karume and Maalim Seif Shariff Hamad. By the time the two leaders met, the trust had already to a considerable degree been built by those who had started to follow up the initiative, namely Moyo, Ismail Jussa, and Mansour Yussuf Himid. It is important to note that the whole process was informal, and the two persons who carried the message from the other side, namely Moyo and Himid, had very close connections to the President (RN4, 14/05/2016). Following those informal talks, President Karume embraced the idea and immediately suggested forming a coordination committee, popularly known as the Committee of Six. The committee consisted of three members from the ruling party and three members from the CUF and helped to coordinate the process and concretize the terms of the agreement, and the entire process was carried out informally and in secret.[17]

Although much of the discussion focuses on the two prominent leaders, namely President Karume and CUF Secretary-General Seif Shariff Hamad, whose decisions and actions were considered decisive, the role of facilitators or enablers on both sides should not be underestimated. Some were operating underground and were not represented in the formal committees constituted. To begin with, the very idea of reconciliation and the plan to have the two leaders meet did not originate from either of the two leaders under discussion. But the fact that the two leaders instantly decided to embrace it and seriously committed themselves to work on it is in itself a transformational character in the given political atmosphere that existed. That is to say, in any organization, for a transformation process to take place, it is not always necessary that the topmost leader conceives the original idea of transformation; the idea of transformation may be conceived of by other members in the organization who may not even be conspicuous once the ball gets rolling. This is consonant with the conceptualization by James McGregor Burns, the founder of modern leadership theory, who defined a transformational leader as one

[17] The members included Hassan Nassor Moyo from CCM (Chairman), Abubakar Khamis Bakary from CUF as Vice – Chairman, Ismail Jussa Ladhu from CUF (Secretary), Mansour Yussuf Himid (Secretary), Mohammed Ahmed Al-Mugheiry [Eddy Riyami] from CCM, and Salim Bimani from CUF.

who "looks for potential motives in followers, seeks to satisfy their higher needs, and engages the full person of the follower."

From the above account, two different styles of leadership which facilitated the reconciliation process could be discerned. The two top leaders, Amani Abeid Karume and Maalim Seif Shariff Hamad, adopted a style primarily centered on individual leadership, particularly with respect to the initial decision, the Committee of Six, which was concretizing and coordinating the process, by contrast, adopted a collective style of leadership. When the two leaders decided to engage in informal talks at the beginning of the process, they had not consulted their parties' organs or requested their blessings. However, the Committee of Six operated like a flat informal organization with all members more or less having the same status. The initial suggestion, for example, of having co-chairpersons, was rejected in the first meeting by the members who unanimously endorsed Hassan Nassor Moyo, from CCM (who was the eldest member in the team) to serve as Chairperson and Abubakar Khamis Bakary from CUF to serve as Vice-Chairperson.

In contrast, Ismail Jussa from CUF and Mansour Yussuf Himid from CCM served as Secretaries to the Committee. That is to say, during the initial and even later stages of the process, two different leadership styles were utilized. Some issues were resolved by the initiatives of individual leaders, particularly the top leaders, and some issues were resolved based on a collective kind of leadership as exemplified by the modus operandi of the Committee of Six.

The two top leaders, notably the President of Zanzibar and the CUF Secretary-General, invariably faced significant challenges translating their commitment to action. When the CUF Secretary-General, Seif Shariff Hamad, presented the idea for the first time to the national council of his party, there was some resistance among some leaders, not in terms of rejecting the idea of recognizing the Zanzibar President as a prerequisite for a constructive dialogue towards the formation of the government of national unity, but essentially in terms of skepticism about the goodwill of the other party. A more serious negative reaction by CUF members, however, happened at a public rally at Kibandamaiti, Zanzibar Town, when Hamad told CUF followers that the national governing council of the party had held a meeting and resolved to recognize Amani Abeid Karume as the President of Zanzibar to end the political hostility that had engulfed

the islands for decades. He was booed at with massive outrage by the crowd that was moving towards the podium to cause a fracas while chanting: "*hatutaki*"; "*hatutaki*" [meaning: We don't agree; we don't agree].[18] Some of the followers were bitterly complaining, and some of them crying out of rage and disbelief: "How come that some of us have lost our relatives and others are handicapped in defense of the politics of our party, and as a result now our leaders have betrayed us!"[19] The security personnel had to intervene to rescue the situation, and Hamad had to suspend his speech. The Chairman of the party, Ibrahim Lipumba, went to the podium to calm down the crowd and clarify some of the issues on how the process of negotiation was carried out and that the decision was an outcome of a thorough deliberation of the collective leadership of the party and not a unilateral decision by Maalim Seif Shariff Hamad. Lipumba further assured the audience that Hamad had never betrayed Zanzibaris and would never do that while fighting for justice.[20] After that, the situation gradually settled, and the situation was relatively calm when a similar rally was held in Pemba.

As days passed, however, most CUF followers understood the wisdom of their leaders and became staunch supporters of *maridhiano* and the government of national unity in Zanzibar. Two main reasons account for the initial trust that developed among some CUF followers. One reason was based on some of the key attributes of a transformational leader, notably the one who commands trust, admiration, and respect from his followers (Bass, 1998). Hamad had evidently these features, given his impeccable long track record as a towering figure in opposition politics in Zanzibar. The second reason was due to some of the earlier decisions taken by Karume, which amounted to confidence-building measures, including the appointment of two CUF members to the House of Representatives.

The decision by the CUF Secretary-General to accept a deal which included, among other things, the recognition of Amani Karume as the President of Zanzibar without any substantive gains in terms of specific terms of the formally agreed pact was precarious. This was mainly because two similar reconciliation agreements that had been formally agreed and signed in the past, namely *Muafaka I* (1999) and Muafaka *II* (2001), were not adequately implemented by the government, and hence they ultimately collapsed. By breaking the news at the public rally that the National

[18] CUF public rally, Kibandamaiti, Zanzibar Town, November 8, 2010.
[19] CUF public rally, Kibandamaiti, Zanzibar Town, November 8, 2010.
[20] CUF public rally, Kibandamaiti, Zanzibar Town, November 8, 2010.

Governing Council of the party had resolved to recognize Amani Abeid Karume as the President of Zanzibar without prior underground work to prepare his followers psychologically, Seif Shariff Hamad demonstrated that he was a risk-taker. To be sure, risk-taking is one of the essential attributes of transformational leadership. One of the most challenging times for leaders is when they lead their organizations and followers into the 'unknown'. This, in effect, implies bringing something unpalatable to their members, i.e., pushing them out of their comfort zone. It is quite natural for the followers to resist the change initially. This is what exactly happened at the CUF rally. At this point, leaders have to demonstrate their courage and ability to persuade their followers to build trust to follow their leaders to venture into the unknown. Apart from the major public rallies held in Unguja and Pemba, the CUF top leadership organized internal meetings at district and local levels to explain what had transpired and their prospects. Ultimately, CUF members and followers gradually accepted the deal and recognized the wisdom of their leaders to venture into the unknown terrain.

During the referendum, different groups and institutions in Zanzibar and beyond strongly supported the transformation process. These included political parties, CSOs, religious institutions, the media, and the international community. The electronic and print media was clearly in favor of the Yes vote. Similarly, religious institutions played an important role in sensitizing people to accept the spirit of reconciliation and turned out in large numbers on the referendum day to cast their votes in favor of the GNU (Bakari & Makulilo, 2012). The strong support of such institutions could not be attributed to the role of political leadership in courting for their support, but fortunately, those were generally out of their motivations already committed to the reconciliation process. On the whole, the political environment was conducive for the spread of the idea of GNU across the political divides.

Apart from the internal forces in Zanzibar that facilitated the reconciliation process, the then President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, had shown strong commitment to support the initiative despite the failure of *Muafaka* III, the process which he had initiated immediately after he took office in October 2005. While inaugurating the tenth parliament, he categorically stated that he was committed to facilitating the process to resolve the political conflict in Zanzibar. What prompted Kikwete to take a more positive political stance is

difficult to tell. However, what could be inferred is that several factors were at play, both internal and external. Internally, with the experience of past elections in Zanzibar characterized by violence and persistent political hostility, it was evident that the use of force could only diffuse the situation for some time but could not resolve the political conflict in Zanzibar. Externally, pressure by the international community was being exerted on the Zanzibar government, including measures to freeze foreign aid by western donors. Against that background, therefore, although we cannot justifiably consider the ruling establishment as one of the key enablers of the reconciliation process,[21] the role of the President of the United Republic was quite instrumental in facilitating the process.

Likewise, we cannot underestimate the influence of western donors in the reconciliation process. They would very well fit in the categories of the enablers of the process. Although they did not directly involve themselves in the reconciliation process or dictate terms to any of the negotiating sides, they had set more or less clear terms as prerequisites for them to continue with development assistance to Zanzibar. Besides, they consistently reminded the government of the United Republic of its responsibility as a sovereign state in resolving the Zanzibar political conflict. The western donors' role and influence in the reconciliation process did not only end with the passing of the tenth amendment to the Zanzibar Constitution that entrenched the GNU into the constitution, but they also provided significant assistance in the preparation of a conducive environment for the holding of the 2015 general elections.

Conclusion

This article was set to examine the reconciliation process in Zanzibar with specific reference to *Maridhiano. The prime objective was* to see whether it contributed to bring some transformation in the Zanzibar conflict and what has been the role of leadership in that process. The transformational role of leadership was based on the schema presented in the theoretical perspective of this study, delineating three different forms and scales of transformation in a conflict situation. First, whether the fundamental change in the relationship between parties and a change in recognizing each other's ethnic and national aspirations has occurred or not. Second,

[21] Given the kind of underground campaign by CCM hardliners during the referendum in Zanzibar and the indication by President Kikwete that the ruling party was afraid of Seif Shariff Hamad that he would break the union, it could be plausible to assume that the ruling establishment was not supportive of the process of reconciliation. See interview with Seif Shariff Hamad with Tshaka Ssali VoA.

fundamental social and political changes have been effected to correct inequalities and injustice to provide all groups with their fundamental human needs; and lastly, whether there have been changes in individuals, i.e., "consciousness and character of human beings. In the case of Zanzibar, we cannot plausibly talk of any 'fundamental' change in the first and the second aspect. However, there were some achievements in the first aspect regarding a certain degree of change in the relationship between parties, particularly in terms of recognizing each other's aspirations. The fact that there was a formal agreement in terms of constitutional amendments to entrench the GNU into the constitution, a decision which a national referendum had preceded, is an indication that, to some extent, there was a change of relationship between the parties. However, there have been considerable achievements regarding the third aspect, i.e., individual consciousness and character changes. To be sure, the decision by the two prominent leaders in Zanzibar (i.e., *Maridhiano)* has not been able to resolve or end the long-standing political conflict, but it has significantly changed the *nature* of the conflict, including, to some extent changing individual consciousness and attitudes which amount to a 'discourse switch' by some key members of the elite, as well as by some citizens. Apparently, there is a gradual process of attitudinal change whereby leaders and the common people are exploring a common national cause for cooperation.

Regarding the agency of transformation, the case of *Maridhiano* in Zanzibar demonstrates that it was possible to transform the nature of conflict and achieve a significant breakthrough by resorting to individual initiatives outside the formal structural arrangements. Whereas the top leadership may get much credit as transformational leaders, behind the scene, they were also very important strategic actors who championed and facilitated the process. Therefore, the initial success of *Maridhiano* underlines the critical importance of creating a 'vanguard' group among the leaders to spearhead and safeguard the initiative against resisters who will always be there in any transformative process (Stedman, 1997). In the case of Zanzibar, it was also revealed that once the key strategic actors achieved the breakthrough, the other significant actors bought into the idea of reconciliation.

On the other hand, it is widely believed that transformational leaders tend to have a strong personal attachment to their missions and that their absence in the course of implementation may have a negative impact in the transformation process even in the context where the mission has

been translated within the legal and constitutional framework.[22] In the case of Zanzibar, the two most prominent transformational leaders, Amani Abeid Karume and Seif Shariff Hamad, were together at the initial stages up to the time of the constitutional amendment and during the time of the 2010 general election. Thereafter, the actual functioning of the GNU was entrusted to Ali Mohamed Shein, the newly elected President of Zanzibar, who, unlike his predecessor, did not seem to have a strong personal attachment to the reconciliation mission.[23]

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[22] See, for example, Luc Reychler and Anton Stellamans (2004) "Researching Peace-Building Leadership", Paper presented at the Conflict Resolution and Peace Building Commission (CRPB), Hungary, July 2014. Available at: https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/400526/1/Cahier71_ReychlerStellamans.pdf. Accessed 27/01/2017. The authors explain the case of F. W de Klerk and Nelson Mandela and their instrumental role in transforming an apartheid South Africa into a new multi-racial democracy.

[23] During an interview with RN 1 and RN 4, they confessed to having requested President Karume to delay the 2010 general election to establish a firm foundation of the reconciliation process.

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Annex 1: List of Respondents

No	Respondent	Code
1.	CUF Secretary-General	RN 1
2.	Minister of Legal and Constitutional Affairs	RN 2
3.	Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources	RN 3
4.	Secretary to the CUF Secretary-General	RN 4
5.	Commissioner, Zanzibar Electoral Commission	RN 5
6.	Lecturer, University of Dar es Salaam	RN 6
7.	Political Scientist, Zanzibar State University	RN 7
8.	Director of Public Prosecution	RN 8
9.	Coordinator, Tanzania Women Media Association	RN 9
10.	Member of Parliament (Special Seat), CUF	RN 10
11.	Member of Parliament for Kojani Constituency (CUF)	RN 11
12.	Journalist, MwanaHalisi Newspaper	RN 12
13.	Immigration Department	RN 13
14.	Tanzania Human Rights Defenders (THIRD).	RN 14
15.	Principal Secretary, First Vice President's Office, Zanzibar	RN 15
16.	ACT Wazalendo, Zanzibar	RN 16
17.	Member of the Governing Council, (CHADEMA)	RN 17
18.	UNDP Consultant, Zanzibar	RN 18
19.	CCM Zanzibar leader	RN 19
20.	Member of the Committee of Maridhiano and Former Minister Under GNU, Zanzibar	RN 20
21.	CUF Leader	RN 21

Reexamining the Politics of "Developmental State" in Ethiopia: Was/Is Ethiopia a Developmental State in EPRDF Regime? A Study From 1991-2018

Getasew Endalew Admasu*

Abstract

The core theme of the article is focused on reexamining the "developmental state" politics in Ethiopia. Conceptually, a developmental state is a state which follows the development approach of a state-led economy. It is characterized by the existence of development oriented-political leadership, autonomous bureaucracy, production-oriented private sector, and performance-oriented governance. Based on this notion, the study aims to prove whether Ethiopia (from 1991-2018) is a developmental state or not in the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) regime by employing a qualitative research approach with secondary sources of data. Hence, EPRDF's economic-political realities are examined using theoretical frameworks and features of the developmental state. Accordingly, the study has found, first, that the rhetoric of creating efficient development-oriented political leadership in Ethiopia is aborted due to the prevalence of the economic-political culture of corruption, organized theft, and rent-seeking. Secondly, the EPRDF regime has failed to build autonomous and efficient bureaucracy. Thirdly, the private sector had forced so as not to be productive, competitive, and strong. Fourthly, through achieving high economic growth and reducing the level of poverty, the regime has relatively succeeded in performance-oriented governance even though debt crisis, high level of unemployment, and huge income disparity, the concentration of national resources prevailed amidst the poor level of industrialization. Thus, empirically, EPRDF's Ethiopia in the study's time frame has exceedingly remained as a predatory state and marginally continued as a developmental state. Accordingly, the study recommends succeeding regimes that strive to achieve sustainable economic development to take lessons from the failure of EPRDF in functioning development-oriented political leadership, production-oriented private sector, and meritocratic bureaucracy, plus realizing performance-oriented governance.

Keywords: Politics, Development, Developmental State, Ethiopia, EPRDF

Introduction

The politics and the notion of 'developmental state' are originated from the experience of East and Southeast Asian states, which became successful in attaining economic development in the 1960s (Meyns and Musamba, 2010). Chalmers Johnson firstly used the term after he investigated the development miracle of Japan through following a state-led economy (Fesseha and Abtewold, 2012; Tewolde, 2017). A developmental state is one alternative path of development

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by which a state plays a crucial role in planning and leading the development of a nation's economy in a comprehensive manner (UNDP, 2012). That is why the developmental state, conceptually, conveys the state-led economy's operation to bring economic development. It is true that lots of politicians in Ethiopia, for the last nearly three decades since the coming of EPRDF into power, correlated the political economy and ideological nomenclature of the country with the idea of a "democratic developmental state," and the country had pronounced itself as a "developmental state" (UNDP, 2012). This political truth remains constant, and researches indicate that a developmental state can be authoritarian or democratic (Muleta, 2015). It entails that a regime type does not matter a state is developmental.

The regime of post-1991 Ethiopia, EPRDF, has inclined to follow the developmental state approach of East and Southeast Asian states from other development alternative paths. This political decision is made following the exceptional success of East and Southeast Asian states and the failure of the neoliberal model in Africa and developing states (Meyns and Musamba, 2010; Muleta, 2015). That is why EPRDF has found the developmental state approach of economic development as appropriate for the development of Ethiopia, which is characterized by underdevelopment. Consequently, the then politicians reiterated that it is impossible to eradicate poverty in Ethiopia through adopting neo-liberalism (Fesseha and Abtewold, 2017). Researchers also affirm that Ethiopia is a 'developmental state' (Muleta, 2015; Tewolde, 2017).

Nevertheless, previous studies describing whether Ethiopia is empirically a developmental state or not are shallow. Scholars' debate is restricted on justifying whether Ethiopia is a democratic developmental or authoritarian developmental state regardless of exhaustively investigating whether Ethiopia is a "developmental state or not though taking all features of the developmental state. For instance, politicians of the EPRDF regime and some scholars have argued that "Ethiopia is a democratic developmental state" (Muleta, 2015, p.108).

On the contrary, Tewolde (2017, p.101) has acknowledged that the post-1991 Ethiopia of EPRDF regime is an "authoritarian developmental state." It is developmental because of the record of unprecedented economic growth (*Ibid*). Like Tewolde, the researcher's position is that EPRDF's Ethiopia is an authoritarian state. Due to the absence of constitutionalism, failure of legitimacy, human rights violation, absence of freedom of speech and freedom of movement, and electoral fraud (Merera, 2007; Yonas, 2016; Tewolde, 2017). However, unlike the above

scholars, the researcher argued that unprecedented economic growth could not enable Ethiopia to be a developmental state. The reason is the existence of different parameters of the developmental state. Thus, proving whether Ethiopia is a developmental state requires further investigations by examining the political-economic realities by comprehensively considering all developmental state parameters that preceding researchers have failed to examine.

In Africa, researchers like Meyns and Musamba (2010) have, in their article, "*the developmental state in Africa: problems and prospects"*, explained that there are few research publications regarding the issue of examining a state from the perspective of the developmental state approach. In the Ethiopian context, Tewolde (2017), in his research titled "*The 'democratic developmental state' in Ethiopia", has* argued that Ethiopia is an authoritarian rather developmental state. However, Tewolde and other researchers have failed to conduct an all-inclusive investigation that conveys whether EPRDF's Ethiopia is a "developmental state" or not by all parameters. It is only the country's "unprecedented economic growth" that Tewolde has inclined with limitation to judge Ethiopia as "a developmental state" (Tewolde, 2017, p.101). UNDP also considered Ethiopia as a developmental state by taking its potential of subsequently recording an economic growth rate that extended from 8.4 – 11% (Ahmed, 2017, UNDP, 2012).

Nevertheless, it is impossible to argue that the high economic growth is sufficient for a state to be entirely judged as developmental (Muleta, 2015). Additionally, "not all countries with good growth rates are developmental states" (Taylor, 2005 in Fesseha and Abtewold, 2017, p.12).

Thus, economic growth is not adequate to consider a state as developmental. Within this conceptual framework, Fesseha and Abtewold's (2017) research, "*Ethiopia: A Democratic Developmental State*?" concluded that the status of Ethiopia to be a democratic developmental state is 'controversial.'

Scholars have identified general features of the developmental state, including development-oriented political leadership, autonomous and effective bureaucracy, production-oriented private sector, and performance-oriented governance (Meyns and Musamba, 2010, p.21). The reason for selecting these four pillars to examine the status of Ethiopia from the perspective of the developmental state approach is emanated from the fact that they are features of the

developmental state. The denotation of East Asian states to be a developmental state results from their status to fulfill these featuring requirements to be called developmental state. However, as it is justified earlier, the issue of proving whether Ethiopia is a developmental state or not is not comprehensively examined by taking such features into full consideration. Thus, it is vital to broadly investigate Ethiopia's categorization of the developmental state by taking the developmental state's general measuring features. Besides, among researchers, Muleta (2015, p.108), in his article, "*The Role of Developmental State in Development: The Case of Ethiopia*", argued that:

> *Ethiopia is one of the emerging democratic developmental states in Africa that largely satisfy the perquisites of [the] democratic developmental state paradigm. A few among them are the presence of development-oriented and committed political elites, commitment to build vibrant and far-reaching institutions, state bureaucracy, and the adoption of [a] long-term development plan*.

Nevertheless, contrary to the conclusion of Muleta, the existing reality as argued by the researcher about Ethiopia's political economy and institutional status is not complementary with its connotation to be a developmental state. Abiy and Bedlu substantiated the argument that corruption was prevalent and organized theft in Ethiopia during the EPRDF regime (Abiy, 2019; Bedlu, 2019). It entails, indirectly, the existence of gaps in leadership when Ethiopia is examined via the feature of development-oriented political leadership. The justification is that developmental states are less corrupted (Meyns and Musamba, 2020). Linked with the autonomous and effective bureaucratic features of the developmental state, the issue of meritocracy and professionalism is questionable. The reason is that, in Ethiopia, merit-based bureaucracy is exposed for ethnicity and party loyalty (Bedlu, 2019; Fesseha and Abtewold, 2017; Getachew, 2018). In addition, post-1991, Ethiopia was primarily held by party-led economic companies (Getachew, 2018), which challenged the country not to build a reasonably competitive and production-oriented private sector. Furthermore, unlike the status of developmental states that they achieve according to the future of performance-oriented governance, problems of unemployment and absolute poverty prevailed in Ethiopia (Alemayehu and Befekadu, 2005 Alemayehu, 2017).

These premises prove the existence of research gaps and suggest the essentiality of reexamining the politics of Ethiopia from the perspective of the developmental state approach. To this end, the study's time frame is extended from 1991 to 2018. In 1991, EPRDF came into power and joined a momentum of 'political reform' in 2018 (UNDP, 2018). Thus, the political economy and institutional realities that researchers have failed to analyze in this time frame must be comprehensively reexamined through the features of the developmental state that scholars have identified. That is why reinvestigating Ethiopia's connotation to be a "developmental state" labeled in the EPRDF regime.

Accordingly, the study's main objective is to reexamine the scientific task of proving whether EPRDF's Ethiopia was/is a developmental state or not. It is done through reviewing the previous findings of researchers who failed to consider groundbreaking realities, which could be seen to study Ethiopia's linkage with the developmental state approach of development. The study is conducted by triangulating tangible realities observed in the governance of the EPRDF regime with the features of developmental state and experience of developmental states.

Hence, in order to validate whether Ethiopia is a "developmental state" or not, the study is encircled to justify four basic research questions. Had Ethiopia experienced a development-oriented political leadership in the regime of EPRDF? Had Ethiopia practiced an autonomous and effective bureaucracy in the EPRDF regime? Had EPRDF's Ethiopia undergone a production-oriented private sector? Had Ethiopia, in the EPRDF regime, implemented performance-oriented governance? The research is done to justify these questions of the study. Apart from filling a research gap, justifying these questions has two fundamental significances. First, the study is valuable to provide a conclusive scientific analysis for intellectual readers to have a deeper understanding, both from a theoretical and empirical perspective, of the politics of the 'developmental state' in Ethiopia. Secondly, the study is significant for the current and future practitioners at all government levels responsible for attaining economic development in Ethiopia to acquire empirical shreds of evidence and findings during EPRDF's regime.

Research Methods and Materials

The study has employed a qualitative research approach. As scholars argue, the qualitative method is advised to be used for a study that is descriptive and non-experimental (Frankfurt-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). Congruent with this research method, the study has adopted a non-experimental research design of content analysis that focuses on using existing collected and written data (Bordens and Abot, 1999, Johnson, 2014). To this end, the researcher has utilized secondary sources of data. Linked with the analysis of secondary data sources, researchers recommend that secondary analysis may benefit in situations where there is a difficulty to access participants by different factors (Sutehal *et al.,* 2010*).* Besides, "secondary data analysis is a viable method to utilize in the process of inquiry" (Johnston, 2014, p.619). That is why the study applied this method of analysis.

Moreover, the existence of great potentiality to achieve the objective and justify the research questions by utilizing secondary data sources can enable the study to be scientifically persuasive and rigorous. Accordingly, the data analysis is conducted through the content-based descriptive technique of qualitative secondary data analysis. Hence, the study exhaustively investigated available literature and research outputs.

Theoretical and Empirical Discussion

The Status of Ethiopia *vis-à-vis* Features of Developmental State

The study's analysis is done by using the featuring concepts of a developmental state as parameters of triangulating the reality both thematically and methodologically. The defining features of the developmental state are identified by those scholars who have researched the experience of East and South-East Asian countries. These features include development-oriented political leadership, autonomous and effective bureaucracy, production-oriented private sector, and performance-oriented governance (Meyns and Musamba, 2010). Accordingly, to justify whether the status of Ethiopia is empirically developmental or not in the time frame of the study, the author has conducted the theoretical and empirical analysis as follows.

Development-Oriented Political Leadership

The theoretical root of the developmental state concept is examined via the regime of EPRDF, by which its ideological orientation has been officially introduced. Similarly, through the leadership

of Ethiopia's ex-Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, the idea of development-oriented political leadership has been overemphasized and reiterated (Muleta, 2015). The reiteration about the developmental state emanates from the interest of mobilizing the people by the slogan of "our enemy is poverty, and we will make poverty history" (Muleta, 2015, p.97). It implies that it was during the EPRDF regime in which poverty was publically declared as the enemy of the country. Accordingly, it is possible to reason out that the regime's justification in introducing a developmental state approach is to reverse poverty which is acknowledged as an enemy of the country. Here, what could be remembered is a substantial role of government intervention to eradicate poverty and transform the economy. For further clarification, a developmental state is a state which is "determined to influence the direction and pace of economic development by directly intervening in the development process, rather than relying on the uncoordinated influence of market forces to allocate economic resource" (Meyns and Musamba, 2010, p.13). Based on this definition, it is vital to justify the purpose of state intervention.

As researchers reveal it, state intervention is to encourage the industrial policy of import substitution to reinforce investment and economic growth by addressing the problem of market distortion (Onis, 1991). That is why the government has a vital role in correcting market failure, which is taken as the feature of an underdeveloped economy (*Ibid*). To this end, the vital force of policy realization is leadership. Again, the leadership of policy realization through achieving politico-economic stability requires the existence of powerful economic and political ideology that drives development (Meyns and Musamba, 2010). Simultaneously, it also demands the presence of functional institutions which can facilitate economic development and political stability (*Ibid*). Within this scope, the primary concern of the developmental state is ensuring relative equity of income, eradicating poverty, and addressing unemployment through achieving sustained economic growth and rapid industrialization (Singh and Ovadia, 2018)). It seems to this end that EPRDF designed development programs like Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP), Plan of Action for Sustainable Development and Eradication of Poverty (PASDEP), and Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) (MoFED, 2010). As it is defined by Leftwich (2000), it bears in mind that the developmental state is demanded to be governed by the highest servants of the public who are developmentally oriented, demonstrate

high levels of commitment, and will attain economic growth. Moreover, following the parameter of development-oriented leadership, leaders of a developmental state are relatively "uncorrupted, non-predatory or had limited personal gains, and thus did not impede investments but rather facilitated the expansion of national productivity" (Fritz, 2006 in Meyns and Musamba, 2010, p.22).

While the reality of EPRDF's regime is examined, corruption and rent-seeking have remained as cancers in transforming Ethiopia's socio-economic and political development (UNDP, 2018 and Bedlu, 2019). This is due to the failure of the EPRDF regime to establish a strong system of accountability which is vital to control public-serving responsibility (Abiy, 2019, Bedlu, 2019). Thus, following the practice of revolutionary democracy in Ethiopia, the public's interest was highly exposed to and exploited by rent-seekers (Abiy, 2019). This fact proves the prevalence of pervasive corruption that blocked the provision of public goods and the attainment of development needs in Ethiopia (Singh and Ovadia, 2018). Additionally, due to the practice of federal state structure in post-1991 Ethiopia, it is an ethnic representation of nation and nationalities that has acquired a prime concern regardless of leadership quality. This experience has paved the way for the growth of the leadership system of patrimonialism, which caused for scrambling the existing wealth of a state differently through collecting servants of the public based on ethnicity, largely, from one area (Abiy, 2019, Singh and Ovadia, 2018). The scenario in Ethiopia conveys the existence of "Patronage-oriented political rulers" (Meyns and Musamba, 2010, p.8). Because of this, resources of the country scrambled and concentrated in the hands of a few instead of being distributed equitably to the majority of the population. Through examining this tendency of the regime, Singh and Ovadia (2018) pointed out that the national wealth of the state is unfairly exploited by a small group.

Apart from this, EPRDF's idea of "Revolutionary Democracy" has failed to ensure the prevalence of the rule of law and failed to limit those individuals who have strengthened their web of plundering the nation's resources and the population (Abiy, 2019). This implies the occurrence of a system that experts call the '*Kleptocratic regime'* system characterized by the existence of expanded corruption and collection of thefts (Fekade, 2018). Corruption is indeed a fundamental impediment to economic and other areas of development (Agbude and Etete, 2013; Plumer, 2012; Zouaoui *et al*., 2017). Accordingly, the developmental state approach, among others, demands leadership quality and relatively uncorrupted governance to achieve the required

mission of development. However, unlike developmental states, Ethiopia is one of those states that scored unchanged high corruption perception index (CPI) (West, 2005; Zemelak, 2017; Zouaoui *et al*., 2017). Researchers and institutions have categorized the corruption level of around 175 states as high, medium, and low. Their value of CPI is limited from 0.85 - 3.2, 3.34 - 6.55, and 6.96 - 8.57, respectively. Accordingly, the CPI of Ethiopia was 2.06, which implied the prevalence of high corruption levels (Zouaoui *et al*., 2017).

Having this data in mind, Ethiopians have proved that EPRDF has arrived from the stage of producing Generals and Ministers who plunder the resources of the state in millions and billions (Bedlu, 2019). The imprisonment of officials of Metal and Engineering Technology Corporation of Ethiopia (METEC) and other federal government ministers in 2018 (Zemelak, 2017; Mahlet and Yared, 2018; Kiruga, 2019) was self-evident for the execution of massive level of corruption in EPRDF's Ethiopia. Due to this, as pointed out in Africa Report and Addis Standard, nearly 60 government officials have been accused of committing grand corruption following the coming of Abiy Ahmed as Prime Minister of a state (Mahlet and Yared, 2018; Kiruga, 2019). However, it does not mean that these are the only corrupted officials of the country. Because of the systematic and structural nature of corruption (Agbude and Etete, 2013), all could not be fully and easily identified and accused.

In Ethiopia, the government of the EPRDF regime also became unable to address the inadequacy of leadership quality of attaining development-oriented political governance (Abiy, 2019). The reason is that leadership in EPRDF is linked with the politics of party loyalty and ethnic representation regardless of referring leadership qualification. In the EPRDF regime, it is justified that rent-seeking is the dominant manifestation of its system of governance. The political power linked with corruption and organized stealing has domiciliated as a culture (Abiy, 2019 and Muleta, 2015). The reality of this practice envisions Habtamu (2017) to argue that the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) dominated system of EPRDF is a collection of governmental robbers.

Moreover, the government has failed to ensure the prevalence of accountability (Zemelak, 2017; Bedlu, 2019). Therefore, there is no possibility to judge Ethiopia as a developmental state within the politico-economic culture of corruption, organized stealing, rent-seeking, violation of law,

and absence of accountability at the back of all efforts to attain economic development. For Ethiopia's status to be a developmental state based on the criteria of development-oriented political leadership, what EPRDF has is only an ideological orientation to promote a developmental state approach. In short, EPRDF's Ethiopia was/is not, empirically, a developmental state while it is examined through the parameter of development-oriented political leadership.

Autonomous and Effective Bureaucracy

Regarding this feature, as the experience of Japan demonstrates, the developmental state demands the existence of "inexpensive, professional and efficient state bureaucracy" (Johnson, 1982 cited in Meyns and Musamba, 2010, p.12). Apart from Japan, the development path of other East and Southeast Asian states like Taiwan, Thailand, and Hong Kong implies that their bureaucracy operates through prioritizing meritocratic recruitment, providing promotion incentives, applying rationality to bureaucratic officials and employees (Meyns and Musamba, 2010). The justification is that "the developmental state is managed by a powerful, professional, highly competent, and insulated and career-based bureaucracy" (Leftwich, 2000 in Meyns and Musamba, 2010, p.16). To this end, a developmental state requires "a political system in which the bureaucracy is given sufficient scope to take initiatives and operate effectively" (Onis, 1991, p.111). That is why the presence of strong and effective bureaucracy is one of the key features and basic source of strength for the developmental state (Abiy, 2019). Thus, a developmental state is needed to have an efficient and autonomous bureaucracy. The bureaucratic autonomy is required to attain the development desires and goals of the public in an inclusive manner instead of predatorily-oriented self-maximizing leadership behavior. To attain development through an autonomous and efficient bureaucracy, a developmental state necessitates and applies the system of accountability because it is accountability by which the effectiveness of bureaucracy of governance of a certain state can be measured (Onis, 1991).

In this perspective, if the reality of Ethiopia is examined, the bureaucracy is linked with the political arrangement of ethnic federalism. In the EPRDF regime, political space is opened for ethnic nationalism to prevail in Ethiopia rather than civic nationalism. However, the "economy of developmental state requires civic nationalism" (Getachew, 2018, p.51) to prevail over ethnic nationalism. In addition, the developmental state approach needs a standard that can generate a

bureaucratic elite with a sense of unity and common or shared identity, which is imperative to attain national goals (Onis, 2011). According to this perspective, Ethiopia's ethnic federalism is faced with the problem of bureaucratic inefficiency in particular and operational problems in general. It is due to the practice of recruiting experts "based on ethnicity who largely do not have a potential to achieve the desirable outcome of development" (Bedlu, 2019, p.38). This practical evidence implies that the inefficiency of state bureaucracy results from the system's failure to recruit those who have the potential of execution based on meritocracy. As justified earlier, Scholars like Onis (1991) have argued that autonomous bureaucracy's effectiveness is determined by the existence and absence of accountability and meritocracy. For instance, the success of Japan (typical developmental state) in building political and economic development has resulted from its commitment to building an efficient and autonomous bureaucracy reliant on knowledge and skill (Abiy, 2019).

On the contrary, Ethiopia has experienced a limitation in building strong bureaucratic institutions even though EPRDF has initiated a developmental state approach in the past nearly three decades (*Ibid*). It is due to the prevalence of party loyalty in the country at the expense of professionalism and meritocracy (Fesseha and Abtewold, 2017; Bedlu, 2019). That is why the late Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, has stated that "everybody could be appointed as a minister if he accepts the intent of EPRDF" (Bedlu, 2019, p.164).

In this leadership path under the guiding principle of ethnic chauvinism, state institutions of Ethiopia were filled and managed to run the administration. Knowledge and working experience have not been prioritized as a standard of serving the public (*Ibid*). Any civic and governmental institutions were required to be led by individuals directly and indirectly affiliated with the power holders of TPLF (Habtamu, 2017). Thus, filling institutional positions was not professional capacity but political loyalty and predominantly ethnic identity of being Tigre (Bedlu, 2017, Habtamu, 2017). That is why the system is criticized by its bureaucratic leadership experience of focusing on recruiting experts on their party loyalty of being a member of EPRDF and ethnic group, which becomes a social base of TPLF with the cost of meritocracy. It entails that institutional practices are connected with the everyday political decision-making process. However, the experience of developmental states demonstrates the establishment of a

"professional bureaucracy that kept its distance from everyday politics" (Hauge, 2019:2073). Based on this fact, it is possible to argue that the necessity of autonomous and effective bureaucracy, which is demanded to realize developmental state approach of development in Ethiopia, failed to be built in the lifetime of the regime. It is because of the deficiency of autonomous and efficient bureaucracy and the existence of a collection of governmental robbers, the governance situation of Ethiopia in the EPRDF regime has arrived from the stage of holding a picture of desperation (Habtamu, 2017). Simultaneously, the prevalence of corruption in Ethiopia has resulted from the ineffectiveness of state institutions (Zemelak, 2017). Thus, there is no ground to argue that EPRDF's Ethiopia is a developmental state in the nonexistence of an autonomous and efficient bureaucracy.

Production-Oriented Private Sector

Developmental states exhibit high capacity levels for effective economic management of domestic and foreign private economic interests (Meyns and Musamba, 2010). For this purpose, developmental states are demanded to apply selective and strategic use of protectionism. This includes providing industrial subsidies, applying sustained rewards to persuade domestic investors, creating business coalitions amongst industrial capital and financial capital with the state (Wong, 2004, Singh and Ovadia, 2018). As we can learn from the experience of East and Southeast Asian developmental states, they have a strong private sector supported by market incentives (Onis, 1991 and Yusuf, 2017). In order to pave a way and realize the existence of a production-oriented private sector, the government is responsible for exercising its autonomy of subsidizing the growth and success of private sectors, especially in the manufacturing sector like what has been seen in Taiwan, Japan, and Singapore (Onis, 1991).

In post-1991 Ethiopia, following the policy of regime change, it was relatively small enterprises that were privatized (Ethiopian Economic Association (EEA), 2007). The economic path was closed, especially for domestic investors who want to produce in a fair and competitive environment. The reason is that the economy was controlled by a few economic forces (Abiy, 2019). Though unprecedented economic growth was recorded (Tewolde, 2017, UNDP, 2012) and EPRDF has "opened the door for the private sector to play a considerable role in the economy" (Muleta, 2015, p.9), a state has failed to build independent and competitive private sector (Getachew, 2018).

Researches indicate that private investment increased in the first three years and decreased in the second half of the 1990s (Shiferaw, 2017). In addition, "although private investment bounced back to 18% of GDP during 2002-2004, it steadily declined to about 14% of GDP in 2011. It was only in 2012, halfway into the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP-1), that private investment rose above 20% of GDP" (Shiferaw, 2017, p.3). Unlike the experience of globally known developmental states in creating business alliances (Singh and Ovadia, 2018), in EPRDF's Ethiopia, the economic alliance of the private and public sector also remained weak (Getachew, 2018). Like in the past, the private sector is highly limited in producing consumer and light manufacturing goods (EEA, 2007, Hague, 2019). These realities prove the existence of pathetic institutional capacity in creating a production-oriented private sector and attaining rapid industrialization development in Ethiopia.

Generally, the required and expected role of the private sector on the economic development of Ethiopia from the perspective of the developmental state approach is unsatisfactory. The private sector has been pushed and forced to continue as weak by government intervention, which ultimately paved the way for rent-seekers to plunder people's wealth (Abiy, 2019). This practice entails that the private sector has been made to be weakened by the government itself. Moreover, it was major party companies of EPRDF like *Effort*, *Tiret*, *Dinsho*, and *Wondo*, extensively engaged under the leadership of the then politicians through dominating the economic share of governmental institutions and private institutions investors. Their economic participation and domination are found both in the business of trade and service provision (Getachew, 2018). Yonas (2016, p.135) has pointed out that "suspicious party-led businesses pervade the private sector whose growth remains anemic, and the government still controls a large share of the national economy." Similarly, Habtamu (2017) justified that the political intervention of the government weakens the private economy.

According to these premises, as mentioned above, we can understand that the domination of party companies of EPRDF has forced the private sector so as not to be competitive and productive. Thus, it is convincing to conclude that the role of the private sector in enforcing the investment sector of the state economy was equated and replaced by the domination of party companies of the regime. Because, apart from controlling political power, the evidence proves

that party-led economic companies of EPRDF have dominance over economic networks by which the private sector deserves to engage for higher production through competition. In economics, the private sector cannot be efficient by its journey of economic participation and production without an enabling economic and political environment and the absence of government incentives. If the private sector has failed to be productive in the end, we cannot find a logical or theoretical foundation to consider a state as 'developmental'.

Based on the production-oriented-private sector feature of developmental states, South East Asian states became capable of "replacing an imported product of factory and exporting their factory product" (Getachew, 2018, p.11). It proves that the import substitution policy of the Asian Tigers became efficient. This success enabled them to block the global market's pressure and become a developmental state. The contrary is true in Ethiopia. That is why researchers on macro-economy and underdevelopment of Ethiopia advise the necessity of applying the policy of import substitution for the development of the country (Eshetu, 2004). To realize the success of import substitution, Ethiopia has hardly experienced strengthening the alliance of foreign investors and private domestic firms though coequally applying the reward and punishment ('carrot and stick') policy (Hague, 2019). Though FDI is increased, the EPRDF regime has focused on applying the carrot policy. The political-economic journey of attracting FDI also lacks a practical linkage to make the private sector productive and competitive (*Ibid*).

Precisely, the success of import substitution demands the existence of a production-oriented private sector. Hence, the production-oriented private sector feature of the developmental state is characterized by its competency of enabling a state to export heavily manufactured products with global competitiveness. Since recently, in the leadership of EPRDF, an improvement has begun to be seen in the manufacturing sector of textile through the support of foreign direct investment even though it does not bring meaningful contributions of export earnings for the country (Shiferaw, 2017). However**,** except for some consumer goods, Ethiopia is still an importer of heavily manufactured goods like in the past (Eshetu, 2004 and Shiferaw, 2017). It implies, partly, the low solidarity level of the production-oriented private sector. That is one of the reasons that from states of Sub-Saharan Africa, Ethiopia is known for its lowest shares of industry and manufacturing (Eshetu, 2004; Muleta, 2015). Other researchers also supported the findings that Ethiopia's private production and investment rate is low (Shiferaw, 2017).

Accordingly, by the parameter of having a production-oriented private sector, empirically, Ethiopia cannot be judged as a 'developmental state'.

Performance-Oriented Governance

The last defining feature of a developmental state is the existence of performance-oriented governance. This type of governance is characterized by promoting economic growth and attainment of rapid industrialization (Meyns and Musamba, 2010, Singh and Ovadia, 2018). From the developmental state approach, benefiting citizens in economic growth is linked with eradicating poverty and addressing unemployment with equity (Musamba, 2010). Through examining the regime of EPRDF, Tewolde (2017, p.101) has concluded that Ethiopia became a developmental state due to its "unprecedented economic growth." However, becoming a developmental state and attaining economic growth that would be measured by Growth National Product (GNP) is different. The justification is that "growth data do not indicate the direction of change in income distribution and its impact on the wellbeing of the people" (Jeong, 2000, p.243). Simultaneously, a developmental state is manifested by the attainment of rapid and sustained growth of industrialization (Singh and Ovadia, 2018). Based on this premise, the researcher argues that economic growth cannot enable Ethiopia to be a developmental state even if that growth is part of such an approach because "growth and development are not the same things" (UNDP, 2012, p.4). However, the remarkable progress of Ethiopia's growth measured in GDP is recognizable.

Moreover, the performance-oriented governance of a developmental state is measured by the state's achievement of rapid and sustained growth of industrialization (Singh and Ovadia, 2018). By this theoretical parameter, Ethiopia is known for its poor level of industrialization and infant stage of the manufacturing sector (Ahmed, 2017). According to Shiferaw (2017), the total contribution of the private and public sectors manufacturing accounts for only 5% of GDP. Accordingly, unlike developmental states, Hauge (2019:2072) revealed that "Ethiopia is at a very early stage of industrialization."

Nonetheless, Ethiopia has invested "heavily to reduce poverty and promote social development" (UNDP, 2018, p.5). Accordingly, the researcher recognized that the regime of EPRDF did

remarkable expansion on the access of social services. Besides this, the quality of education and health services has not been improved (*Ibid*). Furthermore, to appraise the performance-oriented governance of the developmental state, the government is expected to resolve problems of income inequality, unemployment, and rampant poverty (Deyo, 1987 in Meyns and Musamba, 2010, UNDP, 2012). Within such a conceptual and practical level of understanding, as seen from East Asian developmental states, equity is the central point of the success of developmental states. That is why the attainment of economic growth and equitable income distribution is the manifestation of these East Asian states. Accordingly, developmental states have attained a high level of economic growth and relatively equitable income distribution among their respective people (Onis, 1991).

However, in the Ethiopian context, there is a significant disparity in income distribution at the national level. In post-1991, what was created in Ethiopia was the society of few rich and many poor (Getachew, 2018). It is a substantial verification for the existence of a vast disparity of income distribution in the country. In EPRDF's Ethiopia, there was also a disparity of budget allocation at the regional level that challenged the developmental state approach so as not to be realized. Regarding this fact, Merera (2007, p.99) stated that:

> *The Tigray region's per capita share of the federal subsidy was consistently higher than the Oromia, Amhara, and SNNP regions which, together, constitute more than 80% of the country's population. The same is true for capital expenditure per capita as well as foreign loans and aid per capita. Furthermore, the Somali region, whose population is greater than Tigray, was getting proportionally far less than Tigray.*

The above literature assures the prevalence of inequitable and unfair distribution of the country's national resources for its regions. This truth manifests the EPRDF regime as examined from 1991 to 2018. That is why the World Bank has reported that the economic growth recorded in Ethiopia does not create an equal opportunity for all regions and people to be equally benefited (World Bank, 2010 cited by Getachew, 2018). Researchers also urged that, in the EPRDF regime, there is "the growing concentration of power and wealth within a small group" (Singh and Ovadia, 2018, p.1042). Consequently, unfair distribution of national resources and unequal benefit from the state's economic growth entails the weakness of the performance-oriented governance of Ethiopia to be judged as a developmental state.

Moreover, unlike East Asian developmental states, the economic growth of Ethiopia is not accompanied by a sharp increase in the manufacturing sector (Shiferaw, 2017). Other researches also verify that the ties of foreign investors and the domestic economy of typical developmental states in their foreign direct investment (FDI) oriented policy are strong and contributed to the sustained growth of industrialization (Hague, 2019). Nonetheless, the linkage of business between foreign investors and domestic firms in EPRDF's Ethiopia has endured as poor, with the exception of ties between foreign footwear producers and local tanneries (Hague, 2019). It implies that Ethiopia's potential to become a developmental state in building sustained growth of industrialization is not strengthened.

Besides, apart from economic growth, the most imperative success that a developmental state should have is executive political elites who have a high level of commitment to reduce poverty and sustain political legitimacy (Leftwich, 2000 in Meyns and Musamba, 2010). It implies that the legitimacy of the political elite to govern a state is tightly linked to the state's ability to operate efficiently to reduce poverty and legitimate governance of the population. This urges that performance-oriented governance is demanded to address existing problems related to persistent unemployment, rampant poverty, and a high level of income inequality (Meyns and Musamba, 2010). As pointed out by Shiferaw that "the investment rate in Ethiopia doubled from about 20% of GDP in the second half of the 1990s to about 40% of GDP in 2014" (Shiferaw, 2017, p.34) which has contributed significantly to Ethiopia's promising economic growth. Therefore, Ethiopia's economy in the EPRDF regime has achieved a growth rate averaging 9.9 a year from 2007 to 2018 (Oshora *et al*., 2021). However, economic growth exclusively cannot enable a state to be developmental (Hsu, 2012). Hence, considering EPRDF's Ethiopia as a developmental state by considering economic growth as one element of performance-oriented governance is "expected to resolve levels of income inequality, unemployment, and rampant poverty" (Meyns and Musamba, 2010, p.25).

While EPRDF's Ethiopia is examined, up until 2005, 44.2 percent of the total population was living below the poverty line (Alemayehu and Befekadu, 2005). Since then, around 8 million chronically food-insecure people have been targeted to be supported by a productive safety net program (PSNP) (UNDP, 2018). Still, 80% of the Ethiopian population is found in the living

condition, which can be termed "from hand to mouth" (Getachew, 2018, p. 21). Statistical data indicated that poverty was declined by 9% between the years 2005 and 2011 (Jolliffe *et al*., 2016). The population who live in extreme poverty ($1.9 and less) is reduced from 55.3 % in 2000 to 33.5 % in 2015 (World Bank, 2016 cited by Ahmed, 2018). However, how much the promising economic growth of Ethiopia was changed into an inclusive and better quality of job creation is questionable (Oshora *et al*., 2021). Concerning this fact, the regime's inability to attain equity concerning the distribution of national budget and wealth is also justified earlier. Based on the evidence under investigation, EPRDF's Ethiopia cannot be righteously regarded as a developmental state. For a government that prefers to follow a developmental state, Getachew (2018, p.25) has stated that:

> *A certain economic policy's effectiveness is measured by balancing the growth through equitable accessibility of resources, not by making or not making the growth fast. It is only while economic development is balanced and inclusively benefits the whole sections of the society by which a government can argue that it has brought economic growth. The reason is that growth must be citizen-driven rather than a policy-driven.*

Contrarily, the people of Ethiopia are known for the wide disparity of wealth challenged by the increasing trend of inflation, poverty, unemployment, and shortage of foreign currency (Getachew, 2018). Furthermore, inflation which reduces the purchasing power of its people, basically the poor and middle class of the society, became an expanding factor of absolute poverty (75%) in Ethiopia than ever before (Alemayehu, 2017).[24] All of the above qualitative and quantitative data prove that rampant and absolute poverty prevails in Ethiopians' lives, with the exception of its severity from time to time. Moreover, in the Human Development Index (HDI) of 2015, Ethiopia was ranked at 174th of 188 states (Ahmed, 2018). This is the lowest record that is not expected from a state presumed as a developmental state. Thus, the achievement of promising economic growth in EPRDF contributed to the reduction of severity of poverty and unemployment but was not supported by the rapid growth of industrialization, the realization of equity in wealth distribution, and the lowest HDI and failed to guarantee Ethiopia to be righteously developmental state.

[24] Alemyahu Geda is a Professor of Economics at Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia. The researcher recorded this affirmation while presenting his research paper at the University of Gondar in 2017.

Results and Discussions

This research affirmed that Ethiopia, in the EPRDF regime, had developed a comprehensive development strategy that conveyed the essentiality of following the developmental state approach. It also revealed that EPRDF had endured as a proponent of the developmental state approach to achieve economic development. However, in reality, EPRDF's Ethiopia was not profoundly qualified as a developmental state. The research has revealed that the political economy and culture of corruption, organized theft, rent-seeking, and absence of accountability obligated the development-oriented political leadership feature of developmental state to fail in Ethiopia. Due to the dominance of ethnicity and party loyalty, the EPRDF regime had not succeeded in establishing an autonomous and efficient bureaucracy based on meritocracy.

Moreover, the production-oriented private sector was not created in Ethiopia. Instead, the private sector was forced not to be competitive and productive. Besides, the alliance of the domestic private firms with foreign investors for structural and sustained growth of production was weak. From the perspective of performance-oriented governance, the EPRDF regime has failed to attain rapid growth of industrialization. The recorded promising economic growth has indeed reduced the level of poverty and unemployment. However, problems of the debt crisis, unemployment, income disparity, and generally rampant poverty were not resolved in the country. Hence, the study has empirically found that EPRDF's Ethiopia has remained a marginally developmental and exceedingly predatory state.

Conclusion and Recommendation

From the above discussion and analysis, it can be concluded that the status of Ethiopia was not fairly a developmental state. Instead, it has dominantly stayed as a predatory state. It happens due to the failure of TPLF dominated regime of EPRDF to create an enabling environment for comprehensive operation of features of developmental state approach in the country. Thus, essential features of developmental state like development-oriented leadership, autonomous and efficient bureaucracy, production-oriented private sector, and performance-oriented governance have not been efficiently attained. To provide justifications, unlike developmental states, what has been deep-rooted in EPRDF's Ethiopia was grand corruption and structurally organized theft

(Abiy, 2019). Therefore, the practice of structurally organized grand corruption has caused the development-oriented political leadership parameter of developmental state to be aborted.

Furthermore, all of this reality is the manifestation of a predatory state. Conceptually, a predatory state is a state where its business people and political elites tend to extract and exploit public resources for their private purpose instead of benefiting society and ordinary people (Diamond, 2008 and UNDP, 2012). It entails that a predatory state is a state which consists of rulers who primarily focus on maximizing their interests.

Besides proving the existence of a weak private economic sector and inefficient bureaucracy, the study also revealed that EPRDF became unable to realize the performance-oriented governance feature of a developmental state. That is why the performances of the state in attaining equity, eradiating poverty, and addressing unemployment are continued as the most challenging socio-economic issue of the regime. Though promising economic growth is recorded, at the same time, unemployment of youths and economic disparity between the poor and rich has highly prevailed. Moreover, unlike east and Southeast Asian developmental states, EPRDF's Ethiopia does not achieve rapid industrialization growth. The study has concluded that EPRDF's Ethiopia is not a relatively developmental rather a predatory state. Scholars in the field argue that predatory states are known for their lowest performance of attaining popular welfare and character of organized banditry (Moselle and Polak, 2001). The same is true in Ethiopia's political and economic reality, where organized theft of the system has severely affected public welfare, and the trajectory of development projects' success is expanded in the leadership of EPRDF.

Therefore, like other features, the performance-oriented governance parameter of the developmental state approach is not efficiently achieved in Ethiopia. Accordingly, the study concluded that the state-led economy of EPRDF's Ethiopia, characterized by organized theft, inefficient bureaucracy, weak private economic sector, weak industrialization, and rampant poverty, could not enable Ethiopia to be empirically developmental. Generally and empirically, in the EPRDF regime extended from 1991 to 2018, Ethiopia is a slightly developmental and exceedingly predatory state. It entails that the regime has failed to make Ethiopia a developmental state. Thus, the researcher recommends the successive regimes of Ethiopia and other states to take lessons from the failure of EPRDF in attaining development through

efficiently functioning development-oriented political governance, production-oriented private sector, performance-oriented governance, and efficient and autonomous bureaucracy.

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Occupational Health and Safety in Tanzanian Construction Sector: Incompliance, Informality, and Power Relations

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Abstract

The management of Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) on construction sites continues to be an area of concern. Workers have continued to be blamed for unsafe behavior, contributing to the increase in the number of accidents on construction sites. Although various legislative acts enforcing Health and Safety (HS) exist, incompliance with such legislation is evident. This study sets out to understand why construction managers and workers do not comply with OHS legislation. Interviews, focus group discussions, and observations were carried out with the construction site managers and informal construction workers on selected construction sites. Content and thematic analyses were adopted to analyze the data using Nvivo version 12, qualitative analysis software. The study confirmed poor OHS practices and concluded that the precarious nature of the workers' jobs in the construction sector limits their power to demand the enforcement of OHS, resulting in them accepting the risks as wage-for-labor precariat. Site managers have limited power since they are employees of the main contractor, and their focus is on the completion of the construction projects. This study recommends the need to establish an inclusive safety management system that accommodates the main contractors, managers, and workers. Moreover, a review of the current OHS (building and construction) rules is recommended to recognize the precariat-informal construction workers, who are the main players on construction sites.

Keywords: Construction, Informal Construction Workers, Occupational Health and Safety

Introduction

Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) on construction sites continue to be an overarching problem worldwide. The construction sector ranks amongst the most hazardous sectors globally (Abbas et al., 2018; Aikaeli & Mkenda, 2015; Guo & Yiu, 2015; Jason, 2007; Mneymneh et al., 2017; Rowlinson, 2000), claiming an increasing number of workers' lives while leaving others with permanent disabilities or permanent illnesses (Oliveira & Pais, 2018). These incidents contribute to around 25-40% of fatalities around the world (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2005; Lingard, 2013). In Tanzania, the construction sector employs 9-11% of the national workforce, accounting for 25-45% of fatalities (National Audit Office of Tanzania (NAOT),

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2013). The sector also registers the highest number of occupational injuries and fatalities (23.7%) amongst other economic sectors, such as transport (20.6%), mining (20.5%), and manufacturing (11.4%) (National Audit Office of Tanzania (NAOT), 2013). Occupational health services are almost non-existent in the sector, workers primarily receive first aid, or in cases where medical attention is required, they are referred to primary healthcare facilities (Mrema et al., 2015).

Like other countries, the construction sector in Tanzania, as far as OHS is concerned, is a multi-layered, hierarchical sector with various agencies influencing the decision-making process from different angles (Mrema et al., 2015). Such agencies include the government through the Ministry of Works, the Ministry of Health, the OHS regulators, the contractors' registration board, the contractors, the construction site managers, the sub-contractors, and the workers. The sector heavily depends upon informal construction workers to carry out the construction projects (Aikaeli & Mkenda, 2014), as is the case in most developing countries (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2017; Kheni & Braimah, 2014). The informal construction workers in this study are understood as all people working in the construction sector that are not on the regular payroll of the contractors or of other employers; moreover, they are not protected by labor laws, nor do they receive any kind of formal social protection (Chen, 2012; Standing, 2011; Wells & Jason, 2010). Workers in the sector are characterized by having lower-level education, while the activities in which they are involved are usually labor-intensive, with inadequate technology and the absence of well-defined regulations concerning HS management (Kheni, 2008; Mitullah & Wachira, 2003). The workers perform almost 70-80% of construction work (Chamara et al., 2015; Lingard, 2013). Liang et al. (2021) argued that it is not easy to accurately estimate how workers deal with uncertain HS situations if they have insufficient knowledge and awareness of the risks they could encounter. Most workers in developing countries work to impress their supervisors and co-workers, wishing to appear "tough guys" (Choudhry & Fang, 2008). It is because the number of people on the waiting list for similar jobs is high; therefore, those are fortunate enough who have the work, and they do not wish to relinquish their employment.

In Tanzania, the legislation for OHS in workplaces, as well as sector-specific rules for HS management, exist; these include the Occupational Safety and Health Act number 5 (URT)

(2003) that provides for powers of the inspectors, registration, inspection of workplaces, investigation, and sanctioning of the occupiers of workplaces. Also, the Act directs workplaces to have on-board safety and health representatives and safety committees vested with various responsibilities in managing health and safety at work. Besides, Occupational Safety and Health Policy, URT (2010) directs the effective promotion of OHS initiatives at work, the direction of the government towards OHS initiatives of which the vision is to provide sustainable, safe, and healthy working condition and environment at all workplaces. The direction of the Policy is to see the number of work-related accidents and diseases. The prime objective is to observe whether they are reduced in the country by adopting and implementing a culture that focuses on preventing OHS hazards both on the government side and the employer's side. Lastly, Occupational Safety and Health (Building and Construction) Rules (URT (2015) stipulate the duties and responsibilities of all concerned parties on construction, from the contractor, sub-contractor, workers, and others on site. Also, post OHS qualifications of all key actors, risk assessment and mechanisms for risk identification, risk control and risk management, safety measures to be imposed and how the same are governed, record keeping such as reports and certificates as well as health and welfare measures for all workers and employees. Although these are few among other legislations, they provide governance mechanisms on OHS and how to enforce HS on construction sites effectively. However, various studies have identified the unsafe behavior of workers and their incompliance with such rules and regulations (Chileshe & Dzisi, 2012; Hamid et al., 2008; Heerden, 2018; Smallwood et al., 2009) while literature as to why site managers do not enforce HS is non-existent in Tanzania. This study acts as a steppingstone to understand why construction site managers, as front liners in the implementation of construction projects, do not comply with OHS rules and regulations. Specifically, the study investigated how site managers enforce HS through their Policy Statements, understanding workers' behavior towards HS and the environmental factors affecting workers or managers in proper enforcement and compliance to HS.

Delimitation

This study focused on the management and administration of health and safety on the construction site, where the presence and implementation of the contractor's policy statement on health and safety were vital. The study investigated how site management as leaders of the site functions to enforce rules and regulations on-site such as management of occupational hazards,

training workers on health and safety, provision of PPEs, and how management ensures cleanliness and tidiness to minimize risks and accidents. Secondly, the study focused on workers' behavior regarding health and safety, including how workers observe safety protocols, the use of PPEs, attend health and safety training, and workers' skills regarding particular job assignments provided on-site. Lastly, the study observed the environmental factors in relation to health and safety such as weather conditions - too hot, too cold, rainy and the use of PPEs during such weather conditions, but also the location of the site- how it may contribute to specific behaviors on enforcing health and safety.

Theoretical Framework

The study adopts Guy Standing's notion of the precariat to understand the context of workers in the construction sector in Tanzania. Standing (2011) identifies three important characteristics when explaining the precariat. According to him, a precariat can be defined through distinctive *relations of production*, in which there are flexible labor contracts, temporary jobs, labor in the form of casual work, part-time work, labor brokers, or employment brokers. Workers in the precariat have no secure occupational identity, with no narrative to offer concerning their lives, and are characterized by exploitation in the workplace. In Tanzania, workers in the construction sector are mostly informal workers, without any formal work contracts (Aikaeli & Mkenda, 2015; Mrema et al., 2015; Wells & Jason, 2010). The workers are casual, and the employment is temporary (Jason, 2007).

The second characteristic of the precariat is the distinctive *relations of distribution* on which those workers rely, namely wages without any wage benefits, such as pensions and medical insurance. The majority of these workers are not covered by any social protection measures, such as guaranteed health insurance and pensions; they provide their labor for money (Wells & Jason, 2010), and they go without any sort of unemployment benefits when the work is completed (Jason, 2007). According to Standing, such workers are also characterized by a lack of state benefits, such as unemployment benefits and other benefits that could be derived from private contributory insurance plans, since the wages of such people are meager and unpredictable. Construction workers in Tanzania conform to these characteristics, as revealed by Mitullah & Wachira (2003) and (Aikaeli & Mkenda, 2014).

The third characteristic relates to distinctive *relations to the state*, whereby these workers are "supplicants, reduced to pleading for benefits and access to public services." Although these characteristics do not apply entirely to workers in the construction sector in Tanzania, they reinforce the idea of worker migration and identity. For example, Guy argues that workers, as migrants, do not have access to basic rights provided by the state, which apply to country-to-country migrations. In Tanzania, the construction sector is characterized by rural-urban migration, as workers move from rural areas to the towns searching for jobs.

The notion of the precariat presents an important stimulus in terms of understanding informal construction workers in the construction sector in relation to OHS noncompliance. Although the approach was developed primarily in the context of the global north, certain important features within the characteristics fit well with the precariat in the global south context. Furthermore, to understand why workers do not comply with safety rules, the study is based on the Power Resource Approach to understand how various worker power resources could influence workers to behave differently in relation to compliance or otherwise of the safety rules. This approach provides an insight into the attributes that could influence workers to behave in a certain way, by either complying or not complying with OHS, based on their characteristics.

Literature Review

HS Compliance on Construction Sites

Workers in the construction sector have been accused of being the main cause of construction accidents and fatalities on construction sites (Lingard & Rowlinson, 2005) due to individual factors related to unsafe behavior and negligence regarding safety procedures. Scholars Hale & Borys (2013) and Phoya & Kikwasi (2017) revealed factors such as a low level of training or experience of safety and temporary jobs to be among the individual factors. These studies have indicated that when detailed safety rules and procedures are implemented on a construction site, unsafe behavior among workers is minimized, and safety in the workplace increases. Although there has been an emphasis on workers' behavior and the implementation of strenuous rules and regulations has been viewed as an important factor the construction sector is still experiencing an increase in the number of accidents and fatalities (Lander et al., 2016; Swuste et al., 2012). Attempts to study other factors within the construction sites regarding enforcing safety have been made in the literature. Several studies (Grill & Nielsen, 2019; Gui et al., 2020; Jeschke et al.,

2021) have considered how managers and workers interact on-site, as well as the direct and indirect leadership practices of site managers, and have tried to understand the social cognitive process of construction workers. These studies emphasize the importance of other factors, such as construction site managers, foremen, and supervisors, promoting compliance to safety. As noted by Hale & Borys (2013), other factors, external to the workers, contribute to accidents and fatalities on sites, including attitudes to and habits of incompliance with safety regulations, poor supervisor-worker cooperation, a non-participative style of supervision and management turning a blind eye to safety. This demonstrates that it is not only the workers that influence the occurrence of accidents, since other factors, such as management's commitment to enforcing safety on-site, could perhaps reduce the extent of the problem.

Certain scholars Wachter & Yorio (2014) are of the view that the motivation to engage in implementing HS on construction sites, especially in the case of informal workers, is influenced, among other things, by situational and organizational factors, such as values and beliefs, as well as the vision and mission of employers. These include employers' commitment to HS, workforce welfare, the provision of good quality and adequate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), the availability and implementation of policy statements, and the implementation of safety rules on site. However, evidence indicates that such organizational factors are not implemented in developing countries and are simply made available to comply with legislation (Kheni & Braimah, 2014; Mrema et al., 2015). Moreover, Boadue et al. (2020) argue that the characteristics influencing incompliance with HS on construction sites in developing countries include the lack of a skilled and educated workforce, reliance on labor-intensive methods, and the lack of a single regulatory authority overseeing the construction industry. Due to the sector being an avenue for the employment of many unskilled and illiterate workers, issues regarding HS management become secondary, and managers have little influence on HS management. From a different perspective, Boadue et al. (2020) attest that reliance on labor intensiveness is the result of contractors not having the appropriate plant and equipment to carry out construction work, which in turn requires them to have more workers per activity on-site. For example, concrete mixing on a site without a concrete mixer could require ten informal construction workers instead of three, increasing the HS risks. Managing this huge workforce results in

significant negligence regarding incompliance with HS rules and regulations on-site (Aikaeli & Mkenda, 2015; Boadue et al., 2020; Kheni & Braimah, 2014; Lingard & Rowlinson, 2005).

The construction site management has a responsibility to protect the workers from all hazards that may threaten their HS in the workplace (ILO, 2009). In Tanzania, a fundamental principle stipulated in the Occupational Health and Safety Act (2003) (OHS Act No 5 of 2003) is that an employer must, as far as is reasonably practicable, provide and maintain a working environment that is safe and does not pose a risk to the health of anyone on site. In turn, an employee must also take reasonable care for his or her own HS and the HS of others.

According to the study conducted by Jason (2007) in Dar es Salaam, informal workers are not covered by legislation and policies, which led him to conclude that the operational relations of informal construction workers are not well understood (Jason, 2007). The workers are employed on the construction sites as wage-for-labor workers, and Wells & Jason (2010) note that they do not have any contractual agreement that identifies them as employees of the construction company. However, the Tanzania Occupational Safety and Health Act has highlighted in Section 95 (6) that every self-employed worker should conduct his undertaking in such a manner to ensure that all workmen are not exposed to hazards and risks by their activities in such a way it affects their HS, (URT, 2003). Therefore, from this perspective, there is a question of interpretation of the regulation regarding this self-employed worker positioned in the formal construction site since the worker is employed on a wage-for-labor basis, without a binding contract enforceable law.

Many studies (Chileshe & Dzisi, 2012; Hamid et al., 2008; Heerden, 2018; Smallwood et al., 2009) have noted that site managers often refrain from implementing HS on construction sites of putting more emphasis on project completion and profit maximization. It is perhaps because the managers understand the gaps in legislation concerning compliance with safety and thus act in a manner that gives them an advantage over the workers.

The works of Choudhry & Fang (2008), Gui et al. (2020), and Lombardi et al. (2009) show that the workplace relationship, as a social group, can affect workers' attitudes and promote unsafe behavior. The literature also shows that worker influence, foreman influence, and managers' feedback on workers' unsafe behavior play an important role in HS management (Chiaburu & Harrison, 2008). Evidence proves that managers, foremen, and co-workers interact with one

another daily (Peiyao et al., 2019); in this scenario, the kind of workplace relationship between them cannot be ignored. Other existing studies have also analyzed the influence of foremen on the unsafe behavior of workers; these studies are based on the perspective of the supervision and safety management role (Chang et al., 2019; Kaskutas et al., 2013). Site managers were considered role models by the workers, such that in instances when the manager overlooked certain safety aspects, the workers were more likely to ignore these. Interestingly, if the manager adhered to all safety protocols, the workers also followed the same model. Styhre (2012) argues that the site managers are important leaders on the construction site, responsible for the entire site and all other actors, such as the sub-contractors.

Construction projects in Tanzania employ more informal than formal workers. As has been noted by LaDou et al. (2018), informal construction workers are most vulnerable to workplace injuries and diseases. Such workers have the least secure employment, a low income, an inadequate diet, and limited access to healthcare and social security benefits. Furthermore, LaDou et al. (2018) argue that workers are threatened in many ways, with little protection from the government, and if they voice their concerns, they end up losing their jobs. Therefore, workers volunteer to work in such situations (Aikaeli & Mkenda, 2014; Jason, 2007; Mitullah & Wachira, 2003; Wells & Jason, 2010) because they cannot compel their employers to adhere to good labor standards and OHS. As a result, workers often take risks on the job, which ultimately leads to serious accidents on site.

Organization of the Construction Sector in Tanzania

In Tanzania, the construction sector comprises organizations and individuals owning construction companies, firms, and individuals working as consultants, main contractors and sub-contractors, plant and equipment suppliers, material and component producers, builders, and merchants.

Figure 1: Conceptual Organization of the Construction Site



Source: Authors' Elaboration, 2021.

The sector is closely linked with clients and financiers. The government is involved in the industry as a purchaser (client), financier, regulator, and operator (Mrema et al., 2015). The sector is multi-layered (see figure 1 above) and hierarchical; the top-level constitutes the clients/owners of the construction projects and the contractors who bid for the construction tenders, who become the project's owners until it is handed over to the client. The contractors receive and control the projects' resources, including the finances; therefore, the sole control of the project cycle lies with the contractors. In this study, the contractors are the top-level managers of the construction project, who have the power to control resource allocation,

planning, and the execution of the project at hand. Site managers and engineers are the middle-level managers of the construction sites and the execution team of the projects. The middle-level managers referred to as the site managers, work for the contractor with few formal employees within the construction company, such as health officers, foremen, and building and construction engineers. In consultation with the main contractor, the construction management engages sub-contractors of various trades who are the implementers of the construction project.

The sector follows a formal structure that exhibits power relations over the decision-making process of the construction sector. Therefore, either directly or through labor agents, the sub-contractors employ informal construction workers to carry out actual construction work. Lingard (2013) and Chamara et al. (2015) have argued that informal construction workers perform 70-80% of the work. Flor (2021) explained that in relation to theories of power and social change, this paper refers to the capacity of actors to mobilize the appropriate means to achieve the end goal. The construction sector constitutes an elaborative structure that highlights the power relations on the construction site. Besides, how each agent in the structure coordinates and interacts with one another to achieve their objectives. This kind of structure could be a limiting or an enabling factor regarding the enforcement of OHS on construction sites, depending on the capacity of agents to draw upon the structure to achieve outcomes. Within the construction sector in Tanzania, the main contractors are at the strategic apex of the construction company and thus exercise power over the agents, namely, the construction site managers; they are also responsible for making strategic decisions and maintaining client contacts.

Most importantly, they also control the resources to run the projects. Therefore, the top-level managers (main contractors) have control and dominance over the structure, while the middle-level management (site managers) are executors of the project, receiving direct orders from the contactors and relaying feedback when necessary. The site managers exercise power over the agents beneath them, such as labor agents, sub-contractors, and workers. However, at the lowest level of the structure are the informal construction workers, who are the propellers of the construction project and have no influence over the power structure and formal decision-making process of the construction site.

This study sought to understand why managers and workers do not comply with OHS rules and regulations or engage in effective enforcement (Grill & Nielsen, 2019; Hale & Borys, 2013; Lingard & Rowlinson, 2005). The studies revealed that various factors contribute to compliance or incompliance on construction sites. Therefore, this study provides an analytical framework of the factors under investigation (figure 2), namely, the safety policy statement and the attitude of management to safety, demonstrating how the power structure limits or enhances compliance. Moreover, the other aspect of the power structure relates to the workers' obligations regarding safety, environmental factors, and other factors affecting informal construction workers' compliance or incompliance with OHS rules and regulations on construction sites.

Figure 2: Analytical Framework



Source: Author's Elaboration, 2021

Materials and Methods

The study employed qualitative methods, using semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, and observations as tools for data collection. As shown in table 1, a total of 14 key informants, who are construction site managers on 14 different construction sites, were sampled and interviewed across two locations, while four Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted with the informal construction workers with a total of 29 participating in the FGDs.

Interviews and FGDs were audio-recorded, while observational field notes were taken daily on the construction sites, monitoring the behaviors of workers and managers in terms of observing safety procedures. Moreover, the site conditions and housekeeping of the construction area were included as additional observation units. Content and thematic analyses were used to analyze the data built on a general codebook. Nvivo version 12 qualitative data analysis software was used to sort the codes into categories and subcategories (like parent and child nodes) with a specific classification of each category of the interview observation notes or FGDs. The process assisted in discovering the variations, similarities, and associations of the materials that helped the researcher to draw meaningful themes for the interpretation of the results.

Table 1: Characteristics of Respondents and Observations

Respondents	**Description**	**n of respondents**
Construction site managers (Dar es Salaam)	Civil/building	9
Construction site managers (Dodoma)	Civil/building	5
FGDs	**No of FGDs**	**No of participants**
FGDs (Dar es Salaam)	2 (8 in each group)	16
FGDs (Dodoma)	2 (6-first group, 7-second group)	13
Observations	**Object of observation**	**No of sites**
Dar es Salaam	Workers and managers	4
Dodoma	Workers and managers	4

Source: Researcher's Data, 2021

Results and Discussions

The following section presents the study results to highlight why managers and workers are not complying with HS rules.

The Commitment of Management to HS to Protect Workers on Site

Management's commitment to HS contributes to informal workers' practices concerning risk on the construction sites. It was explained by the fewer preferences given to the informal workers, most of whom do not have a direct work contract with the construction company but rather with the sub-contractor, who hired them for a specific period, usually for a day or a week. Observations from the study revealed that site management used the time for job allocation during morning meetings or toolbox meetings. The focus of the talk was the importance of working diligently and finishing all assigned tasks. As noted in one meeting, the manager stated, *"today we have to finish all the outer walls, please work hard, we do not have time to waste, you will only be paid when your part is finished and deemed to be of the required quality after inspection*." The researcher who was present from the start of the workday did not witness an emphasis on observing HS rules. In this work setting, the central focus was on finishing the work and getting paid, with no consideration given to HS issues.

The management of HS on construction sites emanates from the commitment of the construction site management to this cause and its daily implementation by the site managers. Amongst the requirements of the Occupational Health and Safety (Building and Construction Rules) 2015 in Tanzania, the contractors in Section 4 (3) (a) are instructed: "to prepare as often as may be appropriate a revised written statement of their general policy with respect to the health, safety, and welfare of their employees, at building operations or works of engineering construction." This is further elaborated as follows.

Presence of an HS Policy on Site

Workers' behavior and practices on construction sites depend upon how management commits to HS. It includes, among other things, having a written HS policy statement, which is rigorously implemented. The majority of construction sites visited was found to have written statements regarding HS; however, the implementation of the said policies was an issue of concern.

Findings showed that among the coded items relating to HS policies and procedures on-site, the majority agreed (nine site managers) that a written safety policy and procedures were necessary, while five site managers confirmed that they did not have any written safety procedures. When asked whether the policies were implemented as required, the managers revealed that the implementation was not adequate, complaining that it was difficult to follow all the procedures while working to tight deadlines, tight budgets, and with irresponsible workers:

> *"…but we do not implement what is written on these documents. We document very well the procedure that we use to keep workers safe, but we do things very differently. We even give PPE to the employees without even telling them what these are for"* (Manager and key informant, Dar es Salaam).

Another added:

> *"…(laughing) No, who can do that? (meaning following all the procedures), time pressure…we must finish on time…the workers are very irresponsible, they do not care about these things"* (Manager and key informant, Dodoma).

It was also noted from the interviews that the financial resources for the implementation of HS measures on the construction site seemed to be low, to allow managers to adhere to every aspect of the legislation relating to HS on construction sites, even when they had a written safety policy statement on site:

> *"You see, the budget provided for safety does not allow us to implement everything that the OSHA demands, we will not do it, it is insanely expensive…it is true we really will not, not just here, but everywhere"* (Manager and key informant, Dar es Salaam).

The managers reveal a sense of awareness that workers are not safe on construction sites, that there is minimal enforcement of the available on-site safety rules and regulations for HS, and that following all procedures negatively affects their time schedules, delaying the completion of the construction process, which is the primary goal. The absence of proper implementation of the safety policies on construction sites negatively affects workers' safety and could be a reason for an increase in construction accidents.

Provision of Training on HS for Construction Workers

The study reveals that the regular provision of training on HS before the commencement of the work should be amongst the directives of the HS policy that the construction site managers are responsible for implementing. The findings show that managers sometimes claim to provide such training during toolbox meetings, whereby all workers on site are reminded of the hazards and how to avoid them, as noted in an interview:

> *"We sometimes remind workers during toolbox meetings about issues regarding OHS. We think this is a type of training, no? Of course, it is not done many times, but we try our best to remind them of the hazards and the need to take care of themselves for the sake of their families while they back home"* (Manager and key informant).

This finding reveals that managers do not provide adequate HS training prior to employment on-site. This is further evidenced by members of the FGD, who angrily attacked the site managers for not caring about their HS, as noted in the following quotations:

"...Never, I have never been given any training, they do not care about anything we go through, it is a shame" (FGD participant).

"Training? You are kidding me, they want us to finish the job, sometimes we stay until very late at night, when will they get time to train us on these issues" (FGD participant).

"...No! The toolbox meeting is to allocate our work areas for that day, actually what we get from them is anger, especially directed at those who did not finish their part on time the previous day, these people care about money and money only" (FGD participant).

As Styhre (2012) argued, the purpose of managers' meetings (toolbox meetings) with workers or other project implementers focuses mainly on the progress of the work and the upcoming events. It has been noted that the managers concentrate on completing the construction project, transforming the designs and plans into a structure using labor. Therefore, training on OHS is a secondary issue and, perhaps due to the unpredictability of the construction process, is largely ignored. This negatively affects workers' safety since workers must volunteer to perform risk assignments without proper safety training on handling different work assignments.

Provision of PPE

Amongst the safety measures for workers on construction sites, PPE is particularly important. As acknowledged, the work environment on a construction site changes from stage to stage; therefore, all workers must be provided with the necessary PPE. However, it has been revealed that most construction sites do not provide the required equipment, and when this is supplied, it is usually because an inspection is due or an important government official is visiting the site, as noted in the FGDs:

> *"I have worked on many construction sites, managers provide a reflective transparent shirt and sometimes a helmet, although on rare occasions. I cannot remember if I have ever been given safety boots, no! So they sometimes give you a few"* (FGD participant).

Further, the responses were the same in this aspect, and the majority agreed that safety equipment is not adequately supplied; a participant explained:

> *"So, what I have learned is that, when inspectors come to visit, or people like you visit the site, many of us are given safety equipment, or when a politician comes to see the project, we are all provided with the necessary PPE; otherwise, we work without it"* (FGD participant).

Observations also proved what the participants at FGD revealed; the researcher received a formal invitation to the site and had explained to the management that he intended to conduct research on HS. When the researcher entered the site, most of the workers had PPE on the first day. However, on the third day of the observations, the same workers had no PPE. During an informal interview with one of the workers during the lunch break, he was asked about the whereabouts of his PPE, and he responded, *"the manager gave us the PPE and told us to behave well because some guests were coming, the PPE is now back in the office*."

Therefore, the findings revealed that the lack of safety policies and procedures or the inadequacy of regulations contributes to little motivation in relation to safety on construction sites. These findings are contrary to the findings of Mrema et al. (2015); (Aikaeli & Mkenda, 2014) and Kheni & Braimah (2014), who concluded that a lack of policies and regulations contributed to increasing numbers of construction accidents. Whereas, it has been noted that management's commitment to safety is the key issue, since workers are regarded as tools to complete the project promptly and without additional costs. So, policy frameworks have defined the protocols to be followed, but the problems are found at the management's implementational level. Furthermore, it was found that construction site managers blame workers for not taking care of themselves; in this regard, managers are distancing themselves from the workers' issues, yet it is the sole responsibility of the managers to ensure that the workers are safe. It supports the argument noted in box-1 above that managers sometimes provide workers with PPE without

even telling them its utility. Moreover, as one of the managers responds to a question on the provision of PPE, he explains:

> *"To be honest, it is a challenge to provide PPE for everyone because it is expensive. However, workers are so irresponsible sometimes, they take unnecessary risks while working, and we cannot be there every time to protect them"* (Manager, key informant).

And:

"Even when we provide (the PPE) they do not manage it properly, and most of the times they do not wear it at all, they are careless" (Manager, key informant).

This signifies that if a worker is not experienced and has not been in the sector for long, he is more prone to accidents because the management has not played a leading role in aspects of HS, such as the provision of safety training and the importance of using PPE. The managers seem to be busy running the project and pay less attention to how workers practice HS.

Job Skills and Personal Attributes

Construction skills are an important aspect, enabling individuals to secure a job at a construction site. Regarding informal construction workers, it is not formal education that will guarantee a job on a large construction project; skills and experience are rated more highly. Riisgaard et al. (2021) reveal that informal construction workers have a low standard of education, and the majority of construction skills acquired were either self-taught or learned while working as an apprentice; few had attended formal training. Therefore, due to the type of activities performed during the construction period where the sub-contractors and the workers are employed on a short-term basis, it is clear that aspects of HS in respect of the workers are ignored, with the focus being directed towards job performance and completion. As explained by a site manager, *"we need these workers to perform the activities, we supervise them, mostly we hire them based on their experience, they come looking for jobs"* (Manager, key informant).

Workers obtain construction skills on sites or through relatives and friends in the sector without necessarily having to attend specific training. In this kind of setting, where individuals learn on the job, nothing is taught about issues relating to HS at work; therefore, this is not a major concern for workers. The behavior demonstrated by informal workers of disregarding HS issues

could be due to a lack of sufficient knowledge in relation to HS risks on-site, as explained by members of the FGD in box 1.

Box 1: How did you acquire your construction skills?

a. *"I have more than 20-years' experience in construction. I have never attended a vocational training course, I learned about construction from my uncle, today I am a good mason"* (FGD participant).
b. *"For me, this is my 9th year in the job, and I learned at work. I started as a helper, carrying concrete and bricks for my gang leader, now I am a mason myself"* (FGD participant).
c. *"I have many years of experience in construction. I learned from my father that he was a good carpenter, now I have inherited his skills, I never went to any school"* (FGD participant).

Source: Interviews' Transcript, 2021

Informal construction workers were asked to provide their views regarding how they manage their own HS while working on formal construction sites. The majority blamed the construction site managers for not providing a safe environment; they noted that they could not make demands or voice their opinions because of the tightness of the labor market. It was revealed that workers try to observe certain safety protocols themselves so that they finish the jobs and get paid, which is a more important issue, as explained by one participant:

"Everyone takes care of themselves individually, it is hard to work collectively (on health and safety issues) because everyone has their own needs (financial); you might say I am not going to do that job because it is dangerous, but someone else will do it" (FGD participant).

With the exception of the above, it has been noted that workers are very aware of the fact that the construction site managers are supposed to provide them with PPE; therefore, they blame the managers for being a contributing factor to injuries at work:

"Our bosses (site managers) are supposed to make sure the work environment is safe and give us safety equipment; we try our best to make sure we stay safe. Most of the time, I check the

scaffolds myself before climbing up when working at a great height. It is because I once fell from a scaffold and broke my leg, but I was only given first aid. I learned the hard way" (FGD participant).

Others noted that they do not have to worry much about HS because death comes to everyone, *"everyone dies, if it is your day even if you wear everything, you will die."* This statement indicates the ignorance in relation to the importance of HS; therefore, workers' behaviors could be termed reckless regarding HS, but the fundamental problem could be due to a lack of adequate training and knowledge regarding safety protocols on site.

Working Conditions and Environmental Factors

Factors that have negative impacts on HS in developing countries include, among others, extreme weather conditions, poor infrastructure, communication problems due to poor education and literacy, unregulated practices on construction sites, unavailability of equipment, and the improper use of equipment (Kheni & Braimah, 2014). Findings in the current study have shown that extreme weather and difficult working conditions contribute to the way in which workers practice safe behavior at work. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, workers are unable to make demands for a safer environment or the provision of safety equipment, depending on the weather conditions.

(a) Weather Conditions

The current study was conducted in Dar es Salaam and Dodoma, where the weather can reach up to 40 degrees centigrade during the hot season. Most construction projects are implemented during this period to avoid the rainy season, which hampers the timely completion of projects. In this regard, workers must work long hours without any breaks to meet the required deadlines before the rainy season. Findings have also revealed that sometimes workers collapse due to the extreme weather and long work hours. Therefore, workers are exposed to extreme heat for long periods and without any breaks, except for a few minutes to enable workers to buy lunch from food vendors served outside the construction areas. A worker in the FGD explains:

> *"Dar es Salaam is very hot; we do not get time to rest. If you are given a piece to finish, you must do everything to ensure it is finished; we work for long hours to finish the work*

assigned for the day, we become fatigued, and sometimes our colleagues collapse due to the extreme heat" (FGD participant).

And:

"The only time you get to rest for a few minutes is during lunch, the heat is too much, you are given 30 to 60 minutes to eat, but since you have to finish your work to get paid, sometimes you take 25 minutes and then run and finish your work" (FGD participant).

The findings show that the workers are not happy with their working conditions or the way in which the managers supervise them. The workers complain about not being given time to rest or specified resting areas, *"no resting areas, the areas where you can chill for a while are full of construction materials."* They also take risks working in such an environment to earn an income. When the managers were asked about working conditions for workers, they responded that they provide what they can, according to the budget, noting that they do not want to incur extra costs by constructing a resting area with facilities such as cold water and cool air, as this would increase the budget and minimize the profit:

"We provide what we can; imagine a building as a resting place for 50 workers; it will have an extra cost, which we cannot afford. We want to do all these things, but our budgets are tight, and we cannot" (Manager, key informant).

Another manager noted that having resting places for workers would encourage them not to work, that workers would sneak out and have a rest, and the project would not be completed on time; therefore, providing one hour for lunch was sufficient time for a worker to rest.

When the workers were asked if they were provided with PPE and if they used it during the hot season, the majority responded that using plastic helmets and gloves would exacerbate the situation since they get too hot. Consequently, when they work on construction sites that provide such equipment, they tend not to use them during hot periods. This finding was supported by the managers who asserted that the workers take off the safety equipment and misuse the helmets, using them to drink water and sometimes putting food in them:

> *"They do not wear the helmets; for example, they use them as cups for drinking water; I have also met a few with helmets full of rice and beans; these are not important tools"* (Manager, key informant).

This finding indicates that the working environment does not have sufficient facilities to cope with different weather situations, such as cups for drinking water; therefore, the workers are forced to utilize whatever is available to help themselves.

(b) Difficult Working Environment

The current study also noted that managers and workers complain about strained working conditions; this could be termed a way of "distancing oneself" from a troubling situation and expressing anxiety and stress (Jeschke et al., 2021). The managers in the current study revealed that most of the time, the workspace provided for construction is tiny, and they must organize all works and materials in the given space, but above all meet the required deadlines; therefore, it is impossible to follow every stage of the OHS protocols. A manager in the Karikaoo area, in Dar es Salaam noted:

> *"Look at this workspace, I am erecting this building in between buildings, and as you can see, businesses are operating in every square outside; how will I meet every safety protocol here? (showing the tiny free space available), it gives me stress, and the workers have to cope; it is all we have"* (Manager, key informant).

Source: Gervas, 2021

Photo 1 *Dar es Salaam. A photograph showing a group of informal construction workers, working at a great height without any form of PPE, while the site housekeeping is untidy*

Workers also noted that the difficult working conditions, with materials such as sand, cement, steel, wood, wire mesh, and machines all in one place (see photo 1 make the environment heavy and lack adequate air circulation. Therefore, the workers feel that they may contract diseases without knowing, such as tuberculosis. One member noted:

> *"There is no good site arrangement, maybe because the place is too small. All materials and types of equipment are in the same place; we mix concrete, and all the cement is stored around the same area. I got tuberculosis without knowing four years ago from inhaling dust and chemical materials"* (FGD participant).

Discussion

Power of the Construction Site Manager to Enforce Compliance with HS on Site

The effective management of HS is the function of the construction management from the top level. Findings from the current study have revealed that company policies pertaining to HS greatly influence informal workers' practices in relation to HS on construction sites. This is in line with studies by (Kheni & Braimah, 2014; Lars et al., 2021; Lingard & Rowlinson, 2005), who emphasize the importance of commitment to safety on the part of the management. The study also reveals that company policy on safety, as part of the management's commitment, plays an important role, as noted by Heerden (2018) and Kheni & Braimah (2014). However, the current study found that although policy statements on HS exist in construction sites, the enforcement of such policy statements and rules is often non-existent. Findings by Mohammadi et al. (2018) in Nigeria conclude that although most construction companies do have an active OHS policy on the construction sites, companies rarely fully implement these policies, as they are associated with increasing construction costs ultimately lead to fewer profits.

Although Hale & Borys (2013) maintains that managers' organizational planning and control are an effective means of controlling and eliminating risks, the current study found that site managers are not using any organizational planning or control mechanisms and instead focus on the completion of construction projects. Managers perceive safety as secondary in their daily

duties. None of the managers revealed a genuine concern for HS. Furthermore, it has been revealed that construction site managers do not provide safety induction training for workers prior to the commencement of construction work. In contrast, safety equipment is mainly provided to "cover-up" when safety inspectors or important government officials visit the site. From a different perspective, a study by Muhammad et al. (2015) reported that the management of construction companies is ineffective in interacting with the workers of the lower ranks in the construction hierarchy; therefore, workers are independent pertaining to HS risks on site. In addition, Patel & Jha (2016) speculated that construction companies tend to set a low budget for HS implementation on construction sites, which affects the hazard management behavior of individuals working on the site, pre-disposing them to the likelihood of injuries. In this study, informal construction workers, as the frontline, blue-collar workers on the site, are more likely to be exposed to risks of injuries than any other group.

The study reveals that although construction site managers are vested with the mandate to manage HS on construction sites, they may not have the power to influence enforcement since they are also employees of the main contractor. The main contractor, the top-level manager, possesses all the resources to run the construction project; therefore, if the main contractor has not prioritized HS, the construction site managers may not be able to influence change. The client and the main contractors decide the financial resources and budgets for OHS as the top-level managers in the construction site hierarchy. As argued by Styhre (2012), the construction site managers deal with the practical issues that threaten the peace of construction progress, while issues regarding workers' HS are dealt with when time permits. It explains why site managers prioritize the timely completion of the project rather than safety, as this is what the main contractors require.

Workers' Power to Demand Enforcement of HS on Construction Sites

The individual attributes of construction workers, such as their work experience, age, education, and safety awareness, contribute to workers' practices regarding HS while on-site (Phoya & Kikwasi, 2017). The study reveals that the lower-level education of most construction workers limits their knowledge and understanding of safety issues and their compliance with rules and regulations on-site. Most workers are middle-aged, thus making them "fighters" in terms of being the breadwinner of the family; this influences their decision to ignore safety rules. Workers

perceive HS as a subsidiary to their primary needs: income and job security. They are working hard with the motive that it gives them a chance of being hired again in another construction project. According to the Power Resource Approach (PRA), as used by Wright (2000), Silver (2003), and Schmalz et al. (2018), workers can collectively mobilize and advance their issues or interests with different power resources (associational, structural, institutional and societal). However, in this study, it has been noted that most construction workers are not unionized. In the study conducted by Gervas (2021) in Dar es Salaam and Dodoma, only 19% of construction workers are members of worker unions. The workers have *associational power,* but it is limited in terms of application; traditional associational power entails collectivizing workers to give them greater bargaining power against their employers (Gervas, 2021). However, instead of applying this power to demand the adequate enforcement of OHS regulations on-site, they use it to tackle issues that affect them, primarily welfare issues directly. Like Guy Standing, this study argues that the relationship of production limits workers and that the temporary jobs, the uncertainty of accessing jobs once lost, the increasing competition for jobs, and unstable income pose challenges for them. However, workers could exercise structural power in the form of disruptive power (Wright, 2000); they have workplace bargaining power due to their strategic importance in the construction sector and could demand better working conditions and the provision of safety equipment. Unfortunately, due to the tightness of the labor market and the precarious nature of jobs, workers are not able to disrupt the construction process due to concerns over the provision of safety equipment; since this issue is not important, the risks/consequences outweigh the gains. Disruption is only visible when workers have not been paid their wages. This provides an interesting discussion that workers value their income above everything else.

Lastly, it has been noted that environmental factors affect both the site managers and the workers on construction sites, namely, site location and weather. This finding corroborates the findings by Jeschke et al. (2021) in their study regarding complaints relating to OHS. The study revealed that extreme heat or cold affected the pace of work and workers' safety. This study highlighted that Dar es Salaam and Dodoma experience extreme heat across most seasons of the year, resulting in workers failing to wear PPE due to the heat, while difficult working conditions

prevent managers from planning the site housekeeping, exposing workers to risks in the construction process.

Managers have limited power to influence policy since the main contractors have ultimate responsibility but are never on-site; a certain level of negligence regarding compliance with safety regulations could be attributed to the managers. However, authority in the chain of command prevents managers from fully enforcing compliance due to limited financial resources budgeted for HS on construction sites. The latter, therefore, concentrate on project completion and profit maximization, while the workers are most concerned about income, the tightness of the labor market, and competition; thus, safety regulations and procedures become secondary issues. As Guy Standing argues, these workers are supplicants; they need to respect the managers to receive their income and keep their jobs.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The current study reflects why site managers and workers do not comply with OHS management on construction sites. The study draws its emphasis from Guy Standing's notion of the precariat to understand the characteristics of the workers on construction sites and uses the PRA to identify why there is incompliance with safety rules and regulations on construction sites. Findings have revealed that both managers and workers play an important role in the management of HS. To this end, managers do not comply with the governing legislation regarding HS since they do not have structural power to enforce this; such authority is vested in the main contractors and the clients who are never on site. Moreover, since workers are not sufficiently knowledgeable about the precarious nature of their jobs, they are hesitant to demand such services and concentrate on wage-for-labor only; workers do not apply their associational or structural power resources to influence the managers to enforce compliance. Managers ignore most safety protocols, such as training workers on OHS before the commencement of the work, providing adequate PPE, ensuring construction sites are hazard-free, and good housekeeping of materials and equipment. Instead, they focus on minimizing costs, increasing profits, and ensuring the timely completion of projects.

This calls for an effective and inclusive Safety Management System (SMS), taking on board the structural hindrance of the main contractors and the precarious nature of construction workers. The SMS should ensure an effective flow of communication between the contractors,

construction site management, and workers. Managers should understand that workers are not tools for production and that understanding risk is based on rational logic and experience. Since most workers are not educated and have not attended any safety training, it would be beneficial for training to be provided often during the construction process. Workers should be able to communicate directly and voice their demands without the fear of losing their jobs. Therefore, a more comprehensive OHS policy (building and construction industry) is recommended to achieve this. The construction safety rules should recognize the informal workers who provide labor on formal construction sites, and OHS training for all informal construction workers should be implemented as a mandatory requirement.

Author Contributions: Aloyce Gervas is the lead author, wrote and completed the original draft of the manuscript. Godbertha Kinyondo, Nina Torm, Mackfallen G. Anasel provided an intensive review, suggested many revisions that were incorporated in the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript for publication.

Funding: This research was fully supported by the Informality and Social Protection Project (SPIWORK) funded by DANIDA-FFU and implemented by Roskilde University Denmark on a partnership agreement with Mzumbe University Tanzania and University of Nairobi, Kenya.

Acknowledgments: The authors appreciate the kind support of Prof. Lone Riisgaard, from the Department of Social Sciences and Business, Roskilde University, Denmark for overall review of the manuscript and provision of invaluable and constructive comments. Also, thanks for the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments.

Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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