



PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development

AN INTERDISCIPLINARY BIENNIAL JOURNAL

©2021, Center for PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development, College of Law and Governance, Jimma University, Ethiopia. All rights reserved. Except as permitted under Ethiopian laws or by the copyright holder, the use of the whole or part of this publication in any form and by any means is prohibited.



INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD

Dr. Ajede Salamat Atinuke, Tai Solarin University of Education, Nigeria

Dr. Anja van Heelsum, the University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Prof. Ann Fitz-Gerald, Balsillie School of International Affairs, Canada

Prof. Attila Melegh, Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary

Prof. B.M. Jain, University of Rajasthan, India

Prof. Berhanu Mengistu, Old Dominion University, U.S.A

Prof. Edward Shizha, Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada

Prof. Faizan Mustafa, NALSAR University of Law, India

Prof. Farhana Kausar, Aligarh Muslim University, India

Prof. Gloria Emeagwali, Central Connecticut State University, USA

Prof. Harvey White, University of North Carolina, USA

Prof. Ishtiaq Jamil, University of Bergen, Norway

Prof. Italo Trevisan, University of Trento, Italy

Prof. Jane E. Fountain, University of Massachusetts, USA

Prof. Pranab Kumar Panday, University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh

Dr. Shyamika Jayasundara-Smits, ISS, Erasmus University of Rotterdam, The Netherlands

Prof. Steinar Askvik, University of Bergen, Norway

EDITORIAL BOARD

Professor (Dr.) Minhaj Alam (Editor-in-Chief)

Ermyas Admasu Wolde (Assistant Professor - Managing Editor)

Abiot Desta Habte (Assistant Professor - Member)

Bisrat Gebru Wolde (Assistant Professor - Member)

Fikadu T. Ayanie (Assistant Professor - Member)

Girma Defere Tegegn (Assistant Professor - Member)

Siyum Adugna Mamo (Assistant Professor - Member)

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL REVIEWERS

Dr. Minhaj Alam (Professor, Jimma University, Ethiopia)
Ermais Admassu (Assistant Professor, Jimma University, Ethiopia)
Abiot Desta (Assistant Professor, Jimma University, Ethiopia)
Ahmar Afaq (Assistant Professor, Symbiosis Law School, Nagpur, India)
Bisrat Gebru (Assistant Professor, Jimma University, Ethiopia)
Bizuayehu Daba Feyisa (Assistant Professor, Jimma University, Ethiopia)
Dr. Dejene Gemechu Chala (Associate Professor, Jimma University, Ethiopia)
Dr. Raman Kumar (Professor, Hawassa University, Ethiopia)
Fikadu T. Ayanie (Assistant Professor, Jimma University, Ethiopia)
Girma Defere (Assistant Professor, Jimma University, Ethiopia)
Kaso Teha (Assistant Professor, Jimma University, Ethiopia)
Kifle Midagdu (Senior Lecturer, Bule Hora University, Ethiopia)
Mesfin Mulugeta (Ph.D. Scholar, Friedrich-Schiller University, Germany)
Siyum Adugna Mamo (Assistant Professor, Jimma University, Ethiopia)
Dr. Ekta Meena (Assistant Professor, University of Rajasthan, India)
Dr. Farida Tadjine (Associate Prof., University of Kasdi Merbah Ouargla, Algeria)
Dr. Fasil Merawi (Assistant Professor, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia)
Dr. Mehnaz Najmi (Assistant Professor, Texila American University, Guyana)
Dr. Priyabala Singh (Assistant Professor, Delhi University, India)
Abdi Aden Yasin (Assistant Professor, Wolaita Sodo University, Ethiopia)
Degwale Gebeyehu Belay (Assistant Professor, Bahir Dar University, Ethiopia)
Gedifew Sewenet Yigzaw (Assistant Professor, Bahir Dar University, Ethiopia)
Jinat Hossain (Ph.D. Scholar, University of Leuven, Belgium)
Muhammed Hamid Muhammed (Assistant Professor, Bahir Dar University, Ethiopia)

DISCLAIMER

The ideas in this journal do not represent the Editorial Board or the Center for PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development, or the Department of Governance and Development, or the College of Law and Governance, or Jimma University, but solely of the author/s.

AUTHOR'S DESK

The submission of manuscripts should be made through the online platform of the PJGD <http://journals.ju.edu.et/index.php/panjogov>. For any reason, if the website does not work, manuscripts can be submitted to Professor (Dr.) Minhaj Alam (Editor-in-Chief) at minhaj.alam@ju.edu.et or prof.minhajalam@gmail.com or to Ermyas Admasu Wolde (Managing Editor) at ermyas.wolde@ju.edu.et or ermyad@yahoo.com.

The detailed guidelines, the ethical principles that authors must attest before submission, the rules of style, and the format of manuscripts can be found upon registering at the website of the journal (<https://journals.ju.edu.et/index.php/panjogov/guideauth>) or upon request of the editor in chief or the managing editor. In any case, the word count for manuscripts should be as specified below.

1. Original Research Article: (8,000-10,000 words)
2. Review Article: (8,000-10,000 words)
3. Featured Article: (5,000-8,000 words)
4. Research Notes: (3,000-5,000 words)
5. Commentaries: (1,000-3,000 words)
6. Book Review: (2,000-4,000 words)



Editorial

About the Department of Governance and Development Studies (GaDS) and PJGD..... **1**

Articles

China's Engagement and Africa Beyond Aid **3**
Evans Tetteh

Assessment of Occupational Health and Safety Awareness among Healthcare Workers at the Pediatric Hospital in Benghazi City **31**
Amal Ali Mukhtad, Fatima Mohammed Alomamy, Aya Abdullah Almukassbi, Aya Joma Rafa Abbas, Amira Abu baker Alfseiy

The Practices and Challenges of Fiscal Decentralization: A Case of Bedelle Woreda, Oromia Region, Ethiopia **50**
Tesfaye Gudeta, Minhaj Alam, Damena Tolassa

Technology and Immigration System: A New Paradigm for Improving Government Service Delivery in Tanzania **81**
Mustafa Kassim Kipingu and Deodatus Patrick Shayo

The Hermeneutical Task of Postcolonial African Philosophy: Construction and Deconstruction *Yohannes Eshetu Mamuye* **107**

Understanding the Praetorian Rule of Fatah al-Sisi in Egypt **119**
Arshad

Women's Participation in Local Government: An Assessment of Enhancers and Inhibitors in the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abirem Municipality **146**
Raymond Kwasi Boasinke

COVID- 19 and its Effects on Refugee, Asylum Seeker and Migrant Children Aged 12-17 Years at Tongogara Refugee Camp in Zimbabwe **170**
Memory Rumbidzai V. Mandikiana, Yogesh Awasthi, Isaac Ignatious Dambudzo

Alleviation or Politicization of Poverty in Africa? A Critique of Nigeria's Social Investments Programs under Buhari-led Administration, 2015-2020 **206**
Anthony Chinedu Ugwu and Al Chukwuma Okoli

Anatomy of Nigerian Federalism: A Reflection of the Nagging Challenges and Prospects from A Cultural Relativist Perspective **232**
Chioke, Stephen Chinedu

ABOUT THE AUTHORS



Evans Tetteh is currently a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Government and International Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University. He holds a BA in History and Information Studies and an MA in International Relations from the University of Ghana and Xiamen University in China respectively. His research areas include non-traditional security studies, foreign aid for development and local governance, and rural development.

Amal Ali Mukhtad is a Lecturer at Department of Environmental Health Faculty of Public Health, University of Benghazi, Libya. He completed his Master of Science with specialization in Occupational Health & Safety from Faculty of Behavioral and Social Sciences, Wollongong University, Wollongong City, Australia, NSW and his Bachelor of Public Health with specialization in Environmental Health from Faculty of Public Health, University of Benghazi, Libya. He is serving as a Reviewer at Sciences Domain "Academic Journals Websites" for peer-review of Research Papers in field of "Environment, Occupational Health & Safety".

Fatima Mohammed Alomamy did her Bachelor of Public Health with specialization in Health Services Administration, University of Benghazi, Libya along with Online WHO Course Certificate "Accelerating progress towards the health-related Sustainable Development Goals." She is serving as an Office Manager at the Department of Medical Laboratories Alpha Health Care Company as well as Head of the Public Health Unit in the Health Programs Department of the Libyan Red Crescent Society. She is also the Member at Libyan Medical Students and Young Doctors Association, Benghazi.

Aya Abdullah Almukassbi completed Bachelor of Public Health with specialization in Health Services Administration from University of Benghazi, Libya.

Aya Joma Rafa Abbas completed Bachelor of Public Health with specializing in Health Services Administration from University of Benghazi, Libya.

Amira Abu baker Alfseiy completed Bachelor of Public Health with specialization in Health Services Administration from University of Benghazi, Libya.

Tesfaye Gudeta Negussie is a Lecturer at Metu University. He has graduated with Great Distinction in Master of Arts in Governance and Development Studies (specialization in Development Management) from the Department of Governance and Development, College of Law and Governance, Jimma University. He received his Bachelor's Degree from Debrebirhan University in Civics and Ethical Studies. Currently, he is a Lecturer, Researcher, and Co-coordinator of Institutional Reform of Bedele Campus at Metu University.

Dr. Minhaj Alam is a Professor at the Department of Governance and Development Studies, Jimma University, Ethiopia. His research areas include the International Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment, Development Perspectives, Development Finance; Public Policy Making; Population, Environment, and Development; Governance and Institutional Reforms.

Damana Tolossa is a Lecturer at the Department of Governance and Development Studies, Jimma University, Ethiopia. He holds MA in Development Studies with a specialization in development management. His teaching and research priority areas are the roles of NGOs in poverty alleviation, national institution, poverty reduction and aid, migration, and reintegration issue, international political economy, project planning, and management, local government and development, and politics, organization, and public administration.

Mustafa Kassim Kipingu is a government employee with Tanzania Immigration Service Department. He graduated Master of Arts in Public Administration from Dar es Salaam University College of Education, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. His main research areas are digitalization of government service delivery, immigration services, and participatory governance.

Dr. Deodatus Patrick Shayo is a Lecturer and researcher at the Department of Economics and Social Studies at Ardhi University, Tanzania. His Ph.D. is in Political Science, obtained from Muenster University, Germany. He has participated in several conferences, seminars, and workshops – both national and international level – with a focus on, among others, digital governance, digital society, local democracy, and gender issues. He is a body member Research Committee (RC10) on Electronic Democracy, International Political Science Association (IPSA). His research interests include community crowdsourcing and digital engagement, online

participation, crowd-monitoring smart city services, digital inclusion, and technology in local governance.

Yohannes Eshetu Mamuye is serving as an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Civics and Ethics Department, College of Law and Governance, Jimma University, Ethiopia. He is also serving as a Coordinator for Research and Postgraduate Studies at the same college.

Dr. Arshad has a Ph.D. in International Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. He is interested in Democratization, Democratic Backsliding, and Authoritarianism. The author taught at the University of Delhi.

Mr. Raymond Kwasi Boasinke is a PhD candidate in the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology in Ghana. He holds a Bachelor's degree in Economics and Sociology and a Master's degree in Sociology from the University of Cape Coast in Ghana. He is currently a Teaching Associate at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology in the University of Cape Coast, Ghana. He is a member of the Senior Staff Association of Ghana and the Ghana Sociological and Anthropological Association. His research areas are community development, gender, local governance and livelihoods. He helps with teaching and research at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology in the University of Cape.

Memory Rumbidzai V. Mandikiana is a Ph.D. candidate in Peace, Leadership, and Governance at the Africa University in Zimbabwe. She has studied at the Zimbabwe Open University and the University of Zimbabwe for her Master's and Bachelors' degrees respectively. Memory is a seasoned humanitarian and development practitioner with a passion for advocacy for the rights of marginalized people in society. She uses research to bring to light thematic areas that affect society at the grassroots level. She is an active member of the Leaders of Africa Institute.

Dr. Awasthi has joined the Africa University as Chair of Educational Technologies in the College of Business, Peace, Leadership, and Governance (CBPLG). He has published 25 papers on Artificial Intelligence, Watermarking Techniques, and Cloud Computing. Presently, he has written a book entitled 'Let's play with JAVA'. He is a member of the Computer Society in

India, the International Association of Engineers (Hong Kong), and the Editorial Board of peer-reviewed journals. He has guided over 50 and Graduate projects.

Dr. Isaac Ignatius Dambudzo is a Professor and the Dean of Education at the Zimbabwe Open University. He has authored 3 books on Education, 52 research papers, and is a member of the Senate and other committees at the university. He is an expert in educational assessment, teaching, and learning, with over 40 years of experience. He is also an external examiner for universities in the SADC region.

Dr Al Chukwuma Okoli (B.Sc., M.Sc., Political Science), holds a Ph.D. in Defence and Strategic Studies from Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA). He is a Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the Federal University of Lafia, Nigeria. Dr. Okoli's core research interest revolves around Security Studies. He has consulted for UN Women, *The Conversation Africa*, Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) Abuja, Armed Forces Command and Staff College (AFCSC), Jaji-Nigeria, and National Open University of Nigeria (NOUN). He is a member of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). He is also a double laureate of CODESRIA's Institutes (Gender 2018, Higher Education, 2019) and a research fellow of IFRA-Nigeria. Dr. Okoli has published in reputable academic journals, including *Small Wars and Insurgencies* (Routledge), *African Security Review* (Routledge), *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* (ACCORD, South Africa), *Africa Development* (CODESRIA), and *Security Journal* (Springer).

Dr Anthony Chinedu Ugwu is a Lecturer at the Department of Political Science, Federal University of Lafia, Nigeria. He is a member of the Nigeria Political Science Association (NPSA), an executive member of the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), and an executive member of the Nigerian Association of Evaluators (NAE).

Stephen Chinedu Chioke has B.Sc and M.Sc in Public Administration, PGDE, Diploma in Theology and Full Member of the Institute of Professional Managers and Administrators of Nigeria (MIPMA). He is at the verge of concluding his PhD in Public Administration in Nnamdi Azikiwe University (NAU), Nigeria. He has special research interest in Public Policy, Education, Local Government, Governance and Politics. Consequently, he has published and unpublished articles to his credit and an article reviewer.



ABOUT THE DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES (GADS) AND PJGD

Department of Governance and Development Studies (GaDS) is one of the pioneer departments of Jimma University established in September 2007 and functioning as a constituent unit of the College of Law and Governance since September 2014. Since its establishment, the Department of GaDS is playing a vital role in the transformation of society and empowering the government institutions by producing professionals in the area of development and governance. Currently, the Master Program of GaDS has three specializations: (i) Governance and Development; (ii) Development Management; (iii) Peace and Conflict Studies whereas two more specializations (Gender Studies and Federal Studies) yet to be introduced.

The Post-Graduate Program of the Department clearly states its vision as “The Master of Arts Program in Governance and Development Studies (GaDS) institutionalizes a dynamic and strategic vision to provide an interdisciplinary, advanced, research-based and practical education in contemporary issues of national and international governance and development”. This stated vision at the same time echoes the vision of the Jimma University which “aspires to be one of the premier universities in Africa and renowned in the world by 2025”.

It is in pursuance of these stated visions of GaDS and Jimma University, the Center for PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development (PJGD) is established to offer a platform of expression of new scientific inquiries to all intellectuals/academicians/scholars of the world in general and Africa & Ethiopia, in particular, to reflect on how governance and development can be promoted, strengthened and consolidated. As the nature of the journal is multi-, inter-, and trans-disciplinary, the scope of the journal ranges from the disciplines of political science, governance, development, leadership, national and international law, globalization, human rights, economics, environmental science, public policy, international relations, international organizations, gender, peace and conflict management, international political economy, multiculturalism, civil society, and related areas.

**FULL TIME STAFF PROFILE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES**

S.N.	Faculty Members	Qualifications
1.	Abiot Desta	Assistant Professor, M.Phil. in Public Administration, MA in Development & Environment, BA in Political Science and IR
2.	Bisrat Gebru	Assistant Professor, MA in Development Studies, BA in Political Science & International Relations
3.	Damena Tolesa	Lecturer, MA in Governance & Development Studies, BA in Governance & Development
4.	Ermyas Admasu	Assistant Professor, M.Phil. in Public Administration, MA in Development Studies, BA in Political Science & International Relations
5.	Fikadu T. Ayanie	Assistant Professor, Ph.D. Candidate, Joint European Masters in Comparative Development, MA in Development Studies, BA in Political Science & International Relations
6.	Gemechu Fikadu	Lecturer, MA in Governance & Development, LLB in Law
7.	Girma Defere	Assistant Professor, Ph.D. Candidate, MA in Public Management, MA in Rural Development, BA in Political Science & IR
8.	Gudeta Kebede	Ph.D. Candidate, MPhil. in Public Administration, MA in International Relations, BA in Political Science & IR
9.	Idris Yeba	Ph.D. Candidate, MA in International Relations, BA in Political Science & IR
10.	Mekdes Worku	Lecturer, MA in Governance & Development Studies, BA in Governance & Development Studies
11.	Melese Tefo	Lecturer, MA in Development Management, BA in Governance & Development Studies
12.	Merry Kapito	Lecturer, MA in Governance & Development, BA in History
13.	Minhaj Alam	Professor, Ph.D. in Political Science, MA in Political Science, BA in Political Science
14.	Muluken Gemechu	Lecturer, MA in International Relations, BA in Political Science & International Relations
15.	Rahel Assefa	Ph.D. Candidate, MA in Governance & Development, MA in Development Management, BA in Governance & Development
16.	Siyum Adugna	Assistant Professor, Ph.D. Candidate, MA in Development Studies, MA in Philosophy, BA in Philosophy
17.	Tewodros Woldeargay	Lecturer, MA in Political Science, BA in Global Studies & International Relations
18.	Tkue Hayate Sied	Lecturer, MA in Development Studies, BA in Governance & Development
19.	Wasihun Altaseb	Lecturer, MA in Development Studies, BA in Civics & Ethics

China's Engagement and Africa Beyond Aid

Evans Tetteh*

Abstract

In the current interdependent globalized world, inter-polity engagements are anticipated to unleash and empower economic development. To a larger extent, this, however, could be said not to be the case as evidenced in the African context where relations with the developed world have triggered dependence on foreign aid as a conduit to pursue and gratify vital development needs. Contemporaneously, China's intensive forays and engagement in Africa since the turn of the twenty-first century has been one characterized by irresistible development assistance to the latter. This situation has ensuingly excited agitations, cardinal among which borders on the claim about the potential deadweight and stymying effect of foreign aid on Africa's growth and development – thereby adding more odium to the discourse on the call for an 'Africa beyond aid' – currently a bourgeoning research sphere. To this end, the objective of this article is to explore how the Chinese aid engagement could relate to the Ghanaian leadership's clarion call for Africa's development beyond aid. Consequently, the study employed qualitative data and analysis to interrogate the Chinese aid policies towards Africa, as well as projects implemented across the continent. The findings show that gauging from the policy perspective, much as Chinese aid tends to be well suited to the 'Africa beyond aid agenda', it nonetheless exhibits some disquieting implementation features that could impede in the long term, Africa's development beyond aid. This unappealing situation makes it imperatively urgent for Africa to understand, and strategically align with China's aid - with recourse to the vision of Africa beyond aid.

Keywords: *Africa, China, Foreign Aid, Development, Developing Countries*

Introduction

The irresistibly baiting composition and demand for aid are such that less developed countries are more likely to be dependent on aid. Therefore, it occasions little surprise that a larger proportion of aid-dependent countries are mostly of African extraction. Although certain scholarly views such as those of Burnside and Dollar (1998), Loxley and Sackey (2008) admit that, under the right circumstances, aid could be used for promoting economic growth, poverty alleviation, and development, there is sufficient evidence suggesting that donors provide aid with disconcerting political motives. With foreign aid creeping deep into the foreign policy

* Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong. Email: 18481221@life.hkbu.edu.hk

prospect arena of developed countries, the norm of conditional relations between donors and recipients has sharply been shot into prominence (Morgenthau, 1962).

Consequently, most African countries, particularly those south of the Sahara, regrettably appear incapable of shaking off such dependency shackles of aid. Metaphorically, the relationship between Africa and aid could be akin to a servant-master – within an environment where the formers' dependence on the latter remains not only dignified but also a blessed evil - until the servant asserts self-sufficiency. Implicitly, this is to say, developing countries in Africa are found between the 'devil' and the 'deep blue sea'; they continue accepting aid with the presumed donor motives, or they reject aid and miss out on the economic gaps that it could fill. Be that as it may, the possible viable option has to be exploited for Africa's development.

Over the years, studies such as those of Moyo (2009) and Edwards (2004) have delved into Africa's economic and aid dependency to examine the intricacies of the dilemma that Africa might have found itself. Such research efforts exploring aid and underdevelopment nexus, have offered possible approaches that could help the continent emerge out of its developmental abyss. This arena of discussion has become rather interesting with the rising influence of China, not only as a major contender in international power politics, but also, viewed as the country with the capabilities of challenging the dominant status quo of the United States.

Consequently, studies are copiously promulgated, generically comparing the determining factors of especially Western aid financing and that of the emerging powers, particularly China, to establish whether there is a new form of a scramble for Africa with the two superpowers at the helm of affairs (King, 2013; Landry, 2018). In the face of the intellectual excitement generated thereof, it is nonetheless still hazy whether the dearth of radical reforms for Africa's economic independence arises from the ingenuity of African leadership, the interference of the foreign powers or both. With literature and policy evolving around how to manage China-Africa relations, vis-à-vis the correlations with the West, a more recent call has emerged for an Africa beyond aid.

This call encourages Africans to initiate drastic, but yielding steps for the development trajectory that would not be influenced by priorities set by the donor countries (Pilling, 2018; Gatune, 2010; Government of Ghana, 2018a). Still and all, the solicitation so far appears to be a sort of surface dressing rhetoric, insufficiently endorsed by policy guidance that could lighten

Africa's path in dealing with either China or the West. "Africa beyond aid", as it stands, tends to be a rejuvenated old vision defective of a particular consensus and framework to generate the desired outcome.

Although a vast array of literature, (Alden & Large, 2019; Brown & Harman, 2013; Alden *et al.*, 2008), have sought to address Africa's contemporary relations with China, including development financing, discussions about Africa's development beyond aid are yet to adequately attract modern academic attention to enhance research and policy. Against this backdrop, in addition to exploring Africa beyond aid amidst increasing volumes of Chinese aid to Africa, this article sets out to explore how the vision could be accomplished, if indeed it is achievable, for Africa's development against China's debatable aid policies and practices.

Material and Methods

The study used the qualitative method for both the data collection and analysis of results. That preference in the view of the researcher is paramount to investigate the research theme for more rigorous results from the disciplinary and the analytical perspectives. More so, it is in line with the methodology employed by other prominent works such as Asante (2018), Brautigam *et al.* (2018), and Cabestan (2020), which also examined Sino-African relations with aspects on aid and Africa's development. The study analyzed information from primary and secondary sources collected through government official websites, online databases, libraries, journals, and news portals. Furthermore, the researcher from 2019-2020 made other field contacts and engagements mostly in Ghana, which through semi-structured interviews and discussions solicited views and opinions from civil society, scholars, and government officials, as well as some observations from projects, programs, and institutions. In addition, the researcher also makes a field visit to the University Confucius Institute Centers, University of Ghana, and University of Cape Coast, Ghana, in July 2019.

The study investigated the Chinese aid as development cooperation, theoretically exploring how it could be situated as a responsible donor partner for Africa through the forms of implementation projects and programs. The composition demonstrates how China's aid policies and project impacts could be examined and interpreted against the possibilities of achieving Africa beyond the aid agenda. This would help devise countervailing measures for positive outcomes from China's rapidly expanding influence in Africa. Among other things, the study is expected to contribute not only towards policymaking around Africa and aid but also, to

discourses on how aid, especially from China, could be used as development cooperation for the sustainable development of Africa.

Key Informant Interviewees

S. No.	Key Informants	Number
1.	Hospital Official from the China-Africa Friendship (Lekma) Hospital, Ghana	1
2.	Senior Official of the Institute for Liberty and Policy Innovation (ILAPI), Ghana	1
3.	Senior Official of the Ministry of Finance, Ghana	1
4.	Policy Analyst and a contributor to the Ghana Beyond Aid Charter and Strategic Document	1
5.	Professor and an Associate Director of a China-Africa Research Institute in the U.S.	1

Aid and Policy Determinants of China's Aid to Africa

Foreign aid is the voluntary transfer of goods, services, capital, and other resources from a country or an international agency to another country, varying in forms depending on the needs of the recipient country (Williams, 2020). Aid is administered as loans, grants, gifts, or donations intended for specific developmental needs. Accordingly, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which comprises the largest aid providers, weaved the term official development assistance (ODA), as the technical definition for foreign aid. In that respect, ODA is the flow of resources from a donor country, through officially recognized agencies or multi-laterals to promote development by targeting the economic growth and the welfare in the developing countries. Essentially, aid is directed to social and infrastructure services; economic infrastructure; humanitarian activities and emergency support; general funds for budgetary support; and multi-sector assistance funding (OECD, Website).

Despite that widely acknowledged definition, for a comprehensive analysis, especially concerning China, aid should not be limited to ODA for some pertinent reasons. First, ODA is a narrow definition of aid, in that, it excludes certain provisions, and at the same time restricts the spending mechanism. For instance, in the case of China, it includes military equipment, which is provided as gifts or sales with concessional rates as part of foreign aid, but the OECD

specifically excludes such military aid and antiterrorism-related assistance (Apodaca, 2017). Again, while China accounts for its peacekeeping operations as aid, the OECD excludes most aspects of peacekeeping in line with being considered as military costs (OECD, Website). China for the most recent years has provided military grants to countries such as Cambodia and Syria, military equipment and infrastructure to African countries including Ghana, Ivory Coast, and Djibouti, as well as peacekeeping and military humanitarian interventions in countries like Sudan and Mali. That does not imply that the Western donors avoid military aid, but they do not report those as aid defined in terms of ODA. Likewise, the expansive definition of Chinese aid is indicative in the fact that it is technically an integral component of other preferential financings like export buyers credit, subsidized loans for joint ventures, and the construction of huge infrastructure like sporting facilities (Carter, 2017).

Second, the parameters for identifying an aid as ODA tend to have not been lucidly settled, as it recurrently undergoes modifications over the years. This is reflected in the OECD's report explaining changes that were considered and approved to be effected subsequently. Indeed, from 2019 as the base year, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD has further introduced a new reporting mechanism termed as "the grant equivalent system" (OECD, 2018), being an example of the inconsistency with technicalities. Last, although the OECD countries collectively contribute the highest percentage of foreign aid, other countries outside the organization provide a significant amount of aid in varied forms. An official report affirms that in the year 2013 for instance, the Non-OECD donors contributed a total of \$ 23.5 billion being more than 13% of the overall global total (OECD, 2015).

Among the non-OECD donors, China by far stands tall in aid to the developing countries. China's foreign aid had sprung from \$630 million in 2003 to about \$3 billion in 2015, a whooping average growth rate of 14% (Landry, 2018). Across the years 2010 to 2012 as an example, an aggregate of \$14.4 billion was appropriated worldwide, consisting of 36.2% grants, 8.1% interest-free loans, and 55.5% concessional loans (State Council, 2014). Furthermore, China is ranked among the ten largest aid providers, with a substantial percentage of sub-Saharan Africa than any of the other regions (Carter, 2017). That is quite graspable since Africa arguably is the most underdeveloped region and comprises the majority of developing countries with development needs that foreign aid by design is intended to address. Besides, other economic and political interests of China could be more fruitful by courting the African

countries possessing manifold untapped natural resources and being the largest state caucus on the United Nations. Consequently, about 45% of China's worldwide aid financing is expended in Africa, reaching each country on the continent. Statistically supported, seven out of the 21st century top 10 Chinese aid recipients are African countries with amounts through 2000-2014 ranging between \$4.0 billion for Ivory Coast, \$3.7 billion for Ethiopia, and \$2.5 billion for Ghana (AidData, Website).

The penetration of Chinese aid into Africa is propelled by its own peculiarities, setting it apart from that of the Western countries in certain ways. Just like the ODA, China's foreign aid includes grants, interest-free or concessional loans but unlike the ODA, excludes donor's administrative cost. Furthermore, China aid is presented in eight unique forms: infrastructure projects, goods and materials, debt relief on interest-free loans, volunteering activities, medical support team, emergency humanitarian assistance, technical cooperation, and human resource development (Carter, 2017; State Council, 2014). Across the broader orientation, China has administered aid to Africa in an array of sectors suchlike education, agriculture, health, communication, energy, and transportation. In all those, infrastructural projects have taken the chunk with over 900 projects across the continent, most of which were constructed in the 21st century. The funding is a mixed financial arrangement consisting of aid, preferential loans commercial loans, and direct investments (Sun, 2014).

The Chinese financial assistance especially to Africa falls under the category of development finance more than a stand-alone aid. For the most part, cash would not be handed out to the recipient country but channeled through normally the Exim Bank and the Ministry of Commerce to finance the intended projects through material supply, labor, and other deliveries. China's developmental finance is broader in coverage as it presents a "combination of official development aid and other official financings" (Lakatos *et al.*, 2016, p. 9). Recently for the 2019-2021 length of time, China pledged \$60 billion as financing for Africa, which was made up of \$20 billion grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans, \$10 billion investment through Chinese companies, \$ 5 billion funds to stimulate export and imports, \$20 billion credit lines and \$10 billion special development fund (MFA, 2018). Although that could not have substantially been achieved due to the advent of the Covid-19 pandemic, it is a reflection of China's development financing module inclusive of aid to Africa.

Principally, China's aid is regulated by the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and China African Policy documents of 2006 and 2015 as the backing frameworks. Since its establishment in 2000, the FOCAC has progressively been employed as an inter-regional engagement instrument for the leadership to consult, commit to specific principles and projects, build consensus and strengthen the Sino-African relationship for deeper cooperation. So far, seven FOCAC conferences have been held alternating between China and an African country, with another one expected in September 2021, which over the years informed the direction of the 21st-century engagement including foreign aid execution. A high-ranking Chinese official, H.E. Wang Yi State, Minister of Foreign Affairs explained during the 20th Anniversary Commemoration of the FOCAC: The FOCAC has enhanced friendship between the Chinese and the Africans through specific aid initiatives under the mechanism. China has provided 120,000 scholarships, 21,000 Chinese medical personnel have assisted in 48 African countries and emergency health crises such as the Ebola and Covid-19, hence, China through aid has supported the African efforts (MFA, 2020).

More into the policy bargain, China released the first African Policy Paper in 2006, which encapsulated the principles for maintaining the relationship farther into the future. The policy affirmed China's commitment to providing aid to the African countries, the sub-regional organizations like the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), and the African Union regional organization. On the other side, China demands that the "One China" policy – regarding the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the only legitimate representative of the Chinese people – remains a non-negotiable basis for maintaining diplomatic relations with any African country (MFA, 2006). The second China African Policy Paper was released in 2015, which further highlighted the use of aid to enhance people-to-people and cultural exchanges as well as security assistance. As typical of Xi's policy route, it reemphasized achieving a prosperous society by linking the Chinese Dream to an African Dream through the underlying aid delivery ethics of non-interference, no strings attached, and imposing no demands (Duggan, 2020). Viewing those principles against the inalienable "One China" by itself seems quite contradictory and casts doubts on how China in terms of policy attempts to portray aid relationship with the African countries.

Consequently, the Chinese aid to Africa is delivered as development cooperation, by which China regards itself as a partner for Africa's development. Within that setting, it debunks an

altruistic donor-recipient image while it embraces government-to-government bilateralism in a win-win pattern to facilitate Africa's emergence from economic travails and poverty (Li, 2007). That unique bilateral context also depicts the principles of South-South cooperation, where China is presented as a developing nation engaging with fellow developing African countries from the global South. Therefore, the relationship is viewed as that of friendliness, equality, and political solidarity promulgated by the South-South cooperation canon. Historically the principles of the South-South cooperation are ingrained in the Bandung Conference (a meeting of Asian and African States in 1955 in Indonesia) and the Non-Aligned Movement (a principle of not aligning with any power bloc of the international system).

China convincingly projects aid relations with the African countries as a developing country that has gained expert experience and is ready to help the other developing countries to also become successful – that of a shared identity from a once upon a time recipient country, now a donor country among the southern comrades (Mawdsley, 2012, p. 152). For that reason, China's aid is still advocated with the *Eight Principles of Economic Aid and Technical Cooperation*. The principles although founded on the 20th-century historical relations with the African countries are relevant to how Chinese aid is further administered into the 21st century. It maintains equality and mutual benefits; no conditions attached; helping the recipient countries to attain independent development; efficient aid management, quality equipment, and technology transfer with no extra demands (State Council, 2011). The Chinese aid policies towards Africa in a way have evolved from ideologically inclined but altruistic motives to a multifaceted kind of development cooperation with heightened economic benefits. Within the Sino-African relationship, Chinese aid is envisaged to facilitate mutually beneficial economic development. As to the extent of how equal such benefits are, remains a matter of deeper reasoning beyond the mere role of foreign aid superficially detectable from the policy statements. Be that as it may, China's aid as development cooperation seems to resonate more in terms of the historical background and common identity shared with the African countries. Even more, the principles of South-South cooperation maintain an objective for the global South countries to cooperate to forestall over-reliance on Western economic assistance and aid (Asante, 2018).

Overall, when viewed from the purpose and the intended objectives of aid for Africa's

development, China's aid is similar to any other foreign aid provider although not the same. The aid is meant to address economic challenges for development through infrastructure, human capital empowerment, social interventions, and livelihood programs. However, China per its own peculiarity generally administers the aid together with other commercial enterprises that when viewed from the perspective of the ODA would not qualify as foreign aid. In addition, China neither provides adequate data nor allows easy access to the spending figures, posing challenges to understanding the Chinese aid system and the extent to which it is truly delivered as development cooperation acclaimed in the backing policies. Regardless of such conspicuous shortcomings, the African countries, especially leadership and the political elite value the role of China as an alternative financing for Africa's demands, especially for the infrastructure sector.

The 21st Century Footprints of the Chinese Aid on the African Continent

China's engagement with Africa commenced in the 1950s, defined by some policies and principles according to the Chinese tradition and foreign policy. That inter-regional interaction over the years provided some significant volumes of aid to Africa, which has registered an unprecedented surge in the 21st century. The increase is commensurate with China's overall dispensing of development finance as the country economically outperforms most of its peers to becoming a global power. Evidentially, foreign aid is being employed indispensably as a foreign policy instrument by the advanced/advancing countries for diplomatic, political, and economic outreach to the rest of the world, a means that China also seems to be utilizing quite well (Apodaca, 2017; Sun, 2014). Respectively, the 21st-century financial resources for Chinese aid, burgeoning from around \$700 million in 2001 to closely \$7.8 billion in 2019 (Kitano & Miyabayashi, 2020), had implications for China's aid relation with Africa. This is more so because Africa has been established earlier attracts close to half all the Chinese aid.

Beyond the financial estimations, the current state of the Chinese foreign aid enterprise across Africa could be more explored through the actual projects and programs that originated from the implementations. Due to the very nature of the Chinese aid, thus mixing official development financing with other commercial interests, not all the projects are completely aid-funded but to some extent contain financial commitment of aid kind. The Chinese aid to Africa is manifested in all eight forms but infrastructure projects are far greater and intense, possibly around 70%. More into that, China as of 2008, was found controlling half of major African

engineering and construction with 35 African countries substantially benefitted from major infrastructure projects, prominent among which are Ethiopia, Sudan, Nigeria, Angola, Mauritania, Ghana, and Guinea (Shinn & Eisenman, 2013). As a result of the Chinese infrastructure aid being tied to the Chinese products, services, and contracts, it has aggressively promoted the country's commercial interests and presence. For example, China since 2011 commands about 40% of contractors while other Western actors decreased – Europeans from 44% to 34% while the US from 24% to 6.7%. Moreover, China's funding for infrastructure in Africa expanded swiftly to around 15% or so in the past few years when positioned against infrastructure expenditure by all the external financiers (Huang & Chen, 2016).

Into the bargain, infrastructure benefits from the Chinese aid-assisted financing are filling gaps that Western aid sources are not providing. This is not because the Chinese aid is extensively higher than the major Western actors, especially the US, but because the aid from the latter is more of the program and budget-supported aid. Western aid dispensed to Africa shot up from 30% in the 1990s to 43% in 2016 for social intervention programs and activities. On the other hand, over the same period, economic-related projects including infrastructure remained consistently below 20% (OECD, 2019).

Despite China's unrelenting efforts in providing for Africa's infrastructural needs, it also exploits Africa's vulnerability to advance its economic interests through aid mixed with other commercial financing and ventures. It could be argued that, since the 'favorable terms' aid loans and the grants are used to spice up the commercial financing to enhance the attractiveness, it is hard for the African actors to reject the Chinese funding. The commercial outlook is considerably reflected in first; the projects are financed and administered through the China Exim Bank and other state-backed entities that are commercially inclined than being development assistance agencies. The aid is consequently bonded with at least 50% of goods and services being provided by China (Brautigam, 2011).

Second, the dispensing institutions together with the executing companies are strategically positioned to promote internationalization and China's geopolitical objectives, most often smoothed by the aid terms and conditions with the African countries. The execution has provided business opportunities for those companies and state enterprises to expand across Africa posing enormous challenges to indigenous enterprises. As an exemplification,

geopolitically, China is feared to be using Huawei to provide advanced telecommunication infrastructure that could be covertly employed for surveillance and exporting a framework for Africa's internet governance and control, while widening digital technology on the continent (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2020). Third, most of the concessional loans being part of the other aid financing agreements combined with credit lines are tied to Africa's natural resources for the guarantee of payment (Haneur & Lyle, 2014). For example, aspects of the payment for Ghana's Bui Dam were tied to cocoa export to China, likewise projects in Angola, Nigeria, and other African countries tied to various types of resources (Brautigam, 2011).

Besides infrastructure, other forms of Chinese aid have been marginally provided for Africa over the years. Goods and materials in machinery, transport vehicles, medical devices, testing equipment, food, and medicines among the lot are hallmarks of the Chinese aid at certain times for technical support, to augment projects, and support some social interventions. For example, China in 2017 donated patrol boats worth \$4.4 million to Ivory Coast to curb maritime crime. Again, in 2012, Zimbabwe received a \$15 million value of grains for distribution to disadvantaged communities while in 2006 machinery and equipment estimated at \$ 5 million were delivered to support maintenance works on the Tazara (Dreher *et al.*, 2017).

Moreover, China offers aid to Africa to guide production and operations intended to transfer knowledge and skills to succor African expertise for managing completed projects. In that regard, two main initiatives across agriculture and research are cited as evidence of those efforts. First, the agriculture sector as one of the main areas of China's technical cooperation by 2006 had received 10,000 Chinese technicians with 200 projects undertaken. While from the year 2004 to 2010, 4200 technicians and management officials were trained and 14 agricultural demonstration centers were completed (Shinn & Eisenman, 2013). Another recent case of technical cooperation is the Sino-Africa Joint Research Center (SAJOREC) in partnership with the Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (JKUAT) established in 2013. The initiative emphasizes wildlife protection and afforestation, monitoring climate change, and modern agriculture demonstration (Sajorec, Website).

The other forms of aid conservatively being delivered by China but for some specific demands are human resource development, Chinese medical teams, and volunteers, then emergency aid. China maintains a partnership with some African universities, which as of 2013, cooperative

programs were ongoing between 19 Chinese universities and 23 African universities. More so, by way of bridging the existing language barrier and for other broader state ambitions, China's Confucius Institute is operational with at least 61 Institutes and 44 Classrooms in 44 African countries. Additionally, professional seminars and short training are being achieved through at least 10 African research institutes in Chinese universities (King, 2013).

In Kenya for instance, 400 Chinese teachers were dispatched from 2000 to 2009, and China further offered \$ 15 million for the Ethio-China Polytechnic College (Reilly, 2015). Again, 10,000 Kenyan government officials have benefitted from training and seminars since 2001 (Xinhua, 2018). Into the bargain, the Chinese government scholarship has rapidly taken shape at the turn of the 21st century, currently estimated at around 12000 African students a year, far more than any other country could provide (Financial Times, 2020). For example, Ghana is the highest African beneficiary of the Chinese scholarships for the past recent years had 518 in 2016 alone and 5000 total from 2012 to 2016, according to Mdm. Sun Baohong, the then Chinese Ambassador to Ghana (China Embassy, Ghana, Website). As another example, 1000 Kenyans benefitted from the Chinese government scholarship as of 2018 (Xinhua, 2018).

Through the Chinese medical teams, China by yearly engagements provides free medical services, medical personnel training, facilities, free medication, and anti-malaria campaigns. More than 20, 000 medical team personnel had been assigned to over forty-four African countries, treating over 240 million patients in over 100 hospitals and health centers across the continent (Shinn & Eisenman, 2013). China has used the avenue to fortify the health vacuums in Africa especially in the domains of professional training, emergency health care, Chinese traditional medicine, and surgical procedures. In return, China draws international reputation due to the uniqueness of that engagement for relations, attracting attention by the West to what China might achieve for image enhancement (Li, 2011).

The relevance and the role of the Chinese medical team both to Africa and China were further evident in the recent health crisis, the Ebola (2014-2016, where about 1200 or so medical personnel including from the People Liberation Army were dispatched to Africa) as well the Covid-19 pandemic. Chinese health personnel and front-line health workers have assisted in prevention operations, treating infected patients, and constructing make-shift facilities and treatment centers (Cabestan, 2020; Xinhua, 2020). The operations of the medical teams bear

some challenges especially relating to non-collaboration with other development partners and agencies in the recipient countries, services limited to few hospitals of Chinese interest, and underutilization of what they could offer. For example in Ghana, the researcher observed and informed that the teams have consistently been dispatched to only three main hospitals including the China-Ghana Friendship Hospital (Lekma) (Interviewee 1, April 15, 2020).

Again, they are less engaged in community-level services that cut deep into the most deprived rural areas. Besides those downsides, the teams have been praised by their African counterparts for professionalism, special expertise and health delivery for the African countries (Chen *et al.*, 2019).

Briefly elucidated, the Chinese Volunteers are limited in their scope of operations unlike the Peace Corps from the Western countries that spread over the African communities. In Ghana, for example, interactions and observations from the field visit showed their presence only at the Confucius Institutes and related teaching activities for the University Chinese language teaching. Regardless, they are handy for China to introduce the culture and language through activities that span to include even primary level pupils from some basic schools around the catchment areas.

The footprints of the Chinese aid on the African continent could not be discussed without humanitarian and emergency aid. China in its 21st century expanded aid to Africa has provided packs of humanitarian and emergency aid delivered in materials, cash, or personnel to minimize the repercussions of certain predicaments on life and property from the affected areas. Selected examples are shown herein. In 2005, China supported Guinea-Bissau in cash and kind when that African country was plagued with cholera and locust, while food aid (worth CNY 10 million) was given to help drought victims in Djibouti. In 2009, China through the World Food Programme (WFP) offered \$ 5 million for drought relief in Zimbabwe. Again in 2011 and 2012 respectively, emergency food aid (valued at CNY 440 million) was distributed for Kenya, Djibouti, Somali and Ethiopia, while Chad, Niger, Mali among others received humanitarian aid (valued at CNY 70 million). Another \$3 million was granted to care for victims following the arms explosion in Congo in 2012 (Brautigam, 2009; State Council, 2011; Dreher et al., 2017).

The aforementioned interventions for the recent health crises are also humanitarian and emergency aid. The total funding that China committed to Ebola alone in West Africa was \$120 million through the direct bilateral and multilateral relief items, operations, and financial packages (China Daily, 2015). As well, assistance for Africa amidst the Covid-19 pandemic is

not yet full-fledged but China is showing signs of debt forgiveness and vaccine assistance to curb the likely impacts on the African countries. It raises the current debates about health diplomacy as a new aid tool for the foreign actors in African affairs since the continent seems to rely mostly on foreign assistance to vaccinate their populations. Over and above that, China takes advantage of the humanitarian aid to work side by side with other international teams to tap into certain practices that might be useful for its strategic planning, while forging ahead with security outreach and diplomatic interests like demonstrated during the Ebola (Cabestan, 2020).

Finally, China has canceled debts as a form of aid for the African countries. At the end of 2009, \$2.9 billion debts worth of 312 debts were canceled for 35 African countries, being 75% of China's global debt cancellation (State Council, 2014). For the past 19 years, China has overall canceled at least \$3.4 billion for the African countries (Acker et al., 2020). Under the G20 Debt Suspension Initiative to confront the economic impacts of Covid-19 for the developing countries due to debt distress, China is bent on further canceling debts for the African countries. According to reports, about \$1.353 billion debts (both aid and non-aid types) are being canceled for 23 African countries with Zambia and Angola already benefitted (South China Morning Post, 2020).

The issue of debt relief under the circumstances of China's aid being argued a major contributor to Africa's debt distress is one worth attending. Ghana for example at the end of 2020 reached an all-time high of \$24.7 billion external debt being 48.6% of the 76% debt to GDP. More alarming is the projection that the country according to the IMF estimations could reach 85.5% debt to GDP in 2026, and would be only behind Zambia and Congo in such debt levels (JoyOnline, 2021). Furthermore, China per the estimations of solely making up 12% or so of Ghana's external borrowing (see OECD, 2018), therefore contributes substantially to Ghana's debts. Even so, the Chinese aid comparative to Western aid adds up to debts since they provide much of loan aid, unlike the former, which provide more grants. In that respect, China's debt forgiveness to Africa although commendable is quite symbolic but not that much of significant.

On the flip side is also the argument that aid provided in the form of grants to Africa rather limit Africa's agency and is used to advance the donor country's interests, hence, China's delivery mode of more concessional and preferential loans as development cooperation rather than the aid gratis. Whichever side one views the debate, foreign aid in whatever form or from whichever country tends to be designed to advance the interests of the donor country while intended also to

satisfy the development needs of the recipients. In the case of Africa, the conventional view as it seems is that aid is not promoting Africa's development as it is expected to (Moyo, 2009), although it does for the short to medium term meet certain demands.

The Chinese aid as has been shown is filling in the gap for infrastructure development, which the Western aid has gradually withdrawn from, becoming alternative support. While that support is readily available with some sort of "no strings attached", to attract African leadership, it also seems to be triggering and widening the aid dependency spirally. Consequentially, as Africa continues to be viewed as being dependent on aid, it might be revealing to consider how the Chinese aid could be touching on that measure. Thereupon, there is a new call for the possibilities of Africa moving beyond aid, and that call should well be gauged discretely against the Chinese engagement.

The New Call for "Africa Beyond Aid": Ghana in Focus

Recently, His Excellency Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, the President of the Republic of Ghana commenced a campaign first expressed in the joint press conference with Emmanuel Macron, the French President during a visit to Ghana in December 2017. The Ghanaian President echoed a stance that resonated well among most Ghanaians and other Africans at home and abroad, who applauded him for the bold commitment to changing Africa's quandary (Akwei, 2017). The president emphatically stated that Africans could not be able to make policies for themselves because of the external aid that the respective governments receive from donor countries. Retrospectively, cumulative aid has led to more and more dependency: becoming a conundrum that seems not to be getting any better.

The call became more official (particularly for Ghana) through the speech delivered by the president during the national parade commemorating the 61st independence anniversary of Ghana on March 6, 2018. In the delivery, the president contended that the country could not realize its economic reformation through aid since it had relied on aid for the past six decades without any significant progress. The reasons for such a failure, he implied, are first, there could be aid fatigue; second, donors decide how the funding is spent; and third, there can never be enough aid to propel the country (or the continent) into the expected level of development. Accordingly, "Ghana beyond aid" implies that the country would be in charge of its own destiny and could engage competitively with the rest of the world through trade, finance and investment. Ghana beyond aid is a vision to actualize the country's resources, being effectively

used for attaining self-reliance.

That salient call emanated from the convincing assumption that, Africa's retarded economic transformation, among other socio-economic and political challenges, has been triggered by the dependency on foreign aid (Kumi, 2020). The sources of the dependency could be twofold – internal and external. Over the years, experts have argued that despite some successes attributable to foreign aid in Africa, it has endangered a dependency culture and nursed paternalism more than a partnership. Patrimonialism, extraversion, and some sort of political elitism are being fecundated through the aid engagements with foreign donors, undermining the intended use of development aid, but depending on it for certain parochial interests. African actors with influence and involvement in the aid delivery processes are shown to have appropriated aid in ways that could inure to their individualistic benefits for economic control and political dominance at the cost of the societal gains (Alves & Chichava, 2019).

Regarding the external cause of Africa's dependency, aid is admissibly an integral component of the foreign policy for the developing countries, employed as a tool for particular state interests. Certainly, research has established that foreign powers could either withdraw aid or provide aid to make a regime or a region act in certain defined ways for ideological and strategic interests. Beyond that, economic interests are the major driving force behind most aid programs while politically pursued to modify the state behavior of the recipient (Apodaca, 2017). That being the case, it is quite convincing to assert that, aid to Africa is designed and delivered in a way that could sustain that dependency on the donor countries into the unforeseeable future.

Thereupon, Africans, said Nana Addo on another occasion in France, should “take charge of their own destinies, abandon the mentality of being dependent on aid and charity, and work towards transforming their countries” to farther away from the dependency mindset (Government of Ghana, 2019a, para. 5). Further echoed in an article, *Forging Ahead, Ghana Means Business*, it explains that Ghana, as a campaigner and an example for Africa beyond aid, is a country that could mobilize material and human resources internally and expand trade and commercial activities with developing partners instead of subsisting on charity and handouts for wealth generation. Indeed, the recent call radiated from an African ‘grandiloquent president’ and resonating internationally as a new wave for Africa beyond aid (Pilling, 2018).

In further discussions and interactions with the other African and world leaders, the President of the Republic of Ghana seizes every opportunity to expand Ghana beyond aid campaign to Africa beyond aid. Hence, in a speech delivered at the 73rd UN General Assembly in 2018, he noted that Ghana beyond aid is also a vision for an Africa beyond aid. An interesting point from that speech was the historical antecedent of Western powers' exploitation of China through infrastructural aid, which consequently led to the lease out of Hong Kong Port. That draws attention to China as to whether it might be employing just exploitation strategies in their engagements with the African countries through aid or it could be helping the African countries to develop.

The government of Ghana, actively championing Ghana's beyond aid agenda produced the Ghana Beyond Aid Charter and Strategy Document. It explains that to achieve the vision, the behavioral changes that Ghanaians, and for that matter, Africans would be committed to for a better transformation, is very crucial. The document further points out that, a country beyond aid does not mean the rejection of aid, but rather, pursuing strategies for economic transformation that are well aligned with aid. By so doing, the country should be relying less on aid for public services (such should be catered for internally) while encouraging donors to channel aid packages into economic transformation programs for the furtherance of a stronger economy to eventually be weaned off aid (Government of Ghana, 2019b).

The Charter in terms of policy outlines the measures that could hurl an African country like Ghana to move beyond aid. It calls for agriculture modernization, industrialization, infrastructure development, private sector and entrepreneurship growth, social intervention, domestic resource mobilization, protecting the public purse, and financing initiatives to implement the policy objectives. To facilitate the processes, Ghana proposed the establishment of the Ghana Beyond Aid Council with its secretariat to coordinate with the National Development Planning Commission to develop the framework that will reflect specific priorities, programs, and projects. Those policies and strategies are intended for utilizing aid from various quarters in a way that would empower the country. In that regard, it is also important that the type of aid from prominent donors like China is well comprehended.

Chinese Aid Engagement and Achieving “Africa Beyond Aid”

From the policies and principles that propel the Chinese aid system, it could be argued that the South-South development cooperation evident from the FOCAC framework and the various

policy outlines could drive Africa beyond aid. This is more so because as stated earlier, the vision is 'encouraging donors to channel aid packages into economic transformation programs'. However, reasoning further beyond the policies and the rhetorical principles, practical engagement might possess certain attributes that would demand thorough examination to establish its suitability to the vision.

Substantially, the stated vision by Ghana, the main projector of Africa beyond aid, has some striking resemblance with Chinese aid policies and engagement with Africa. As could be established from the Chinese aid footprint, the aid is combined with investment, trade, infrastructure development, and to some extent technology. Therefore, China's policy, especially in recent years towards Africa, is in certain ways linked with a grand strategy for economic transformation rather than a mere interest in natural resources and energy (Li, 2007). Moreover, the Chinese aid is delivered as an economic cooperation program, which for the most part emphasizes infrastructure, production, and joint ventures but also human capital development and technical cooperation that supposedly create employment and local capacity.

Aid packages are predominantly channeled into the infrastructural-based economic reforms than public services, social grants, and humanitarian incentives. That point of direction has helped to address energy, transportation, telecommunication, and other health and education needs for most of the African countries. Specific examples across the continent are the Ruzibazi Hydropower Station of Burundi, the Souapiti Dam of Guinea, the fiber-optics network for Togo, the Bui Dam, and rural electrification projects for Ghana, the University of Dar es Salame Library and the Kibungo Hospital of Uganda. Those empowerment interventions could be utilized to move beyond aid especially where China makes the funding readily available with a wider coverage where the aid is tied to other commercial development finance.

Lastly, the Chinese aid is more demand-driven to facilitate the African agencies in deciding the projects that aid funds could be directed to (Dreher *et al.*, 2017; King, 2013). It implies that the African countries have the say in determining the kind of projects that suits their broader policy strategy and development agenda at particular times. That is an aspect of ownership, which according to the *Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness*, is one of the key determinants of how aid could be employed by a donor country for effective development for the recipient country. In Ghana, for example, most of the projects undertaken by the Chinese aid have either being on

the development agenda of the country or were decided before it was proposed to the Chinese. The Bui Dam for instance was earmarked decades back but faced setbacks with Western financing until it was carried out by the Chinese. Similarly, a \$22.5 million Chinese interest-free loan that financed the Ofankor-Nsawam Highway was already part of Ghana's grand road network to link other land-locked countries of the sub-region.

Without doubts, the Chinese aid possesses those developmental targets that could in certain measures help to achieve an Africa beyond aid. Moreover, the flexibility, the availability, and the packaging of China's aid, more enchanting from the policy perspective could justify it being the type suiting a South-South cooperation non-dependent but an interdependent relationship for 'win-win' and mutual benefits. However, the same aid could be quite challenging to the implementation of that vision for Africa, if certain practical attributes are not carefully examined for enhancement.

To achieve an Africa beyond aid, public institutions must be strengthened to participate actively in the development processes. However, the Chinese aid is yet to be directed to strengthening institutionalism for a better recipient-end internal management. Presently, the intrinsic idiosyncrasy of China's aid is founded on the non-interference and respect for sovereignty principles, which is rewarding in a certain respect but engenders institutional deficiency. Most of the Chinese aid projects are implemented in Africa through sole-sourcing agreements with less or no competitive bidding, maintaining procurement arrangements with limited local content (Williams, 2017). In the case of Ghana's Bui Dam, the processes evaded the Public Procurement Act and the mandated Public Procurement Authority of Ghana (Odoom, 2015). Similar setbacks including the less and non-transparent oversight responsibility by the recipient country's regulatory bodies do not strengthen institutional capacity.

On the other, the Chinese seem to strengthen their institutions by channeling aid through both their public institutions and government-supported private companies, to ensure the sustainability of such Chinese entities. By that, the aid delivery mechanism is also tied to Chinese goods and services. For example, the concessional Eximbank aid is officially stated to be not less than 50% of the procurement made from China (Brautigam, 2011). Besides, grants and interest-free loans could rather be tied more, not to talk of the dominating Chinese workers and services for the Chinese aid projects.

Although tying aid to goods and services is not exclusive only to China, Africans tend to be

driven to accept the readily available Chinese credit and aid facilities even when they are tied to the Chinese goods and services than the other aid sources, particularly the West. Again, Western aid to Africa has made attempts in recent years to untie aid by directing flows into budgetary support and program aid, which do not require much of the donor's goods and services. In the circumstances of tied aid, it could help economic development through the infrastructural projects, but not at the desired rate because it could thwart local production and indigenous commerce and industrialization. Consequently, the Chinese aid by principle and structure intentionally or unintentionally induces institutional dependence, contributes less to economic institutional reform, and even so more attractive to African leaders who are apprehensive of reforming their institutions to maximize their interests (Brazys & Vadlamannati, 2018).

As another point, ironically a practice that seems to be uncooperative although China holds the principles of cooperation is that the aid is implemented in isolation, undermining the collective aims of the donor partners in Africa. Overall, the Chinese aid is poorly coordinated with other donors across the African continent, maintaining no cooperation with bilateral donors in particular although initial discussions are being held for co-financing of projects, and some efforts with multilateral such as the African Development Bank and the World Bank (Barthelemy, 2011). To date, China under the South-South cooperation multilateral arrangements has only undertaken technical and personnel support for some trilateral projects such as with the Danish for a renewable energy technology transfer in Ghana (2014-2018) and with the UK for agriculture technology transfer in Malawi and Uganda (UNDP, 2017). However, it does not collaborate for coordination, alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability being the established core principles designed for global aid effectiveness. That is to say, China's aid is divergent by not working together with the other donors to reconcile the broader aid objectives, which could hinder economic reforms and global development goals for Africa.

Probably more perturbing about the Chinese aid delivery in Africa is the combined issues of debt trap and resource extraction. As illustrated before now, Africa's debt is becoming complicated, worrying, and alarming caused also by China's readily available financing. That is not to say that China has ceased or is about to take total control of facilities in the African

countries due to debts owed, probably that is an overblown and unsubstantiated assumption (Brautigam, 2020). But then, China's engagement is significantly scaling the debts for the African countries, more especially when the recipient country is granted the financing so far as it craves for it. This could make such countries vulnerable to China when they are unable to meet the loan obligation in the future, which may result in some economic and political concessions. Those could be leading to higher aid dependency.

Over and above that, to ensure security and guaranteed repayment, China in most of the cases give out aid and receive natural resources including oil, cocoa, and other minerals as payback demonstrated by Jiang (2009) and mentioned in this study about the payment arrangement for Ghana's Bui Dam and others like in Nigeria and Congo. Besides, such resources might be used as guarantors, which seems to be fueling the fears of China's direction regarding the economic compromises that such countries could make in the future – more and more Africa's resource vulnerability to China. Looking at the issues, Chinese aid is particularly alarming because it is more often than not commodity/resource-backed loans (Interviewee 2, June 23, 2019). The debt-trap predicament is a potential cause for massive resource extraction from the affected countries, and perhaps joint-operation of certain ventures between some African countries and China because of debts, sooner or later. Debt-trap, resource extraction, non-collaboration with other donor partners, and the undermining of institutional reforms in the recipient African countries are the high-risk factors of China aid, which could be endangering the achievement of Africa beyond aid.

Conclusion

The article referred to the current call for an Africa beyond aid, establishing that, although not entirely a new call, it sounds convincing, rejuvenating, and timely with the rapid inflow of Chinese aid to Africa. It has demonstrated how Africa beyond aid could be aligned to the Chinese aid engagement on the continent, to understand how their approach might be affecting the success or otherwise of the vision. The general discussion dissected the dynamics of the Chinese aid, theoretically viewing aid as development cooperation and South-South cooperation as enshrined in the backing policy principles of the Chinese. Furthermore, the study empirically examined the Chinese aid footprints, especially infrastructure projects on the African continent with the likely benefits and detriments to Africa.

As a contribution to the aid discourse at large, and specifically how the Chinese aid could be

suited to achieving an Africa beyond aid, the study has shown that, policy-wise, besides the questionable so-called 'no strings attached', China maintains attributes of aid packages meant for economic transformation programs more than just altruistic gratis and gifts. Those features the study has contended are compatible with promoting Africa's development beyond aid. However, in practice, the same aid is implemented in ways that are noticeable to maximize China's commercial interests, in essence not enhancing Africa's development like expected. Indeed, Africa beyond aid is a worthy call, but then more needs to be done instead of the Chinese aid engagements to achieve the intended objectives for Africa's development. In that vein, certain recommendations are advanced forthwith to position China's aid appropriately to that pragmatic objective.

Recommendation

Having identified the characteristics and the possible risk factors of the Chinese aid provides an insightful guide for effective decision-making and research. More importantly, it demonstrates how China's aid engagement with the continent could be ominous to long-term development objectives, hence cautiously interpreted to achieving Africa beyond aid vision. Even though China's practical implementation of aid could pose challenges, the policies and the principles, i.e. aid as development cooperation and the bilateral delivery hinged on South-South cooperation mechanism, are suited for an engagement that could propel Africa to becoming less dependent on aid. Such positive aspects could serve as a favorable ground for other measures that would collectively assist to tune the Chinese aid to an Africa beyond aid.

First, African leaders should effectively ensure the collaboration among the activities of the aid providers – the West (otherwise the OECD countries), China, and the non-OECD countries like India, Brazil, and Russia in the African countries. Possibly, the *Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness* and the *Accra Agenda for Action* are the global frameworks for aid harmonization and alignment, which China endorsed to adhere to, so could be shoved to apply. Consequently, Africa needs measures, for instance, a unified African policy framework toward China, which concisely would define how the Chinese aid as development cooperation would be in harmony with all the other development partners. 'The absence of an African policy speaks to the slanted nature of the relations, a fact that should inspire corrective action' (Wekesa, 2021, p. 11).

Second, there ought to be a specific institution in each of the African countries for the

coordination, policy implementation, and administration of aid-related activities. Currently, in Ghana, for example, there seems to be a lack of unified and definite responsibility across the ministries and agencies for issues relating to foreign aid (Interviewee 3, June 5, 2020). Again, although Ghana has established a Ghana beyond aid office, as an adjunct to the Office to the President, may not appropriately function as a standing institution or agency could (Interview 4, June 11, 2020). In that same vein, China ought to coordinate its aid activities in a cohesive partnership with the responsible institutions in the African countries. For example, the recently established China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) is a step in the right direction that could encourage African countries to establish parallel ones, and at the same time, the CIDCA be willing to work effectively with the African counterparts. To add to that, the African countries should be determined to strengthen institutions rather than political agenda since political leaders change over time, lapsing with their pledges.

Third, the African countries need to set stringent debt sustainability threshold that corresponds with the long-term potential of achieving Africa beyond aid. This could help to avoid the alarming debt trap that could be resulting from the readily available Chinese aid. Regarding that, China should be acting in good faith by closely working with the African countries to help them achieve the objectives, even when they seem desperate for aid funding. Moreover, China could provide more grants and interest-free loans than loans with interest, and possibly restructure or provide debt relief for such countries likely to be drowned in debts. Indeed, China on a more commendable note has shown signs of commitment to debt relief for the African countries (see Acker *et al.* 2020) but should correspond more to the levels of indebtedness.

Finally, scholars and experts of China-Africa relations from both ends should be actively involved in foreign aid-connected bilateral arrangements and agreements to ensure balanced fairness and stronger African agency for the economic deals. The Chinese policies and state behavior could be misunderstood because it involves a great deal of multiple actors, with Chinese operational characteristics and no direct variation between the political and economic interests (Interviewee 5, November 23, 2019). Thus, academic expertise requires in dealing with that complex web of interdependence. On a positive note, however, China's attention could easily be drawn to certain shortcomings about its engagement with Africa the difficulties and the harm that the specific practice may be posing to the intended objectives of development cooperation, which could be expertly referred to from the Chinese own foreign policy principles

towards Africa.

References

- Acker, A., Brautigam, D., & Huang, Y. (2020). Debt Relief with Chinese Characteristics. *Working Paper No. 2020/39*. China Africa Research Initiative, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC. Retrieved November 5, 2020 from <http://www.sais-cari.org/publications>.
- AidData. (Website). China's global development footprint. Retrieved December 23, 2020 from <https://www.aiddata.org/china-official-finance>.
- Akwei, I. (2017). Ghana president's anti-Western dependency speech gets young Africans thinking. *Face to Face Africa*. Retrieved October 14, 2020 from <https://face2faceafrica.com/article/ghana-presidents-anti-western-dependency-speech-gets-young-africans-thinking>
- Alden C., Large D. & de Oliveira R.S. (2008). *China Returns to Africa: A continent and a Rising Power Embrace*. New York: Hurst Publishers.
- Alden, C. & Large, D. (2019). *New directions in Africa-China studies*. New York: Routledge.
- Alves, A.C. & Chichava, S. (2019). Neopatrimonialism and extraversion in China's relations with Angola and Mozambique. In C. Alden & D. Large (Eds), *New directions in China-Africa relations* (pp. 243-259). New York: Routledge.
- Apodaca, C. (2017). *Foreign aid as foreign policy tool*. Oxford Research Encyclopedias.
- Asante, R. (2018). China and Africa. A model of South-South relations? *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies*, 4(2), 1–21.
- Barthelemy, J.C. (2011). China's Engagement and Aid Effectiveness in Africa. *African Development Bank Working Paper Series, No. 129*. Retrieved July 2, 2021 from <https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Working%20129.pdf>
- Brautigam, D. (2009). *The dragon's gift: the real story of China in Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Brautigam, D. (2011). Aid 'with Chinese characteristics': Chinese foreign aid and development finance meet the OECD-DAC aid regime. *Journal of International Development*, 23(5), 752–64.
- Brautigam, D. (2011). Aid 'with Chinese characteristics': Chinese foreign aid and development finance meet the OECD-DAC aid regime. *Journal of International Development*, 23(5), 752–64.
- Brautigam, D. (2020). A critical look at Chinese 'debt-trap diplomacy': the rise of a meme. *Area Development and Policy*, (5)1,1-14.
- Brazys, S. & Vadlamannati, K.C. (2018). Aid curse with Chinese characteristics? Chinese development flows and economic reforms. *AidData Working Paper #52*. Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William & Mary.
- Brown, W. & Harman, S. (2013). *African Agency in international politics*. London: Routledge.
- Burnside, C. & Dollar, D. (1998). Aid the interactive regime and poverty reduction. *Policy Research Working Paper Series 1937*. The World Bank.
- Cabestan, J.-P. (2020). China's response to the 2014–2016 Ebola crisis: Enhancing Africa's soft security under Sino-US competition. *China Information*, 35(1), 3-24. doi:10.1177/0920203X20978545

- Carter, B. (2017). Literature review on China's aid. *K4D Helpdesk Report*. UK: Institute of Development Studies.
- Chen, S., Pender, M., Jin, N., Merson, M., Tang, S., & Gloyd, S. (2019). Chinese medical teams in Africa: a flagship program facing formidable challenges. *Journal of global health*, 9(1), 010311. <https://doi.org/10.7189/jogh.09.010311>
- China Daily. (2015, March 21). *Timeline of China's anti-Ebola aid in Africa*. Retrieved July 1, 2021 from https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015-03/21/content_19873984.htm
- China Embassy, Ghana. (2017). *Remarks by Chinese Ambassador to Ghana H.E. Mdm. Sun Baohong at the Handing-over Ceremony of the ICT Classroom at Lady Julia ICT Knowledge Community Center*. Retrieved July 2, 2021 from <http://gh.china-embassy.org/eng/sgxw/t1440066.htm>
- Dreher, A., Andreas F., Bradley P., Austin M.S. & Michael J.T. (2017). Aid, China, and growth: Evidence from a new global development finance dataset. *AidData Working Paper #46*. Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William & Mary.
- Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B.C., Strange, A. M., & Tierney, M. J. (2017). Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset. *AidData Working Paper #46*. Williamsburg, VA: AidData.
- Duggan, N. (2020). *Competition and Compromise among Chinese Actors in Africa, A Bureaucratic Politics Study of Chinese Foreign Policy Actors*. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Edwards, S. (2014). Economic development and the effectiveness of foreign aid: A historical perspective. Retrieved March 25, 2021 from <https://voxeu.org/article/development-and-foreign-aid-historical-perspective>
- Eom, H., Atkins, L., Chen, Y. & Zhou, S. (2017). The United States and China in Africa: What does the data say? *SAIS China-Africa Research Institute*.
- Financial Times. (2020, June 24). China surpasses western government African university scholarships. *A news desk report by Andrew Jack*. Retrieved July 5, 2021 from <https://www.ft.com/content/4b2e6c1c-83cf-448a-9112-477be01d2eee>
- Gatune, J. (2010). Africa's development beyond aid: getting out of the box. *The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 632 (1), 103-120.
- Government of Ghana. (2018a). *Address By The President Of The Republic, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, On The Occasion Of Ghana's 61st Independence Day Celebration*. Retrieved December 28, 2020 from <https://www.presidency.gov.gh/index.php/briefing-room/speeches/568-address-by-the-president-of-the-republic-nana-addo-dankwa-akufo-addo-on-the-occasion-of-ghana-s-61st-independence-day-celebration-at-the-independence-square>
- Government of Ghana. (2018b). *President Akufo-Addo's Speech At 73rd UN General Assembly*. Retrieved January 1, 2021 from <https://www.presidency.gov.gh/index.php/briefing-room/speeches/378-address-delivered-by-the-president-akufo-addo-at-the-72nd-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly>
- Government of Ghana. (2019a). Official visit of President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo to France. Ghana Embassy France. Retrieved January 7, 2021 from <https://paris.embassy.gov.gh/official-visit-of-president-nana-addo-dankwa-akufo-addo-to-france/>
- Government of Ghana. (2019b). *Ghana beyond aid charter and strategy document*. Office of the President of the Republic of Ghana.

- Hanauer, L. & Lyle J. M. (2014). *Chinese Engagement in Africa: Drivers, Reactions, and Implications for U.S. Policy*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- Huang, Z. & Chen, X. (2016). Is China building Africa? *The European Financial Review*, June/July, 41–47.
- Jiang, W. (2009). Fueling the dragon: China's rise and its energy and resources extraction in Africa. *The China Quarterly*, (199), 585-609.
- JoyOnline. (2021, April 12). Ghana's debt to hit 81.5%, 86.6% of GDP in 2021, 2025 – IMF. *Report by Charles Nixon Yeboah*. Retrieved April 30, 2021 from <https://www.myjoyonline.com/ghanas-debt-to-hit-81-5-86-6-of-gdp-in-2021-2025-imf/>
- King, K. (2013). *China's aid and soft power in Africa: The case of education & training*. Rochester: Boydell and Brewer.
- Kitano, N. (2019). *Estimating China's foreign aid: 2017-2018 preliminary figures*. Tokyo: JICA Research Institute. Retrieved January 20, 2020 from https://www.jica.go.jp/jica-ri/publication/other/175nbg000018z3zd-att/20190926_01.pdf
- Kumi, E. (2020). From donor darling to beyond aid? Public perceptions of 'Ghana Beyond Aid'. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 58(1), 67-90. doi:10.1017/S0022278X19000570
- Lakatos, C., Maliszewka, M., Osorio-Rodarte, I. & Go D. (2016). China's slowdown and rebalancing: potential growth and poverty impact on Sub-Saharan Africa. *Policy Research working paper; no. WPS 7666*. Washington DC: World Bank.
- Landry, D.G. (2018). Comparing the determinants of Western and Chinese development finance flows to Africa. *Working Paper No. 2018/21. SAIS China-Africa Research Institute*
- Li, A. (2007). Transformation of China's policy towards Africa. Center on China's Transnational Relations. *Working Paper No. 20. Paper Presented at International Conference 'China-African Links'*, 11/10-11/11, 2006: Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.
- Loxley, J & Sackey, A.H. (2008). Aid effectiveness in Africa. *African Development Review*, 20(2), 163-199.
- Mawdsley, E. (2012). *From recipients to donors: Emerging powers and the changing Development Landscape*. Zed Books, London
- MFA. (2006). *China's African Policy*. Retrieved April 30, 2021 from <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zgdfzcc/t481748.htm>
- MFA. (2018). *Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2019-2021)*. Retrieved July 12, 2021 from http://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zywj/t1594297.htm
- MFA. (2020). *Build on Twenty Years of Proud Achievements and Open Up a New Chapter in China-Africa Relations*. Retrieved July 2, 2021 from https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/t1831815.shtml
- Morgenthau, H.J. (1962). A political theory of foreign aid. *American Political Science Review*, 56, 301-09.
- Moyo, D. (2009). *Why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Odoom, I. (2015). Dam In, Cocoa Out; Pipes In, Oil Out: China's Engagement in Ghana's Energy Sector. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 52(5), 598-620. doi:10.1177/0021909615599419

- OECD (2019). Development Aid at Glance Statistics by Region: Africa. Retrieved from <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/Africa-Development-Aid-at-a-Glance-2019.pdf>
- OECD. (2015). Development co-operation by countries beyond the DAC. *The OECD Development Co-operation Directorate*. Retrieved March 5, 2021 from <https://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/Development%20Co-operation%20by%20Countries%20beyond%20the%20DAC.pdf>
- OECD. (2018). Official developmental assistance – definition and coverage. Retrieved December 19, 2019 from <https://www.oecd.org/development/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm#ODA2017>
- OECD. (2019). *Development Aid at Glance Statistics by Region: Africa*. Retrieved July 5, 2021 from <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/Africa-Development-Aid-at-a-Glance-2019.pdf>
- OECD. (Website). Official development assistance – definition and coverage. Retrieved December 15, 2021 from <https://www.oecd.org/development/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm>
- Pilling, D. (2018, October 8). The grand vision to stand-alone. *Financial Times*. .
- Sarajec. (Website). About SAJOREC. Retrieved July 21, 2021 from <http://www.sinafrica.cas.cn/English/About/Introduction/>
- Shinn, D. H. & Eisenman, J. (2012). *China and Africa: A century of engagement*. University of Pennsylvania Press.
- South China Morning Post (2020, November 21). *Coronavirus: China suspends US\$2.1 billion in debt service for poor nations*. Retrieved May 25, 2021 from <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3110822/coronavirus-china-suspends-us21-billion-debt-service-poor>
- South China Morning Post. (2018, September 5). China shakes up old order of Western donors with surge in aid to Africa. Retrieved September 17, 2021 from <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2162778/china-shakes-old-order-western-donors-surge-aid-africa>
- State Council. (2011). *White Paper on China's Foreign Aid*. Beijing, China: Xinhua/Information Office of the State Council.
- Sun, Y. (2014). *Africa in China's Foreign Policy*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution
- U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. (2020). *2020 Report to Congress*. Washington DC: US Government Publishing Office. Retrieved June 30, 2021 from <https://www.uscc.gov>
- UNDP. (2017). Trilateral Cooperation with China: Sharing China's Development Experience through Innovative Partnerships. *UNDP Discussion Paper*. Retrieved from <https://www.cn.undp.org/content/china/en/home/library/south-south-cooperation/trilateral-cooperation-with-china-.html>
- Wekesa, B. (2021). A Call for an African policy framework towards Africa. In: P. Mthembu, P. & F. Mabera, (Eds), *African-China cooperation: Towards an African policy on China?* International Political Economy Series. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Williams, V. (2020). Foreign Aid. *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Retrieved January 05, 2021 from <https://www.britannica.com/topic/foreign-aid>

- Xinhua. (2018, December 04). *China contributes to Kenya's human capacity building: official*. Retrieved July 1, 2021 from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-12/04/c_137650589.htm
- Xinhua. (2020, August 18). *Spotlight: China's medical teams help cement China-Africa friendship amid COVID-19*. Retrieved June 27, 2021 from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-08/18/c_139299532.htm

Assessment of Occupational Health and Safety Awareness among Healthcare Workers at the Pediatric Hospital in Benghazi City

Amal Ali Mukhtad* Fatima Mohammed Alomamy* Aya Abdullah Almukassbi*
Aya Joma Rafa Abbas* Amira Abu baker Alfseiy*

Abstract

Occupational health and safety (OHS) is an essential area that is concerned with the protection, health, and safety plus the welfare of individuals involved in any kind of occupation. This study aimed at assessing the occupational health and safety awareness and practices among the healthcare workers in the pediatric hospital in Benghazi city, Libya. The study adopted descriptive survey research in the Benghazi pediatric hospital. The study randomly selected 246 healthcare workers and the response rate was 96%. A questionnaire was used as the main data collection instrument. The data were coded and analyzed using descriptive statistics; frequencies and percentages and inferential analysis of correlation. Around 50% of the participants reported a lower level of awareness regarding occupational health and safety (OHS). The study proposes that the ministry of health should conduct specialist training in occupational health and safety for their staff, they also should confirm provisions of this policy and technical guidelines apply to all health institutions and administrative units within the health sector. Further hospital risk management should put in place a regular monitoring team who will certify that workers notice in firm terms safety measures put in place to avoid any accidents/injuries. Lastly, the study recommends that further research on the factors determining the implementation of occupational health and safety awareness and practices at public health care facilities in Libya.

Keywords: Risk, Hazard, OHS (Occupational Health and Safety), Awareness, Healthcare Facilities.

Introduction

Over the world, around 317 million accidents occur each year at workplaces causing losses where nearby 2.3 deaths increase annually resulting in production losses according to the International Labor Organization (ILO), therefore negatively impact the economy of the country at large, this can be recognized to the poor of implementation of health and safety policies (ILO, 2018). Occupational health and safety at the workplace can enhance the economy by dropping health burdens associated with it, enabling individuals to live more satisfied and longer (Cudjoe. S, 2011; Boateng & Arthur, 2014).

* University of Benghazi, Libya. Email: amal.mukhtad@uob.edu.ly

International Labor Organization (ILO, 2018) recommends that occupational health services are recognized near places of occupation to protect the workers against any work health-related hazards resulting in the ill health of the worker. A study conducted to evaluate the occupational health hazards among healthcare workers in Kampala, Uganda; displayed that healthcare workers work in an environment that is most hazardous due to their work-related activities (Ndegwa P, 2015).

The main goal for Occupational safety and health (OSH) is to focus on the prevention of work-related injuries and illnesses through the providing of suitable conditions of occupation to achieve the highest level of health of all workers. This thoughtful mandate of the International Labor Organization (ILO, 2018) acts to make sure that the safety and health of workers are not ignored and that the workers do not lose occupation due to occupational illness or injury. Over the world, healthcare workers are more than 50 million and they must be protected from the many occupational hazards which they frequently face. Healthcare workers are exposed to harmful physical, chemical, and biological agents as well as violence, and musculoskeletal disorders (WHO, 2019). Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA, 2018a) reported the annual rates of absenteeism allied with work-related injuries/illnesses and the likelihood of being injured in healthcare sectors are higher than in other sectors. For instance, the incidence of occupational illnesses and injuries in hospitals of the United States (US) was 68 cases per 1000 regular healthcare workers in the year 2011. Also, Healthcare-Associated Infections (HAIs) over 1.7 million and 99,000 related deaths occur annually over the world. HAIs are predictable to account for roughly 10% of hospital admissions and up to 31% in countries with controlled resources (Njogu *et.al.* (2019).

While the implementation of OSH policy in a workplace in terms of work risk management is the main approach for the decline of occupational safety and health problems, it is less common in healthcare sectors than in other sectors. Relevant legislation and guidelines are set up; however, a majority of institutions fail to implement them effectively. Training is a fundamental component in the management of occupational safety and health to assure and to improve understanding of the role of work risk management on performance enhancement among healthcare workers, managers, and supervisors. The management is required to realize the relevant legislation and effective OSH management, while healthcare workers should know occupational hazards and safe work practices. Knowledge and awareness of occupational hazards

can contribute to safer work practices in workplaces. Then, OSH awareness can significantly make healthcare workers fit into their work by obtaining the essential skills and knowledge, and this benefits in making suitable decisions, and in the achievement and nourishment of worthy working environments (Ndegwa P, 2015; OSHA, 2018a).

Statement of the Problem

Occupational health and safety in any healthcare facility is an issue that should be dealt with a lot of concern because it provides a qualifying environment to healthcare workers in ensuring high-quality performance and reduction of risks. Given the above healthcare facilities in Libya carry a large workforce drawn from different professions who need to perform their duties in sometimes overcrowded places, limited facilities, and even limited training to this awareness (Abd-el-Kader B, 2012). Some of the potential hazards are physical, chemical, biological, and psychological. And therefore Health and Safety issues relating to the personal safety and protection of its workers are a very important Environmental Health concern for hospitals (Vitayanti, F. & Nini, A, 2017). The implementation of OSH in most health facilities in Libya is low and thus has contributed to exposure to hazards (Abd-el-Kader B, 2012). This may predict a high workload per health personnel with high exposure to the health hazards and, limited time to exercise some of the OSH practices such as hand washing, glove changing, sensitizations, and training. Also, no accurate data regard OHS is available in Libya as most of the diseases and accidents in the workplace do not come under the consideration of the labor department of the health ministry. Further, the number of occupational health physicians, nurses, and specialists is very limited compared to the entire healthcare workforce in Libya. On this basis, the OH system is not well recognized in the country, resulted in an insecure and unhealthy workplace. Based on the statement of the problem, the objective of the study was to assess the level of occupational health and safety (OHS) awareness and practices among the health care workers in Benghazi Pediatric Hospital, Libya during 2020.

The significance of the study is to provide awareness to HCWs about their right, progress, and encouragement of healthy and safe workplaces. It also can help in the enhancement of the physical, psychological and social well-being of HCWs and sustain for improvement and protection of their working ability. Also, provide the information on the current status of the OH services in the health sector and work to fix the situation of the problem because long-term productivity and high quality of services cannot be achieved in the poor working environment

with HCWs who are presenting to health and safety threats.

Under the limitations, there were no difficulties we faced at the beginning of sample collection inside the hospital until the outbreak of the Covid-19 epidemic in a large way and all means of access to the target group were closed and many of them were afraid and avoided direct interaction, which led to a waste of our time to collect the sample and start its analysis. In addition, limited sources were found about the knowledge, attitudes, and practice of OHS in healthcare facilities in Libya.

Materials and Methods

Based on the nature of the research, the cross-sectional survey research design was applied. The study targeted 688 healthcare workers (HCWs) including physicians, nurses, technicians; in the Pediatric Hospital in Benghazi city, Libya. The sample size was estimated by using the *Krejcie & Morgan 1970*, standardized table for determining sample size for the known population. Thus, the sample size was 246 however, the response rate of those targeted groups was 95% (237 healthcare workers).

Data Collection Procedures: As a methodology, it has been used benchmarking literature accessible. This study consisted of 3 phases. Phase one involved the analysis of existing evidence and drawing up lists of work potential risks/hazards in the healthcare setting. Phase two included a questionnaire that was used by previous evidence (Cudjoe S, 2011). This questionnaire was translated to Arabic language and adapted to the Libyan environment. It was divided into 2 sections. The first section included demographic questions about gender, age, educational level, education, occupation. Section two dealt with a variety of questions regarding occupational health and safety perception including questions about knowledge, attitudes, practices, and worker's awareness as well as occupational hazards, work satisfaction, etc. The questionnaire was randomly distributed from March 1 to July 26/ 2020. Healthcare workers have worked for less than a year, excluded from the current study. Additionally, to ensure the reliability of the research instrument a pilot study was conducted in the hospital a month before the actual study to assess the validity of the questionnaire that was not contained within the later study. After pilot testing, the required changes were completed and adopted accordingly. Phase three, conduct a short interview with HCWs and citing responses from interviews that agreed with the findings.

Data Analysis: Data for this study was normally distributed, so quantitatively analyzed by Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 21. It was used to investigate quantitative

data and descriptive statistics including frequencies and percentages and inferential analysis (correlation coefficient) was done. Tables, graphs, and charts were used in data presentation to provide visual simplicity of presented data. In addition, thematic analysis was used to analyze qualitative data and was combined with the quantitative data by mentioning responses from interviews that agreed with the results.

Ethical Considerations: There were no ethical issues, but an application for ethical acceptance was obtained from the director of the development and human resources department to collect data for voluntary participation in this study.

Findings and Discussion

Table (1) shows the demographic characteristics of the participants. The highest percentage of the total sample were females with 76% (n=181), while 24% (n=56) were males of the total sample. Regarding age categories, 46% (n=109) was ranged from (20-30 years), 32% (n=75) was ranged from (31-40 years), while 19% were more than 40 years old and 3% were less than 20 years old. The majority of the target group [43% (n=101)] were nurses of the total sample, followed by physicians, who were 36% (n=86), while 21% (n=50) of the total sample were technicians. Also, 46% (n=108) of the respondents had a bachelor's degree, 24% (n=57) had a high diploma, 21% (n=50) of respondents had a high school\diploma and 7% (n=18) had a preparatory educational level. 2% (n=4) was the lowest percentage of educational level with postgraduate. It has been found that 44% (n=103) had worked in the hospital for less than five years. 29% (n=69) was practiced their works for more than 10 years and 27% (n=65) of the respondents had to experience ranged between 5 to 10 years.

Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of the Participants

Variables	Frequency	Percent %
Gender		
Male	56	24
Female	181	76
Age		
< 20 Year	8	3
20-30 Year	109	46
31-40 Year	75	32
>40 Year	45	19
Occupation		
Physician	86	36
Nurse	101	43
Technician	50	21
Academic Level		
Preparatory		

High School/Diploma	18	7
High Diploma	50	21
Bachelor	57	24
Postgraduate	108	46
	4	2
Work Experience		
>5 Years	103	44
5-10 Years	65	27
>10 Years	69	29

(n=237)




Figure 1: Awareness Regarding Concept of Occupational Health and Safety (OHS)

Around 49% (n=117) of the study participants have aware of the concept of occupational health and safety (OHS), while about 45% (n=107) have unaware of the concept of OHS and the rest 5.5% (n=13) have unknown of this concept as presented in Figure 1. Also, a study in Iraq displayed that around 50% of the respondents, described the lower level of OHS awareness (Shakhawan A & Shareef O., 2019). However, 84% of respondents reported that healthcare workers were very aware of OHS awareness (ILO, 2018)

In Nigeria, a study aimed to determine the level of knowledge, attitude, and practice among healthcare workers, where 89% were aware of the OSH and only 11% were not aware (Costa *et.al.*, 2013). Thus, the lack of conducting OHS training programs for healthcare workers at the Benghazi pediatric hospital can be one of the main causes of the lower level of OHS awareness.

Table 2. Current Occupational Health and Safety Measures

OHS Measures for Healthcare Workers	Frequency	%
Immediate reporting of accidents/injuries	21	9
Provide a medical record and a medical periodic examination	6	2.5
Provide a vaccination program (before and during the profession)	13	5.5
Regular monitoring and evaluation of workplace risks/	5	2

hazards: Ensuring compliance with OHS measures		
Training on health and safety in the work environment is an essential part before starting work	11	5
Using protective clothing	43	18
Conduct all the OHS measures	53	22
Do not conduct any OHS measures	85	36

(n= 237)

Besides, Table 2 displays the current occupational health and safety procedures in the hospital. 36% (n=85) of the participants reported that they did not conduct any of the OHS measures mentioned, while 22% (n=53) of the participants reported conducting all OHS procedures listed in the questionnaire, 18% (n=43) mentioned only wearing protective clothing, and 9% (n=21) informed that immediate reporting of accidents and injuries was conducted, and 5% (n=11) confirmed that involved in a training program about OHS on regular basis, 2.5% (n=6) reported the provision of a medical record and periodic medical examination, and only 2% (n=5) mentioned that there were regular monitoring and evaluation of workplace hazards. In contrast, evidence has a high level of OHS practices as 86% of the target group complied with PPE use (Shakhawan A & Shareef O., 2019). The reason for the improper use of PPE was the lack of knowledge toward its protection and the lack of obligation.

Moreover, a low percentage of the participants reported the vaccination as the current OHS measures at the Benghazi pediatric hospital. Evidence determined hospital nurses' knowledge levels regarding occupational health and safety and found 91% have got vaccinated as the vaccination is considered as one of the basic OHS measures conducting at their healthcare facilities (Singh B & Ghatala M 2012).




Figure 2: Who are Responsible for Occupational Health and Safety during Duties

Figure 2 illustrates healthcare workers' awareness to investigate who are responsible for their occupational health and safety during their duties. Approximately 64% (n=151) of those participants reported that workers who were responsible for protecting themselves during performing duties, while 13.5% (n=32) reported that supervisor who has responsibility for protecting workers during performing duties, whereas 13.1% (n=31) of those targeted showed that occupational health unit was responsible for the protection and approximately 10% (n=23) informed that the head of the hospital was responsible for providing a safe work environment for workers.

Table 3. Accident/Injury Exposure at Work

	Frequency	%
Accident/Injury Exposure (n=237)		
Yes	104	44
No	133	56
Accident/Injury Risk Factors (n=104)		
Un compliance with occupational health and safety measures	23	22
Lack of adequate training on occupational health and safety	31	30
Lack of proper personal protective equipment	41	39
Work stress/Workload	9	9
Accident/Injury Reporting		
Yes	75	72
No	29	28
Occupational Health and Safety Department at the Hospital (n=237)		
Yes	85	36
No	41	17
Unknown	111	47

Table 3 shows accident/injury exposure at work. 65% (n=133) of participants did not mention any work accident/injury exposure. However, 44% (n=104) of participants stated that they had work accident/injury exposure. The study was found that 72% of the respondents were confirmed immediate work accident/injury reporting (Cudjoe S, 2011). 39% (n=41) of the participants had an accident/injury risk factor due to the lack of proper personal protective equipment. 30% (n=31) informed that they had also an accident/injury risk factor because of a lack of training on OHS. 22% (n=23) reported that they had an accident/injury risk due to un compliance with occupational health and safety OHS) measures listed before in table two. 9% (n=9) mentioned that they had work stress/workload. 72% (n=75) of participants reported the occurrence of accident/injury. On the other hand, the evidence presents that 64% of 38 respondents stated that

work accidents resulted in work stress and physical and verbal abuse respectively (Bett *et.al*, 2019). 47% (n=111) of the participants did not know if there was an OHS department inside the hospital or not. 36% (n=85) confirmed the presence of the OHS department inside the hospital while 17% (n=41) of the participants answered: there is no OHS department in the pediatric hospital in Benghazi. Bett *et.al* (2019) shows that most of the respondents were aware of the occupational risks they are exposed to as 88% of the respondents agreed that there are occupational accidents in their health facilities.

The current study was intended to find out from participants who they think is ultimately responsible for their health and safety at the workplace during performing duty, representing 63% indicated that occupational health and safety is more of an individual staff member's responsibility than management, supervisors or any other person, department or unit. This can justify the reason for not complying with safety preventive measures. It also explains why 47% of those participants did not aware of the existence of the Occupational Health and Safety Department inside the hospital. It has been seen that the provision of OHS services may be limited particularly, in conducting work risk management. Evidence agreed with this outcome as more than half of the respondents declared that the hospital does not conduct work risk management in its organizational structure (Shakhawan A & Shareef O., 2019). It clears that occupational health and safety (OHS) measures did not properly apply on-site.

The healthcare workers in Benghazi pediatric hospital who have reported work accidents/injuries exposure stated some causes of the accidents/injuries: lack adequate of training on health and safety, failure to track instructions on the use of tools and equipment, no provision of necessary protective clothing and equipment and ignorance on health and safety matters. However, the majority of the study participants (75%) stated that providing a safe work environment has positive effects on the quality of work performance. This result was consistent with a study that aims to assess the knowledge of nurses on occupational health and safety measures in the hospital (Sanaei Nasab H *et al.*, 2009).

Table 4. Training Program for Workers

	Frequency	%
Conducting the OHS Training Program (n=237)		
Yes	71	30
No	166	70

If yes, how regular is training organized (n=71)		
Quarterly	5	7
Biannually	12	17
Annually	11	15
No definite fixed time	43	61
Conducting the First Aid Program (n=237)		
Yes	85	36
No	152	64

Table 4 shows the training program for healthcare workers in the pediatric hospital. 70% (n=166) of the participants did not involve any OHS training program. 61% (n=43) of them said "training has no fixed time", 17% (n=12) supposed training was twice a year. 15% (n=11) supposed was annually, and the rest 7% (n=5) informed, training was quarterly. But, the majority [64% (n=152)] of the participants reported that they did not conduct any first aid program.

Regarding the conducting of training program at work in specific OHS training and first aid program, it has been noticed in the current study that the percentage of participants who did not receive both training programs about work safety and first aid were high. It can be seen that though the hospital organizes a few training on health and safety, this process is not implemented on regular basis. Staff needs to be aware of training schedules on health and safety and share fully in it. A study was conducted in public health facilities in Kenya that aimed to determine (OSH) and awareness among healthcare workers. These facilities conducted work safety training program for their workers on regular basis, following the Occupational Safety and Health Law in states of Kenya, that it requires the employer to ensure the provision of training and necessary information on occupational safety and health for all persons in the workplace (Kaguathi J, 2013; Ndejjo *et al.*, 2015; Yesilgul Ci, 2018).




Figure 3: Importance of Risk Assessment and Management at the Work

Figure 3 represents the important role of risk assessment and management at the work. Most participants have confirmed the essential role of conducting work risk management on the worker's performance. 46% (n=109) of the participants agreed that risk assessment and management at the hospital are necessary whereas nearly 44% (n=104) also strongly agreed. The rest of the participants disagreed.

Table 5. Improvement of the Level of Work Risk Management at the Hospital

Risk Management Actions/Procedures	Frequency	%
Involve a safety expert to redesign the hospital's occupational health and safety policies	3	1
Training Worker to report any health and safety risks/hazards at work	18	7.5
Training workers to report work injury/accident	16	7
Training on Quick response during work injury/Accident	18	7.5
Training for wearing PPE	24	10
Conduct all of the above actions	54	23
Handling Work stress/Avoid Violence	-	-
No Actions	104	44
Total	237	100

Regard the improvement level of work risk management at the hospital as presented in Table 5, 44% (n=104) of the participants stated with no improvement in the level of work risk management while 23% (n=54) informed that all the above OHS actions were received whereas 10% (n=24) received only training for donning and doffing PPE, about 7.5% (n=18) for both of accident/injury reporting and hazard/risk reporting. On other hand, all participants reported that there was not any risk assessment/management for handling work stress and violence.

Figure 4: Worker Awareness Regarding Reducing the Level of Risks at Work




Figure 4 demonstrates the worker awareness regarding reducing the level of risks at the work. It

has been found that the highest percent of the total sample were agreed 50.6% (n=120), strongly agree were 34.2% (n=81), followed by disagreeing 12.2 % (n=29), 4 % (n=1) was a natural, followed by strongly disagree 2.5 % (n=6) of the total sample.

Table 6. Positive Impacts of Conducting Work Risk Management on the Quality of the Work Services

Variables	N	%
Provide a safe work environment have a positive impact on the quality of work performance	175	74
Yes	20	8
No	42	18
Unknown		
Positive Impacts on The Quality of Health Services		
Labor turnover is reduced	62	26
The corporate image of the hospital is enhanced	5	2
Improves the quality of health services for patients	22	9
Raise the employee's job satisfaction level	3	1.3
Reduces absenteeism rates from work	11	5
Reduces cost of compensation to injured workers	1	0.4
Reduces accidents and injuries	8	3
Reduces risks of worker loss or death	3	1.3
All of the above	122	52
Total	237	100

Table 6 shows the positive impacts of conducting work risk management on the quality of health services. Although 18% (n=42) did not know how a safe workplace can positively affect the quality of health performance, 74% (n=175) of the participants agreed that providing a safe work environment has a positive impact on the quality of work performance. Also, 26% (n=62) of the participants supposed that the reduction of labor turnover was the most important positive effect of conducting work risk management. 9% (n=22) stated that can improve the quality of health services for patients. 5% (n=11) supposed that can reduce work absenteeism rates and 3% (n=8) also supposed that can reduce accidents and injuries. Only three healthcare workers supposed that can raise the employee's job satisfaction level and reduce risks of worker loss or death. Accordingly, 52% (n=122) of the participants listed all the above positive impacts. The majority of them were ranged from strongly agree to agree that point of view as they showed conducting work risk assessment and management are a crucial requirement for effective occupational health and safety. But, studies were argued that the staffs agree that there cannot be effective health and

safety if monitoring, inspection, and evaluation are carried out. (Cudjoe S, 2011) (Yesilgul Ci, 2018) (Kipruto Be, 2019).

The study participants presented in their opinions that effective occupational health and safety policies can have an impact positively on job performance in the hospital. The current study participants indicated the success as the benefits the hospital and workers develop from effective occupational health and safety policies including decreases accidents, decreases the cost of compensation to injured employees, loss or death of a worker, labor turnover is reduced, and corporate image of the hospital is improved. These findings were also displayed in several studies (Cudjoe S, 2011; Makala, 2011; Yesilgul Ci, 2018; Njogu *et.al.*, 2019).

Figure 5: Guidelines on Occupational Health and Safety at the Hospital




Figure 5 illustrates a pie chart of provision documented guidelines on occupational health and safety (OHS) in the hospital. Most of the participants [81.9% (n=194)] stated no provision whereas 18.4% (n=43) were stated yes. In a study conducted in Kenya, designed to determine the level of OHS awareness among workers in the field of health public clinics and health centers, 48.8% mentioned having OHS documented guidelines (Njogu *et.al.*, 2019).




Figure 6: Types of Occupational Hazards

This Bar chart (Figure 6) shows common types of occupational hazards at the pediatric hospital. The results indicate that 50.6% of those targeted were aware of the level of occupational hazards and risks. It is clear that the highest risk exposure to the healthcare workers in the Benghazi pediatric hospital was reported hospital-acquired infection, which was agreed with evidence that indicated the highest level risk exposure of the healthcare workers in Nicosia, Cyprus was blood-borne diseases (Yesilgul Ci, 2018). On the other hand, radiation risk exposure was reported very low at the Benghazi pediatric hospital, while the respondents in a study were conducted in Nicosia, Cyprus, reported high concern towards risk exposure to radiation, back pain (22%), and physical exhaustion (71.5%) and workplace violence (Yesilgul Ci, 2018). The percentage of the perception of the healthcare workers in Benghazi Pediatric hospital regard back pain and physical fatigue were weak where the violence was 17%. It can be seen that the limited knowledge regard occupational hazards and risks can increase the exposure to them during the duties. Thus, adopting and evaluating the role of OHS in terms of work risk management can significantly improve the quality of health services.

Table 7. Correlations between Work Experience and Occupational Health and Safety Awareness

			Work Experience	OHS Awareness
Spearman's rho	Work Experience	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	.080
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.220
		N	237	237
	OHS Awareness	Correlation Coefficient	.080	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.220	.
		N	237	237

Table 7 describes the correlations between work experience and occupational health and safety awareness. There was a weak direct correlation between awareness of health and occupational safety and practical experience and its value was (0.080) and it has been noticed that the probability value was greater than (0.025), so it can say that the association was not significant morally.

Table 8. Correlations between Work Experience, Satisfaction Regarding the Current OHS Preventive Measures and Satisfaction Regarding the Current Risk Management

			Work Experience	Satisfaction regard the current OHS preventive measures	Satisfaction regard the current risk Management
Spearman's rho	Work Experience	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	-0.47-	-0.61-
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.475	.348
		N	237	237	237
	Satisfaction regard the current OHS preventive measures	Correlation Coefficient	-.047-	1.000	-.344- ^{**}
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.475	.	.000
		N	237	237	237
	Satisfaction regard the current risk Management	Correlation Coefficient	-.061-	-.344- ^{**}	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.348	.000	.
		N	237	237	237

^{**}. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 8 shows the correlation coefficients between work experience and satisfaction concerning the current preventive measures for occupational health and safety satisfaction concerning current risk management were weak inverse relationship coefficients and from the probability values, we find that the correlation coefficients have no significant effect.

Additionally, 44% of the study participants had work experience for more than 5 years. There was a weak direct correlation between awareness of occupational health and safety and work experience so the association was not significant. However, a study reported that 44% of the healthcare workers practiced work during 1-5 years. It was found that there was a significant and statistically significant correlation between years of experience and the level of perception about occupational health and safety (Shakhawan A & Shareef O, 2019).

Table 9. Correlations between Educational Level and OHS Awareness

			Educational Level	OHS Awareness
Spearman's rho	Educational Level	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	-.211- ^{**}
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.001
		N	237	237
	OHS Awareness	Correlation Coefficient	-.211- ^{**}	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.
		N	237	237

^{**}. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

It clears that Table 9 shows the correlation between (educational level) and (occupational health and safety awareness) which was a weak reverse correlation and its value (-0.211) so this probability value was less than (0.025). It can say that the correlation was significant.

Table 10. Correlations between conducting Occupational Health and safety training program and accident/injury exposure.

			Accident/Injury Exposure	OHS Training Program
Spearman's rho	Accident/Injury Exposure	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	-.003-
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.965
		N	237	237
	OHS Training Program	Correlation Coefficient	-.003-	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.965	.
		N	237	237

It has been found from Table 10 that there was a weak inverse correlation between (OHS training) and (accident exposure) and its value (-0.003). Also, the probability value was greater than (0.025), so the correlation was not significant morally.

Table 11. Prevention of OHS Risks/Hazards

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes	237	100	100	100

The participants were additionally asked whether the occupational safety health risks/hazards that are exposed to are preventable and all the participants approved on the preventability. From the interview plan the participants indicated that occupational hazards/risks could be prevented by approving that medical examinations are done frequently in the hospital, risk assessment in this hospital, strict implementation of health rules and regulations, confirming that warning signs are indicated and labeled in the hospital. Dagbah G, (2011) identified that the promotion of health interventions that significantly can lead to the prevention of injury confirmed higher levels in productivity in the organizations under study.

Conclusion

It can be concluded that the healthcare workers in Pediatric hospitals in Benghazi city, Libya reported their exposure to many occupational hazards including hospital-acquired infection, violence, work stress, and others. These hazards can have a great impact on their health and their work performance so the lack of conducting OHS training programs for healthcare workers at the Benghazi pediatric hospital was considered as one of the main causes of the lower level of OHS awareness among healthcare workers because the low level of awareness of OSH was (45%) among those workers about risks and hazards they were exposed to at work. Thus more training programs, seminars, and workshops are required to bridge the gap noticed from healthcare workers who had no OSH awareness.

The worker in the health sector plays an essential role in providing health services in hospitals. To ensure these services become at the satisficing level they are required to be worked in a safe work environment, avoiding work hazards and risks that can negatively impact the healthcare settings. Accordingly, workers need to comply with all health and safety rules, knowing that the person ultimately responsible for his/her health and safety is himself/herself. They are also required to wear protective clothing, use equipment and tools provided for their work, and report any accidents/injuries. Accidents can be costly both to the affected worker and the organization. Therefore, every effort should be made to avoid them from happening in the workplace. The study recommended that a responsible organization should be focused on conducting an OSH management process that involves the steps of risk assessment and recommended as well as

implemented control measures with emphasis on continual improvement in terms of the monitoring work environment and reviewing the steps of risk assessment and management. Further depth researches on the factors determining the implementation of occupational health and safety OHS awareness and practices at public health care facilities in Libya should be conducted.

References

- Abd-el-Kader, B. (2012). Evaluation the performance of the healthcare services in hospitals in Benghazi city, Libya. Unpublished Research Working Paper.
- Boateng, J & Arthur, Y. (2014). Influence of risk management practices on service quality in health care delivery. *Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development*, 5(14): 176-185
- Costa, V, Meirelles, B & Erdmann, A. (2013). Best practice of nurse managers in risk management, south of Brazil. *Revista Latino-Americana de Enfermagem*, 21(5):1165-1171
- Cudjoe, S. (2011). An assessment of occupational health and safety practices on job performance at the Tetteh Quarshie Memorial Hospital, Mampong-Akuapem, Ghana. Published Research Working Paper. Retrieved from <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.829.7352&rep=rep1&type=pdf>
- Dagbah, G. (2011). Internal control as a toll for financial management in the public sector: A case study of Ges, Adaklu-Anyigbe District, Ghana. Masters' Thesis, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi Ghana.
- International Labor Organization (2018). Safety and health at work: International Labor Office (ILO): Geneva.
- Kipruto, B. (2019), Assessment of occupational safety and practices in public health facilities in Kenya. *IOSR Journal of Dental and Medical Science*, 18(8):42-50.
- Makala. (2011). Assessment of occupational safety and health awareness and practices in public health facilities, in public policy at the University of Witwatersrand. *PAMJ* (38):76-22.
- Ndegwa, P. W. (2015). Perceptual measures of determinants of implementation of occupational safety and health programs in the manufacturing sector in Kenya (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from <http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/1703>
- Njogu, P. Mburu, C & Karanja, B. (2019). Role of safety and health awareness in occupational safety and health performance in public health facilities in Machakos country, Kenya. *Journal of Health and Environmental Research*, 5 (1): 1-7.
- Occupational Safety and Health Administration (2018a). Safety and health management systems: Facts about hospital worker safety- New York: U.S. Department of Labor.
- Sanaei Nasab, H. Tavakoli, R. Ghofranipour, F. Kazemnejad, A & Khavanin, A.(2009). Evaluation of knowledge, attitude and behavior of workers towards occupational health and safety. *Iran J Public Health*, 38(2):125-129.
- Shakhawan, A & Shareef, O. (2019). Assessment of occupational health and safety measures knowledge and experienced types of hazards among nursing staff in Rania Hospital. *Erbil j. Nurs. Midwifery*, 2(2): 39-43

- Singh, B & Ghatala, MH. (2012). Risk management in hospitals. *International Journal of Innovation, Management and Technology*, 3(4): 417-421.
- Ndejjo, R. Musinguzi, G. Yu, X. Buregyeya, E. Musoke, *et.al.* (2015). Occupational health hazards among healthcare workers in Kampala, Uganda. *J Environ Public Health*, (5):741-913.
- Vitayanti, F. & Nini, A. (2017). The effect of control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication and monitoring on fraud prevention in the local government of Palu, Indonesia. *Russian Journal of Agriculture and Socio-Economic Sciences*, 5(65):181-191.
- World Health Organization (2019). Health worker occupational health. In: WHO (Ed.) *Occupational Health Workers*, Volume 2012. Geneva: WHO.
- Yesilgul, Ci. (2018). Nurses' knowledge levels and perceptions regarding occupational risks and hazards in Kenya. *International Journal of Caring Sciences*, 11(2):1117-1122

The Practices and Challenges of Fiscal Decentralization: A Case of Bedelle Woreda, Oromia Region, Ethiopia

Tesfaye Gudeta* Minhaj Alam** Damena Tolassa***

Abstract

The study's main objective was assessing the practices and challenges of fiscal decentralization at Bedelle woreda, with particular reference to basic selected sectors (Education, Agriculture, Health, Water, and Road). According to the nature of this study, a descriptive research design with qualitative and quantitative methods was adopted. The population of the study was government employees working in selected sectors of Bedelle Woreda. The census sampling technique was used in this research because the study population was manageable. To this effect, 128 participants were selected using a census sampling size. Besides this, Woreda (District) Finance and Economic Development and Woreda Revenue Office Authority officials were purposely selected to conduct interviews. The data-gathering instruments were questionnaires, key informant interviews, and document analyses. Descriptive and inferential statistical techniques were used for data analysis. In descriptive using frequencies and percentages and inferential statistics, multiple linear regression was used to assess relationships between the independent variables (legal framework, revenue, expenditure, employee experience, employee training, management commitment, and fiscal transfers) and the dependent variable (fiscal decentralization). The findings show that internal revenue raising and utilization in the selected sectors was very low. Besides, lack of autonomy in expenditure decisions of sectors, insufficient capacity building, the extent of fiscal transfer, and financial resource were the major challenges in the study area. Overall, the regression analysis revealed that, Revenue raising ($\beta = -0.164$, $p < 0.05$), Expenditure decision ($\beta = 0.236$, $p < 0.05$), Employee experience ($\beta = 0.525$, $p < 0.05$), and Commitment of management ($\beta = 0.172$, $p < 0.05$), all have statistically significant and positive effect on fiscal decentralization. Based on the study's findings, it is recommended that existing legal frameworks be modified to enable the sectors to use their budget in line with their action plan to generate and utilize sufficient revenues. Special emphasis should be given to an employee's capacity building, independence of planning and budgeting, and clear autonomy of expenditure assignments. Inter-governmental fiscal relations should also be planned to reduce the horizontal imbalances observed at selected sectors of the woreda under study.

Keywords: *Fiscal Decentralization, Revenue Assignment, Expenditure Assignment, Fiscal Transfers, Bedelle*

* Metu University, Ethiopia. Email: tesfayegudeta2030@gmail.com

** Jimma University, Email: prof.minhajalam@gmail.com

*** Jimma University, Email: ibsaabbageda2006@gmail.com

Introduction

As one of the major dimensions of decentralization, fiscal decentralization has been a worldwide phenomenon since the 1990s (Abu, 2005). The fiscal decentralization framework must link local financing and fiscal authority to the local government's service provision responsibilities and functions so that local politicians can bear the cost of their decisions and deliver on their promises. It helps to bring economic and political systems closer to local communities (*ibid*).

Since the last decade of the twenty-one century, many developing countries are experimenting with fiscal decentralization to improve their governance and economic growth. Fiscal decentralization is the transfer of financial power from the center to local bodies. A growing number of countries have adopted it in an effort to improve the performance of their public sectors (Abu, 2005). Fiscal decentralization mainly deals with functional assignment, tax assignment, and intergovernmental fiscal relation among different tiers of governments in a federation (Mbedzi and Gondo, 2010).

After independence, sub-Saharan African countries inherited a highly centralized model of the territorial government and fiscal arrangements. Therefore, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, many countries have engaged in decentralization by transferring federal responsibilities to lower tiers of government. Fiscal decentralization reforms started gaining momentum in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s. Fiscal decentralization is most advanced in three sub-Saharan African countries Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa, where spending at the subnational government level represents about half of total general government spending (IMF, 2006).

The 1991 government change in Ethiopia has ushered in a decentralized system of governance. Decentralization in Ethiopia hopes to bring about harmony and cooperation between different groups and promote local self-rule. The FDRE Constitution shared government powers between federal and regional states. The regions are divided into zones, woredas, urban administration, and kebeles (villages). The zones are regarded as agents of regional states, while woredas are regarded as the key local government unit of the region with significant responsibility for providing basic service (Deribe, 2015).

The FDRE Constitution of Ethiopia is a source to guarantee fiscal decentralization and autonomy of local government in Ethiopia. Article 50(4) states that the regional state government grants the lowest level government units adequate power. The region has decentralized autonomy with

respect to local revenue to its cities/towns or woredas on revenue-raising and expenditure management.

The Oromia regional state constitution defined the duties and responsibilities of the woreda administration and gave them the autonomy of revenue generation and finance given and expenditure prioritization while planning. Therefore, woredas have been empowered to deliver basic services within their respective jurisdiction. There is a broad consensus that the woreda level decentralization program (WLDP) is key to improving local economic development by enhancing service delivery and local empowerment (Minhaj A and Dabela B, 2018).

Statement of the Problem

Since the 1980s at the global level and 1991 in Ethiopia, the decentralization reform program was to empower the local institutions as service providers. Oommen (2008) quoted in (Deribe, 2015) Ethiopia attempted to introduce federalism in general and fiscal decentralization in particular since the time of transition period (1991-1994). The Proclamation No.7/1992 provides for the establishment of *Regional self-governments* with broad power:

- i. Planning and directing economic and social establishments
- ii. Preparing, approving, and implementing their own budgets
- iii. Borrowing from domestic sources; and levying taxes and dues to a well-functioning decentralization system in Ethiopia, the government has endorsed woreda level decentralization programs in general and fiscal decentralization in particular since 2002.

However, the woreda level fiscal decentralization practices face a set of challenges in Ethiopia (Eyob, 2017). Some of the previously conducted researches indicated the problems related to woreda level fiscal decentralization. For instance, Eyob (2017) researched the appraisal of woreda-level fiscal decentralization in the Addis Ababa city government and concluded that woreda administrations had a weak revenue base and expenditure assignment autonomy. Abraham (2011) conducted research on the implementation of woreda level decentralization in Gambella Regional State, and he concluded that the expenditure and revenue assignment of woredas is limited to the region. Similarly, Minhaj, A and Dabela B (2018) conducted their research on the assessment of fiscal decentralization at Sibu Sire woreda and concluded that the

very purpose of implementing fiscal decentralization does not fulfill the criteria of fiscal autonomy to the woreda.

However, the previous study did not assess the practice and the main challenges of fiscal autonomy at the woreda level, particularly the major public sectors. Moreover, no empirically conducted study on the practices and challenges of fiscal decentralization is available in the study area. Hence, this study tried to fill this gap by assessing the practices and challenges of fiscal decentralization with particular reference to selected public sectors in the study area.

The study's main objective was investigating the practices and challenges of fiscal decentralization at Bedelle woreda, with particular reference to selected basic sectors. The specific objectives of the study include: i) To describe the legal frameworks to practices of fiscal decentralization; ii) To assess the practice of revenue generation of fiscal decentralization; iii) To assess the practice of expenditure authority of fiscal decentralization; iv) To assess the challenges related to the practices of fiscal decentralization; v) To evaluate the extent of the fiscal gap between revenue and expenditure.

Although the study brought relevant information in the study area on the challenges that limit the proper practices of fiscal decentralization, and it also helped different stakeholders (policymakers, researchers) to increase the awareness and understanding about practices and the challenges of fiscal decentralization in the country in general and at woreda level in particular. Decentralization is a broad initiative in the Development Strategies of Ethiopia that involves multiple actors and factors at its phase of adoption and implementation (Demelash, 2011).

However, this is limited to the fiscal decentralization to make more specific and selected basic government sectors include: Education, Health, Agriculture, Water, and Rural Road Sectors. These sectors are selected purposively in terms of their budget allocation and service delivery at the local level, and due to their main role in realizing the national development objectives, they require real implementation of fiscal decentralization. The study has delimited to three areas of fiscal decentralization: revenue, expenditure, and grants and geographically delimited to Bedelle Woreda in Bunno Bedelle Zone, Oromia Regional State and mainly focused on the assessment of practices and challenges of fiscal decentralization in the area of revenue, expenditure, and grant to selected sectors of woreda.

Review of Literature

The Concept of Fiscal Decentralization

Fiscal decentralization, one of the forms of decentralization, generally refers to the devolution of taxing and spending powers from the control of central government authorities to government authorities at sub-national levels (regional, provincial, municipal, woreda, etc.). In a highly decentralized system, local governments have considerable power to mobilize resources through taxing authorities accompanied by strong tax bases (Bird, Richard M., 2008).

Fiscal decentralization who sets and collects what taxes, who makes what expenditures, and how any vertical imbalance is rectified has been especially prominent in recent discussions in many countries, but as just indicated, many of the more fundamental questions related to political and administrative decentralization (Inman and Rubin Feld, 1997).

Fiscal decentralization refers to the structure of financial and broader relationships between central and subordinate levels of government. The process of altering the structure of fiscal decentralization by devolving powers to lower levels of government is generally known as fiscal decentralization. Essentially, fiscal decentralization is a specific process meant to alter the financial state of affairs (Boschmann, 2009).

Scholars suggest that fiscal decentralization is more efficient by allowing local governments to determine the appropriate level of service delivery and creating competition between local governments while allowing voters to move from one jurisdiction to another to obtain an optimal preference of service provision (Smith, 2012).

Fiscal Decentralization Theory

Theoretical Arguments

The prominent writer Oates (1972) affirms that decentralization enhances economic efficiency because local governments have better knowledge of local conditions and preferences or the provision of the public good than national/central governments due to their physical and institutional proximity. This informational proximity allows local government to deliver public goods and services that better match local preferences or deliver the same public goods and services at a lower cost at the same time by diversifying government output. Oates further argues that decentralization at higher levels of public goods and services across jurisdictions will

generally be inefficient; the larger variance in regional demands for public goods, the larger benefits of fiscal decentralization.

According to Rodrigues, A., and A. Kroijer (2009), cause of the enhanced proximity between those governing and those governed, fiscal decentralization empowers individuals and helps to generate institutions such as greater trust, interaction, and networking, in turn, it contributes to a reduction of the transaction cost. Finally, Smoke Paul (2009) argues there can be no argument with analysis that points to potential macro-economic dangers and growth retarding effects of fiscal decentralization; most of the evidence, however, is anecdotal relevant only under particular uncommon circumstances focused on correctable rather than inherent problems. The reality is that the appropriate degree of decentralization will vary with the context of particular countries, and some steps can be taken in most countries to neutralize potential macro-economic dangers. Simply decentralizing is not going to bring development, and failing to decentralize will not necessarily undermine it.

The theory of fiscal decentralization addresses three issues related to fiscal decision-making: assignment of responsibilities and functions between the federal government and sub-national governments, the assignment of taxation power, and the design of intergovernmental transfer (subsidy) of fiscal resources coupled with provisions about the borrowing windows to sub-national governments (Abu, 2005).

Key Factors for Effective Decentralization Process in Local Government

Decentralization demands some kind of commitment and also the existence of well-framed institutional structures to encourage the development effort both at national, regional, and local levels (Litvack, 2005). These scholars indicated the following points that are necessary conditions for effective decentralization. These are:

- i. Political commitment is of intrinsic importance to decentralized service delivery for several reasons. It is widely accepted that political commitment on the part of federal or state governments is a sine qua non of effective democratic decentralization, especially forms of decentralization that are specifically geared to the interests of the poor.
- ii. Effective inter-organizational relations in recognition of the latent power of organized civic protest, local authorities in different countries have experimented with

institutional arrangements designed to facilitate public engagement, feedback, and oversight.

- iii. Availability and access to resources required is a critical determinant of the equity, quality, and efficiency of public services, and the inadequacy of financial resources often explains poor service outcomes. Lack of resources implies incapacity of any agency. Most developing countries are constrained mainly by a lack of finance to implement decentralization policies.
- iv. The capacity of implementing institutions is an actual decentralization that has to be institutionalized and integrating their own organizational policies into practice.
- v. Training program in the district to equip staff with the necessary knowledge has been initiated to capacitate to bring forward decentralization of services at local levels. In his study, Ali (2018) stated that international partners have mostly provided training, but the local government lacks a budget allocated to staff training.

Fiscal Decentralization in Ethiopia: Empirical Review

The 1995 Federal Constitution is the basic document that lays out the legal and institutional framework for decentralization in Ethiopia. The decentralization reforms focus on strengthening local governments as institutions of democratic governance and efficient service delivery. It also outlined the respective spheres of authority and responsibilities of the Federal Government and the Regional States (WorldBank, 2010)

Currently, fiscal decentralization is seen as part of a reform agenda to strengthen regional and local governments. In contrast, Smith (2012) suggests that local governments or administrative units possess the legal authority to impose taxes in many developing countries, but the tax base is so weak and the dependence on central government subsidies so ingrained that no attempt is made to exercise their authority. This is because the central government alone cannot satisfy all of the competing needs of its constituent units. Besides, local and regional governments help to implement national economic development strategies, which can be more reliable with adequate taxation powers to meet their expenditure responsibility (Kena, 2016).

As initiated in the Transitional Charter and reaffirmed by the 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian federal system has introduced political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization to ensure the right to self-administration (Zemenu,

2016). Accordingly, Ethiopian fiscal decentralization reform followed the political imperative of establishing a federal political structure (Aberra, 2015). Currently, Ethiopia is among those African countries with constitutions in which self-rule and the existence of local governments are formally recognized (World Bank, 2001). Furthermore, the government has introduced constitutional, administrative, and institutional reforms to deepen and broaden the decentralization process to Woreda through Woreda/District Level Decentralization Program (DLDP) in 2001 World Bank, (2001).

So far, two phases of decentralization have been put in place in the current government administration: The first wave of decentralization (1991-2001) and devolution of powers and responsibilities at the Woreda level since 2002. The first wave of decentralization aimed to create and empower national and regional governments, whereas the second phase of decentralization concerned the devolution of powers at woreda levels - lower levels of administration (Deribe, 2015). Similarly, Aberra (2015) found that beginning from 2001/2, regional states decided to transfer major responsibilities and resources to the Woreda level. In these states, woreda became a legally sanctioned lower tier of government closest to the people and entrusted with significant responsibilities to plan, formulate, and implement policies on economic development and social services.

Pillars of Fiscal Decentralization

As initiated in the Transitional Charter and reaffirmed by the 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian federal system has introduced political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization to ensure the right to self-administration (Zemenu, 2016).

Fiscal decentralization has to do with the degree of fiscal autonomy and responsibility given to sub-national governments. Fiscal autonomy relates to the ability of the local jurisdiction both to raise enough revenues from the local economy and then to determine how to spend those revenues. It involves the ability of the jurisdiction to set tax rates and establish the revenues base without outside influence, as well as to have the ability to provide the service levels that the jurisdiction citizens demand. Smoke Paul (2009) stated that fiscal decentralization is the financial aspect of devolving to regional and local government consisting of three major issues. The following section discusses these three issues in detail.

Revenue Assignment

The Ethiopian Constitution, from articles 94 to 100, FDRE Constitution clearly defined revenue assignments to each tier of the government besides borrowing and subsidies. Revenue assignment refers to vertical sharing of public resources (what share of the total government budget should be decentralized (Bird, Richard M., 2008). Regional and local taxation can introduce inefficiencies in allocating resources across the federation and cause inequities among people in different jurisdictions (Moges, 1994). The purpose of this provision is to make available income – or revenue – that determines how much there is to spend to implement policies and the costs of service delivery stipulated in the budget.

Expenditure Assignment

Assigning responsibilities for spending, including the exercise of regulatory functions, must precede the assignment of responsibilities for taxation because tax assignment is generally guided by the spending requirements of the different organs of government and cannot be determined in advance. It may also be said that expenditure assignment is more important than revenue assignment, for there are fundamental justifications to decentralize expenditure assignments than revenue assignments (Getachew, M (2011).

Intergovernmental Transfer (subsidy)

Intergovernmental fiscal relations must be thought of as a fiscal system to fill fiscal imbalance, and all the pieces of that system must fit together (Bird, Richard M., 2008). Fiscal imbalance refers to both vertical and horizontal regional imbalances. The former refers to an imbalance between revenue means and expenditure needs at different levels of government, while the latter refers to regional variations in correspondence between revenue base and expenditure requirement (Tegegne et al., 2007). There are two organs responsible for intergovernmental fiscal transfers in the Constitution. House of Federation (HOF) is the principal organ for this purpose; secondly, the federal government may directly be involved in the states' fiscal transfers. Article 62 (7) of the Constitution stipulates that it would determine the formula the federal government gives subsidies (grants) to the states.

Challenges of Fiscal Decentralization in Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, the concept of decentralization is influenced by a mix of economic, political, and social factors. According to Azfar O. et al. (2005), utilizing the concept of fiscal decentralization

would be helpful to understand its dynamics fully. A host of factors is likely to influence the performance of fiscal decentralization in sub-national and local level governments; this study also confirms this argument in the study area. These include the political framework, fiscal aspects of decentralization; transparency of government actions; citizen participation; the effectiveness of civil society; aspects of the social structure, the capacity of sub-national governments, lack of autonomy, fiscal imbalance, and other factors were raised as major challenges.

Conceptual Framework of the Study

The study's conceptual framework has been contextualized following a review of related literature. This study has tried to identify the influence of independent variables on the dependent variable.




Figure 1: Conceptual Framework
Source: Developed by Authors (2020)

Research Methodology

Research Approach and Design

This study relies on a mixed research approach. Because using both quantitative and qualitative methods simultaneously is more advisable (Teshome, 1998). Because quantitative data provides precise summaries and comparisons, while qualitative data provided general elaborations, explanations, meanings, and relatively new ideas, therefore, this approach is more appropriate to investigate the topic under discussion on assessment of the practices and challenges of fiscal decentralization at Bedelle woreda with the selected basic sectors.

Kothari. C, (2004) argues that research design helps the researcher plan in advance of the methods adopted for collecting the relevant data and techniques to be used during analysis. Based on these theoretical arguments, the study employed a descriptive research design. Since the primary purpose of this study focuses on assessing the practices and challenges of fiscal decentralization at Bedelle woreda with selected sectors through collecting data related to people's opinions, then the descriptive design is appropriate.

Sampling Techniques and size

From 29 sectors in Bedelle woreda, five (5) basic sectors are selected using purposive sampling techniques. These sectors include - Education, Health, Agriculture, Water, and Rural road. The reasons for selecting these five basic sectors are because their budget allocation is more and these sectors play a crucial role in the development, and they considered poverty reduction sectors and prioritized under government policy. However, the researchers refer to five offices of selected sectors directly or indirectly related to the study for data collection like Woreda Office of Finance and Economic Development, Woreda Civil Service Office, and Woreda Administration purposively. The researcher used purposive sampling not to miss the target group and focus on particular characteristics of the population interested and best answer research questions.

According to the data obtained from the woreda civil service office, the total number of staff of the selected sectors is 128 (Male 94, Female 34). Therefore, the researcher used census sampling because the size of the study respondents is manageable. Census sampling uses the entire

population as the sample and is more attractive for small populations (e.g., 200 or less) (Masuku, 2014).

So that, the key informants of the study were selected from the Woreda Office of Finance and Economic Development, Woreda Office of Revenue Authority, Woreda Civil Service Office and Woreda Administrator and the Managers and Vice Managers of selected sectors for in-depth interview purposively. Because the research requires those respondents who have a basic understanding of issues under investigation and the very purpose of using the respondents from staff helps to understand the other challenges of the practices of fiscal decentralization in the study area. The following table shows the sample size of the study.

Ref .No	Selected Basic Sectors	No of Staffs		
		M	F	T
1	Education sector	21	4	25
2	Health sector	20	11	31
3	Agriculture sector	38	12	50
4	Water sector	8	4	12
5	Rural road sector	7	3	10
	Total	94	34	128

Source: *Bedelle Woreda Public Service Office* (2020).

Methods of Data Collection

Based on the research problem and objectives, both primary and secondary data sources were used. For primary data collection, questionnaires and interviews were selected, while secondary data sources were document analysis like five consecutive fiscal years of the sectors under discussion. Moreover, the structured interview was conducted for key informants of the study, the managers and experts of selected sectors, Woreda Office of Finance and Economic Development manager, Woreda Civil Service leader, Woreda revenue authority leader, and the Woreda administrator were selected for interviewees and they considered as knowledgeable and rich to provide explanations on the study.

Document Analysis and Reliability of Research Instruments

Under this, the related written documents were reviewed and analyzed to collect the secondary data necessary for the study. This includes the Federal and Regional Constitutions,

proclamations, WOFED documents budget, Woreda Revenue Authority Office document, and budget documents for each selected sector. For the reliability of the questionnaires, the researchers have conducted a pilot test using the Cronbach Alpha test of reliability. The reliability statistics is 0.87 (see the table below), which implies a high level of consistency in the questionnaire in measuring all the variables of the study. Because, Wallen, N. E., (2000) argues if Cronbach's alpha higher than 0.70 indicates internal consistency on the instrument. The following table indicates the test statistic for the Cronbach Alpha test.

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
0.87	40

Source: Survey, 2020

Methods of Data Analysis

The collected data were first checked for consistency, completeness, missing, and other errors before the entry process. The data coding makes ready the completed and correct questionnaire for analyzing process. A data entry outline was organized, and data was entered into the appropriately designed program for analysis. Therefore, data has been analyzed by descriptive and inferential statistics using Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS-version 20). Descriptive statistical indexes like percentage, mean and standard deviation are used for analyzing. Similarly, inferential statistics such as correlation and multiple linear regressions were also used to identify the strength of the relationship and the degree of prediction between independent and dependent variables (fiscal decentralization). The mathematical model of multiple regressions below was used to determine the quantitative association between the variables:

$$Y = B_0 + B_1X_1 + B_2X_2 + B_3X_3 + B_nX_n + E$$

Where **Y**= Dependent Variable,

X= represents the explanatory (Independent) Variable in the estimation model.

B₀= constant

B_n=Coefficient

E = represents the error term

Regression Assumption Tests

Different assumption tests were considered before applying multiple linear regression models to ensure the appropriate use of data analysis. Those assumption tests include normality, linearity, and multicollinearity tests. Lastly, based on those tests, there was no normality, linearity, and multicollinearity problem to proceed to the multiple linear regressions.

Model Specification

This study used multiple linear regression models to assess the relationship between the variables in practices of fiscal decentralization at the study area. Thus:

$$PFD = -.161LF + 0.071ET + .164Rev + 0.236Ex + .525EE + 0.172CM + 0.19FTs$$

Where,

- ❖ *PFD* = Dependent Variable
- ❖ Variables written in **bold** are independent variables.

Result and Discussion

The objective of this research paper is to assess the practice and challenges of fiscal decentralization in the Bedelle Woreda: mainly, by taking five selected basic public sectors of the woreda under study. The data were gathered through questionnaires, key informant interviews, and document analysis. The data collected from the target population was analyzed using SPSS version 20.

The study participants' responses regarding independent and dependent variables and the demographic profile of the respondents are summarized using frequencies and percentages. In addition, multiple regression analysis was used to measure the relationship between of independent variable on the dependent variable.

Legal Frameworks of Fiscal Decentralization in the Study Area

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1995) laid the foundation for autonomy and introduced decentralized government systems (Mulugeta, 2012). In line with this, by 2002, the

regional block grant has been introduced so that districts can finance their expenditure needs. Different capacity-building efforts were also made in view of the weak implementation capacities observed in the processes of district decentralization (Worku, 2005; Desalegn, 2015). The results show that most respondents are not satisfied with the existing legal framework placed to implement fiscal decentralization at the sector level. In light of this, the responses gained from study participants, 33.1% and 20.7% of respondents strongly disagree and disagree on the level of satisfaction with the existing legal framework placed to implement fiscal decentralization at sectors level, respectively. This indicates that 53.8% of respondents are not satisfied with the existing legal frameworks to implement fiscal decentralization at the sectoral level. However, 12.4% and 24.8 % of the respondents responded strongly agree and agree, respectively. This shows that 37.2% of the respondents were generally satisfied with the existing legal frameworks to implement fiscal decentralization at the sector level. The rest, 9.1% of respondents, remained undecided regarding the same issue.

In addition to this, the data collected from key informants through interview revealed that the existing legal frameworks to implement fiscal decentralization in sector level, is not satisfactory, for instance, as rural road sector office response, the rural road construction rate principle is not updated with the current situation of contractors. Because, rate principle is developed since 2006/14, but today, everything is changed more than the folds of the then time. This situation affects the effective implementation of fiscal decentralization in the sector office.

Again, the research conducted by Eyob (2017) confirms that the local government is trying to implement institutional and legal frameworks, which it adopted to establish effective woreda level decentralization; however, there is still lacking a proper implementation of fiscal decentralization.

Revenue Generation and Utilization of Selected Sectors of Bedelle Woreda

The revenue assignment is an important element of fiscal decentralization. If fiscal decentralization is a reality, sensational governments must control their source of revenue which is the essence of decentralization (Yilmaz 2001; Box and Heredia 2005; Mahat, 2007). In this regard, the result of the questionnaires respondent shows that 17.4% and 26.4% of the respondent responded that they strongly disagree and disagree, respectively, with the issue of sector offices internally generate adequate revenue to cover some own expense. This shows that,

in aggregate, 43.8% of the respondents said there is no adequate revenue internally generated to cover some own expense of the sector office whereas 25.6% and 17.4% of respondents strongly agreed and agreed on the same issue, respectively. Aggregately, 43% of the respondents said that the sectors internally generated adequate revenue to cover some own expense of their sector office while the rest, 13.2% of respondents, remained undecided regarding the same issue. Generally, the result implies that sector offices have no internally generated revenue to cover some expenses. With this regard, the literature confirms that, in many developing countries, local governments or administrative units possess the legal authority to impose taxes. However, the tax base is so weak and the dependency over the central government subsidies so deep-rooted that no attempt is made to exercise their authority (Smith 2011).

Expenditure Authority and Responsibility of Selected Sectors

Assigning expenditure responsibilities to local government increases economic efficiency as local governments can provide better services due to proximity and informational advantages (Rodrigues, A., and A. Kroijer, 2009). In this regard, the result shows that 34.7% and 27.3% of the respondents responded that they strongly agree and agree with the sector's issue of autonomy in decision-making on expenditure assignment. The sum of both, 62% of the respondents said the sector has autonomy in decision-making on expenditure assignment. Whereas 24% and 10.7% of respondents responded strongly disagree and disagree, respectively. Moreover, the remaining 3.3% of respondents were undecided on the same issue. This implies that the sectors have autonomy in decision-making on expenditure assignment.

In contrast, literature on this issue indicates that the assignment of expenditure responsibilities and decision-making power to lower levels of government is one of the basic arguments in the theory of fiscal decentralization that improves the local government capacity to efficiently identify and address the needs of their citizens (Demelash, 2011). Hence, the researchers concluded that what is observed in the study area is not in line with existing fiscal decentralization literature. The woreda government needs to means appropriate frameworks to make decisions on spending revenue, as they are at the forefront of responding to the demands and preferences of the local people.

Expenditure and Revenue trends in the Selected Public Sectors of Bedelle Woreda

The arguments and principles of fiscal decentralization require the sectors to generate their revenue and exercise adequate expenditure responsibilities (Minhaj A and Dabela B, 2018). In

this argument, this study attempted to assess the share, revenue, and dependence average of *five consecutive fiscal years* Bedelle woreda selected public sectors under study.

Name of Sectors	Average of sectors share from woreda budget in %	Average of internal revenue raised by sector in %	Average of dependence on grant in %
Education	34.86	0.63	99.37
Agriculture	19.72	0.866	99.13
Health	11.20	0	100
Road	5.35	4.95	95.05
Water	2.39	5.28	94.72

Source: Survey 2020

Note

- ✓ 73.52% of the five-year budget was allocated for these sectors in five consecutive years.
- ✓ 97.65% sectors were depended on grant
- ✓ 2.35% of the sectors raised internal revenue

The *woreda* understudy, in consecutive five years:

- ✓ 84.54% depend on grant
- ✓ 15.46% internally raised revenue.

The Factors Affect Effective Revenue Generation and Expenditure Decision in Study Area

The Employee's Experience on Program

Local governments lack the capacity and experience to attract and retain the right talent of staff to articulate plans and execute programs and projects in order to transform the lives of the grassroots people (Fosu, 2012). In this regard, the study results show that 16.5% and 30.6% of the respondent responded that they strongly disagree and disagree, respectively, with the issue of the sector employee's experience concerning revenue autonomy of the sectors is satisfactory. This indicates that, in aggregate, 47.1% of the respondents believed that the sector's employee's experience on the program is not satisfactory whereas 24.8% and 8.3% of respondents strongly agreed and agreed on the same issue, respectively. Rest 19.8% of respondents remained undecided regarding the same issue. The variable realized a mean of 2.94 and a standard deviation of 1.434, implying that the sector's employee's experience on the program is not satisfactory.

The Woreda Top Management Commitment on Program

Shah (2013) adds that local revenue mobilization has the potential to foster political and administrative accountability by empowering communities. However, prescriptions deriving from the theory and good international practice impose huge factors on local governments' choice of revenue instruments. Olowu (2003) reveals that the reason for poor local authorities' revenue mobilization includes weak administration, which, combined with a lack of commitment of managers for enforcement, generates a low level of local revenue mobilization performance. In this regard, the result shows that 29.8% and 25.6% of the respondents responded that they strongly agree and agree with the top management issue effectively discharge their responsibility and inadequacy on the budget transfer from the top. This shows that 55.4% of the respondents believed that the top management effectively discharged their responsibility inadequacy on the budget transfer from the top whereas 21.5.5% and 16% of respondents strongly disagreed and disagreed, respectively, on the same. The rest, 6.6%, were remaining undecided on the same issue. The result implies that the top managers effectively discharge their responsibility inadequacy on the budget transfer from the top.

Similarly, the review literature also confirms that successful pro-poor decentralization is associated with governing parties that are politically committed to the democratic empowerment of local governments. Decentralization cannot occur until the highest political authority supports it.

The Employee's Training on Program

Shortage of well-trained and qualified personnel that are supposed to serve as a tool for collecting taxes and rates at the local level, even the few available are not adequately trained in efficient budgetary and financial management systems (Armstrong, 2009). In this regard, the result shows that 33.9% and 17.4% of the respondents responded that they strongly disagree and disagree, respectively, with the issue that training is given for concerned employees concerning the internal revenue-raising of sector office is effectively practiced. This shows that, in aggregate, 51.3% of the respondents believed that no training is given for concerned employees concerning internal revenue rising in the sectors whereas 28.1% and 8.3% of respondents strongly agreed and agreed on the same issue. Then, the rest, 12.4%, remained undecided on the same issue. This shows that training is not given for concerned employees concerning the rising internal revenue of the sector office, so it is not effectively practiced.

As the response of key informants of the study, the sectors have not been capacitated to generate sufficient internal revenue to cover some part of their expenses because of lack of training and workshop to concerning bodies like; local communities and the sector's employees about internal revenue mobilization and its benefits for local communities. This leads the sectors to depend on the regional grant highly. Similarly, the study conducted by Ali (2018) confirms that the local government lacks a budget allocated to staff training. This could be attributed to a lack of adequate funding for public services and fiscal autonomy at the local level.

Inter-Governmental Fiscal Transfer (GIFT)

To fill the fiscal gap, governments typically seek to provide a range of predictable and transparent sub-national transfers (for example, block, equalization, and conditional grants) that enable local authorities to meet their recurrent and investment needs (International Development Agency, 2005). Results revealed that 29.8% and 28.9% of the respondents strongly disagree and disagree, respectively, for the satisfaction to the extent of fiscal transfers. This indicates that, in aggregate, 59.6% of the respondents believed that they are not satisfied with the extent of fiscal transfers from the top tier of the government to the sector/woreda whereas 12.4% and 19% of respondents strongly agreed and agreed on the same issue, respectively. The rest, 9.9% of respondents, remained undecided regarding the same issue. The results show that most respondents are not satisfied with the extent of fiscal transfer from the top tier of the government to the sector/woreda. However, literature on this issue revealed that intergovernmental fiscal relations must be thought of as a fiscal system, and all the pieces of that system must fit together (Bird, 2003).

The Challenges and Constraints to Practice Fiscal Decentralization in the Study Area

On the program of Woreda-level fiscal decentralization in Ethiopia, there are various institutional, administrative, and political challenges, International Development Agency (2004). However, the Ethiopian government has introduced constitutional, administrative, and institutional reforms to deepen and broaden the decentralization process to Woreda through Woreda/ District/ Level Decentralization Program (DLDP) in 2001. However, the woreda under discussion faces some institutional and legal framework problems to implement fiscal decentralization at the local level. In this regard, the study indicates that 25.6% and 24.8% of the respondents strongly disagree and disagree, respectively, or in aggregate, 50.4% of the

respondents generally agreed that the main challenges of fiscal decentralization application in woreda is the legal framework. However, 20.7% and 26.4% of the respondents strongly agree and agree, respectively, that the major challenges of fiscal decentralization in the study area are legal frameworks. This implies that out of the total respondents, 41.7% of respondents disagree and strongly disagree that the main challenges of fiscal decentralization are the legal framework. Besides, 2.5% percent of respondents responded as undecided about the issue.

The study further revealed that the other bottlenecks of fiscal decentralization lack *logistics and supply* at the local level, including the study area. In this regard, the result shows from table 28 the 57% and 26.4% of the respondent responded that they strongly agree and agree, respectively, with the main constraint of fiscal decentralization application of the woreda is a lack of logistics and supply. This shows that, in aggregate, 83.4% of the respondents agreed that the main constraint of fiscal decentralization application of the woreda is a lack of logistics and supply, whereas 6.6% and 9.9% of respondents strongly disagreed and disagree respectively on the same. Moreover, the information from key informants of the study revealed that logistics in the sector is a severe problem. The operational cost allocated to the sector for maintenance, oil gas of car, motor bicycle, and other logistics facilities is very low from woreda. Even, there is almost no transportation facility to follow up and supervise the activities going on in the kebeles of the woreda under concerned sectors. For instance, the water sector has only one motor bicycle to follow up and supervise the 41 kebeles of the woreda. Among kebeles, some are found 42km from the center of woreda.

Furthermore, lack of logistics supply in the health sector is a severe problem in the sector office. To address services and make continuous supervision, there is a lack of adequate transportation, like the car, motor bicycle, fuel, lack of money for maintenance, etc. The researchers also observed the broken car, which is the possession of the sector, but it is not maintained due to lack of budget.

The devolution of power to districts is one of the major challenges in its implementation has been the problem related to the availability and the quality and quantity of *manpower*. In this regard, the study shows that 46.3% and 19.8% of the respondents responded that they strongly agree and agree that the main problem related to the practical implementations of fiscal decentralization in the sector is manpower. Aggregately, 66.1% agreed on manpower problems in the sectors under study, whereas the 11.6% and 9.9% of respondents, a sum of 21.5%, strongly

disagreed and disagreed on the same issue. In contrast, the rest, 12.4% of respondents, remained undecided regarding the same issue.

The key informants' data indicates that the sector's lack of sufficient human resources is the main problem of implementing fiscal decentralization. It indicates that the lack of manpower is a severe problem in the Bedelle woreda health office. For instance, the needed human power in the water sector is 38, but the actual human resource is 12. Moreover, the sector has only one maintenance expertise for 41 kebeles of the woreda. In the health sector, the needed manpower is 53, but the actual expertise is 13 on average. Whereas in the agriculture sector, the needed manpower for all kebele is 123 expertise, which means one kebele three expertise, (1:3) but actual expertise is 96, (1:2). Furthermore, the woreda needs eight crop production expertise, but the actual crop production expertise is only 3 for all 41 kebeles.

The other severe challenge of the practice of fiscal decentralization is a significant mismatch between its expenditure obligation and the financial resources it receives in the form of the block grant and use of its own revenue. In this regard, the result of the study indicates that 48.8% and 23.1% of the respondents strongly agree and agree, respectively, or in aggregate, 71.9% of the respondents generally agreed that the main constraints related to the practical implementations of fiscal decentralization in sectors are *financial resources*. However, 5% and 13.2% of the respondents strongly disagree and disagree, respectively, that the major challenges of fiscal decentralization in the study area are financial resources. While the rest, 9.9% of respondents, responded that they were undecided about the issue.

Last but not least, the challenge of implementing fiscal decentralization at the districts level is a *lack of autonomy*. Districts could not exercise sufficient local autonomy, and the performance of the districts as effective units of government has been constrained by a number of inter-related factors (Meheret, 2007). In this regard, the result of the study shows that 69.4% of the respondent responded that the main source of sector revenue in the budget from the top government, while 20.7% of the respondent responded that the main source of sector revenue is from different NGOs, whereas 5.8% and 4.5% is from school grant and other sources respectively. It proves that 95.9% in aggregate, the sector depends on the top government and NGOs, while 4.1% of the sector budget is internally mobilized.

The secondary data refers, *i.e.*, document from the woreda office of finance and economic development and the woreda revenue authority confirms the high dependence of the woreda budget on regional government. The woreda revenue authority raised revenue maximum of 16 million in the five consecutive fiscal years, specifically in 2011/19. It proves the high dependency of Bedelle woreda on the grant budget from the Regional government average of **84.54%** in the consecutive fiscal year under study. In the five consecutive fiscal, years the Bedelle woreda raised and collected the maximum of 16 million Ethiopian Birr (ETB) during the fiscal year of 2011/19, and the cumulative average of collected revenue during consecutive fiscal year understudy was **15.46%** only.


Similar to these findings, Eyob A (2017) found insufficient administration and institutional capacity, top-down decision and authority structures afflicting the state system, and the absence of transparency and accountability at the local level. Again, Girma, D (2018), in Ethiopia, the practices of fiscal decentralization show that there is high vertical fiscal imbalance and regional disparities, the problem of effectiveness and efficiency in resource utilization, problems of administrative malpractice, and tight political influence mainly at local levels. In conclusion, the researchers believe that the woreda government should alleviate the challenges and implement fiscal decentralization effectively.

Regression Assumption Test

Before applying the multiple linear regression analysis to test the influence of independent variables on fiscal autonomy, some tests were conducted in order to ensure the appropriateness of data analysis as follows:

Normality Test


The main assumption in normality is that the data distribution in each item and all linear combinations of items is normally distributed (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007; Hair et al., 2010). The researcher used the histogram method of testing the normality of the data. The histogram is bell-shaped, which implies that the residuals (disturbance or errors) are normally distributed. The residuals should be normally distributed about the predicted dependent variable score. As shown in the figure below, the dependent variable is normally distributed for each value of the independent variables.



Linearity Test

Linearity means the correlation between variables, which is represented by a straight line. Knowing the level of the relationship among variables is considered an important element in data analysis. It is crucial to test the relationship of the variables to identify any departure that may impact the correlation (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). Linearity refers to the degree to which the change in the dependent variable is related to the change in the independent variables. To determine the relationship between the independent variables such as legal framework, employee training, revenue-raising, expenditure responsibility, employee experience, management commitment, fiscal transfers, and dependent variable fiscal decentralization is linear, plots of the regression residuals through SPSS software had been used. In linearity, the residuals should have a straight line relationship with predicted dependent variable scores.

As shown in the figure below, the change in the dependent variable is more related to the independent variables' change. Therefore, there is no linearity problem on the data for this study, and residual follow at a straight line.



The regression model assumption of linearity in the study

Source: Survey, 2020

Multicollinearity Test

Multicollinearity means that two or more of the independent variables are highly correlated, and this situation can have damaging effects on the results of multiple regressions (Hair et al., 2010). The Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) of the linear regression indicate the degree that the variances in the regression estimates are increased due to multicollinearity. Therefore, the Collinearity statistics show that the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) ranged from 1.021 to 1.130, and tolerance values ranged from 0.885 to 0.979, as described below.

Model	Collinearity Statistics	
	Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)		
Legal framework	.939	1.064
Employee Training	.885	1.130

Revenue raising	.956	1.046
Expenditure responsibility	.907	1.103
Employee Experience	.942	1.061
Commitment of management	.908	1.101
Fiscal transfer	.979	1.021

a. Dependent Variable: Fiscal decentralization

b. Independent Variables: Legal framework, Employee Training, Revenue raising, Expenditure responsibility, Employee Experience, Commitment of management, and Fiscal transfer.

Source: Survey, 2020

Field (2005) stated that the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) of the linear regression indicated the degree that the variances in the regression estimates are increased due to multicollinearity and VIF values higher than 10, which shows us there is a multicollinearity problem. As Pallant (2007) stated, tolerance is a statistical tool that indicates the variability of the specified independent variable from other independent variables in the model. It has no multicollinearity problem if the tolerance is more significant than 0.10 values. Tolerance and VIF results suggest that multicollinearity is not suspected amongst the independent variables because the values of Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) are below 0.10 while the tolerance values are above 0.10.

Multiple Linear Regression Analysis

Hair. et al. (2007), multiple regression analysis is a form of general linear modeling and is an appropriate statistical technique when examining the relationship between a single dependent variable and several independent variables (predictors).

The table below shows, the R-value obtained by regression is .669, and the R square value is, which means that all independent variables have explained 44.8% variations in fiscal decentralization, and 55.2% was due to other factors.

The R-value obtained by regression is .669, and the *R square* value is **.448**, which means that *the all-independent variables have explained 44.8%* variation in fiscal decentralization and 55.2% was due to other factors. It is explained in the following model summary table.

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
-------	---	----------	-------------------	----------------------------

1	.669 ^a	.448	.414	.342
---	-------------------	------	------	------

Source: Survey, 2020

- a. Predictors: (Constant) Legal framework, Employee Training, Revenue raising, Expenditure responsibility, Employee Experience, Commitment of management, and Fiscal transfer
- b. Dependent Variable: Fiscal decentralization

The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) results of the regression between *predictor variables* and *fiscal decentralization* shows that the *probability value* of **0.000 (p<0.05)** indicates the relationship was *highly significant* in predicting how dependent *explain* fiscal decentralization. It is explained in the following Regression ANOVA Results table.

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	10.522	7	1.503	12.603	.000^b
Residual	13.478	113	.119		
Total	24.000	120			

Source: Survey, 2020

Results of Multiple Linear Regression Model for Independent Variables

On the other hand, the P-value can explain the variation in the dependent variable. When the P-value is less than 0.05, the independent variables explain the variation in the dependent variable. Whereas, when the P-value is greater than 0.05, the independent variables do not explain the variation in the dependent variable. To this effect, since P-value is 0.000 (p<0.05), all independent variables explaining the variation in the dependent variable (fiscal decentralization). It is explained in the following multiple regression coefficients result table.

Independent variables	Coefficients (B)	P-Values
Legal framework	-.161	.059
Employee's Training	.071	.404

Revenue raising	-.164	.025
Expenditure Decision	.236	.002
Employee Experience	.525	.000
Commitment of Management	.172	.020
Fiscal transfer	.019	.791

Source: Survey 2020

The Beta Coefficient (B) result shows the strength of the effect of each independent variable to the dependent variable (fiscal decentralization), as shown in the above table. The Mathematical Model of multiple regressions below can be used to determine the quantitative association between the variables:

$$Y = B_0 + B_1X_1 + B_2X_2 + B_3X_3 + \dots + B_n X_n$$

Where

Y = dependent Variable,

B_0 = constant

B_n = Coefficient

x_n = represents the Independent Variables in the estimation model.

Interpretation of Multiple Linear Regression Model Result

The internal revenue-raising negatively influences the dependent variable and is significant at a 5% probability level in the study area. Therefore, when internal revenue rising decreased by 1 percent, the fiscal decentralization will decrease by 16.4%, keeping the other factors constant.

Employee Experience has a positive influence on fiscal decentralization; When Employee Experience increases by 1 percent, the fiscal decentralization will increase by 52.5%, keeping the other factors constant.

Similarly, management's commitment has a *positive influence* on the dependent variable and is significant at a 5% probability level. As the commitment of management increase by 1 percent, the fiscal decentralization will increase by 17.2%, assuming the other variable is held constant.

Expenditure decision *positively influences* the dependent variable and is significant at a 5% probability level. As expenditure decisions increase by 1 percent, the fiscal decentralization will increase by 23.6%, assuming the other variable is constant.

The Major Findings of the Study

- The study revealed the problem of autonomy to plan the budget in line with the sector demand and conduct their own activities in line with the needs and interests of their jurisdiction. Regarding legal framework, the response of key informants of the concerned sectors is dissatisfied with the existing legal framework to implement effective fiscal decentralization.
- The study found that the woreda's internal revenue generation and utilization are very low and the revenue utilization of the sectors under discussion. There is a high dependence of woreda on regional government, accounting for more than **84.6%** % and **97.6%** for sectors. It implies there is *no fiscal autonomy* in the woreda.
- The study found that there was no sufficient training and capacity building given to the employee in mobilizing revenue at the sector level and lack of employee training affects revenue raising and fiscal autonomy of the woreda.
- Concerning the sector's autonomy in expenditure assignment, the study found that sectors sector has autonomy in decision-making on expenditure assignment.
- The employee experience on the program of fiscal decentralization affects the sector's fiscal decentralization practice, like a low level of internal revenue generation of their own expense. The lack of commitment of managers of the concerned offices of woreda affects the effective practice of fiscal decentralization in the study area.
- The study revealed that the fiscal transfer to filling fiscal imbalance among sectors of the study area is weak, and also, the extent of fiscal transfer for the concerning sector was unsatisfactory.
- The study found that the practice of fiscal decentralization in the woreda sectors is facing challenges. These include:
 - ✓ *Inadequate institutional and administration frameworks,*
 - ✓ *lack of well-trained local government personnel,*
 - ✓ *Lack of commitment,*
 - ✓ *Lack of manpower,*

- ✓ *Financial problem and limited autonomy,*
- ✓ *The absence of transparency and accountability at the local level were major challenges.*

Conclusion and Recommendations

Conclusion

- Based on the study's summary, the existing legal framework to implement fiscal decentralization at the sector level is unsatisfactory.
- Revenue generation and utilization of the woreda and selected sectors is very low. Because of insufficient training and capacity building given to the employee in mobilizing revenue rising at the sector level, it leads to a high fiscal imbalance in the program.
- Employee experience and management commitment to the fiscal decentralization program affect the effective practice of fiscal decentralization in the study area.
- The fiscal transfer to filling fiscal imbalance among sectors is weak, and the extent of fiscal transfer for the concerning sector is unsatisfactory.
- Based on the coefficient of Beta value (B), the revenue-raising is negatively predicting fiscal decentralization while employee experience is more positively predicting fiscal decentralization than the other variables in the study area.
- Generally, the practice of fiscal decentralization in the woreda sectors faces a number of challenges like; inadequate institutional and capacity shortages, lack of well-trained local government employees, and budget insufficiency were the main challenges of fiscal decentralization.

Recommendations

Based on the study findings, the following major recommendations are forwarded:

- Government should develop relevant legal and institutional frameworks for woreda and sectors to make sufficient decision-making power, serve as autonomous units, and manage the service provisions in their areas to maximize the benefits of local residents.
- Woreda government should provide *capacity building to the employee* through *short- and long-term training* and workshop for the sector staff and concerned body to smoothly implement fiscal decentralization at the local level.

- The Woreda government has the authority to generate and utilize revenue from its sources, which is recognized by law; therefore, the woreda should ultimately use power to *raise revenue* through a *revenue mobilization program* to reduce budget dependence syndrome.
- The Woreda top management should follow up the expenditure decision of the sectors and encourage internal revenue generation of sectors in order to promote local fiscal autonomy.
- The Woreda government should provide motivational incentives for responsible employees and preparing revenue mobilization programs in different sectors and
- The top government should consider the extent of fiscal imbalance at the local level and transfer the necessary budget to fill the gap.
- To make an effective fiscal decentralization program, the researchers suggest reducing the challenges listed in the study.

Reference

- Aberra, T. (2015). *The extent and impacts of decentralization reforms in Ethiopia*. Theses & Dissertations, Boston University.
- Abraham, G. (2011). *Assessment on the Implementation of Woreda Decentralization in Gambella Regional State*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
- Abu, G. (2005). Fiscal Federalism and Its Discontents: Theory and Policy. *3rd EAF-EARO/CADPR-WMU International Symposium on Ethiopian Development Studies*, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
- Alam, M. & Girma Ch. (2017). Challenges and Opportunities of Fiscal Decentralization in Sidama Zone. *Indian Journal of Politics* 51(3&4).
- Ali, A. A. (2018). *Factors affecting Decentralization of Public Sector Services on Local Governance of Puntland: Case of Garowe District*. Kenya: Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology.
- Azfar, O., et al. (2005). *Decentralization, Governance and Public Services: The Impact of Institutional Arrangements*. IRIS Center, University of Maryland, College Park.
- Bird, Richard M. (2008). *Asymmetric Fiscal Decentralization: Glue or Solvent?* Georgia State University, United States of America.: International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Working Paper 03-09.
- Boschmann, N. (2009). *Fiscal Decentralization and Options for Donor Harmonization* Development Partners Working Group on Local Governance and Decentralization. Berlin, Germany.
- Deribe, A. (2015). *Fiscal Decentralization in Ethiopia: Achievements and Challenges*. Ethiopian Civil Service University: Public Policy and Administration Research,
- Eyob, A. (2017). *Appraisal of Woreda-Level Fiscal Decentralization in Addis Ababa City Government*.

- FDRE. (1995, December 08). Federal Democratic Republic Constitution of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa.
- Litvack, J. J. (2005). *Rethinking Decentralization in Developing Countries*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- Mbedzi and Gondo. (2010). *Fiscal Management in Dangila Municipality, Ethiopia*. Washington, DC.
- Minhaj A and Dabela B. (2018). Assessment of Fiscal Decentralization in Ethiopia; The Case Study of Sibu Sire Woreda, East Wollega Zone, Oromia Regional State;. *Jurnal Studi Pemerintahan 10* (2). DOI: <https://doi.org/10.18196/jgp.102101>.
- Neven, I. (2002). *Background paper on decentralization. National Forest Programs in the European Context, Contribution to Cost-Action E19, Institute Alterra*. Wageningen, the Netherland: Green World Research.
- Oates, W. (1972). *Fiscal Federalism*. New York.
- Smith, H. J. (2012). *Fiscal Decentralization and Development: and Analysis of City Governments in Argentina and Mexico, 1980–2010*. University Graduate School. Florida International University.
- Smoke, Paul. (2009). Fiscal Decentralization in East and Southern Africa: A Selective Review of Experience and Thoughts on Moving Forward. *Conference on Fiscal Decentralization*.
- WorldBank. (2001). *Ethiopia Woreda Study. (In Three Volumes) Volume I: Main Phase, Country Office in Ethiopia*.
- WorldBank. (2010). *Ethiopia Public Finance Review*. Retrieved from Retrieved from <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/530241468255278847/Ethiopia-Public-finance-review-2010>
- Zemenu, Y. (2016). *Sub-national Fiscal Autonomy in a Developmental State: The Case of Ethiopia*. Dire Dawa, Ethiopia.: Haramaya University.

Technology and Immigration System: A New Paradigm for Improving Government Service Delivery in Tanzania

Mustafa Kassim Kipingu* Deodatus Patrick Shayo**

Abstract

This paper explores how digital transformation has improved the delivery of immigration services. In contrast, this refers to the fact that, despite the existence of e-immigration services, there has been inadequate research to examine the e-immigration system in Tanzania. This paper explores the e-immigration portal, its advantages, and its challenges. Using a mixed method, data were collected from secondary and primary sources through document review, portal analysis, interviews, and questionnaires. Primary and secondary data show that e-immigration portals can be accessed using personal computers, smartphones, and internet cafes. Also, the time for applicants to receive passports and travel documents has decreased from more than seven days in the old manual system to three days on average in the new e-immigration system. Following the transforming government process, immigration service delivery has been improved by implementing the e-immigration system. The e-immigration services offer advantages to users like online application, online payment, time-saving, and costs, but challenges like digital literacy, inaccuracy of information, feedback, and network problems impact the system's smooth operation. Here digital literacy campaign, feedback mechanism, applicant support desk, and digital service desk are recommended.

Keywords: *digital governance, e-immigration, e-government, e-services, Tanzania*

Introduction

The advent and growth of information and communication technologies (ICTs) have affected every walk of life in society and led to reform in delivering technology-based public services (Khelifi *et al.* 2020). Public service delivery has passed through a period of reforms to improve the accessibility and quality of public services. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, public service delivery in Tanzania experienced a period of deterioration partly due to world economic hardships. Most developing countries (Africa in particular) had to adopt some structural adjustment programs in order to restructure their economies because of a limited flow of capital

* Dar es Salaam University College of Education, Tanzania.
E-mail: mustafa.kipingu@immigration.go.tz

** Ardhi University, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. dpshayo@gmail.com

and grants from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Western donors (Zattler, 1989). This cut in capital flows forced most African countries to embark on cost-sharing programs in service delivery as one of the strategies to ensure the availability and quality of public services. However, improvements in efficiency and effectiveness of public services take time to realize and even more time to translate into effective delivery of public services (Ruguyamheto, 2005).

The immigration department was, in one way or another, affected by these economic hardships and, therefore, the development of public service delivery remained stagnant. The history of the development of public services delivery in the immigration department in Tanzania started with the enactment of the immigration ordinance of 1924 under the then Tanganyika British colonial rule. The law was used to manage migration matters up to 1948. In 1949, the department came to be known as the immigration and passport department as an independent department. Immigration services such as passports, citizenship, visa, and residence permits were the main mandate of the department. As services were in paper form, a range of application forms and procedures had to be completed for a customer to apply for services. Passports were issued in handwritten booklets, which varied in size as time went on. The evolution of Tanzania passports started with a British passport (Tanganyika) (1949–1961), Tanganyika passport (1962–1964), Tanzania pass (1964–1992), and Tanzania passport (1993–2017). Visas were issued in stamps at immigration entry points. Residence permits and passes were issued as leaflets, whereas personal information was in handwritten form. All these processes were through manual files whose storage and movements in the service delivery chain were slow. The time spent to accomplish a single immigration service application was ultimately long.

From the year 2005, the government initiated efforts to modernize immigration services. The passport issuance system changed into a semi-electronic service delivery system because application processes remained manual, but printing became electronic. Passports had a Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) where applicant information was stored in a specific data storage device (Larkotey *et al.*, 2017). This change aimed to ensure the quality of the service and enhance national security due to fears of terrorism and other transnational crimes that emerged in the 2000s (URT, 2011; Habibu *et al.*, 2019). The introduction of the residence permits issuance system in 2012 was a shift to semi-electronic service delivery in the issuance of residence permits to the foreigners residing in the country. Just as in passport procedures, residence permit

application processes remained manual but were printed with specific electronic features. It marked the route to the electronic service delivery in the department.

Furthermore, a visa administration system (VAS) was introduced. A visa sticker has to be generated from a specific computer system after swapping the applicant's passport in a specific device (URT, 2011). The visa applications process was upon arrival, and the application process was through VAS. This system could identify persons blacklisted in the system for security purposes.

The primary objective of the modernization of immigration services is to control security (Amiri, 2017; Wimalasiri & Jeyamohan, 2018; Putra & Arifin, 2020; Hanzlik & Kutylowski, 2021) in order to protect information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification or destruction to provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Khelifi *et al.* 2020; URT, 2019b). After the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, in New York, pressure the need to introduce and implement a "new security policy" (Malcik & Drahansky, 2012) at the airports and worldwide borders. The introduction and implementation of electronic immigration (e-immigration) system through e-passport, e-visa, e-permit, and e-border control management were demanded by the incident of the terrorist attack, identity fraud, and also to control illegal immigrants (Malcik & Drahansky, 2012; Wimalasiri & Jeyamohan, 2018; Habibu *et al.* 2019; Khelifi *et al.*, 2020). Similarly, the new e-immigration system is expected to facilitate the control entry of terrorists and kept the country safe from illegal immigrants (Amiri, 2017; Habibu *et al.*, 2019; Glouftsios & Scheel, 2021).

Given the fact that there have been growing "reported attempts of illegal immigration across a number of country borders" (Wimalasiri & Jeyamohan, 2018, p.15), e-passport, e-visa, e-permit, and e-border control management system is a newly established research area. Studies on the e-immigration system focus on mitigating the risks of the e-visa application system by building mobile applications containing the list of trusted companies to connect visa applicants with reliable agencies in the UAE (Khelifi *et al.*, 2020). Wimalasiri and Jeyamohan (2018) examined and proposed a multistage of e-passport verification schemes based on biometrics, watermarking, and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) in Sri Lanka. On their side, Putra & Arifin (2020) explored electronic border control of immigration and autogate at airports in Indonesia, while Malcik & Drahansky (2012) provided an insight into the security of biometric passports in the Czech Republic. In their article, Glouftsios & Scheel (2021) were concerned with technology,

border security, and migration management illustrated through an encounter between a migrant and the visa information system. In Uganda, Habibu *et al.* (2019) analyzed users' concerns and threats to the biometric passport system, where the first biometric passports were planned for rollout in 2019.

Since the implementation of the e-immigration system in Tanzania, there has been inadequate research to explore how it has been able to improve public service delivery. Amiri (2017) analyzed risk management strategies of e-immigration to ensure the system's safety against malware attacks. The above scenario poses a number of fundamental questions, which remained unanswered. One of those questions is whether the e-immigration system has improved service delivery in Tanzania. This article, therefore, focuses on exploring the e-immigration portal system and to uncover the advantages and challenges of the e-immigration (e-passport, e-visa, and e-permit) system for improving service delivery. In this way, the article seeks to contribute to the growing body of migration literature exploring how digitalization transforms government services through the e-immigration system. This paper attempted to address the following questions: i) how does the e-immigration portal operate in Tanzania? ii) what are the advantages of the e-immigration system in Tanzania? iii) what are the challenges of e-immigration services in Tanzania?

Review of Literature

Electronic Government

Digitalization and web-based technology have "changed the outlook and function of the public administration by transforming government processes and external interactions" (Putra & Arifin, 2020, p.138). Digital government services aim to enhance and simplify the administration of public service delivery that is reliable and citizen-centric based on available ICT tools (Larkotey *et al.*, 2017; Shiyo *et al.*, 2018). Electronic government (e-government) is defined as "the use of ICTs for new designs or redesigns existing information processing practices to achieve better governance, and sending electronic services to companies and citizens" (Putra & Arifin, 2020, p.138). E-government services make government operations and process more "transparent and more effective for citizens and businesses, and provide a variety of benefits for the community at large such as reducing services' time and connecting businesses and citizens to government information at any time" (Dewa & Zlotnikova, 2014, p.37). The inversion of e-government has attracted more attention to government, politicians, administrators, and policymakers on how such applications can be shared, interacted with, and integrated (Lupilya, 2015; Habibu *et al.*,

2019). Transformation focuses on government, business productivity, and the social-economic paradigm of implementing e-government projects (Lupilya, 2015).

The development of e-government systems helps generate and disseminate information and strengthen the attitude that citizens are customers and that their satisfaction makes the government exist (Shiyo *et al.*, 2018). E-government services mean all services which public institutions deliver by electronic means (URT, 2019b). E-government helps to make better communication between businesses, citizens, and their governments. E-government helps to simplify processes and makes access to government information programs and services easier for the public. It puts the government services online, offering accessibility and enhancing the quality of services in terms of time, content, and accessibility (Alshehri & Drew, 2010; Rosie, 2015; Shiyo *et al.*, 2018).

Electronic systems and services are not well established in most developing countries (Dewa & Zlotnikova, 2014; Rosie, 2015). It makes it challenging to manage migrants and provide immigration services. Some studies show that while most of the developed countries are in the final stages of the transformation of government services, developing countries are still in the early stages of e-government development (Dewa & Zlotnikova, 2014). The e-government improves public service delivery, which is relevant and sufficient to meet people's expectations of easy access, efficiency, and effectiveness (Rosie, 2015) and deliver quality and responsive services to the public (Lupilya, 2015).

On the other hand, e-government has some challenges (Larkotey *et al.*, 2017). Although these challenges hinder the successful implementation of e-government, they do not make its implementation void. E-government initiatives continue to be a solution to most service delivery deficiencies that existed during the old government service delivery systems (Habibu *et al.*, 2019). These challenges include information and communication technology infrastructure, privacy, security, top management support, resistance to change to electronic systems, collaboration, lack of qualified personnel and training, digital divide, culture, and high cost of laying down the systems (Alshehri & Drew, 2010; Honade *et al.*, 2018; Punithavathi & Geetha, 2019). In this context, the e-government program needs collaborative initiatives between stakeholders and qualified personnel as well as periodic training, massive investments, and needs to be protected against cybercriminals and to protect the rights of service users. Rosie (2015) offers almost the same challenges and points out other challenges to lack equality in public

access to the internet and the ability to access computers due to illiteracy, hence the need for customers to get assistance from service officers.

Despite the challenges of e-government services, Yang (2017) observed that China local governments had started a new style of service delivery in recent years. The use of e-applications such as WeChat, Weibo, and other Chinese domestic applications has improved the way people interact with the government. This makes it easy for them to access government services and information on time. Since WeChat added public services to its platform in late 2014, its users have experienced unprecedented convenience in their daily life. Unlike Weibo, WeChat has combined government e-services thoroughly with its existing platform functions from messaging to payment. Until the first half of 2017, there were mainly two ways to activate public e-services on WeChat: (i) a unified city service platform providing dozens of public services in cities, and (ii) a mass of government official accounts in which citizens can check information and enjoy one-stop-service from different departments (Yang, 2017).

Electronic Immigration Services

E-immigration is an electronic service delivery system, whereby most application processes for immigration services are through the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs), particularly the internet, as a tool for delivering better government services to the citizens, businesses, and employees (Alshehri & Dew, 2010; Wimalasiri & Jeyamohan, 2018). According to the UN (2017), developed countries enjoy high-quality services, including immigration services, due to the application of electronic services. Nevertheless, they enjoy high-security conditions because of the use of electronic services and control systems. There is an increase in world migration in recent years. According to the UN (2017), between 1990 and 2017, the number of international migrants worldwide rose by over 105 million. However, much of this increase occurred from 2005 to 2017. That is why this increase in migration needs to be managed by sophisticated service systems.

In Europe and other developed states, the ability to handle this increasing number of migrants from developing states such as those in Africa is high because these states have already implemented e-immigration since the 2000s (Larkotey *et al.* 2017; Honade *et al.*, 2018). E-immigration systems in most developed countries had security consciousness rather than customer orientation (NAO, 2007). Here e-immigration has simplified the operation of e-gates in most European countries. NAO (2007) argued that the "e-passport project is part of the identity

and passport service's wider program to improve the security of passports" (p.23) in the United Kingdom. In this, the UK and US e-immigration systems are, therefore, more of security ones though, through that, customers and other users benefit from accessible, efficient, and effective services.

Electronic Immigration Services in East Africa

In East Africa, the State summit in March 2016 instructed the rollout of "biometric passport in all the member states (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda) with each member having a 1-year phase-out of the existing national and community passports and adopting biometric passports in their place" (Habibu *et al.*, 2019, p.1). Electronic immigration service is stated in the East African Community (EAC) Regional Strategic Framework for e-immigration 2014/15-2019/20 (EAC, 2014). This framework outlines the major areas of concern that EAC member states must work closely within the immigration sub-sector in order to ensure the achievement of the common market and customs union protocols (EAC, 2014). Article 5 (2b) of the EAC common market protocol envisages easing the cross-border movement of persons within the region and adopting an integrated border management system. With an operational regional e-immigration strategic framework, it is possible to lift internal borders and introduce an external border encompassing all partner states (EAC, 2014).

Through the EAC regional strategic framework for e-immigration, partner states have been encouraged to implement e-immigration systems and services to be in operation by 2020. As of recent, most East African states are in different stages of the implementation of e-immigration where Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda are in different stages of the implementation of the e-immigration system since 2018 (Habibu *et al.*, 2019). Both have started to issue passports in the collective format agreed in the EAC whereby all passports issued in the partner states have the title East African Passport followed by words that introduce respective states like The Republic of Kenya and Republic of Uganda. Likewise, in Tanzania, the identifier United Republic of Tanzania follows the East African Passport. Partner states are further integrating their systems through the operation of one-stop border posts where all immigration services and information can be found in one service building at the borders. Examples of borders with these service integrations in the East African region are Namanga and Horohoro-Lungalunga between Tanzania and Kenya, Rusumo between Tanzania and Rwanda, Mutukula between Tanzania and Uganda, just to mention a few.

In 2014, the East African Community, through its secretariat, released a review report on the regional strategic framework for e-immigration 2014/15-2019/20, which among other things, provided the status of the infrastructures for e-immigration adoption in the East African member states intending to advise member states on the best way to implement e-immigration services (EAC, 2014). EAC member states were encouraged to fasten their strategies to prepare the infrastructures needed to make e-immigration implementable such as laying down the National Fibre Optic Cable known as the National ICT Broadband Backbone (NICTBB), which Tanzania accomplished in 2014. These efforts enabled the country to implement various e-government strategies, including e-immigration as directed in the EAC strategic framework for e-immigration.

Electronic Immigration Services in Tanzania

In Tanzania, e-immigration started to operate in January 2018 with the introduction of electronic passports. The second stage involved the introduction of an electronic visa. The third stage was about electronic residence permits. The fourth stage involved introducing electronic border management, which encompasses an integrated border management system between immigration headquarters and Zanzibar immigration head office, regional immigration offices, entry points, Tanzania embassies abroad, and district immigration offices (URT, 2019a).

E-immigration has been reflected in the National ICT Policy of 2003, which later incorporated the EAC framework on e-immigration. The adoption of e-government policy led to the establishment of the electronic government agency (e-GA) in 2013. The mandate of the agency is to administer e-government through the implementation of a nationwide e-government strategy. This strategy serves as a framework through which the objectives for electronic service provision are set down. Among the objectives set under this strategy are institutional framework, human resources capacity, government-wide electronic infrastructure, government-wide shared systems, e-service flagship projects, and e-government awareness.

According to URT (2017), the objective of e-government policy is to improve the quality of public services in order to meet the increasing demand for these services by the Tanzanian population. Among the targets of the objective of this strategy is to achieve a high percentage of users satisfied with e-services (URT, 2013). E-immigration is designed to serve various benefits, including defense and security; promotion of tourism; promotion of investment; strengthening

records and statistics management; facilitating and strengthening immigration service delivery; increasing efficiency and effectiveness, and reducing running cost (URT, 2017). This argument shows that the aspect of security is still vital in this newly introduced service delivery system. Furthermore, the system emphasizes increasing efficiency and effectiveness in immigration service delivery, which are the main emphasis in the new public services model.

Types of Electronic Immigration Services in Tanzania

Electronic immigration services are services offered by the immigration department by using electronic systems. These systems allow customers and officers to deliver services using computers and smart mobile phones. In the immigration department, the operating e-services include e-passport, e-visa, and e-residence permits. The border management system is not operating yet.

E-Passport

The electronic passport stores biographical information and biometric identifiers of applicants. The E-Passport is “comprised of an integrated chip. This chip inserted in the document’s cover page contains biometric information of the passport holder” (Punithavathi & Geetha, 2019, p.342). The chip, when retrieved, recovers the holder's information in times of emergency, such as when the passport is lost (Abeyratne, 2013). In Tanzania, there are three main types of passports: *ordinary passports* for ordinary citizens who travel abroad for business, visits, treatment, religion, studies, and many other ordinary activities. There are also *service passports* for senior public servants such as permanent secretaries, senior public service leaders, and public institutions who travel abroad for official responsibilities. The third category comprises *diplomatic passports* for leaders with diplomatic statuses such as presidents, ambassadors, members of parliaments, ministers, and other people with such entitlements when traveling abroad for official responsibilities. One can possess more than one passport and use it to travel abroad based on the purpose of the travel. Except for the document that justifies the applicant's purpose of the journey, the entire requirements needed for the application of a passport are almost similar.

Applications for electronic passports for all types of passports are through the immigration portal. Through the portal interface, a customer makes his or her application, uploads essential documents, and makes partial payment of the passport fee. After that, the application form is ready for manual submission at a nearby immigration office. After submission and interrogation, full payment, fingerprint procedures, and internal processes start. Based on the observation of the

immigration officer, "passport may be ready for issuance to a customer within a day depending on the urgency of the customer's travel." Printed passports have a unique electronic chip containing the holder's important information. The information in the chip can be stored in the holder's smartphone for emergency consumption (URT, 2019a). Therefore, an e-passport "offers substantial benefits to the rightful holder by providing a more sophisticated means of confirming that the passport belongs to that person and that it is authentic, without jeopardizing privacy" (Honade *et al.*, 2018).

E-Visa

An applicant applies an electronic visa application in person or by a company representative on behalf of the applicant. Uploading of essential documents is also through the online submission system. Once applications are submitted, internal approval processes take place until a notification is communicated to a customer to allow him or her present in person to any nearby embassy of Tanzania abroad or entry point for visa verification (URT, 2019a).

E-Permit

Electronic residence permit applies the same processes as in e-visa. Application processes are the same in both private institutions and business companies, and government institutions. In addition, applications for the same are by institutions and companies employing foreign expatriates. Through the company application account, applicants have a place to follow the status of their applications through the system. After all application processes and approval, a payment procedure for residence permits follows. The issued permit document bears some security features that distinguish it from a mere document (URT, 2019a).

E-Border management and control

Since the early 2000s, there is a proliferation of digitalization of border security and migration through "recording the comings, goings, and doings of travelers and migrants, often coupled with biometric recognition systems, the use of drones and satellites to monitor border zones" (Glouftsiou & Scheel, 2021, p.123). In Tanzania, electronic border management is still in its initial construction stages. The aim is to connect and integrate all borders, embassies abroad, head office Zanzibar, regional and district offices with immigration headquarters in Dar es Salaam. This integration will help all immigration offices to have one immigration management system (URT, 2018).

Theoretical Framework of the e-Immigration System

New Public Management

In the 1980s, this model arose as a critique of old public administration models, which faced challenges, including poor performance of governments in public service delivery. The new public management model aimed to answer how the government can perform better and deliver on its key objectives. UNDP (2015) provides the underlying principles under which this model operates. They include attention to lessons from private-sector management; the growth both of hands-on "management" in its own right and not as an offshoot of professionalism, and of "arm's-length" organizations where policy implementation is organizationally distanced from the policymakers (as opposed to the "inter-personal" distancing of the policy/administration split (UNDP, 2015; Yusuph & Guohua, 2017). Other principles are a focus upon entrepreneurial leadership within public service organizations; an emphasis on input and output control and evaluation and performance management and audit; the disaggregation of public services to their most basic units and a focus on their cost management; and the growth of market competition and contracts for resource allocation and service delivery within public services.

Act of Parliament No.11 of 1995 established Tanzania Revenue Authority. It started its operations on July 1, 1996, to respond to the needs of new public management, including entrepreneurial leadership within public service organizations and emphasis on input and output control in public service delivery. New public management strengths lie in establishing government structures for financial management such as revenue authorities and internal audit units, which improved governments' capacity to collect revenue and ultimately finance service delivery. The National Audit Office and Audit Units in various agencies were established to cater to such needs of NPM (UNDP, 2015). However, the main weakness of this model was that it puts more emphasis on reforming the government structures to bear those in the private sector, forgetting to put people at the center as the main beneficiaries of public services (UNDP, 2015; Yusuph & Guohua, 2017).

New Public Governance

The new public governance model suggests that the government should be catalytic, a community-owned government, competitive government, mission-driven government, results-oriented government, customer-driven government, decentralized government, and market-oriented government (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). These characteristics have catalyzed the government of Tanzania to undergo significant changes in service provisions. Although

immigration services have security bases, they contribute much to the country's economy, especially in attracting investments.

The new public governance draws its synthesis from the failure of new public management to place people at the center of public administration. It is not only the government or the market forces that determine service delivery but also the combination of various forces and interactions within society, which determines societal needs. This model stresses the importance of citizens' involvement in determining their fate in policy formulation and service delivery preferences (UNDP, 2015). Therefore, public administration should be centered to respond to people's needs for efficient and effective services. This model did not manage to put people at the center as was expected. This may be the case in Tanzania, where immigration service systems remained state-centered, focusing on security rather than the people. Therefore, this model lacked a customer-centered aspect and was replaced by the New Public Service model.

New Public Services

The principles governing new public service include building collaborative relationships with citizens and groups of citizens, encouraging shared responsibilities, disseminating information to elevate public discourse, and fostering a shared understanding of public issues, thereby seeking opportunities to involve citizens in government activities (UNDP, 2015). New public service emphasizes digital systems in the provision of public services. It starts with the premise that the focus of public governance should be citizens, community, and civil society (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015). What makes new public service distinct is its emphasis on the use of technology in disseminating information to the citizen to share responsibilities with the people. The potential of new technologies for opening up government information to public access and scrutiny has gained considerable momentum with the advent of the new transparency agenda and the increasing sophistication and prevalence of digital governance (UNDP, 2015; Solong, 2017). In new public service, the primary role of the public servant is to help citizens' articulate shared interests and promote citizenship integrated with citizen discourse and the public interest rather than to attempt to control society (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000; Habibu *et al.*, 2019).

The government has significantly adopted new public service in order to achieve efficient, effective, responsive, and equitable service delivery (Solong, 2017; Larkotey *et al.*, 2017). Under new public service, changes from manual service delivery processes aimed to remove the old bureaucratic governance systems and introduce electronic systems, which increase efficiency,

effectiveness, and citizen access. New public service puts people at the apex of immigration service delivery, and citizens interact with their government in service delivery and information sharing through digital technologies (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015; Putra & Arifin, 2020).

Materials and Methods

The article employed quantitative and qualitative research designs. Both designs were used because some data sources are descriptive and only need to be described in the report. The immigration portal as one source of data provides only descriptive information. Other sources of data, which are descriptive, include various documents which establish and provide information about the management of the e-immigration system, such as laws, regulations, and manuals. This article uses primary and secondary approaches to collect and access different sources of data. Secondary source focuses on various documents with information for the introduction of the e-immigration system was reviewed. These documents have preliminary information about the operation of the e-immigration system. The immigration laws and regulations, immigration newsletters, legal documents, magazines, and e-immigration project write-ups helped give relevant information about the system preparation and service delivery. Primary sources such as interviews and questionnaires were used as sources of data. Here, the focus is on the three e-immigration services: e-passport, e-visa, and e-residence permit. The researchers conducted interviews with well-informed immigration officers who offer services under the e-immigration system. Twenty-three respondents, including officers serving in the respective service sections such as passport, visa, residence permit, and ICT officers and public relations officers, were interviewed. Here traditional note-taking data recording techniques by using a pen and a notebook were deployed.

Questionnaires were administered to individual customers who applied for passports and those who had obtained their passports. In addition, questionnaires were administered to representatives of various institutions and companies who apply for visas and residence permits on behalf of foreign expatriates expecting to work in the country for their institutions/companies and individual customers. Here eighty questionnaires were distributed to various customers. Out of the eighty questionnaires, fifty-two questionnaires were administered to passport applicants, and twenty-eight were administered to institutional customers applying for visa and residence permits. The researchers managed to meet institutional customers when they visited immigration offices in Dar es Salaam for immigration document submission or collection.

An accidental sample involved eighty customers who visited the respective offices for service application or immigration document collection. Each service applicant who appeared in the immigration offices had an equal opportunity to participate in responding to a questionnaire only because he/she had an application to submit or an immigration document to collect. Other respondents got an equal chance to respond to questionnaires only because they were waiting for their documents, mainly passport applicants. Purposive sampling was used in order to interview technical persons of immigration officers in various service desks such as five in the passport section, five in visa, and five respondents in the residence permits. Also, a purposive sample was used to interview six ICT officers and one public relations officers to explore their experience in terms of advantages and challenges about the–immigration system.

This research was geographically delimited to the Dar es Salaam region, particularly at immigration headquarters and the Dar es Salaam regional immigration offices. Dar es Salaam was selected due to the existence of vast e-immigration service applicants compared to other regions. Most individuals and companies benefiting from e-immigration services are located in Dar es Salaam. This region provides an opportunity for the researchers to have a wider range of responses because it is a "referral place" for immigration service applicants from other centers or regions. Therefore, the scope of this article provides an analysis of the e-immigration portal, advantages, and challenges to establish to what extent the modernization process improves service delivery compared to the old manual system of passport, visa, and work permit application.

Results and Discussion

Accessing E–Immigration Portal System

An analysis of the immigration system shows four categories of services offered through an e-immigration portal in Tanzania. These include e-passports, e-visas, e-residence permits, and e-border management and control. It is worth noting that three immigration services are operational through this portal, with the exception of electronic border management and control services. The main information found in this portal is an entry option that users use in accessing the e–immigration system for immigration services. One of the ICT officers cited that in order for the applicants to access the e-immigration portal is required to have: (i) a personal computer,

laptop, or a smartphone or access point with such devices, (ii) internet access or smartphone bundles to allow access to the website, and (iii) a bank card with electronic money services or a cellular phone and sim card registered with financial services such as Airtel Money, M-Pesa, Tigo Pesa, Hallo Pesa, Ezy Pesa or T-Pesa.

Further, the ICT officer elaborated that:

The ability to have access to digital devices and mobile financial services allows one to use the portal to apply for immigration e-services. For a customer to access any immigration service online, have to click on the specific service. If a customer needs to apply for a passport, visa, or residence permit, will click on the e-services and chooses the respective service to apply. When clicking over the passport application form, allow a customer to fill in the necessary information for the system to create an identification number for the application. The required information for the e-immigration system to create an identification number includes mobile phone number, location of the applicant, and place of application. When this information is submitted, the system creates an application identification number for the e-passport application service. When the user clicks on the new application option, the system displays an application form that has to be filled in accordingly by providing relevant and correct information.

Filling application information requires one to be literate in computer and know how to read and write, especially *Kiswahili* language for passport applicants. It is worth noting that the e-passport application form is in the *Kiswahili* language only because all passport applicants must be Tanzanians, and every Tanzanian is presumed to be conversant in the national language and even those who have got Tanzanian citizenship by naturalization according to the Citizenship Law of 1995. Nevertheless, if the applicant is illiterate may be assisted by a trusted person in filling the form. The completion of the application form makes the system create a control number to allow the customer to make an initial payment amounting to twenty thousand Tanzanian Shillings. Afterward, *“the application form must be printed and presented to the immigration officer for interrogation and completion of payment upon acceptance of the application by the immigration officer”* (Interview, 2020). Immigration officers use the same portal to access the system in a different manner by using specific system accounts for each officer.

In addition, it reported by one immigration officer that there are aspects that determine access to the immigration portal, such as the stage in getting into the portal, the type of devices used to access the portal, and the cost of making an application. The stages involved in getting into the portal are straight forward as one of the passport customers observed that:

It is very smooth to get into the portal from the first stage to the last because it directs the user to the next stage in filling the application form. The portal gives directions for filling the respective e-passport application form, attaching basic documents, payment of particular service, online submission of the application, and printing the completed passport application form. All these stages are simple and straight, such that most applicants with basic computer knowledge can do. The portal has different signs and colors to demarcate some options and attract users. This alerts the users to be extra careful with some important or compulsory spaces to fill in the information. In general, the portal and its contents and procedures are organized in such a way that customers can access and use it easily.

In order to access e-immigration services, computer or smartphone devices must be enhanced with the internet, either in a wired or wireless form. Desktop computers, mobile phones, and smartphones are used as tools for delivering government services to citizens and businesses (Alshehri & Dew, 2010). Here study survey data shows that applicants who use office desktop computers or laptops to access the portal constituted 22.5% and those who use smartphones were 28%, while 48% neither use their own/office computers nor smartphones, but used to incur costs in the internet cafes to access the portal. The costs incurred by customers to access the portal through internet cafes increase the costs of the application.

Customers who use the internet cafes represent a considerable portion of users of the system who deserve to get smooth access to the system by enjoying low costs for making applications as stipulated by the e-government policy of 2017, which targets the reduction of running costs (URT, 2017). Here customers who use internet cafes, 48% of them paid between one thousand to five thousand Tanzanian shillings, 33% paid six thousand to ten thousand, and 17% paid eleven thousand to fifteen thousand Tanzanian shillings. This implies that the costs for accessing the portal through internet cafes, though somewhat affordable, can cause service applicants to fail to

access the portal. Hence, the cost to access the e-immigration portal should be relatively affordable to the majority of the applicants.

The group of respondents who used old manual and new electronic systems could differentiate between the two systems in service delivery. Table 1 presents applicant's responses on the number of days they had to wait for their passport document after processing the application show that in the old system, those who had to wait for 1–3 days were 10%, 4–6 days, 19%, 7–10 days 56% and 15% over 10 days. This shows that few applicants received their passports within the range of one week as the majority got their documents in the period of more than one week. Still, some were getting their passport in more than ten days as observed by the immigration officer that "*perhaps those who got their passport within the range of one week maybe those with emergency trips, including official trips, students and those attending medical treatment abroad*" (Interview, 2020).

Table 1: Old manual system and new e-immigration system, N=80

	Number of days			
	1-3 days	4-6 days	7-10 days	Over 10 days
Old manual system	10%	19%	56%	15%
New e-immigration system	31%	22%	42%	5%

Source: Field data, 2020

In addition, Table 1 shows the case of new electronic immigration services. Here the findings show that, of the 80 respondents who responded to the same question, 31% received their passport documents within the range of 1–3 days, 22% obtained their documents in 4–6 days, 42% got their documents within 7–10 days, and 5% got their documents more than ten days. This means that the number of applicants who got their documents within 1–3 days has increased dramatically from 10% in the old system to 31% through online immigration services. Reduction in the number of days for customers to get their documents to an average of less than seven days has been the promise of the immigration client service charter of 2017. It can be observed that the number of applicants who received their documents within one week has also increased, whereas those for more than ten days have dropped from 15% to 5%. This data implies that there is a significant improvement using electronic immigration service delivery.

Advantages of the Electronic Immigration Services

Service delivery systems that existed before the implementation of e-immigration were supplied, installed, and managed by different entities whose objectives were centered on security issues rather than on the realization of customer satisfaction (Hanzlik & Kutylowski, 2021). This situation could not allow immigration services to meet the required standard of system integration for efficient and effective service delivery. There have been complaints from the public that the delivery of immigration services in Tanzania does not meet acceptable standards (URT, 2014). Specifically, the services did not meet the growing demand for quality services. Furthermore, immigration services systems were insufficient and ineffective in supporting immigration services management (URT, 2014). Electronic immigration systems became a tool for improved services to meet high immigration services demand and customer expectations (Larkotey *et al.*, 2017; Habibu *et al.*, 2019).

Sections 27–31 of the e-Government Authority Act of 2019 in Tanzania authorize government institutions, including the immigration department, to offer electronic services (URT, 2019b). The Act through Sections 29-31 insists on reducing paper works by innovating and digitalizing work processes and introducing electronic records and electronic payment (URT, 2019b). This Act allows any government institution to use service providers which offer electronic services such as payment services on behalf of the institution. It is through this venture that the immigration department uses mobile phone operators, among others, Tigo (Tigo Pesa), Airtel (Airtel Money), Vodacom (M-Pesa), Halotel (Halo Pesa), and Zantel (Ezy Pesa) to make payments for e-immigration services. This helps applicants pay their immigration service bills and, therefore, avoid long queues and time spent in banks.

The general e-government regulations of 2020 provide the interpretation of the Act for ease of implementation of the law. Regulation 40 (a) insists that the language be used to deliver e-government services to be friendly to users (URT, 2020). It further insists on electronic services being citizen-centered. In this case, the e-immigration system uses both English and the Kiswahili language to ensure easy accessibility. Regulation 40 (b) (i)–(iii) gives the means through which customers access the e-service system, including web-based technologies, mobile channels, and any other emerging technology (URT, 2020). All these are platforms through which this regulation aims to improve e-service delivery in Tanzania and e-immigration service.

The application for a visa to Tanzania is online from anywhere, anytime, where visas and permits are issued remotely and timely. Also, for efficiency in processing and getting services, mobile money services are available and deployed in making online payments of applicable service fees. As a result, the new system has reduced the time to fill online applications as well as the waiting time for the documents. Visa applicants make online applications wherever they are because “*visa applicants are not required to visit immigration offices during visa application. However, those who are making applications through Tanzania embassies abroad, they go to the office once for biometric clearance*” (Interview, 2020). In this context, e-immigration service had cut down the costs of the application for various services. This is because an “*applicant visits the immigration office less frequently than ever before since most application processes are completed online*” (Interview, 2020). It has been pointed out by the respondent in visa section that, “*visa applicants abroad appear just once in embassies for biometrics, different from the old visa application system where they had to travel several times*” (Interview, 2020).

Immigration officers shared the view that the e-immigration system has reduced forgery by service applicants. This is elaborated by one of the ICT officers that:

Before online services, customers could forge documents or attachments for various service applications. However, in the present electronic system, the chances to submit forged documents are meager because the e-immigration system integrates other electronic systems used to issue various documents used as attachments to most immigration applications, including national identification number, taxpayer identification number, and birth certificate.

On the other hand, the system has reduced the workload that immigration officers were experiencing before introducing the system. As observed by one immigration officer that “*using the new online immigration system, officers can now accomplish their daily application processing activities immediately and without carryovers*” (Interview, 2020). In this regard, respondents were asked to rate the general performance of the e-immigration system. Responses presented in Table 2 show that none of the respondents rated it low, 15% rated the system performance average, 45% rated it high, and 40% rated it very high in performance. This data depicts the general performance of the e-immigration to be high 45% and very high by 40% in general. This justifies users’ satisfaction with the performance of the new e-immigration system.

Table 2: General performance of the new e-immigration system, N=80

	Average	High	Very high
Respondents	12	36	32
Percentage	15	45	40

Source: Field data, 2020

The introduction of e-immigration has reduced the workload they used to have in the old manual system, and it is time-saving as they can attend more applications in a shorter time. Therefore, the work is simple because *“there is no need for officers to carry files to approving officers but just send them online”* (Interview, 2020). Similarly, *“there is no loss of files within the file movement process because it is online”* (Interview, 2020). This serves immigration officers time to allow them to work on more and more applications. As a result, in turn, it has *“improved work efficiency and the effectiveness of officers compared to their efficiency in the old manual system”* (Interview, 2020). The respondents interviewed reported that the system is efficient and effective in the passport, visa, and residence permit service delivery. Interviewed officers of the immigration department admitted that the system has made their responsibilities smooth and time-saving. As one of the immigration officers reported, *“the system has reduced the time to process one passport application and time for applicants to obtain their documents from the average of ten days to the average of five days”* (Interview, 2020). Passport applicants present themselves in immigration offices only during printed application document submission and passport document collection stage. On the other hand, the officials pointed out that *“the new e-visa application system takes one to three minutes to attend and complete a single visa application submitted online”* (Interview, 2020).

Challenges of Electronic Immigration Services

One of the challenges presented by the respondents includes inaccuracy of the information provided by applicants during the online application process. Inaccuracy of information accounts for some cases of service delays and other inconveniences. Information needs to be accurate during the application. However, some challenges with the system include *“applicant knowledge on e-services, submission of incomplete applications, power cutoffs, network problems and language challenges for some applicants especially visa permit who do not know English”* (Interview, 2020).

Another challenge is inadequate information and knowledge about proper documents to be attached in the online submission system. There was a lack of options in the portal to add

missing documents after submitting the application form and a low space/byte for uploading supporting documents. Byte to upload applications documents more than fifty percent of residence permit and passport applicants pointed out this challenge. However, for visa applicants, it was rarely mentioned. The reason could be that the number of supporting documents required to be attached and uploaded for the residence permit and passport application are too huge than for visa application.

Also, 20% of the passport applicants pointed out that the system lacked options to either make corrections to the information provided or delete uploaded files after submitting the application. However, passport applicants are advised to verify the information and documents and then confirm before final online submission. This is because one of the immigration officers explained that “*the system is made so that any change of information after submission can only be done by responsible immigration officers*” (Interview, 2020). For the payment system, the e-immigration system has feedback and updates in passport payment platforms through cellphone messages and grant notice messages for visa or residence permit applicants through emails. However, applicants view this as inadequate as they needed a service notification at every application stage.

The dangerous risk in the e-immigration system is the risk of hackers and that of malware. The risk of malware may distort the system's operation to the extent that its effectiveness, efficiency, and security of data are endangered. Similarly, there are “security threats due to the fact that all biometrics features are usually very sensitive information that has to be appropriately treated” (Malcik & Drahanaky, 2012, p.1). It is argued by one user that:

Accordingly, if not well protected, there is a risk of hackers interfering with the system's operation or diverging its identities to bear the identity of other systems. This situation is dangerous because it may contravene even the financial credentials of the system and hence endangers the security of the immigration system and customers' data.

On the other hand, it is argued that “using biometrics to improve the system of travel documents is undoubtedly a crucial milestone” (Malcik & Drahanaky, 2012, p.1). As one of the respondents supported that:

The benefits of e-immigration range from security benefits as the system integrates with other security systems, improves tourism as tourists get their visas on time, encourages investors as residence permit processes are simplified, intending to minimize running costs on the part of the government. However, the threat associated with this system is that any connection errors may lead to data loss and delays in service delivery if it happens.

Despite the fact that the new application of digitalization of immigration system (passport, visa, permit, and border management) poses a number of security and privacy risks challenges, still, the e-immigration system can "reduce fraud, identity theft and will help governments worldwide to improve security at their country borders" (Wimalasiri & Jeyamohan, 2018, p.15). In addition, the chances of forgery and fake immigration documents can be minimized (Hanzlik & Kutylowski, 2021), and electronic immigration may play an important role in the following applications: "reducing illegal immigrations, cross-border security, provide smooth travel experience with online facilities, provide quick and protected border crossings, genuine trade practice, provide national security, and minimize identity theft" (Punithavathi and Geetha (2019, p.342-343).

Conclusion and Recommendation

The growth of digital transformation has managed to influence the implementation of e-immigration services. Here public services can better be delivered to citizens by using digital technologies. The e-immigration system has put citizens at the center of the immigration service delivery, thereby making maximum use of digital technology to access services through various digital means easily. This is because e-immigration portal analysis shows that the system has been very easily accessible by applicants. Immigration service delivery has been improved following the implementation of the e-immigration system compared to an old manual system. For instance, the system has removed some delays experienced by applicants in the previous manual system. Respondents have expressed their satisfaction with the new e-immigration services because 85% rated the level of performance of the e-immigration system high to very high. Also, the number of services has fallen from seven days on average in the old service system to three days on average for applicants to get a passport, visa, and residence permit under e-immigration. Through the analysis of the immigration portal, findings show that it is easy for

applicants to access the immigration portal despite the challenges of the network, costs, and digital literacy.

In addition, the old manual application system took too long for immigration officers to process service applications. There were few steps, but each step takes a long time to clear the process of application. In this old manual system, once the application is received, immigration counter officers interrogate the applicant. Upon the officer's satisfaction, the applicant gets a payment bill, which will necessitate applicants to go to the bank to queue up for a long time to make an application payment. The fingerprint was also a long exercise that consumed applicants' time because immigration officers used manual devices. Creating application files was also manual and required officers to manually find the files, make application assessments, and move manual files to approve officers. File movement also had some challenges, including the loss of files. However, the introduction of e-immigration services addressed most of the challenges encountered by immigration officers in service delivery. E-immigration has reduced the workload of the old manual system, and it is time-saving to attend more applications in a short time. Here there is no need for officers to carry files to approving officers but send them online without losing files. Also, the e-immigration system reduced the time to process one application and obtain their passport documents. This saves the time to allow officers to work on other applications. This, in turn, has improved service delivery compared to an old manual system.

The immigration department is advised to introduce applicant support desks in each immigration office. The immigration department can use this opportunity to introduce support desks operated by immigration officers, whereby it will perform support functions to users compared to the current one in private stationaries and internet cafes. These desks will give an official guide to applicants on the required documents, procedures for application, and dangers of forgeries. The desks will also help to reduce undue actions by fake personnel, mitigate fraudulent ways of getting immigration documents, and thus, make immigration services more professional, trusted, and reliable. This article suggests that service fees be used to support desks and motivate officers operating in the desks for better services. Also, ICT officers must ensure system improvement and maintenance periodically to make sure that challenges of the system are addressed. The portal analysis shows the system has an inadequate feedback mechanism to the immigration service applicants and even for the service users to evaluate the quality of service delivery. The improvements may include but are not limited to creating an electronic feedback mechanism that

will provide information on the progress of passport application in every stage. This is because “feedback is considered an effective means for improving the performance of public utilities” (Deichmann & Lall, 2007, p.649).

References

- Abeyratne, R. (2013). The ePassport — New Technology to Counter Security Threats. *Journal of Transportation Security*, 6: 27–42.
- Alshehri, S., & Drew, S. (2010). Implementation of e-Government: Advantages and Challenges. Proceedings of the IASK International Conference E-Activity and Leading Technologies and InterTIC 2010. Retrieved from https://research-repository.griffith.edu.au/bitstream/handle/10072/40620/72631_1.pdf?sequence=1.
- Amiri, H. (2017). Assessment of Risk Management Strategies for E-Government Services: A Case of Immigration Department and E-Government Agency in Tanzania (Unpublished Master Dissertation). University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
- Deichmann, U., & Lall, S.V. (2007). Citizen Feedback and Delivery of Urban Services. *World Development*, 35(4): 649-662.
- Denhardt, R.B., & Denhardt, J.V. (2000). The New Public Service: Serving Rather than Steering. *Public Administration Review*, 60(6): 549-559.
- Denhardt, R.B., & Denhardt, J.V. (2015). The New Public Service Revisited. *Public Administration Review*, xx(xx): DOI: 10.1111/puar.12347
- Dewa, M., & Zlotnikova, I. (2014). Citizens Readiness for e-Government Services in Tanzania. *Advances in Computer Science: An International Journal*, 3(4): 37-45.
- EAC (2014). Regional Strategic Framework for e-Immigration 2014/15-2019/20. East African Community Secretariat, Arusha, Tanzania.
- Glouftsiou, G., & Scheel, S. (2021). An Inquiry into the Digitisation of Border and Migration Management: Performativity, Contestation and Heterogeneous Engineering. *Third World Quarterly*, 42(1): 123-140.
- Habibu, T., Luhanga, E.T., & Sam, A. E. (2019). Evaluation of Users’ Knowledge and Concerns of Biometric Passport Systems. *Data*, 4(58): 1-17.
- Hanzlik, L., & Kutylowski, M. (2021). ePassport and eID Technologies. In: G. Avoine, & J. Hernandez-Castro (eds.), *Security of Ubiquitous Computing Systems*. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10591-4_5
- Honade, S., Sarwar, A., Kanawade, S., & Hawle, A. (2018). Electronic passport using RFID. *International Journal of Innovative Science and Research Technology*, 3(2): 610-613.
- Khelifi, A., Hashmi, S., Darwich, F., Ali, S., & Al Tenaiji, A. (2020). Smart Visa System with Improved Security Features. In: A.N. Al-Masri & Y. Al-Assaf (eds.), *Sustainable Development and Social Responsibility*. Volume 2, Advances in Science, Technology and Innovation. Springer Nature Switzerland, 251-262.
- Larkotey, W.O., Effah, J., & Boateng, R. (2017). Development of E-Passport Application Portal: A Developing Country Case Study. *Twenty-First Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems*, Langkawi.
- Lupilya, E.C. (2015). E-government Strategic Plan Implementation in Tanzania: Learning from Challenges and Experiences from Kenya, Korea, India and Malaysia. *The Korean Journal of Policy Studies*, 30(2): 147-175.

- Malcik, D., & Drahansky, M. (2012). Anatomy of Biometric Passport. *Journal of Biomedicine and Biotechnology*, 2012:1-9.
- NAO (2007). Identity and Passport Service: Introduction of e-Passports. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, National Audit Office, UK. Retrieved from: <https://www.nao.org.uk/report/identity-and-passport-service-introduction-of-epassports/>.
- Osborne, D.E., & Gaebler, T. (1992). *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector*. Plume, Addison – Wesley Publishing Company, USA.
- Punithavathi, P., & Geetha, S. (2019). Cancelable Biometric Transformations for E-Passport Security. *International Journal of Engineering and Advanced Technology (IJEAT)*, 9(1S3): 342-346.
- Putra, BH, & Arifin, R. (2020). The Adoption of Border Technology of Immigration Control and Auto gates in Indonesia. *Science and Information Technology Journal*, 3(2): 137-148.
- Rosie, S. R. (2015). Advantages and Disadvantages of e-Government Implementation: Literature Review. *International Journal of Technology Marketing*, 5(9): 18-34.
- Rugumyamoto, J. (2005). The Enabling State and the Role of the Public Service in Wealth Creation: Problems and Strategies for development In Africa. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
- Shiyo, N.E., Jeremia, Y., & Shayo, D.P. (2018). Digital Citizens at Work: Mapping Citizen m-Participation Cases in the Governance of Services in Tanzania. *Tanzanian Journal of Population Studies and Development*, 25(1&2): 77-101.
- Solong, HA (2017). Actualization New Public Service (NPS) Administration in Public Service. *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications*, 7(3): 505-513.
- UN (2017). International Migration Report 2017. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, United Nations. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017.pdf>.
- UNDP (2015). From Old Public Administration to the New Public Service: Implications for Public Sector Reform in Developing Countries. Global Centre for Public Service Excellence, Retrieved from: <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/capacity-building/global-centre-for-public-service-excellence/PS-Reform.html>.
- URT (1995). Citizenship Law of 1995. United Republic of Tanzania
- URT (2007). The Electronic Transactions Act of 2007. United Republic of Tanzania
- URT (2011). Immigration News Issue No. 15. Special Edition for Fifty Years of Independence of Tanzania Mainland, Immigration Department, Ministry of Home Affairs, United Republic of Tanzania.
- URT (2013). Tanzania e-Government Strategy, PO–PSM, United Republic of Tanzania.
- URT (2014). Report for the establishment of an integrated immigration services system in the Immigration Department of the Ministry of Home Affairs in Tanzania: Introduction of e-immigration services in Tanzania, Main Report.
- URT (2017). Immigration Client Service Charter of 2017. Immigration Department, United Republic of Tanzania
- URT (2018). E–Immigration Information Manual of 2018. Immigration Department, Ministry of Home Affairs, United Republic of Tanzania

- URT (2019a). Immigration Newsletter No. June 17, 2019. Immigration Department, Ministry of Home Affairs, United Republic of Tanzania
- URT (2019b). The e-Government Act No. 10 of 2019. United Republic of Tanzania
- URT (2020). The e-Government General Regulations of 2020. United Republic of Tanzania
- Wimalasiri, B., & Jeyamohan, N. (2018). An E-Passport System with Multistage Authentication: A Case Study of the Security of Sri Lanka's E-Passport. *Global Journal of Computer Science and Technology: G Interdisciplinary*, 18(2): 14-20.
- Yang, Y. (2017). Towards a New Digital Era: Observing Local E-Government Services Adoption in a Chinese Municipality. *Future Internet*, 9(3):53. <https://doi.org/10.3390/fi9030053>
- Yusuph, M. L., & Guohua, W. (2017). Challenges for implementing New Public Management Reforms in Local Government in Tanzania: Evidence from Six Selected Local Government Authorities. *Public Policy and Administration Research*, 7(6): 32-45.
- Zattler, J. (1989). The effects of Structural Adjustment Programmes. *Intereconomics*, Verlag Weltarchiv, Hamburg, 24(6): 282-289.

The Hermeneutical Task of Postcolonial African Philosophy: Construction and Deconstruction

Yohannes Eshetu Mamuye*

Abstract

Meta philosophical issues surround the topic of African philosophy. What should be counted as African philosophy, and what makes African philosophy so notable has long been a matter of reflection by African and African descended thinkers? One stance taken by African thinkers leans toward ascribing philosophical status to the collective worldviews of Africans embedded in their traditions, language, and culture. By criticizing ethnophilosophy as being unanimous and uncritical, professional philosophers epitomize a philosophy to be a universal, individualized, and reflective enterprise. This tendency of appropriating cultural traits as philosophical and thereby tending to emphasize particularity by ethnophilosophers on the one hand and the universalist claim by professional philosophers puts African philosophy in a dilemma and whereby makes it counterproductive to the neocolonial liberation struggle. The article's central argument is that African philosophical hermeneutics is a panacea for the 'double blockage' that the philosophers currently look into contemporary African philosophy. African hermeneutics is the extension of German and French hermeneutical tradition with the works of Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricœur. Hermeneutics is a mediation between culture and philosophy and also universality and particularity.

Keywords: *Hermeneutics, Ethnophilosophy, postcolonial, Construction, Deconstruction*

Introduction

The contemporary discussion on the nature and character of African philosophy was embarked by Placid Temple's book *Bantu Philosophy* in 1945. The discussion amounts to the meaning of 'Philosophy' itself and the unique meaning of adding the prefix 'African' to Philosophy. Father Placide Temple's book *Bantu Philosophy* was the first manuscript to initiate a keen interest in African philosophy. With the prevailing colonial domination mediated through persistent theoretic discourse thwarted Africans from philosophical reflection and rationality, *Bantu Philosophy* was welcomed feverishly by black people to challenge Eurocentric biases. The impact of Temple's *Bantu Philosophy* was reflected by Wiredu, who says, "Tempels [has] formed the impression, which in the circles in which he moved was quite revolutionary, that those African peoples had a coherent philosophy and that it governed their day-to-day living." Of course, he thought much of the validity of the *Bantu philosophy* (Wiredu, 2004).

* Jimma University, Ethiopia. Email: cephaphilo2003@gmail.com

Tempels studied the Baluba culture to explore Bantu philosophy. According to him, the Bantu people, represented by the Baluba, consider force the primary 'being'. If for western people, 'being' refers to 'what is', for the Bantu, it means the 'force that is'. When western people think of being, the Bantu think of force (Tempels, 1959). Thus, the Baluba culture is reducible to a hierarchy and an interaction of forces with God at the highest level, as the supreme force; followed by founders of clans or 'arch patriarchs'; then come dead people shadowed in their turn by the alive generation. Below the alive generation, we have lower forces - animals, minerals, and vegetables. Tempels also outlines the laws of interaction between forces: upper forces directly influence lower ones; man can thus use a lower force - animal, mineral, or vegetal - to destroy another man or force (Tempels, 1959).

This traditionalist perspective in African philosophy epitomizes communal beliefs and tradition of a given African culture as philosophy has been supported by other African thinkers like Alexis Kagame and John Mbiti. They endorse Tempels' approach of African philosophy as a collective worldview shared by all those who belong to the same culture.

Since then, there has been a hot debate on whether the so-called 'ethnophilosophy' deserves philosophy's status. Indeed, when Bantu philosophy came into being, it was warmly welcomed by the African people described as uncivilized, alien to abstract thought, and inferior by the Europeans. However, shortly after a while, it has been a subject of contention among philosophers. Among others, for instance, Paulin Hountondji describes Bantu Philosophy as 'the product of the ideological structure of the time' (Hountondji, 1996). Hountondji further challenged ethnophilosophy because of its unanimity. He says,

I acknowledged clearly that any human group could live on a set of assumptions shared by all its members, whether or not this set of assumptions is systematic enough to be considered, as it often is, as a 'system of thought'. I still rejected, however, the hasty way in which ethnologists and some philosophers tended to label such sets of assumptions as 'philosophies'. To me, these assumptions represented instead of the initial material in relation to which philosophy could develop as a critical, personal body of thought (Hountondji, 1996).

Professional philosophers like Hountounji and Wiredu, trained in western philosophical perspectives, challenged ethnophilosophy as uncritical, collective, and anonymous. For them, philosophy is an individual enterprise that is critical and rational. This stance characterizes the universal nature of philosophy and undercuts unanimous collective views of people who share a culture. Hermeneutics transcends the shortcomings of these two views. On the one hand, as Okere says, philosophy is "essentially an individual enterprise and is often a *mise-en-cause*, and a radical questioning of the collective image" (Okere, 1983). Moreover, the complete appropriation of the view that emphasizes the universal nature of philosophy, which avoids culture and traditional stance that epitomizes professional philosophers, has challenged particularity. Professional philosophers have made African culture and traditions little value in African philosophy by highlighting philosophy's universal, individualistic and rational character. The other shortcoming of ethnophilosophy, as Wiredu opined, is that the ethnophilosophical approach takes up communal ideas without making any evaluation and assessment; instead, they are prone to be descriptive and interpretative.

Philosophy is a narrative and an evaluative enterprise, the latter being an essential aspect of the discipline. On this view, philosophers should not content themselves with just informing others of the ideas entertained by their communities; they should also concern themselves with figuring out, for their own enlightenment and, perhaps, that of others, what in them is true, if any, and what is false, if any (Wiredu, 2004).

Therefore, this piece of work is geared toward discussing ethnophilosophy and professional philosophy underlining on transcending their dearth to articulate a viable forward-thinking through a hermeneutical tradition. The writer considers that Hermeneutics, as a philosophical approach, is a good means to overcome the dichotomy between particularity/universality and culture/philosophy for doing philosophy in Africa in this postcolonial era.

‘Double blockage’ in African Philosophy

Maricien Towa characterizes the difficulty that African philosophy currently faces. Towa has described: the danger to which African philosophy is currently exposed is that of a 'real blockage.' Here, the important issue should be inquiring about the essence of this real blockage in contemporary African Philosophy (Towa, 1991).

The debate between the two trends in contemporary African philosophy - ethnophilosophy and professional philosophy - that is, the interest, on the one hand, is focusing on the communal worldviews, values, and beliefs of a society or an ethnic group by ethnophilosophers. On the other hand, the denial of these traditional African thoughts in the name of being uncritical, unanimous, and unscientific by professional philosophers is what Towa has described as a real 'blockage' in contemporary African Philosophy. Similarly, Okonda Okolo has described the contention between ethnophilosophy and professional philosophy as "the expression of a problematic that oscillates between a naïve philosophy and unproductive criticism" (quoted in Serequeberhan, 1994). Another thinker, Komo, says that the different ethnophilosophical works

create confusion between philosophy and culture and the essence of philosophy itself. Thus, ethnophilosophy presents a certain ambiguity. On the one hand, ethnophilosophers underscore the undeniable link between philosophy and culture, but, on the other, they fail to define philosophy as a personal reflection or interpretation of culture. They speak of philosophy as a common idea (Komo, 2017).

Tsenay Serequeberhan, in his Hermeneutical orientation, did not satisfy with this 'double blockage' in contemporary African philosophy in a sense either of which is not sufficient enough to explain the conditions and problems of what he calls 'Africa in Metamorphosis.' Instead, he insists that contemporary African philosophy should transcend beyond the debate on what Towa called occlusion and exclusion of traditional thoughts by ethnophilosophers and professional philosophers, respectively. In a nutshell, Serequeberhan criticizes both ethnophilosophers and professional philosophers, i.e., ethnophilosophers focus on dead traditions and the appropriation of Western paradigm to appraise traditional thoughts by the latter.

Hermeneutical Approach to African Philosophy

The researcher's central argument in this article is that African hermeneutics is a panacea for this 'double blockage' in contemporary African philosophy. African hermeneutics is the extension of German and French hermeneutical tradition with the works of Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur. Hermeneutics is a mediation between culture and philosophy and also universality and particularity (Komo, 2017). Philosophy, as Okere says, "is always determined by culture. There is, therefore, a need for mediation between philosophy and culture. For Okere, hermeneutics is this necessary mediation. Philosophy is essentially an interpretation of symbols embedded in a

culture and language to render their meaning to make use of them for our present concerns and exigencies. Komo says, "Philosophy always grows out of the cultural background and depends on it. Without this background, there cannot be a foreground. Although philosophy is not to be confused with myths, weltanschauung, and religion, it is always rooted in a specific culture" (Komo, 2017). Okere regarding philosophy also maintains a similar view as essentially hermeneutical, who says, "Symbols are pregnant of meaning. In them, all have already been said. Nevertheless, to philosophize, we have to interpret them at the level of reflection. So hermeneutics, that is, interpretation becomes "the mediated factor between the two poles - culture and philosophy" (Okere, 1983).

In what follows, the researcher will present the hermeneutic views of Tsenay Serequeberhan. Serequeberhan argues that every philosophy, whether European, Asian, or African, departs from the lived concerns and historical horizon from which it is emitted. Serequeberhan, in his book *The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy: Horizon and Discourse*, defines horizon and discourse as:

Horizon designates the historico-hermeneutical and politico-cultural milieu within and out of which specific discourses (philosophic, artistic, scientific, etc.) are articulated. It is the overall existential space within and out of which they occur. On the other hand, discourse refers to these articulated concerns interior to the concrete conditions of existence made possible by and internal to a specific horizon (Serequeberhan, 1994).

Alternatively, to put it in other words, philosophy, by whatever name we call it, is the reflection of the lived concerns and historicity of the horizon within which it is articulated. For this reason, Antonio Gramsci clearly says:

The starting-point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is, and is 'knowing thyself' as a product of the historical processes to date, which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory' (quoted in Serequeberhan, 1994).

As Gramsci puts here, the beginning of every philosophical reflection is a critical 'inventory' of the lived contexts and historical horizons from which it is emerged. Thus, the departure point of every philosophical elaboration, Gramsci claims, is making a critical 'inventory' of 'what really is.' When we see both trends in contemporary African philosophy, i.e., ethnophilosophy and professional Philosophy – lack the sharp historical awareness of what Gramsci called critical 'inventory' of "what really is as a departure point of African Philosophy."

Another important point related to this is Towa's characterization of philosophy. Towa recognizes that the general essence of philosophy is that it should serve the supreme importance of humanity. This general essence of philosophy is conditioned by differentiated particularity - cultural, spiritual, history, political and economic particularities within which a philosophic discourse is articulated (1991). Accordingly, Serequeberhan defines African philosophy as "the exercise by Africans of a specific type of intellectual activity within a specified lived concern and historical horizon" (Serequeberhan 1994).

To substantiate his claim, Serequeberhan identifies instances from different lived actualities and historical horizons. These are the modern European philosophy that begins with Descartes and Zara Ya'aqob and his pupil Walde Heyward. He says, "the discourse of modern European philosophy beginning with Descartes... originates in the concerns arising from the horizon of modern science. Out of these concerns, associated with the names of Galileo and Newton, the discourse of modern philosophy is articulated" (*Ibid*). The philosophic discourses of the sixteenth century Abyssinian Philosopher of Zara Ya'aqob and his disciple Walde Heyward, in contradistinction to Descartes, Kant, and others, are grounded in the lived concerns of their day (*Ibid*). That is, the religious confrontation provoked their philosophy rained during the time between Abyssinian Coptic church and the Jesuits missionaries. In other words, the fact that Zara Ya'aqob was born and brought up within a specific historical horizon, his Hateta was preoccupied with reflecting upon the nature of faith and religion.

Although the concerns and historical horizon that has ignited Zar'a Ya'aqob to philosophy is quite different from his European counterparts, what we see both in Zara Ya'aqob on the one hand and philosophies of Descartes and Kant on the other, is a critical attitude towards the tissue being interrogated. Zara Ya'aqob did not blindly accept his forefathers' views, which is what we can find in the philosophies of his European counterpart.

What we have, in each case, is a 'critical inventory' always located in and concerned with the issues of a specific tradition and awareness. It has its own lived limits of the historicity on which it is unleashed and out of which it formulates and forms its conception (Ibid).

A similar argument has been provided by Towa, who affirms that to philosophize is being aware of the lived actualities and historical horizon of one's milieu; and to make some kind of critical 'inventory' upon it.

Philosophers are not themselves abstractions but are beings of flesh and bones that belong to a continent, a particular culture, and a specific period. Moreover, for a particular philosopher, it is necessary to examine the essential problems of his milieu and his own period critically and methodically. He will thus elaborate philosophy that explicitly or implicitly relates to his times and his milieu (1991).

The postcolonial Africa horizon is basically political. This is the reason that Serequeberhan says, "for us [Africans], the question of our existence, of our 'to be' is an inherently political question...when we ask or reflect on our own humanity when we examine the actuality, "the substance of our existence as human beings, there we find and are confronted by an internalized imperious Europe dominant over the contradictory remains of our own indigent and subjected indigenusness" (Serequeberhan, 1994).

African philosophy, too, should focus on understanding a critical 'inventory' of the lived concerns and historical horizons of the African people so as to make it helpful in addressing the needs and problems of the continent. To put it in other words, "philosophic discourse is a reflexive and reflective response to the felt crisis of the lived and lived horizon" (*Ibid*).

Africa is currently facing both historical and ahistorical problems. Slave trade and colonialism have left on the Africa black scare. Although the physical domination of the continent has come to an end, it is apparent that Africa is still in a subordinate position in every aspect of life comparing to the west. Because of this, Serequeberhan argues, "the central concern for the practice of philosophy focused on the formerly colonized world should be directed at helping to create a situation in which the enduring residue of our colonial past is systematically overcome" (*Ibid*). Thus, the task of philosophy in postcolonial Africa is:

for us contemporary Africans, what impels us to think is precisely the estranged actuality of our present deriving from the colonial experience, the specific particularity of our history. Thus, in view of the inert presence of neocolonialism - the diremptions and misunderstandings consequent on colonialism - that radical hermeneutics becomes the proper task of contemporary African philosophy.

Moreover, more than the economic and political dependence on the west, Serequeberhan claims, Africa is still in a subordinate position in terms of theoretical works on the west. In our history, slave trade and colonialism have left their own legacy on African beings; and even after colonialism has been wiped out, a different form of 'colonialism' still persists on the continent under the guise of science, technology, and economic aid. Because of this, Africa could not yet come up with its own theoretic framework and scientific paradigm that would reduce our dependence on the west by offering an alternate scientific paradigm.

In this context, African philosophy should be construed to serve the needs and exigencies of Africans by undermining those values and assumptions that put Africa in a subordinate position and developing its own alternate ways to contribute to the 'world system of knowledge'. The place of Africa in a globalized system of knowledge is still too minimal. How could this condition be averted? Serequeberhan identifies two interrelated points that could shape contemporary African philosophy the 'way ahead'. These are i) The reorientation of philosophic work, and ii) The critique of eurocentrism in philosophy.

Contemporary African Philosophy: Construction and Deconstruction

With this regard, contemporary African philosophers have a double task: constructive and deconstructive. It is, indeed, the task of contemporary African philosophers to make a critical 'inventory' of their traditions and come up with ideas that could ameliorate the existing African problems. The promises that African leaders have made since post-independence forfeited owed to neo-colonialism and a weak bureaucratic setup. Moreover, as Hountounji noted, Africa has remained lingered in terms of theoretic dependence on the west. The upshot for such dependence is far-reaching. The total usurpation of ideas from the west, which downplay the contribution of indigenous knowledge in Africa, has abated sound and sustainable development in the continent. UNESCO briefed this case as follows:

It is not surprising... that culture has increasingly come to be seen as crucial to human development in the second half of the twentieth century. We understand better not just that culture can be a mechanism for, or an obstacle to, development, that it is intrinsic to sustainable human development itself because it is our cultural values which determine our goals and our sense of fulfillment. Development processes that fail to recognize this simplistically divide people's resources from their aspirations or their health from how

they struggle to produce lasting improvements in people's lives. Instead, we have to engage with development in the context and through the medium of human cultures.

In other words, making a critical 'inventory' of our traditional values is vital for overcoming the problems that the slave trade and colonialism have left on us. Only by making such a critical examination of our traditional thoughts and indigenous knowledge systems can we reduce our theoretic dependence on the west. This is the constructive task of contemporary African philosophy. Gyekye, in this regard, noted:

[t]he starting points, the organizing concepts and categories of modern African philosophy be extracted from the cultural, linguistic, and historical backgrounds of African peoples if that philosophy is to behave relevance and meaning for the people if it is to enrich their lives (Gyekye, 1987).

Although such a critical 'inventory' of tradition is a vital practice, it does not mean that whatever is in tradition is valuable. Some sterile elements in our traditions should be annihilated. Nevertheless, there needs to be what Serequeberhan calls 'selective analysis'. He argued, "The philosopher/interpreter who works out of the context of the present, as it relates to and arises out of a specific tradition, should not passively adhere to what is given by the tradition" (Serequeberhan 1994). It is by such 'selective analysis' that we can bring those traditional values which are helpful for ameliorating the postcolonial problems of the continent.

Thus, we will be able to overcome, in engaging our concrete needs, the dependent character of theoretic work ... is restricted to the collection of data and the implementation of results. In this manner, one can also imagine the future development of indigenously spun theoretic paradigms formulated out of a fusion of the traditional and modern in and out of Africa (Serequeberhan, 1994).

Therefore, through such a critical 'inventory' of our traditional values in light of the contemporary needs and exigencies, we can redefine our being to cope with the hegemonic western system of knowledge. To philosophize in postcolonial Africa is taking the specific cultural traits in our traditions as a departure point in conjunction with modern science and building our philosophical systems based on contemporary needs and exigencies.

... to interpretively engage the present situation in terms of what Africa 'has been' - both in its pre-colonial 'greatness' as well as in its colonial and neocolonial demise - is the proper hermeneutical task of African philosophical thought. Furthermore, this

interpretative exploration has to be undertaken in view of the future of freedom toward which Africa aspires – as exemplified by its undaunted struggle, and despite all its failings, against colonialism and neocolonialism (Serequebrehan, 1994).

The deconstructive aspect should supplement the constructive aspect of contemporary African philosophy. The deconstructive aspect of African philosophy aims to delegitimize the 'myths' imposed on African, which portray the inferiority of the colonized world. It is necessary to expose the internal weaknesses and inconsistencies of the ideas that western discourse had invented about Africa, which claims particular European existence as a standard to be imitated. Serequeberhan has remarked the aim of philosophy in Africa in these words:

African philosophy is aimed at unmasking these European residues [in the form of its educational, political, and cultural institutions] in modern Africa that still sanction - in the guise of science and enlightenment - the continued subordination and intellectual domination of Africa (Serequeberhan, 1991).

The colonial motives of imperious Europe were not only accomplished by the military strength of Europe but also armed with such 'myths' which portray the inferiority of the colonized world. After colonialism has been surpassed, the 'myths' that claim the Europeans' superiority still dominates the minds of the formerly colonized world in the form of 'false consciousness.'

Radiological thinkers such as Kant, Hegel, and Marx gave a philosophical basis that affirms the particular European existence as the historicity of humanity per se. This exclusion of non-western races from the status of humanity proper is possibly the defining character of western philosophical discourse. Thus, the constructive and deconstructive aspects of contemporary African philosophy are complementary in the sense that the deconstructive project could pave the way for a philosophical reassessment of our traditions and vice versa.

Conclusion

The task of African philosophy in the postcolonial period should be seen from its contribution to overcoming the historical and ahistorical anomalies of the continent. It seems that doing philosophy on the African soil could not be successful unless the African philosophers recognize the historical and social factors that have shaped the contemporary African reality. Therefore, through such an awareness of being thrown in a unique historical and social context, the future development of African philosophy can be viewed. Accordingly, contemporary African

philosophy should concentrate on reflecting upon the lived concerns and historical horizon of the postcolonial situation of Africa in such a way as to ameliorate the African predicament.

As Serequeberhan argues, Africa's contemporary situation is characterized by economic and political subordination of Africa to the west and in theoretic works. It is, indeed, a point of departure for contemporary African philosophers to reflect upon their culture and tradition in order to have access to bring any meaningful alternative to the hegemonic western system. Like any part of the world, Africa has its own traditional values and beliefs, which could give us an alternative scientific paradigm to the dominant western knowledge system if we could make a curious study and critical 'inventory' of our much-neglected traditions. We could not yet take a serious philosophical undertaking to make use of our values for the betterment of the continent. Given the Eurocentric dominance of the system of knowledge, we become vulnerable to be simply the recipient of the ideas, values, and practices that have been achieved in other parts of the world.

It is the deconstructive aspect of African philosophy aimed at undermining the metaphysical assumptions of western philosophy that could enable Africans to reaffirm their sense of dignity and worth. The appropriation of western values without questioning their worth simply in the name of 'science' and 'modernity' would be harmful to overcome Africa's contemporary needs and problems. The beliefs descended from the colonial past, which portrays the superiority of European existence, hinder Africans from being skeptical about those European values that negatively affect the continent. However, here researcher is not arguing that whatever comes from the west is worthless. Indeed, globalization forces us to integrate our values with that of the modern scientific system the way it is beneficial for our existence. So, the undermining of the metaphysical underpinning of Eurocentric thoughts is what Serequeberhan says is "a prerequisite for the concrete reorientation of our theoretic and practical tasks and not a vain antiquarian pursuit" (*Ibid*).

References

- Gyekye, K. (1987). *An essay on African philosophical thoughts: The Akan conceptual scheme*. UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Hountondji, Paulin. (1996). *African philosophy: Myth and reality*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Hountondji, Paulin J. (2004). Knowledge as a development issue. In K. Wiredu (Ed.), *In a Companion to African philosophy*. USA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

- Komo, B. Louis-Dominique. (2017). *The hermeneutical paradigm in African philosophy*. Canada: Ottawa University Press.
- Okere, T. (1983). *A historico-hermeneutical investigation of the conditions of its possibility*. Lanham: University Press of America.
- Okolo, O. (1997). *Tradition and destiny: Horizons of an African philosophical hermeneutics*. In Serequeberhan (Ed.), *African philosophy: The essential reading*. New York: Paragon House.
- Preface to UNESCO 'Recognizing culture: A series of briefing papers on culture and development'
http://www.unesco.org/culture/development/briefings/html_eng/foreword.shtml (accessed 22 May 2020).
- Serequeberhan, T. (1994). *The hermeneutics of African philosophy: horizon and discourse*. New York: Routledge.
- Serequeberhan, T. (2004). *Theory and the actuality of existence: Fanon and Cabral*, In K. Wiredu (Ed.), *A Companion to African Philosophy*. USA: A Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
- Serequeberhan, T. (1991). *African philosophy: The point in question*. In Serequeberhan, T. (Ed.), *African philosophy: The essential readings*. Philosophy. USA: A Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
- Tempels, Placide. (1959). *Bantu philosophy*. Paris: Presence Africaine.
- Towa, M. (1991). *Conditions for the affirmation of a modern African philosophical thought*." In K. Wiredu (Ed.), *African Philosophy: The Essential Reading*. New York: Paragon House.
- Wiredu, Kwasi. 2004. *Introduction: African Philosophy in Our Time*. In K. Wiredu (Ed.), *A companion to African philosophy*. USA: A Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Understanding the Praetorian Rule of Fatah al-Sisi in Egypt

Arshad*

Abstract

Gamal Abdel Nasser established the praetorian regime in 1952. Nasser ruled Egypt with the 'party-state' system to maintain the 'social contract' between the state and the Egyptians. The government thrived on the patrimonial relationship and de-politicization of the population. The 'Egyptian upheaval' in 2011 sought the protection of individuals' rights, equality, and freedom against the military-led praetorian regime. A short-democratic experiment led to the arrival of Islamist majority rule in Egypt under the leadership of President Mohammed Morsi. The liberal-secular oppositions and the military removed President Morsi because Islamists failed to achieve the protesters' aspirations. Egyptians supported the military's rule that led to the election of General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi as President of Egypt. Fatah al-Sisi shifted the dynamics of government from 'party-state' to 'ruler-arbiter' praetorian rule that centralized the authority and power under his leadership through military domination to counter the Islamists and revolutionary aspirations. The research explains the causality behind the Egyptian military's intervention in politics, structuring of the praetorian regime in Egypt; the return of military praetorianism after the removal of President Hosni Mubarak; the rise of the Sisi as 'ruler-arbiter' and its implications on the democratization process. The paper's method is explanatory to study the 'structural' (military) and 'agential' (Sisi's rule) factors to determine the causes of establishing the praetorian 'ruler-arbiter' type Sisi's regime. The approach to examine the ruler-arbiter phenomenon is the 'actor-centric' instead of the 'mechanistic' to understand the praetorian rule in Egypt. The research finds that the rise of the 'ruler-arbiter' regime under the leadership of the Sisi, caused by the military-established praetorian authority and President Sisi's choices and decisions, led to the failure of the democratization in Egypt.

Keywords: *Military, Democratic Transition, Egyptian Revolt, Social Contract, Authoritarianism*

Introduction

A political system with a low level of political institutionalization and an extreme level of political engagement is called the 'praetorian system' in politics (Dobel, 1978, p.966).² A well-established praetorian state gets a license to use violent means, creates more social and political inequalities, destroys the peace, circumvents the justice delivery system, and divides society (Sabine, 1937, p.343). The praetorian rule, thus, is naturally an authoritarian state that survives on the suppression of the violent and non-violent opponents through its most potent institution

* University of Delhi, Delhi, India. Email: arshada8@gmail.com

² The Greek philosophers explained that "the system supported by 'wronged' or 'perverted' constitutions (Aristotle, 2010, p.112). The political decay results in praetorian societies which are without civic culture. Hence, the state is characterized by force, wealth, numbers, and charisma, aptly termed by Machiavelli, a 'corrupt state' (Dobel, 1978, p.966).

called the military. The military in a praetorian state is one of the most critical institutions because such a state enjoys little popular legitimacy (Barany, 2012, p.4).

As a distinct variety of authoritarian political systems, a praetorian state dominates all public spaces and subordinates any competing space that civil society institutions could occupy. The military controlled the state's apparatuses because it converted its generals and co-opted civilian leaders to become part of the 'bureaucratic state' and a considerable force in making the middle class based on patrimonial alliances. It indicates the military's embeddedness in the organizational assembly and the domineering authorities over the state (El Fadl, 2015, p.264). Following the military intervention in politics, officers establish a praetorian rule based on their involvement in the political system. For instance, the 'arbiter regime' imposes a fixed time limit on the military power to make a tacit agreement for the civilian government. It, however, never relinquishes political influence with the excuse that the military will play the role of the 'guardian' of the civilian government to maintain political order. The preponderance of praetorian rule is based on the de-politicization of the society to hunt its personal goals. It means that army generals control all political power because they fear losing their illegal control over the state to legitimate democratic oppositions. Consequently, they diminished citizenship and curbed political identities to abolish the independent political spaces. Thus, the praetorian rulers consider the prolonged absence of 'imaginary' antagonism as evidence of 'social peace' among the conflicting classes and tacit consensus for their policies (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 2013, p.55).

The praetorian regime reduces the political system to a state-party system. In an authoritarian structure, the military 'strongman' becomes the ruler who determines the country's political trajectory. The ruler concentrates all power in his hands prefers the country over the citizens. The perpetual stronghold over the country helped the 'strongman' to appropriate economic, political, and social powers to establish the 'military society.' The military rule is for the projection to the outside world, but inside, a military 'strongman' led 'ruler-arbiter' praetorian regime plays the leading role in a country. The strongman politics becomes the cornerstone of the praetorian rule. The ruler defines the rules of the political game and emasculates the opponents from garnering political power. The result is that a robust ruler-arbiter regime consolidates the praetorian ruling establishment. The survival of the ruler-arbiter regime depends on the permanent fracturing of the political system in weaker segments through matrimonial alliances.

Conceptual Framework

The study aims to examine the phenomenon of ‘praetorian’ rule in the context of Sisi’s regime in Egypt. In identifying two sets of factors: structural (military) and agential (Sisi’s rule), it seeks to explain the extent to which the latter, what Samuel Huntington (1991) calls the ‘causer,’ was responsible for the rise of the praetorian regime since Sisi became President. The study follows the ‘actor-centered approach, which, according to Adam Przeworski (2004), has been a reaction to the ‘mechanistic approach of the new transition process in which individual agency did not get the explanatory weight. It further argued that the leadership skills and the strategic choices could determine the outcome of the transition to democracy, otherwise bounded by what Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (1986, p.19) call ‘structural indeterminacy.’ Therefore, the focus is on the functional saliency of structural factors such as the praetorian rule, societal development that produces the crony capitalism, absence of autonomous entrepreneurial class formation, and economic marginalization of large sections of the population that remained non-conducive for the ‘democratic transition’ in Egypt. The actor or political agency is affected by the ‘balance of power,’ underplayed by social and political forces (Mahoney, 2001, p.131). Given the structural constraints for political actors in the transition period, much depends on their choices, strategies, policy decisions, and style of functioning to utilize the opportunity constructively in an environment that delimits the range of possible actions. In other words, ‘democratic transition’ is a ‘political game’ in which rule is played by ‘wise’ political actors who know what, when, and how to act (Mainwaring, 1989, p.33).

After all, as argued by James Mahoney and Richard Snyder (1999, p.13), "Political actors operate in an environment that delimits the range of possible actions resultant in determining the political outcome." It means that the social conditions or political structures are not the ultimate causal factor; political agents depending on leadership skills can significantly make a democratic transition. It has much to do with what Huntington (1991, p.106) calls ‘causers’ of democracy which corresponds to actors and agents factors.

The Free Officers Movement established the ‘praetorian’ regime in Egypt after toppling the constitutional monarchy in 1952. The low level of political institutionalization, lack of sustained support for political structures, and weak and ineffective political parties pushed the country toward praetorian rule. The new military-led regime followed the ‘ruler’ type model based on a

'party-state' or 'one-party' system, typical of Amos Perlmutter (1974), designated as a praetorian state. The 'party state' is a dominant political system in non-democratic regimes with elite recruitment, candidate nomination, and electoral mobilization (Gunther and Diamond, 2001, p.8). Thus, authorities give less space to opposition parties in the praetorian setup, resulting in elections having no consequences (Hicken & Kuhonta, 2014, p.333). The ruling party flourishes to help the autocratic regime in peaceful succession and manage intra-elite conflicts (Hackenesch, 2018, p.33).

The military remained in perpetual motion during the rule of Sadat and Mubarak because of its entrenched control over Egyptian society and government institutions. A partial political and economic liberalization was allowed under the *Infitah* policy due to the pressure from internal and external political and economic dynamics. Nevertheless, the praetorian structure of the Egyptian state dominated by the military remained the epicenter of power. Therefore, the resultant structural changes in partial liberalization and military intervention in politics during the Mubarak regime failed to maintain Nasser's 'social contract' between the praetorian authority and Egyptians.

Subsequently, after a short democratic experiment during Arab Spring, the military under the leadership of Fatah al-Sisi returned to power. It established a 'ruler-arbiter' type praetorian regime. There was the maximization of the military rule that completed the direct and permanent military control. Sisi projected himself as a 'divinely' ordained leader and sole savior to achieve total control over Egypt to prevent state collapse. The result was that the Sisi-led military regime weakened the constitution, controlled the top brass of the judiciary, amassed the power, and inflicted a brutal crackdown on the Islamists and other oppositions. The government had the unlimited authority to intervene in politics in the name of the 'protection of constitution and democracy' and 'safeguarding the basic components of the state.' Through military domination, Sisi made the 'protection of regime' equivalent to the 'Strong Egypt' and 'Egypt First'. The style of functioning of Sisi was arbitrary by nature that shaped the 'ruler-arbiter' type regime. It focused on the 'agential' factor that prefers the 'agent' over the 'structure' to determine the political transition. As an 'agent,' Sisi instrumentalized the military as a 'structure' to fracture the oppositions, controlled the economic resources, and military officers dominated the government and other institutions. The result of the 'actor-centered' politics of Egypt diminished

the nascent mushrooming of multi-party politics. It subverted the ‘civil associations’ that remained substantially dormant before the Egyptian revolt of 2011. Consequently, the ‘ruler-arbiter’ leadership of Sisi fits into the category of ‘agential’ factor that determined the ‘structural’ dominance of the military in post-Mubarak politics.

The paper’s objectives: (i) to explain military intervention in the politics of the Arab world. (ii) Structuring of the praetorian rule in Egypt to explain the party-state system. (iii) How the praetorian regime controls and manages the economic resources of the state. (iv) The implications of the return of military praetorianism in post-Mubarak Egypt. (v) The rise of Fatah al-Sisi as the ruler-arbiter in post-Arab Spring Egypt. (vi) And the last section will conclude the findings of the paper.

Research Methodology

The research focused on the explanatory method. The research objectives so derived will be tested with systematically and carefully selected data. Much of the available literature related to the 2011 Egyptian uprising and its aftermath provides valuable insights into the factors accounting for the overthrow of three decades of the authoritarian rule of Hosni Mubarak and the structural domination of the military in the post-Mubarak Egyptian politics. However, the ‘agential’ factor did not get much attention that determines the ‘ruler-arbiter’ type praetorian rule of Sisi in the country. The paper focuses on the decisions and choices made by Sisi for deciding the outcome of the transitional process. In this way, the study aims at bridging the gap between the structural ‘causes’ on the one hand and the agential ‘causer’ on the other hand, which corresponds to actors and agential (agency-centered) factors. A combination of both would provide a holistic approach to understand the phenomenon of the ‘praetorian’ rule of Sisi in the case of post-Mubarak Egypt. The approach to examine the ruler-arbiter phenomenon is the ‘actor-centric’ as opposed to the ‘mechanistic’ to understand the praetorian rule in Egypt.

The study relied upon both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources were the translated constitutions of 2012 and 2014 of Egypt, speeches of the Fatah al-Sisi, and Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies Annual Reports, Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies Annual Report, Human Rights Watch Reports, and Freedom House Reports. The secondary sources include books, journal articles, newspapers, unpublished research documents, and other relevant materials published in media from time to time.

Results and Discussion

Explaining the Military's Intervention in Politics in the Arab World

In comparative politics literature, the military in politics is considered a highly contested subject. While some scholars believe it is a positive development contributing to modernization in the newly independent states, others treat it as a significant roadblock in democratic transition. Even in several cases of a new democracy, according to Huntington (1995, p.10), "The removal of authoritarian controls has heightened the communal, ethnic and political tensions; hence, people find stability in militaries." There is, however, a broad agreement among scholars over the interplay of two sets of 'pull' and 'push' factors that account for the military intervention in the political system. The former concerns the military organization's strict professional discipline, arms, and regimentation. Besides, it has a close identification of the military with national interests and prestige. The army met with its interests with the intervention in the corporate sector. The latter includes the structural factors ranging from poor governance, lack of legitimacy, low political culture, ineffective institutions, economic under-development, and absence of consensus regarding the game's rules. The interplay of the 'pull' and 'push' factors establishes the military as the most robust institution of the country to dominate politics.

As Huntington (1985, p.86) has pointed out, two conditions maximize the military's intervention in politics: first, relative supremacy of military officers' power over the civilian political groups within the society. Second, ideologically, professional military ethics is more superior to prevailing political ideologies in society. Likewise, Samuel E. Finer (1988, p.89) maintained, "The propensity of the military to intervene in politics depends primarily on the type of political culture in society and its military institutions."

In any case, the development of military intervention results in two conflicting views. First, armed forces and allies claim that the military as 'guardians' of the republic protected their countries from descending into anarchy. Second, the left and human rights organizations blamed the military for destroying the democratic system to perpetuate their control over the state. Both the narratives became egoistic and adamant about changing their versions because of their own political experiences (Wright, 2007, p.182).

The decolonization process produced the exceptional elasticity of the republics of the Arab world due to their capacity to project themselves as the only stable alternative to instability. This self-

explanatory narrative perfectly fitted the well-entrenched prejudices about the 'oriental despotism' in the strategic relationship with Western allies and other outside partners. It seasoned with a paradoxical anti-Islamist rhetoric: full-fledged dictatorship, or at least authoritarian regimes, was supposed to be the only antidote to an overwhelmingly popular Islamism that would inevitably win any electoral contest (Filiu, 2011, p.73). Against this backdrop, the robust capabilities of the military as an institution to remove the monarchy and its ability to protect its core interests reduced the prospects for the independent political parties and civic associations to survive (Vincent, 2013, p.3). The regime's survival tactics depend on the capacity of the state to defeat the rising opposition.

William Zartman (1993, p.241) argues that "there are several apparatuses of state's forte such as stability, security, capacity, accountability, autonomy, and legitimacy that shape its survival strategy in the Arab World." Further, Joel Migdal (1998, p.19) focused on the "capabilities of states to change in society through state policies, actions, planning, and implementation." Whereas Francis Fukuyama (2004, p.22) argued that the "regime's capacity is the potentiality to frame and execute policies to enforce laws." Similarly, Lisa Anderson (1987, p.2) explained that "those states in which modern administrative constructions are robustly framed and steady are termed strong while supervisions are neither capable nor strong which are incapable of reaching to the population and provide resources through patrimonial alliances are weak." Nevertheless, the decaying of any state's potential components weakens the state's control over the country. Traditionally, the military in the Arab world is devoted to controlling the state to protect its legitimacy. The capability of military regimes is visible as it successfully appoints 'officers' to the institutions of the state. The civilian-decision-making bodies such as the legislature, executive and judiciary, political parties, and even several non-state actors are influenced by military regimes. It has an authoritarian tendency while reacting to the political or social conditions laden with repression rather than dialogue. The military power generates its 'longevity' from the suppression of the opposition. Besides, legitimacy is both a principle of authority and the orientation toward securing electoral support (Perlmutter, 2014, p.13). Thus, in the praetorian state, the possibility of a peaceful transition to democracy is relatively limited and

likely to remain a 'liberalized autocracy.'³ at best to cope with external or internal pressure for systemic change.

Military as an institution does not contribute directly to the improvement of the economy. The military benefitted from controlling the state's resources, produced tremendous military progress, and increased the state machinery and police, making the state stable. The officers entered the ministries, administration, public and private enterprises. They participated in managerial expertise and professional training to increase the military's control over the state's institutions, producing a complex and incompetent bureaucracy. Thus, the military stability faced several problems: declining political legitimacy, increasing social discontent, no consensus over the leadership succession, economic dependence on 'rentier' resources, and external aid that increase the dependency of the fiscal policy on the volatility of international political and economic situations. Thus, it is very likely that in the future, the military regime will deal with serious challenges ranging from the demands of the economic reforms to the removal of the authoritarian leadership.

Consequently, a robust security establishment thrived on a substantial percentage of their Gross National Product (GNP). However, in reality, such spending aims to make the security establishment loyal to the regime to be used as a weapon to intimidate the domestic challenges. As a result, the rules have shown a remarkable propensity by creating multiple security establishments to maintain a vital check and balance (Springborg, 1989, p.97). A solid and repressive *Mukhabarat* state delimits the endurance of authoritarianism. Thus, the Middle East and North Africa region witnesses the durability of autocracy because it relies on repression to maintain the red line in society (Brownlee, 2002, pp.6-14; Kienle, 2001; King, 2003). However, the strategy stabilized the regime for the short term and a continuous rise in expenditure (Bellin, 2004, p.145). External aid becomes the principal lifeline for authoritarian regimes to maximize the logistics and weapons to gain stability. In this sense, the European countries, Russia, China, and the US have played a significant role in strengthening the Arab world's authoritarian regimes. It explains how the coercive apparatus of the establishment has enabled the ruler to

³ The "liberalized autocracy" is a combination of authoritarian and liberalism; elections are usually a 'managed' affair (Brumberg, 2002).

frustrate any chance of democratization, thus, scuttling any hope of even partial political opening. In reverse, military rule thrives in the region.

Structuring the Praetorian Rule in Egypt

President Gamal Abdel Nasser utilized the weak political institutionalization to dismantle the networks of the old *latifundia* class⁴ Nasser enforced the military's control over the parliament, executive, and judicial branches of the government, business bourgeoisie, the intrusive monarchy, and the interference of colonial Britain. Besides, the 'social contract' established the patrimonial network in the education, media, syndicates, labor unions, rural institutions, and religious institutions. Patrimonialism was the basis for the economic redistribution that had two implications. First, it institutionalized the patron-client relationship. Second, it denied the liberalization of the political system. The lack of an independent political culture helped Nasser monopolize 'legitimate' political activity in Egypt (Gorman, 2006, p.112). The military controlled the state's authority to facilitate the nationalization of the economy and the secularization of the society (Halpern, 1963, p.3). The army became the most organized and unified national standard-bearer institution, while the rest remained negligent and unproductive (Perlmutter, 1974, p.60). Thus, the military's domination over the middle classes created power disequilibrium in Egypt, tilted towards the military (El Fadl, 2013, p.306).

President Anwar Sadat introduced partial liberalization in the economic and political sectors under the 'corrective revolution' banner in 1971. Sadat launched the multi-party system to create a plethora of political parties that outwardly looked 'liberal' and multifarious in terms of political leaning. Inwardly, it meant for the pre-emption of any political threat to Sadat's political authority. The result was the formation of several political parties (Arab Socialist Rally (ASR), the Liberal Socialists, and National Progressive Unionists (Tagammu)), including Sadat's National Democratic Party (NDP). It means that the possibility for transition through the ballot box remained bleak (Brumberg, 2002, p.58). Egypt, therefore, was termed as 'liberalized autocracy' that faced the constant threat of broad-based mobilization under the Islamist organization against the regime. Thus, the military-led state's inherent contradiction or structural

⁴ An absentee old-landowning class provided the tremendous military scope to intervene in politics regularly (Mohapatra, 2008, p.285).

ambiguity creates an unstable political equilibrium that eventually leads to full-fledged repression or transition to democracy (Przeworski, 1991).

The assassination of Sadat by radical Islamists created a power vacuum, filled by the referendum that voted Hosni Mubarak to become President of Egypt in 1981. Mubarak co-opted Defense Minister Field Marshal Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala, who later became the deputy Prime Minister in 1982 (Tartter, 1991, p.305).⁵ He also kept Field Marshal Muhammad Husayn Tantawi commander of the military (Springborg, 1989, p.98).⁶ Therefore, the military suffered from ‘rank disequilibrium, a ‘psychological dissonance’ that blowout among members of an organization whose place became at odds with their novel responsibilities. The military turned into a garrison army, and *Mukhabarat* and the police controlled the state (Karawan, 2004, p.25).

At the organizational level, *Mukhabarat* is a ‘power triumvirate,’ comprising of General Investigation Directorate (GID)/State Security Investigations Services (SSIS)/Homeland Security, Office of the President for Information and Military Intelligence Department (MID). A mighty pyramid of complex intelligence and security establishment became the backbone of Egypt’s new political order (Vatikiotis, 1978, p.164-65). President Mubarak was the head of the Supreme Council of the Police (SCP) (Brumberg & Sallam, 2011, p.6). Mubarak unleashed the police-led war against citizens to destroy the crumbling Nasser’s era ‘social contract.’ The police torture moved beyond the frequent practices to a standard behavior to target citizens rather than the activists to extract the confessions. The method of repression sharpened when the Ministry of Interior (MoI) officials hired petty criminals to intimidate and shove opponents (Mann, 1986, p.173).⁷ The US State Department's 2006 Human Rights report exposed that there was a “culture of impunity in the security sector; citizens had become a practically fair game” (Cordesman, 2006, p.192).

⁵ Under Ghazala, the military's growing involvement in Egypt's industrial, defense, and agriculture sectors offset the military's diminishing role in politics.

⁶ A 'controlled' system was engineered by Mubarak, based on the appropriation of financial rewards and a post-retirement career for officers who remained loyal to the regime (Kamrava, 2000, p.16).

⁷ The new technologies enhanced security agencies power, as has been put by Michael Mann that "technological advancement enables the generation of new state structures" (Mann, 1986, p.173).

Mubarak offered a degree of liberalization and controlled democratization that allowed opposition parties banned under Sadat to rejoin the political arena. Besides, the regime continued with the emergency law to suppress the Islamists and genuine oppositions (Hosseinioun, 2015, p.58).⁸ The party activity during Mubarak consisted of issuing a weekly or monthly publication. Only during elections, parties used to conduct rallies and meetings. It was a clear sign of the absence of democratic culture (Sivan, 2000, p.71). The electoral system became the regime's instrument to promote, co-opt new elites, and appease dissent from elite groups. By the end of the 1990s, the Egyptian government continued unbroken and reserved its strength to regulate outcomes *ex-post* (Okar, 2005, p.22). The 'trappings of democracy' and selective repression disintegrated political parties. The segmented political system, further consolidated by the government's support for internal conflict and factionalism in the opposition parties (Al-Wafd, Nasserist, Socialist Labor, Liberal, and Al-Ghad), crippled their ability to challenge the regime coherently (Shehata, 2010, p.34).⁹ Also, opposition leaders were nervous because of the fear of suppression in appropriating the masses' support to meet their political demands. Mubarak's rule, West alliance, and opponents' threats created an 'iron cage of liberalism' (Ritter, 2015, p.45).

The weakness of the political opponents allowed Mubarak to follow the 'one-party system led by the National Democratic Party (NDP). Sadat established NDP in 1976, but it remained the country's dominant political party till 2011. The dominance of NDP marginalized the military's role in politics. The NDP¹⁰ and business people were the central part of the government's most robust base among the social classes (Kandil, 2012, p.174). Only NDP-dominated Political Parties Committee gave other parties licenses for recognition (Zaki, 2007, p.51). The NDP always dominated Egypt's representative institutions by gaining 75-90 percent of the seats in all Parliament elections. The leadership of the party was either in the hands of the traditional guard

⁸ Stripped of their political and social agency, the people of Egypt were mere subjects, not citizens, as stipulated within their constitution (Hosseinioun, 2015, p.58).

⁹ Mubarak established a formidable apparatus akin to the Benthamite panopticon, constantly intimidating opponents in the hope of quashing any form of dissent (Heydarian, 2014, p.27). Despite the regime's prevalent oppression, it received financial aid maintaining the status quo established by Camp David Accord in 1979 from the EU and USA (Bome, 2015, p.23).

¹⁰ National Democratic Party (NDP) held a massive logistical advantage over its opponents through state control of most newspapers and all broadcasting news outlets NDP (Ayubi, 1989, p.13)

and technocrats. Mubarak's son Gamal Mubarak was a banker and became the NDP's deputy secretary (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011, September 22).

Under Gamal, a state-business nexus run the regime with the help of the 'state-party'-NDP, business, and state cronies, MOI Habib al-Adli, cabinet members, and individuals (newspapers editors, directors of state-owned media, intellectuals, and university professors in the NDP Policies Committee), internal security services and the bureaucracy (Shahin, 2013, p.64). They depicted that Egypt is an emerging market and democracy. Thus, the entrenched praetorian regime remained insulated from any outside threat. However, the vertical differences between the military and the aging Mubarak nevertheless created irreversible conflict. During the 2011 popular uprising, the result was that the army focused on securing its core interests rather than saving the Mubarak regime.

Praetorian Rule Controls Economic Resources

In a typical praetorian state, the military is a multi-functional organization with political and economic roles (Wilfried, 2007, p.8). Generally, the military runs state-owned enterprises and private companies: the senior or retired military officers involved in the business (Picard, 1988, p.142). The military's involvement in the economy provides self-reliance and the civil structures to institutionalize the state so that the state security apparatus becomes part of people's economic and social welfare (Frisch, 2001, p.106). National security became the central point to utilize the economic resources to protect the military's privileges. Even emergency law remained in force to prevent any monitoring of the military's financial assets by legislation and the press.

The *Infitah* (opening) policy (1974) initiated partial economic liberalization that replaced Nasser's distributive 'social contract.' It reoriented the military at the center of national economic development (Gotowicki, 1999, p.116). Besides, the military discreetly controlled and managed its resources, labeled by critics as the 'black box' in Egypt (Sennott, 2012, January 2). Sadat founded Egypt as a dependent state. It was the non-developing, de-industrialized, and haphazardly liberalized state; Mubarak only followed in his footsteps (Kandil, 2012, p.161). Egypt made a strong alliance with the USA that expanded the economic leverage of a faction of elites at the cost of the dismantled Nasser era 'social contract'. Mubarak implemented the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) that produced adverse outcomes due to the corruption and

‘red-tapism’ in bureaucracy (Basheer, 1999, p.14). As a result, Egypt became a corrupt police state par excellence.

Simultaneously, the military kept its interests secured by getting support from abroad and domestic private sectors regarding funding, technology, and joint ventures. Thus, the military itself had become part of the global business process. Now the top-notch retired and serving officers got involved in the lucrative business sector. Most governors and mayors were ex-military officers and appointed many retired officers as directors and managers of private companies (El Fadl, 2013, p.306).¹¹ The military planned to accumulate capital with the help of the private sector to create a new faction of the ruling class that did not focus on the economic production in the country (Joya, 2020, p.2). The military links with the neoliberal global economic order that perpetuated coercive apparatuses of the state against democratic practices and processes. Mubarak gave his son Gamal Mubarak a free hand to run the economy. A new class of young entrepreneurs sprung up under Gamal, who had created companies and factories in all sectors of the economy. The economy was improving steadily; yet, the middle class and the youth did not get any legitimate part of the benefits that ultimately escalated the socio-economic tensions in Egypt.

Mubarak preferred stability over the country’s economic development that reduced the chances of the emergence of a ‘reform-minded entrepreneurial class’ in Egypt (Povey, 2016, p.7). Later, as Mubarak’s policy of ‘provider’ of material benefits affected the economy’s decline, he started cutting off the subsidies. However, to ensure social cohesion, Mubarak had to rely on bribery and coercion. Unlike the oil-rich gulf countries, the republican military-led regimes are not rich in energy resources to earn petro-dollars. Mubarak’s regime, thus, faced resource limitations where it had to use the resources to co-opt big business, military, security service, regime intellectuals, and bureaucracy to sustain the praetorian system. The result was that most Egyptians had no access to essential economic resources. Besides, citizens faced regular violence and repression in the name of counter-terrorism. The prevailing situation made Egypt an unstable society, sitting on the regime’s brutal praetorian rule, exposed to the reaction of disgruntled Egyptians. The demand for stability rather than reform descended Egypt into chaos as the underground social,

¹¹ For instance, Oriental Weavers has retired army officers as its board of directors and managers (El Fadl, 2013, p.306).

political, economic differences came to the surface and created a sharp dividing line vertically and horizontally among different sections of Egyptian society (Cook, 2012, p.40).

Return of Military Praetorianism in Post-Mubarak Egypt

President Mubarak's thirty years of desire for stability became synonymous with instability. After a powerful popular uprising against Mubarak and the series of repressive measures by the regime against the protestors, on February 11, 2011, he resigned and left the military to rule under the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). The SCAF assumed control of the state on February 10, 2011, by retaining the presidency, police, Mubarak's propaganda arm, the Ministry of Information, and his coercive instruments. Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi headed the SCAF (Azzam, 2012, p.2). Egypt's generals opted to back the uprising with a discreet roadmap. The country's military elites hedged their bets by quietly advancing its position in the government and simultaneously detaining, abusing, or enabling the police to assault protestors. It showed that Egypt had a political class and a 'deep state' with considerable experience in keeping control.

The SCAF structured its 'arbiter' role through a 'constitutional decree' that helped secure its core interests (budget, autonomy, and no presence of rival and military survival) by keeping the authority intact. The SCAF shaped and directed but even distorted the transition process because it kept the majority of the decision-making power at its disposal. The generals had identified the 'fault' line between the opposition on the identities of 'secular' and 'Islamist' confrontation. They successfully manipulated the divisions to position themselves as the ruler to decide Egypt's future of political transition.

The praetorian nature of SCAF was revealed when it implemented the paradoxical policies: first, it sided with the revolution from January 25 to February 11, 2011, and then it resisted any significant political reforms except dissolution of parliament and scrapping of the old constitution. Besides, the army used excessive violence against the advocates of democracy to deploy the same old methods of military police and intelligence apparatus (Said, 2012, pp.398-99). The military successfully took control over the transition because civilian political actors had a relative weakness and fragmentation. It was also a product of the strength provided by the military's legacy, based on its longstanding centrality in modern Egypt's historiography and its

rich endowment of political and economic resources (Springborg, 2013, p.94).¹² The SCAF continued with the neo-liberal economic policies to secure its financial interests.

The repression remained the primary weapon to muzzle the dissent despite the change of leadership in Egypt. This problem was brought to the fore by the Cairo Institute of Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) in its report, where it exposed that “the pillars and policies of the autocratic Mubarak regime had not been removed; security establishment had neither purged nor reformed; victims of the human rights abuses were not given justice in post-Mubarak Egypt, and a civil and democratic state was not established by a constitution that set the governance rules and delineates their prerogatives (2011, p.84).” Besides CIHRS, the Nadeem Center and the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) drafted reports on human rights situations, provided legal assistance, observed elections, promoted democratic values, and pressurized regime to modify the Egyptian laws.

In the post-Mubarak political system, Muslim Brotherhood (MB) became the dominant political force. SCAF, eventually allied with MB, marginalized other political forces, notably the secular liberals and leftists. Under the new Constitution, Parliamentary elections were held in January 2012. The MB won the majority seats to form the government and committed to the business-friendly neo-liberal economic policy and an agreement to deal respectfully with the army. All this revealed that both had set for cohabitation to forge an unholy alliance in the government.

Despite the newly emerged consensus, the ruling MB and military fought to retain control over the state institutions reflected the ‘competitive authoritarianism.’ In 2011, the military launched a supplementary constitutional declaration to overtly grab extra-constitutional rights to reinforce its prerogatives to defend the constitution against the civilian presidency. The newly elected President, Mohammed Morsi, appointed Fatah Al-Sisi as the new Defense Minister, a SCAF member. The MB advanced its power at the expense of secular-liberal factions during Morsi’s Presidency. The power-sharing between Islamist and SCAF terminated with the collapse of the National Assembly in July 2012 by the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) on excluding liberal and secular sections of society.

¹² For instance, SCAF invited MB member Sobhi Saleh to become a member of the Constitutional Committee formed by the SCAF while excluding the representatives from secular parties or revolutionary youth groups.

In the meantime, President Morsi's constitutional decree on November 22, 2012, helped MB sign the constitution. The result was that the 'Islamist-dominated constitutional assembly' passed the constitutional draft on November 30, 2012. The focus was now on *Sharia Law* as the primary tenant for running the government and society (Hussein, 2012, November 30). Indeed, the idea of Islamization of the governance did not go well with the 'secular' praetorian military and intelligentsia. Besides, the revolutionary youth organizations that were secular rejected the Islamization of politics.

Consequently, oppositions, including National Salvation Front (NSF), April 6 Youth Movement, and Coptic Christian Church, spearheaded the protest under the banner of the 'Tamarod' (rebel) group, comprising mainly young pro-democracy activists against Morsi for enforcing an Islamist agenda in the country. Fearing theocracy, some appealed to the military, led by General Sisi, who duly launched a coup on July 3, 2013, and ordered the arrest of Morsi. The military undermined the political transition by a new referendum in 2014 in which Egyptians voted for Sisi to become the new President of Egypt.

The Rise of Fatah al-Sisi as 'Ruler-Arbiter'

Abdel Fatah al-Sisi was groomed into a personality cult before his announcement for the presidential election. He acquired several prominent political positions: the deputy Prime Minister, the in-charge of national security, and the Defense Minister. The military needed a strong leader in post-Mubarak politics. Sisi's increasing sway over Egypt made him a de-facto 'strongman' of the country. Following the tradition of his predecessors (Sadat and Mubarak), who went to the US to take military training and improving relationships, Sisi revamped the partnership with Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump to acquire the economic and military aids. The increasing lack of legitimacy from the Egyptians pushed the military to gain legitimacy from the external actors, mainly the US, to consolidate Egypt's military rule.

Sisi followed two choices to stabilize the country: One, Egypt was put at the center rather than its people while dismantling the memories of the revolution. The impact of the 2011 Arab uprising has unraveled the 'political awakening' of the masses that had a very deep-rooted leaning for their political emancipation from the military. Consequently, under Sisi's rule, the freedom of the Egyptians faced gruesome constraints because the regime feared that the people could lead to the expansion of democratic forces at the cost of the reversal of military rule. Second, Sisi sought

economic development with the authoritarian tendency. The armed forces and the western counterparts of the regime ignored the brutal repression of political and social freedoms and gross violations of human rights. The improvement of the economy was based on neoliberal reforms to meet the basic needs of the Egyptians. The plan was to revive the ‘social contract’ of the Nasser era. Still, it remained in limbo because, in the neo-liberal economy, the desire of ‘business class’ for profit-making did not improve the conditions of the masses that toppled Mubarak from power.

General Sisi applied the ‘divide and rule policy to deepen the fraction in the widespread opposition group (seculars-liberals, leftists, revolutionary youth fronts, moderate and extreme religious groups). Along with the military and the relics of Mubarak’s coterie, in July 2013, launched a roadmap with the support from Sheikh of Al-Azhar, Pope Tawadros II Coptic Church, National Salvation Front, and Salafist Al-Nour Party. Subsequently, the military dismantled *Tahrir Square* to erase the ‘memories’ of the 2011 Egyptians uprising. The government erected a new dismal and remarkably unspectacular monument just after the military takeover. It reflected much about how the counter-revolution wished *Tahrir* to (not) be remembered (Bayat, 2017, p.133). Subsequently, the General Directorate of State Security Investigations Service (GDSSIS) was renamed Homeland Security in 2013. Now it was the leading organization that dealt with domestic security matters. The GDSSIS was a clandestine and pervasive organization aimed to use repressive measures to target any opposition, including liberals and seculars that demanded the fundamental rights of freedom and equality of individuals.

The MB-led protest swept the streets of Egypt against the ‘soft coup.’ The military quickly took control of the media and censored footage of pro-Morsi demonstrations aired by private satellite channels. In Khaled Abou Al-Fadl’s words, “By stepping in to remove an unpopular president, the Egyptian army re-affirmed a despotic tradition in the Middle East where army officers decide what the country needs, and they always know best” (2012, July 7). Sisi came out publicly at the graduation ceremony for the Navy and Air Defence academies. He said that “I told him (Morsi) six months ago that his project is not working out and that he should go back on it before it is too late” (Egypt Independent, 2013, July 24). The generals’ undoubtedly fear was that MB leaders reinforced the free market economy based on neo-liberal policies that would weaken the

military's monopoly over its resources. Thus, according to Talal Asad (2012, p.276), "the SCAF was motivated by various pressures: the ever-active radical revolutionaries; the increasing political landscape of MB; the financial and diplomatic maneuvering of the USA and Saudi Arabia and its institutional privileges."

The military shut down Islamists satellite channels, including *Al-Jazeera*, *Mubashir Misr*, and the Brotherhood's *Misr 25*, stations like *al-Hafiz* and *Al-Nas*, as the regime blamed them for supporting violence (Mustafa, 2013, July 5). Besides, the military used repressive measures to clear the MB supporters' streets, resulting in the killings of protestors at Rabaa Al-Adawiya Mosque and Nahda Square. (Al-Arian, 2014, August 14). On November 24, 2013, the regime launched a new decree to target the April 6 Movement and its leaders Ahmed Maher and Mohammed Adel (Kingsley, 2014, March 14). However, the pro-state media supported it, but the human rights organizations outrightly criticized it at national and international levels.

Egypt adopted the new constitution in January 2014 to strengthen the military, police, and judiciary. The army became the central political authority, and Egypt's coercive institutions (police and security agencies) reconsolidated society's dominance. A new counter-terrorism clause entrusted the military and security agencies with sweeping powers. The military now grabbed the power to veto the election for eight years of Defence Minister position (Kingsley, 2014, January 18; Maugiron, 2016). Sisi imposed a life ban on religious, political activity that further marginalized MB and other Islamist organizations. The SCC and the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) had judicial sovereignty to conduct the critical assignment in appointing, transferring, and promoting the judges (Brown & Dunne, 2013, December 4). The military, however, authored the constitution to increase the judiciary's power to purge the protestors. The judges became the extended hands of the generals to punish the oppositions, particularly MB and youth. At the surface level, the text of the constitution remained pro-freedom. Still, it catered to the corporate interests of the state bureaucracies, more than ever shielded from civil society's interference in their dealings. The post-coup constitution confirmed the military budget's complete secrecy and unlimited freedom to exercise authority with total control over the judiciary.

General Sisi resigned from the military position on March 26, 2014, to run for President. The regime and opposition already accepted him as the dominant character in the military-led post-MB provisional authority. Even Sisi became the entity of cult-like prevalent devoutness while

displaying proficiency as a ‘political tactician.’ The shift was visible in Sisi’s speeches on media platforms and election campaigns where he focused on ‘Strong Egypt’ and ‘Long Live Egypt.’ As a President of Egypt, Sisi stressed the restoration of *haybat al-dawla* (the fear/respect of state) to eliminate terrorism. The regime projected a ‘welfare-populist’ image of Sisi that promised to improve housing, agriculture, education, poverty-stricken areas, and boosting employment (Yossef & Cerami, 2015, p.18). With no legislature in place following his election, Sisi ruled by decree of October 2014. The regulation positioned all public and vital facilities under military jurisdiction, resulting in the transfer of thousands of protesters’ trials in the military courts with usually fabricated charges and was denied to provide the ‘due process of law’ mechanism.

Egypt employed several repressive laws and draconian tactics to impede any protest that could challenge the regime's stability. The Sisi’s government extended its crackdown to secular, Islamists and liberal parties, individuals, and journalists. The authority widened the scope of repressive laws to include labor strikes, traffic disruptions, and the spread of false information. The repressive measures bolstered the state's grip on power by further eroding judicial independence and imposing suffocating restrictions on the media, NGOs, trade unions, political parties, independent groups, and activists.

Sisi successfully consolidated his authority because there was no unified leadership of the opposition movement; many leaders had different goals. The moderate Al-Azhar and the minority Coptic Church faced insecurity both from the regime's suppression tactics and the threat of the *Brotherhoodization* by the Islamists. The result was that Al-Azhar and Coptic Church supported the Sisi that increased the legitimacy of his regime. The claim for supporting Sisi was to prevent the bloodshed on the streets and conduct free and fair elections. Besides, the religious blocs, Ahmed al-Tayeb and Pope Tawadros II wanted to secure their positions in their community against the fear of military intervention (Fahim, 2014, July 4; Al Anani, 2020, July 20). Therefore, both supported Sisi-led military-security apparatuses to dislodge the MB from power.

The ultra-Islamist Salafists supported Morsi’s ouster because they wanted to create their political space in the post-Mubarak fluid political landscape. Sisi backed the uprising against Morsi. MB blamed him for waging war against Islam. Therefore, Sisi welcomed the Salafists to discredit the claims of MB. With the support of the state, Salafists were successful in maintaining a

significant presence in the mosque despite the regular demands from secular and liberal Egyptians to ban their presence (Emam, 2018, January 28). The secular-democratic April 6 Movement supported the Sisi to strengthen democracy, secularism, social justice, and free and fair elections against Morsi's Islamization plan of the Egyptian state (Carr, 2012, April 6). However, after the coup, the regime targeted the youth movement and banned its leaders from political participation. The repression started with MB, spreading to the April 6 Movement, journalists, Al-Jazeera, youth, and gays. Currently, Egypt has kept twenty thousand political prisoners. There was a restriction on gathering more than ten people publicly, the imposition of false charges, hefty penalty and fine on protestors for their anti-regime political statements, and issuing mass death sentences to MB members (Human Rights Watch, 2013, November 26).

President Sisi came with a plan to protect the interests of the military; therefore, he did nothing to bridge the ideological differences as a divided opposition was conducive to the survival of the military's rule. Sisi has returned the military to the forefront of the political system by implementing authoritarian measures to refute the democratic gains of the Arab upheaval. Sisi projected the threat of *Brotherhoodization* of Egypt to influence the liberals and seculars to support the military. The result was that it was easy for the military to reverse the initial democratic progress made during the revolt against Mubarak and established the domination of the 'one-party' led by the 'ruler-arbiter' praetorian military (Esposito, Sonn & Voll, 2015, p.230).

President Sisi openly selected a severe political model by announcing that "democracy is a luxury the country cannot yet afford and that the constitution, while good, cannot be implemented immediately" (Emir, 2015, June 8). He emphasized that the priority must be to restore security and rebuild a robust Egyptian state, and citizens must sacrifice their interests to those of the state. Besides, Sisi ensured that the media sector remained submissive, suppressed human rights organizations, foreign scholars barred, domestic critics, arrested, state-imposed surveillance on electronic communications to move within and outside Egypt, and some even forced exile. Consequently, the competitive norms in parliamentary elections replaced violent tactics to terminate any potent opposition from political organizations, media, and civil society.

The culture of repression against oppositions had a typical pattern followed by all authoritarian regimes, including Egypt. Under Fatah al-Sisi rule, it became an indispensable plan to achieve

the state's regime's existence and order. Repression was the inherent part of the structure of power. It became the backbone of the authoritarian regime when it could not garner any more legitimacy from the society. Repressive measures were employed when positive outcomes surpassed the invested costs. It was a well-established fact that withholding power was the decisive expected benefit to survive the rule (Joshua & Edel, 2014, p.4). The emergency law has remained in place since October 2014. The civil society faced massive repression by the police that curtailed Egypt's civil and political rights (Teti, Abbott & Cavatorta, 2018, p.7).

President Sisi also targeted the recently opened public spaces for gays and women in post-Mubarak politics. With the collapse of the democratic experiment, the police and security forces did witch-hunting of gays and women on the charges of homosexuality because they were the torchbearers of the Egyptian revolution. The state-sponsored media and pro-government private media created a supremacist image of Sisi. The media exalted General Sisi as the 'lion of Egypt' and the nation's 'real man' (El-Shenawi, 2020, May 20). These features of Sisi denoted the establishment of 'strongman' politics in Egypt. Regular propaganda was launched that depicted gays as 'female-like or 'half man.' It indeed served the new national chauvinist narrative that the post-Morsi counter-revolutionaries championed patriarchal sensibilities and conservative religiosity of the Egyptian society. In 2014, the Egyptian Ministries of Youth and Endowments (Religious Affairs) created a national plan to combat the atheist phenomenon through education, religious, and psychological means (Bayat, 2017, p.184). The plan was to perpetuate the uniformity in Egyptian society, driven by military-dominated hyper-nationalism devoid of any space of alternative thinking.

President Sisi successfully appointed loyal professionals and patrimonial-oriented officers in government institutions to establish a deep-seated societal network of the military elites. Only the military's privileges and officers had no accountability towards the citizens and society. Sisi also granted himself the power to dismiss the heads of state's auditing bodies in a 2015 decree. Recently, President Sisi amended the constitution to rule until 2030, explaining that the ruler-arbiter praetorian regime in Egypt reconsolidated itself.

Conclusion

The paper has attempted to explain the structural and agential factors that account for the military's persistence to intervene in politics to shape the trajectory of democratization in Egypt.

The military is the most powerful institution in post-colonial countries with all the military might and rentier economies, including external aid. The result is that the army has established patrimonial alliances with the masses through the vast networks of exchanges of resources that bind society to remain de-politicized, coupled with the series of repressive measures to contain any kind of oppositions to the generals. The low level of political institutionalization and high level of patron-client relationship based on informal networks and patrimonialism helped the military monopolize over the 'legitimacy' to become the sole authority of the Egyptian state. Military leaders allowed partial liberalization and controlled democratization to challenge the genuine oppositions that made Egypt 'liberalized autocracy.' The dominant one-party system became the source of political legitimacy for the regime under the leadership of the National Democratic Party (NDP). A nexus of NDP, business, and political cronies created the rule under Mubarak that was liberal in its outlook but deeply repressive against the domestic opponents. Thus, the military became the center of power, based on officers-led praetorian politics. The complex control system, therefore, sustained the praetorian rule in Egypt. It was produced by Nasser and Sadat and carried forward by Mubarak.

The popular uprising against the autocratic Mubarak regime set off the political transition. After toppling Mubarak's government, the united opposition lost in the transition process. It did not realize that it was not only Mubarak and the repressive police system that was part of the counter-revolutionary forces. But it was also the profoundly military-ruled Nasser's 'praetorian' state that dominated the Egyptian state and society from behind the curtain. The secular-liberal opposition and Islamists failed to forge a consensus that allowed the military to fill the political void to stabilize the country under the leadership of Sisi.

Nevertheless, the magic of *Tahrir* and *Taghir* removed Mubarak. However, the uprising made no concrete transformation toward a democratic transition in terms of 'structural' changes. Therefore, Egypt witnessed a 'half revolution.'

The 'ruler-arbiter' regime now dominated the executive because the military remained its primary source of support. President Sisi did not revive the NDP to accumulate political power under the party-state system. Instead, Sisi became the only source of authority and power that protected the state. Any alternative source of information, dialogue, and ideas from non-military sources is considered anti-state and anti-Sisi in Egypt. It resulted in the complete crushing of the

independent civil society and individual freedom, which led to the consolidation of the robust praetorian rule, based on the ruler-arbiter model that is the sole driver of strongman politics Sisi. The breakdown of the democratization process attributed more to the persistence of the structure of the old military-led control, directed by the agential-driven leadership of the Sisi. Therefore, the combination of structural and agential factors created the praetorian 'ruler-arbiter' regime that restricted any democratic transition. To remove the democratically elected President Morsi, Sisi showed the commitment to protect the democratization from Islamists and authoritarian tendencies. It pushed the democratic change to 'democratic backsliding.' Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report mentioned that "Egypt Not Free" in 2017 due to the sharp decline in press freedom, net freedom, political and civil rights. The return of the military under the leadership of Sisi as the ultimate 'arbiter' revealed what Guillermo O'Donnell calls 'sudden death' of democratization in Egypt.

References

- Al-Anani, K. (2020, July 20). All the dictator's Sheikhs. *Foreign policy*.
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/20/all-the-dictators-sheikhs/>.
- Al-Arian, A. (2014, August 14). The terror metanarrative and the Rabaa massacre. *Oxford University Press's Academic Insights for the Thinking World*.
<https://blog.oup.com/2014/08/terror-metanarrative-rabaa-massacre/>.
- Anderson, L. (1987). The state in the Middle East and North Africa. *Comparative Politics*, 20(1): 1-18. <https://doi.org/10.2307/421917>.
- Aristotle. (2010). *Politics*, Translated by L. Carnes, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Asad, T. (2012). Fear and the ruptured state: Reflections on Egypt after Mubarak. *Social Research*, 79(2): 271-298. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23350066>.
- Ayubi, N. (1989). Government and the state in Egypt today. In C. Tripp., & R. Owen. (Ed.), *Egypt under Mubarak* (pp.1-21). London: Routledge.
- Azzam, M. (May 2012). Egypt's military council and the transition to democracy. House Briefing Paper: Middle East and North Africa Programme, *Chatham House*, No.2. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Middle%20East/bp0512_azzam.pdf.
- Barany, Z. (2012). *The soldier and the changing state: Building democratic armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Basheer, T. (1999). The Egyptian state in transition. In P. Marr (Ed.), *Egypt at Crossroads: Domestic Stability and Regional Role* (pp.3-17). Washington DC: National Defense University Press.
- Bayat, A. (2017). *Revolutions without revolutionaries: Making sense of the Arab Spring*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- Bome, SM (2015). The roots of authoritarianism in the Middle East. In J. Karakoc (Ed.), *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Before and After the Uprisings* (pp.7-37). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Brown, N., & Dunne, M. (2013, December 4). *Egypt's draft constitution rewards the military*

- and judiciary. *Carnegie Endowment*. <http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/12/04/egypt-s-draft-constitution-rewards-military-and-judiciary-pub-53806>.
- Brownlee, J. (2002). Democratization in the Arab world?: The decline of pluralism in Mubarak's Egypt. *Journal of Democracy*, 13(4): 6-14.
- Brumberg, D., & Sallam, Hesham. (October 2011). *The politics of security sector reform in Egypt*. Special Report: *United States Institute of Peace*.
- Brumberg, D. (2002). Democratization in the Arab world? The trap of liberalized autocracy. *Journal of Democracy*, 13(4): 58-68. [10.1353/jod.2002.0063](https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0063).
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (September 22, 2011). "National Democratic Party", <https://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/22/national-democratic-party-pub-54805>.
- Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (2011). *Fractured walls: New horizons: Human rights in the Arab region*," Annual Report 2011. <https://www.cihrs.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/the-report-e.pdf>.
- Carr, Sarah. (2012, April 6). Profile: April 6, Genealogy of a Youth Movement. *Egypt Independent*. <https://egyptindependent.com/profile-april-6-genealogy-youth-movement/>.
- Cook, A. S. (2012). *The struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cordesman, A.H. (2006). *Arab-Israeli military forces in an era of asymmetric wars*. Westport: Praeger Security International.
- Dobel, J. P. (1978). The corruption of a state. *The American Political Science Review*, 72(3): 958-973. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1955114>.
- Egypt, Independent. (2013, July 24). Excerpts from general Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's speech. <http://www.egyptindependent.com/excerpts-general-abdel-fattah-al-sisi-s-speech/>.
- El Fadl, K. A. (2015). Failure of revolution: The military, secular intelligentsia and religion in Egypt's pseudo-secular state. In L. Sadiki (Ed.), *Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring: Rethinking Democratization* (pp.253-271). London: Routledge.
- El-Fadl, K. A. (2013, July 7). The perils of a people's coup. *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/08/opinion/the-perils-of-a-peoples-coup.html>.
- El-Fadl, K.A. (2013). The praetorian state in the Arab spring. *Journal of International Law*, 34 (2): 305-314. <https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss2/1>.
- El-Shenawi, Eman. (2020, May 20). Brand Sisi sweeps Egypt as sweet triggers glorify army General. *Al-Arabiya*. <https://english.alarabiya.net/perspective/features/2013/09/10/Egypt-s-Top-Gun-have-the-masses-created-a-brand-Sisi->
- Emir, N. (2015, June 8). *Al-Sisi is pushing Egypt away from democracy: US Report*. *Daily News*. <https://dailynewsegypt.com/2015/06/08/al-sisi-is-pushing-egypt-away-from-democracy-us-report/>.
- Esposito, J.L., Sonn, T., & Voll, O. L., (2015). *Islam and democracy after the Arab spring*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fahim, J. (2014, July 4). Egypt's copts may soon regret supporting Sisi. *Al-Monitor*. <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2014/07/egypt-coptic-christians-sisi-secular-islamist.html>
- Filiu, J.P. (2011). *The Arab revolution: Ten lessons from the democratic uprising*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Finer, S.E. (1988). *The man on the horseback: The role of the military in politics*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Freedom House. (2017). *Populist and autocrats: The dual threat to global democracy*.

- Washington DC: Freedom House.
- Frisch, H. (2001). Guns and butter in the Egyptian army. *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 5(2): 1-14.
- Fukuyama, F. (2004). The imperative of state-building. *Journal of Democracy*, 15(2): 17-31. <https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-imperative-of-state-building/>.
- Gorman, A. (2006). *Historians, state and politics in twentieth-century Egypt: Contesting the nation*. London: Routledge.
- Gotowicki, S.H. (1999). The military in Egyptian society. In P. Marr (Ed.), *Egypt at Crossroads: Domestic Stability and Regional Role* (pp.105-129). Washington DC: National Defense University Press.
- Gunther, R. & Diamond, L. (2001). Types and functions of parties. In L. Diamond & R. Gunther (ed.), *Political Parties and Democracy*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Hackenesch, C. (2018). *The EU and China in African authoritarian regimes: Domestic politics and governance reforms*. Bonn: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Halpern, M. (1963). *The politics of social change in the Middle East and North Africa*. Washington DC: Rand Corporation.
- Hicken, A. & Kuhonta, E.M. (2014). *Party system institutionalization in Asia: Democracies, autocracies, and the shadows of the past*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hosseinioun, M. (2015). Reconceptualizing resistance and reform in the Middle East. In Fawaz A. Gerges (Ed.), *Contentious Politics in the Middle East: Popular Resistance and Marginalized Activism beyond the Arab Uprisings* (pp.51-75). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Human Rights Watch. (2013, November 26). *Egypt: Deeply restrictive new assembly law*. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/26/egypt-deeply-restrictive-new-assembly-law>
- Huntington, S.P. (1985). *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military relations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Huntington, S.P. (1991). *The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century*, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Huntington, S.P. (1995). Armed forces and democracy: Reforming civil-military relations. *Journal of Democracy*, 6(4): 9-17. <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/16708>
- Hussein, A. R. (2012, November 30). Egyptian assembly passes draft constitution despite protests. *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/30/egypt-constitution-morsi_
- Heydarian, R.J. (2014). *How capitalism failed the Arab world: The economic roots and precarious future of the Middle East uprisings*. London: Zed Books.
- Joshua, M. & Edel, M. (2014). To repress or not to repress- Regime survival strategies in the Arab spring. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 27(2): 289-309. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.806911>.
- Joya, A. (2020). The military and the state in Egypt: Class formation in the post-Arab uprisings. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 47(5): 681-701, DOI: [10.1080/13530194.2018.1509692](https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2018.1509692).
- Kamrava, M. (2000). Military professionalization and civil-military relations in the Middle East. *Political Science Quarterly*. 115(1): 67-92, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2658034>.
- Kandil, H. (2012). *Soldiers, spies, and statesmen: Egypt's road to revolt*. London: Verso.
- Karawan, I. (2004). Security sector reform and retrenchment in the Middle East. In A. Briden, &

- H. Haenggi, (Ed.), *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector* (pp.247-279). Muenster: LIT Verlag.
- Kienle, E. (2001). *A grand delusion: Democracy and economic reform in Egypt*. New York: I. B. Tauris.
- King, S.J. (2003). *Liberalization against democracy: The local politics of economic reform in Tunisia*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Kingsley, P. (2014, March 24). Egypt court sentences to death hundreds of Morsi supporters. *DW*. <http://www.dw.com/en/egypt-court-sentences-to-death-hundreds-of-morsi-supporters/a-17516184>.
- Kingsley, P. (2014, January 18), Egypt's new constitution gets 98% yes vote. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/18/egypt-constitution-yes-vote-mohamed-morsi>.
- Mahoney, J. (2001). Path-dependent explanations of regime change: Central America in comparative perspective. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 36(1): 111-141. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02687587>.
- Mahoney, J., & Snyder, R. (1999). Rethinking agency and structure in the study of regime change. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 43(3): 3-32. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02687620>.
- Mainwaring, S. (1989, November). Transitions to democracy and democratic consolidation: Theoretical and comparative issues. *Kellogg Institute: Working Paper, No.30*. https://kellogg.nd.edu/sites/default/files/old_files/documents/130_0.pdf.
- Mann, M. (1986). *The sources of social power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vol.1.
- Maugiron, N.B. (2016). Should the 2014 Egyptian constitution be amended to increase Presidential powers? https://www.researchgate.net/publication/302888283_Should_the_2014_Egyptian_constitution_be_amended_to_increase_presidential_powers.
- Migdal, J.S. (1998). *Strong societies and weak states: State-society relations and state capabilities in the third world*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Mohapatra, A. K. (2008). Democratization in the Arab world: Relevance of the Turkish model. *International Studies*, 45(4): 271-294. <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F002088170904500401>.
- Mustafa, H. (2013, July 5). Media watchdogs slam closer of Islamist TV stations in Egypt. *al-Arabiya.net*. <https://english.alarabiya.net/en/media/2013/07/05/Media-watchdogs-slam-closure-of-Islamist-TV-stations-in-Egypt-.html>.
- O'Donnell, G., & Schmitter, C. P. (1986). *Transitions from authoritarian rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertain transitions*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- O'Donnell, G., & Schmitter, C. P. (2013). *Transitions from authoritarian rule: Tentative conclusions and uncertain democracies*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press University.
- Okar, E. L. (2005). *Structuring conflict in the Arab world: Incumbents, opponents, and institutions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Perlmutter, A. (1974). *Egypt: The praetorian state*. New Jersey: Transaction Books.
- Perlmutter, A. (2014). *Political roles and military rulers*. New York: Routledge.
- Picard, E. (1988). Arab military in politics: From revolutionary plot to authoritarian state. In A. Dawisha & I. W. Zartman (Eds.), *Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State* (pp.188-219). London: Croom Helm.
- Povey, T. (2016). *Social movements in Egypt and Iran*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Przeworski, A. (1991). *Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern*

- Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ritter, D. (2015). *The iron cage of liberalism: International politics and unarmed revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sabine, G.H. (1937). *A history of political theory*, New Delhi: Oxford and IBH Publications.
- Said, A. (2012). The paradox of transition to "Democracy" under military rule. *Social Research*, 72(2): 397-434, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23350071>.
- Shahin, E. E. (2013). The Egyptian revolution: The power of mass mobilization and the spirit of Tahrir Square. In R. Laremont (Ed.), *Revolution, Revolt, and Reform in North Africa: The Arab Spring and Beyond* (pp.53-75). New York: Routledge.
- Shehata, D. (2010). *Islamists and secularists in Egypt: Opposition, conflict and cooperation*, New York: Routledge.
- Sivan, E. (2000). Illusions of change. *Journal of Democracy*, 11(3): 69-83, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2000.0065>.
- Charles M.Sennott. (January 2, 2012). "The lack box of Egyptian military power, Global Post, <https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-01-02/black-box-egyptian-military-power>.
- Springborg, R. (1989). *Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the political order*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Springborg, R. (2013). Learning from failure: Egypt. In T. C. Bruneau & F. Cristiana (Ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations* (pp.93-110). New York: Routledge.
- Tartert, J.R. (1991). National security. In H. C. Metz, (Ed.), *Egypt: A Country Study*. Federal Research Division: Library of Congress.
- Teti, A. Abbott, Pamela. & Cavatorta, F. (2018). *The Arab uprisings in Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia: Social, political and economic transformations*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Vatikiotis, P.J. (1978). *Nasser and his generation*. London: Croom Helm.
- Vincent, P.D. (2013). Prospects for democratic control of the armed forces. *Armed Forces and Society*, 40(4): 696-723. <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0095327X12468881>.
- Why are Egypt's Salafists backing Sisi? (January 28, 2018). *The Arab Weekly*. <https://theArabweekly.com/why-are-egypts-salafists-backing-sisi>.
- Wilfried, BV (2007). Civil-military relations and democracies. In C. Giuseppe (Ed.), *Social Sciences and the Military: An Interdisciplinary Overview, Cass Military Studies* (pp.163-181). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Wright, T.C. (2007). *State terrorism in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and International human rights*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Yossef, A., & Cerami, J.R. (2015). *The Arab spring and the geopolitics of the Middle East: Emerging security threats and revolutionary change*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2015.
- Zaki, Moheb. (2007). *Civil society and democratization in the Arab world*. Annual Report 2011. Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies.
- Zartman, W. (1993). State-building and the military in Arab Africa. In B. Korany, P. Noble., & R. Brynen. (Eds.), *The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World* (pp.239-258). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Zegart, A. (1999). *Flawed by design: The evolution of the CIA, JSC and NSC*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Women's Participation in Local Government: An Assessment of Enhancers and Inhibitors in the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abirem Municipality

Raymond Kwasi Boasinke*

Abstract

The participation of women in local government is one of the burning governance issues in the world today. Such participation is expected to serve as a springboard to propel women to participate at the national level. However, an analysis of women's participation in local government reveals that women are grossly underrepresented. This study assessed the factors that enhance and inhibit women's participation in local government as elected representatives in the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abirem Municipality of the Central Region of Ghana. The qualitative approach was used to conduct in-depth interviews using a census of all the elected past and present assembly members in the Municipality. The study revealed that women's participation at the household level, training and education by Non-Governmental Organizations, and cordial working relationship with male colleagues in local government were the main enhancers of women's participation in local government. The inhibiting factors revealed by the study included financial constraints, unreasonably high expectations, and the non-cooperative attitudes of community members. It is recommended that women and girls be made an integral part of household decision-making. Women who contest local elections should be supported financially. The NGOs that ran programs to empower women to participate in local government should be encouraged and supported.

Keywords: *Women, Participation, Local Government, Assembly Members*

Introduction

Women's participation in politics is consistent with the tenets of natural justice or democracy, and it is also an excellent avenue for their interests and views to be enshrined into national policies. It has been argued that as long as politics does not consider women's opinions on the same footing as men in shaping public policies and governance, human society will continually run a flawed system of governance (Nwagbara, 2009). Recognizing the importance of women's participation in politics and all other facets of life has led many countries and organizations to incorporate gender equality into their policies and programs. Both the Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Development Goals devoted significant attention to gender equality and empowerment issues. For example, the European Union has enshrined gender equality in the EU Treaties and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (European Union, 2013).

* University of Cape Coast, Cape Coast, Ghana. Email: raymond.boasinke@ucc.edu.gh

In Ghana, there have been attempts to increase the number of women in politics at both the national and local levels. The earliest attempt to give women a sound footing in politics at the national level started immediately after independence. It culminated in the introduction of a quota system for women. Under this system, ten special seats were reserved for women in the National Assembly (Tamale, 1999). The quota system was to serve as a foundation upon which greater participation of women in politics and public life was to be built (Allah-Mensah, 2005). The CPP government at the time also appointed women as District Commissioners and had one woman as a deputy minister (Tsikata, 1989; Manuh, 1991). This initial springboard for greater participation of women in Ghana was truncated by the 1966 coup and the subsequent coups and counter-coups. Although successive governments have made some attempts at enhancing women's participation, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) attempted to address the issue from the grassroots level. This was mainly done through the introduction of a new decentralization system in 1988. This decentralization policy contains provisions such as the non-partisan local government system, the freedom to use the local language for the assembly's business, and the discretion in creating additional sub-committees (Offei-Aboagye, 2000) that are aimed at facilitating women's participation in local government. However, an examination of women's participation in local government in Ghana reveals that the percentage of elected women in local government is still very low. The percentage of women who have been elected into local government since 1994 has been 6 percent on average (Boateng & Kosi, 2015). The slow progress in women's participation in spite of all the global and national efforts could be appreciated in the words of Schwanke (2013:8) "The structural, prejudicial, and discriminatory hurdles these women face are often subtle and misunderstood, creating a complex, pervasive, and multi-faceted labyrinth that thwarts any progress they may make."

Statement of the Problem

Available countrywide data on women's performance in the local level elections in Ghana suggests that women have only made marginal gains over the years. An analysis of the data on the number of elected women from 1994 to 2015 shows that in terms of percentage, women's representation nationwide has averaged less than 10 percent of the total number of elected members. The data show that only in 2006 that the number of elected women in local government nationwide went beyond 10 percent (Boateng & Kosi, 2015). This data puts Ghana's efforts at enhancing women's participation in politics at the local level in a rather sobering

context. This is especially so because the framers of the local government act intended to use the participation of women in local government as a springboard to propel more women into national politics.

The Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abirem (KEEA) municipality in Ghana's Central Region, where this study was carried out, is not an exception to this national problem of poor representation of women in politics at the local level. For instance, in 2006, the Municipality had six elected women, but this dropped from six in 2006 to three in 2010. It also represented a reduction of 50 percent. This issue was even more crucial because none of the previously elected women who served their four-year term in 2006 was re-elected in 2010. Of the five women candidates who contested the 2015 local elections, none was elected. In the 2019 local elections, no woman was elected to represent an electoral area in all the 37 electoral areas in the Municipality. This means that the Municipality has not had an elected female representative since 2015. It is against this backdrop that this study sought to achieve the following objectives: i) To assess the factors which inhibit women's attempt at participating in local government as elected members in the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem Municipality, ii) To identify specific measures which enhance women's participation in local government, and iii) To make recommendations that will address the inhibitors and strengthen the enhancers to women's participation in local government.

Conceptual and Theoretical Issues

Rowe and Frewer (2004) define political participation as the mechanisms through which we facilitate "members of the public in the agenda-setting, decision-making and policy forming activities of organizations or institutions responsible for policy development." It could also be conceptualized as the process whereby all segments of the society actively involve and engage themselves in the political processes that affect their lives. Political participation, therefore goes beyond, merely voting in an election to include the ability of citizens to incorporate their views into critical decisions that shape their lives. Participation in the context of this study refers to women's ability to contest and win elections so as to influence policies and programs at both the local and national levels. The ability of women, to achieve equal participation in politics as elected officials, has become a burning governance issue that has attracted the attention of many scholars. Some of these studies are highlighted below to contextualize the present study.

One of the key challenges that past researchers have often cited as a barrier to women's participation in politics is the educational gap between men and women. One body of empirical research established that this phenomenon largely accounts for women's inability to contest and win elections. The underlying theme that runs through their argument is that the illiteracy among women is high compared to men, and the formal decision-making process essentially involves writing and understanding the legal language (Cusack & Manuh, 2009; Khan, 2006). Horowitz (2009), in her review of literature on education and women's participation in local government in India, found that women who had no formal education noted that they could have made more significant contributions to the proceedings and activities of their various local governments if they had the advantage of schooling. Other studies have also shown that women's educational attainment was less significant in predicting their presence in politics, especially in legislatures, and concluded that illiteracy should not be a barrier to women's participation in politics (Paxton & Kunovich, 2003). This raises the question of whether or not the education women need in order to participate in politics should be limited only to formal education. However, the need for formal education is more important because politics has been dislodged from the 'traditional' local settings to a formal, rational-legal setting requiring alien procedures and formalities. This is what has primarily displaced women without formal schooling from holding political office.

Many researchers have also cited gender socialization as one of the main inhibitors affecting women's ability to contest elective positions in the political sphere. Researchers who share this point of view generally argue that the differential socialization given to women and men predisposes men to the 'public' sphere and women to the 'private' sphere. The 'private' sphere implies women's domestic and nurturing work, imposing significant time constraints and workload. This disproportionate share of domestic and nurturing work that women do essentially limits their ability to engage in politics (Adu-Okoree, 2012; Akita, 2010 and Campbell, 2005). In what Akita (2010) termed gender socialization and its trappings, he contends that gender socialization in Ghana has perpetuated an entrenched notion of women's subservience, subordination, and compliance to socio-cultural ideas about the pre-eminence of men. This makes it herculean for women to navigate their way into politics in Ghana. Such hurdles appeared to be the same for women irrespective of their socio-economic statuses.

Others also argue that contemporary politics and public decision-making tend to reflect the values and norms of men and that males generally determine the 'rules of the game' in the political arena and make politics unattractive for most women (Jayal, 2006; Ahikire, 2003). Politics, both at the local and national levels, tends to be adversarial in nature, full of character assassinations, a campaign based on the characteristics of the individual contestants and not necessarily on the developmental challenges of the citizenry. This has made many people, especially women, perceive politics as a venture that is not for very decent people. Moreover, some males have negative attitudes towards women who seek leadership positions either in corporate sectors or in politics. Such men see women who do so as having invaded a male domain. It also affects their ability to change the status quo because doing so would be interpreted as going beyond their boundaries and might elicit a backlash from the society (Akita, 2010; Broughton & Miller, 2009). This challenge makes women's work very stressful, and in order to cope with this male-dominated environment, some women in leadership positions sometimes adopt the 'Queen Bee Syndrome.' This refers to the situation where women in top positions hardly associate with their colleagues in lower positions and discourage other women from seeking such positions (Hamel, 2009).

Many researchers also traced the source of the problem to women's inability to play active roles in decision-making at the household level (Awumbila, 2001; Greenberg & Okani, 2001; Brown, Ekumah and Ghartey, 1996). Even though as far back as 1996, Benneh (1996) argued that structural transformations in most developing countries' economies had empowered women to get actively involved in decision-making at the household level. Awumbila (2001) explained that in most cases, women's ability to participate in decision-making at the household level is correlated with their level of education, occupation, and the amount of financial resources they contribute to family upkeep.

Women's relatively weaker financial status and its impacts on women's participation in politics have also been the focus of a considerable number of studies (UN Report on Women, 2010; Ofei-Aboagye, 2000). The inability of women to raise enough resources for campaigning has been highlighted by a number of studies as a key inhibitor to their political participation. The underlying reason for this could be attributed to certain customs and traditions within most

organizations and in the dominant society. For example, women are mostly found at the lower echelons of most organizations, where salary levels are generally low.

Globally, women are paid less; their wages are 17 percent lower than those of men. Only one in four senior officials or managers is a woman (UN Report on Women, 2010). More women than men are unemployed globally and are more likely than men to be vulnerable, mainly in developing countries (ILO, 2018). It is estimated that women could increase their current levels by 76 percent if these discriminatory employment practices and wage gaps between women and men are eliminated or closed. The value of such a closed wage gap is estimated to have a global value of 17 trillion US Dollars (ActionAid, 2015).

Issues such as these have implications for women's ability to contest and win elections at both the local and national levels. Tsikata (2009) observed that the financial challenges represent one of the barriers to women's representation in politics in Ghana. Madsen's (2019) study on women in parliament in Ghana revealed that they encounter great difficulties in order to raise the money for the campaigning. Some of the Members of the Parliaments, for example, reported that they had to sell their cars and take loans in order to be able to finance their political activities. One of the female MPs reported that she did not receive any salary as an MP for eight years because her salary was used to pay for the loans she took to finance previous elections.

The Westminster Foundation for Democracy (2018) also highlighted the financial challenge as a key obstacle to women's representation in politics, although it explains that men tended to spend more money in politics than women in areas such as costs for campaigning, donations, and party workers, however, women outspend men in only one area which is media visibility and advertisement. This is understandable because the media may not naturally put a premium on making female candidates visible, so they have to put in more resources in this area.

Other researchers have examined the response to these challenges. Prominent among these studies is the role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in promoting women's participation in politics as well as the introduction of quota systems. Chikulo (2010) argued that NGOs serve as the fulcrum around which participatory and responsive development revolves. They play a significant role in deepening the democratic decentralization in their catchment areas. This is often achieved by making people, especially marginalized groups such as women, aware of their rights and the need to get actively involved in the decentralization process and by

lobbying the government to provide greater services. Boateng (2017) also confirmed the enormous roles these organizations play in supporting women to participate in local government as elected representatives. Horowitz (2009) observed that NGOs' training and support programs had become a major response source to the education gaps between female and male politicians.

In most cases, NGOs have sponsored candidates, trained them after the election, and helped to instill in them the virtues of accountability and responsiveness (Ofei-Aboagye, 2004; Kudva, 2003). Kudva (2003) has categorized the role of NGOs into three thematic areas; skills and confidence building, role clarification, and gender awareness. Collier (1996 cited in Chikulo, 2010) indicated that NGOs could inadvertently jeopardize the prospect of genuine development of a state by stepping into the gap between the people and the government, which discourages the people from demanding their rights from the government just because the NGOs have offered to provide some aid. Apart from this note of caution by Collier, the works of NGOs in empowering the poor and marginalized groups such as women have been a recurrent theme in the literature.

The Liberal Feminist Theory

This study was guided primarily by the liberal feminist theory. The theory has its origin in the tradition of the 16th and 17th centuries' liberal philosophy, which espouses principles such as equality and liberty. The basic tenet of the Liberal feminist theory is that all human beings have the potential to be rational and that all human action must pass the test of rationality. It posits that inequalities between women and men cannot be justified in rational terms (Parpart, Connelly & Barriteau, 2000). Liberal feminists argue that an individual's sex is purely an 'accident', and as such, it should never be the basis for inequality and discrimination (Parpart et al., 2000). Advocates of this theory argue that women as a group are not allowed the same freedom or opportunity that men have; men are judged on their actual abilities and interests, while for women, their sex takes a central stage in how society evaluates them. Liberal feminists contend that the way women are treated in contemporary times violates, in one way or another, all of liberal feminism's political values, such as equality, liberty, and justice (Parpart et al., 2000).

Liberal feminists stress that women's relegation to certain works degrades them; diminishes their liberty and autonomy. Women are paid less and constitute a disproportionate share of the poor the world over. These limit their abilities to exercise their right to travel, to free expression, and

their right to contest for public office because they find it difficult to finance an electoral campaign. Liberal feminists are of the view that poverty makes most women unequal to most men. To a liberal feminist, the worth of liberty is less for the poor (Jaggar, 1983).

Liberal feminists assert that most of the inequalities women suffer are not the result of discriminatory laws emanating from the legal system but from customs (Jaggar, 1983). They cited two forms of customary discrimination: first, the reluctance to appoint women to certain jobs, especially the most prestigious, well-paying, or supervisory ones, as well as the reluctance to allow women to acquire the necessary training and qualification; second, the cultural assumption that women are well-suited for some jobs such as running a home and rearing of children, and in paid labor, they are expected to work at the lowest echelons of the organization (Jaggar, 1983 in Parpart et al., 2000).

This theory generally draws a line between the private and public spheres of life. Even though there is a general debate about where exactly this line should be drawn, liberal feminists converge on the point that this line is drawn to preserve liberty. They argue that some form of regulation in the domestic sphere is needed to ensure the protection of women's safety and well-being (Parpart et al., 2000). They further stress that women's relegation to certain types of works degrades and diminishes their liberty and autonomy (Jaggar, 1983). They also advocate for education so that customs that tend to entrench gender inequalities could be addressed. However, liberal feminists have been criticized for not being radical enough in addressing the fundamental issues of patriarchy that underlie the subordinate status of women in society.

Materials and Methods


Study Area

The Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abram (KEEA) Municipality is of great historical and political importance to the Central Region of Ghana. This is because this Municipality served as an entry point for the Europeans in the 15th century. It also served as a port and a major center for the Trans-Atlantic slave trade (Abane, 2010). The Municipality covers 372.45 square kilometers. It is bordered to the northeast by Twifo-Hemang Lower Denkyira District of the Central Region, to the northwest by the Mpoho Wassa District in the Western Region, to the east by the Cape Coast district, and to the west by the Shama-Ahanta East District in the Western Region. The district is

bordered to the south by the Gulf of Guinea. It has five traditional councils, which are Edina, Komenda, Eguafo, Abram, and Agona.

The 2010 Population and Housing Census put the population of the municipal assembly at 144,705 (69,665 males and 78,040 females). Males represent 48.14 percent of the population in the Municipality, whereas females represent 51.86 percent. The Municipality has an average household size of four. The Municipality is largely rural since only thirty-five percent of the population live in urban areas. It is home to the Elmina Castle, the oldest castle in Africa south of the Sahara, and some beach resorts that attract many tourists from all over the world. Agriculture remains the mainstay of the Municipality's economy; eighty-five percent of the population in the Municipality is either engaged in food and cash crop production or fishing.

Figure 1: A Map of the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abirem Municipality showing all settlements



Source: Cartographic Unit, Department of Geography and Regional Planning, University of Cape Coast (2014).

Data Collection

This study adopted a purely qualitative design. It used a census of all women who had been elected as assembly women in the KEEA Municipality as research participants. There were eight such women in the study area when the data collection was carried out. These women were

purposely targeted because the researcher believed that this group is in the best position to tell precisely how women navigate their way into local government as assembly women in the study area. This decision was reached considering that these women are key stakeholders in local governance in the study area.

Besides, the study specifically targeted women who had served in the municipal assembly as elected representatives. All eight women who had served as elected assembly members until the 2015 local level elections were contacted using snowballing. The snowball technique came in handy due to the unavailability of data on past elected assembly women from the office of the Municipal Electoral Commission. The in-depth interview guides were used to elicit the subjective experiences of the assembly women in the KEEA Municipality.

The responses from the in-depth interviews were tape-recorded with the consent of respondents and transcribed. The data were qualitatively analyzed and presented using themes that emerged from the analysis. Voices that precisely captured the themes were highlighted to give glimpses into how the respondents felt about the researched issues. Pseudonyms were used in order to ensure anonymity.

Results and Discussion

Financial Obstacles

An analysis of the interview data revealed that financial difficulties were a great inhibitor to women in their desire to contest and win elections and to function successfully as assembly women in their electoral areas. All eight research participants indicated this challenge in their narrations. This financial challenge becomes more significant when one gets elected and starts working as an assemblywoman. Participants cited situations where some parents in their communities expected them to pay school fees and hospital bills for their children. They also indicated that they had to hire plastic chairs anytime they organized meetings for their communities. Some voters also expect to be remunerated for their presence when they attend meetings organized by assembly members. The views of Abena that give an idea about the financial challenges during electioneering campaigns and those that occur when they are elected as Assembly Members are presented as follows:

The financial issue is one of the major challenges for women when it comes to local politics. Everything is money; posters, campaigning - sometimes we will go somewhere

and meet a group of people, and after the meeting when we are leaving, they will say "honorable, so are you leaving us just like that, we have to take at least some 'koko' (Corn porridge). So if we are not well resourced, we cannot contest. Sometimes we have to go around begging people we know to help us with things such as posters. So it is a major challenge; without money, we cannot contest.

It was revealed that, on average, an elected assemblywoman spent about nine hundred Ghana Cedis on their electioneering campaigns. It is instructive to note that this money excluded other sponsorships and support most of them received from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) and, in some instances, political parties. These amounts of money spent by the assembly women may seem meager, but they considered the amounts they spent were somewhat on the high side given that most of them were engaged in petty trading with very little capital. These financial challenges become more pronounced when they get elected into local government. Immediately they are elected, the electorates in their electoral areas expect them to single-handedly bear the cost of items rented for meetings they attend. They are invited to attend funerals and naming ceremonies in the electoral areas, where they are expected to donate generously to the families that invite them. Maame, a past assemblywoman, had this to say on this challenge:

The only problem I have now is money because people approached to resolve their problems and give invitations with the expectations where money seems a prerequisite to resolving them. Sometimes, I have money in order to be able to organize people to do specific jobs in the electoral area.

The research participants also reported about contingencies fund that they need to resolve the problems as per the expectations of the community. They cited instances where they had to incur the costs of burial for unknown persons who had to be buried and instances where they had to arrange for the transportation of sick people in their electoral areas in order for them to get to higher health facilities for medical attention. Benita narrated an unforeseen incident that occurred in her electoral area that elaborates the challenge in question:

When a community problem requires money to be solved they access to us with expectation as we are assembly members. There was an instance where we found a dead person in the electoral area. The body was decomposing, so we had to see the police who

permitted us to bury him. In such a situation, an Assembly member had to bear all the expenditure. Those in rural areas face many problems, so the government should give assembly members some monthly allowances to cater to such problems.

The findings presented above show that women in local government face a daunting financial challenge in their quest to contest and get elected into local government, and for those who get elected, the financial burden becomes heavier. This finding on finance is much more appreciated when it is evaluated against the fact that six of the participants were engaged in petty trading, one was working with a local NGO, and the other was a retired nurse engaged in subsistence farming. Due to this financial burden, women are always in a dilemma about whether to invest the little money they have in local politics or use it for family upkeep. Therefore, it was not surprising that at the end of the narrative of Benyiwa, she appealed for assembly members to be paid some monthly allowances so that it could ease the financial burden on them.

It is evident that financial challenge remains one of the key inhibitors to women's participation in local government. The unanimity on the part of the research participants on the issue of funding as a constraint to their work as assembly members demonstrates the gravity of this as an inhibiting factor to women's quest to participate in local government as assembly members. The amount of money they had to spend during the electioneering campaign was on the high side, given their meager incomes. This partly stems from the fact that some voters would want the candidates to offer something either in cash or in-kind to demonstrate that they had the welfare of the communities at heart. Members of the electoral areas largely depend on them to fund certain activities in the communities. For example, in one of the communities, one of the research participants narrated how her sleep would be interrupted at midnight because a member of the electoral area was sick and needed help to hire a vehicle to convey him or her to the nearest health facility. Others also reported that anytime the community members invited them to occasions such as funerals, they were expected to make some cash donations.

These findings align with the study of Madsen 2019; the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 2018 and Tsikata, 2009 that indicated that financial challenge is one of the most significant inhibitors to women's participation in politics. It was not surprising that some of the respondents suggested that they should be given monthly allowances in order to cushion them from the enormous financial burdens associated with their work. This support will further give

meaning to the perceived flexibilities noted by Offei-Aboagye (2000) in the Local Government Act (ACT 462), intended to make women's participation easier. The difficulties women encounter in raising money to fund their campaign is a global one and has persisted for so long. This is due primarily to the feminization of poverty and the general wage gap between women and men, even when they engage in the same task. Indeed, the findings of the ILO (2018) that more men than women are employed and that women are more likely to be found in vulnerable employment as well as those by the UN Women Report on Women (2010) that revealed stark income inequalities between women and men provide us with a clear contextual lens to appreciate these financial inhibitions on the part of women. This fact was also acknowledged by the liberal feminist theorists who observed that discrimination based on customs and traditions has led to women relegation into the lower echelons of most organizations and is paid lower wages than men.

All these have implications for women's ability to raise the needed funding to participate in local government. As noted in Ghana, the major political parties have also initiated a policy where female parliamentary aspirants pay about one-half of the official filing fees that the parties approve for their internal party contests. Such initiatives have been taken bearing in mind the patriarchal motif of the Ghanaian and global economic structure that largely confines women to the lower levels of paid employment, thereby making them financially less capable than men to mobilize resources for purposes such as contesting an election.

Unreasonably High Expectations

Another inhibitor had to do with high expectations from community members towards assembly women. The participants explained that community members demanded more than they could offer as assembly women within their resources and power. This, according to them, was largely due to the fact that they were women, and as such, their community members expected them to display motherly compassion. This puts tremendous pressure and stress on them as representatives because the community may misconstrue failure to meet these demands to mean that they were not caring enough to get re-elected. This perhaps accounts for the difficulty that elected assembly women face in their bid to get re-elected after their first four-year tenure in the KEEA Municipality. An elected assembly member called Aba expressed the following thoughts concerning this challenge:

Expectations of the community from the women assembly members are comparatively high even to manage the homely problems. To manage, I had to, by all means, get them some loans, and where I had not been able to do that, some have started saying many untruths about me. Because of this, I even called the meetings; most of the community members did not attend.

It is instructive to note that this particular assemblywoman had been in office for less than a year at the time of the in-depth interview. However, women in the community wanted her to organize them and secure loans from banks for them. She was expected to serve as a guarantor for them when she barely knew the activities they were engaged in and could not determine their creditworthiness. The women in the community felt that as a woman, she should be very responsive to their needs even within six months of assuming office. Such a demand could not possibly be met within such a time frame, and this had led to boycotts of meetings she attempted to organize.

The findings revealed that community members expect women to do so much for the electoral areas. These expectations sometimes become unreasonable when they are evaluated against the core duties of elected assembly members. Elected assembly women experience a lot of pressure and stress as a result of these high expectations from the electorates in their electoral areas. This attests to the fact that most of the challenges that assembly women in the study area encounter emanate from the societal perception of women as people who should be tender-hearted and compassionate as in the traditional role of a mother, who is expected to provide for the needs of her children whether or not she has the means. This extreme, and sometimes unreasonable pressure on elected assembly members to almost single-handedly solve the problems of their electoral areas, often compels assembly women not to contest local elections after the first four-year tenure. These findings are in tandem with the arguments of the liberal feminist theorist that in evaluating the abilities of women and men, the sex of women often becomes the central focus, whereas men are evaluated on their actual capabilities. It is also possible that most women are not willing to contest local elections in the study area because they know about the experiences of women who had served as assembly members in the past. In the 2015 local elections, no woman was elected to the municipal assembly in the KEEA. Only one out of the three assembly

women who were elected in the 2010 local elections in the study area contested the 2015 local elections, but she could not win for the second time.

It should be noted that these high expectations do not emanate from the promises made by the elected assembly women during their campaigns. Instead, they need to be understood from the Ghanaian cultural context; the Ghanaian culture portrays a woman in a leadership position as a mother to her people. As a result, she is expected to be sensitive and responsive to the community's needs, even when not within her power and ability. Indeed, it is not uncommon to hear electorates refer to female politicians as 'Mummy' even if the woman has a Ph.D. or bears the professorial title. From the discussions thus far, it is clear that this inhibitor has nothing to do with any discriminatory law in Ghana; it is instead the result of the gender socialization that exists within the study area in particular and the country in general. This finding is also in consonance with the arguments of the liberal feminist theory. As noted by Odame (2010), the 1992 constitution of Ghana prohibits any form of discrimination and guarantees equal rights for both women and men in all areas of their life. She explained, however, that the cultural norms of Ghanaian society do not make politics a conducive arena for women. Thus, the unreasonably high expectations are to be understood within the cultural rather than the legal context.

Lack of Cooperation from Community Members

The study revealed uncooperative attitudes of community members, including chiefs, as one of the inhibitors to women's participation in local government. Some of the assembly women cited cases where some community members vehemently opposed their moves to bring about accountability into some of the operations of the communities. Others cited chiefs and some members of the traditional authorities as being a stumbling block to their work as assembly members. Maame, a female assembly member, expressed the following views:

One of the problems I had was about accountability. The community had been selling water, and those in charge had never rendered accounts to the community. When I insisted that they should do it, it generated a whole lot of confrontations. This demand for accountability was something that the masses demanded, so it was not my decision. I received a lot of threats because of this.

Tuba also made the following remarks concerning the uncooperative attitudes of people in the electoral area as follows:

When I was elected, I did not have any Unit Committee. There was no chief, it was later that the past assemblyman became the chief, and he frustrated my efforts. When I even ask the town crier to beat the gong-gong, he will order not to do so. This made the organization very difficult. So I had to go to churches to make announcements before I am able to organize meetings. When I used the public address system, the chief summoned me before the Edina 'Manhene'. That was the reason why I lost the last elections because my supporters felt too much harassment from the chief, so they asked me to quit and leave his town for him. So, when I contested for the second time, they did not even turn out to vote for me."

Women encounter hostile attitudes in their communities to perform their duties as elected representatives in their electoral areas. For some of the assembly women in KEEA, it was because of such issues that some members of their immediate families expressed reservations or opposition when they made their intentions of contesting in local elections known to them. One thing that stood out clearly in the interviewing process was that none of the assembly women's challenges (ed) in the course of their duty could be attributed to any perceived or actual incompetence on their part. They were, however, largely due to the gendered norms and values of the society in which they found themselves.

Gender socialization could also account for such challenges, which tacitly inculcates the idea that men are the 'natural' or 'ideal' leaders of society. Some often see women who attempt to challenge the status quo of the electorates and the traditional authorities as irascible. To the extent that female assembly members sometimes receive threats for demanding such simple democratic rights, revealing the kind of frustrations and stresses that they might go through in their electoral areas. These intimidations and threats from males in the electoral areas explain the patriarchal undertones, sexism, and gender bias that continue to exist in Ghanaian society. Such intimidation could make the female assembly member 'give up' or rethink her decision to seek re-election. These uncooperative attitudes were not from colleague assembly members but rather from some men who felt that women are undermining their long-held privileged position as leaders. These men practically perceive women who do so as having invaded a male domain. This resistance in the form of lack of cooperation on the part of men affects women's ability to change the status quo because doing so would be interpreted as going beyond their boundaries

and might elicit a backlash from society (Akita, 2010). It also shows that the toxic gender socialization that seems to give men pre-eminence in almost all aspects of the Ghanaian social system is still alive and must be addressed holistically. It is not uncommon in Ghana for women who question certain practices and systems within the society to be cautioned that 'women are expected to sell garden eggs and not gun powder.' To wit, women must keep to their traditional gender roles and not cross into areas not meant for them. Women who defy these standards are treated as cantankerous women who do not know their proper place in society.

Relationship with Male Assembly Members

The assembly women in the KEEA Municipality did indicate that they had an excellent working relationship with the assemblymen and that the male assembly members had been very supportive of their work. This was one of the factors that enhanced their work as assembly women. They revealed that there had never been a period in their campaigning or as assembly members where their male colleagues gave them any problems or cause for concern. The excellent relationship they enjoyed with their male counterparts made their work much more manageable. The explanation given by Eunice summed up the relationship between female and male assembly members:

... they are all very friendly because we share views and have each other's phone numbers. If I am in need of assistance and I call them, they advise me and say do this or that; do not spend money on this leave it for the assembly, and they will do it. We all have a very cordial relationship.

The study revealed that one of the enhancers of women's participation in local government was the cordial relationship with elected men in local government. The excellent relationship between the elected male and female in local government differed from the general attitudes of males in the Municipality towards female elected representatives. This means that male assembly members in the KEEA, in particular, have probably come to terms with the fact that women must be viewed and treated as equal partners in development and politics. It could also represent an understanding of women's crucial roles in ensuring quality local governance and development in the KEEA municipality.

This finding is in sharp contrast with some of the earliest works on women's participation in local government. One of the earliest and comprehensive studies done on women's participation

in local government in the Central Region by Brown, Ekumah & Ghattey (1996) and other similar studies Ofei-Aboagye, (2000), concluded that men's attitude in the assembly made it challenging for women to work effectively. For instance, in the study of Brown, Ekumah & Ghattey (1996), assembly women attributed their inability to function effectively partly to the attitudes of their male counterparts towards them.

However, this study revealed something to the contrary. In the present study, elected assembly women indicated that their male counterparts have been very supportive and never had any problems. This came as an unexpected finding, giving the patriarchal nature of Ghanaian society. The cordial relationship between female and male assembly persons greatly enhanced the work of female assembly members in the study area. It could be argued that perhaps the education and training programs, which were continuously organized for assembly members in the country on the need to accept women as equal development partners in the various districts, municipalities, and metropolitan assemblies, are beginning to bear fruits. This difference in attitudes towards women leaves us with no other plausible explanation than the one the author alluded to earlier that the training given to male assembly members by NGOs might be responsible for such a change in attitudes. It also does not support the view of Broughton & Miller (2009) and Odame (2010) that in leadership positions where men outnumber women, the men sometimes make work unnecessarily tricky for women. It does not reflect the literature wholly that politics is solely a man's arena, and their male counterparts view any woman who ventures into it as having crossed the line. This conclusion is only within the context of the relationship between female and male assembly members within the KEEA and could therefore not be generalized for other jurisdictions or fields.

Participation in Household Decision-Making

The study revealed that the majority of the assembly women have been very much involved in decision-making in their various households. For most of the time, personal involvement in decision-making at the household level helped build their confidence and impetus for their involvement in local government. Of the eight past and present assembly women interviewed, seven indicated that they were actively involved in household decision-making before joining the assembly. It was only one participant who indicated that she was never involved in decision-

making in her household. This participant was not married and lived with her parents prior to her election into the municipal assembly. She informed:

Our family was a polygamous one. We were only living with our father and sometimes step-mothers, so our father was the major decision-maker of the house, and we did not have a say. If daddy says this or that, that is all; nobody talks.

Of the seven participants who said they were actively involved in decision-making in their various households, six of them said the confidence they derived from their active involvement in decision-making in the household motivated them to offer themselves for elections into the municipal assembly. The comment below can sum up the views:

When our family meets, and we are not present, they would not discuss anything. This is because our opinions and decisions have always helped our family members, and they accord us great respect.

The only assemblywoman who said her participation in household decision-making did not influence her to get involved in local government attributed her desire and motivation to contest to the education, encouragement, and motivation she received from a non-governmental organization that works to empower women in the study area.

Allah-Mensah's (2005) study indicated that to fully understand women's difficulties in participating in any democratic process, it was important to come down to the household level to examine the power relations that operate there. The fact that the majority of the participants indicated that they were actively involved in household decision-making and that their active participation in household decision-making gave them some level of confidence to get actively involved in local government. Women's participation in household decision-making is important if we are to boost the confidence and courage of women to get actively involved in local government in their various electoral areas as contestants. Therefore, participation in household decision-making is one of the solid foundations upon which women could be propelled to take up more significant roles in public or formal decision-making both at the local and national levels. Participation in decision-making at the household level builds women's confidence and inculcates the boldness to contest elections at the local and national levels. Women's ability to participate in decision-making at the household level serves as one of the fulcrums around which their decision to participate in politics revolves. This, therefore, means that participation in

decision-making at the micro-level such as those within the family has a significant influence on macro-level decision-making, such as those that occur in local government.

Non-Governmental Organizations and Women's Participation

NGOs' role in educating and empowering women to get actively involved in local government was one of the recurring themes that ran through the in-depth interviews with the assembly women. All the respondents indicated the immense roles that NGOs such as the Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF) and Christian Mothers Association have played in empowering them to be bold and assertive and contest the Municipality's local elections. These NGOs have provided training and education on public speaking, supported women with their posters, and in some rare circumstances, provided some donations in the form of cash to some female contestants. It was the view of the assembly women that the education that could empower women to participate in local government is not necessarily formal education, but rather that which the NGOs provide. As much as they did not seek to downplay the importance of formal education, they believed that what gave them the needed empowerment to contest and win such elections was the training and education provided by these NGOs. The views expressed by Benyiwa on this particular issue are narrated below:

I attended a lot of workshops that Christian Mothers and other NGOs organized. The workshops helped me acquire a lot of skills, such as how to mount the platform, speak one-on-one with electorates, do house to house campaigning, and control my temper.

The NGOs are helping the women who show interest in becoming representatives in their local government area in the study area were the Christian Mothers, WiLDAF, and the Central and Western Fishmongers Association (CEWEFIA), among others were mentioned by the research participants for the vital roles they have been playing in empowering women in the Municipality. NGOs' role in training women who show interest in local government was a significant enhancer of women's participation in local government.

This finding showed the important roles that NGOs play in enhancing women's participation in politics. All the research participants had received some training from NGOs on how to conduct their campaigns, the art of public speaking, and the rudiments of the political decision-making process. These training often took the form of workshops before and after the local elections. The training and support essentially filled the gap in political knowledge between males and

females and placed women at a level where they could compete favorably with their male counterparts. One of the participants revealed that although she was not part of any decision-making at her household, it was an NGO in the study area that provided her with the proper education and empowerment in order for her even to dare to contest elections. There was also an instance where one of the participants indicated she was in her early twenties and had never dreamt of becoming an assembly member. However, the NGO identified her potential and empowered her to contest, winning against her male contender.

The finding is in line with studies by Boateng, 2017; Chikulo, 2010; Horowitz, 2009; Ofei-Aboagye, 2004; Kudva, 2003, all emphasized the NGOs play in promoting women's empowerment and participation in local government. It also fits into Kudva's (2003) categorization of the role of NGOs in promoting women's participation in local governance, namely skills and confidence building, role clarification, and helping women to appreciate gender relations and their implications for their candidacy (Gender Awareness). The findings on NGOs and their role in enhancing women's participation in local government appear to suggest that the NGOs are operating in tandem with one of the key proposals of the liberal feminists on how to end women's subordination in society, which is education. For liberal feminists, it is through education that the age-old customs and discriminatory practices that are inimical to the advancement of women in all spheres of life can be addressed. The findings are also in keeping with the observation by Horowitz (2009) that the training and support programs of NGOs constitute a significant source of response to the education gaps between female and male politicians.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This study sought to assess the factors that enhance and hinder women's participation in local government. The prominent inhibiting factors were financial constraints, unreasonably high expectations, and uncooperative attitudes of community members. The most significant factors that enhanced women's participation in local government were women's active involvement in decision-making at the household level, the education, training, empowerment, support programs by NGOs, and a good working relationship with male assembly members.

It could be concluded that the challenges women face in their quest to participate in local government as elected representatives do not emanate from deliberate laws but the result of long-

held customs and beliefs about the proper roles of women in society. This is in keeping with the arguments of the liberal feminist theory. It appears the inhibitors to women's participation have remained static, and unless firm decisions are taken to address them once and for all, they will continue to linger over. However, in the midst of these daunting inhibitors, other women have been able to navigate their ways into the corridors of political power and have shared their enhancing factors with us. While we await a period where these inhibitors will be addressed using principles of equity, women who aspire to be elected into local government must take advantage of the available enhancers. This study, therefore, recommended the following in order to improve on women's participation in politics at the local level:

- The National Commission for Civic Education, educational institutions, faith-based organizations, and NGOs should educate the citizenry on the importance of women's representation in politics both at the local and national levels.
- The state and other international donors should support NGOs that work to empower women politically.
- The state or the local government should ensure that elected representatives in local government are paid either salaries or allowances monthly to ameliorate the enormous financial challenges they are confronted with.
- Parents, households, and lineage heads should consciously involve and encourage their girls and boys to participate in household decision-making.

References

- Abane, A. M. (2010). Background characteristics and accident risk of commercial vehicle drivers in Cape Coast-Elmina area of the central region of Ghana. *Oguaa Journal of Social Sciences* 5(1): 64-86.
- Adu-Okoree, B. I. (2012). Enhancing women's household reproductive roles through microfinance: A study of women traders in Tema. *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences* 2(6):261-272.
- Ahikire, J. (2003). Gender equity and local democracy in contemporary Uganda: Addressing the challenge of women's political effectiveness in local government. In Goetz A. M., Hassim S. (eds.). *No shortcuts to power: African women in politics and policymaking*. London and New York: Zed Books, pp. 213-39.
- Akita, E. (2010). *Hegemony, Patriarchy and Human Rights: The Representation of Ghanaian Women in Politics*. (Electronic Thesis or Dissertation).<https://etd.ohiolink.edu/> (Accessed 29 December 2020).
- Allah-Mensah, B. (2005). *Women in politics and public life in Ghana*. Accra: Friedrich-Ebert Foundation.

- Awumbila, M. ((2001). Women and gender equality in Ghana: a situational analysis. In Tsikata D.(ed.). *Gender training in Ghana: Politics, issues and tools*. Accra: Worli Publishing Service, pp.33-59.
- Boateng, J.S. (2017). *Women in District Assemblies in Ghana: Gender construction, resistance and empowerment* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation Edith Cowan University, Western Australia). Retrieved from [HTTPS:// ro.ecu.edu.au/theses/2048](https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses/2048).
- Boateng, J.S. & Kosi, I. (2015). Women's representation and participation in District Assemblies in Ghana: Analysis of supply-side and demand-side framework. *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications* 5(10): 1-6.
- Benneh, G. (1996, December 14-18). Keynote address on family and development, delivered at the research and training workshop on family held at school of administration, university of Ghana, Legon.
- Broughton, A., & Miller, L. (2009). Women in senior management: Is the glass ceiling still intact?' *ISGUC: The Journal of Industrial Relations & Human Resources* 11(4): 7-23. DOI:10.4026/1303-2860.2009.0122.x.
- Brown, C.K., Ghartey, N.K.T., & Ekuma, E.K. (1996) *Women in local government in Ghana: A case study of central region*. Accra: Freidrich Ebert Foundation.
- Chikulo, B. (2010). Democratic local governance in Southern Africa Development Community region: Some emerging issues and challenges. *Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance* 5: 145-157. DOI.org/10.5130/cjlg.voi5.1479.
- Cusack, K. & Manuh, T. (eds.) (2009). *The architecture for violence against women in Ghana*, Accra: Ghana Gender Studies and Human Rights Documentation.
- European Union (2013). Women and men in leadership positions in the European Union 2013: A review of the situation and recent progress. European Commission- Directorate-General for Justice DOI: 10.2838/50821.
- Ghana Statistical Service (2012). *2010 Population and Housing Census: Final Results*. Accra, Ghana: Ghana Statistical Service.
- Hamel, S. (2009). Exit, voice, and sense-making following psychological contract violations. *Journal of Business Communication*, 46(2): 234-261.
- Horowitz, K. (2009). Getting good government for women: A literature review. *Agriculture and Rural Development Discussion Paper 43*, The World Bank.
- International Labour Organization (2018). World employment and social outlook: Trends for women 2018 Global Snapshot. International Labour Office-Geneva https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-dgreports/-dcomm/publ/documents/publication/wcms_619577.pdf (Accessed on 12 November, 2020).
- Inter-Parliamentary Union and UN Women (2015). Women in politics: Situation on 1 January 2015. http://www.unwomen.org/~media/headquarters/attachments/sections/news/stories/2015/femmesenpolitique_2015_web_anglais.pdf (Accessed on 20 November, 2020).
- Jaggar, A.M. (1983). *Feminist politics and human nature*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
- Jayal, N. G. (2006). Engendering local democracy: The impact of quotas for women in India's panchayats. *Democratization* 13: 15-35.
- Kudva, N. (2003). Engineering Elections: The experiences of women in the Panchayati Raj in Karnataka, India. *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 16: 445-63.
- Madsen, D. H. (2019). Gender, power and institutional change: The role of formal and informal

- institutions in promoting women's political representation in Ghana. *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 54(1): 70-87. DOI: 10.1177/0021909618787851.
- Nwagbara, U. (2009). Changing Canon: Chinua Achebe's women, the public sphere and the politics of inclusion in Nigeria. *The journal of pan African*, 3(3): 3-22.
- Odame, F.S. (2010). Women in politics in Ghana: A study on local government in the Greater Accra Region. *Ghana Journal of Development Studies* 7(1): DOI: 10.4314/gjds.v7i1.61401
- Ofei-Aboagye, E. (2000). *Promoting women's participation in local governance and development: the case of Ghana*. Accra: Institute of Local Government Studies.
- Ofei-Aboagye, E. (2004). Promoting gender sensitivity in local governance in Ghana. *Development in practice* 14:753-60.
- Parpart, J.L., Connelly, M.P., & Barribeau, V.E. (eds.) (2000). *Theoretical perspectives on gender and development*. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre.
- Paxton, P., & Kunovich, S. (2003). Women's political representation: The importance of ideology. *Social Forces* 82: 87-114.
- Rowe, G. and Frewer, L. J. (2004). Evaluating public-participation exercises: A research agenda. *Science, Technology and Human Values*, 29 (4): 512-556.
- Schwanke, D. (2013). Barriers for Women to Positions of Power: How Societal and Corporate Structures, Perceptions of Leadership and Discrimination Restrict Women's Advancement to Authority. *Earth Common Journal* 3(2): 15-28. DOI: 10.31542/j.ecj.125
- Tamale, S. (1999). *When hens begin to grow: Gender and parliamentary politics in Uganda*. Boulder Colorado, USA: Westview Press.
- United Nations Report on Women (2010) *UN Women: Facts and figures on women worldwide*. <http://www.unwomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/UNWomen-FactsAndFiguresOnWomen-20100702.pdf> (Accessed on 4 April, 2019).
- Westminster Foundation for Democracy (2018). The costs of politics in Ghana. <http://www.wfd.org> (Accessed on 24 June, 2021).

COVID- 19 and its Effects on Refugee, Asylum Seeker and Migrant Children Aged 12-17 Years at Tongogara Refugee Camp in Zimbabwe

Memory Rumbidzai V. Mandikiana* Yogesh Awasthi** Isaac Ignatius Dambudzo***

Abstract

Refugee, asylum seekers, and migrant (displaced) children are at protracted vulnerability levels, and COVID-19 has exacerbated the situation. Zimbabwe accepts refugees but enforces an encampment policy, and displaced populations are encamped at Tongogara Refugee Camp (TRC). The research gap is that there is very little literature on refugees in Zimbabwe. The research objectives for the study were to explore the challenges that refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced children at TRC face, ascertain how COVID-19 has affected children at TRC, and propose solutions to these challenges. This research relied upon a mixed method of quantitative and qualitative approach considering the immediacy of the COVID-19 pandemic. Secondary data is referred from published articles and organizational reports. The population size of 2,304 children aged 12 to 17 was obtained through the United Nations refugee agency (UNHCR)'s January 2021 population statistics for TRC. A 10% sample of 230 respondents was selected. Non-probability sampling techniques were used in administering a questionnaire through individual and focus group interviews, which were fed into KoBo Toolbox. Data cleaning and analysis were conducted, with SPSS and NViVo for quantitative and qualitative data analysis, respectively. Ethical considerations of consent, confidentiality, do no harm, and statements to withdraw from the study were employed. The process involved strict observance of World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines on COVID-19. The research was conducted between April 2020 and February 2021. Results showed that displaced children suffered a spectrum of challenges before COVID-19. During the COVID-19 period, respondents had limited access to child protection services, experienced increased conflicts at home, and limited access to formal learning and entertainment: their already dire situation was exacerbated by COVID-19. The study recommends the upgrade of the local secondary school to advanced level status, adoption of educational innovations in lieu of the COVID-19 pandemic, including radio, television, and virtual learning platforms; improved child protection mechanisms; accommodation; dietary diversity; access to water and sanitation hygiene; provision of electricity; adequate street lighting; activities for entertainment; and increasing awareness against child abuse and gender-based violence (GBV).

Keywords: *COVID-19, TRC, Refugees, Emergencies, Innovations.*

* Africa University, Mutare, Zimbabwe, Africa. Email: mandikianam@africau.edu

** Africa University, Mutare, Zimbabwe, Africa. Email: awasthiy@africau.edu

*** Zimbabwe Open University, Harare, Zimbabwe, Africa. Email: idambudzo@yahoo.co.uk

Introduction

Tongogara Refugee Camp (TRC) lies in the south-eastern part of Zimbabwe and is home to 14,750 (66.54%) of the 22,168 refugees, asylum seekers, and persons of concern in the country. Of the population at the refugee camp, 2,304 (15.62%) are minors below the age of 12-17 years (UNHCR, January 2021). The large number of refugees, asylum and displaced populations concentrated in Tongogara Refugee Camp is because Zimbabwe enforces an encampment policy, based on its reservations to Articles 17 (access to employment) and 26 (freedom of movement) of the 1951 UN Convention relating to the status of refugees (UN, 1951). The encampment policy also creates room for coordinated humanitarian response and provision of security. Long-term solutions to this temporary arrangement are voluntary repatriation and resettlement to other countries, mainly in the developed world.

Camp concentrations are, however, a rich ground for the spontaneous spread of pandemics. For a population of such magnitude, the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic created an explosive scenario, considering the fragmented disaster preparedness levels existent at international, regional, national, and community levels. In an effort to contain the pandemic, governments across the globe adopted national lockdown strategies, including the government of Zimbabwe. The lockdown affected service delivery, with service providers retreating to the comfort and safety of their homes and families outside the refugee camp. Refugees, asylum seekers, and migrant populations were left in a quagmire of uncertainty.

Objectives of the study

The research objectives for the study were: i) to explore the challenges that refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced children aged 12-17 years and residents at Tongogara Refugee Camp face, ii) to ascertain how COVID-19 has affected refugee, asylum seekers, and migrant children aged 12-17 years who reside at Tongogara Refugee Camp; and iii) to propose solutions that refugee, asylum seeker and migrant children aged 12-17 years are facing the challenges at Tongogara Refugee Camp.

Research Gap

Although some minimal research work had been conducted on how refugee children at global levels had been affected by COVID-19, TRC remained an area that required refined study to ascertain the magnitude of the effects of COVID-19 and determine the specific interventions

which were required to mitigate or enhance these effects, depending on whether they were negative or positive in design respectively.

Contribution to the Study

This study focussed explicitly on Tongogara Refugee Camp in Zimbabwe. The contribution is an in-depth analysis of Tongogara Refugee Camp's case to inform policymakers on the corrective trajectory to take. It is also expected to inform the government and its partners as they continue with their work at TRC so that they are better informed when making decisions that affect the children in the camp.

Statement of the Problem

The COVID-19 pandemic caught governments at the global level napping. For African countries in general and Zimbabwe in particular, disaster preparedness levels were almost non-existent or dysfunctional. Although refugees in Zimbabwe are provided with very basic services, an additional crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the programing and operational gaps to the assistance rendered to displaced populations residing at Tongogara Refugee Camp.

Literature Review

Theoretical Framework

Tongogara refugee camp is a place where 14,750 refugees, asylum seekers, and persons of concern reside. The theories of social development and social and emotional learning (SEL) are considered the foundation of this study. This is primarily based on the realization by Huitt and Dawson (2011) that 'human beings are inherently social.' By this qualification, social development theories are central to understanding the interactions and dynamics within this society. SAGE (2015) records the various social development theories, including maturism, psychoanalysis, psychosocial development, behaviorism, cognitivism, socio-culturalism, bio socialism, and ecological systems theories.

Of particular interest is Freud's (1856-1939) psychoanalytic theory of the genital stage, which covers children 11-18 years. As this is the category under which the respondents fall. So, it is important to understand that there is a strong interest in the opposite sex at this stage and that with the onset of puberty, libido is very high. Likewise, Erickson's (1982) psychosocial development theory places the 12-18 years category in the adolescent stage, characterized by

identity and role confusion. According to his theory, children battle to understand themselves and how they fit into the world at this stage. Role confusion then sets in as they fail to place themselves anywhere in society.

In addition, Bandura's (1986) theory of social learning and cognition explains that social competence is achieved through,

'Behaviors children and adolescents observe within their home or culture, cognitive factors such as a student's own expectations of success, and social factors such as classroom and school climate' (Bandura 1986 in Huitt and Dawson, 2011).

The above propositions confirm that children are a part of society, and who they become is shaped by their cognitive and social environments. In order to then function as constructive beings, children require to acquire social competence skills. Social competence is in itself defined by Bierman (2004) as the

'capacity to coordinate adaptive responses flexibly to various interpersonal demands, and to organize social behavior in different social contexts in a manner beneficial to oneself and consistent with social conventions and morals' (p. 141).

Although the above theories have explained social development in humanity, their hiatus is that they have not considered the principles of social development in emergency and encampment scenarios. Fegert et al. (2018) acknowledge that refugees and displaced populations experience trauma before, during, and after the war and conflict flight experiences, resulting in post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD), which leads to dysfunctional behavior and an inability to cope with social and family life. However, again, the challenge with this principle is that it is hinged upon social relations. In the awakening of the COVID-19 pandemic, mitigation strategies such as lockdown and minimized physical, social contact created a theoretical gap on how children can develop during a humanitarian emergency and lockdown scenarios. The panacea to these challenges has been Social and Emotional Learning (SEL), which, according to Elias et al. (1997), refers to a process of acquiring competencies to recognize and manage emotions, set and achieve goals, appreciate the perspective of others, establish and maintain social relationships, make responsible decisions, and handle interpersonal situations constructively.

Empirical Framework

The researchers assume a positivist epistemology that the world must be investigated through objective means. This perspective fits into the realist ontology, wherein the researchers inquire

into the area under study using scientific methods, with the belief and understanding that there is a single truth that can be unearthed through scientific means. Due to the complexity of the study, a lighter approach of internal realism which also assumes that even though facts are concrete, sometimes it is difficult to reveal them, is also considered.

At the end of January 2021, there were 22,168 refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced persons of concern in Zimbabwe. Of these, 14,750, representing 67%, were housed at Tongogara Refugee Camp, found in the country's south-eastern part, with at least 5,411 (37%) of this population being children school-going age between 5 and 17 years. Based on its reservations to Articles 17 and 26 of the UN 1951 Convention on Refugees, Zimbabwe enforces an encampment policy. There are, however, some exceptions for travel for various reasons, but a gate pass is obtained from the Camp Administrator's office. Chikanda and Crush (2016) explain that although refugees in Zimbabwe are permitted to integrate at minimal levels into towns and villages, the government prefers to enforce the encampment policy, which permits refugees, asylum seekers, and persons of concern to receive assistance from the government and various agencies in a coordinated manner. Mufandauya (2015) challenges this position, explaining that the encampment policy infringes on refugees' human rights and freedoms and displaced populations.

Conceptual Framework

The state of being a refugee is synonymous with vulnerability. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2020), at least 25.2 million refugees and internally displaced people are in Africa. These are largely hosted in poor countries with compromised health service delivery systems and very weak support structures. Zimbabwe is no exception, as Chikohomero (2019) posits:

"The Zimbabwean economy has been teetering on the edge of crisis... The economy is bedeviled by many ailments...low productivity, policy inconstancy, and uncertainty and the government's inclination towards control, as well as a currency and liquidity crisis."

The Zimbabwean government is already struggling with its own population, and the addition of refugees and displaced populations exacerbate the situation. Entreculturas (2011) adds that "life in Zimbabwe has become extremely difficult for the majority of the population. And despite this, it continues to receive refugees...internally displaced persons living in illegal settlements are in a

worse situation than refugees." According to Mbiyozo (2021), the long-term solution lies in resettling refugees into developed countries. However, the folly is that resettlement prospects have dwindled over the years, with only 22,770 out of 79.5 million refugees resettled by 20 countries in 2020 (Mbiyozo, 2021). The translation is that what was once a temporary encampment arrangement has turned into a long-term solution, with severe violations of human rights over the years.

Children in emergencies face a plethora of challenges. Constituting over half of the Tongogara Refugee Camp population, it is precarious to ignore the consequences of their state of life. UNHCR (2020) statistics show that at least 70% of refugees in Tongogara Refugee Camp are from the Democratic Republic of Congo, where war has been ongoing for over a decade. The implication is that refugees suffer from mild to severe trauma and certain dysfunctionalities, which render them both a threat to and threatened by society. Fegert et al. (2018) explain that "refugees who have fled from war zones are at significantly increased risk for post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD) and other trauma-related disorders." Refugees, especially children and women, experience grave traumatic experiences during three phases: pre-flight (back in their countries of origin), during flight (as they flee their homes and seek refuge), and after the flight (in the camp). These experiences may include witnessing mass shootings or man slaughtering of close family members, rape, being forced to become child soldiers, female genital mutilation, torture, discrimination, domestic violence, hunger, linguistic barriers, and other traumatic experiences which render them at the mercy of the host government and its partners.

Children who would have had their education disturbed by war or other reasons in their home country also face a plethora of challenges when they arrive in the host country. First, language barriers prevent them from direct academic engagement with educators. Their wounded psyche also makes it difficult for them to have a lengthy concentration span of at least 8 hours per day at school, and the educators, mostly local staff members, do not share in their traumatic experience and hence are less likely to empathize with them. The results are chronic absenteeism, school drop-out, and negative coping strategies, including juvenile delinquency, teenage pregnancies, and crime.

The above adverse effects are especially more heinous for unaccompanied minors in emergencies. Mhlanga, Kapesa, and Dziro (2018) summarise this vicious downward circle by arguing that "refugee life is a complex life defined by poverty, vulnerability and uncertainty,

with vulnerability at the core of the matrix. However, unaccompanied refugee minors are even more vulnerable..." The implication is that within the vulnerable population of refugees and people in emergencies, vulnerability is also stratified, with children, especially unaccompanied children, at the peak of this matrix.

The handful of agencies that work at Tongogara Refugee Camp support the Zimbabwean government in unique ways. Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) provides pastoral education, child safeguarding, and livelihoods support. Teres Des Hommes provides shelter, education, water, and sanitation hygiene (WASH), health, psychosocial, child safeguarding, and food support. World Vision provides water and sanitation hygiene (WASH) and livelihoods support. Childline provides psychosocial and child safeguarding support, while the government of Zimbabwe, through the Department of Social Department, provides social work services is the over-arching body that coordinates activities at TRC. Additionally, the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) provides security, law, and order, considering the volatile nature of the backgrounds of the TRC population.

Temporary housing structures, mostly comprised of prefabricated material, are provided to displaced persons at TRC. These are arranged into ten housing sections, mostly dependent upon one's country of origin, year, and month of arrival. Some refugees and asylum seekers have gone to great pain to build single or double-roomed structures using self-molded bricks, an exercise that has fueled child labor and deforestation in the area.

IOM (2020) bemoans that "many live in overcrowded camps, settlements, makeshift shelters or reception centers." The Great Lakes region, especially the Democratic Republic of Congo, which contributes at least 70% of Zimbabwe refugees, has a huge family size culture. This means the average family has between 4 and 6 children. The bigger picture is that families live in overcrowded and almost squalid conditions. Their shelters are often one or two-roomed houses with very limited or no ventilation at all: a situation potentially fuels the spread of chronic infections such as COVID-19.

Water is provided through 15 bush-type boreholes and 97 communal taps, although some works are underway to improve the situation. Based on the population figure, each water pump services an average of 124 people. The limited national electricity supply and limited pumping capacity of the main borehole make it impossible for a 24-hour water supply. For this reason, water

pumped into a tank is opened between 8 AM and 3 PM on a rotational basis, based on sections in which people live, and families make the trip to the communal taps for the day's supply.

Ablution facilities are also mostly communal, each squat hole serving an average of 20 people or more, with some of them also doubling as bathrooms. A significant number of these ablution facilities are dilapidating, posing a danger of giving in while someone is in use. Additionally, the ablution facilities are naturally cited far from the makeshift houses, thereby posing a hazard to different groups of the society, especially girls and women, who are prone to physical and sexual abuse.

Health services for refugees are, by Zimbabwean standards, far much better than for local mediocre to poor people. This is largely because services for refugees are free. Medication is provided free of charge, albeit some medication being out of stock in isolated cases. They also have access to a Doctor's medical health practitioner once or twice a week, and every weekday, respectively. The two ambulances available also assist in medical referrals to the district hospital in Chipinge, where more complicated cases are treated. Regardless of this superb arrangement, specialized services such as dental care, optometry, dialysis, and others are not covered under the free medical scheme, administered by Teres Des Hommes (TDH) and funded by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).

Flipping the coin, the presence of refugees in Tongogara Refugee Camp has also created avenues for boosting the Zimbabwean economy. This has been achieved through employment creation for the government and partner organizations and supporting livelihood activities for the host communities. The TRC community also provides a ready market for fresh farm produce and supply of various sundries.

COVID-19 Pandemic

Zimbabwe's Statutory Instrument (SI) 77 of 2020, section 2 defines COVID-19 as 'the Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCov), which is an infectious disease caused by a virus which, having emerged during 2019, was declared a global pandemic by the World Health Organisation on the 11 March, 2020.' The pandemic has symptoms almost similar to the common flu, inclusive of headache and sore throat, but also causes shortness of breath and chest pains, leading to severe pneumonia in aggravated cases. WHO (20 April, 2020) situational report 91 stated that there were 2,314,621 confirmed COVID-19 cases globally, with 157,847 deaths, the majority of which in European countries. As of 26 April, 2020, Zimbabwe recorded 31 cases, 5 recoveries, and 4

deaths. The transmission was sporadic, except for one case of international travel in the near distant past (WHO, 20 April, 2020). With no cure in sight, the World Health Organisation recommended vaccination as the most effective way to curtail this virus. Additionally, strategies to curtail the spread of the virus were adopted. These included national lockdowns, social distancing to a minimum distance of 1 meter between people, regular washing of hands with soap and water, sanitizing hands with an alcohol-based rub, not to touch one's face, sneezing into one's flexed elbow, discarding tissue paper immediately after use, quarantining and self-isolating for between 14 and 21 days of persons who would have been in contact with some positively identified cases, and proper wearing of face masks.

COVID-19, Globalization and Refugees

COVID-19 is an infectious disease that has demonstrated to the world that it is non-selective. Anyone can get infected, and this includes the young, old, rich, and poor. However, it is also true to say that because of the nature of the spread of the virus, through close contact with an infected person, the conditions in which refugees find themselves are desirable for the spread of the pandemic. IOM (2020) records COVID-19 as the largest mobility crisis, wherein migrants and displaced populations are at the highest risk of infection. Although it has come with technological advantages, such as virtual technology to conduct business and learning, the concept of globalization has, in this scenario, worked largely against humanity. A virus that began in Wuhan, China, has terrorized the entire globe to gigantic proportions, evidence that all nations have a meeting and melting point. Despite economic status or global location, there is some interaction, and the human being is the greatest disease vector.

The impacts of the virus are pretty frightening: human capital loss, economic meltdown, a threat to human security, disruption of the general functioning of the global village, and several others. Notably, Ambrose (2020) recorded that by 20 April, 2020, the United States crude oil prices plunged from \$ 18 a barrel to - \$38. In an ironic turn out of events, suppliers were paying buyers to relieve them of unwanted stocks for which they could no longer find storage. All this being part of the economic crunch caused by COVID19, as consumption decreased, industries closed, and human capital also became seriously affected or infected in one way or the other.

For refugees, the impact is far outreaching, as IOM (2020) hammers that "refugees, those forcibly displaced, the stateless and migrants, are at heightened risk." With already compromised immune systems due to nutrition deficiencies, stress, and squalid living arrangements, refugees remain vulnerable to infectious diseases such as COVID-19. At Tongogara Refugee Camp and other refugee camps in Africa, the squalid living conditions make it practically impossible to observe the recommendations for the social distancing of at least 1 meter between two people. Similarly, several governments adopted lockdowns, including the Zimbabwean government, which also led to increased child and gender-based abuse.

Yaker and Erskine (2020) confirmed increased incidents of gender-based violence due to quarantine, lockdown, and social distancing measures related to stress and tension, brought about by COVID-19, an indication that the pandemic has far-reaching impact than what meets the eye. The global focus shifted towards responding to the health emergency of COVID-19. This negated other services, inclusive of sexual and reproductive health, antenatal and post-natal care. Women and girls were disproportionately affected as they were disabled to negotiate safer sex (UNFPA, 2020). The prolonged enclosures also confirmed Freud's (1856-1939) psychoanalytic theory, with agencies recording an increase in teenage pregnancies and sexual interactions amongst children in TRC, including cases of incest.

COVID-19 and Refugee Children

Refugee children have not been spared in this matrix. Their lives are extremely complicated, as they are disproportionately at the pinnacle of the vulnerability index. Zimmermann and Curtis (2020) posit that the symptoms of COVID-19, which include fever, cough, sore throat, fatigue, shortness of breath, and gastrointestinal symptoms, are more aggravated in children. Daily, children's lives are a real struggle, as observed by UNICEF (2020) that "every day, refugee children, migrant children and children affected by conflict face unspeakable threats to their safety and well-being, and this in the absence of the pandemic." Henceforth, COVID-19 exacerbated the complexity of refugee children's lives. The Alliance for Child Protection in Humanitarian Action (2020) explains that diseases of an infectious nature disrupt children's daily routine, affecting their well-being and progression. The 51% of children living in Tongogara Refugee Camp were subjected to a national lockdown of up to 5 consecutive weeks in March and April 2020. The results showed that their daily lives were excessively disrupted.

At least a week before the scheduled holidays, the closure of schools on 24 March, 2020 disrupted examinations and revision lessons, with some uncertainty over the way forward regarding the national examinations for Form Four and Six learners at the end of the year. It was unclear how long it would be before schools re-opened or the transmission mode of lessons after that. According to Mandikiana (2020), the COVID-19 pandemic affected 4.6 million, and 127,000 learners and educators in Zimbabwe, respectively.

Chances for nutrition needs to be met further distanced from them, as the lockdown disrupted their parents and caregivers' small livelihood activities. These same livelihood activities would provide dietary variety, albeit in a small way, as parents would outsource for some unanticipated amenities such as their monthly food rations, which comprise cereals, pulses, and vegetable oil.

Violence against children increased to figures which could not be confirmed during the national lockdown, largely due to the absence or minimal presence of child protection agency workers and government social workers subjected to the lockdown. With service providers retreating from the frontline, children were left exposed to a plethora of abuses, with limited hope of reporting to relevant authorities.

Refugee families in TRC are quite huge, with an average of four to six children per family, and all are living in a single or double roomed house. The implication was that children were subjected to pornographic nuances as their parents, caregivers, or siblings engaged in conjugal activities. Children's inherent right to play, in accordance with article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, was also taken away from them due to the COVID-19 induced lockdowns. There were very limited options to pose as indoor recreational activities. Although health services continued, these were reduced to emergency cases, and regular health care such as HIV/AIDS testing and counseling services, sexual and reproductive health services, and teenage psychosocial counseling sessions were suspended.

The community-based 97 water taps and 15 bush-pump type boreholes also meant that children, especially girls, who do most of the reproductive chores, were exposed to COVID-19 through contact with others at the water-points, as no fumigation was done. Although social distancing was observed, contact with others was not wholly removed. In the absence of COVID-19, for children, the trip to the water taps was associated with an opportunity to meet and socialize with friends. For this incentive to be taken away, the effects were daunting to children.

Some unprecedented levels of stigma and discrimination were also experienced, as the community shunned the disease and any suspected cases. Suspected cases were not clinically confirmed, but there was some form of stigma within the community over individuals with some symptoms, even those for common influenza. Children of the suspected cases were also shunned by others, thereby affecting their psychological well-being.

Knoll and Bisong (2020) argued that 'social distancing means less support, less access to necessities or services.' Examples include how food aid has come to a halt in Italy and that refugees in Libya were completely cut off from aid. For refugees already living in the encampment, the impact is grave as they heavily rely on the services and amenities provided by the government and its partners for survival. Summarily, with their only source of livelihood and support removed, the vulnerability of refugees, especially unaccompanied refugee children, is exacerbated.

Refugee Children's Education and Social and Emotional Learning (SEL)

While education can be damaging and fuel conflicts in that it can be manipulated to promote hatred, resentment, and stereotypes, it is also a means towards achieving peace and post-conflict reconstruction. The World Bank (2005) has acknowledged the significant role that education contributes towards restructuring the minds of broken children. The experience of forcible recruitment as child soldiers, being manipulated into prostitution, being brainwashed into hating one's own family, and several other vices used as machinations to significantly cause damage to children, all have lasting effects, which children regrettably haul with them into the classroom. There are three formal schools at TRC: an Early Childhood Development (ECD) Centre, primary and secondary schools with enrolments of 694; 2 486 and 862 children respectively, and two non-formal courses comprised of a language class and after-school homework classes offered by Jesuit Refugee Service in support of St Michael's secondary school. The enrolment for these two classes varies, but the average is 50 and 299 learners, respectively. Added together, this brings to 4,391 the number of children that are in school in TRC. Of the total of 7,576 children below the age of 18 years in TRC, 2,165 are under 5 years, leaving 5,411 the total number of school-going aged children in the camp. Of these, 81% are receiving either formal or non-formal education.

Children in emergencies experience all sorts of traumatic experiences before, during, and after their flight experience. In TRC, as of July 2019, the trend was a high school drop-out, truancy, teenage substance abuse, teenage pregnancies, and general juvenile delinquency. An inquiry made by JRS through an education project baseline survey indicated that refugee learners faced language barriers at school, found it challenging to learn the Zimbabwean curriculum delivered to them in a third language, and were naturally demotivated as they felt they were not heard, understood and that they were discriminated against (JRS,2019). It was learned that in addition to the national curriculum, Social and Emotional Learning (SEL) was a required method to address the psychosocial and emotional well-being of learners, youth, and children at Tongogara Refugee Camp.

Social and Emotional Learning (SEL) is described by the International Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE, 2016) as fostering interrelated cognitive, affective, and behavioral competencies of 'self-awareness, self-management, social awareness, relationship skills, and responsible decision making.' It is a way in which both learners and educators understand individual and social dynamics. Elias et al. (1997) explain that it is 'the process of acquiring core competencies to recognize and manage emotions, set and achieve goals, appreciate the perspective of others, establish and maintain positive relationships, make responsible decisions, and handle interpersonal situations constructively.' As part of Social and Emotional Learning, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC, 2007) designed a pyramid for psychosocial support programming. Basic services and security form the base, followed by community and family support, focused and non-specialized support, and specialized services at the top or pinnacle of the pyramid. Therefore, it follows that COVID-19 response mechanisms supersede the more specialized psychosocial healing process, which is a vital component for displaced populations. Designed to function in rather normalized emergency or refugees' setups, at least more than 70% of SEL interventions rely on physical contact or provision of services in the vicinity of each other. The global COVID-19 pandemic presents a rather daunting scenario wherein social distancing has become mandatory to prevent the further spreading of the virus. Newer and more innovative ways of providing Social and Emotional Learning and psychosocial support programming which do not necessarily require physical contact must be designed. Such interventions must include the use of toll-free numbers, suggestion boxes, and social media

platforms, such as WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. Social and Emotional Learning and Psychosocial support provisions may also be adopted through Information and Education Communication (IEC) material, and folktales or culture dances, relayed through radio or television. In the family setup, such messages can be adopted in play, using indoor activities such as skipping ropes, snakes and ladders, chess, darts, and others, adopting innovating means of relaying such vital messages.

Materials and Methods

Study Area and Variables

The research was a case study that focussed on refugees, asylum seekers, and migrant children aged 12 to 17 years who are residents at Tongogara Refugee Camp (TRC). The camp is situated in Chipinge district, in the south-eastern part of Zimbabwe. The study area was human rights, with a specific focus on refugee children and COVID-19.

The dependent variable for the research study was children aged between 12 and 17 years who were residents at Tongogara Refugee Camp during the study period. COVID-19 was the independent variable, whereas the variables included access to education, health, child protection, water and sanitation, accommodation, and other amenities.

Data Collection Techniques

Ramamurthy (2011) explains a research design as

"The specification of methods and procedures for acquiring the information needed. It is an overall operational pattern or framework of the project that stipulates what information is to be collected from which source by what procedures" (p.50).

This research study triangulated emerging literature on COVID-19: how it affects children in general; children in vulnerable situations, particularly girls, orphans, and migrant populations. This was obtained through published journal articles and various situational reports from agencies that operate in the camp. Additionally, the researchers also conducted action research through observation and inquiry. Murairwa (2016) explains that observation "is a primary data source for acquiring knowledge about an individual or unit in the research sample or population...This source of research data allows certain phenomena to be accessed and properly understood."

Population and Sample Size Determination

UNHCR (January 2021) population statistics for Tongogara Refugee Camp were used to obtain children aged between 12 and 17 years. From this population, the researchers chose the standard 10% population sample size. According to Murairwa (2016), the research sample size is determined by the population size. For this study, this was calculated as follows:

$N = 2,304$ (1,101 females and 1,203 males)

$n = 10\%$ of 2,304

$n = 230$

Sample Size: 230 participants

Based on the above sample size selection, the researchers collected data from 230 respondents. However, it should be noted that in the collection of data, no cognizant was given to the sex of the respondents.

Data Collection and Sampling Techniques

For the data collection process, the researchers designed an interview tool administered to various stakeholders in the camp. A questionnaire for children living in TRC was designed and fed into KoBo Toolbox. The link was shared to refugee children WhatsApp platforms for completion. Additionally, and more effectively, copies were also printed and shared with respondents for completion. Two multi-lingual and clean child protection records research assistants from the community were hired to assist with this process. Despite the advantages of physical data collection, because of the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic, hard copies could have been a severe vector in spreading the virus. This mainly was because children at TRC mentioned constraints with access to smartphones and data to complete the online questionnaire. Care was taken to observe COVID-19 regulations, including sanitizers, face masks, and social distancing.

Non-probability sampling techniques were employed in the process of data collection. These included voluntary, collision, convenience, snowball, judgmental, and quota sampling designs. The researchers and research assistants targeted private but open spaces for child protection issues. The Camp Administrator granted consent to speak to children, who represent the government, being the overarching duty bearer. In cases where it was also expedient to do so, permission was sought from the guardians and parents of the children in question. Despite consent being granted, the sensitive nature of some of the questions made it quite difficult to

conduct interviews in the children's homes and in the presence of parents and guardians. Likewise, the accommodation situation at Tongogara Refugee Camp (TRC) was not ideal for observing COVID-19 regulations. For this purpose, most of the data were collected in open spaces. Respondents were debriefed on the research objectives and the overall advocacy goal towards improving their lives and stay at Tongogara Refugee Camp. Informed consent was sought from them too, and they were sufficiently informed of the option to withdraw from participating if they felt the need to do so.

The collected data, which was captured in KoBo Toolbox, was cleaned and analyzed. Quantitative and qualitative data were analyzed through SPSS and NVivo, respectively. All three research questions were qualitative, whereas some aspects were quantitative. The study responds to the gap in the literature on Tongogara Refugee Camp, especially on how COVID-19, as a new pandemic, has affected children aged 12- 17 years.

Results and Discussions

TRC Demographic Status

As of 31 January 2021, Tongogara Refugee Camp was home to 14,750 refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced persons. Of these, 2,304 (15.62%) comprised 1,203 males, and 1,101 females were minors aged between 12 and 17 years. The demographic data, disaggregated by age, was shown in Figure 1 below:




Figure 1. Tongogara Refugee Camp Demographics as of 31 January 2021.

Although no special care was taken to balance off the gender of the research participants, table 1 below shows that 12.2% more males participated in the research study.

Table 1. Disaggregation of Research Participants by Gender

GENDER			
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Male	129	56.1
	Female	101	43.9
	Total	230	100.0
Total		230	100.0

This same data is represented by figure 2:




Figure 2. Gender Disaggregation of Respondents

The ages of participants varied from 12 to 17 years. The below frequency distribution table shows that those aged 16 years constituted 31.3%, translating to the highest percentage, whereas children aged 13 participated the least, constituting 6.1% of the respondents, as shown in Table 2 below:

Table 2. Age Frequency Distribution of Respondents

		Age	
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	12	18	7.8
	13	14	6.1
	14	24	10.4
	15	45	19.6
	16	72	31.3
	17	57	24.8
	Total	230	100.0

The study also inquired about the duration of stay at TRC. The majority of respondents, represented by 73.5%, had stayed at TRC for over five years. 25.2% had stayed between twelve months to five years, whereas the least percentage of 1.3% had stayed between 0 and 11 months.

Table 3. Duration of Stay at TRC

Duration at Tongogara

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	+5 years	169	73.5
	1 - 5 years	58	25.2
	Up to 1 year	3	1.3
	Total	230	100.0

Most of the refugees that participated in the survey were enrolled at school, with school students occupying 86.1% of the sample population. A small number argued that they were not enrolled in school for various reasons, including their being new arrivals, having no refugee status, not wanting to go to school, and language barriers.

Table 4. School Enrolment

		School enrolment	
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Out of school	32	13.9
	In school	198	86.1
	Total	230	100.0



Figure 3. School Enrolment for Respondents

Although the population of the respondents comprised of different nationalities, it can be seen from Table 5 below that the majority were from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The remaining population was almost evenly distributed among the remaining countries, although a small number was seen on respondents of Sudanese and Eritrean origins.

Table 5. Respondents Disaggregated by Country of Origin

Country of Origin		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Burundi	23	10.0
	Democratic Republic of Congo	121	52.6
	Eritrea	8	3.5
	Ethiopia	15	6.5
	Mozambique	16	7.0
	Rwanda	19	8.3
	Somalia	19	8.3
	Sudan	9	3.9
	Total	230	100.0




Figure 4. Duration of Stay at TRC, Distributed by Country of Origin

Hypotheses Tests on Demographics

Treatment of TRC Children *versus* Host Community Children

An inquiry was made on whether respondents felt discriminated against or not compared to children in the host community. Hypotheses were made as follows:

H0: Refugees living at Tongogara refugee camp are not equally treated against children in the host community.

H1: Refugees living at Tongogara refugee camp are equally treated against children in the host community.

The binomial test shows a calculated value of 0.059, which is greater than 0.05. With these results, we fail to reject H0 at a 5% level of significance and therefore conclude that children living at TRC are not equally treated compared to children from the host community.

Table 6. Binomial Tests

Binomial Test						
	Category	N	Observed Prop.	Test Prop.	Exact Sig. (2-tailed)	
TREATMENT AT TONGOGARA	Group 1	Yes	73	.32	.50	.059
	Group 2	No	157	.68		
	Total		230	1.00		

Knowledge on COVID-19 *versus* School Enrolment

A test was run on whether there is any relationship between COVID-19 knowledge and school enrollment, assuming that the categories occur with equal frequency. The hypotheses were as follows:

H0: There is no sufficient evidence to prove that refugees enrolled at school are more likely to have knowledge of COVID-19 than those that do not go to school.

H1: There is sufficient evidence to prove that refugees enrolled at school are more likely to have knowledge of COVID-19 than those that do not go to school.

Table 7. Knowledge on COVID-19 versus School Enrolment

		SCHOOL ENROLMENT * KNOWLEDGE ON COVID-19 Crosstabulation				
		KNOWLEDGE ON COVID-19			Total	
			Very well	Average		Not at all
SCHOOL ENROLMENT	Yes	Count	3	159	36	198
		Expected Count	2.6	150.7	44.8	198.0
	No	Count	0	16	16	32
		Expected Count	.4	24.3	7.2	32.0
Total		Count	3	175	52	230
		Expected Count	3.0	175.0	52.0	230.0

Table 8. Chi-Square Tests on Knowledge on COVID-19 versus School Enrolment

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	16.145	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	14.322	2	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	15.730	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	230		

The results above show that the calculated p-value is less than 0.05, which means we reject H₀ at a 5% significance level. Therefore, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to prove that refugees enrolled at school are more likely to know COVID-19 than those who do not go to school.

Test of Q.1: Challenges Faced by Refugee, Asylum Seeker and Migrant Children at TRC

Respondents were asked about the challenges they face at Tongogara Refugee Camp, and the results show a spectrum of them. These range from child abuse of various forms (sexual, emotional, and verbal abuse, child labor, early marriages, and other forms), poor accommodation, limited privacy, no access to alternative learning, poor sanitation and hygiene,

and others. The least cited challenges were limited access to career guidance, entertainment, scholarship opportunities to further studies, and no advanced level facilities at the local (St Michael's) secondary school.



Figure 5. Word Cloud on Challenges Faced by Children at Tongogara Refugee Camp

The frequency distribution table and graph below zoom into the occurrence of these challenges:

Table 9. Frequency Distribution of Challenges Faced by Refugees at TRC

	Frequency
Abuse (Sexual, verbal, emotional and physical)	42
Poor accommodation with no privacy	36
No access to alternative learning	35
Poor sanitation & limited access to water and health	35
No access to electricity	30
Hunger & poor diet	29
Early marriages	24
Child Labour	22
Tribalism & discrimination	20
Teachers do not attend lessons	16
No representation at important fora	15
Conflicts in the community	13
No refugee status	10

Not allowed to participate in sports activities at the national level	10
No access to scholarships	7
No entertainment	7
No access to career guidance	5
No Advanced level at St Michaels (local) secondary school	4




Figure 6. Challenges Faced by Children at Tongogara Refugee Camp

Test of Q.2: Effects of COVID-19 on Refugee, Asylum Seeker and Migrant Children TRC

Effect on Education

Research results unearthed that COVID-19 greatly affected respondents. 33.9% were worried that "they will not cover the expected ground for the various syllabi." This resulted in fear of underperforming in their year-end national examinations, which would hugely affect their academic and professional future. A small percentage (5.6%) argued that shutting down schools might result in learners' not getting child protection services from the school.

Table10. Shutting Down of Schools Due to COVID-19 on Children Resident at TRC

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Worried that we will not cover expected ground for the various syllabi	78	33.9
	Worried to either not perform well or to miss examinations at the end of the year	47	20.4
	Miss teachers, competition, interaction and playing with other learners	19	8.3
	Worried that I am not getting child protection services from the school	13	5.7
	All of the above	41	18.3
	Total	198	86.5

The study also investigated learning alternatives provided during COVID-19 lockdowns. The following hypotheses were made:

H0: COVID-19 induced lockdowns did not affect refugees that are enrolled in school at TRC.

H1: COVID-19 induced lockdowns affected refugees that are enrolled in school at TRC.

Table 11. School Enrolment *versus* Learning Alternatives during COVID-19

SCHOOL ENROLMENT * LEARNING ALTERNATIVES PROVIDED DURING LOCKDOWN							
Crosstabulation							
			LEARNING ALTERNATIVES PROVIDED DURING LOCKDOWN				
			Learning material from other partners working in the camp	Online lessons offered by the school	Library services offered by NGOs/ educational partners	No access	Total
SCHOOL ENROLMENT	Yes	Count	32	9	5	151	197
		Expected Count	32.8	9.0	5.0	150.2	197.0
	No	Count	1	0	0	0	1
		Expected Count	.2	.0	.0	.8	1.0
Total	Count	33	9	5	151	198	
	Expected Count	33.0	9.0	5.0	151.0	198.0	

Table 12. Chi-square Tests on Learning Alternatives Provided during COVID-19 Period

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5.025	3	.017
Likelihood Ratio	3.609	3	.031
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.011	1	.045
N of Valid Cases	198		

The above results show that the calculated p-value (0.017) is less than 0.05, leading to rejecting H_0 . We, therefore, conclude that COVID-19 induced lockdowns affected refugees that were enrolled at school in TRC. Most students stated that they had no access to any learning alternatives, which made them fear not being able to cover expected ground for the various syllabi.

Effects on Child Protection and Conflicts during COVID-19 Lockdown Period

The study also made an inquiry on child safety and conflicts at home during the COVID-19 lockdown period, with the following hypotheses being formulated:

H₀: There is no evidence to support the argument that staying at home during COVID-19 lockdown increased the magnitude of conflicts at home.

H₁: There is evidence to support the argument that staying at home during COVID-19 lockdown increased the magnitude of conflicts at home.

Table 13. Conflicts at Home during COVID-19

HAVE CONFLICTS INCREASED BECAUSE OF LOCKDOWN * DO YOU FEEL SAFE AT HOME DURING COVID-19 Crosstabulation					
			DO YOU FEEL SAFE AT HOME DURING COVID-19		
			Yes	No	Total
HAVE CONFLICTS INCREASED BECAUSE OF LOCKDOWN	Yes	Count	95	129	224
		Expected Count	97.4	126.6	224.0
	No	Count	5	1	6
		Expected Count	2.6	3.4	6.0
Total	Count		100	130	230
	Expected Count		100.0	130.0	230.0

Table 14. Chi-square Tests on Conflicts at Home and COVID-19

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3.982	1	.046
Likelihood Ratio	4.168	1	.041
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.965	1	.046
N of Valid Cases	230		

From the results, since the p-value is less than 0.05 (0.045), we reject H0 and conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support the argument that staying at home during COVID-19 increased the magnitude of conflicts at home.

Commensurate with the learning gaps during COVID-19 lockdown periods, 16.2% of the children explained that they needed learning material for use during schools closure. 15.1% highlighted the need for entertainment, 14.2% needed someone to talk to, 14.1% required child protection services, 12.4% wanted access to play, 11.5% needed access to the internet, while 10.7% mentioned the need to access more food, with the least (5.7%) requesting access to medical supplies. The results are shown in Table 15 below:

Table 15. Areas for Support during COVID-19 Lockdown

		Responses	
		N	Percent
Support needed during COVID-19 period	Child Protection Service	181	14.1%
	Someone to talk to (Psychosocial/ Social and Emotional Learning/ Wellness support)	182	14.2%
	Medical Supplies	73	5.7%
	More Food	137	10.7%
	Study (school) Material	208	16.2%
	Internet Service	148	11.5%
	Playing With Friends and Family	159	12.4%
	Entertainment (Watching television/ listening to the radio/ reading novels or magazines)	194	15.1%
Total		1282	100.0%

Of the children who reported the need for protection services and someone to talk to, the majority (87%) feared that access to services was limited. 10.7% said the areas were inaccessible, whereas 2.23% said they had complete child protection services.

Table 16. Areas for Reporting Concerns

AREAS FOR REPORTING COVID-19 CONCERNS * IS THE PLACE(S) ACCESSIBLE Crosstabulation					
Count		IS THE PLACE(S) ACCESSIBLE			Total
		Yes	No	Limited access	
AREAS FOR REPORTING COVID-19 CONCERNS	Yes	5	24	195	224
	No	0	6	0	6
Total		5	30	195	230

Effects on Sickness during COVID-19 Period

60.9% of respondents reported suffering from significant sickness during the COVID-19 lockdown period, whereas 39.1% indicated that they experienced no health challenges at all. Although a significant number of children fell ill during the COVID-19 period, only 5.7% requested extra medical support. Table 16 below shows sickness during the COVID-19 period:

Table 16. Sickness during COVID-19 Period

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Yes	140	60.9
	No	90	39.1
	Total	230	100.0

Test of Q.3: Solutions to Challenges Faced by Children at TRC

Research respondents listed a host of possible solutions to the challenges children face 12-17 years at TRC. These included the provision of alternative learning material, especially online sources, through access to Wi-Fi, increased access to child protection services, provision of decent accommodation which permits privacy. Besides, increased food ration and dietary

diversity, provision of cash to meet other household needs, access to electricity, the building of a safe house, prosecution of perpetrators, awareness campaigns against child abuse, recruitment of refugee teachers at the local schools, non-discrimination of refugee children in the provision of identity documents, provision of scholarships to further education, provision of vocational skills training, direct distribution of sanitary wear to women and girls, upgrading the local secondary school to Advanced level status, and allowing refugee children to participate in sporting activities, in order of preference. The below word cloud, frequency table, and word string represent the findings of the research.



Figure 7. Word Cloud Showing Panacea to Challenges Faced by Children at TRC


Below is:

Table 17. Distribution of Suggested Panacea to Challenges Faced by Children at TRC

	Frequency
Provide Wi-Fi, internet cafe and alternative learning methods	57
Make child protection reporting more accessible	38
Provide decent accommodation	37
Increase food rationing and provide cash	22

Provide access to electricity	22
Build safe houses	19
Perpetrators must be arrested	19
Stop Child abuse campaigns	17
Hire refugee teachers	15
Stop Child labor campaigns	15
Provider ID's and passports for refugees and asylum seeker	15
Improve access to water	14
Awareness campaigns against child marriages	13
The Ministry of Education must supervise teachers	13
Provide entertainment	13
Offer specialized services	10
Provide access to scholarships	9
Offer Vocational Training facilities	8
Distribute sanitary pads directly to women and girls	7
Provide A level at St Michael's Secondary School	7
Awareness campaigns against COVID-19	6
Participate in sporting activities at all levels	5

Figure 8. A Word String on Proposed Solutions to the Children at TRC



Summary, Conclusion, and Recommendations

Aim of the Study

The study aimed to explore the effects of COVID-19 and its mitigatory strategies on refugees, asylum seekers, and migrant children who are residents at Tongogara Refugee Camp, with the purpose to influence policy change towards closing any programming gaps.

Major Findings

The study unearthed that refugee, asylum seeker, and migrant children at TRC had pre-existing challenges before COVID 19. These included inadequate access to water and sanitation, poor accommodation, language barriers at the schools, discrimination and conflicts in the community, child labor, and different forms of abuse.

Based on the research question on the effects of COVID-19 on children at TRC, they explained that during the lockdown period, they had no access to learning material, feared not to complete syllabi, and failed end-of-year examinations. The children also cited increased conflicts at home due to prolonged lockdown periods, inaccessibility of child protection services, and generalized increase in significant sickness during the COVID-19 period.

In response to the question on the panacea to challenges faced, children explained the need for alternative learning methods, increased access to child protection services, provision of entertainment facilities, improved accommodation, awareness campaigns on thematic areas such as ending child labor, sexual abuse, child marriages, upgrading the local secondary school to Advanced level status, recruitment of refugee teachers at the local schools, increased scholarship opportunities and improved health services.

Conclusion

Refugees flee their countries for various reasons, inclusive of war and conflict. This renders them vulnerable as they experience mild to severe trauma during three phases: pre, during, and after the flight experience. The effects are far daunting on refugee children who have to cope with a new lifestyle and adapt to a new school and social and economic setups. COVID-19 has further aggravated their vulnerability, throwing refugee children into a dungeon of not enjoying school, observing social distancing, and not experiencing play, in accordance with Article 31 of the UNCRC. They also experience compromised nutrition status, increased exposure to violence and exploitation, and psychosocial trauma, among other challenges. There is uncertainty and a

prevailing somber atmosphere at Tongogara Refugee Camp. As the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2020) observes, if not adequately addressed through policy, the social crisis created by the COVID-19 pandemic may also increase inequality, exclusion, and discrimination.

Research Gap and Further Research Avenues

Although Zimbabwe's government and its partners have made significant strides towards addressing the physical needs of refugees, asylum seekers, and persons of concern, there is a yawning gap in the provision of holistic psychosocial support. The response to traumatic experiences of children and other complex situations which involve the psyche of children in particular and refugees, in general, is weak, and some thorough work must be needed in this arena. There should also be significant investment in the provision of inclusive and holistic education for displaced children at Tongogara Refugee Camp. This should include upgrading the local secondary school to advanced level status and the provision of meaningful support towards displaced children's access to tertiary education.

Recommendations

After discussing the context, challenges faced, and responses on the ground, the study proposes a new model to respond to displaced children's needs during an emergency.

The Children in the Humanitarian Emergency Model

The 'children in humanitarian emergency model' hinges on the notion that children are at the pinnacle of the vulnerability index. The mere fact exacerbates this social status of refugees and in a health emergency such as the COVID-19 pandemic.


The model proposes that children require a holistic approach to support, wherein the family, community, host government and partner agencies, the regional bodies, and the international community all converge to meet the needs of children in humanitarian emergencies. The major drive, in this case, would be the best interests of the child (Article 3 of the UNCRC), taking into account their rights, responsibilities, and protection from exploitation and abuse. Additionally, the model recognizes that children also learn from each other at the peer level.

In the interest of children's safety, it cannot be feasible to have all these partners and support structures directly in contact with them. Henceforth, it is proposed that in lockdown and travel restriction situations emanating from health-related or other humanitarian emergencies, it is important to build a task force to interact with children directly. In Tongogara Refugee Camp, as

is the case in most, if not all refugee camps in Africa, there is in existence a Child Protection Committee, comprised of Child Safeguarding Officers and Social Workers from the government, members of the police force, and other agencies which support and complement government efforts. This committee should nominate representatives who can engage with children based on the urgency and gravity of matters reported.

For the reporting system, toll-free numbers which voice calls can access, text messages or WhatsApp messages, suggestion boxes and, in grave circumstances, a physical visit, accompanied by a strict observance of health protocols such as the washing of hands with soap or sanitizer, use of face masks, temperature checks and social distancing, must be adhered. Child-friendly spaces and means of collecting data must also be employed. These include photo voices, child-friendly notice boards or walls, peer-to-peer, positive parenting engagements, and safe houses. Photo voices are a way of data collection, wherein children take pictures of all the spots or areas that threaten their safety and share them with policymakers or Child Protection Officers. The same applies to children's voices, wherein children write on pieces of paper their fears and threats to their security, and the same papers are stuck onto a chart or wall for policymakers and relevant authorities to review and take necessary action.

Figure 9: The Children in Humanitarian Emergency Model



References

- Ambrose, J. (20 April, 2020). *Oil prices dip below zero as producers are forced to pay to dispose of excess*. The Guardian. Accessed through www.theguardian.com on 20 April, 2020.
- Bandura, A. (1997). *Self-efficacy: The exercise control*. New York, NY: W. H. Freeman.
- Bierman, K. L. (2004). *Peer rejection: Developmental processes and intervention*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Chikanda, A., & Crush, J., (2016). *The Geography of refugee flows to Zimbabwe*. African Geographical Review. 35(1):18-34.
- Chikohomero, R. (2019). *Open for Business? Appraisal of FDI in Zimbabwe*. Institute of Security Studies. Southern Africa Report 33.
- Elias, M. J., Zins, J.E., Weissberg, R.P., et.al. (1997). *Promoting social and emotional learning: Guidelines for educators*. Alexandria, V.A: Association for Supervision and Consortium Development.
- Erikson, E. (1982). *The life cycle completed*. New York, NY: Norton.
- Fairholm. J. and Singh. G., (2011). *Ten Steps to Creating Safe Environments: How Organizations and Communities Can Prevent, Mitigate and Respond to Interpersonal Violence*. Canadian Red Cross. Page 23.
- Fegert, J.M., Diehl, C., Leyendecker, B., et al., and the Scientific Advisory Council of the Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth. (2018). *Psychosocial problems in traumatized refugee families: overview of risks and some recommendations for support services*. Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and Mental Health. Accessed through <https://doi.org/10.1186/s13034-017-0210-3> on 14 February, 2020.
- Freud, S. (1962). *The ego and the id*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton.
- Hope, J. & van Wyk, C., (2018). *Child Abuse Research in South Africa-A Model for Emergency Child Protection Intervention*. South African Society on the Abuse of Children (SAPSAC). 19 (1):45-57. Accessed through <https://hdl.handle.net/10520/EJC-f13da461f> on 23 April, 2020.
- Huitt, W. & Dawson, C. (2011, April). *Social development: Why it is important and how to impact it*. Educational Psychology Interactive. Valdosta, GA: Valdosta State University. Retrieved from <http://www.edpsycinteractive.org/papers/socdev.pdf> on 17 March 2021.
- Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) (2015). *Guidelines for Integrating Gender-Based Violence Interventions in Humanitarian Action: Food Security and Agriculture*.
- Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) (2007). *IASC Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings*. Geneva: IASC.
- International Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) (2016). *Psychosocial Support and Social and Emotional Learning for Children and Youth in Emergency Settings*. International Rescue Committee, Inc, New York. USA.
- International Organization for Migration (IOM) (31 March, 2020). *The rights and health of*

- refugees, migrants and stateless must be protected in COVID-19 response.* Accessed on 15 April, 2020 through www.com.int .
- Jesuit Refugee Service (2019). *Baseline assessment report on education at Tongogara Refugee Camp.*
- Knoll, A., & Bisong, A., (30 March 2020). *Migration, mobility and COVID-19- A tale of many tales.* Accessed on 15 April, 2020 on www.ecdom.org .
- Mandikiana, M. R. V. (2020). *Rethinking Zimbabwean education during and beyond the COVID-19 pandemic.* Quest Journal of Management and Social Sciences. 2(2): 290-306.
- Mbiyozo, A. N. (2020). *COVID-19 responses in Africa must include migrants and refugees.* Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
- Mbiyozo, A. N. (2021). *Refugee pressure rises as funding dwindles.* Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
- Mhlanga, J., Kapisa. M. J., & Dziro. C., (2018). *Analyzing the effectiveness of foster care arrangement for unaccompanied refugee children at Tongogara Refugee Camp, Zimbabwe.* African Journal of Social Work. 8 (2):29-37.
- Ministry of Health and Child Care (26 April, 2020). *Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: 26 April, 2020.*
- Mufandauya. R. (2015). *Effectiveness of the refugee encampment policy in Zimbabwe: A study of Tongogara Refugee Camp (2013-2014).* Bindura University Publications.
- Murairwa, S. (2016). *Research Statistics with Application Procedures in Statistical Package for the Social Sciences.* Uttar Pradesh. Research Foundation.
- Ramamurthy, G. C. (2011). *Research Methodology.* New Dehli, Dreamtech Press.
- Rogoff, B., & Chavajay, P. (1995). *What's become of the research on the cultural basis of cognitive development?* American Psychologist (50):859-877.
- SAGE, (2015). *Theories of human development.* Accessed on 12 March 2021.
- Skinner, B. F. (1974). *About behaviorism.* New York, NY: Vintage Books.
- The Alliance for Child Protection in Humanitarian Action., (2020). *Technical Note: Protection of Children during the Coronavirus Pandemic.* Version 1, March 2020.
- United Nations (1951). *UN Convention on Refugees.* Accessed through <https://www.unhcr.org/4ca34be29.pdf> on 11 March 2021.
- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (6 April, 2020). *The Social Impact of COVID-19.* Accessed through <https://www.un.org> on 21 April, 2020.
- UNFPA (17 April, 2020). *COVID-19 Situation Report No 1 for UNFPA Eastern and Southern Africa.* Accessed through <https://www.unfpa.org> on 17 April, 2020.
- UNHCR (January, 2021). *Population Statistics for Refugees, Displaced, Asylum and Persons of Concern in Zimbabwe.* Unpublished agency reports.
- UNHCR (April, 2020). *Key Considerations for protection of refugee children in COVID-19 context.* Accessed through www.unhcr.org on 20 April, 2020.
- UNICEF (3 April, 2020). *Protecting the most vulnerable children from the impact of*

- coronavirus: An agenda for action*. Accessed through <https://www.unicef.org> on 22 April, 2020.
- Watson, J. B. (1998). *Behaviourism*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- WHO (no date). *Child Abuse Definition* (online). Accessed through http://www.who.int/topics/child_abuse/en/ on 15 April, 2020.
- WHO (20 April, 2020). *Coronavirus Situation Report 91*. Accessed through <https://www.who.int> on 21 April, 2020.
- World Bank (2005). *Achieving learning for all*. Accessed through www.worldbank.org/education on 20 January, 2021.
- Yaker, R., & Erskine, D. (2 April, 2020). *GBV Case Management and the COVID-19 Pandemic. Gender-Based Violence Area of Responsibility (GBV AOR)*. Accessed through <https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net> on 21 April, 2020.
- Zimbabwe: *Commitment to education in crisis situations*. Accessed through <https://entreculturass.org> on 13 March, 2020.
- Zimbabwe government (2020). *Statutory Instrument 77 of 2020. Public Health and COVID-19 Prevention, Containment and Treatment Regulations, 2020*.
- Zimmermann, P., & Curtis, N. (2020). *Coronavirus Infections in Children Including COVID-19*. *Pediatric Infectious Disease Journal* Number 20.

Alleviation or Politicization of Poverty in Africa? A Critique of Nigeria's Social Investments Programs under Buhari-led Administration, 2015-2020Anthony Chinedu Ugwu^{*} Al Chukwuma Okoli^{**}**Abstract**

The study interrogates the politics of poverty alleviation amidst the prevalence of poverty in Africa, focusing on Nigeria. Nigeria currently ranks among the poor countries in the world. While many studies have examined aspects of poverty mitigation within the national development frameworks, the politics underlying such endeavors have been under-explored. This study narrows this gap by investigating how politicians bastardize social investment programs through tokenish material 'hand-outs' designed to serve immediate political ends. The study is based on textual and contextual analysis of secondary sources, as complemented by corroborated anecdotes. Appropriating Marxian production theory, the study posits that the prevalence of poverty in Africa has been occasioned by macro and micro-level politics. At the macro-level, the balance of trade cum balance of payment asymmetries has reproduced conditions that perpetuate dependency and underdevelopment in the developing countries in general and Nigeria in particular. At the micro-level, local politicians trivialize social investments by exploiting the poverty situation of the populace for electoral gains through ad hoc material 'hand-outs.' This has weakened the social investment policy environment and alienated the citizenry in decision-making concerning wealth creation, distribution, and social investments priorities. The study recommends mainstreaming social investment governance into national development programming for sustainability.

Keywords: Nigeria, National Development, Politicization, Poverty, Social Investment.

Introduction

Public policy is at the core of governance in modern political systems. It is the process by which the authoritative allocation of values is made in that context (Easton, 1965). The essence of public policy is to promote the public good through the strategic deployment of powers and resources of the state (McLean & McMillan, 2003). The expectation in this regard is that framers and operators of public policies should be guided by the dictates of civic rationality, selflessness, and due diligence to ensure the delivery of the public good.

The process of public policy in Africa has been somewhat ironic. Rather than advance national development, public policy in most African states has been associated with elements of 'bad politics.' According to Obanya (2010), these elements include the preeminence of politics over

* Federal University of Lafia, Nigeria. Email: chinedugwu5@gmail.com

** Federal University of Lafia, Nigeria. Email: okochu007@yahoo.com

policy. Besides, the undue emphasis is on the political governance of policy rather than on its substance, the multiplication of structures for the management of the policy. There has been a tension between the imperative of public good and the exigencies of vested interests in most instances. So, instead of being a rational and strategic endeavor, policymaking and implementation in most African states, including Nigeria, have become a politicized venture characterized by political patronage and partisan syndrome. In addition to the syndrome, Ngwu (2012) further explained that in most instances, the most significant impediments to effective public policy implementation are the legal instruments from which such policies derive their beings.

The contradictions of public policy in Africa are such that despite the usual lofty goals espoused in a policy, the outcome hardly brings about the desired end. This has been the situation with social investments policy in Nigeria since 1989 when the social development policy was crafted. In that policy document, social development was defined as:

The process of continuous improvement of the social structure, institutions, and programs in order to create a societal condition in which the rights of citizens are advanced and protected; their welfare enhanced; and their effective functioning and self-actualization ensured (Social Development Policy for Nigeria, 1989, p.3).

Without ado, the above idea is what gives legitimacy to any form of government, and the task of this paper is to examine the social development climate in Nigeria under the current administration led by President Muhamadu Buhari (2015-2020). Since its inception, Buhari's government has launched a number of social development programs christened the National-Social Investment Program (N-SIP), aimed at poverty reduction and sustainable human development. The paper evaluates the strategic efficacy of these programs, intending to ascertain if the efforts have amounted to poverty mitigation or politicization.

The remainder of the paper is thematically structured into three broad sections. The following section considers conceptual, theoretical, and contextual issues in an attempt to situate the epistemological background to the discourse. This is followed by the exploration of the literature and the analysis of the substantive issue. The last section looks at the policy implications of the analysis and conclusion.

Research Methodology

This paper is an exploratory critical discourse on the efficacy of social investment and poverty alleviation programming in Africa, particularly Nigeria. It engages Nigeria's social investment policy and programs under the current administration led by President Muhammadu Buhari to situate their successes, challenges, and prospects. The paper is a product of desk research that relied on textual and contextual engagements with the literature and relevant policy documents to deliver its analysis. The thrust of the analysis is prosecuted thematically, with the aid of descriptive data that are qualitatively harnessed to substantiate the underlying arguments. The analysis is premised on salient assumptions of Marxian theory of social production as contextualized within the pathology of Africa's post-colonial developmental problem. The peculiar nature and outlook of the paper as a socially conscious policy-cum-advocacy analysis has necessitated an analytical bent towards an evaluative and prescriptive discourse.

Frame of Reference

Three key terms constitute the frame of reference in this paper, namely, politicization, poverty, and social investment. This section (Table 1) considers these terms to conceptualize them based on their operational applications in the context of the present discourse.

Table 1: Conceptualizing the Basic Terms

Term	Conceptualization
Politicization	Politicization bears positive as well as negative connotations. In a positive sense, it implies prioritizing a matter as a strategic policy issue (Bebbington, 2006; Busso, 2017). In the negative sense, it refers to the abuse of a policy process or an issue thereof through political patronage and partisanship (Okoli & Orinya, 2014). Politicization is understood and applied herewith in its negative sense.
Poverty	Poverty refers to the condition of material lack, whereby a person or a population cannot sustainably meet its basic existential needs. The meaning of poverty in this context encompasses a lack of access to basic and sustainable livelihood as well as socio-economic entitlements that guarantee sustainable livelihood (Harriss, 2007).
Social investment	Social investment is the deployment of investment capital to create social returns in terms of secured livelihood, economic empowerment, and social uplift (NSIO, 2018). This is achieved through interventionist programs targeting vulnerable social strata in critical socio-economic standing, such as the youths, rural women, and other vulnerable populations.

Source: Authors' corroborations with the various authorities cited in-text.

Literature Review

Perspectives on Poverty and Social Investment

Poverty has assumed multidimensional implications for human security and development worldwide, especially in developing countries. About Africa, Okpeh, Ikoh, Onaji-Benson, and Ikase (2019) noted that:

Africa is the most poverty-ridden continent in the world. There are several glaring but worrisome statistics in the public domain to prove the assertion. For instance, in the period 1960-1970, 20 out of 30 least developed countries were in Africa; 12 of these countries had negative Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. In the period 1970-1976, 20 African countries had negative growth rates. For the period 1960-1979, 8 African countries had negative annual growth rate per capita; others had growth rates per capita ranging from 0-1% and 1% and 2% (p.viii).

The scenario above was Africa in the immediate post-colonial era, and as such, it carries a lot of concerns regarding the quality of independence that she got from her colonial lords. Nigeria, in particular, has a lot to worry about as her statistics are not different from the scenario above. According to Onah and Olise (2019, p.1), "about 100 million Nigerians (62.6 percent of the population) live below the international poverty line (PPP US\$1.25 per day)". This is notwithstanding that the Nigerian GDP growth rate was observed at an average of 8% a year between 2000 and 2013. During the same period, per capita income more than quadrupled from US\$646 to US\$2,937, nearly triple the rate of population growth (CDD, 2019, p.2), but unfortunately, the poverty rate has maintained a negative trend.

Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) sector were to revert this trend as it was observed to have contributed about 52% of GDP and employed 82% of Nigeria's workforce in 2014. However, the lack of adequate support to the sector posed an enormous challenge to the Nigerian economy. It was noted that:

Regarding access to credit for development, less than 5% of credit from financial institutions went to MSMEs, leaving about 89% of the 37 million enterprises in this sector without access to credit from the formal financial sector. This severely limited their capacity to grow, increase value

addition, modernize processes and technology and boost employment creation (DBN, 2017 in CDD, 2019, p.3).

This equally got sundry social challenges in Nigeria. Unemployment doubled from 6.4 percent in 2014 to 14.2 percent in 2017 (FGN, 2017, p.16). There was also a high rate of inequality (GINI Coefficient of 43 percent) not just with respect to income but also in terms of access to basic social services and opportunities. This was the state of the Nigerian economy when the Buhari-led administration took over power following a democratic election in 2015 and after that felt compelled to initiate national social investment policy. Unfortunately, the situation has got more complicated as the country has witnessed a high level of insecurity ranging from Boko Haram insurgency, herders attack, banditry, cattle rustling, kidnapping, and others.

Many African countries are also mired in this Nigeria's debilitating socio-economic situation. Thus, Fwatshak (2011, p. 70) noted that "Africa's foreign debts represents up to 80% of GDP, inflation rates average between 12-45%, unemployment rates (excluding the informal sector) ranges between 12 and 25%, while the saving rate is the lowest in the world". In the same vein, Ihonvbere (2011) observed that 15 of the world's 20 most impoverished nations are in Africa, with over 3 million refugees and 18 million internally displaced persons. International agencies estimate that over 250 million have no access to potable water, while over 200 million have no access to basic health services. More than 2 million children die before their first year; over 150 million youths are illiterates. The World Bank (as cited in Agwuele, 2011) summarizes the African predicament thus:

The continent is noted for being a cauldron of poverty, conflicts, wars, and death. African geopolitics is characterized by forlorn, dysfunctional, and conflict-ridden failed states. Africa sustains the least frontiers of backwaters in the global calculation, despite its abundant human and natural resources and more cultivable land than any region in the world. African states have also received an estimated \$1 trillion in foreign aid since independence and yet have slid into near abysmal poverty and underdevelopment (p. 89).

The African predicament, as presented, shows a continent that lags behind all other continents, especially in terms of poverty tackling and development provisioning. African countries had to borrow to close the gap, which compounded their predicaments, as Fwatshak (2011) elaborately observed. In the case of Nigeria, the Debt Management Office (DMO) (2020, p.7) recorded that:

Between 2015 and December 2020, Nigeria's external debt profile has risen from \$9.7 billion to \$27 billion. Most of these were borrowed in the first four years of President Muhammadu Buhari's Presidency via multilateral, development, bilateral, and commercial loans). Nigeria's total debt profile rose to N 31,009 trillion (\$85. 897 billion) as of June, 2020. The figure comprises the debt stock of the Federal government, 36 states of the federation, and the federal capital territory, Abuja.

This period falls within President Buhari's first tenure and part of his second tenure as Nigeria's civilian President. Furthermore, the DMO report (2020) expects the public debt stock to grow as the balance of the new domestic borrowing is raised and expected disbursements are made by the World Bank, African Development Bank, and the Islamic Bank, which arranged to finance the 2020 budget. This expectation came to fulfillment and was documented in DMO (2021)'s release. Therein, Nigeria's Public Debt Stock as of March 31, 2021, stood at N33.107 trillion or USD87.239 billion.

While there may exist genuine reasons for borrowing, the spree for it by Nigerian leaders is worrisome, especially as there exists little or no evidence in terms of capital projects or human development and security as stipulated by Nigeria's Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2007. Since Nigerian political elites have been notorious for fiscal irresponsibility and indiscipline, as Urama, Iloh, and Ekeocha (2018) noted, the consequences have been ever-increasing poverty rate and the likes.

The global trend for combating the predicament of poverty worldwide consists of the plethora of social investment packages that various countries in the world have adopted to manage such malaise towards total eradication. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which have naturally succeeded the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), are universal initiatives to eradicate poverty and improve sustainable livelihood based on some indicators and targets.

Applying social investment policies and programs to achieve the laudable indicators and targets has elicited views of scholars from an array of schools of thought. The debate has been about whether a social investment has been a better strategy to reconcile the goals of employment, growth, and social inclusion. In recent years, some scholars have criticized the social investment approach for not being able to achieve its intended distributional consequences. These scholars have also raised doubts about whether the social investment goals of increasing employment and decreasing poverty are reconcilable. However, other scholars hold that the merits of social investment have remained popular both in developed and developing countries.

In advancement of the popularity of the social investment approach, Cronert and Palme (2017) noted that:

For over the past 15 years, the concept of 'social investment' has gradually gained traction among European Union policymakers. Here, social investment-oriented policies aimed at enhancing the productive capacity and employments of the population have been identified as key elements in a strategy to increase growth and competitiveness and reduce poverty and social exclusion. Central strategies and policy agendas, such as the Lisbon Agenda of 2000, the Europe 2020 strategy of 2010, and the Social Investment Package of 2013, are all manifestations.

The context above is quite vocal on the appreciation of the merits of social investment for which policymakers in Europe have tied the continent's future. The policymakers hold that social investment-oriented services go a long way to achieve egalitarian redistribution in society. Scholars who support this view include Esping-Andersen and Myles (2009), who found that services are generally redistributive but less so than some cash transfers, whereas Verbist and Matsaganis (2014) found that the poverty-reducing effect of services is much larger than the one of cash transfers to the working-age population. Nelson and Stephens (2012) find that a range of social investment-oriented services is positively related to the consequent level of general skills - especially in the bottom half of the skill distribution - and to both the employment levels in general and employment in knowledge-intensive services. Using concentration coefficients, they show that although the design of cash transfers in most cases make them more oriented toward lower-income groups, services are much more important in size.

The argument on the distributive consequences of social investments has elicited reactions in recent scholarly debates, particularly on its consequences for poverty, which have received the most skepticism (Cronert & Palme, 2017). Many factors have been brought up that might have a detrimental effect on poverty and are typically held to be intrinsic to the social investment approach. However, some of these concerns primarily have a bearing on either the particular principles or policy prescriptions, which according to Cronert & Palme (2017), are linked to the Third Way approach or the consequences of 'activation' reforms introduced across Europe over the past two decades; most of which have had very little investment content according to De la Porte and Jacobsson (2012). Other scholars whose views do not support social investment service-oriented policies and programs include Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx (2011), Cantillon (2011), Corluy and Vandenbroucke (2014), and de Beer (2007). Their postulations have been itemized as follows.

- First, it has been argued that because the consumption of those public services associated with the social investment approach is typically work-related and earnings-related, such services have a less redistributive profile than traditional cash transfers, giving way to 'Matthew effects' and increasing inequalities in social investment-oriented states (Cantillon, 2011).
- Second, it has been argued that the shift on the political agenda from passive income support policies to active investment policies has resulted in a reallocation of resources away from the more redistributive policy areas to the less so.
- Third, it has been argued that the discursive emphasis on 'making work pay' has justified, and perhaps even necessitated, a re-commodification of citizens by means of retrenchment of benefits, with detrimental consequences for the more vulnerable (Vandenbroucke & Vleminckx, 2011).
- Fourth, it has been argued that while on an aggregate level these consequences could have been mitigated in case the policies were successful in moving unemployed people into employment, the proportion of people living in jobless households has hardly decreased in the EU in the wake of the employment and inclusion strategies, despite rising overall employment rates. This has raised doubts about whether the goals of increasing employment and decreasing poverty underpinning the social investment

approach are reconcilable (Cantillon, 2011; Corluy & Vandenbroucke, 2014; de Beer, 2007).

In sum, existing evidence seems to suggest that in general, the distributional profile of social investment-oriented services, as discussed by Cronert and Palme (2017), scrutinized two different versions of the social investment approach identified as the 'Nordic approach' (cf. Esping-Andersen et al., 2002) and the 'Third Way Approach' pioneered by Giddens (1998). It is a function of their content and targeting and the national context in which they are implemented. Thus, the potential of social investment to reduce poverty is not in doubt, but who implements the policies and how the policies are implemented are fundamental in the success or otherwise of any social investment programs. Giddens (1998) has said that the Third Way rejects the state socialist conception of socialism as a form of economic determinism espoused by Karl Marx. It instead accepts the conception of socialism as:

An ethical doctrine that views social-democratic governments as having achieved viable ethical socialism abhors capitalism's unjust elements by providing social welfare and other policies like egalitarianism in society through action to increase the distribution of skills, capacities, and productive endowments. It emphasizes commitment to balanced budgets, providing equal opportunity, which is combined with an emphasis on personal responsibility, the decentralization of government power to the lowest level possible, encouragement and promotion of public-private partnerships, improving labor supply, investment in human development, preserving of social capital and protection of the environment (Rosenau, 2003, p.209).

These ethically laden words furthered Giddens's radical approach to politics of welfare to the citizens by the European States and beyond. As in Europe, social investment policies and programs have assumed an air of importance among the countries in the global South and eminently so in Africa. In this recognition, Samson (2013) observed that countries of the South over the past decade have increasingly recognized the importance of social protection for ensuring that development reaches all members of society, especially the poor. A growing number and range of programs are channeled such as cash transfers by the government to the

poorest sectors of society and health insurance. In Africa alone, the number of cash transfer programs increased ten-fold between 2000 and 2009 – from 25 in 9 countries to 245 in 41 countries (Garcia & Moore, 2012).

Other developing countries in Asia and Latin American continents have also established Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs and recent qualitative studies on them affirm their viability for social protection. Here, we recall evaluative studies by IEG (2011), Fiszbein et al. (2009), Rawlings and Rubio (2005), which submitted that; on the whole, CCT programs have positive effects on schooling (enrollment, attendance, dropout) and health (vaccinations, medical check-up) outcomes. These reviews also indicate substantial variation in effect sizes between countries and among different population groups within countries (for example, gender, age, or urban vs. rural residence). These studies evaluated programs in Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Brazil. The studies noted that while the basic structure of CCTs is essentially the same, specific design features vary considerably across programs and countries. Specific individual evaluations suggest that program design features such as transfer amounts (Filmer & Schady, 2009a), the timing of payments (Barrera-Osorio, Bertrand, Perez-Calle & Linden, 2009), or whether there is a supply-side intervention (Filmer & Schady, 2009b; Glewwe & Olinto, 2004) explain specific patterns of treatment effect heterogeneity. However, the overriding impact is that CCTs have been positive on poverty reduction where it was applied with genuine intent that accommodates the supply and demand sides since they are crucial in determining the program's long-term effects. Britto (2005) made it clear that:

The mere fact that more children go to school does not necessarily translate into higher educational attainment and, in turn, the translation of higher educational attainment into higher earnings cannot be taken for granted, as it is mediated by the quality of education received, rates of employment, absorption of skilled labor in the economic structure and general rates of return to education (p.13).

This idea is crucial as the pro-Welfare State scholars have based their argument against social investment on the temporality of its impact and its limited redistributive capacity to transform the poverty situation. Thus, incentivization towards school enrolment and attendance will be appreciated to the extent of the quality of education provisioning.

Furthermore, in their examination of the relationship between the developments in social investment policies and the variations in poverty and income inequality across countries and over time, Van Vliet and Chen (2015) suggest that the detrimental effect of social investment policies, described in some specific cases in the literature, cannot be generalized. This submission came from a study of 15 European countries relying on EU ECHP/SILC1 data and data from the OECD (2012a) Social Expenditure Database.

Theoretical Framework: Marxian Theory of Social Production

The theory of social production was propounded by Karl Marx (1818–1883), wherein he postulated that the basic principles of history are hinged on the economic environments in which societies develop. Marx used the term *mode of production* to refer to the specific organization of economic production in a given society. The mode of production determines politics and social and cultural life (Igwe, 2005, p.353). A mode of production includes the *means of production* used by a given society, such as factories and other facilities, machines, and raw materials. It also includes labor and the organization of the labor force. The *relation of production* refers to the relationship between those who own the means of production (the capitalists or bourgeoisie) and those who do not (the workers or the proletariat). According to Karl Marx, history evolves through the interaction between the mode of production and the relations of production. The mode of production constantly evolves toward a realization of its fullest productive capacity.

Capitalism is a mode of production based on private ownership of the means of production by the capitalists. Capitalists produce commodities for the exchange market and, to stay competitive and realize the fullest productive capacity, must extract as much labor from the workers as possible at the lowest possible cost. The economic interest of the capitalist is to pay the worker as little as possible, in fact just enough to keep him alive and productive. The workers, in turn, come to understand that their economic interest lies in preventing the capitalist from exploiting them in this way. Implicit in this is the scenario that the social relations of production are inherently tenuous and antagonistic, giving rise to a class struggle that Marx believes will lead to the overthrow of capitalism by the proletariat.

In applying this theory to our study, it is arguable that Nigeria is a capitalist state, and so it is with most African countries (Jimoh & Olanrewaju, 2009). However, Nigeria's existence within a capitalist global economy renders it susceptible to the features of capitalism. Within the global

economy, capitalist countries control the movement of goods and capital (money) around the world. Countries that immediately prominently come to mind here are America, Britain, Japan, Germany, Russia, China, France, and their likes (World Population Review, 2021). The relationship between Africa and particularly Nigeria, and these countries is complex of mutual benefits. The less advanced countries are of interest to the capitalist powers to the extent that they facilitate capital accumulation in the metropolitan or advanced capitalist countries. The metropolitan countries find Nigeria a dumping ground for their goods and a good source of cheap raw materials. Nigeria, a peripheral capitalist, does not have the wherewithal to bargain or negotiate with the 'core' or capitalist countries.

The core countries are politically, economically, scientifically, and technologically more advanced than Nigeria and other countries within the African continent. No wonder Ihonvbere (2011) noted that at the beginning of the new millennium, Africa was the poorest, most technologically backward, most politically unstable, most crisis-ridden, most indebted, and most foreign-dominated and exploited, as well as the most marginal continent in the world. This has bequeathed Africa, ipso facto Nigeria, with a dependent status. Ozor (2008) noted that:

This dependency describes the extent to which an economy is structurally disadvantaged in the international division of labor, that it lacks the autonomous capacity to exploit, control, and manage its natural, economic, and human resources without falling prey to the dictates of foreign economic and other interests (p.90).

It is, thus, apparent that the phenomenon of dependency that entangles Nigeria is a logical outcome of orchestrated imperialism and colonialism (Ozo, 2008). In this present global reality, Nigeria accepts virtually whatever conditionalities she is given in her strive towards socio-economic development and her quest to remain within the modern state orbit. For this reason, Nigeria's efforts at development and fight against poverty have always followed a foreign design hardly embodying any autochthonous ideas and initiatives capable of reflecting the peculiarities of her environment. This accounts largely for why Nigeria and most African countries still suffer from the hemorrhage of poverty since her development initiatives or processes depend on outside factors or stimuli either of capital or expertise.

At home, the character of Nigerian politics and politicians tend to have negated efforts at mitigating poverty. The social investment policies and programs have hardly impacted positively on the poor; they are mere palliatives to keep them from organized protests capable of overthrowing the pro-capitalist political class. By its nature, social investments in Nigeria have remained ad-hoc, parochial, and self-serving for the political class who by and large views the electorates as a commodity to be bought and sold as the capitalists do. This fetish obsession with money and commodity led the Nigerian political class into excessive primitive accumulation with the result that inequality between the poor and the rich ranks worst in the world. This shows the extent of government lip service to social welfare issues in Nigeria. In this regard, Idyorough (2019) noted that:

All political parties in Nigeria have welfare issues on the agenda in their manifestoes, and they do deploy all sorts of political rhetorics to woo votes from citizens. At the end of it all, the welfare issues are neglected, and in its place, the politicians go home with rich pockets. Annual budgets are prepared and approved by them. Yet the amount budgeted and released for welfare remains meager and hardly enough to meet our welfare needs. An evaluation of the annual budgetary allocation to the social welfare sector from [the] 2014 budget to 2018 clearly shows the neglect of this sector (p. 344).

The lack of political will compounds this neglect to address social welfare despite capturing it in chapter two of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria, which has not become justiciable. Under the present administration led by President Muhammadu Buhari, social investment has been further casualized and caricatured. The social investment programs include N-Power, N-YES, TraderMoni, Government Enterprise, and Empowerment Program (GEEP), a.k.a. MarketMoni, Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT), Home Grown School Feeding Program (SFP).

Of these programs, only four were activated towards the 2019 general elections, where first degree and postgraduate degree graduates were offered two years of employment for a monthly remuneration of 30,000 (thirty thousand nairas). Amidst this program implementation, Nigeria ranked the poorest country in the world after India (Kazeem, 2018, Busayo, Azuh, Olaronke, Ogundipe, Bowale, & Azuh, 2021).

This further validates Cunningham's (2007) assertion that there will always be poverty, irrespective of any half-hearted attempts to alleviate it by the welfare state. This trend has aptly validated the choice of this theory by Marx and the Marxists, who established the source of poverty in the structural essence of society; they identify the welfare system as an instrument of the state, which acts to maintain gross inequalities of wealth that see some people living in dire destitution with little chance of ever really escaping from it (Okoli & Orinya, 2014). In Nigeria, it has been proven beyond doubt that while the welfare packages from the social investment programs of President Muhammadu Buhari-led's administration are on course, poverty still surges in the country. Odewale (2021) notes that the social and welfare programs for the unemployed and less privileged serve as a panacea to the perennial unemployment problem in Nigeria, have not been effective. Substantiating this claim, Odewale (2021) recalled that the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) on Friday, August 14, 2020, released the statistics on unemployment for the second quarter, Q2, of 2020 after a long hiatus since the third quarter, Q3, of 2018. Therein, the percentage of unemployed people stood at 27.1%, which shows a worsening situation from the previous release in 2018, where the percentage of the unemployed was 23%. Apparently, within two years, the unemployment rate in Nigeria rose by 4% despite the social investment programs which in Muhammadu Buhari's Manifesto would lift three million Nigerians out of poverty by creating three million jobs.

Nigeria's Poverty Profile: An Overview

Nigeria is a resource-endowed nation grappling with the paradox of plenty syndrome. Despite her ebullient human and natural resource endowments, Nigeria still parades one of the world's worst development indicators. According to a World Bank's World Poverty Clock report published in June 2018, Nigeria is the poorest country on earth based on the percentage of her population exposed to extreme poverty (Kazeem, 2018, P.1; Table 2). Recent figures indicate that 45.7% of Nigerians live within extreme poverty (Babalola, 2018, p.3).

Table 2: Top 10 Poverty-stricken Countries of the World

Rank	Country	% of population below the poverty line
1 st	Nigeria	86.9 million
2 nd	India	71.5
3 rd	Democratic Republic of Congo	60.9
4 th	Ethiopia	23.9

5 th	Tanzania	19.9
6 th	Mozambique	17.8
7 th	Bangladesh	17
8 th	Kenya	14.7
9 th	Indonesia	14.2
10 th	Uganda	14.2

Source: World Bank's *World Poverty Clock* (2018).

By the World Bank's standard index, any individual who lives below the threshold of \$1.9 per day is considered to be extremely poor. In line with this yardstick, the bank reported that Nigeria has the highest number of extremely poor persons in the world, following results from its 2018 World Poverty Clock, which indicated that 86.99 million Nigerians live below the extreme poverty line. By these statistics, Nigeria has overtaken India as the world's poverty headquarters (cf. Table 2).

In addition to its abysmal national poverty profile, Nigeria also parades some dismal Human Development Indices (HDI). A recent UNDP report shows that Nigeria's HDI status has largely fallen below the global average across several critical indicators, including life expectancy, expected years in school, and per capita income (Table 3). Besides these macro-economic indices, Nigeria is equally faring so severely in salient aspects of human security, such as food and nutrition, healthcare, livelihood, and the like (UNDP (2018)).

Table 3: Nigeria's HDI trends (1990-2017)

Year	Life expectancy at birth	Expected years of schooling	Mean years of Schooling	GNI per capita (2011 PPP\$)	HDI value
1990	45.9	6.7		2,792	
1995	45.9	7.2		2,569	
2000	46.3	8.0		2,451	
2005	48.2	9.0	5.2	3,669	0.465
2010	50.8	8.4	5.2	4,862	0.484
2015	53.0	10.0	6.0	5,527	0.527
2016	53.4	10.0	6.2	5,326	0.530
2017	53.9	10.0	6.2	5,231	0.532

Source: UNDP (2018:2).

Note: The above statistics are based on consistent time series data and new goalposts. By this record, Nigeria's HDI value for 2017 is 0.532 - which places the country in the low human development category - positioning it at 157 out of 189 countries and territories surveyed (UNDP, 2018:2). However, between 2005 and 2017, Nigeria's HDI value rose from 0.465 to 0.532, which amounts to an increase of 14.4 percent. As Table 2 also indicates, between 1990 and 2017, Nigeria's life expectancy at birth increased by 8.0 years; mean years of schooling increased by 1 year; expected years of schooling increased by 3.3 years, and GNI per capita increased by about 87.4 percent between 1990 and 2017. Despite the apparent progress in HDI, the country's poverty profile has remained persistently low.

Understanding Buhari's National Social Investment Programs (N-SIP)

The 2015 general elections in the Federal Republic of Nigeria brought in the government of President Muhammadu Buhari (GCFR). Shadare (2017) recalled that:

In the course of the last presidential campaign in Nigeria, which saw the People's Democratic Party overthrown for the first time since the return to democracy in 1999, the candidate for the All Progressive Congress promised a direct cash transfer to the poorest citizens. While pundits and critics generally viewed it as an unrealizable promise designed to win votes, it seems that Nigeria could be on the cusp of a social protection transformation (p.1).

Upon assumption of office, the Federal government under President Buhari unveiled four programs christened National Social Investment Programs (N-SIP). The programs are designed to draw from the social protection policy framework to ensure a life of dignity for those constrained in one way or another from achieving their full potential (FGN, 2017). Below is a graphical brief on each of the four major social investment programs administered by the Muhammadu Buhari-led administration since 2016.

Table 4: Overview of Buhari's National Social Investment Programs, 2015-2020

S/N	Program	Objective	Target
1.	N-Power	N-Power is designed to help young Nigerians acquire and develop life-long skills to become solution providers in their communities and players in the domestic and global markets.	N-Power Corps:500, 000 N-Power Knowledge:25, 000 N-Power Build: 75,000
2.	Home Grown School Feeding	The program aimed at increasing enrolment and completion rate at the primary school level. It will also help to	5.5 million primary school pupils

	Program (HGSFP)	create jobs (via recruitment of cooks) and raise agricultural demand since the program is a key to building a value chain. The manufacturers of utensils for cooks and feeding are also another added value.	
3.	Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT)	The program aims to target transfers to poor and vulnerable households, with the final aim of graduating them out of poverty.	1 million households to receive N5,000 monthly as conditional cash transfers. Additional 200,000 households and livelihood support will be provided through world Bank credit (upon approval of borrowing plan)
4.	Government Enterprise and Empowerment Program (GEEP) a.k.a. MarketMoni	The program aimed at providing financial services access to traders, market women and women cooperatives; artisans and MSMEs; enterprising clusters/youth, farmers, and agricut workers	1 million traders, women Cooperatives and market women 200,000 MSMEs; 260,000 enterprising youth; 200,000 farmers and agricut workers.

Source: Compiled from the National Social Investment Program's website:

<https://nasims.gov.ng>

Evaluating Buhari's Social Investments Package (N-SIP): Poverty Mitigation or Politicization?

Opinions have remained divided on the performance of these programs in relation to their stated objectives, mainly as they concern poverty mitigation. With over twenty international and local collaborators from public and private sectors of the economy, the N-SIP is undoubtedly ambitious and arguably more ambitious than over 26 earlier social protection programs under erstwhile administrations. The programs partners under the President Muhammadu Buhari administration in Nigeria include the World Bank, Actionaid, Bill & Melinda Gates, Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors, Dangote Group, MacArthur Foundation, Ford Foundation, UNICEF, The Nigeria Economic Summit Group (NESG), Lagos Business School, The Partnership for Child Development (PCD), Department for International Development (Dfid), IITA, and others (FGN, 2019).

However, the performance of the programs has left curious minds unsatisfied. Scholars and social commentators, including Murtala Adogi Mohammed, forewarned that the success of the programs would largely depend on professionalism instead of politics. According to him,

Most Nigerian politicians have no sense of social protection, so they cannot even think of designing, and much less, implementing programs aimed at attacking poverty frontally...to them, this is something new, and (my) suggest(ion) must be handled (sic) with care. Some of my concerns are Nigerian factors such as the politicization of the beneficiaries' selection process, weak public-civil servant capacity, weak institutions at the state and local level to coordinate the scheme; all these are something worth noting (Adogi, 2016, p.1)

This caution that came very timely before the full commencement of these programs captured the nature and character of development administration within Nigeria's socio-political ecology. The fragility of the public administration environment in the country has made the delivery of the common good associated with social investment programs very precarious. The political will that is needed to drive the programs to their logical conclusions is hardly manifested by the political elites. Thus, social protection in the country remains more of a political instrument deployed by politicians for attracting political support from the external environment and votes during elections than a genuine strategy for alleviating poverty in Nigeria (Okoli & Ugwu, 2016).

A look at the development of social protection in the country reveals this line of argument. Social protection programs in Nigeria have a history as old as the late 80s, though; in its current form, it could be said to have begun in 2004, yet, it has been unable to acquire the desired momentum that should drive it. Every government since 2004 has made an effort according to the global trend in social investment programs. However, the supposed benefits of such have been sacrificed on the altar of politics. Hence, most such programs end up in a small community of political supporters. At the expiration of the tenure of such a government, the programs are mostly starved to death. Thus, the lack of sustainability of social protection policies and programs in Nigeria has left the country to attain the unenviable capital of poverty in the world by the latest global poverty index.

The present government's efforts to redeem the country's image abroad and improve the living condition of the Nigerian masses are hardly known to have had any significant positive impacts. As of early 2020, about 40 percent are still extremely poor, living below the international standard of \$1 per day (World Bank, 2020, NBS, 2020). These statistics invariably indicate that the major problem with Nigeria is inequality. In this wise, a major concern then is: how are the social investment programs (N-SIP) bridging the gap between the poor and the rich in Nigeria on the one hand and the gap between Nigeria and the developed capitalist countries in the process of globalization?

In the 2018 *Commitment to Reducing Inequality Index* (CRI) compiled by Development Finance International (DFI) and Oxfam, Nigeria placed bottom in 157 nations. The CRI ranks the commitment of national governments to reducing the gap between rich and poor citizens by measuring three factors considered 'critical' to reducing the gap: social spending, tax policies, and labor rights. Nigeria ranked bottom of the index for the second consecutive year. The report notes that Nigeria's social spending (mainly on health, education, and social protection) is 'shamefully low', which is reflected in inferior social outcomes for its citizens, as shown below.

Table 2: Bottom 10 countries in the CRI Index ranking of 157 countries

	OVERALL CRI RANK	SPENDING ON HEALTH, EDUCATION AND SOCIAL PROTECTION	PROGRESSIVITY OF TAX POLICY	LABOUR RIGHTS AND MINIMUM WAGES
Bangladesh	148	146	103	148
Singapore	149	91	157	71
Lao PDR	150	153	44	146
Madagascar	151	135	142	143
Bhutan	152	81	153	147
Sierra Leone	153	143	132	150
Chad	154	145	138	154
Haiti	155	133	145	156
Uzbekistan	156	42	156	132
Nigeria	157	157	104	133

Source: Development Finance International and Oxfam Report (2018).

It appears that the inequality between the poor and the rich in Nigeria is a political creation at both supranational and national levels rather than a natural order. At the national level, the table

below shows the salary and emoluments of Nigerian politicians in the national assembly compared to other politicians from some other countries.

Table 3: Annual salaries of legislators from different parts of the world

Nigeria	\$189,500
United States	\$174,000
Brazil	\$157,600
UK	\$105,400
South Africa	\$104,000
France	\$85,900
Kenya	\$74,500
Saudi Arabia	\$64,000
Ghana	\$46,500
Indonesia	\$65,800
Thailand	\$43,800
India	\$11,200
Italy	\$182,000
Bangladesh	\$4,000
Israel	\$114,800
Hong Kong	\$130,700
Japan	\$149,700
Singapore	\$154,000
Canada	\$154,000
New Zealand	\$112,500
Germany	\$119,500
Ireland	\$120,400
Pakistan	\$3,500
Malaysia	\$25,300
Sweden	\$99,300
Sri Lanka	\$5,100

Spain	\$43,900
Norway	\$138,000

Source: Ngwu and Nwaigwe (2019).

The data above shows that Nigeria's politicians are hardly committed to bridging the inequality. The minimum wage in Nigeria has been stagnated at N18,000 (\$43.80) until a few months ago, when it was increased to N30,000 (\$72.99). In all intents and purposes adds no meaning to the basic and average standard of living where the neoliberal tax regime has been unleashed on the citizens. There are also the challenges of inflation and terrorism which impact seriously on the living standard of Nigerians.

The inequality phenomenon is also being reinforced by politicians who rely on it to achieve political ends, especially during electioneering processes towards perpetual retaining political power and patronage. Nigeria is a pseudo-capitalist economy as she makes her capital largely through rent from oil and not the production of a sort. It has remained dependent on the capitalist states. The politicians in charge of the country's finances and economy share this capital with little concern for the masses (Urama, Iloh & Ekeocha, 2018). Their take home from the public treasury on a monthly basis is outrageous. More precisely, the Nigerian legislators' salaries and emoluments are known to be among the highest in the whole world (Awotokun, 2020, Oxfam, 2017, Denrele, 2013).

The corruption that has crept into the implementation of N-SIP has taken a toll on all facets of national life. The wife to Mr. President, Mrs. Aisha Buhari, raised the alarm on Saturday, May 25, 2019, in Abuja during an interactive program she organized for women at the Presidential Villa. In her words, the N500bn Social Investment Program of her husband's administration has failed 'woefully', especially in the North. Aisha, who hails from Adamawa State, said the situation in her home state, as far as the SIP implementation was concerned, was pathetic. She disclosed that though Mrs. Maryam Uwais, the Senior Special Assistant (SA) to the President who is directly in charge of the programs' implementation, informed her that 30,000 women would be beneficiaries in Adam was in a pathetic state, four years had passed, and there was not the SA had kept her word. She also cited Kano, a highly-populated northern state where the SA hails from, as another example where she believed the program has failed.

The acting chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in Nigeria has repeated the allegation recently during the 15th Anti-Corruption Situation Room organized by the Human and Environmental Development Agenda in Kaduna on Tuesday, September 25. Thereafter, he called on the civil society organizations to play a more active role in partnering with the commission to combat corruption, especially in the National Social Investment Program.

Stakeholders' perception of the timing of N-SIP reemergence and its implementation is critical in the assessment of the programs. It has been observed that the programs had gathered unusual momentum towards the 2019 general elections in February and March 2019. For instance, a breakdown of the amount disbursed from the inception of N-SIP showed that the sum of N79.98 bn was released in 2016, while N140bn and N250.84bn were released in the 2017 and 2018 fiscal years, respectively (Onuba, 2019). This was attributed to serve as a ploy to harvest votes from the actual and potential beneficiaries who would be lucky to be selected. There is also this notion that the programs, especially the cash transfers, are a mere scam as there are reported cases in which N-SIP coordinators from the headquarters in Abuja connived with some of their states and local government agents to impersonate the supposed beneficiaries on the government register thereby defrauding the real poor and needy.

Amidst these crises and controversies, Mrs. Uwais, the SSA to the President on N-SIP, has praised the implementation of the N-Power program, in which about 500,000 people spread across 774 Local Government Areas have been recruited to teach in public schools, act as health workers in primary health centers and as agriculture extension advisors to smallholder farmers in various communities. The National Home-Grown School Feeding Program, which was aimed at providing one nutritious, balanced meal for 200 school days in a year, has been able to reach over 9.7 million pupils. Through the Government Enterprise and Empowerment Program, about 1,681,491 loans have been made available to successful applicants in all states and the Federal Capital Territory.

This report above has generated more controversies, especially regarding the bogus number of beneficiaries, which is 44,588,628. In this regard, Buhari (2019) curiously recollected interacting recently with a 74-year-old man selling petty things in Kano, whom she asked how much is his capital, and he responded between N3,000 and N4,000. In Ebonyi's state, there is another instance where a mother cried out for almost losing her son, whom she claimed was forced into

forty-one days of fasting after considering the poverty-stricken background and the failure of the government to live up to its promise of N5,000 to the poorest of the poor every month.

Conclusion

The poverty situation in Nigeria has been systematic, endemic, and chronic. Nigeria being a peripheral state, has been a victim of the international capitalist system. The need to mitigate the situation has prompted different policy interventions such as the social investments programs. Unfortunately, these programs have suffered major setbacks, owing to negative factors associated with their conception and implementation. This paper critiqued social investments programming in Nigeria, with particular reference to the endeavors of the current administration led by President Buhari. The paper posited that Nigeria's political elites had trivialized social investment initiatives by alienating the people from governance and exploiting their vulnerable material conditions for partisan gains through ad hoc material hand-outs, cash transfers, and sundry pseudo and unsustainable empowerment programs tied to political patronage and electoral exigencies. The paper submits the way forward in mainstreaming social investment programs into national development policy through an Act of the Parliament. In that regard, the following measures will be necessary:

- Promulgation of a national economic empowerment and welfare policy (NEEWP) in order to mitigate the growing incidence of poverty and socio-economic insecurity in the country.
- Mainstreaming of such policy through parliamentary procedures in order to ensure its statutory regularization and sustainability.
- Incorporating the existing ad hoc poverty reduction cum social investment programs into the NEEWP to boost operational efficiency.
- Professionalization of the administration of social investment programs in Nigeria in order to guard against politicization, nepotism, and abuse.

References

- Ameh, J. (2019). N500bn social investment scheme has failed in the North –Aisha Buhari; <https://punchng.com/n500bn-social-investment-scheme-has-failed-in-north-aisha-buhari/> (retrieved August 10, 2020).
- Awotokun, K. (2020). The Nigeria's presidentialism and the burden of profligacy in an inchoate constitutional democracy. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 2(5); DOI: <https://doi.org/10.36941/mjss-2020-0053>.

- Babalola, T. (2018). Poverty tracker: Raising the red flag. *Proshare Economy*. 1(18): 1-32.
- Bardhan, PK & Mookherjee, D. (2000). Capture and governance at local and national levels. *American Economic Review*, 90(2): 135–139
- Barrera-Osorio, F., Bertrand, M., Linden, L., & Perez-Calle, F. (2009). Improving the design of conditional transfer programs: Evidence from a randomized education experiment in Colombia. Unpublished manuscript.
- Bebbington, A. (2006). Social movements and the politicization of chronic poverty policy. *CPCR Working Paper 63*. London: Institute of Development Policy and Management.
- Britto, T. (2005). *Recent Trends in the Development Agenda of Latin America: An Analysis of Conditional Cash Transfers*. Brazil: Ministry of Social Development.
- Busso, S. (2017). The de-politicization of social policy at the time of social investment: Mechanisms and distinctive features. *The Open Journal of Socio-political Studies* 10(2): 421-447.
- Cantillon, B. (2011). The paradox of the social investment state: growth, employment and poverty in the Lisbon era. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 21(5): 432-449.
- Centre for Democracy and Development (2019). An assessment of the effectiveness of government policies and programs on economic growth and development. [https://media.africaportal.org/documents/An assessment of the effectiveness of government policies.pdf](https://media.africaportal.org/documents/An%20assessment%20of%20the%20effectiveness%20of%20government%20policies.pdf) (retrieved August 18, 2020).
- Corluy, V. & Vandenbroucke, F. (2014). Individual employment, household employment and risk of poverty in the European Union: A decomposition analysis, In Cantillon, B., & F. Vandenbroucke (eds.). *Reconciling Work and Poverty Reduction: How Successful Are European Welfare States?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cronert, A. & Palme, J. (2017). Approaches to Social Investment and Their Implications for Poverty in Sweden and the European Union: Global challenges. CROP/UiB Global Working paper series. Axel Cronert/ Uppsala University.
- Darmawan, R. (n.d). Elite capture in urban society: Evidence from Indonesia. Draft paper, Department of Economics. University of Goettingen. Germany: Platz der Göttinger Sieben.
- De Beer, P. (2007). Why work is not a panacea: a decomposition analysis of EU-15 countries. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 17(4): 375-388.
- De la Porte, C. & Jacobsson, K. (2012). Social Investment or recommodification? Assessing the employment policies of the EU member states, In Morel, N, Bruno, P. & Palme, J. (eds.) *Towards a Social Investment Welfare State?* Bristol: The Policy Press.
- Denrele, A. (2013). Nigerian-lawmakers-are-the-highest-paid-in-the-world. <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/08/nigerian-lawmakers-are-the-highest-paid-in-the-world/> August 25, 2013 (retrieved August 11, 2020).
- Development Bank of Nigeria (2017). *Assessing the Financing Gap of Nigerian MSMEs and Emerging Corporates*. Abuja: Federal Government of Nigeria.
- Federal Ministry of Budget and National Planning (2017). Economic Recovery & Growth Plan, 2017-2020. Abuja: Federal Government of Nigeria.
- Easton, D. (1965). *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: Wiley.
- Esping-Andersen, G., Gallie, D., Hemerijck, A. & Myles, J. (2002). *Why We Need a New Welfare State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Filmer, D., & Schady, N. (2009a). *Are there diminishing returns to transfer size in conditional*

- cash transfers? Policy Research Working Paper 4999.* Washington DC: World Bank.
- Filmer, D., & Schady, N. (2009b). *School enrollment, selection and test scores. Policy Research Working Paper 4998.* Washington DC: World Bank.
- Fiszbein, A., Schady, N., Ferreira, F., Grosh, M., Kelleher, N., Olinto, P., & Skoufias, E. (2009). *Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty.* Washington DC: World Bank.
- Garcia, M. & Moore, C. (2012). *Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa.* Washington D. C: World Bank.
- Giddens, A. (1998). *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy.* Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Glewwe, P., & Olinto, P. (2004). Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers on Schooling: An experimental Analysis of Honduras' PRAF Program. Unpublished manuscript.
- Harrison, J. (2007). Bringing politics back into poverty analysis: Why understanding social relations matters more for policy on chronic poverty than measurement. *CPRC Working Paper 77.* Vancouver: School for International Studies. Simon Fraser University.
- Idyorough, E. A. (2019). Lamentations on the politics of social welfare in Nigeria, In Kida, M. I. & G. A. Genyi (Eds). *Delivering Democratic Promises in Nigeria: Prospects and Challenges.* Makurdi: Gwatex Publishers.
- Igwe, O. (2005). *Politics and Globe Dictionary.* Aba: Eagle Publishers.
- Isenyo, G. (2019). There is corruption in N-SIP program –Magu <https://punchng.com/there-is-corruption-in-n-sip-program-magu/> (retrieved July 3, 2021).
- Jimoh, A. and Olanrewaju A. O. (2009). Nigeria, Capitalism and the Question of Equity. *Anthropologist*, II (4)
- Kazeem, Y. (2018). Nigeria has become the poverty capital of the world. Retrieved from: <https://qz.com/africa/1313380/nigerias-has-the-highest-rate-of-extreme-poverty-globally/> (accessed on: 09/09/2019).
- Musgrave, M.K. & Wong, S. (2016). Towards a more nuanced theory of elite capture in development projects. The importance of context and theories of power. *Journal of Sustainable Development*, 9(3): 87-103.
- Nelson, M. & Stephens, J. D. (2012). Do social investment policies produce better jobs? In Morel, N, Bruno, P. & Palme, J. (eds.) *Towards a Social Investment Welfare State?* Bristol: The Policy Press.
- Ngwu, E.C. (2012). The state and public policymaking in Nigeria: A study of the formulation and implementation of the Universal Basic Education (UBE) policy, 2000 – 2011. Unpublished Ph.D Seminar. Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.
- NSIO (2018). *Investing in our people. A brief on the National Social Investment Programs in Nigeria.* Abuja: National Social Investment Office.
- Obanya, P. (2010). Planning and Managing Meaningful Access to Education: The Nigerian Experience. Paper presented at *Department of Education Open Seminar Series, 2010 of Centre for International Education University of Sussex on January 25.*
- Okoli, AC & Orinya, S. (2014). Political opportunism and crisis of governance in Nigeria:

- Implications for sustainable statecraft and development. *International Journal of Development and Sustainability*, 7(4):1477-1487.
- Okoli, A. C. & Ugwu, A. C. (2016). Materialism-cum-commodification of delegacy: A political economy of vote aale in 2014 PDP governorship primary in Nasarawa State, Nigeria. *FULafia Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 1(1): 51-68.
- Olaf van-Vliet & Chen W. (2015). Social investment and poverty reduction: A comparative analysis across fifteen European countries. *Journal of Social Policy*. DOI: 10.1017/S0047279415000070.
- Onuba, I. (2019). FG's social safety program gulps N471bn in three years. <https://punchng.com/fgs-social-safety-program-gulps-n471bn-in-three-years/> (retrieved July 3,2021).
- Onah, R. C. & Olise, C. N. (2019). National Social Investment Program (NSIP) and sustainable poverty reduction in Nigeria: Challenges and prospects. *Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)*, 24(10): 20-31.
- Ozor, C. O (2008). Development administration and the incorporation of less-developed countries into the global capitalist system, In Obi, E. A. et al. (eds). *Readings on Comparative Public Administration*. Onitsha: Bookpoint Educational Limited.
- Oxfam, (2017). Inequality in Nigeria. https://www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_attachments/cr-inequality-in-nigeria-170517-en.pdf
- Platteau, J. (2004). Monitoring elite capture in community-driven development. *Development and Change*, 35(2): 223–246.
- Rawlings, L. B., & Rubio, G. M. (2005). Evaluating the impact of conditional cash transfer programs. *The World Bank Research Observer*, 20(1): 29-55.
- Report, D. F. (2018). *Commitment to reducing inequality index*. Retrieved February 2, 2020, from <https://www.oxfamamerica.org/explore/research-publications/the-commitment-to-reducing-inequality-index-2018/>: <https://www.oxfamamerica.org>
- Rosenau, P. V. (2003). *The competition paradigm: America's Romance with Conflict, Contest, and commerce*. Lanham/ Maryland/ Oxford/ England: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Samson, M. (2013). Development Co-operation Report. Ending Poverty. OECD.
- SparkNotes Editors. (2005). SparkNote on Karl Marx (1818–1883). Retrieved October 23, 2019, from <http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/marx/>
- UNDP .(2018). *Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update (Briefing note for countries on the 2018 Statistical Update [Nigeria])*. Geneva: United Nations Development Program.
- Vandenbroucke, F. & Vleminckx, K. (2011). Disappointing poverty trends: is the social and investment state to blame? *Journal of European Social Policy* 21(5): 450-471.
- Yomi, K. (2015). Nigeria has some of the world's highest paid lawmakers and this start-up wants to slash their pay. *Quartz Africa*. <https://qz.com/africa/417192/nigeria-has-some-of-the-worlds-highest-paid-lawmakers-and-this-start-up-is-trying-to-slash-their-pay/>(retrieved July 3,2021).
- World Bank (2018). *World Poverty Clock*. New York: World Bank.
- World Bank (2020). Nigeria releases new report on poverty and inequality in the country. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/lms/brief/nigeria-releases-new-report-on-poverty-and-inequality-in-country>____(retrieved July 3, 2021).

Anatomy of Nigerian Federalism: A Reflection of the Nagging Challenges and Prospects from A Cultural Relativist Perspective

Chioke, Stephen Chinedu^{*}

Abstract

There is a dearth of reliable literature that appropriately coined and conveyed the conceptual framework of federalism, scarcity of reliable information that analytically x-rayed the structural arrangement of Nigerian federalism, and challenges militating against the expected gains of federalism and the prospects thereof. The paper relied on qualitative methods like document analyses, personal experiences, key informant interviews, and discussions in generating relevant data that were thematically presented and resultantly analyzed using content analysis. The results show that there are works of literature that wrongly conceptualized federalism. Police brutality, political godfatherism, corruption, secession, revenue allocation problem, sectionalism, and conflicts were among the predominant challenges facing Nigerian federalism. Furthermore, the results show that sustainable development and efficient service delivery are part of the prospects. The paper concluded that many Nigerians do not have an adequate understanding of the nitty-gritty of federalism. As a corollary to this, destructive tendencies have troubled Nigerian federalism, making the center epileptic. The study for policy and practice implies that Nigeria, the largest populated country of Africa, has continued its federalist operations on the side of very low cohesion and unification of existing ethnic groups.

Keywords: Anatomy, Cultural Relativism, Nigerian Federalism, Stomach Infrastructure, Democracy

Introduction

This paper titled anatomy of Nigerian federalism: a reflection of the nagging challenges and prospects from a cultural relativist perspective, tilted toward reviewing existing literature on federalism. Hence, this underscores the empirical significance of the title and the entire work. On the theoretical significance of this review, it is the expectation of the author that this paper will be additional literature with a difference from the existing literature that focused on federalism. However, this present paper will provide succor to navigating through conceptual analysis of federalism in Nigeria. It is also an attempt to reposition the ailing federal system of government in Nigeria by charting the way forward through its recommendations.

^{*} Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria. Email: eruditescholar001@gmail.com

Presently, Nigeria is a great nation-state, greatly endowed with unimaginable resources. To say that Nigeria is materially endowed is not erroneous. To suggest that Nigeria is humanly blessed is equally not an overstatement. Nevertheless, to say that the center and the rest of the component units are poorly managed is by no means an understatement. Then what is the nagging challenge? It is the over-concentration of power at the federal level, reckless abandonment of social responsibilities by corporate bodies, the culture of looting – gaining wealth illicitly by a public official and allied matters. It then becomes pertinent to ask: why is Nigeria called the Federal Republic? According to Oboli (1965, p.13), “Nigeria is called the Federal Republic of Nigeria for two reasons:

- a) Nigeria is a Republic. This means that it is governed by persons who have been elected by the people of Nigeria, and the head of the state is the president.
- b) Nigeria is a federation: This means that it is made up of several regions, each of which has its own government and some control over its regional affairs.”

In line with the number (b) above, we note that Nigeria has replaced that term (regions) with geopolitical zones and regional states. Hence, the researcher herein adopts states/geopolitical zones for the purpose of this analysis. Arguing from the (b) reason above, we would point out that the component states in Nigeria are merely toothless bulldogs that cannot bite, and in the present ordeal, they are powerless appendages uniquely contrived and affixed to the center. This contributes to making Nigeria's federalism a sort of feeding bottle federalism. "Suffice it to say that the very unprecedented odoriferous saga that has saturated and permeated the federal government, political thoughts, political lifestyle, game, and social engineering in the ever dynamic sovereign entity, Nigeria is obviously and intricately enigmatic in its totality even when the economic and political policies of the state have been transfigured by the change in the bureaucratic template of Nigeria (Chioke, 2017, p.3).” The states/geopolitical zones in Nigeria are slaves benefitting from the crumbs that fall from the table of the master – the government at the center.

Given this, the states are beggars at the mercy of the troublers of Nigeria, the corrupt ruling and non-ruling elites. We are where we are today because the leaders pretend to be working when they are merely moping with utter confusion at the constitutional duties that premised the social contract the state and her citizens entered into, which resultantly gave rise to an entity called Nigeria. However, did the generality of the country bargain for such a Nigeria with her peculiar

federalist structure? Many believe that the response to this query is a 'no' answer. We, therefore, recognize that there abound countless challenges that have contributed to the failure of the Nigerian style of federalism. Amongst them is greediness occasioned by the stomach infrastructure of the whole members of the general system called Nigeria. According to Dauda (2020, p.366), "Stomach infrastructure is a reality projected by the Nigerian politicians on the vulnerable electorate who for poverty are encouraged to mortgage their fundamental right of freedom to choose who governs them in exchange for immediate gratification in monetary, food, or other material terms." The politics of the now and not of the later negates good governance and sustainable development and embraces perishable commodities for immediate consumption and future servitude/hunger.

There are responsibilities, functions, and duties enshrined in the federal government's exclusive list because of the nature of those functions. Sequel explained that "The Federal Government retains those powers, e.g., defense, foreign affairs, and communications, which are essential for the **unity** of the Federation (Oboli, 1965, p.13)." To buttress this, we may recall that the National Open University of Nigeria (NOUN) (2014) aligned in this way: "Some authors see federalism as a form of governmental and institutional structure put in place for the purpose of maintaining **unity** while also preserving diversity (p.99)." We emphasized the term 'unity' to show the need for federalism. However, it is quite regrettable to note that the federal structure has hosted centrifugal forces, which have often threatened the unity of Nigeria. For the adequate performance of the existing contractual responsibilities, the constitution accorded the central government these functions enlisted in the exclusive list, but the nagging challenges have remained detrimental and have sabotaged the attainment of sustainable national development. Let us bear in mind that "Government is the machinery of the state through which the wills and aspirations of the people are articulated, crystallized and implemented (Ewuim, 2008, p.iii)."

Nigeria is far from achieving the wills and aspirations already articulated through her stance on the federal system of government and factors like poor implementation of policies and lack of true federalism rooted in democratic leadership. Then the other factor is one of the principal concerns of this paper, summarily called the challenges of Nigerian federalism. To clear the intellectual underbrush that has engineered and helped in obfuscating roadmaps to where we ought to stand at this point and the ongoing controversies regarding the true meaning of

federalism explicitly encoded in the available literature. Therefore, this paper would first and foremost throw up introductory remarks on the meaning of federalism and present Nigerian federalism from a cultural perspective. Specifically, it is poised to examine and bring to the fore the challenges and prospects of Nigerian federalism from a cultural relativist point of view because it is a formal statement of history that the community's or the people's challenges must be addressed from the angle of their cosmology. Hence, the cultural relativist dimension appears to be helpful in addressing the nagging challenges of Nigerian federalism.

Statement of the Problem

The author had observed the poor knowledge of students and practitioners on the subject matter undertaken by this review. Arguably, this problem emanates from the existing literature that had introduced and inculcated this poor knowledge via its poor conceptual explication. For example, commenting on the component units of a federation, Ewuim (2008, p.72) posited that, "These components may be the central, state (regions) and the **local (counties) governments.**" Additionally, there is a paucity of literature that appropriately coined and conveyed federalism from a glocalized purview. Hence, the need to relay useful impulses that guide students' conceptual knowledge and understanding of federalism and the poorly educated mass of politicians in the system.

There appears to be a dearth of literature that analytically pointed out the structural arrangement of Nigerian federalism. From careful observation, there is a probability that federalism has been practiced without due consideration to the unique cultural patterns of Nigeria as a sovereign entity, which has resulted in a sort of marriage of inconvenience. Concerning this, the article will seek to dissect the anatomy of Nigerian federalism from a cultural relativist background to show the various centrifugal inputs that have troubled the structure of federalism in Nigeria.

Despite the workability and dividends of federalism in other climes, there seem to be in existence copious negative trends in the political-institutional machinery and the general administration of Nigeria. Perhaps, these include nepotism, godfatherism, corruption, maladministration, and others. These may have contributed to fueling dissenting voices with respect to Nigeria's existence as an indivisible sovereign state. Therefore, another problem of this study is to x-ray the web of challenges that have disturbed federalism in Nigeria.

Objectives of the Paper

The broad objective of this paper is to present the anatomy of Nigerian federalism: a reflection of the nagging challenges and prospects from a cultural relativist perspective. To achieve this, the following specific cardinal objectives guided the review: i) To relay useful impulses/phraseologies that will aid proper conceptual knowledge and understanding of Nigerian federalism, ii) To carry out a dissection of the anatomy of Nigerian federalism from a cultural relativist background, and iii) To examine and bring to the fore the challenges and prospects of Nigerian federalism from a cultural relativist approach.

Theoretical Standpoint

Cultural relativism is herein adopted as the paper's theoretical foundation. Cultural relativism is a theory that propagates or projects consciousness of differences in existing cultures all over the globe. "Cultural relativism is a complex concept that has its intellectual roots in discussions about relativism in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. Relativism is typically viewed in contrast to realism, which is the idea that what is true and real exists independently of the mind (Idike, 2014, p.5)." Put differently, "The perception that the norms and values of each culture have their own validity and cannot be used as a standard for evaluating other cultures is termed cultural relativism (Okafor & Emeka, 2004, p.21)." Cultural relativism projects the idea that a specific culture should not be used as a yardstick to measure or pass judgment on any other culture. In this regard, no one culture is superior to another compared to cultural practices, politics, laws, mores, ethics, besides others. Thus, culture is indeed relative. Nigeria, as a political unit, has its political culture with its own peculiarities. Then to understand federalism, we embark on it from the lens of cultural relativism, hence Nigerian federalism. Why say Nigerian federalism? This is simply because this sort of federalism is as practiced in Nigeria with or without the exact trappings of federalism obtainable in other climes.

Writing further, Okafor & Emeka (2004, p.21) stated, "This perception recognizes that what is weighty in one society may be trivial in another and that each trait has full validity within its own cultural environment and must be respected as endowing itself with its own validity." Therefore, "It is impossible to understand the behavior patterns of other people if the criterion for acceptance or rejection is solely what happens in our own (*Ibid*)." Then, one would say that cultural relativism is advantageous as it fashions fathomable dimensions for appreciating the need for equality, respect, fairness, and tolerance for the totality of the way of life of other

people, tribes, races, groups, and entities. It is hundred percent possible and even entirely true that one's experience of a system of doing things and in our present case, federalism will and must not necessarily be the same with the other(s). Perhaps, it was in line with this that Okafor & Emeka (2004, p.21) opined that "...cultural relativism gives room for varieties, tolerance and respect for the way of others." Owing to this, cultural relativism is repugnant to *ethnocentrism* in all aspects. In this dimension, there is a need to reject the idea of an absolute method or viewpoint based on one's own culture, which appears to be the epicenter of ethnocentrism. This helps us to understand the peculiarities and unique differentia observable in Nigeria's typology of federalism. We know the Nigerian federalism is not the same as what is practiced and obtainable in other developed democracies of the world.

From the angle of cultural relativism, this study examines how federalism, as practiced in Nigeria, is different from what is obtainable in developed federalist states of the world. To apply the cultural relativist approach to this paper, it is thus borne in mind that what works for one or other regional or sub-regional cultural cum political enclave(s) in the adoption of a federal system of government may not work for Nigeria because of the differences in cultures and traditions. No doubt, people's experiences differ in size and weight, and in the same vein, a country's experience with respect to policies and activities is not entirely similar when viewed from the experiential evidence in other countries. The reason is that human beings are not scientific, and that makes public administration a cumbersome activity.

Materials and Methods

A qualitative research method was adopted. Creswell (1998) advocates 20 – 30 samples for qualitative research. Thus, secondary data collected through a thorough review of textbooks, journal articles, and internet sources have been analyzed qualitatively. In order to complement and authenticate the views expressed in the extant literature that made up the secondary sources of data, the researcher employed the use of Key Informant Interviews (KIIs). The informants include 5 Secondary School Students, 5 Undergraduates, 5 Public Administrators, and 5 Political Scientists from the component units in Nigeria. The interviewed Key Informants (KIs) and their respective disciplines for each scholar are abbreviated as secondary school students (SS), undergraduates (UG), and public administrators (PA), while 1, 2, 3...was used to differentiate the thoughts of informants from the same discipline.

Results and Discussion

This section deals with a detailed presentation and discussion of the findings vis-à-vis the specific objectives of this review. From a content analysis cum descriptive method, the author relays the following findings on the specific objectives of this paper:

Federalism: An Analysis of the True Meaning from a Glocalized Viewpoint

By assumption, almost everyone is quite familiar with the concepts – ‘federal government and federalism’ as they are now household phraseologies employed in daily chats and discourse. However, we cannot rely on such a level of familiarity to conclude that all know these concepts and then hastily conclude that such knowledge is adequate to be adopted as a foundation for an acceptable or classical definition and practice of federalist governance. First, to duly decipher and appreciate this scholarly attempt, the scholars must remember that the terms 'federalism' and 'federal system of government' are the same and thus used interchangeably in this study. Having said this, we then note that "Federalism is a system of government in which governmental powers of a given state is constitutionally shared between the Federal Government and other component units. In Nigeria's federalism, powers are constitutionally shared between the federal government and federating units – the states. Here, each level of government enjoys a certain degree of autonomy. By virtue of federalism, it suffices to say that the federal government and the federating units are contractually bound for purposes explicitly or implicitly underscored (Chioke, n.d, p.171).”

Apart from Nigeria, we have other examples of countries with a federal constitution, such as the USA, Argentina, and others. Put differently, Maduabum (2008), cited in NOUN (2014, p.99), opined that, “Federalism is a political concept in which a group or member is bound together by covenant with a governing representative head.” These two definitions have something in common and adequately show that there is always a bond between the center and other units. Why? They are bound together for one reason or the other. Nevertheless, these conceptual reviews are not enough to be adopted herein as this paper's operational definition of federalism.

In keeping with the already highlighted problem statement, Akpotor (1995, p.8) defined it as "the system of government in which governmental parts are shared between the central government,

i.e., the federal government and its components (State and local government)." In this regard, the following informants stated:

Code	Institution	Remark
(KI: SS)	Community Secondary School	Federalism is about the sharing of power between the central government, state, and local government.
(KI: UG)	Federal Polytechnic, Oko	Federalism is a system of government in which governmental powers are constitutionally shared between the levels of government (federal, state, and local government).
(KI: PA3)	NAU	Federalism is a system of government where power is shared among the three tiers of government <i>viz</i> executive, legislature, and judiciary

Following these misconceptions, two questions arise below:

- Our bodies like the executive, legislature, and judiciary tiers of government or arms of government?
- Does the local government really possess and enjoy the constitutional power that makes it to be seen as a federating partner in a federation?

For the first question, these bodies are known as arms/organs of government. Then for the second question, we note that the answer is no when viewed from both international and contextual purview. Contributing to the existing misconceptions about the meaning of federalism, it was stated that, "Federalism is a system of government in which the powers of the state are divided among the various tiers, levels or components that make up the state. In it, both the taxing and expenditure powers of the state are shared among the components of the federation. These components may be the central, state (regions) and the local (counties) governments (Ewuim, 2008, p.72)." Consequently, Amah (2017, p.288) noted that "Federalism as a political arrangement has faced serious crises of conceptualization."

Following the logic of the above perspectives, the paper, therefore, submits that the views expressed therein are wanton in practice, universality, acceptability, and credibility. Thus, these definitions should not be accepted as proper conceptual explications. Why this stance? It is

popularly believed that it takes two to tangle. When viewed from a global lens, the federal system of government presupposes a system of government in which powers are shared between the federal/central government and states without further justification. In this parallax, local government or counties or whatever lesser name may be given, any government lower than the state is not a federating unit because it is unknown to the constitution as a sound federating unit. Categorically, those governments at the grassroots (local governments) are just administrative units, whereas the States are federating units.

Based on these propositions, this current study does not subscribe to Akpotor (1995), Ewuim (2008), and other perspectives that erroneously inputted local government as a federating unit, because it is practically evident within our territorial jurisdiction and other world-known federal States that local government is not recognized as a federating unit. Local governments are merely recognized in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as the third tier. However, are they the third-tier government in the true sense of a federating partner or any ramifications such as fiscal autonomy? As acknowledged by one of the informants, "Federalism is a system of administration/government made up of a central authority and constituent parts with the bulk of the power residing at the center (KI: PA2)."

A Constitution Lawyer, Prof. Itse Sagay, was quoted in The Nation Newspaper, "Those advocating autonomy for local government should bid federalism goodbye." It is apparent that there is no known provision for local government as a federating unit within Nigeria's democracy and other developed democracies of the globe and to think or talk of such is to engage in frivolity, absurdity, and vanity of the highest order. In a federal system, powers are shared between states and a central governing authority having postulated nationwide, sub-regional wide, regional wide or worldwide duties vested on it by the electorate through the instrumentality of the *grundnorm*, international conventions, and treaties. At the central level, these powers are simply the exclusive list of the federal system of government which is usually reserved and left for the central authority. The residual list is the legislative powers of the State governments in Nigerian federalism.

In line with the specific objective, we contextualize and operationalize federalism as follows:

- a) In any sound sovereign state, federalism is a process as well as an established structure of governance that develops and fosters unity in diversity on the basis of mutual

agreement by constitutionally uniting politically stratified and disjointed units (*i.e.*, states as a federating partner) into a limited, but encompassing political system known as a federation. Given this, federalism as a process is to install appropriate mechanisms and apparatuses for attaining the will of the state through public administration. As a structure, federalism is structurally contrived to manage and juxtapose sensitive matters unavoidably needed to maintaining unity amidst the need to preserving diversity and heterogeneity.

- b) Nigerian federalism is a system of governance/public administration where political powers are constitutionally shared between the federal government and the federating units. However, it must be borne in mind that each level of government in Nigeria enjoys a certain degree of autonomy, but the irony here is that the autonomy and discretion given to the government at the center is too much when compared to other known federations like the United States of America (USA). As such, it takes to tangle any inclusion of another body as a federating partner creates a power imbalance and would further degenerate into unequal yoking and crises.

Summarily, these definitions represent a glocalized perspective on the conceptual demystification of federalism against the doctored and contorted views of some authors of textbooks used in teaching and coaching naïve and unsuspecting learners in Nigeria and possibly beyond.

Nigerian Federalism: A Dissection of the Anatomy from a Cultural Perspective

Anatomy is a branch of natural science that deals with the structural organization of living things. Though anatomy is a scientific term that means the scientific study of the structure of animals and human bodies, it is herein used to dissect and show the components of Nigerian federalism inherent in the organizational structures and state apparatuses. This would enable juxtaposing various centrifugal issues that bother on the federal system of government as perceived by Nigerian elites (ruling and non-ruling elites inclusive) and the generality of the electorate.

To show the matter, it is herein stated that Nigerian politics, leadership, democracy, and federalism are deeply rooted in stomach infrastructure. Stomach infrastructure peculiar to Nigerian politics is a concentration of political interest based on what is obtainable now that is

perishable in nature that was promised and made available for the immediate gratification of the belly than that which will make the future better sustainable. In short, this is politics based on the immediate provision of perishable goods for the immediate gratification of the poor electorates. What is the impact of this on the development of electioneering processes in Africa with a specific emphasis on Nigeria? Perhaps, this is a gap that other empirical studies by the interested researcher may consider to fill in subsequent attempts.

Imperatively, to say that stomach infrastructure has become the culture of virtually the masses - educated and illiterate is not an aberration. The educated engage in the immediate gratification of the stomach and selfish desire during pre-election and election period due to unemployment and underemployment/meager earnings. The illiterates do that on the ground of ignorance of the fact that they are directly or indirectly mortgaging their future and that of their children in the hands of enemies of their sustainable progress.

At this juncture, we hasten to add that the culture of stomach infrastructure has challenged Nigerian federalism, and everyone seems to be focused on the present satisfaction of human needs, especially food. As most electorates are in dire need of food, politics here is based on who promises to give/serve the people food. In reality, the food served has always been in the manner of crumbs. Crumbs are traditionally the exclusive reserves of dogs and slaves. Hence the colonial masters had seen the blacks in Africa with the core emphasis on Nigeria as slaves and dogs. They positioned for the devouring of crumbs that fell from the table of the indecent master. The emphasis here is that Nigerians were reduced to glorified slaves as did by the British colonial authorities and the leaders who directly or indirectly siphoned Nigeria and Africa at large.

There is no gainsaying that Nigeria is a sort of colonial embargo placed upon people from various tribes who from the onset did not bargain for amalgamation of the present sort partly because of the vivid satisfaction ostensibly derived from their existing political arrangements. To say that all the tribes in Nigeria had one form of government or the other is by no means an error. We are duly informed about the existing government in various parts of Nigeria before the coming of the White with their ulterior motives. For example, "...the territory contained a number of people, each severally pursuing its own destiny. Each of these peoples had achieved or succeeded, through varying degrees, in developing their own peculiar civilization so much so that what the European colonizers encountered on arrival were several independent political

units, some considerably highly developed, and others very simple. Generally, each remained politically distinct and separate (Udenta, 2004, p.350).” To further back up the preceding views, we project Ojukwu’s claims as follows:

These tribes, though variedly associated with the three major entities, still preserved their independence and pursued their progress, each in a manner quite distinct. Each also had developed sophisticated cultures of renown, chronicled in the annals of international history long before the birth of Nigeria and some of these ancient groups include the Edos of the Mid-West, the Ijaws of the Delta, the Kanuri of the North-East (an offshoot of the ancient Songhai Empire), the Jukuns of the Middle Belt, and the Nupes, just to mention a few (Ojukwu, 1989, p.15).

Indeed, Nigeria was contrived by the British colonial imperialist for the purpose of siphoning the wealth of Africa. Corroborating this, a Bureaucrat in an interview with the author, when asked – do you think the British colonized Nigeria for the purpose of siphoning the wealth of Africa? He answered in affirmative as:

Before the name Nigeria came to be, it has been existing till the amalgamation of Northern and Southern protectorate in 1914. This would have brought the people together and provided a firm basis for the arduous task of establishing closer cultural, social, religious, and linguistic ties, which are vital for true unity. For the colonial masters, this union, if allowed to develop, would have amounted to a major threat to the very economic interests they were striving to protect. This brought about the system of divide and rule government in the country. This also brought about social apartheid, division, hatred, unhealthy rivalry, and pronounced development disparity among the country's various people (KI: PA1).

Then, it is not an error for one to say that Nigeria was born as a result of corruption and into severe corruption originated from her corrupt parents. Under this colonial background, the angle of culture would be appropriate to investigate the problems under investigation. That is, we begin by excavating and presenting the meaning of culture. "A very natural approach to the study of any culture is to describe the way the people perceive their world (Kalu, 1978, p.37)." This suggests that culture is based on the way people perceive their world and not just merely about

how they perceive it, but how they react to various stimuli, elements, and forces that symbiotically or parasitically interplay in their physical and social environments.

To Udentia (2004, p.347), "...culture is the concept or notion that stands for a network of designs, prescriptions, and responses, both existential and normative, which characterizes a designated aggregate of people." To this end, what is the people's perception as per the federalist structure in Nigeria? On the side of the meaning of perception, Udentia (2004, p.348) wrote: "perception is the process by which we organize and interpret the stimuli in our environment." Therefore, Nigerians' perceptions as per federalism are nostalgic and, to a high extent, deeply rooted in regrets. For instance, with respect to Nigeria's federalism and public administration, there are two observable stimuli in her public space: negative and positive. The negative stimuli are the challenges of Nigerian federalism, while the positive stimuli are the prospects. We shall look into these as we progress.

Still, on the nostalgic cum regrettable side of the present system, we note that Africa is the home of the black man. However, by deliberate exaggeration and miscalculation, Nigeria has been called/nicknamed the giant of Africa. If Nigeria is the giant of Africa, simple logic thus tells us that Nigeria should be the home of the black man the world over. In reality, with her quasi-federalist position, Nigeria is a political entity under the neocolonial rulership and influence of those she should ordinarily be better than if not for the existing marriage of inconvenience. Therefore, one could testify that Nigerian federalism is soaked with colonial mentality and shape, Shibboleths, Manichaeism, and anti-corruptionist philosophy with its evident utopian approach.

Hence, the entire polity is wallowing in seemingly inextricable corrupted federalism that we can now refer to our poverty of idea/practice as quasi-federalism. We cannot thence say we are unaware of the dangers thereof. In this sense, to state and demonstrate the true meaning of Nigerian federalism, we examine the views of other citizens – that is what is obtainable in Nigeria. Then, "To begin with, Shibboleths and Manichaeism speak of a *Weltanschauung* or world-view enmeshed in stereotypes, straight jackets, jaundice or prejudices" (Udentia, 2004, p.347).

By this, we see the big ordeal that has eaten deep into the fabrics of Nigeria's cake-sharing methodology, ideology, and culture. The methodology, ideology, and culture in the county's

resource allocation are deeply embedded in prejudice exhibited through tribal sentiments and the utter discard of the so-called federal character principle by the government at the top echelon and even those below. At this point, we hasten to add that Nigerian federalism is a federal structure created and luridly decorated with such elements as falsehood, mismanagement, injustice, too much concentration of power on the center, meddlesomeness by the federal government on election matters at the federating partners' level. In addition, divide and rule, quackery (unprofessionalism), disunity, unemployment, poor service delivery, and hatred against one another are rampant. These prevalent cultures have greeted Nigerian federalism, and these adverse inputs already pointed out above ought to be expelled *in toto* with immediate effect. With these, we now move correctly into the challenges.

Cultural Relativist Presentation of the Challenges and Prospects of Nigerian Federalism

Significantly, "The transformation and centralization of the Nigerian federation by 'soldiers and oil' has produced contentious and contradictory outcomes (Rotimi, 2010, p.459)." It is enough to say that Nigerian federalism is enveloped in diverse challenges that have threatened the **co-existence of all and sundry**. Perhaps, it is against this backdrop that Rotimi (2010, p.459) pointed out that, "Many influential commentators describe the current centralized system of federalism as a veritable source of, rather than a credible solvent for, the country's **multifaceted crises of unity** (emphasis mine), democracy and development." Reacting to the question – while asked to give an opinion on Nigerian federalism? An interviewee retorted, "With the recent happenings, Nigerian federalism is not encouraging at all. It is more of anarchy! We wish for a change – God should send Nigeria another David." At present, certain features in the form of irregularities and challenges have become a stumbling block to the actualization of true federalism in Nigeria's polity vis-à-vis the behavioral/cultural patterns of the heterogeneous nationalities in Nigeria. Thus, these challenges are relative to Nigeria as a sovereign entity, which means that those spotted challenges may not be the problem of other known federations in Africa and the world. They are:

Police Brutality – The Nigerian Police Force seems to have been socialized with extreme measures of brutality, and this has permeated the public space without an express permit. As such, many, including the author, have endured a measure of brutality from the Nigerian police force in one form or the other. The recent #END SARS protests all over the country speak volumes of this challenge and have equally painted the Nigerian Police Force with unacceptable

(lurid) colors. Indeed, this has equally made mockery of her federalism and democracy. Looking at police brutality, do we think it has scorned federalism and governance in Nigeria? An interviewee reacting to this question said: "It has undermined everything we know about federalism, for police brutality is one-sided going by what we observed so far in Nigeria (KI: PA1)." He went further to say, "It is what led to the past anti-SARS protests. Our president behaved like a feudal potentate, demonstrably unconcerned and dangerously clueless (KI: PA1)." It can be said that Nigerian Police Force is a puppet under the manipulation and control of the federal government to the detriment of federating units is quite acceptable and in order. However, regrettable is the underlying aftermaths in our anarchy-riddled and ridden society.

Minority Issue and State Creation – There have been several calls for the creation of another state, particularly in the Eastern part of Nigeria. Ethnic multiplicity led to the development of ethnic nationalism in Nigeria, leading to increased demand for autonomy (Chioke, n.d). Minority issues have lingered in Nigeria even before October 1, 1960, Independence. It is in response to minority issues that the Colonial Administration in 1957 set up Willink's Commission. The Commission was charged with the task of conducting an inquiry into the fears of minorities and the means of allaying those issues. In its report, Willink's Commission, after various meetings and hearings of the complaints and submissions on the way forward, did provide the Colonial Administration with a detailed view and comprehension of the nature and scope of the fears of the minority tribes from Northern and Southern protectorates of Nigeria. Nevertheless, the fears of the marginalized minorities in Nigeria are left unattended to and in the southeast geopolitical zone, the matter over these years has been the issue of creation of one additional state, which has equally been recklessly allowed to culminate into dangerous agitations for the secession of the Igbo nation, known as Biafra. In respect of minority issues, it led to the cataclysm and genocide experienced in Eastern Nigeria during the three-year war of 1967 – 1970.

Political Godfatherism – Politics, according to Chikendu (2002), "is that aspect of human activity which deals with the distribution of power, influence, and authority in the state for the purpose of order and good government." In lieu of the fact that politics is about the distribution of power and authority in the state for the purpose of order and good governance, it must be stated herein that political godfatherism has over the years been wrongly used to arrogate political power and authority to a few non-ruling elites (godfathers) in the states/federation and

this has posed a heavy stooge to federalism in Nigeria. For instance, Mgbenkemdi (2015) argues that “In the Nigerian society today, the one who is regarded as a godfather is expected to service the inordinate ambitions of his wards (p.10).” To further demonstrate the challenge of Nigerian federalism in keeping with political godfatherism, it is reiterated that:

“Importantly, political godfatherism, just like corruption, throws up goal displacement and this has plagued the general interest of state. Political godfathers usually form political coalitions in order to capture the political apparatus of the state and attendant maintain a monopoly of political power. And this, more often than not, is perpetuated in a sit tight political setting with the intention of dictating the tune of state politics and equally determining who gets what, where, and how in the bureaucratic setting. This does not augur well with sustainable development in Nigerian politics and Enugu State in particular because the goal of the state having been displaced leaves the state with nothing for sustainable development”
(Chioke, 2020a, p.287-288).

Indeed, godfatherism has threatened the federalist structure obtainable in Nigeria and has widened the gap between the haves and the have not.

Boundary Disputes – The problem of intrastate boundary disputes is a major hiccup to federalism. For instance, the problem of a land dispute between Ezza and Ezillo in Ebonyi State is the *locus classicus* of this issue, and it has resulted in a wanton rate of loss of lives and property (Chioke, n.d). Also, there are instances of boundary disputes between some parts of Ebonyi State and Cross River State, and the two-state governments seem to have joked with the management of the clashes between one community and another. Thus, boundary disputes have brought the worrisome cumulative effect of decreased gross domestic product (GDP) and per capita income *via* wanton loss of lives and mass destruction of properties during communal clashes related to land matters. The problem of boundary disputes is an indication of the failure of government at the state and federal levels.

The terminal disease called, Corruption – It is an understatement to say that corruption is not a disease and not an exaggeration to aver that it is a terminal disease. Corruption is worse than bacteria. It is a phage and must be shown the exit door. Sapru (2013, p.506) argues that "Corruption clearly entails increased administrative costs, losses in government revenue, and

makes administration difficult as it creates a second line of authority parallel to the formal one, in the process undermining and weakening it." Thus, "...without mincing words, the issue lies in the nation's inability to pass the subtle line of the nation's childhood threat – Corruption (Chioke, 2016, p.1)." Sen Babafemi Ojudu, in a plenary session on December 20, 2012, warned that "If you don't kill corruption in this country, corruption will kill all of us." For this reason, "...virtually all the Nigerian leaders who have come in as physicians have left office as a patient (Ilufeye, 2009, p.281)."

Issue of Secession – The secessionist trouble that swallowed Nigeria's existentiality and potentialities could be traced to colonial times. The Eastern region of Nigeria has always felt dissatisfied over the divide and rule policy and ill-treatment meted out to them by the British's despotic colonial cum imperialistic rulership. This paved the way for what transpired in the Legislative house – a motion for self-government in 1953. We note that "After the motion for self-government by Anthony Enahoro in 1953, there has been a secessionist struggle here and there in Nigeria, which contributed significantly to the challenges of Nigeria's federalism. The secessionist struggle started from the North when the motion for self-governance was made in the house. Then, the secession issue can also be traced to Yoruba's disagreement with the proposal to separate Lagos from the Western Region. The last was that of the Igbo's in 1967 when the Nigerian Biafran civil war eventually kicked off (Chioke, n.d, p.171)." Today, we have seen the birth and growth of several secessionist groups like MEND, MASSOB, and IPOB, all pushing for the disintegration of Nigeria.

Revenue Allocation problem – Regrettably, Heather (2011, p.62) opines that "Data from social indicators also demonstrate the lack of equal distribution of revenue allocation among levels of government." To this end, "The problem of equitable and accepted revenue allocation sharing formula has hampered the needed peaceful atmospheric condition for true federalism (Chioke, n.d)." The issue of revenue allocation has become a source of conflict between the center and other federating units. With this, leaders of different federating partners in Nigeria and the central government have struggled to manage the outpouring demands of managing poverty and have resorted to injecting the stomach infrastructure syndrome into Nigerian politics.

It is evident that "In Nigeria, the politics of poverty and the poverty of politics seem to have coalesced to produce a phenomenon known as 'infrastructure of the stomach' in the polity (Dauda, 2020, p.366)." Moreover, every stakeholder in this federation seems to be hugely concerned and preoccupied with the means of salvaging the ever insatiable protruded stomach of the elites here and there. However, we must not forget that "Revenue allocation at the government level affects citizens through the quality and level (or lack of) societal infrastructure (Heather, 2011, p.62)."

Sectionalism and Favoritism – The current ebb and flow of sectional, religious and tribalistic disposition displayed by the Buhari's led administration is a serious threat to Nigeria's peace, unity, and federalist structure. Corroborating this, an interviewee reacted as "Nigeria is not a true federal state. Its power and profiling are one-sided. Why are some people untouchable? Why are some tribes being more favored? The problem is too complex to get rid of (KI: PA1)." Right from the inception of Buhari's civilian government, Nigeria has not been able to stand with oneness and practice true federalism. It has been a case of sectional politics and unjust allocation of values. Hence, the center cannot hold again! In the true sense, sectionalism breeds a dearth of qualified manpower in the organization of societies plagued by it.

To start with, "Organizations in the Nigerian context have suffered supply shortage, and this has remained an ugly reoccurring decimal in the nation's public enterprises and civil service, and one cannot, therefore, look askance at this and wallow in the pretense that all is well with the sovereign entity wrongly called the giant of Africa (Chioke & Mbamalu, 2020, p.388-389)." It is thus unequivocally stated that "Effective bureaucratic leadership is missing in Nigeria's path to good governance and improved quality of life for her citizens (Ukeje, 2006, p.1)." Furthermore, the disappearances of effective bureaucratic leadership coupled with sectionalism/tribalism have hindered the practice of true federalism in Nigeria and likely beyond. As such, "Bureaucratic organizations in Nigeria are largely and grossly inefficient (Chioke, 2017, p.11)."

Conflicts – Conflicts are quite unavoidable in both human and institutional relationships. With respect to the institutional relationship, there are disagreements between the federal government and states in Nigeria. Also, there are examples of Executive – Legislative conflicts at the federal and state levels. Nevertheless, the question is: what are the causes of conflicts between these

institutional relationships? This is another gap where other researchers can investigate the deep-rooted problem.

Then we pause to ask: why do conflicts occur between the above institutions? Now, conflict in the above institutional relationships may occur with respect to uncertainties in the functionalities of federating partners, which are occasioned by ambiguous provisions and legal lacuna. In this tune, Ewuim (2008, p.73-74) opined that "Conflict and clash of interest may arise especially between the central and states/regional government in discharging their concurrent functions." Suffice it to say that, "Ultimately, focused reforms, especially electoral and anti-corruption reforms, will be required to consolidate Nigeria's real successes in mitigating potentially disintegrative ethno-political **conflicts** (emphasis mine) and to assuage current agitations for the wholesale restructuring or dismantling of the federal system (Rotimi, 2010, p.459)." We, however, recall that "The Civil War did not resolve the National Question in Nigeria (Abdul, 2007, p.81)."

Therefore, conflicts have continued to resonate and constitute a significant hiccup in Nigeria's search for a proper federal structure. In Nigeria, conflicts between the federal and state governments endanger, hamper and even depreciate sound and sustainable policymaking and policy implementation. Consequently, clashes between the above units (federal and states) have constantly thrown up copious effects in the manner of poor political and socio-economic well-being of the generality of the common people of Nigeria. Thus, it is believed that "Nigeria's political system has continued to operate with minimum cohesion (Ola, 1995, p.7)."

After discussing the challenges posed by the peculiar federalist style of the Nigerian government, we move to highlight the traceable prospects of federalism in Nigeria. Whatever be the case, it has been intoned that "As with all federal systems, the Nigerian federal system is a dynamic system which changes with time (Ufot, 1991, p.191)." There are a series of areas that the federalist structure already installed has to consolidate within the nation's political space. We would be succinct in our quest to dissect those areas objectively. Consequently, we extrapolate the few areas of prospects which are:

Sustainable Development – Federalism is a step toward sustainable development at the center and the national level. Then, what is sustainable development? We begin pretty simply by few words on development. Rodney (1972) sees "development whether economic, political or social

as both increase in output and changes in the technical and institutional arrangement by which it is produced.” Udentia (2004, p.355) says, “Development captures the ability of man to subdue his biophysical and inter-human environment – making it serve his needs. It is the ability of man to unlock or transform the boundaries of nature locked up in the earth’s surface and direct these at satisfying his needs and desires which continue to increase and to assume more and more complexity.” Then again, we bear in mind that “...development is a multi-dimensional concept and in spite of the various conceptions, development is basically about the process of changes which lies around the spheres of societal life (Chioke, 2020b, p.52-53).” In this dimension, sustainable development is one whose changes lie around the spheres of societal life, which considers the present and the future.

Now, how does federalism trigger sustainable development? It does that by giving room for discretion and initiative. Highlighting the merits of federalism, Ewuim (2008, p.73) stated that, “It promotes initiative and development as the different units can initiate their own programs.” To achieve sustainably developed federating units, the performance of functions must follow due process. In light of this, we ought to bear in mind that “Performance of tasks must not violate existing enabling laws and the constitution of the land. Legality would help to ensure that the actions of organizations are not rendered nullity and declared ultra vires by a court of competent jurisdiction (Chioke & Mbamalu, 2020, p.393).” Based on already relayed premises, it is wise to note that sustainable development is a crucial prospect of Nigerian federalism, and Nigeria will be on her to sustainable development if corruption and other challenges are rooted out.

Efficient Service Delivery – The sharing of powers gives room for effectiveness and efficiency in the performance of functions (Chioke, n.d). Federalism anywhere in the world has the potential of providing for the people in a more accessible way. Through efficient service delivery, the people at the federating units would benefit from the government at the center. There are various voices heard and some suppressed by the federal government with respect to undelivered services. In short, while some services were provided, others were poorly provided, others were abandoned, and many were left unattended by policy implementers at the state levels. However, there is a high degree of prospects regarding service delivery, which Nigeria has no choice but to toe the path of efficient service delivery.

Restructuring – There are different calls from all quarters to restructure Nigeria's politics and administration. First and foremost, for one to call for restructuring, many dichotomous cum centrifugal forces intermingle and interplay within the ecosystem, which makes the state possess an anti-social and anti-development posture. Undoubtedly, Nigerian federalism has better chances of getting and delivering the dividends of democracy through true federalism anchored upon restructuring if all states and grassroots will begin to restructure their respective political terrain. The logic of restructuring is centered on charity begins at home. That is "if you make your place convenient and I make my own, the whole place will be liveable on earth, and everybody will be happy. If the grassroots and state governors restructure their respective units, restructuring will transcend to the center. Generally, the federating partners in Nigeria must synergically restructure the entire system through the instrumentality of a constitutional rebirth.

Good Condition of Service – Employees in this country have little or no encouraging condition of service. Apart from this, one of the problems faced by Nigerian workers is the problem associated with retirement. Retirement is a period of time where one is not actively engaged in gainful employment where he/she had actively contributed to the goals of that institution over a specific period of time. The fact is that so many employees are unwilling to retire because, at the point of retirement, retirement benefits such as gratuity and pension are not quickly released for the beneficiaries' use. The administration of Governor Ifeanyi Ugwuanyi of Enugu State, Nigeria, has denied the majority of retirees their retirement benefit – gratuity is a worrisome issue. Allegedly, this administration has nepotistically paid retirees who are party loyalists, close associates, and cronies their gratuities upon bowing out of active service – retirement. If the federating units in Nigeria's government environment decide to do the needful, Nigerian federalism has the prospect of changing in this direction.

Conclusion

Many Nigerians do not have an adequate understanding of the nitty-gritty of federalism. As a corollary to this, destructive tendencies have troubled Nigerian federalism, making the center epileptic. The obvious negative and centrifugal tendencies that have contaminated and made it disastrous in this era have herein been spotted as the challenges of Nigeria's style of federalism. Therefore, this review is adequate to conclude.

There is a huge nexus between federalism and democracy, and in this sense, we predicate that federalism will succeed under a democratic government, and if there is no democracy, then federalism would just be floating like a boat upon the river. Therefore, the challenges pointed out in this review make a mockery of Nigeria on the global scene. Thus, it calls for immediate response by adopting the panacea provided below and other possible means to ameliorate the negative impacts of those challenges on Nigerian federalism.

Having attained the cardinal objectives of this review, there are other unresolved questions thrown up in this review. Hence, this review did not examine any possible impact of Executive – Legislative Conflicts on Nigeria Federalism and the way forward. Also, this review did not ascertain the effects of Federal and State Conflicts on Nigeria’s Federalism and the measures of mitigating its effects for proper Administration of Nigeria.

Anatomy of Nigerian Federalism: The Panacea

From a globalized approach, federalism thrives in federalist countries with well-structured cum perceived leadership duties at the center and other federating units. To get it right, we turn attention to the need to install well-meaning leadership in Nigeria's federal system of government from the state to the federal government. Leadership involves responsibility based on a clear perception of areas of functionalities and necessities. It would ordinarily include financial, administrative, and public accountability at all governance/public administration levels. This is achievable when politicians are given their due place in the scheme of things within the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

War against corruption is a step in the right direction. However, as already pointed out, Nigeria is soaked in anti-corruptionist philosophy with its evident utopian approach. Hence, a paradigm shift from existing to the expected is among the way forward. The fight against corruption calls for all hands to be on deck to kill this evil that Nigerians were hurriedly socialized with.

As earlier stated, boundary disputes have brought a loss of lives and properties, a decrease in GDP, per capita income, and a decrease in the nation's economic health. In order to curb the loss of lives occasioned by the problem of boundary disputes, the government should conduct nationwide boundary delimitation.

In short, to overcome the recent problems posed by **#END SARS** protests in Nigeria, we must tackle the problem of development within our territorial space, starting from the grassroots – States and Federal government. Thus, for Nigerian federalism to be sustained, we need not

require merely the tissue paper development program but the actual execution of those programs. Implementation of development policies is herein canvassed for as a way out.

To overcome the avalanche of centrifugal forces trying to tear this nation apart aggressively, the federal government should look into the issue of state creation. The southeast geopolitical zone is at the hub of this, as there should be a creation of another state in the southeast to equitably balance the state powers in all the existing geopolitical zones in Nigeria. It is sheer wickedness that other geopolitical zones are made of six states each while the southeast has just five states to her credit.

Implications of the Study

This review has implications for effective learning and practice by students and politicians. Therefore, with the results on specific objective number one, the researcher discovered that both secondary school and undergraduate students in Nigeria need proper academic support and guidance from educators in charge of teaching 'Government' and 'Political Science' as fields of study because this will provide an atmosphere that is not inimical to the academic development.

This review is thus a guide and a reference tool to other scholars and researchers for further researches on the subject matter and related areas.

The other findings implicate that the country called the giant of Africa has continued its federalist operations on the side of very low cohesion and unification of existing ethnic groups. Hence, this review will positively affect policymaking in Nigeria by spurring unifying public policies to be initiated, formulated, and implemented in Nigeria.

Suggestions on Future Direction of Studies

The following areas are recommended for further empirical study/review:

- An Analysis of the Impact of Stomach Infrastructure on the Development of Electioneering Processes in a Federalist State.
- Federalism: A Comparative Survey of Nigeria and Ghana
- Executive – Legislative Conflicts in Nigeria Federalism: An Examination of the Causative Agents and Possible Treatments.
- Effects of Federal and State Conflicts on Nigeria Federalism and the Way Forward

References

Abdul R. M. (1986). The national question and radical politics in Nigeria. *Review of African Political Economy*. 13(37): 81-96.

- Akpotor, S. A. (1995). The dynamics of federal character in Nigeria: A polity in transition self-reliance, politics and administration in Nigeria.216.
- Amah, E. I. (2017). Federalism, Nigerian federal constitution and the practice of federalism: An appraisal. *Beijing Law Review* (8): 287-310.
- Chikendu, P. N. (2002). *Introduction to political science*. Enugu: Academy Publishing Company.
- Chioke, S. C & Mbamalu, K. U. (2020). Human resource planning and organizational performance: A philosophical approach. *International Journal of Management, Social Sciences, Peace and Conflict Studies (IJMSSPCS)*. 3(3): 387- 398.
- Chioke, S. C (2020a). The trouble with godfatherism in Enugu State from 1999 – 2019: diagnosing the gargantuan enigma and the escape route thereof. *Journal of Public Administration and Governance Research*. 3(1):277–300.
- Chioke, S. C. (2016). The impact of treasury single account on the administration of state and national bureaucracy: A study of Nigerian Immigration Service, Enugu State Command. M.Sc. Thesis submitted to the Department of Administration, Faculty of Management Sciences. National Open University of Nigeria.
- Chioke, S. C. (2017). An overview of bureaucracy and treasury single account in an era of economic change. *Journal of Research in Science and Technology Education*. 7(2):1-13.
- Chioke, S. C. (2020b). Corruption and sustainable national development: The underlying implications and overarching consequences. *Kobia International Journal of Education Humanities and Social Science* 1(1):49-62.
- Chioke, S. C. (n.d). Government, politics, and administration in Nigeria and beyond: Past and present issues. Unpublished paper.
- Creswell, J. W. (1998). *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five traditions*. California: Sage Publications.
- Dauda, B. (2020). Transactional politics: The manifestations of the challenges of ‘infrastructure of the stomach’ and ‘infrastructure for the stomach’ in Nigeria. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*. 38(3):366 -380.
- Ewuim, N. C. (2008). *Succinct approach to government: A comparative analysis*. Awka: Mount Carmel Printing & Publishing Ltd.
- Heather, C. (2011). The impact of political corruption on social welfare in the federal republic of Nigeria. Department of Political Science University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida.
- Idike, A. N. A. (2014). Democracy and the electoral process in Nigeria: Problems and prospects of the E-Voting Option. *Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences (AJHSS)*. 2(2): 133-141.
- Ilufoye, S. O (2009). Political corruption in Nigeria: Theoretical perspectives and some explanations. *The Anthropologist* 11(4):281-292.
- Kalu, O. U (1978). Precarious vision: The African’s perception of his world in Kalu, O. U (ed.). *Reading in African humanities, African cultural development*. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd, 37 – 44.
- Leke, S. (2013). Is Local Government Federating Unit? *The Nation Newspaper*. June 18, 2013. Retrieved November 2, 2020.
- Maduabum, C.P. (2008). *The Mechanics of Public Administration*. Lagos: Concept Publications Ltd cited in National Open University of Nigeria (NOUN) (2014), course guide on

- “*Ecology of public administration*” course code: PAD 803, Lagos: National Open University of Nigeria.
- Mgbenkemdi, E. H. (2015) Godfatherism: Life and survival in Nigeria society: A psychoanalytic approach. *Global Journal of Applied, Management and Social Sciences (GOJAMSS)*. (9):9–19.
- National Open University of Nigeria (NOUN) (2014), course guide on “*Ecology of public administration*” course code: PAD 803, Lagos: National Open University of Nigeria.
- Oboli, H. O. N (1965). *Beginning geography in Eastern Nigeria*. Ikeja: Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd.
- Ojukwu, C. (1989). *Because I am involved*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd.
- Okafor, R. C & Emeka, L. N. (2004). Concept of culture in Okafor, R. C & Emeka, L. N (eds). *Nigerian Peoples and Culture*. Enugu: Nigerian Generation Books.
- Ola, R. F. (1995). *Nigerian political system: Inputs, outputs and environment*. Benin City: Ambik Press.
- Rotimi, S. (2010). The Nigerian federal system: Performance, problems and prospects. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*. 28 (4):459-477.
- Sapru, R. K (2013). *Administrative theories and management thought (3rd ed)*. Delhi: PHI Learning Private Limited.
- Udenta, J. O. E (2004). The Nigerian perception of his/her world of shibboleths, Manichaeism, colonial mentality. In Okafor, R. C & Emeka, L. N (eds). *Nigerian peoples and culture*. Enugu: Nigerian Generation Books.
- Ufot, B. I. (1991). Federalism in Nigeria: The crucial dynamics. *The Round Table*. 80(318): 191-207.
- Ukeje, I. O. (2006). The challenges of effective leadership in Nigerian public administration: (A case study of Obasanjo administration 1999-2006). Unpublished B.Sc Project). Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki, Nigeria.