



# PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development

**An Interdisciplinary Biannual Journal**

©2021, Center for PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development, College of Law and Governance, Jimma University, Ethiopia. All rights reserved. Except as permitted under Ethiopian laws or by the copyright holder, the use of the whole or part of this publication in any form and by any means is prohibited.





## *International Advisory Board*

Dr. Ajede Salamat Atinuke, Tai Solarin University of Education, Nigeria

Dr. Anja van Heelsum, the University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Prof. Ann Fitz-Gerald, Balsillie School of International Affairs, Canada

Prof. Attila Meleg, Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary

Prof. B.M. Jain, University of Rajasthan, India

Prof. Berhanu Mengistu, Old Dominion University, U.S.A

Prof. Edward Shizha, Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada

Prof. Faizan Mustafa, NALSAR University of Law, India

Prof. Farhana Kausar, Aligarh Muslim University, India

Prof. Gloria Emeagwali, Central Connecticut State University, USA

Prof. Harvey White, University of North Carolina, USA

Prof. Ishtiaq Jamil, University of Bergen, Norway

Prof. Italo Trevisan, University of Trento, Italy

Prof. Jane E. Fountain, University of Massachusetts, USA

Prof. Pranab Kumar Panday, University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh

Prof. Priya Deshingkar, University of Sussex, UK.

Dr. Shyamika Jayasundara-Smiths, ISS, Erasmus University of Rotterdam, The Netherlands

Prof. Steinar Askvik, University of Bergen, Norway

## *Editorial Board*

Professor (Dr.) Minhaj Alam (Editor-in-Chief)

Ermyas Admasu Wolde (Assistant Professor - Managing Editor)

Abiot Desta Habte (Assistant Professor - Member)

Bisrat Gebru Wolde (Assistant Professor - Member)

Fikadu T. Ayanie (Assistant Professor - Member)

Girma Defere Tegegn (Assistant Professor - Member)

Siyum Adugna Mamo (Assistant Professor - Member)

Dr. Eba Teresa Garoma (Associate Professor - Language Editor)

## *Internal and External Reviewers*

Dr. Minhaj Alam (Professor, Jimma University, Ethiopia)

Ermias Admassu (Assistant Professor, Jimma University, Ethiopia)

Abiot Desta (Assistant Professor, Jimma University, Ethiopia)

Bisrat Gebru (Assistant Professor, Jimma University, Ethiopia)

Bizuayehu Daba Feyisa (Assistant Professor, Jimma University, Ethiopia)

Edilu Shona Dikale (Assistant Professor, Hawassa University, Ethiopia)

Fikadu T. Ayanie (Assistant Professor, Jimma University, Ethiopia)

Girma Defere (Assistant Professor, Jimma University, Ethiopia)

Kaso Teha (Assistant Professor, Jimma University, Ethiopia)

Siyum Adugna Mamo (Assistant Professor, Jimma University, Ethiopia)

Dr. A. V. Satish Chandra (Professor, Osmania University, India)

Dr. Kiran Gardner (Professor, Alliance University, Bangalore, India)

Dr. H. M. Kutub Uddin (Assistant Professor, Azad Hind Fouz Smriti Mahavidyalaya, Calcutta University, India)

Dr. Swati Chakraborty (Assistant Professor, Schoolguru Eduserve, India)

Dr. Debrework Debebe (Assistant Professor, Hawassa University, Ethiopia)

Abdi Aden Yasin (Assistant Professor, Wolaita Sodo University, Ethiopia)

Anteneh Tesfahun (Senior Lecturer, Bahir Dar University, Ethiopia)

Besfat Dejene (Assistant Professor, Bahr Dar University, Ethiopia)

Gedifew Sewenet Yigzaw (Assistant Professor, Bahir Dar University, Ethiopia)

Yoseph Watte (Assistant Professor, Hawassa University, Ethiopia)

## **Disclaimer**

**The ideas in this journal do not represent the Editorial Board, or the Center for PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development, or the Department of Governance and Development, or the College of Law and Governance, or Jimma University, but solely of the authors.**

## AUTHOR'S DESK

The submission of manuscripts should be made through the online platform of the PJGD <http://journals.ju.edu.et/index.php/panjogov>. For any reason, if the website does not work, manuscripts can be submitted to Professor (Dr.) Minhaj Alam (Editor-in-Chief) at [minhaj.alam@ju.edu.et](mailto:minhaj.alam@ju.edu.et) or [prof.minhajalam@gmail.com](mailto:prof.minhajalam@gmail.com) or to Ermyas Admasu Wolde (Managing Editor) at [ermyas.wolde@ju.edu.et](mailto:ermyas.wolde@ju.edu.et) or [ermyad@yahoo.com](mailto:ermyad@yahoo.com).

The detailed guidelines, the ethical principles that authors must attest before submission, the rules of style, and the format of manuscripts can be found upon registering at the website of the journal or upon request of the editor in chief or the managing editor. In any case, the word count for manuscripts should be as specified below.

1. Original Research Article: (8,000-10,000 words)
2. Review Article: (8,000-10,000 words)
3. Featured Article: (5,000-8,000 words)
4. Research Notes: (3,000-5,000 words)
5. Commentaries: (1,000-3,000 words)
6. Book Review: (2,000-4,000 words)



***Editorial***

About the Department of Governance and Development Studies (GaDS) and PJGD..... 1

***Articles***

The Paradox of Ethiopia's Underdevelopment: Endogenous Factors in Retrospect 3

*Feyera Senbeta*

The Utilization of Nile Water among the Riparian States: Tensions and Controversies on the Filling and Annual Operation of the GERD 31

*Negasa Gelana Debisa*

Maintaining Mutual Benefits between Investor and Local Community: Mechanisms to Reopen Lega Dambi Gold Mining, Ethiopia 55

*Abdisa Olkeba Jima*

The Ethiopian Legal Frameworks for the Protection of Women and Girls from Gender Based Violence 82

*Marew Abebe Salemot and Alemtseyahe Birhanu*

The Roles of Political Parties and Their Challenges in Political Transition: The Case of Ethiopia 103

*Ayenew Birhanu Worku*

The Status of Democratic Developmental State in Ethiopia: Is It Rolling Back or Rolling Forward? 124

*Teklie Tesfamariam Berhe*

The Effects of Teachers' Training on Professional Development and Teaching Practice: A Case Study of Two Selected Colleges in Bangladesh 148


*Mohammad Jahangir Hossain Mojumder*




## About the Authors




<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6502-4797>

 **Dr. Feyera Senbeta** is an Associate Professor at the Centre for Environment and Development of the College of Development Studies, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia. He received his BSc Degree in Forestry from Alemaya University of Agriculture in 1994, MSc Degree in Natural Forest Management from the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences in 1998, and Ph.D. in Vegetation Ecology from the University of Bonn in 2006. He has over 25 years of work experience in teaching, research, and community services. He has been involved in various interdisciplinary research projects and produced several outstanding findings and publications. He published over 80 peer-reviewed journal articles, books, book chapters, working papers, and proceedings. His research focuses on biodiversity conservation, vegetation ecology, ecosystem services, social-ecological systems, and climate change.


<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0161-1076>

 **Negasa Gelana Debisa** is a Lecturer at the Department of Civics and Ethical Studies, College of Social Sciences and Humanities, Bule Hora University, Ethiopia. He earned his BA Degree in Civics and Ethical Studies from Wollega University in 2012 and his MA Degree in Foreign Policy and Diplomacy from Hawassa University in 2018. He worked as the Dean of College of Social Sciences and Humanities from October 2019-to May 2020 at Bule Hora University. Currently, he is the Director of Indigenous Knowledge and Technology Affairs in the same university. His area of research interests is indigenous knowledge, terrorism, international relations and diplomacy, democracy, good governance, human rights, conflict, transboundary water resources, peace, and security.

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0183-0084>

 **Abdisa Olkeba Jima** is a Lecturer and Researcher at the Department of Governance and Development Studies, Bule Hora University, Ethiopia. He received a BA Degree in Civics and Ethics from Madawalabu University, Ethiopia, and an MA in Development Management from Jimma University, Ethiopia. His research areas include socioeconomic effects of FDI on local communities, impacts of a large scale gold mining on the local community, socioeconomic impact of human trafficking among Asian returnee young women, prospects and challenges of incorporating Gadaa system into Ethiopian higher education curriculum, challenges of good governance packages on urban water service delivery, and vicious circle of Ethiopian politics. He has served as Department Head, Civics and Ethical Studies, and Department Head, Governance and Development Studies. Currently, he has been serving as Director of the Internationalization Office at Bule Hora University.

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2612-6923>

 **Marew Abebe Salemot** is a graduate of the Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia holding MA Degree (2013) in Federalism studies. Worked as a Lecturer at different public universities in Ethiopia Debre Markos University (September 2013 to December 2014), Oda Bultum University (October 2016 – 2019), and since August 2019, the

Author is working as a Lecturer and Researcher at Debark University. His areas of teaching and research interests are on the issues of federalism and minority rights. He has also attended short-term training in Germany and Hungary.

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1858-9995>



**Alemstehay Birhanu** completed his MSc in Gender & Developmental Studies from the University of Gondar, Ethiopia and currently working as a Lecturer at Debark University, Ethiopia since August 2019.

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1891-8939>



**Dr. Ayenew Birhanu Worku** has graduated in Political Science and International Relations from Addis Ababa University, and also holds MA and Ph.D. in Federal Studies from Addis Ababa University. Currently, he is teaching at Kotebe Metropolitan University.

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4757-6130>



**Teklie Tesfamariam Berhe** has BA Degree in Civics and Ethical Studies and MA Degree in Governance and Development Studies from Mekelle University, Ethiopia. Currently, the author is working as Assistant Professor at the Department of Civics and Ethical Studies, Adigrat University, Ethiopia. He has researched the pervasive issues of governance, media, development, corruption, and rent-seeking. Besides, he has been diligently engaged in the teaching and learning process and delivering community services. Moreover, the author has participated and presented his research papers devoted to the notion of the democratic developmental state and its challenges in some of the national conferences. Finally, the author is highly interested to pursue and identify scholarly the fundamental problems faced in the political economy of Ethiopia.

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0985-9842>



**Dr. Mohammad Jahangir Hossain Mojumder** is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science at Chowmuhani Government S.A. College, Noakhali, Bangladesh. He has been in teaching for the last 15 years covering both higher secondary and tertiary levels. In 2019, the author obtained his Ph.D. from the Institute of Bangladesh Studies, University of Rajshahi. In addition to that, recently, he has been pursuing an ‘MA in Education’ at the University of Nottingham Malaysia (UNM). Previously, he performed as a trainer for the higher secondary level teachers. His publications include a book from Routledge, UK, a couple of journal articles from international publishing houses, and a good number of newspaper articles in substantial national dailies in Bangladesh. Furthermore, he has presented several papers in international seminars and participated in various other workshops. Notably, his areas of academic interest include (local) governance, NGOs, service delivery, women’s empowerment, remittances, and education.



## **About the Department of Governance and Development Studies (GaDS) and PJGD**

Department of Governance and Development Studies (GaDS) is one of the pioneer departments of Jimma University established in September 2007 and functioning as a constituent unit of the College of Law and Governance since September 2014. Since its establishment, the Department of GaDS is playing a vital role in the transformation of society and empowering the government institutions by producing professionals in the area of development and governance. Currently, the Master Program of GaDS has three specializations: (i) Governance and Development; (ii) Development Management; (iii) Peace and Conflict Studies whereas two more specializations (Gender Studies and Federal Studies) yet to be introduced.

The Post-Graduate Program of the Department clearly states its vision as “The Master of Arts Program in Governance and Development Studies (GaDS) institutionalizes a dynamic and strategic vision to provide an interdisciplinary, advanced, research-based and practical education in contemporary issues of national and international governance and development”. This stated vision at the same time echoes the vision of the Jimma University which “aspires to be one of the premier universities in Africa and renowned in the world by 2025”.

It is in pursuance of these stated visions of GaDS and Jimma University, the Center for PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development (PJGD) is established to offer a platform of expression of new scientific inquiries to all intellectuals/academicians/scholars of the world in general and Africa & Ethiopia, in particular, to reflect on how governance and development can be promoted, strengthened and consolidated. As the nature of the journal is multi-, inter-, and trans-disciplinary, the scope of the journal ranges from the disciplines of political science, governance, development, leadership, national and international law, globalization, human rights, economics, environmental science, public policy, international relations, international organizations, gender, peace and conflict management, international political economy, multiculturalism, civil society, and related areas.

## Full-Time Staff Profile of the Department of Governance and Development Studies

S.N.	Faculty Members	Qualifications
1.	Abiot Desta	Assistant Professor, M.Phil. in Public Administration, MA in Development & Environment, BA in Political Science and IR
2.	Bisrat Gebru	Assistant Professor, MA in Development Studies, BA in Political Science & International Relations
3.	Damena Tolesa	Lecturer, MA in Governance & Development Studies, BA in Governance & Development
4.	Ermyas Admasu	Assistant Professor, M.Phil. in Public Administration, MA in Development Studies, BA in Political Science & International Relations
5.	Fikadu T. Ayanie	Assistant Professor, Ph.D. Candidate, Joint European Masters in Comparative Development, MA in Development Studies, BA in Political Science & International Relations
6.	Gemechu Fikadu	Lecturer, MA in Governance & Development, LLB in Law
7.	Girma Defere	Assistant Professor, Ph.D. Candidate, MA in Public Management, MA in Rural Development, BA in Political Science & IR
8.	Gudeta Kebede	Ph.D. Candidate, MPhil. in Public Administration, MA in International Relations, BA in Political Science & IR
9.	Idris Yeba	Ph.D. Candidate, MA in International Relations, BA in Political Science & IR
10.	Mekdes Worku	Lecturer, MA in Governance & Development Studies, BA in Governance & Development Studies
11.	Melese Tefo	Lecturer, MA in Development Management, BA in Governance & Development Studies
12.	Merry Kapito	Lecturer, MA in Governance & Development, BA in History
13.	Minhaj Alam	Professor, Ph.D. in Political Science, MA in Political Science, BA in Political Science
14.	Muluken Gemechu	Lecturer, MA in International Relations, BA in Political Science & International Relations
15.	Rahel Assefa	Ph.D. Candidate, MA in Governance & Development, MA in Development Management, BA in Governance & Development
16.	Siyum Adugna	Assistant Professor, Ph.D. Candidate, MA in Development Studies, MA in Philosophy, BA in Philosophy
17.	Tewodros Woldeargay	Lecturer, MA in Political Science, BA in Global Studies & International Relations
18.	Tkue Hayate Sied	Lecturer, MA in Development Studies, BA in Governance & Development
19.	Wasihun Altaseb	Lecturer, MA in Development Studies, BA in Civics & Ethics

## The Paradox of Ethiopia's Underdevelopment: Endogenous Factors in Retrospect

Feyera Senbeta (Ph.D.)\*

### Abstract

*Ethiopia is a country of diverse historical, cultural, geographical, archeological, and ecological resources and is well known as the cradle of humanity. It is also the tenth-largest country in Africa and endowed with vast land and water resources. This country was unable to translate these potential resources into positive development outcomes. This paper examines the historical perspective of Ethiopia's underdevelopment mystery under the last three regimes (i.e., Haile Selassie (Imperial), Derg, and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)). Qualitative approaches mainly interview, discussion, document analysis, and personal experiences were employed in generating relevant data that were analyzed and presented thematically. The results show that Ethiopia ranked the least in many global human development indexes such as Human Development Index, Corruption Index, and Global Hunger Index in the last decade. The underlying historical development challenges include political instability, despotic leadership, corruption, dependence on foreign aid and assistance, controlled freedom of expression, lack of diversity within unity, and inconsistent development policies. Over the last three successive regimes, the state-society relationship has been characterized by conflict, disagreement, and supremacy of state which messed up available national development opportunities. If Ethiopia has to come out of poverty and underdevelopment, it needs to improve its political stability and governance. It must be governed by 'popularly elected' not by 'self-elected leader' and put in place a system of accountability for a better future and wellbeing of its population. Consistent and pro-poor policy, good working culture, and unity in diversity must be other areas of concern for future development.*

**Keywords:** *Corruption, Development, Diversity, Ethiopia, Policy, Unity*

### Introduction

Ethiopia is a country with greatly varying landscapes ranging from high and rugged mountains, flat-topped plateaus, deep gorges, and incised rivers to valleys and rolling plains. With many mountains and plateaus, and abundant water resources, it is commonly known as the "roof of Africa" (Asrat, 2016) and the "water tower of Africa" (UNEP, 2010), respectively. It also possesses diverse historical, archeological, and ecological accounts. Occupying an area of about 1.1 million square kilometers, it is the tenth-largest country in Africa. The Great Rift Valley system runs from northeast to southwest and divides the country into the northwestern and southeastern highlands. The highlands give way to extensive semi-arid lowlands to the east, south, and west. The country is also the second-most populous country in Africa, with a population of around 114.9 million in 2020 (PRB, 2020). The population is greatly diverse, hosting over 80 ethnic groups of which the majority practice some sort of belief. Ethiopia has

---

\* Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia. Email: [feyera.senbeta@aau.edu.et](mailto:feyera.senbeta@aau.edu.et)

rich cultural and natural sites; and registered many UNESCO World Heritage Sites. The country has a long and rich history with the hominid “grandmother” of Lucy (Marcus 1994; Adejumobi, 2007; Lie & Mesfin, 2018).

A long history of human settlement and associated anthropogenic factors has therefore influenced the biophysical environment of the country for years. For example, archaeological and pollen evidence suggest that agriculture practice has influenced the natural vegetation cover of the country since ancient (Phillipson, 1985; Eshetu & Högberg, 2000; Darbyshire *et al.*, 2003).

Over the last ninety years, the people of Ethiopia have experienced three different types of regimes, *i.e.*, Imperial (1930-1974), *Derg* (1974-1991), and EPRDF (1991-2019). Characteristically, the three regimes followed distinct political ideology and development strategies reflective of their inherent nature. *The* Imperial System followed the ideology of the Emperor being “Elect of God” and events assumed to be performed by the Emperor of the Empire of Ethiopia. The socialist regime is commonly known as “*Derg*” formally eliminated the monarchy and embraced Marxist ideology. The EPRDF ousted the *Derg* and elevated itself as the democratic and promising regime of a moment (Marcus, 1994; Prunier, 2015; Poluha & Feleke, 2016).

Despite diverse political backgrounds, Ethiopia has been an icon of poverty for years (Marcus, 1994; Adejumobi, 2007; Gill, 2010); and remains one of the least developed countries in the world (Lie & Mesfin, 2018; UNDP, 2019). Development is progress towards achieving intricate goals such as elimination of poverty, provision of employment, reduction of inequality and the guarantee of human rights (Hicks & Streeten, 1979; World Bank, 2016; Abuiyada, 2018); and a state of achieving better human wellbeing (Nicholas, 1989; Lawan, 2008). Until now, however, Ethiopia ranked among the least developed countries in the world (UNDP, 2018, 2019). The prevalence of subsistence farming, poverty, poor infrastructure, poor housing, low standard of living, environmental degradation, and human rights abuse are some of the indicators that justify Ethiopia’s underdevelopment at the moment.

Various scholars have tried to comprehend the development trajectory of Ethiopia concerning politics (Clapham, 2015; Lie & Mesfin, 2018), poverty (Flynn, 2005), and the nature of Ethiopia’s history (Marcus, 1994). Courtesy to earlier reports, this study examines

comprehensive issues as to what factors trapped Ethiopia's development efforts for a long period. This article tries to understand the irony of Ethiopia's (under) development from a historical perspective focusing on the imperial, *Derg*, and EPRDF regimes by searching answers to some basic questions that include: Why does Ethiopia remain one of the least developed countries in the world in the 21<sup>st</sup> century? This overarching question can be further decomposed into issues of resource availability, governance and leadership, and policy imperatives. A critical search of answers to these questions could hopefully uncover what went wrong and erroneous in Ethiopia's past which will serve to seek and scrutinize the future development pathways.

### **Conceptual Framework**

Development as a concept has been contested among scholars for a long as it has often been looked at from political or economic perspectives or both. However, economic growth was regarded as central to the development endeavors up to the 1980s (Adams, 2009). Slowly, development came to be understood as a multidimensional concept that should encompass economic, social, environmental, political, and cultural components (all of them having a direct impact on the quality of human life). Thus, there is no single model of development suitable and desirable for all countries. After World War II, for example, a range of development thinking has emerged that include modernization theory, dependency theory, human development, neoliberalism, post-development, sustainable development, and millennium development goals. The archaeology of development and changing circumstances for development has contributed to such diverse thoughts (Lewis, 1998; Rapley, 2007; Pieterse, 2010).

Experiences reveal that the concepts of development of a given country have been associated with its economic growth through higher productivity (Kuznets, 1966), political stability (Shepsle & Bonchek, 2010), the extension of rights to all social groups, and the opportunities available to get them (Bayly, 2008) and the proper functioning of institutions and organizations (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). According to Remenyi (2004), development is a process rather than an outcome that changes from one state or condition to another through a course of time within the prevailing political spheres. Often development leads to improved quality of life such as social justice, equal opportunity for all citizens, equitable distribution of income, and the democratization of the development process (Agbiboa, 2012; Pritchett *et al.*, 2013). Thus, development symbolizes the whole range of change by which an entire social system moves

away from a condition of life widely professed as unsatisfactory towards a situation where life is considered as better (Todaro & Smith, 2003; Remenyi, 2004; Agbiboa, 2012). In contrast, underdevelopment is recognized in the situation when the capacity of human self-reliance and satisfaction deteriorates, mainly because the means to be responsible for one's livelihood or welfare has been lost to corruption, war, human right abuse, civil unrest, or the imposed need to escape and adopt the life of a refugee (Remenyi, 2004).

Over the years, many institutions including multilateral agencies and NGOs have tried to develop global indicators of development range from economic indicators (*e.g.*, Gross National Income, GDP) to various kinds of poverty and social inequality, education, and health, all the way down to more subjective development indicators such as happiness. In this article, these indicators are being considered to determine the paradox of Ethiopia's underdevelopment.

### **Research Methodology**

The study employed different methods to address the research question of why Ethiopia is still underdeveloped in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. First, secondary sources, such as existing literature on the issues of development and underdevelopment were extensively consulted to establish solid theoretical grounds as to how this key concept was conceptualized and understood by others. Based on the selected literature, a textual analysis was carried out to shed some light on the concept of development/underdevelopment. The author's personal experiences and observation of Ethiopia's development and politics over an extended period were also used to corroborate the sources and the findings. Data were collected between September and December 2019.

Besides, an interview was conducted with graduate students (35), university professors (22), and scholars (14) involved in wide ranges of specialization. The interviewed Key Informants (KIs) and their respective discipline for each scholar are abbreviated as economist (EC), sociologist (SO), historian (HI), anthologist (AN), natural resource management (NR) expert, agriculturalist (AG), demographer (DE), ecologist (EO), forester (FO), geographer (GE), environmentalist (EN), biologists (BI), politician (PO), development (DE) expert and graduate student (GS) of development studies. These abbreviations were used throughout the manuscript to authenticate the source of information for quoted sources.

The qualitative method can provide complex textual descriptions of how people perceive and experience a given research issue. It provides information about the human side of an issue – that



is, the often paradoxical behaviors, beliefs, opinions, emotions, and relationships of individuals presented (Creswell, 2009). According to Marshall (2003), the qualitative method of data generation is very effective in identifying intangible factors, such as social norms, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and religion, whose role in the research issue may not be readily apparent. The interview mainly focused on the questions such as: How did each interviewee make sense of Ethiopia's development trends over the years? Why does Ethiopia remain underdeveloped in the 21<sup>st</sup> century? Then, information was thematically analyzed and interpreted accordingly.

## **Results and Discussion**

### **Development Trajectory of Ethiopia**

Ethiopia has tried and experienced different development pathways such as feudal, socialist, and recently revolutionary democracy and developmental state system. However, these pathways never transformed Ethiopia into prosperity and economic development - rather the move from one system to the other led to chaos and devastation of human and economic resources (Clapham, 2015; Poluha & Feleke, 2016; Lie & Mesfin, 2018). In this article, the development trajectory of Ethiopia focused on the recent three successive regimes, namely Imperial, *Derg*, and EPRDF.

The Imperial system was based on the exploitation of the peasants who used to receive a piece of land in return for serving a lord (Cohen, 1974). The era of Imperial was a period of exploitive feudalism, built on injustice and disparity, in which the government was devoted to the glory of an emperor (Clapham, 2015). This system was recognized as pairing a bureaucratic monarchy and local noblemen, who often quarreled with each other, against a deeply oppressed peasantry who did not consider themselves citizens and who usually, spoke different languages and worshipped different deities, were subjugated and dehumanized (Cohen, 1974; Ghose, 1985; Bekele *et al.*, 2016). This led to serious grievances and uprising which finally removed the feudal system through a revolution in 1974 and brought the *Derg* into power (Lorch, 1995; Mayfield, 1995; Plaut, 2012).

But the way the *Derg* took over the feudal system was revolutionary and many underpinning and existing economic, institutional, and human resources were destroyed by the name of lord property. According to one informant, "*when the peasants finally took action, it was in the form*

*of a chaotic explosion of revenge. Large estates were burned and crops uprooted (KI: PO).” Derg's regime started by executing 60 imprisoned former government officials and followed by the Red Terror in which tens and thousands of people were killed because of their political stance. Derg throughout its existence was engaged in various kinds of fighting with many resistance movements and with Somalia while trying to set itself as a socialist that was not approved even by the Soviets (Prunier, 2015). The subsequent outbreak of famine (1983/1984) in the country forced population migration and villagization policy which destabilized the policy of the regime and finally led to its removal.*


The erstwhile Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) which came to power by removing the *Derg* regime in 1991, also followed by destructive episodes like the previous government and apparent institution, natural resources, and many systems were completely dismantled by the name of *Derg* assets. As acknowledged by one of the informants:

*The civil wars that took place at different moments had damaged the resources of the country. History proved that civil war has been an integral part of most of the kings, rulers, and ministries even as of today's Ethiopia. Civil war poses a potential danger to unrest and underdevelopment (KI: HI).*

Figure 1 below demonstrates the aftermath of the change in regimes and the social, economic, and political damages that followed. This displays the discontent and disapproval of the earlier regime by the large segments of society, and the hope of showing care of warning for a newly reigned group. This exhibits that none of those regimes were loyal and transparent to their people during their governance period. These irresponsible political transformations have led the country to chaos and destruction which contributed to the low development of the country in the last nine decades (Teferra, 1984; Mayfield, 1995; Flynn, 2005; Gill, 2010). Policy formation has been and is still a top-down approach in the history of the country. No government gave damn care to its society as to what type of development policy and strategy the country needs - instead all past governments developed policies that fit well to their political gamble. This phenomenon has been and remains part and parcel of Ethiopia's history and made governments detested of all-time by a large proportion of the citizens. Whatever development policy and strategy being formulated by the government, the people have been and are still suspicious and expect a little positive outcome. State-society relations have been characterized by contention, contradiction,

and domination, and a struggle to limit the power and domination of the state was either missed or messed upon many occasions. The state has remained dominant and resilient, coping with the resistance mainly by military and authoritarian means (Bekele *et al.*, 2016).

**Figure 1: Historical Development Trends among Different Regimes of Ethiopia**



(Source: Own Development)

As time goes by, each government moves down to the politics of the blame game of the previous regime. As observed by Poluha & Feleke (2016) that the usual narrative during the *Derg* period was that Ethiopia remained backward because of oppression and exploitation by the feudal system. The EPRDF period was ushered with the claim that the *Derg* dictatorship was, in essence, a continuation of the previous regimes and that the new order would be contributing to the welfare of the Ethiopians and rescuing them from centuries of subjugation and backwardness. Governed by the EPRDF regime for more than a quarter of a century, Ethiopia remains poor and backward by all standards (as explained in the following section). Whether the incoming regime cheerfully goes along the same pathway of blame game or not, is yet to be seen.

### Recent State of Human Development

To argue rationally either in favor or against recent development trends, it is imperative to assess first the recent global human development data and compare it with that of Ethiopia. In so doing, one can realistically claim the human development trend of Ethiopia against other nations or

regions in the world. Subsequently, the recent Ethiopia's *Human Development Index*, the *Corruption Perceptions Index*, and *Global Hunger Index* were comprehended as examples and compared with other countries. These are indices used globally to compare countries in terms of human, poverty, and corruption status as indicators of development. Accordingly, each index is analyzed one after the other in the following sections.

### ***Human Development Index***

The Human Development Index (HDI) measures average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development - a long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living (UNDP, 2018). Long and healthy life is measured by life expectancy, and knowledge is measured by a combination of mean years of schooling, an average number of years of schooling, and access to learning whereas the standard of living is measured by Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (UNDP, 2019). The index counts value between 0 and 1, and an index value close to 0 and 1 shows low and high human development trends respectively. An index of less than 0.550 shows low human development while a value of 0.800 or greater shows very high human development. Index value from 0.550-0.699 shows medium human development, and 0.700–0.799 shows high human development.

In the 2018 HDI Report, Ethiopia's HDI was 0.470 and ranked 173 out of 189 countries and territories (Table 1 below). All values in 2018 and preceding years fall within the low human development group and the least as compared to different regions and global values. This confirms the low evolution of development processes in Ethiopia related to basic needs of health, education, and standard of living seen in a comparative perspective. As uttered by all informants, persistent political instability, conflicts and war, racism and nepotism, poor education, bad governance, and poor political commitment were mentioned as primary causes of low development over the years.

Table 1: Human Development Index for Ethiopia and Other Regions: 2000 and 2010-2018

2018 Rank	Categories of development	Country/regions/	2000	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
			Figures of human development index									
	Very High Human Development		0.823	0.866	0.871	0.874	0.878	0.882	0.886	0.888	0.890	0.892

	High Human Development		0.630	0.706	0.713	0.720	0.727	0.733	0.738	0.743	0.746	0.750
	Medium Human Development		0.497	0.575	0.584	0.593	0.599	0.608	0.616	0.625	0.630	0.634
	Low human Development		0.386	0.473	0.479	0.484	0.490	0.496	0.499	0.501	0.505	0.507
<b>173 of 188</b>		<b>Ethiopia</b>	<b>0.283</b>	<b>0.412</b>	<b>0.423</b>	<b>0.429</b>	<b>0.439</b>	<b>0.446</b>	<b>0.453</b>	<b>0.460</b>	<b>0.467</b>	<b>0.470</b>
		<b>Developing Countries</b>	0.571	0.642	0.650	0.657	0.663	0.669	0.674	0.680	0.683	0.686
		<b>Regions</b>										
		Arab States	0.613	0.676	0.681	0.687	0.688	0.691	0.695	0.699	0.701	0.703
		East Asia and the Pacific	0.597	0.691	0.700	0.707	0.714	0.721	0.727	0.733	0.737	0.741
		Europe and Central Asia	0.667	0.735	0.744	0.750	0.759	0.766	0.770	0.772	0.776	0.779
		L. America and the Caribbean	0.687	0.731	0.737	0.740	0.748	0.752	0.754	0.756	0.758	0.759
		South Asia	0.505	0.585	0.593	0.601	0.607	0.617	0.624	0.634	0.639	0.642
		Sub-Saharan Africa	0.423	0.498	0.505	0.512	0.521	0.527	0.532	0.535	0.539	0.541
		<b>World</b>	0.641	0.697	0.703	0.708	0.713	0.718	0.722	0.727	0.729	0.731

(Source: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data#>; accessed: 01/01/2020)

### ***Global Hunger Index (GHI)***

The Global Hunger Index (GHI) is a composite index that tries to measure and track hunger at the global, regional, and country levels by incorporating four component indicators: undernourishment, child wasting, child stunting, and child mortality (von Grebmer *et al.*, 2019). Each indicator is given a standardized score in percentage, and scores are then aggregated to estimate the GHI score for each country. Then, the country's hunger level is evaluated on four levels:  $\leq 9.9$  shows "low"; 10.0-19.9 shows "moderate"; 20.0-34.9 shows "serious"; 35.0-49.9 shows "alarming" and  $\geq 50.0$  shows "extremely alarming". The 2019 GHI report ranks Ethiopia 97<sup>th</sup> out of 117 qualifying countries with a score of 28.9 which falls within a level of hunger that is "serious".

Ethiopia has been more often involved in violent conflict and war to sustain the supremacy of leaders and their legacies (Lorch, 1995; Flynn, 2005; Gill, 2010; Plaut, 2012) which have been strong drivers of hunger and under nutrition (von Grebmer *et al.*, 2019). Still, every year, the country is experiencing hunger that makes millions of people depend on food aid to keep them alive. Development has yet to reach the great majority of the population and much of the country's wealth – and political power – has been retained by the leaders and ruling party (Peebles, 2013).

### ***Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)***

The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is a composite index published annually by Transparency International since 1995 to measure perceptions of corruption in the public sector (Transparency International, 2020). The CPI ranks countries “on a scale from 100 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt)”. According to the 2020 CPI report, Ethiopia is listed 96 out of 180 countries with a value of 37 (Table 2 below). Comparatively, the 2019 Ethiopian corruption scale (37) is more close to the highly corrupted countries (*e.g.*, Sudan, Kenya) than the less corrupted countries (*e.g.*, New Zealand, Denmark) which demonstrates the seriousness of the problem. Meager improvement has been observed over the last seven years which implies continued corruption challenges for the social, economic, and political transformation of the country. A large proportion of the study informants noted corruption to be a grave challenge that undermined development efforts in the country over the years.

Table 2: 2012-2019 Corruption Perceptions Index of Ethiopia and Some Selected Countries.

Country	Rank 2019	Corruption Perceptions Index Score: 2012-2019							
		2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012
New Zealand	1	87	87	89	90	91	91	91	90
Denmark	1	87	88	88	90	91	92	91	90
Norway	7	84	84	85	85	88	86	86	85
Botswana	34	61	61	61	60	63	63	64	65
Senegal	66	45	45	45	45	44	43	41	36
South Africa	70	44	43	43	45	44	44	42	43
Ethiopia	96	37	34	35	34	33	33	33	33

Zambia	113	34	35	37	38	38	38	38	37
Djibouti	126	30	31	31	30	34	34	36	36
Kenya	137	28	27	28	26	25	25	27	27
Nigeria	146	26	27	27	28	26	27	25	27
Eritrea	160	23	24	20	18	18	18	20	25
Sudan	173	16	16	16	14	12	11	11	13

(Source: Transparency International, 2020)

Chronological analysis of successive Ethiopian governments also displays the presence of systematic and rampant corruption. There are many idioms that support the presence of overwhelming corruption in the society. As an example, there is a proverb stated as “*Sishom yalbela sishar yiqochewal*” that means, “if someone does not deprive during his/her reign, he/she will regret when he/she loses the power”. Likewise, another proverb is stated as “*Semay aytasesim; nigus ayikesesim*” loosely translated as “as it is impossible to plough the sky, accusing the king is impossible”. These and other proverbs support and define corruption as acceptable norm in the society. Ethiopia is challenged by a kind of corruption known as ‘State Capture’. It is a practice in which commanding groups exert their corrupt and unfounded influence on others in order to shape the institutions and policies, laws and regulations of the state for their benefit rather than for the public service (Broadman & Recanatini, 2001; Hassan, 2016). Transparency International’s expression stands to be good evidence as to the extent to which corruption can damage the social, political, and economic development efforts of a nation:

*Corruption is a major obstacle to democracy and the rule of law. It is extremely challenging to develop accountable political leadership in a corrupt climate. Economically, corruption depletes national wealth. Corrupt politicians invest scarce public resources in projects that will line their pockets rather than benefit communities and prioritize high-profile projects such as dams, power plants, pipelines, and refineries over less spectacular but more urgent infrastructure projects such as schools, hospitals, and roads. Corruption also hinders the development of fair market structures and distorts competition, which in turn deters investment* (<http://www.transparency.org>).

Corruption is widely regarded as one of the biggest impediments to economic growth, social development, and environmental sustainability (Smith *et al.*, 2010; Agbiboa, 2012). In all of its form, corruption is an evil, an unethical set of activities that misplaces resources from where it is most needed to where it is easily wasted. Lack of political will and commitments are partly contributing factors to reduce the damaging effects of corruption in Ethiopia.

### **Despotic Leaders and Their Legacies**

Regardless of their political, ideological, educational, social, and economic differences, Ethiopian leaders traded terrible leadership characters such as cruelty, brutality, intimidation, etc. (As shown in Table 3 below). According to Kets de Vries (2004), in societies where there are weak democratic traditions and institutions, political systems and/or an ineffective judiciary, and economic distress, they are usually vulnerable to tyrants; and these situations facilitate a power grab by a power-hungry despot.

For example, Haile Selassie kept Ethiopia as a land of misery where the feudal system ridiculed suppression and dehumanization and built the country around his beliefs (Lorch, 1995; Plaut, 2012). Revolts, rebellions, droughts, and famine marked Haile Selassie's reign although he proclaimed himself as a “King of Kings of Ethiopia”. Protests and demonstrations against the emperor led to the overthrow and the accession of Mengistu Hailemariam to power in 1974 (Mayfield, 1995). Mengistu formally abolished the monarchy and embraced communism and shifted the geopolitical path from the West to the East (Keller 1991; Lie & Mesfin, 2018). Instead of dialogue, Mengistu preferred warfare against Eritrean independence forces, Somalia invaders, and ethnic-based insurgencies by Tigray Liberation Front (TPLF) in the north and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in the south (Lie & Mesfin, 2018). As a result, tens of thousands of people were killed, including the emperor, and many were tortured and a million peasants were relocated (Lorch, 1995; Gill, 2010; Plaut, 2012).

Following the fall of Mengistu in 1991, Meles Zenawi established a nominally multi-party system. Despite the initial promising signs, the government's human rights record was oppressive, undemocratic, brutal, and governed by a powerful party in which there was no distinction between party and state (HRW/Africa, 1997; HRW, 2010; Plaut, 2012; Peebles, 2013). Many human rights advocates report that the government has tried all its best to suppress its political opponents, and killed/imprisoned tens of thousands of people in Oromia, Somali,



Gambella, Southern, and the other Regional States. Following the unexpected death of Meles in 2012, Hailemariam Desalegn (2012-2018) led Ethiopia for about six years and gave up his leadership in 2018. Hailemariam's headship was characterized by humanitarian, political, and security crises like his forerunners; and finally forced to give up his position. As a leader during his period, more often, he claimed to maintain and uphold the legacy of Meles.

Three years of persistent anti-government protests in Oromia, Amhara, and the Southern Regional States have eventually led to the upcoming of Abiy Ahmed's leadership. Upon assuming the position, Abiy started releasing prisoners and invited exiled movements to return home for the democratic course including armed groups. He also re-established bilateral relations with Eritrea that was frozen for two decades, and this attracted the Norwegian Nobel Committee to award Abiy the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2019. Within the country, however, adversary regional, ethnic and political factions conflict over ideology, power, and resources, has led to the killing of thousands of people and displacing more than three million people (ICG, 2020). The security forces more often engaged in intimidation, killing, and even decree unofficial State of Emergency in many parts of the country. Both local and global human rights advocates have severely criticized and expressed their concern about harassment and intimidation in the country (HRLHA, 2020; HRW, 2020; ICG, 2020). Since he crowned, his government has more often undermined the existing ethnic federalism and apprehend unitary state system often advocates the heritage of traditional monarchs on top of human right abuses. This situation has already created significant polarization among the elites/politicians in the country into the unitary vs. federalism pathway of state-building.

Over the past decades, the Ethiopian leaders exercised a brutal type of governance system where freedoms of speech and human rights abuses were the common denominators for all. Long years of dictatorial leadership have hardly helped Ethiopia's development. This continued underdevelopment was not because of a lack of resources, rather due to a lack of dedicated leaders who can strive to transform the country to prosperity. Each coming and going leaders turn-by-turn tried to lay down their wicked legacy while Ethiopia has been and remains the land of misery owing to famine, war, poverty, tyrant leaders, and human right abuse (Flynn, 2005; Gill, 2010; Lie & Mesfin, 2018; Lorch, 1995; Mayfield, 1995; Plaut, 2012). On the contrary, none of them accounted for what they did to the people and the nation.

Table 3: Some Attributes of Ethiopian Leaders and Their Resemblance

Attributes	Name of Ethiopian Leaders				
	Haile Selassie (1930-1974)	Mengistu Hailemariam (1974-1991)	Meles Zenawi (1991-2012)	Hailemariam Desalegn (2012-2018)	Abiy Ahemd (2018-)
Accountability	↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
Transparency	↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
Respect	↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
Cohesiveness	↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
Integrity	↓	→	↓	↓	↓
Democracy	→	↓	↓	↓	↓
Novelty	↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
Ego	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑
Assassination	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑
Intimidation	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑
Injustice	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑
Favoritism	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑

(Arrows represent situation of: “↑” - high; “→” - medium and “↓” – low); (Source: Partly adopted from Gill (2010) & Wigington (2019))

All these years, the Ethiopian leaders have continued manipulating the nation for their own personal and/or group benefits without any valid accountability. An assessment of Ethiopian leaders' attributes shows that most of them demonstrated bad leadership behavior (e.g., suppression, corruption, dishonesty, intimidation, etc.) than good leadership quality (As shown in Table 3 above). Kets de Vries characterizes autocratic leaders as:

*Dictators prohibit all associations between citizenry that could lead to free debate, knowing that the loss of 'voice', the inability to speak one's mind and talk with others who cherish similar 'apostate' ideas, enhances feelings of isolation. To ensure that the populace cannot coordinate any form of political opposition, tyrants suppress or destroy all organizations and individuals that espouse views diverging from the main secular or theocratic ideology. To that end, they rely on an elaborate network of spies*

*and informers, and they use police terror to prevent lateral communication (Kets de Vries, 2004, p.170).*

The contemporary Ethiopian leaders understand intuitively the psychological vulnerability of humans and tried to keep their subjects isolated. They went to great lengths to break up traditional relationship patterns and dismissed opportunities often provided to their population or citizen. In this respect, an informant stated as:

*Ethiopia never had a strong and visionary leader. The political elites who came to power at different times have adopted patrimonialism, clientelism, and patronage which have led to a partisan political system. There has not been democratic governance in the history of the country. Political disruptions, associated with social unrest and conflicts over the past decades have adversely impacted the political, social, and economic development of the country (KI: PO/SO).*

### **Lack of Diversity within Unity**

Modern Ethiopia was founded in the last decade of the 19<sup>th</sup> century by merging the northern and southern blocks of today's Ethiopia. Since then, unifying Ethiopia remains a big national challenge. Ethiopia possesses over 80 ethnic-national groups and is recognized as one of the diverse nations. Ethiopia's political system, however, has been highly centralized and dominated by a single identity until the late 20<sup>th</sup> century (Gudina, 2007). The vast majority of the southern block of Ethiopia has been subjected to political suppression, economic marginalization, and cultural dehumanization for years. Historical inequality in the political system has created a sense of grievance, discontent, and disassociation among many ethnic groups in Ethiopia. The paradigms of oppression led to long years of civil wars, violation of human rights, poverty, and misery in monumental proportions that led to anti-unity. When EPRDF took power in 1991, there were many liberation fronts in the country that all fought for either self-determination or independence that showed how the unity of the country was under question. Failure to have 'Diversity within Unity' has made it complex for Ethiopia to make its people an endearing force for the country's development efforts. Given the historic and recent ongoing alienated political system, 'Diversity within Unity' remains a scary national challenge in today's Ethiopia. The dichotomy is still vibrant among the Ethiopian elites.

The purpose here is, however, not to discuss lack of unity, but rather opted to demonstrate how lack of recognizing diversity within unity can influence development. Ethiopia as a nation has continuously lost golden opportunities (the 1960s, 1970s, 1990s, and 2000s) to become a prosperous country. The economic growth of Ethiopia was partly wrecked owing to the internal conflict that prevailed over many years. Even today, the political environment is not based on comprehensive reconciliation and different groups have different views; and which at the end of the day obstructs the development of Ethiopia. Nowadays, the Ethiopian population is highly divided and even they do not have common ground on the national emblem and flag - leave alone on the philosophy of development (Gudina, 2007; Lorch, 1995; Poluha & Feleke, 2016).

Given the old-aged favoritism to the political system in the country, the people of Ethiopia have been troubled by the never-ending atrocities. Atrocities have pushed some groups/people to contend that this is not their government and country. It is the prowling of public resources by a few and the severe shady activities which have led some Ethiopians to think as if they have not been part of the equation of diversity within unity. Orchestrated by dissimilarity in political and economic injustice by folks who assert to represent one ethnic group - to be viewed with greater anger thereby harboring resentment and escalating the polarization and resulted in the fragmented nation-building. Many remained on what was noted as an 'exit option'. Innovative ways need to be devised to strengthen Diversity within Unity to make people a winning and unified force for the country.

### **Controlled Freedom of Speech**

Historical sources indicate that most media outlets in Ethiopia are owned by the government until very recently although funded by taxpayers' money. The recently emerged independent national media are not only small but also self-censored and steer controversial political issues out of fear of harassment (Canela, 2014; Mukundu & Rasmussen, 2018). In modern Ethiopia, freedom of expression was for the first time given juridical recognition in the 1955 Revised Constitution of Ethiopia; and further reiterated in the 1974 Draft Constitution and the 1987 Constitution of Ethiopia. However, none of these constitutional guarantees were effective and there was hardly any free press or freedom for political difference notwithstanding what these constitutions provided (Timothewosim, 2010; Mukundu & Rasmussen, 2018). The 1995 FDRE

Constitution also further granted freedom of expression more than ever before even if the practice on the ground has been debatable to date (e.g., Article 29, 30).

Article 19 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)* of United Nations states that “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” In Ethiopia, over the years and even today, entitlement and freedom of seeking, receiving, and imparting information or ideas are very much controlled and scrutinized by the government. Some key informants (KI: PO/HI) expressed their frustration about the unprogressive development of freedom of expression; and the social, economic, and political impacts it brought to the nation. Century-old journeys to freedom of expression and speech have derailed Ethiopia. Many people have been detained or sanctioned or even killed by the government for voicing their opinions whether it is a protest, or individual opinion, or whatever means of information communication they used out of the government channel (Mukundu & Rasmussen, 2018).

*Freedoms of speech and expression are key elements of the development agenda for improved public policies, competent and effective governments, quality education, and to fight against corruption.* As Canela (2014) states:

*The right to freedom of speech in its triple challenge of ensuring the search for, reception, and transmission of information, ideas, and opinions by any means and platforms offered and still offers everyone a set of tools that are central to the processes of development: production and distribution of information; production and distribution of knowledge; participation in the drafting of public policies; monitoring of governments through accountability mechanisms; and the protection of other rights (p. 2).*

In this way, we can affirm that freedom of expression in a democratic political system plays a critical role in driving development agenda through contributing towards the inclusion of essential themes of the public sphere of the contest and by acting as the watchdogs of government activities in the development process and therefore play a key role in the whole process of accountability.

## **Dependence on Aid and Assistance**

Ethiopia has been and remains prone to drought resulting from natural and human factors. Various sources (*e.g.*, IIRR, 2007; Pankhurst, 1985) have indicated the incidence of drought over the last many years. Since the early 1970s, however, the magnitude, frequency, and impacts of drought have increased and extended to large parts of the country (IIRR, 2007). Drought often exposed millions of people to starvation/hunger and famine every year. Incapability to support afflicted populations frequently forced governments to submit an appeal for international development or humanitarian assistance. Ethiopia has been receiving aid in different forms (Mousseau, 2005; Geda & Tafere, 2011; Hassan, 2013). Over the years, foreign assistance has shown some successes, but they are not as great as many thought due to the political, diplomatic, and economic interests of donors and receivers (Geda and Tafere, 2011; Hunt, 2004; Mousseau, 2005). Getting external support in the form of aid unfortunately created dependency syndrome by the government and affected community; and apparently, reduced their preparedness on self-reliance. International donors have also taken for granted the situation, and they did not push Ethiopia to be self-sufficient in the medium to long term goals. A combination of food aid recipients' and donors' attitudes have remained an impediment to the food self-reliance strategies of many developing countries including Ethiopia since the international food aid initiative started in the 1950s (Mousseau, 2005).

Foreign aid has without a doubt helped and saved millions of lives in crises. The impact of foreign assistance on the Ethiopian economy, however, was associated with increased inflation rates and dependency than improvement (Geda & Tafere, 2011). According to Hassan (2013), the provision of development aid played and continued to play a big role in the development and institutionalization of state capture in Ethiopia. Hassan highlighted as:

*The provision of welfare in the form of development assistance has reduced the government responsibilities to the people it ostensibly represented and reduced its legitimacy. Despite the huge annual influx of foreign aid (to the tune of \$3.3 billion by 2009 and rising), life in Ethiopia has gotten worse, not better - with the poor getting poorer, income inequality worsening, citizens leaving their country in a call trying to escape the onslaught of poverty and oppression that has been aided and abetted by foreign aid. Ethiopians are unable to realize their potentials because their*

*rulers, who benefit in so many ways from the influx of foreign aid, would not let them get out of the aid trap and break the dehumanizing begging bowl* (Hassan, 2013, p. 77).

Over years, international development assistance has shown mixed feelings concerning the impact of aid on development efforts in Ethiopia. Many informants (KI: EC/AN/DE/AG), nevertheless, asserted that foreign aid has negatively impacted the political, economic, and social wellbeing of the country of which, dependency syndrome and state capture have been evidenced by most informants.

### **Fragile Public Policy Formulation and Implementation**

Governments often engaged in policy formulation and implementation to transform the social, economic, and political needs of their society. Policymaking is a decision about a proposal to be followed by the government in dealing with a societal problem (Cochran, 2015) whereas policy implementation is the process of changing a formulated policy into reality (Ajulor, 2018). A public policy determines the activities of governments and stakeholders about providing services designed to solve a given problem (Oni, 2016; Ajulor, 2018). Unrealistic policy formulation and implementation have been portrayed as one of the major development problems in developing countries (Dialoke *et al.*, 2017). Often, a gap between stated policy goals and the realization of the planned goals is mostly hinged. Unsuccessful and fraudulent political leadership can also contribute to poor policy implementation. Corruption and incompetence of leadership influence the substance and quality of policy at the formulation stage. Politicians or political leaders make policies mostly to attract public compliments and thought concerning their correctness in addressing the given problems or the possibility of their effective practical implementation by the public bureaucracy.

In Ethiopia, successive governments have crafted different development policies that were not achievable throughout their tenure. Ethiopia has developed and adapted several policies that were mostly inappropriate or inconsistent to transform the nation to prosperity. There has been also a culture of discontinuity as the government changes. Over the last two decades, policy priorities led by the governments embarked on agriculture and rural-centered development - the Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) encompassing poverty reduction and food security, commercialization, and export promotion. More recently, the development agenda

focused on two strategies: the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), and the Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE). They prioritize the achievement of middle-income country status by 2025 by taking low carbon, resilient and green growth paths.

However, detectable challenges remain in the policy formulation and implementation processes such as lack of grassroots participatory policy-making, inadequate analytical skills, and knowledge, limited dialogue among the various stakeholders, and inadequate networking among the different stakeholders (EEA, 2011). The recent and past policy-making and implementation have failed short of the expectation; and renowned as a policy-making exercise with a limited transformation story. Policy-making seriously suffers from a lack of public engagement and participation. More often, these policies are incompatible with the objective reality of the country, and as a result, failed to transform the country to prosperity. As stated by some of the informants:

*Ethiopia has been formulating some of its development policies and applying them to the country without carrying out proper piloting and experimentation. Most implemented development policies suffered from periodic failures. One can mention the present Educational Policy of EPRDF as a case in point where the graduates of the different programs have been left with low skill or unskillful owing to the untested policy implementation from elsewhere (KI: PO/HI).*

Governments missed the gap between ideas of the best practice and the actual political, economic, legal, and administrative processes. The policymaking process in Ethiopia is a government realm, and stakeholders' participation is usually lacking. Policy development is more often oriented toward political perspective or/and donors driven, but when it comes to implementation, it is left disconnected mostly because of incompetency. Making the process participatory by engaging stakeholders may lead to the adoption of the new policy and then advance to the implementation stage. Any envisaged development or/and transformation should be supported by policies that must be properly formulated, implemented, and well monitored to avoid failures (Samson & Stanley, 2014). The failure or success of any given policy is much influenced by the pattern and nature of policy implementation.

Thus, there must be an effective communication system between the policy-makers, the target beneficiaries, and the policy implementers. The culture of changing or discontinuing a policy



once there is a change in government should be discouraged simply because the society will continue despite the change of government. There should be continuity regarding policy issues unless it is proved not to be in the service of the people. Politically acceptable policy formulation means that the proposed course of action is likely to be authorized by the legitimate decision-makers, usually through support by the majority in a bargaining process (Ajulor, 2018).

### **Inadequate Innovation, Incentive, and Entrepreneurship**

Society's transformation is immensely influenced by the level of its innovativeness. Innovation is the driver of development and without innovative entrepreneurs, the global community would not have been able to enjoy the tools and services that provide people with a success today that far exceed its ancient predecessors. More entrepreneurial activity is shifted toward productive entrepreneurship that strengthens economic development (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005). This entrepreneurial activity tends to explode during the innovation-driven stage of a society that culminates in a high level of innovation, with entrepreneurship leveling out as institutions are fully developed (Fukuyama, 1989). All societies may have a constant supply of entrepreneurial activity, but that activity was distributed unevenly between productive, unproductive, and destructive entrepreneurship because of the existence of incentive structure (Acs, 2010). To change the incentive structure, there is a need to strengthen policy and institutions, which further requires a need to fix the government or the political system.

Ethiopia lacks legal and institutional frameworks and incentive mechanisms that encourage the innovation and entrepreneurship behaviors of individuals/groups. Lack of societal innovation and entrepreneurship behaviors can seriously weaken societal transformation. Attributable to different reasons, the knowledge of Ethiopians has been and still low in understanding the need for novelty and entrepreneurship for national development. Innovation and entrepreneurship dealing are at an infant stage in Ethiopia until now. Ethiopia was repeatedly governed by dictators who often tried to build their legacy. In such a governance environment, if a person is engaged in innovation and gets fame he/she may be assumed as a betrayal to the leader or the system and liable to some kind of punishment. In this regard, one of the key informants states as:

*The customary thoughts and institutions are still constraining the development of the country when some innovative ideas are either adopted or emanated in the different productive systems (KI: SO).*

Traditional tool makers and innovators – blacksmiths, potteries, carpenters, weavers, leather workers, traditional healers, etc., have been reduced to sub-human status and corrupted that led to their near-extinction with all their nicknames and stigma.

### **Underprivileged Working Culture**

Until recently, there have been many non-working days per week in Ethiopia owing to religious or social norms/celebrations. Majorities of Ethiopians are religious, and “humble” religious teachings have already been internalized in their minds. Religious people always think that this world is not theirs, and some do not crave a better life. So, social norms and religious dogma, mixed with culture, are hard to change, and they sometimes drive existing institutional differences. In this regard, one of the respondents stated as:

*Ethiopians have been very much obsessed by cultural/religious and psychological demons such as strong cultural patterns that obstruct positive economic changes and undermining the trends of development. For example, different nicknames were given to those who work on metallurgy, woodwork, leather, etc. while these are important shifts in the productive systems of the country (KI: SO).*

In Ethiopia, many people still remain poor because they lack a good work ethic or hard-working manners and unmoving/unchanging belief in witchcraft and bequest. There is a bad working culture and most Ethiopians are not workaholics. However, hardworking is the magic and the silver bullet of development which does not seem to exist as needed. There is also a culture of dependence on the family that is often considered as a norm for families to take care of their children even if they are 22 years old and university graduates. In this regard, one of the key informants stated as:

*Strong work culture, common vision, endurance, creativity, innovativeness, etc. are largely lacking among Ethiopians. Creativity, and openness to experiment or experience, and the need for higher achievement are at a low level in all cultures. The country has not still gone through social and cultural changes/transformations. This has also been one of the impediments of the development endeavor of the country (KI: GS).*

On top of this, the stagnant politics and unrewarding governance structures for years have been and will continue to impede development. The socio-cultural-political landscapes within which people are placed and the source of resentment and endless conflict have dwarfed the common goods of the country.

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

The last three successive Ethiopian regimes messed up the development opportunities of the country. They were not able to bring about change owing to political instability, war, and conflicts, corruption, despotic leadership, and ill-sighted development policy and strategy. Political and economic institutions were extractive in the long history of the country. Unlike Ethiopia, for instance, many South Asian nations have revolutionized their political and economic institutions toward an inclusive approach and laid the foundations for subsequent growth and development. If Ethiopia has to come out of the quagmire of poverty and underdevelopment, it needs to scrutinize the political, economic, and social development pathways it followed; and devise mechanisms for future development opportunities. This paper, therefore, recommended the following points for better future development opportunities:

- Ethiopia never had popularly elected leaders and leadership throughout its history. Genuinely elected leaders are highly required to establish governance that enables legitimate and holistic transformation. In the past, Ethiopian leaders fought to establish their own legacy instead of transforming the nation. The country must fight once for all and get rid of self-elected leaders and put in place a system of accountability for the better future and wellbeing of its population.
- Political instability has been and remains to be the common phenomenon of contemporary Ethiopia. Achieving prosperity depends on solving basic political instability that directly entails solutions to economic problems. If Ethiopia has to come out of poverty and underdevelopment, it needs to improve its political stability and governance system.
- Ethiopia has been a center of experimentation for many inadequate policies/strategies; and misguided policy implementation in the absence of accountability. The culture of changing policies following a change in government should wane.

- Corruption has been the de facto government system of Ethiopia until now. Thus, the country needs to put in place strong mechanisms that ensure transparency and accountability in the government and political system.
- Many Ethiopians have remained poor because of a lack of a good work ethic or hard-working manners and unmoving belief in witchcraft and bequest. Hard-working is the magic and the silver bullet for development.
- In Ethiopia, over the years and even today, rights to entitlements and freedoms of seeking, receiving, and imparting information or ideas are very much controlled and scrutinized by the government. Freedom of expression plays a critical role in driving development by acting as the watchdogs of government activities. This is one of the areas where the Ethiopian government needs to explore and improve for a better future.
- Failure to have 'diversity in unity' has made it complex for Ethiopia to make its people an endearing force for development efforts. Given the historic and the recent ongoing alienated political system, 'diversity in unity' remains a scare national challenge in today's Ethiopia. Innovative ways need to be devised to strengthen unity in diversity to make its people a winning force for the country.
- The economic success of the Asian Tigers has served as a role model for many developing countries, where Ethiopia can learn from it and scan its future development horizon for improvement.

### **References**

- Abuiyada, R. (2018). Traditional development theories have failed to address the needs of the majority of people at grassroots levels with reference to GAD. *International Journal of Business and Social Science* 9(9):115-119.
- Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J. (2012). *Why nations fail*. New York: Crown Business.
- Acemoglu, D., & Johnson, S. (2005). Unbundling institutions. *Journal of Political Economy* 113(5): 949-995.
- Acs, Z.J. (2010). Entrepreneurship and economic development: The valley of backwardness. *Annals of Innovation and Entrepreneurship* 1:1. DOI: 10.3402/aie.v1i1.5602.
- Adams, W.M. (2009). *Green development: Environment and sustainability in a developing world (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.)*. New York: Routledge.
- Adejumobi, S.A. (2007). *The history of Ethiopia*. Westport: Greenwood Press.

- Agbiboa, D.E. (2012). Between corruption and development: The political economy of state robbery in Nigeria. *Journal of Business Ethics* 108:325-345.
- Ajolor, O.V. (2018). The challenges of policy implementation in Africa and sustainable development goals. *People: International Journal of Social Sciences* 3(3):1497-1518.
- Asrat, A. (2016). The Ethiopian highland massifs: Spectacular volcanic landscapes with high biodiversity. In Anhaeusser C. R., Viljoen M. J., Viljoen R.(eds.). *Africa's Top Geological Sites*. Cape Town: Struik Nature, pp. 189-196.
- Bayly, C.A. (2008). Indigenous and colonial origins of comparative economic development: The case of colonial India and Africa. *Policy Research Working Paper 4474*, The World Bank.
- Bekele, Y.W., Kjosavik, D.J. & Shanmugaratnam, N. (2016). State-society relations in Ethiopia: A political-economy perspective of the post-1991 order. *Social Sciences* 5(3):48:1-19. DOI: 10.3390/socsci5030048.
- Broadman, H.G. & Recanatini, F. (2001). Seeds of corruption – Do market institutions matter? *Economic Policy in Transitional Economies* 11(4): 359-392. DOI: 10.1023/A:1015264312632
- Canela, G. (2014). Freedom of speech as a key element of the development agenda. <https://www.observacom.org/freedom-of-speech-as-a-key-element-of-the-development-agenda/> (Accessed: 27 April 2020).
- Clapham, C. (2015). The era of Haile Selassie. In Prunier G, Éloi F. (eds). *Understanding contemporary Ethiopia: Monarchy, revolution and the legacy of Meles Zenawi*. London: Hurst & Company.
- Cochran, C.L. (2015). *Public policy: Perspectives and choices* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.). USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Cohen, J.M. (1974). Peasants and feudalism in Africa: The case of Ethiopia. *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 8(1):155-157.
- Creswell, J.W. (2009). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Darbyshire, I, Lamb, H. & Umer, M. (2003). Forest clearance and regrowth in northern Ethiopia during the last 3000 years. *The Holocene* 13 (4): 537-546.
- Dialoke, I, Finian, U. & Veronica, M.I. (2017). Policy formulation and implementation in Nigeria: The bane of underdevelopment. *International Journal of Capacity Building in Education and Management (IJCBEEM)* 3 (2): 22-27.
- Eshetu, Z. & Högberg, P. (2000). Reconstruction of forest site history in Ethiopian highlands based on 13C natural abundance of soils. *AMBIO: A Journal of the Human Environment* 29 (2): 83-89.
- Flynn, J. (2005). Ethiopia: What can be done? *Student Economic Review* 19: 253-263.
- Fukuyama, F. (1989). The end of history? *The National Interest* (No.16): 3-18.
- Geda, A. & Tafere, K. (2011). Official development assistance (Aid) and its effectiveness in Ethiopia. *Institute of African Economic Studies*. IAES Working Paper Serious No-A07-2011:1-33.

- Gill, P. (2010). *Famine and foreigners: Ethiopia since live aid*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gudina, M. (2007). Ethnicity, democratization and decentralization in Ethiopia: The case of Oromia. *Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review* 23 (1):81-106.
- Hassan, S. (2013). Aid, predation and state capture: the role of development aid in fuelling corruption and undermining governance: the case of Ethiopia. *Ethiopian e-Journal for Research and Innovation Foresight (Ee-JRIF)* 5(1):51-93.
- Hassan, S. (2016). Ethiopia: The people want their country back. *Pambazuka*.<https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/ethiopia-people-want-their-country-back> (Accessed: 26 April 2020).
- Hicks, N. & Streeten, P. (1979). Indicators of development: The search for a basic needs yardstick. *World Development* 7(6):567-580.
- HRLHA. (2020). Ethiopia: Politically motivated mass arrests make the coronavirus (COVID-19) risk worse. *Human Rights League of the Horn of Africa (HRLHA) Press Release*. [https://www.humanrightsleague.org/?page\\_id=14550](https://www.humanrightsleague.org/?page_id=14550) (Accessed: 16 April 2020).
- HRW. (2010). *Development without freedom: how aid underwrites repression in Ethiopia*. (Accessed:<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ethiopia1010webwcover.pdf> (Accessed: 16 Apr 2020).
- HRW. (2020). *Human Rights Watch (HRW) World report/2020 Events of 2019*.[https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world\\_report\\_download/hrw\\_world\\_report\\_2020\\_0.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/hrw_world_report_2020_0.pdf) (Accessed: 16 April 2020).
- HRW/Africa. (1997). Curtailment of rights. *Human Rights Watch* 9 (8A).
- Hunt, J. (2004). Aid and development. In Kingsbury D, Remenyi J, Mckay J, J. Hunt J (eds). *Key issues in development*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- ICG. (2020). *Managing the politics of Ethiopia's Covid-19 crisis*. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/managing-politics-ethiopias-covid-19-crisis> (Accessed: 16 April 2020).
- IIRR. (2007). *Leaving disasters behind: A guide to disaster risk reduction in Ethiopia*. International Institute of Rural Reconstruction (IIRR), Nairobi & Save the Children USA, Addis Ababa.
- Keller, E. (1991). *Revolutionary Ethiopia: From empire to people's republic*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Kuznets, S. (1966). *Modern economic growth: Rate, structure and spread*. Connecticut: Yale University Press.
- Lawan, M.A. (2008). The paradox of underdevelopment amidst oil in Nigeria: A socio-legal explanation. *PhD Thesis*, University of Warwick.
- Lewis, C.H. (1998). *The paradox of global development and the necessary collapse of modern industrial civilization*. In Dobkowski M. N. & Wallimann I. (eds). *The coming age of scarcity: Preventing mass death and genocide in the twenty-first century*. New York: Syracuse University Press.
- Lie, J.H.S. & Mesfin, B. (2018). *Ethiopia: A political economy analysis*. Norway: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.
- Lorch, D. (1995). *Ethiopia deals with legacy of kings and colonels*. The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/31/world/ethiopia-deals-with-legacy-of-kings-and-colonels.html> (Accessed 30 March 2020).
- Marcus, H.G. (1994). *A history of Ethiopia*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Marshall, P.A. (2003). Human subjects protections, institutional review boards, and cultural anthropological research. *Anthropol Q* 76(2):269-285. DOI: 10.1353/anq.2003.0028
- Mousseau, F. (2005). *Food aid or food sovereignty? Ending world hunger in our time*. Oakland: The Oakland Institute.
- Mukundu, R. & Rasmussen, F. (2018). *Media and freedom of expression assessment Ethiopia in transition: Hope amid challenges*. Copenhagen: International Media Support (IMS).
- Nicholas, C. (1989). Theories of development and the underdevelopment of the Orang Asli. *Akademika : Jurnal Sains Kemasyarakatan dan Kemanusiaan* 35: 55-68.
- Oni, E.O. (2016). Public policy analysis. In *Fundamental of Political Governance*. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334749461> (Accessed: 6 May 2020).
- Pankhurst, R. (1985). *The history of famine and epidemics in Ethiopia: Prior to the twentieth century*. Addis Ababa: Relief and Rehabilitation Commission.
- Peebles, G. (2013). *Displacement, intimidation and abuse: land loyalties in Ethiopia*. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/> (Accessed: 10 April 2020).
- Phillipson, D.W. (1985). *African archaeology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pieterse, J.N. 2010. *Development theory: Deconstructions/reconstructions*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.
- Plaut, M. (2012). The legacy of Meles Zenawi. *Review of African Political Economy* 39(134): 645-654. DOI: 10.1080/03056244.2012.738796
- Poluha, E. & Feleke, E. (2016). *Thinking outside the Box: Essays on the history and (under) development of Ethiopia*. Bloomington: Xlibris Publisher.
- PRB. (2020). *2020 world population data sheet*. Washington: Population Reference Bureau (PRB).
- Pritchett, L., Woolcock, M. & Andrews, M. (2013). Looking like a state: Techniques of persistent failure in state capability for implementation. *The Journal of Development Studies* 49(1):1-18.
- Prunier, G. (2015). The Ethiopian revolution and the Derg regime. In Prunier G, Éloi F. (eds). *Understanding contemporary Ethiopia: Monarchy, revolution and the legacy of Meles Zenawi*. London: Hurst & Company.
- Rapley, J. (2007). *Understanding development: theory and practice in the third world*. USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Remenyi, J. (2004). What is development? In Kingsbury D, Remenyi J, McKay J, Hunt J (eds). *Key issues in development*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Samson, E. & Stanley, A. (2014). Public policy failures in Nigeria: Pathway to underdevelopment. *JPPAR* 4 (9): 38 - 43.
- Shepsle, K. & Bonchek, M. (2010). *Analyzing politics*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Smith, M.H., Hargroves, K.J. & Desha, C.K. (2010). *Cents and sustainability: Securing our common future by decoupling economic growth from environmental pressures*. United Kingdom: Earthscan Publications.
- Teferra, D. (1984). The lack of development in Ethiopia. *Northeast African Studies* 6(1/2):13-22.
- The Ethiopian Economics Association (EEA). (2011). *The development of key national policies with respect to rainwater management in Ethiopia: A review*. Challenge Program on Water and Food (CPWF) Nile coordination and multi-stakeholders platform (Project 5). Addis Ababa: International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI).
- Timothewos, G. (2010). Freedom of expression in Ethiopia: The jurisprudential dearth. *Mizan Law Review* 4(2): 201-231.

- Todaro, P. & Smith, C. (2003). *Economic development* (8<sup>th</sup> ed.). New York: Pearson Education.
- Transparency International. (2018). *Corruption perception index (CPI) 2018*. Germany: Transparency International.
- UNDP. (2018). *Human development indices and indicators: 2018 statistical update*. New York: UNDP.
- UNDP. (2019). *Global multidimensional poverty index 2019: Illuminating inequalities*. New York: UNDP.
- UNEP. (2010). *Africa water atlas: Division of early warning and assessment (DEWA)*. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Program (UNEP).
- VonGrebmer, K., Bernstein, J., Mukerji, R., Patterson, F., Wiemers, M., NíChéilleachair, R., Foley, C., Gitter, S., Ekstrom, K. & Fritschel, H. (2019). *2019 global hunger index: The challenge of hunger and climate change*. Bonn: Welthungerhilfe.
- World Bank. (2016). *World development indicators 2016*. Washington, DC: World Bank.



## **The Utilization of Nile Water among the Riparian States: Tensions and Controversies on the Filling and Annual Operation of the GERD**

Negasa Gelana Debisa\*

### **Abstract**

*Despite the fear entertained by the downstream countries of the Nile basin, little attention was paid to the right of Ethiopia to utilize the Blue Nile waters. The purpose of this study is to explain the tension between upper riparian Ethiopia and downstream Sudan and Egypt on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) filling and controversies on its annual operation. A descriptive qualitative research method was employed to describe the tension concerning the filling and controversies on the annual operation of the GERD. The investigation relied on secondary sources of data obtained from YouTube videos of international broadcast media such as CGTN, Aljazeera, and TRT World. In addition, national broadcast media of Ethiopia (Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation and Ahadu Television), Sudan (Sudan Tribune), and Egypt (Daily News Egypt) accessed to make data balance. Moreover, letters from these countries sent to the UNSC have been reviewed. Besides, published and unpublished secondary sources on the Nile basin hydro-politics and the GERD were reviewed. The finding of the study reveals that the filling of the dam does not constitute significant harm as it can be seen from the first phase filling given the hydrological condition in the Eastern Nile Basin. The controversy regarding the annual operation of the GERD arises from the fear that their historical and current water use will be threatened. They wanted to conclude the binding agreement in their favor at the expense of Ethiopia's future utilization of Blue Nile water. Their fear is Ethiopia would not remain faithful to its promises that the dam and its filling do not affect their water security. Rather than basing their claim on invalid colonial treaties, Egypt and Sudan should acknowledge Ethiopia's right to utilize the Blue Nile water resource and fill the dam without causing significant harm. It is suggested to clear distrust and discuss issues of common concern by tolerating short-term risk for the long-term collective prosperity.*

**Keywords:** *Annual Operation, GERD, Hegemony, Nile Basin Tensions, Reasonable Utilization*

### **Introduction**

Transboundary water resources have been causes of cooperation or/and conflict among nations sharing them. There are 261 international river basins (some argue 263) (Ribeiro and Sant'Anna, 2014) where 63 are located in Africa (Wirkus and Böge, 2006), and the Nile River is one of them. It is a blend of tributaries of the Blue Nile and White Nile. The White Nile passes through Equatorial Lakes and joins with the Blue Nile at Khartoum and a great deal of water reaches Egypt. The maximum water share (86%) of the Nile comes from Ethiopia (Swain, 2011).

The quest for utilization of Nile water has been either unilateral or associated with colonial powers' interest (Merrill, 2008). The Anglo-Egyptian Nile Basin Treaty was signed in 1929

---

\* Bule Hora University, Ethiopia. Email: [n.gelana@yahoo.com](mailto:n.gelana@yahoo.com)

between Great Britain and Egypt to utilize the Nile water (Zewdineh & Ian, 2004; Wolde, E. A., & Habte, A. D., 2020). It allocated 48 billion cubic meters (bcm<sup>3</sup>) water to Egypt and 4 bcm<sup>3</sup> to Sudan. The 1929 treaty did not include upper stream countries. With Sudan's increased water demand, the 1929 agreement was revised in 1959. This treaty allocated 55.5 bcm<sup>3</sup> to Egypt and 18.5 bcm<sup>3</sup> of water to Sudan. Yet, it did not include Ethiopia and other upper riparians (Cascão, 2009).

The hydro-politics of the Nile basin is characterized by the contradiction of hegemony and counter-hegemony. Several institutional and legal frameworks have been developed to address the tensions between upper and downstream states in the basin. Of all, the recent agreement's Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) was signed by six upper riparians (Ethiopia, Kenya, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda) at Entebbe in 2010. Egypt and Sudan refused to sign this agreement. Article 4(1) of CFA discusses that riparian states have a right to utilize the Nile water resources equitably and reasonably in their territory. Similarly, article 5(1) addresses that states should adhere to principles of no significant harm in the utilization of the water resources in their territories (CFA, 2010). On the other hand, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan signed the Declaration of Principles (DoP) on the GERD on 23 March 2015 in Khartoum. It incorporated provisions of equitable and reasonable utilization of Nile Water and the principle of causing no significant harm. The filling and operation of the GERD will take place on the recommendations of the International Panel of Experts (IPoE) and the finding of the Technical National Committee (TNC) (DoP, 2015).

Several pieces of researches were conducted on the impacts of the GERD and its filling on the downstream countries (Wheeler *et al*, 2016; Liersch *et al*, 2017; Abdulrahman, 2019; Elsayed *et al*, 2020). Abdelhady *et al* (2015) analyzed a new hydro-political map in the Nile basin using nationalism and hydro solidarity. Other studies identified how to address water allocation deadlock (Onencan & Walle, 2018), water security and reservoir operation (Wheeler *et al*, 2020), and the post-GERD water flow to Gezira Scheme and Lake Nasser (Zhang *et al*, 2015). Obengo (2016) investigated the solution to the diplomatic challenges between Ethiopia and Egypt. Others studied downstream states' hegemony over the Nile water and counter-hegemony (Ibrahim, 2011; Endalcachew, 2016; Endaylalu, 2019; Wendmu, 2019). Furthermore, the environmental, human rights, public health, and water treatment for community usage of the Nile water utilization (Udobong, 2016) and riparian states' perception of cooperation beyond the river have

been explored (Tawfik, 2019). Recently, Wolde & Habte worked on the title ‘trilateral talks on the filling and annual operation of the GERD: competing demands and the need for revisiting the status quo towards a negotiated settlement’ which specifically focused on the trilateral negotiation processes between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt and intervening roles played by USA and WB (Wolde & Habte , 2020). Despite their invaluable efforts, little attention has been given to tensions and controversies on the filling and annual operation of the GERD. Hence, this paper examines the tensions and controversies on the filling and annual operation of the GERD between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt to pinpoint possible angles of cooperation beyond the controversy.

### **Theoretical Frameworks of the Utilization of Shared Water Resources**

#### **Theory of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty**

This theory is known as the Hermon doctrine, following the USA Attorney General Harmon who applied the idea to dispute with Mexico on the Rio Grande River (Lazerwitz, 1993). The theory argues that states have absolute sovereignty to utilize water resources within their territory regardless of the right and situations of downstream riparians (Goad, 2020). It favors upstream countries with the absolute right to divert and use the river in their interest (Qureshi, 2017). Upper Nile basin riparians have been claiming over water resources within their territory. However, it contradicts with the contemporary legal and moral frameworks adopted to utilize transboundary water resources (Yeshihareg, 2014).

#### **Theory of Absolute Territorial Integrity**

This principle advocates that downstream countries have veto power over development decisions of upstream states in the transboundary river basins. They have an absolute right to an uninterrupted flow of water from the territory of upstream countries (Lazerwitz, 1993). The upstream states are forbidden not to utilize excessive water for agricultural or hydropower purposes to the level it causes scarcity in the downstream states (Qureshi, 2017). This principle has been widely used by Egypt and Sudan to maintain the status quo and current use (Yeshihareg, 2014). Although it allows the upstream nations to utilize the water resources within their territory, it highly emphasizes water security and maintaining the natural flow of the water to downstream states. Historical and current water allocation should not be undermined

(Eckstein, 1995). However, it contradicts the principle of reasonable and equitable utilization of the Nile water resources, which is currently in use.

### **Theory of Reasonable and Equitable Utilization**

This theory is also known as the theory of sovereign equality and territorial integrity (Rahaman, 2009). It was emerged out of Helsinki rules to maintain “equitable and reasonable utilization of transboundary water resources among the riparian states” (Lazerwitz, 1993). It recognizes that riparian states have the right to reasonable and equitable utilization of shared water without causing significant harm (Eckstein, 1995). It works for the cooperative utilization of the water resources to maintain their interests and developmental goals than selfish claims denying the right and interest of the other riparians (Qureshi, 2017). The upper stream countries of the Nile basin have agreed to implement the principle of “reasonable and equitable utilization of the Nile water resources” (Yeshihareg, 2014). This principle is also incorporated in CFA and DoP.

### **The Nile Basin: The Hub of Tensions**

The Nile River is the world's longest river with 6,825 kilometers draining 2.9 million km<sup>2</sup>. More than 250 million people are dependent on it for their livelihood (Brunnée and Toope, 2003). It is shared by 11 countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea, Uganda, Burundi, DRC, Tanzania, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, and Egypt). A great deal of water comes from the Blue Nile, which originates from Lake Tana in Ethiopia while White Nile originates from Burundi and passes through the Equatorial Lakes region. It joins the Blue Nile at Khartoum and flows to Egypt. Ethiopia is a source of Blue Nile (Abbay), Tekezze (Atbara), and Sobat (Baro), and all contribute 86% to the Nile water.

Historically, Egypt has been a hegemon over the Nile and concluded treaties with colonial powers like Great Britain in 1929 and Sudan in 1959 (Madani *et al*, 2011). At various stages and media, Egypt debated that it has exclusive rights over the Nile waters regardless of upstream states' claim. It attempted several times to halt upper riparians developing projects on the Nile River tributaries. In different times, Egypt used destabilization strategies in upstream countries to disturb their concentrated efforts to work on water resources in their territories (Paul, 2002). Its destabilization scheme was supporting ethnic conflicts and rebel groups to deteriorate

government attention from building projects. It employed this strategy mainly in Ethiopia by supporting liberation fronts, secessionist forces, and ethnic nationalism (Gebreluel, 2014).

The downstream states' share of water excluding upper riparian development interest and right agitated the quest for equitable utilization of the Nile water. The historic and natural right thesis ascribed to Egypt and Sudan was stumbled by equitable and reasonable utilization of shared water resources advocated by upper riparians. This has tightened the Nile basin hydro-politics. The old narrative excludes the upstream countries from the utilization of the Nile water, whereas the new paradigm discredits the historical hegemony over the Nile River.

### **The Nile and Colonial Treaties**

The Nile is associated with Egypt by Greek writer Herodotus, as "Egypt is the gift of Nile" (Oloo, 2007). Egypt claims that the Nile is a gift from God, which no one could take from it. This was mainly ascribed to maintain hegemony over the river. Besides, the arrival of colonial powers shifted the geopolitics of the Nile basin. East Africa, mainly the Horn of Africa fell to the grip of Great Britain, France, and Italy (Adejumobi, 2007). Egypt and Sudan were among the British colonies in Africa.

In 1891, Great Britain signed the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty. Great Britain wanted Italy to assure it would not construct any facility on the Atbara River, which in turn sustains the Nile water's catchment. They signed it to demarcate their sphere of influence in the East and the Horn of Africa (Swain, 2008). This was not effective and sustainable because Italy was defeated by Ethiopia at Adwa in 1896. Great Britain with Egypt tried to make sure of their control over the White Nile. The Mahdist rebellion in Sudan was also another hub of a challenge for Britain to control the Nile.

In 1902, Great Britain and Ethiopia signed an agreement on the Nile. Ethiopia did not ratify this due to the different meanings it had in Amharic and English versions (Gebreluel, 2014). The English version of article III reads "His Majesty the Emperor Menelik II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, engages himself towards the Government of His Britannic Majesty not to construct or allow to be constructed any work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana, or the Sobat, which would arrest the flow of their waters except in agreement with His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of Sudan" (Talwar *et al*, 2013). However, it was not ratified as some say it was

signed under duress. The Vienna Convention of the Law of the Treaty of 1969 article 52 states the treaty is void or invalid if the state is forced or threatened to sign it.

### *The 1929 Treaty over the Nile*

The 1929 treaty was signed between Egypt and Great Britain. This treaty aimed to allocate water between Egypt and Sudan and to ensure their natural historic right over the Nile River (Cascão, 2009). The treaty allocated 48 bcm<sup>3</sup> of water to Egypt and 4 bcm<sup>3</sup> of water to Sudan. However, it did not include upper riparians mainly Ethiopia which contributes huge water to the Nile (Swain, 2011). The agreement espouses that Egypt would be vulnerable to water scarcity and Britain agreed to maintain its fear. In turn, the British retained its interest to navigate through the Suez Canal, which helps British Empire to have access to the Indian Ocean (Nunzio, 2013).

The 1929 agreement was biased, unrepresentative of all riparian countries. It was masterminded by the colonial powers, which by no means represent the upstream countries. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of a Treaty of 1969 article 34-38, third-party states are “strange to the contract and can neither be beneficiary of any rights conferred thereunder nor be [bound by] any obligations imposed thereunder” (Lumumba, 2007). The only way the state may be bound by the treaty it does not sign is only if that particular treaty became part of customary international law (Shaw, 2003). Accordingly, the effectiveness of the 1929 treaty between Egypt and Great Britain would be elusive as per the International Law of Treaty concerning the succession of the states to treaties. Accordingly, Egypt inherited a “*clean slate*” from Great Britain (Lumumba, 2007). The Vienna Convention on Succession to Treaties under article 16 stipulates:

*Newly independent states were not bound to maintain in force or to become a party to any treaty by reason only of the fact that the treaty had been in force regarding the territory in question at the date of succession* (Shaw, 2003, p. 882).

Ethiopia’s stand on the utilization of Blue Nile (Abbay) water by no means is in question. Its refusal to the validity of the 1929 agreement assures its commitment to protect, preserve, and promote its national interest based on international law. Likewise, the progress of GERD for national development and poverty alleviation shows Ethiopia’s commitment to the improvement of its people’s life and contribution to regional integration and cooperation. It is more significant to work on issues of common concern by the Nile basin families than looking towards

insignificant external coaching. The lasting solution to Nile basin tension will not be realized by a belief in colonial treaties. Coming together and talking about their differences and ascertaining issues of collective concerns will provide a clue for cooperation.

### ***The 1959 Agreement***

The 1929 agreement was revised in 1959 owing to Sudan's claim for increased water demand (Lumumba, 2007). This treaty concluded upstream countries' water needs would be addressed based on Egypt and Sudan's goodwill (Samuel, 2008). Yet Ethiopia as a major contributor to the Nile water was neither consulted nor invited to participate (Arsano, 2007). The agreement increased Sudan's water share to 18.5 bcm<sup>3</sup> and of Egypt to 55.5 bcm<sup>3</sup> (Obengo, 2016). They agreed if water quantity increases and yields more, the allocation of water should be equally shared between them (Bah *et al*, 2018). Contrarily, the appropriation of water by both countries never thought of the variation of the annual discharge of Nile water, which sometimes drops less than 84 bcm<sup>3</sup> (Howe, 2010). Due to seasonal factors, climate change, and evaporation, the water of the Nile may yield below the figures. Given the annual discharge of Nile water drop below 84bcm<sup>3</sup>, the allocated amount of water to each would also drop. Likewise, the agreement did not consider 10 bcm<sup>3</sup> water disappears annually through evaporation at Aswan High Dam and Lake Nasser in Egypt (Bah *et al*, 2018).

Both 1929 and 1959 agreements in advance consolidated Egypt's monopoly over the Nile water. At some point, they should have thought that concern over the water of the Nile would rise from upper basin countries when their need and economic power allows. Egypt is more concerned about colonial treaties than recent ones while upper riparians including on behalf of whom the British signed the 1929 agreement rejected these agreements. Egypt's argument in favor of colonial treaties contradicts the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses of 1997. This convention sanctions "watercourse states shall in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse equitably and reasonably" (Shaw, 2008). Recent developments in Ethiopia and its claim for its natural right (Swain, 2002) over the Nile water corresponding to its huge water contribution have partly changed the hydro-politics and geopolitics of the Nile basin. In the end, it would be important to focus on growing development demands and basin-wide cooperation by developing wide legal and institutional frameworks.

## **Research Methodology**

This research employed a descriptive qualitative method with critical reflection to examine the tension and controversies on the filling and the annual operation of the GERD. It relied on secondary data sources from books, articles, reports, official documents communicated by these states to United Nations Security Council and Nile basin agreements (CFA, DoP). Besides, interview videos regarding the Nile water tensions, GERD, and its filling were accessed from CGTN, Aljazeera, and TRT World. In addition, national media of each country such as Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation (EBC) and Ahadu Television, Daily News Egypt and Ahram Online, and Sudan Tribune were used as sources of data to balance the concern of each side. These international media outlets were chosen because they interviewed representatives of each country and scholars who have sufficient information about the issues on the ground. Data obtained from these sources qualitatively analyzed using content analysis.

## **Result and Discussion**

### **Ethiopia's Quest for Utilization of the Blue Nile Water**

The Blue Nile (Abbay) River (Arsano, 2007) joins with the White Nile at Khartoum. Several pieces of literature label Abbay the Blue Nile (Swain, 2011), which is contrary to its connotation in Ethiopia. The word *Abbay* is probably equivalent to the word “power, hope, and faith” (Ethiopian Herald, 2020). However, the Blue Nile has something to do with the water texture that comes from the Ethiopian highland transporting fertile soil (Paul, 2015). Abbay (Blue Nile) river is “believed to be the father of all rivers and the symbol of the Ethiopian nation” (Arsano, 2007). Ethiopia, therefore, is striving to develop projects on its water that mainly originates from its land where no one has a claim.

Ethiopia claims for its right to utilize the water resource lies in its very heartland. Egypt by hook or crook has been attempting to stop Ethiopia from developing any project from the time of antiquity (Swain, 2008). This argument is raised because any development in Ethiopia would cause water insecurity in Egypt. This objection does not fit the right of all riparians because it affects their interest and demand. On the other hand, Sudan has shown a sign of moving away from downstream historical claims. This was indicated in the 1991 Ethio-Sudan agreement on the equitable utilization of the Blue Nile and Atbara rivers (Zeydan, 2018). A slight slide of



Sudan from this counts to equitable and reasonable basin-wide utilization of the Nile water resources.

In 1993, an agreement was signed in Cairo between the Transitional Government of Ethiopia and Egypt. The agreement mainly emphasizes the consolidation of friendship and cooperation between these countries “to establish a broad sense of common interest” (Arsano, 2007). Both parties agreed not to cause significant harm, especially to the downstream nations. They also looked into basin conservation and development on the Nile water has to be consulted or made known before its commencement. This was broken when Egypt developed several projects in the West and East of Sinai, Toshka project and North Sinai Development projects (Swain, 2008).

Before the 1990s, Ethiopia took an observer position and Egypt was the mastermind of the Nile basin negotiations. In the post-1990s, Ethiopia has visibly begun to demand a comprehensive framework on the utilization of Nile water (Nicol and Shahin. n.d). The GERD is a response to past injustice as well as lapses of development efforts in Ethiopia. The population surge in Ethiopia necessitates a sustainable economy to survive the negative impact of the population increase. It is not an option to utilize the Blue Nile water, but a matter of existence (Arsano, 2007). Taye Atske Selassie, Ethiopia’s Ambassador to the UN on 29 June 2020 said, “The Nile is as important to Ethiopia as it is to Egypt and Sudan as a source of livelihood and development”. The Ethiopian government indicated more than fifty million people live without electric light and still depending on wood fires. Here, Ethiopia has two options. The first is observing Blue Nile water running down through the course to flourish downstream countries and singing about it for the rest of its life. This is not possible because it does not contribute to Ethiopia’s development and to reduce surging poverty. The second argument is that Ethiopia should utilize its water resources and provide light to its poor people, address the scarcity of drinking water, fish production, and tourism. This has to be done in a way it does not affect the downstream countries. Sudan and Egypt, on the other hand, should cooperate on project development in Ethiopia to tackle perceived damages proactively.

On the other hand, Egypt’s military threat to Ethiopia for many years bears no solution to Nile basin tension. The Ethiopian government responded that this threat is a daydream and nonsense (Abteu, 2014). Military threats would worsen the situation and reverse the condition that could be resolved by cooperation. Military threats bear no promising fruit because of the following

facts. First, Egypt shares no border with Ethiopia. This is a challenge to Egypt's military actions against Ethiopia. The only means to do this is if Sudan cooperates with Egypt. If this is so, military action against Ethiopia by a coalition of Egypt and Sudan is more than a Nile water and might be an invasion. The issue of Nile will not obtain a lasting solution by military action. No disagreement has ever been solved through war. Yohannes Gedamu, a Lecturer of Political Science at Georgia Gwinnet College indicated that threatening a country that contributes more than 85% of water to the Nile would make Egypt's future more complicated (Foster, 2020). Adel Darwish argued on the TRT World "the Nile issue is not going to be resolved through war because war is a means to an end" (*ibid*). Abere Adamu, head of the GERD Public Participation Coordination Office indicated that Ethiopians commitment to fund the GERD and to confirm their concern has increased than ever. The fact is that any attempt that Egypt might make to demoralize Ethiopia motivates them to double their participation to the extent of sacrificing their life. The truth is that Ethiopians have the strength and determination to stand for their sovereignty and country (Surafel and Lidya, 2020).

Second, suppose Egypt strikes the GERD. The question is why would Egypt attack the GERD? Is it because the dam is a threat to Egypt's water security or another intention is behind it? If it is for the first one, the issue can be resolved through negotiation. If it is for the second question, it is clear that Egypt's demand is beyond the GERD and water security. There would be no significant gain to both Ethiopia and Egypt from war. It would be significant to tolerate short-term risks and enjoy lasting economic and infrastructural benefits (Abdelhady *et al*, 2015).

Third, Egypt knows war is not a viable solution to the Nile basin tension. Downstream Sudan is not fond of this, because its concern is Ethiopia's utilization of Blue Nile waters without causing significant harm and the GERD's role to reduce flood and siltation run-off to its dams. The reduction of silt, sand, and clay amounted to 110 tons annually is not only beneficial to Sudan but for Egypt too (Tadesse, 2008). Sudan in advance needs the construction of GERD in a way that it would not cause significant harm and reduce flood and siltation run-off to its dams on the Blue Nile. The project maintains Ethiopia's interest to utilize the water resource within its territory for development and fighting abject poverty. In the same way, it also interlocks these countries to work for collective prosperity and a common future through the utilization of the Nile water.

### **Is GERD a Potential Threat to Downstream Countries?**

The issue of utilizing Nile water has been a cause of disagreement between the upper and downstream countries. The sharing of water between Sudan and Egypt without considering the interest of upstream nations led to a quest for equitable and reasonable utilization. The GERD on its completion will hold 74.01 bcm<sup>3</sup> of water and storage of 59.22 bcm<sup>3</sup> (Upadhyay and Gaudel, 2017). Egypt and Sudan are scared it will affect their historical right on the Nile waters. Ethiopia argues it has a natural right to utilize water running from its territory. Ethiopia does not consume water resources that balance its water contribution compared to Egypt, the consuming riparian. Egypt's reluctance to change the status quo and work for joint water management has been a potential cause of unilateral developments (Swain, 2002). Likewise, unilateral development of large-scale projects by downstream countries did not consider Ethiopia's interest (Zeydan, 2015). Besides, the adamant praise of colonial treaties has been a principal obstacle to reaching a comprehensive arrangement. To maintain equitable and reasonable utilization of the Nile water resources, upper riparians signed the CFA in 2010. This agreement incorporated issues of "development, protection, conservation, and management of the Nile River Basin and its resources and establishes an institutional mechanism for cooperation among the Nile Basin States" (CFA, 2010). It was signed by six upstream states (Ibrahim, 2011), while DRC repeatedly expressed its intention to sign it but not yet (Mehari, 2020). Egypt and Sudan did not sign the agreement because they assumed it would nullify their historical right and current use (Swain, 2011). It introduced equitable and reasonable utilization of water resources and no harm principles, which are opposite to historical hegemony over the Nile waters by Egypt. The inclusion of these principles into the CFA has changed the Nile basin geopolitics. It was based on articles 5, 6, 7 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Use of International Watercourse signed on 21 May 1997.

Salman (2011) identified three areas of disagreement by Egypt and Sudan regarding the CFA. These are i) the existing uses of water by Egypt and Sudan, ii) consideration of colonial treaties, particularly the 1929 Agreement, and iii) the notification for planned projects and the amendment of CFA whether should be by a majority, or by consensus. In 2015, Sherif Ismail, the Egyptian Prime Minister capitalized that Egypt has three main concerns on the GERD. These concerns are preserving Egypt's historical water share, ensuring that the GERD is not used for any political purpose, and implementing the construction stages as previously agreed (El-Sebahy,

2015). Besides, Article 14 (b) of CFA became a cause of disagreement between the upper and downstream states. The Article states, “not to significantly affect the water security of any other Nile Basin State” (CFA, 2010). Egypt and Sudan wanted it to be redefined “not to adversely affect the water security current uses and rights of any other Nile Basin States” (Nicol and Cascão, 2011). The refusal of downstream states to sign and accept CFA has led to unilateral action for GERD by Ethiopia on the Blue Nile and Equatorial Lakes states on the White Nile (Wendmu, 2019). Following CFA, the commencement of the GERD in 2011 shook the long-established hegemony of Egypt and Sudan.

On the other hand, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt signed the DoP in 2015. Article II of the DoP indicates, “the purpose of GERD is for power generation, to contribute to economic development, promotion of transboundary cooperation and regional integration through the generation of sustainable and reliable clean energy supply”. Similarly, the principles of not causing significant harm (Art. III) and Equitable and Reasonable Utilization (Art. IV) were included to resolve the Nile water utilization nightmare. Getachew Mekonen, Ethiopian Foreign Relation Strategist and International Researcher indicated on Ahadu Television that the DoP suggested that these countries, based on the finding by the International Panel of Expert and Technical National Committee comprised of scientists from these states, have to reach an agreement (Surafel and Lidya, 2020). An attempt to maintain its historical interest and monopoly over the Nile water urged Egypt to claim that the GERD is potential harm to its water security. The reality on the ground, however, differs. If Egypt needs to sustain its water needs and benefit from the Nile, sticking to equitable and reasonable utilization without causing significant harm is a wise choice. Fekahmed, the Executive Director of the Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office (ENTRO), indicated on Ahadu Television that, in May of 2018, a tripartite committee of Scientists was organized to study the filling and water release. He stated, the members of the Committee presented their findings for water ministers of Nile riparians on 25 September 2018 at Addis Ababa. Majorities of water ministers agreed including Egypt’s water minister, who later changed his mind after he was back in Egypt (Surafel and Lidya, 2020).

The Convention of transboundary water indicates that states have sovereign rights to utilize water resources in their jurisdiction without causing damage to the environment and significant harm to lower riparian countries (Okoth-Owiro, 2004). The construction of the GERD hinges on this standard, which Ethiopia made clear from its start. On 2 July 2020, the good way to respond

to this tension is through hydro-diplomacy and joint basin management that are vital instruments to reduce predictable harms in the future. The GERD does not pose a substantial threat to downstream states; however, it encourages cooperation. According to some studies, increased hydropower project development in Ethiopia regulates the flow of water to downstream riparians, decreases high water evaporation, and maintains water availability downstream (Satti and Siddiqui, 2015). Ethiopia, the origin of the Blue Nile has vast potential for hydropower development. Karyabwite (2000) argues that developing mutually beneficial arrangements has to be appreciated and Egypt has to work with Ethiopia to address its hydroelectric power scarcity by constructing dams in Ethiopia. Furthermore, Egypt and Sudan will benefit from the dam as it “protects them from flooding, reducing sedimentation, allowing irrigation expansion, boosting water use efficiency, and providing them with cheap and clean energy” (Sudan Tribune, 2013).

A recent interview with Fekahmed Negash indicates the GERD has importance to Egypt and Sudan as well. He pointed out that the dam reduces water evaporation at the Aswan High Dam and Lake Nasser. Likewise, it guarantees the safety of dams built on the Nile in Sudan and Egypt by holding silt and sand run-off (Surafel and Lidya, 2020). The GERD will produce huge power that Ethiopia will not only use for itself but also export to neighboring countries. Some argue Egypt’s development is more confronted by lack of power than lack of water. On the other hand, Ethiopia has enormous potential for generating hydroelectric power. To address the power shortage in the Nile basin, cooperation with Ethiopia will yield a win-win solution (Karyabwite, 2000). The GERD would help Sudan to regulate “its irrigation system more rapidly, like water stored in those locations would be delivered by gravity flow, and pumping expenses would be kept to a minimum” (Wu and Whittington, 2006).

Generally, the GERD is not a threat to the downstream countries as they attempted to portray. Their commitment to utilizing the Nile water equitably and reasonably as mentioned in the DoP yields more results if they add their respective political commitment. Besides, resorting to their tripartite solutions and work on the detailed technical issues as mentioned in the DoP is productive. Egypt and Sudan should come to recognize that Ethiopia as a country contributing 86% of water to the Nile has the right to utilize the water resource within its territory. They have to also share the benefit of the GERD yields in terms of hydroelectric power, reduction of flood and sedimentation, and reduction of water loss through evaporation. Moreover, the economic and

cooperative aspect of the project for investment, regional cooperation, and integration is very significant.

### **The Filling Tension and Controversy on the Annual Operation of GERD**

The filling of the GERD and its annual operation are other sources of tension between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt. The dam progress is at 76%, thus, the need to store water in the reservoir is necessary to start the test as per the statement of the Ethiopian government. This tension arises from the period of filling and the operation of the GERD, given the fear of downstream states. Regarding the filling of the dam, according to their agreement in the DoP, the implementation of filling and the operation of the dam will be implemented based on the recommendation of the IPoE and the Technical National Committee drawn from these three countries (DoP, 2015).

Egypt announced that Ethiopia would not start filling without reaching on binding agreement on the filling timetable by the three nations (El-Said, 2020). Sudan's Irrigation and Water Resource Minister claimed that signing an agreement is a prerequisite before filling the dam and Sudan has the right to demand it. Sudan does not accept the unilateral filling of the dam and he mentioned, "Sudan's support for the right of any country an equitable use of water without causing harm" (Xinhua, 2020). He argued, "the filling of GERD's reservoir would affect storage in reservoirs at the Roseires and Sennar dams on the Blue Nile" (Daily News Egypt, 2020). According to Article V (a) of the DoP, these nations agreed on guidelines and rules on the first filling of GERD, which shall cover all different scenarios, in parallel with the construction of the dam. Sudan and Egypt stressed that reaching a binding agreement on the filling and annual operation of the GERD is mandatory. Ethiopia, on the other hand, strongly rejected that the agreement will affect its future project development. Instead, Ethiopia drafted a proposal of "guidelines and rules agreement on the first filling of the dam that could be unilaterally modified in some aspects and even repealed in certain cases" (Sudan Tribune, 2020).

Ethiopia arranged the schedule and volume of water to be filled within four-to-seven years considering the probability of drought occurrence in the basin. Egypt, on the other hand, insisted the filling of the dam should be from 12-20 years (Ottaway, 2020). However, Sudan proposed five years to fill the GERD (El-Said, 2020). The negotiation between Ethiopia and downstream Egypt and Sudan is tough as the downstream states strongly insisted on the historical rights, which Ethiopia considers unfair. Egypt perceived the GERD filling as a security issue and took it

to the UNSC on 1 May 2020. In the letter, Egypt requested UNSC to encourage Ethiopia to accept the agreement that was brokered by the World Bank and the USA (Wolde, E. A., & Habte, A. D., 2020). As a response, Ethiopia sent a letter to the UNSC on 14 May 2020 that GERD filling and operation issue is not a political and security issue; rather, a technical issue that can be addressed at trilateral negotiations. In one of its letters to the UNSC on 24 June 2020, Sudan indicated the UNSC should encourage Ethiopia and Egypt to show political will and commitment to resolve the conflict and work for a common future. The UNSC recommended the three countries resolve their common issues through tripartite negotiation under the auspices of AU.

In July, Ethiopia filled 4.9 bcm<sup>3</sup> of water (EBC, 2020). Regarding this filling, Adel Darwish on TRT World indicated, “despite some political noises, there was no real hardship due to the filling of the water in Egypt” (Foster, 2020). Osman El-Tom, former Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation discussed on Aljazeera that the first phase filling should not be a serious threat to both Sudan and Egypt. He indicated, water simply passes through the dam and the volume of water in the first phase filling is small (Khan, 2020). Gedion Asfaw, the Head of the Technical Committee, Ethiopian Negotiating Team, and Former Head of IPoE stressed on Aljazeera that the filling of the dam is stage-based that takes 4-7 years although it could be filled within 2-3 years given the hydrology of the Blue Nile (*ibid*). He indicated filling the GERD does not affect the water situation of the downstream counties, because the availability of rainfall in Ethiopia is reliable. The filling of the dam will take place based on the DoP principles that Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt that the GERD is not a threat, but a tool of cooperation and integration (Tesfa-Alem, 2016).

Dr. Nasr Allam, former Egypt Water Minister on CGTN specified that Egypt’s requirement was a reduction of the size of the GERD considerably to reduce the damage it causes downstream (Beatrice, 2014). In all its effort, Egypt has been trying to influence Ethiopia to reduce the size of the GERD in its favor. However, Ethiopia remained firm in its project because this matter falls to Ethiopia’s sovereign authority. Mac Sharkawy, a Researcher on Egyptian Affairs and Expert in Middle East Affairs on Aljazeera indicated that the problem with Egypt arises from a lack of trust in Ethiopia. He stressed that “we cannot trust Ethiopia will remain faithful to its word regarding downstream Egypt” (Khan, 2020).

The second stage of filling will be undertaken in the summer of 2021. This year, Ethiopia planned to fill 13.5 bcm<sup>3</sup> of water in the GERD reservoir (Khan, 2020). The remaining filling phases require the commitment of tripartite negotiations to manage technical issues as mentioned in the DoP and all parties should take it seriously. The filling of the dam during the months' rain reaches its peak guarantees the interests of the three countries. Sudan and Egypt with Ethiopia have to work hard to achieve collective as well as their separate interest attached to the Nile water (Abdelhady *et al*, 2015). The responsibility to ensure sustainable water use and basin management is at the disposal of all riparian countries. This cannot be realized without the commitment of all parties in the basin guided by the principle of equitable utilization of the Nile water mentioned in the CFA and DoP.

Regarding the annual operation of the GERD, there have been controversies. Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt in Article V (b) “agreed on guidelines and rules for the annual operation of the GERD, which the owner of the dam may adjust from time to time”. Article V(c) of the DoP states, “to sustain cooperation and coordination on the annual operation of GERD with downstream reservoirs, the three countries, through the line ministries responsible for water, shall set up an appropriate coordination mechanism among them”. The GERD is the property of Ethiopians, built in the sovereign country to ensure equitable utilization of the Nile water based on the international water law. The matter of the annual operation of the GERD, therefore, remains in the sole authority of Ethiopia, the owner of the project. Regarding this, Fekahmed on Ahadu TV indicated that the GERD is Ethiopian property, is funded by Ethiopians, in the Ethiopian land, and on its river. The filling and managing water release should be left to the Ethiopian government. Ethiopia has the responsibility to release water for the downstream countries, not for the historical relationship we have with them, but for our good neighborhood and regional cooperation (Surafel and Lidya, 2020).

The tripartite negotiation regarding the filling and annual operation of the GERD has not yet reached an agreement. Egypt and Sudan need a binding agreement before Ethiopia fills the dam and operation of the dam. Ethiopia, on the other hand, does not want this because it affects its future development plans on the Blue Nile. At the same time, Egypt and Sudan want to maintain historical claims and current uses of water. These issues and contradictions are challenges to the progress of the negotiation.



### **Either Cooperation or Conflict: Cost and Benefit Analysis**

The Nile water has been a cause of disagreement between the upper and downstream countries. Downstream countries' insistence on the historical right and upstream states' claim for reasonable and equitable utilization tightened the Nile basin hydro-politics (Zeydan, 2018). Mostly, Egypt's claim of dependence over the Nile water for electricity, food, and drinking has been mentioned to be a potential source of conflict. William Davison, an analyst at the International Crisis Group on TRT World described the conclusion of recent treaties in the Nile basin ensured colonial treaties are obsolete and no more reliable (Foster, 2020). Similarly, Adel Darwish argued that the chief factor of tension in the Nile basin is not the dam, but worries predated the GERD and aimed to cherish the 1929 and 1959 treaties (*ibid*). The indicator is, Egypt feared it and called for the UNSC to intervene to stop Ethiopia from filling the dam without reaching an agreement. This was not the matter that the Security Council is responsible for rather it is within the mandate of these riparians. In the interview on TRT World, William Davison discussed:

*It is neither clear how does taking the issue of the GERD to the UN Security Council address the dispute nor changes Ethiopia's position which is being consistent since the inception of the project in 2011. Egypt and Sudan should accept the reality of the GERD on the ground that it is filled with 4.9 bcm<sup>3</sup> of water, which makes bombing the dam an insane thing to do because of the damage it causes downstream (Foster, 2020).*

On the other hand, upstream countries claim they have an equitable and reasonable utilization of water resources in their sovereign territory for their wellbeing and development (Cascão, 2009). To ensure sustainable utilization of Nile waters, the Nile Basin Council of Ministers drafted CFA with an endorsement to establish a permanent Nile basin commission in 2007 (Swain, 2011). This draft was signed by six upstream countries in 2010. The central thesis of this agreement is equitable and utilization of Nile water resources without causing significant harm. Despite their concern of maintaining the status quo, Egypt and Sudan did not sign the CFA. Contrarily, they argue in favor of colonial treaties and historical and current water use, which contradicts the equitable and reasonable utilization of common water resources. The grave barrier to Nile basin cooperation is the downstream states' unjust claim over the just claim of upstream riparians.

Ethiopia as a major contributor to Nile waters has not utilized it yet. The GERD is one of the indicators of equitable and reasonable utilization of the Nile water without causing significant harm. However, the downstream states especially Egypt have been wandering in the Arab Leagues to gather support, escorted by the United States whereby Donald Trump officially told the Sudan Prime Minister that Egypt should bomb the GERD. What Egypt and Sudan are doing by far is not to narrow the gap by adhering to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization of Nile water, rather extend the status quo. In doing so, they reject what they have agreed in the DoP in 2015. Rather than looking at the riches that the GERD brings to East Africa and Africa as a whole, they misleadingly portrayed the project as a curse. Moreover, a military deterrence that Egypt makes against Ethiopia bears no solution to Egypt's water security. War is the stick of those who have no truth and want to attain the wrong claim unfairly. This will never solve the tension that may arise from the project itself, the filling, and the annual operation.

The Nile basin countries could be more beneficial from cooperation than confrontation. Cooperation is the most important instrument to attaining common development goals (Barnaby, 2009). The Nile water is an important instrument for regional economic and developmental cooperation. Beyond energy, food security, and other aspects of development, the Nile is a potential source for attracting foreign investors and donors (Talwar *et al*, 2013). The cooperative aspect of megaprojects on Nile water creates diplomatic, regional, and economic importance. Infrastructural development along the basin has to focus on national, regional, and transboundary implications whereby these benefits are equitably shared among the riparian states.

### **Conclusion**

The Nile water has been a source of tension among the Nile riparians for many years. The basin has agonized from a lack of far-reaching institutional and legal frameworks, which resolve their disagreement. The argument arises from the historical right thesis purported by downstream countries and equitable and reasonable utilization of Nile water resources by upper riparians. The extreme reliance of downstream states on colonial treaties is challenged by the upper countries who were not a party to it. The CFA included the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization of the Nile water resources without causing significant harm. This has changed the Nile basin hydro-politics as the GERD commenced to follow it. The construction of GERD on the Blue Nile has been depicted by Egypt and Sudan as a monster of concrete that arrests water

flow downstream. Egypt attempted to halt any financial support by international donors and countries to the GERD and to preserve its hegemony regardless of its zero water contribution. The downstream states' self-centered claim has been an obstacle to equitable and reasonable utilization of Nile water resources for developmental purposes.

Besides, the quests for equitable and reasonable utilization of the Nile water resources, the filling, and the annual operation of the GERD have been points of controversies. The tripartite negotiation between upstream Ethiopia and downstream Sudan and Egypt has been on track since the commencement of the GERD. In 2015, these countries signed the DoP, which discusses the equitable and reasonable utilization of the Nile water, not to cause significant harm, the filling, and the annual operation of the GERD. The ambiguity about how to fill the GERD and manage the annual operation has kept the room open for the three states to address it through negotiation. The solution to controversy related to the filling and annual operation of the GERD lies in the hand of the three states. As mentioned in the DoP, the purpose of the GERD is power generation to bring economic development, cooperation, and regional integration. Despite this, the tension between the downstream states and Ethiopia has not yet been overcome. Egypt's and Sudan's securitization of the filling and operation of the GERD and their reluctance to recognize Ethiopia's right to utilize its water resources has been the root causes of all these confusions. Cognizant of the significance it has as agreed in the DoP, tensions attached to the filling and operation of the GERD should be handled at a tripartite negotiation. Furthermore, the dam filling tension proceeds from lack of trust and fear of discredited historical monopoly over the Nile and the change of geopolitical power.

It is recommended that in order to bring a lasting solutions to the Nile basin, all riparians should stick to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization of the Nile water resources without causing significant harm. They should show political commitment and diplomatic effort for collective development and prosperity as a Nile family. The downstream countries should accept the reality that colonial treaties are obsolete and should not be used to impede others from utilizing water resources in their territory. The conclusion of recent agreements such as CFA and DoP indicates that these treaties are no more valid. The tripartite talk regarding the GERD's filling and management of technical issues should be made from the perspective of equitable and reasonable utilization of Nile water resources without causing significant harm. Egypt and Sudan

should accept the fact that the GERD is a tool of regional economic and infrastructural cooperation.

### References

- Abdelhady, D., Aggestam, K., *et al.* (2015). The Nile and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Is there a meeting point between nationalism and hydrosolidarity? *Journal of Contemporary Water Research and Education* 155(1):73-82.  
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1936-704x.2015.03197.x>.
- Abdulrahman, S. A. (2019). The river Nile and Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam: Challenges to Egypt's security approach. *International Journal of Environmental Studies* 76(1): 136–149.
- Adejumobi, S. A. (2007). *The history of Ethiopia*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Bah, M. L., Sangare, Z.D., & Bantin, A.B. (2018). Integrated water resource management policy in Africa: Case study of the Nile water and its politics. *Journal of Geology and Geoscience* 2(2): 1-10.
- Barnaby, W. (2009). Do nations go to over water? Essay. *Nature* (458): 282–283  
DOI; <https://doi.org/10.1038/458282a>.
- Beatrice, M. (Host). (2014). *Talk Africa: The Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam*. CGTN Africa News, Nairobi. Retrieved on October 19, 2020, from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RD72UStS-yI&t=548s>.
- Brunnée, J. & Toope, S. J. (2003). The Nile basin regime: A role for law? In Abdulrahman, S. Alsharhan & Warren, W. Wood (Eds.), *Water Resources Perspectives: Evaluation, Management, and Policy*, pp. 93-117.
- Cascão, A.E. (2009). Changing power relations in the Nile river basin: Unilateralism vs. Cooperation. *Water Alternatives* 2(2): 245-268.
- CFA. (2010). Agreement on the Nile river basin cooperative framework. Entebbe, Uganda.
- Daily News Egypt. (June 7, 2020). Ethiopia will rethink before filling GERD reservoir without trilateral agreement: Sudan Foreign Minister. *Daily News Egypt*. Retrieved on 26/12/2020 from <https://dailynewsegypt.com/author/daily-news-egypt/>.
- DoP. (2015). Agreement on Declaration of Principles (DoP), March 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2015, Khartoum, Sudan.
- EBC. (2020). Ethiopia completes the first filling of the GERD, *Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation*, Televised News, July 22 2020.
- Eckstein, G. (1995). *Application of international water law to transboundary groundwater resources, and the Slovak-Hungarian dispute over Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros*, 19 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 67. Available at: <https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/247>.
- El-Said, M. (July 13, 2020). AU-sponsored Nile dam talks end fruitless: Concerned parties to present separate final reports on GERD negotiations to AU chair on Tuesday. *Daily News Egypt*. Retrieved on 26/12/2020 from <https://dailynewsegypt.com/author/m-said/>.
- El-Said, M. (July 26, 2020). Ethiopia cannot complete GERD filling without consensus: Egypt Official. *Daily News Egypt*. Retrieved on 26/12/2020 from <https://dailynewsegypt.com/author/m-said/>.
- Elsayed, H., Djordjevi, S., Savić, D. A., Tsoukalas, I., & Makropoulos, C. (2020). The Nile water-food-energy nexus under uncertainty: Impacts of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. *Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management* 146(11): 1–17.

- El-Sebahy, N. (November 18, 2015). Egypt has 3 concerns on Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Prime Minister. *Daily News Egypt*. Retrieved from <https://dailynewsegypt.com/author/daily-news-egypt/>.
- Endalcachew, B. (2016). Agreement on declaration of principles on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project: A reaffirmation of the 1929 and 1959 agreements? *Arts and Social Sciences Journal* 07(02): 7–9.
- Endaylalu, G. A. (2019). Egypt's quest for hydro-hegemony and the changing power relation in the eastern Nile basin. *Ethiopian Journal of Social Sciences* 5(1): 36–62.
- Foster, D. (Host). (October 14, 2020). *Ethiopia dam dispute: How to solve it?* [Video File] *Round Table*, TRT World. Retrieved on October 17, 2020, from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rFv3iCA7zM4&t=91s>.
- Gebreluel, G. (2014). Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam: Ending Africa's oldest geopolitical rivalry? *The Washington Quarterly* 37(2): 25–37.
- Goad, D. (2020). Water law be dammed?: How dam construction by non-hegemonic basin states places strain on the customary law of transboundary watercourses. *American University International Law Review*, 35(4): 907–939.
- Howe, L. (2010). Hydropolitics of the Nile River: Conflict, policy and the future. *Insights* 4(1): 30-43.
- Ibrahim, A. M. (2011). The Nile basin cooperative framework agreement: The beginning of the end of Egyptian hydro-political hegemony. *Missouri Environmental Law and Policy Review* 18(4): 282–313.
- Karyabwite, R. D. (2000). *Water sharing in the Nile river valley. UNEP Project Gnv011: Using GIS/Remote sensing for the sustainable use of natural resources*. UNEP/DEWA/GRID-Geneva.
- Khan, I. (Host). (June 28, 2020). *What is behind the dispute over Africa's largest dam project?* [Video File] *Aljazeera Inside Story*, Retrieved on August 13, 2020, from [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LYrG\\_cOljd4](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LYrG_cOljd4).
- Lazerwitz, D. J. (1993). The flow of international water law: The international law commission's law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses, *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 1(1): 247-271. <https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol1/iss1/12>.
- Liersch, S., K. H., & Hattermann, F. F. (2017). Management scenarios of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and their impacts under recent and future climates. *Water* 9(728): 1–24.
- Lumumba, P. L. O. (2007). The interpretation of the 1929 treaty and its legal relevance and implications for the stability of the region. *African Sociological Review* 11(1): 10-24.
- Madani, K., Rheinheimer, D., Elimam, L. & Connell-Buck, Ch. (2011). A game theory approach to understanding the Nile river basin conflict. In K. M. Person (Eds.). "A Water Resource", pp. 97-114: Lund University.
- Mehari, T. M. (2020). The Nile rivalry and its peace and security implications: what can the African union do? *IPSS Policy Brief* 1(1): Addis Ababa University.
- Nicol, A. & Cascão, A.E., (2011). Against the flow-new power dynamics and upstream mobilization in the Nile basin. *Review of African Political Economy* 38 (128): 317-325.
- Nicol, A. & Shahin, M. (n.d) *The Nile: Moving beyond cooperation* (Provisional version). UNESCO.

- Nunzio, J. D. (2013). *Conflict on the Nile: The future of transboundary water disputes over the world's longest river*. Strategic Analysis Paper. Future Directions International. Australia.
- Obengo, J. O. (2016). Hydropolitics of the Nile : The case of Ethiopia and Egypt. *African Security Review* 25(1): 95–103.
- Okoth-Owiro, A. (2004). *The Nile treaty, state succession, and international treaty commitments: a case study of the Nile water treaties*. Occasional Papers no.9. Nairobi: Konrad Adenauer Foundation.
- Oloo, A. (2007). The quest for cooperation in the Nile water conflicts: The case of Eritrea. *African Sociological Review* 11 (1): 95-105.
- Onencan, A. M., & Van de Walle, B. V. (2018). Equitable and reasonable utilization: reconstructing the Nile basin water allocation dialogue. *Water*, 10(6): 1-32.
- Ottaway, M. (July 7, 2020). *Egypt and Ethiopia: The curse of the Nile*. Wilson Center's Middle East Program. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/egypt-and-ethiopia-curse-nile>.
- Paul, Block. (2015). *Ethiopia's Grand Dam Plan* [Video File]. Presented at University of Wisconsin, Maddison. Accessed on 8/13/2020 from <https://r5---sn-xuj-5qqq.googlevideo.com/videoplayback>.
- Paul, Williams. (2002). Nile cooperation through hydro-realpolitik? *Third World Quarterly* 23(6): 1189-1196.
- Qureshi, W. A. (2017). Equitable apportionment of shared transboundary river waters: A case study of modifications of the Indus waters treaty. *San Diego International Law Journal* 18(199): 199-240.
- Rahaman, M. M. (2009). Principles of international water law: Creating effective transboundary water resources management. *International Journal of Sustainable Society* 1(3): 207-223.
- Ribeiro, W. C., & Sant'Anna, F. M. (2014). Water security and interstate conflict and cooperation. *Documents d'Anàlisi Geogràfica* 60(3): 573–596.
- Samuel, L. (2008). *Double-edged hydro politics on the Nile linkages between domestic water policy making and transboundary conflict and cooperation* (Doctoral Thesis). ETH Zurich Research Collection.
- Satti S., Zaitchik B., & Siddiqui S. (2015). The question of Sudan: A hydro-economic optimization model for the Sudanese Blue Nile. *Hydrology and Earth System Sciences* (19): 2275–2293.
- Shaw, M. N. (2003). *International law (Fifth Edition)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shaw, M. N. (2008). *International Law (Sixth Edition)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sudan Tribune. (August 15, 2020). Sudan, Egypt call for legally binding agreement on Ethiopia's Dam. *Sudan Tribune: Plural News and views on Sudan*. Retrieved on 2/18/2021 from [https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id\\_article=69707](https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=69707).
- Sudan Tribune. (June 29, 2013, Addis Ababa). Symposium: Ethiopia's Nile Dam cuts Sudan's expenditure on siltation. *Sudan Tribune: Plural news and views on Sudan*. Retrieved on 2/18/2021 from <https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&idarticle=47124>.
- Surafel, Z. & Lidya, A. (Hosts). (October 9, 2020). *Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the Recent Position of Egypt* [Video File]. Ahadu TV: *Ahadu Medrek*, Retrieved on October 17, 2020, from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EfhbV8e9oAw&t=142s>.

- Swain, A. (2002). The Nile river basin initiative: Too many cooks, too little broth. *SAIS Review* 22(2): 293-308. DOI:10.1353/sais.2002.0044.
- Swain, A. (2008). Mission not yet accomplished managing water resources in the Nile River Basin. *Journal of International Affairs* 61(2):201-214.
- Swain, A. (2011). Challenges for water sharing in the Nile basin: Changing geopolitics and changing climate. *Hydrological Sciences Journal* 56(4): 687-702. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/02626667.2011.577037>
- Tadesse, Debay. (2008). The Nile: *Is it a curse or a blessing?* ISS Paper No. 174. Institute for Security Studies.
- Talwar, E., Vishwanath. A., Kumar, A., Philip, D., Singh, E. & Mutoo, Sh. (2013). *Blue peace for the Nile*. Strategic Foresight Group. Mumbai.
- Tawfik, R. (2019). Beyond the river: Elite perceptions and regional cooperation in the eastern Nile basin. *Water Alternatives* 12(2): 655-675.
- Tesfa-Alem, T. (14 January 2016). Ethiopia rejects Egypt's proposal to redesign Nile Dam. *Sudan Tribune: Plural News and views on Sudan*. Retrieved on 2/18/2021 from [https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id\\_article=57682](https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=57682).
- The Ethiopian Herald. (July 24, 2020). *Abbay - From a source of grief to a cause of relief*. Retrieved on October 17, 2020, from <https://www.press.et/english/?p=25335#>.
- Udobong, E. (2016). The rising conflict on the Nile waters: Understand its legal, environmental, and public health consequences. *Liberty University Law Review* 10(3): 468–500.
- Upadhyay, S. N. & Gaudel, P. (2017). The adoption of the declaration of the principles on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and lessons for South Asia. *Hydro Nepal* 1(21):17-24. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.3126/hn.v21i0.17817>.
- Wendmu, B. (2019). Counter hydro-hegemony movement over the Nile basin by the upstream states and Egypt's reactions: The cooperative framework agreement and the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam. *Mekelle University Journal of Political Science and Strategic Studies* 1(1):1-34.
- Wheeler, K. G., Basheer, M., Mekonnen, Z. T., Eltoum, S. O., Mersha, A., Abdo, G. M., & Dadson, S. J. (2016). Cooperative filling approaches for the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. *Water International* 41(4): 611–634.
- Wheeler, K. G., Jeuland, M., Hall, J. W., Zagana, E., & Whittington, D. (2020). Understanding and managing new risks on the Nile with the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. *Nature Communications* 11(5222): 1–9.
- Wirkus, L. & Böge, V. (2006). Transboundary water management on Africa's international rivers and lakes: Current state and experiences. In Waltina Scheumann & Susanne Neubert (Eds.), *Transboundary water management in Africa: Challenges for development cooperation*, pp. 1-11. Bonn: German Development Institute (DIE).
- Wolde, E. A., & Habte, A. D. (2020). Trilateral talks on the filling and annual operation of the GERD: Competing demands and the need for revisiting the status quo towards a negotiated settlement. *PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development (PJGD)* 1(2): 4-29. DOI:10.46404/panjogov.v1i2.2381
- Wossenu, A. (2014). "Land and water in the Nile basin". In Assefa M. Melesse, Wossenu Abteu & Shimelis G. Setegn (Eds.), *Nile river basin eco hydrological challenges, climate change, and hydropolitics*, pp. 119-129. Switzerland: Springer International Publishing.

- Wu, X & Whittington, D. (2006). Incentive compatibility and conflict resolution in international river basins: A case study of the Nile Basin. *Water Resources Research* 42(2): W02417. DOI: 10.1029/2005WR004238.
- Xinhua. (2020-06-18). *Sudan voices rejection to filling of Ethiopia's Nile Dam without agreement*. Retrieved on October 12, 2020, from [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-06/18/c\\_139147287.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-06/18/c_139147287.htm).
- Yeshihareg, A. (2014). *A comparative analysis of hydropolitics in the Rhine and Nile river basins* [Unpublished Master's Thesis]. Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa.
- Zewdineh, B. & Ian, W. (2004). *Common goods and the common good: Transboundary natural resources, principled cooperation, and the Nile basin initiative*. Center for African Studies, Breslauer Symposium on Natural Resource Issues in Africa (University of California, Berkeley).
- Zeydan, B. A. (2015). *Water security and population dynamics in the Nile river basin*. Tenth International Water Technology Conference, IWTC10 2006, Alexandria, Egypt.
- Zeydan, B. A. (2018). *Nile water conflict management*. Research Gate. Available at <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327228212>.
- Zhang, Y., Block, P., Hammond, M., & King, A. (2015). Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam: Implications for downstream riparian countries. *Journal of Water Resource Planning Management* 14(9): 1–10.



## **Maintaining Mutual Benefits between Investor and Local Community: Mechanisms to Reopen Lega Dambi Gold Mining, Ethiopia**

Abdisa Olkeba Jima\*

### **Abstract**

*Mining, specifically, large-scale gold mining has become one of the primary economic activities that play a pivotal role in the socio-economic development of one country. But there is no consensus among scholars whether gold mining companies maintain mutual benefits with local communities. The main objective of this research is to scrutinize the mechanism to be employed in reopening Lega Dambi large-scale gold mining by maintaining mutual benefits between the company and the local community. The researcher employed a qualitative method and a case study research design. Focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews were used to collect data from the local community, elders, religious leaders, Abbaa Gadaas, Guji Zone, and Odo Shakiso Woreda investment office, land management office, social and labor affair, mineral, and energy office administrators, and Odo Shakiso Woreda health station and Adola hospital. Secondary sources and regulatory frameworks such as FDRE Constitution and Mining Operations Proclamation No. 678/2010 were used to triangulate with primary data. The finding shows that Lega Dambi's large-scale gold mining company failed to maintain mutual benefits between itself and the local community. Basic tenets such as national and regional corporate social responsibility, community development agreement, impact and benefit agreements, social and labor plan, and social license were not implemented properly to balance the mutual benefit between the company and the local community. The researcher concluded that Lega Dambi large-scale gold mining company disregarded the role of the local community during commencement time albeit it had a strong relationship with the central government. Consequently, the company was terminated because of a bad relationship it had with the local community. It is recommended that national and regional corporate social responsibility that shows the company's specific joint administration of the central and Oromia region governments should be designed and implemented fully. It is also recommended that discussions should be held with local communities and arrived at a consensus concerning the reopening of the company.*

**Keywords:** *Gold Mining, Investors, Lega Dambi, Local Community, Mutual Benefit*

### **Introduction**

Mining plays a significant role in the economy and has been central to the economic and social development strategies (Ministry of Mines and Energy, 2009; Mining Journal, 2011; World Gold Council, 2015; World Bank, 2016; Hailemariam *et al.*, 2017; Nguyen *et al.*, 2018). It provides inputs for other industrial sectors that are vital for sustaining the population wellbeing

---

\* Bule Hora University, Ethiopia. E-mail: [olkebabdisa@gmail.com](mailto:olkebabdisa@gmail.com)

and the functioning of global economies (Mancini & Sala, 2018). It can also create job opportunities, raise economic development, afford social services, and can generate taxes and royalties (Ministry of Mines and Energy, 2009; Hailemariam *et al.*, 2017; Nguyen *et al.*, 2018).

On the other hand, mining increases social and economic inequality among the community (Addison *et al.*, 2017). The continuous existence of large-scale mines in indigenous communities is threatened without the cooperation and support of local people (Adonteng-Kissi & Adonteng-Kissi, 2017), and it brings little improvements to the local community's welfare (Punam *et al.*, 2017). Thus, the health of the local community is affected (Nguyen *et al.*, 2018). In addition, the most concerning aspects in the mining sector are land use-related and environmental impacts that affect the livelihood of the local community (Kitula, 2006; Meisanti *et al.*, 2012; Mancini & Sala, 2018).

Due to a shift from farmers to miners, there were rising local conflicts between the peasants and gold mining firms (Meisanti *et al.*, 2012). Albeit many communities are benefited from responsible gold mining, there are disputes and even conflicts between mining companies and other stakeholders (World Gold Council, 2015), and hence, communities feel that the companies do not live up to their responsibility to support local development (Garvin *et al.*, 2009). Surface mining leads to the dispossession of local people from their farming land because of which the households are usually unable to feed themselves well, or send children to school, or care for their health and welfare needs (Tenkorang & Osei-Kufuor, 2013).

To maintain mutual benefits between the local community and the company, issues like socio-economic baselines, and defining local community investment data have to be improved (World Gold Council, 2015). Mining companies have responded by developing global corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies as part of their larger global business strategies in which a prominent place is given to their relationship with local communities (Kapelus, 2002). Although partnerships among companies, government, and civil society are introduced as a potentially effective and efficient strategy for CSR, mining companies fail to have the prior consent and authentic participation of the local community (Hamann, 2003). Consequently, they are not deemed to share benefits (Nguyen *et al.*, 2018). Recently, mining companies operating in developing countries have become under pressure because of the challenges they are facing from opponents (Kapelus, 2002).

Mining relates to land use and territorial aspects are the major concern in African countries (Mancini & Sala, 2018). Additionally, albeit large-scale gold mining is contributing to countries' growth and domestic product (GDP) and export revenue, its impact on socio-economics and employments of the local community is low in Africa (World Gold Council, 2015). In the same vein, the compensation package of the major large-scale mining company is not enough to alleviate the poverty of local farmers, which causes food shortage and poor living conditions of local farmers (Adonteng-Kissi, 2017). Hence, gold companies are challenged by the high expectations of communities because of the lack of engagement of local, regional, and national governments and coupled with a history of mistrust (Garvin *et al.*, 2009).

Ethiopia has the ambition to raise the contribution of the mining sector to GDP from 1.5% to 10% by 2025 (Ministry of Mines and Energy, 2009; World Bank, 2016) with the vision to establish a diverse, and environmentally sound private sector to enhance the socio-economic development (Ministry of Mines and Energy, 2009). During the Derg regime (socialist Ethiopia from 1974-1991), only government institutions had the right to explore and develop the country's mineral wealth, so privatization was impossible (Ministry of Mines and Energy, 2009; Hagos *et al.*, 2016). Since the fall of the Derg regime in 1991, private participation in mineral prospecting, exploration, and development activities has been encouraged in Ethiopia (Ministry of Mines and Energy, 2009; Mining Journal, 2011; Hagos *et al.*, 2016). For this reason, different proclamations such as Mining Proclamation No. 52/1993, Mining Regulations No. 182/1994, and Mining Income Tax Proclamations No. 53/1993 were promulgated to raise private participation in mining (Mining Journal, 2011).

So far, a developed large scale gold mine in the country is the Lega Dambi gold mine with an estimated reserve of 82 tons of gold, located in the southern greenstone belt region, being operated by a private company, MIDROC Gold Mine PLC's, with an average annual production of 3.6 tons of gold (Ministry of Mines and Energy, 2009). In Ethiopia, to reduce the impacts of gold mining, the Environment and Community Development Directorate were established in 2007 with the mandates to ensure environmental and social impact assessments; occupational, health, and safety standards; and community development (World Bank, 2014).

Contrary to the above facts, how mining is experienced by the residents in mining communities has received relatively little attention (Nguyen *et al.*, 2018). Further, Lega Dambi's large-scale

gold mining has terminated due to the bad relationship between the company and the local community albeit the place reaches in gold deposits (Abdisa, 2020). Specifically, the company caused a miscarriage in pregnant women and animals, reduction quality of livelihood of landholders and artisans, eviction of landholders from their lands without any compensation, reduction of the current income of the landholders, the death of the local community and their animals (Abdisa, 2020, p.1). As a result, this research is designed to scrutinize the mechanism to be employed in reopening Lega Dambi large-scale gold mining by sustaining mutual benefits between the investor and the local community.

The researcher attempted to answer the following questions:

1. What mechanisms should be employed to maintain mutual benefits between Lega Dambi large-scale gold mining company and the local community?
2. How can Lega Dambi large-scale gold mining be reopened to commence gold mine by avoiding conflicts with the local community?

The conceptual framework of this research is summarized as follows.




Figure1: Conceptual framework of the study (Own construction, 2020)

#### Definition of Acronyms

SIA=Social Impact Assessment

IBA=Impacts and Benefits Agreement

MLD=Mining Legal Framework

IDS=Inclusiveness of Different Stakeholders

CDA=Community Development Agreement

SLP=Social and Labor Plan

NRCSR=National and Regional Corporate Social Responsibility

SLO=Social License to Operate

### Research Methodology

To conduct this research, qualitative research was employed. In qualitative research, the researcher is central as he/she collects and analyzes primary data. In addition, the data are mediated through the researcher or the “Human instrument” (Key, 1997). Moreover, the techniques of focus group interviews, projective, and depth interviews are used (Kothari, 2004). The interest of the researcher lies in the process as well as the insight to be gained through illustrations. More importantly, the researcher plays a key role in constructing and interpreting different concepts, theories, and principles out of the detailed discussion, interviews, and observations (Creswell, 2003). Similarly, a qualitative case study research design was used because it is suitable to collect in-depth data about a single company, Lega Dambi gold mining.

In the frame of qualitative research, the researcher collected, organized, and analyzed data. Data were gathered through semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions from the local community, local elders, religious leaders, and *Abbaa Gadaas* on how to reopen the company. Also, semi-structured interviews were employed to collect data from Guji *Zone*, and Odo Shakiso *Woreda* investment, land management, social and labor affairs, mineral, and energy offices administrators, and Odo Shakiso *Woreda* health station and Adola hospital to elicit local views on how the company will regain the former position and to begin gold commencement by maintaining mutual benefits between the company and the local community.

The study population is categorized into clusters due to the heterogeneity of the participants. Accordingly, the population was clustered into three. Cluster one consists of the local communities, who live surrounding the company. The participants of this cluster were selected from four *Kebeles* surrounding Lega Dambi large-scale gold mining company. The four Kebeles were purposively selected because they surrounded the company so that “They are directly affected by the company” (Abdisa, 2020). Those *Kebeles* are *Dhiibbaa Battee* (Diba Bate), *Reejjii* (Reji), *Sawwaanaa* (Sawana), and *Diidola* (Didola). For the focus group discussion, eight participants were selected from each *Kebele* through purposive sample techniques. Thirty-two participants participated in four focus group discussions altogether. Additionally, two participants were purposively selected from each *Kebele* for interview; there are a total of eight participants. In brief, the total sample size of this cluster consists of forty participants.

Cluster two is composed of government officials who work at Odo Shakiso *Woreda* and Guji *Zone*. In this cluster, twelve participants were selected for the interview. These were selected purposively because their jobs are directly related to the research problem. They were from i) Odo Shakiso *Woreda* and Guji *Zone* investment, ii) land management, iii) mining and energy, and iv) labor and social affairs offices, where each office has delegated one participant. Furthermore, four participants were selected from Odo Shakiso *Woreda* health station and Adola hospital respectively.

Cluster three encompasses local elders, *Abbaa Gadaas*, and religious leaders. In this cluster, the researcher has taken participants for focus group discussions and interviews. For interviews, two *Abbaa Gadaas*, two local elders, and two religious leaders were selected. Besides, four *Abbaa Gadaas*, three local elders, and three religious leaders were selected for focus group discussions because their decision-making roles are high in the community. Hence, the total sample size of this cluster constitutes sixteen participants. Generally, the samples in all clusters are sixty eight participants. To select participants under each cluster, a purposive sampling technique was employed because it enables the researcher to obtain specific data, and helps him to glean information from various groups.

In the same vein, document review is another data gathering tool. In this regard, the researcher accessed some documents such as books, reports, journals, articles, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution, and the Mining Operation Proclamation concerning the research topic. To conduct focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews, *Afaan Oromoo* was used to get sufficient information. Furthermore, an attempt was made to ensure gender representation during focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews. Finally, the collected data was analyzed through the content and thematic data analysis method. Translation into the English language was made first to convert the data, which were collected in *Afaan Oromoo*. Next, coding was made to organize different topics according to the respective title. Then, the coded data were categorized and discussed under each theme.

Table 1: Summary of Data Collection Method, Participants, Sample Size, and Focused Areas  
(Own Summary, 2020)

Respondents	SS*	Activities	Employed Tools	Focused Areas
Local community	32 8	Discussion  Interview	Focus Group Discussion Semi-structured Interview	Reopening the company Mining legal framework The company impacts CDA IBA SLP SLO
Guji Zone & Odo Shakiso Woreda investment office administrators, Land management office administrators, Mineral & energy office administrators, Labor and social affairs office administrators, Odo Shakiso Woreda Health station and Adola hospital representatives	12	Interview	Semi-structured Interview	Company reopening Mining legal framework CSR CDA IBA SLP SLO The company impact on local community and animals
Local elders Abbaa Gadaas Religious leaders	10 6	Discussion  Interview	Focus Group Discussion Semi-structured Interview	Company reopening Mining legal framework Actors inclusiveness CSR CDA SLP SLO
<b>Total</b>	68			

Key: SS= Sample Size

## Results and Discussion

### Maintenance of Mutual Benefits between the Investor and the Local Communities

Lega Dambi gold mining company had begun gold commencement as a state company during Emperor Haile Selassie I. According to interviews with Odo Shakiso *Woreda* and Guji *Zone* land management and investment administrators, the company was owned by the state until it was

privatized in 1997/8. Besides, the interview result with Odo Shakiso *Woreda's* investment office administrator showed that the FDRE government privatized the company to the Mohammed International Development and Research Organization Company (MIDROC) Gold Mining Private Limited Company (PLC) following the privatization policy which was promulgated in 1992. Likewise, the administrators of Guji *Zone* investment, and mining and energy offices informed:

*When it was privatized, the tenure of the agreement was 20 years with a possibility for the second time. Accordingly, the first round of agreement ended in 2018. The Ministry of Mining and Energy attempted to extend the license which was estimated to last in 2038. Unfortunately, the local community opposed the agreement and forced it to terminate because the local community was blaming the socioeconomic damage which was caused by the company (Interview, 2020).*

Recently, MIDROC Gold Mining PLC, which used to produce about 4500 kg gold annually in Lega Dambi, was terminated due to the rough relationship between the company and the local community (Abdisa, 2020). Moreover, according to an interview with local elders, religious leaders, and *Abbaa Gadaas*, the immediate cause for the termination of the company was the renewal of its license for the 2<sup>nd</sup> time. However, the company released toxic substances to the environment, especially, to the *Mormoraa* River that was responsible for the death of many people and cattle of the local community - more than 600 cattle, 12 goats, and three donkeys died (Abdisa, 2020). Here, there are two overriding interests - the company's interest (profit maximization) and the local community's interest (survival, welfare, and clean environment). This needs the attention to establish mutual benefits between the investor and the local community before the reopening of the company. To sustain mutual benefits between MIDROC Gold Mining PLC and the local community, the researcher tried to address the following basic elements to be fulfilled and implemented practically for the reopening of the company for safe production. Those tenets are conducting social impact assessment, mining legal framework, national and regional corporate social responsibility, inclusiveness of different stakeholders, community development agreement, cost and benefits agreement, social and labor plan, and social license to operate.



## **Social Impact Assessment**

Social impact assessment can be defined by different scholars from different points of view. Wilson (2017) defines it as the process of identifying and managing the social impacts of industrial projects that can be applied to policies, plans, and programs. Vanclay (2003) explains that social impact assessment includes the processes of analyzing, monitoring, and managing the intended and unintended social consequences, both positive and negative, of planned interventions (policies, programs, plans, projects) and any social change processes invoked by those interventions for the primary purpose of a more sustainable and equitable biophysical and human environment. The central theme of Vanclay and Wilson is the same as they focus on the mechanism of maintaining mutual benefits between industries on one hand, and human beings and the environment on the other. “In Lega Dambi gold mining company, assessment of social impact is not visible,” Shakiso *Woreda* social and labor administrator argued. The administrator also explained that the local communities complained about the death of their animals, skin problems of local communities, and miscarriage of pregnant women because of using the polluted water near the company. Interview with the Guji zone social and labor affairs administrator showed that the company was unwilling to assess the social impacts when Shakiso *woreda* and Guji *zone* social and labor affairs requested the company to do so on the complaint of the community.

Similarly, Inter-American Development Bank (2018) stipulates that social impact assessment is a process that includes specific milestones, deliverables, and products such as reports and plans *i.e.*, resettlement plans and socio-cultural analysis, at appropriate times during the project cycle. Theoretically, every company conducts a social impact assessment. But most of the companies do not practically address the social impact assessment as per the generated report. Interview with the investment office of Odo Shakiso *Woreda* administrator exhibited that the company was protected by the Federal army, and thus it was so difficult to enter and assess whether it practically implements social impact assessment. This shows that the company would not have terminated if it had implemented the social assessment and included the resettlement plan of the local community by identifying socio-cultural analysis. Social impact assessment is used to predict and mitigate negative impacts and identify opportunities to enhance benefits for local communities and broader society (Wilson, 2017), but this is not contextualized, conceptualized,

and implemented in Lega Dambi gold because of the inexperience and unwillingness of the company to do so.

Social impact assessment has the potential to be an effective means of involving affected communities in developing community goals, identifying issues affecting local sustainability, and engaging groups within the communities to work with the company in addressing and monitoring these issues (Esteves, 2008). It also enables to assess and manage project-related risks and benefits, strengthens local understanding and support for the project, provides information and continued stakeholder engagement to enable adaptive, responsive, and cost-effective project management and provides the basis and means to evaluate social outcomes and impacts of a project (Inter-American Development Bank, 2018). Before the reopening of Lega Dambi gold mining company, whether it is opened by MIDROC gold mining PLC or by other new investors or by the government itself, local communities and other stakeholders first need to discuss and evaluate the social outcomes and impacts of a project. Social impact assessment has many principles that ensure mutual benefits between the community and investors. For this research, the Inter-American Development Bank (2018) principles of social impact assessment were employed. Accordingly, two principles are demonstrated: what social impact assessment should do (nine principles), and what social impact assessment should not do (one principle). Generally, ten principles are suggested by Inter-American Development Bank (2018). Those are:

1. What social impact assessment should do?

- Promote equal opportunity, inclusion, and sustainability in a project setting;
- Promote local benefits, community development, and capacity;
- Promote empowerment and social capital;
- Be a proactive and integral part of project planning and implementation, interconnected with economic, physical, environmental, and other issues;
- Address both risks and opportunities;
- Be rigorous in its use of data, which may include quantitative as well as qualitative data;
- Be widely applicable in different contexts and settings;
- Build on local knowledge and participatory processes, and reflect diversity in culture and values; and

- Respect and promote human rights, transparency and accountability, and the rule of law.

2. What social impact assessment should not do?

- The social impact assessment should not apply coercion or undue force.

In Lega Dambi large-scale gold mining company, the possibility of designing and implementing social impact assessment is low. The above principles were not implemented by the company, and thus it was forced to terminate by the local community. “If the company designed and implemented social impact assessment properly, the company would not be terminated,” as outlined by Odo Shakiso *Woreda* mining and energy administrator. The involvement of different government actors such as the Ministry of Mines, Petroleum and Natural Gas, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Ministry of National Defense Force, Addis Ababa University (evaluation of the environmental and health impacts after the protests), Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Oromia Regional State, Oromia Environmental Protection and Forestry Bureau, Oromia Environmental Protection and Forestry Bureau (Environmental Justice Atlas, 2018) do not save the company from termination because local communities opposed the company many times in big rallies. All focus group discussants from the local community have argued that “The Company had to give equal chance for us in terms of job opportunities and provision of social services. Contrarily, it did not benefit the local community. For this reason, the community forced it to terminate.”

Therefore, to maintain mutual benefits between Lega Dambi gold mining company and the local communities, the researcher adopted the Integrative social investment decision process of Esteves (2008) because it plays a significant role to reopen the company by readdressing the societal needs. The detail is explained in Figure 2 below. The decision has different phases. Those are problem structuring, social development needs analysis, preference evaluation-I, alternatives generation, preference evaluation-II, project planning and implementation, and review phases.




Figure 2: Integrative Social Investment Decision Process for Healthy Mining (Esteves, 2018)

In the absence of an integrative social investment decision process and social impact assessment in Lega Dambi gold mining, the company would affect the life of the local community through a decline in the quality of livelihood of landholders and artisans, and the decline of current income of the landholders. Absence and/or lowness of getting job opportunities of local labor and community in the company, and absence of transparency in the company on labor recruitment and wage payment violated the rights of local laborers to get a job (Abdisa, 2020, p.16). Hence, social impact assessment needs to be reassessed and should be fully implemented before the reopening of the company. Lega Dambi gold mining company needs to respect and promote the

human rights of the local community, transparency and accountability, and the rule of law to maintain mutual benefits between its company and the local community.

### **Mining Legal Framework**

To maintain the mutual benefits between the local community and the investor, the researcher adopted the Canadian mining legal frameworks - mining activities are governed by the laws of the regional state or territory in which the mine is physically located. The reason for adopting the Canadian mining legal framework is that both countries follow federal state structures and hence, power is decentralized into local sub-units. In Ethiopia, the Federal Ministry of Mining and Energy (MoME) has the sole power of giving license of large scales gold mining albeit the FDRE constitution article 40(3) which states that “The right to ownership of rural and urban land as well as of all-natural resources is exclusively vested in the State and the peoples of Ethiopia.” Lega Dambi gold mining, which is one of the natural resources, is located in the Oromia region, Guji Zone, Odo Shakiso *Woreda*. Contrary to this, according to Mining Operations Proclamation No. 678/2010, the license of large scales gold mining is given solely by the FDRE Ministry of Mining and Energy. Hence, the accountability of the company, MIDROC Gold Mining PLC, was direct to the Federal government. Here, there is a legal inconsistency between the FDRE constitution and Mining Operations Proclamation No. 678/2010 on ownership and rights of managing the company. Odo Shakiso *Woreda*'s investment office administrator suggested that “Mining Operations Proclamation No. 678/2010 contradicts with the constitution so that it is invalid. Besides, Lega Dambi gold mining company undermined the voices of the local community and lastly, people coerced it to terminate.”

The researcher argues that Lega Dambi gold mining needs concurrent administrations of the federal and Oromia region. The region needs to maintain mutual benefits between the company and the local community. This can be done by giving and renewing a license, monitoring each activity, following up the practical implementation of rules and regulation, principles and agreements (such as social impact assessment, community development agreement, social and labor plan, social license to operate, and CSR implementations), solving disagreement if there, and collecting taxes and royalties. On the other hand, the federal government needs to follow the overall activities of the company, supervise the region, collect taxes and royalties, solve

disagreements if the region is unable to solve them, and take necessary measures if the region corrupts.

By the same token, local community focus group discussants blamed that:

*Despite the mining sites found in the Oromia region, it has no relation with the region and to us. We have reported about the problem of the company to the region via our representatives. But they did not bring any change for us since the company was regulated by the law of MoME, which is far away from us. Its license was also given by the federal government. Thus, it undermined our voice and affected our livelihoods and cattle. Lastly, we are obliged to terminate the company.*

Generally, to avoid such ambiguity and to maintain consistency of the community development program, Oromia regional state should have the power to control and to give a license on Lega Dambi gold mining as it was already stated in the FDRE constitution article 40(3). The FDRE constitution needs to be consistent with Mining Operations Proclamation No. 678/2010 to avoid the confusion of legal ambiguity.

### **National and Regional Corporate Social Responsibility**

Ethiopia needs to design a national and regional corporate social responsibility policy. So far, there is separate corporate social responsibility at federal and regional levels, but there is no national and regional corporate social responsibility policy as a single document. To solve the legal contradiction between the constitution and FDRE Mining Operations Proclamation No. 678/2010 - even though the power to control mining areas is given for Oromia regional state where the gold is operated constitutionally - there needs to be a joint national and regional CSR. Accordingly, mineral resource development in Ethiopia is a shared responsibility between the federal and Oromia regional state governments. This confirms the FDRE constitution article 98(3) which declares that “The federal government and state shall jointly levy and collect taxes on incomes derived from large scale mining... and royalties on such operations”. By contrast, the interview result with Odo Shakiso *Woreda* and Guji *Zone* investment, and land management administrators showed that the federal government practically had absolute and monopolized power on Lega Dambi gold mining company. They also stated that the issues were dragged on and could not be solved yet even though they presented complain to the region and federal

governments. On the other hand, the Oromia region, where gold mining is founded, neither levies, collects taxes and royalties nor controls the company.

Similarly, Odo Shakiso *Woreda* and Guji *Zone* mineral and energy offices administrators suggested:

*To avoid such ambivalence - albeit the federal government is responsible for developing the country's mineral policy and regulations to guide mineral development - it is the power of the Oromia region to ensure resource ownership and management, land-use decision-making, royalty design and collection, laws, and regulation on resource exploration and development, and operational matters according to the FDRE constitution.*

This can avoid the rough relationship between the local community and MIDROC Gold Mining PLC because the region is near to the local community if it acts responsibly so that the region can communicate with the community and then the company can return to its operation. Apart from that, the Oromia region and the federal government are responsible for implementing the joint legal framework - national and regional corporate social responsibility policy.

Vintró & Comajuncosa (2010) present that Corporate Social Responsibility plays a significant role in the mining industry to maintain and ensure environmental health, the safety of workers and the local community, and sustain economic development. They set three CSR criteria. These are sustainability, ethics, and human resources as summarized below. The researcher argues that these criteria need to be implemented by Lega Dambi gold mining company to maintain mutual benefits between its company and the local community.

Table 2: Types of Corporate Social Responsibility Criteria (Vintró & Comajuncosa, 2010)

Sustainability	Ethics	Human resources
Rational exploitation of natural resources, Clean extraction technologies, Mine closure and recovery program Emergency management, and Quality of production.	Promotion of local community economy and social work, Fair fund administration, and Job security and dignity.	Secure working methods, Training capability development, Employee-manager relations, and Respect for local people.

Besides, Jenkins & Obara (2008) observe that CSR is a manifestation of a move toward greater sustainability in the mining industry. What is more, the principle of accountability in CSR provides an important conceptual linkage between the current risk paradigm, and the notion of self-regulation (Kemp *et al.*, 2012). Also, the result from the interview which was held with government officials revealed that clear and implementable NRCSR can maintain mutual benefit between the investor and the local community. From this, the researcher inferred that, after doing this, Lega Dambi gold mining company can reopen and continue its commencement since it plays a pivotal role at the national level through generating foreign exchanges.

### **Inclusiveness of Different Stakeholders**

The reopening of Lega Dambi gold mining is realized when all stakeholders including local communities are involved in decision making. This facilitates effective communication. Esteves (2008, p.45) summarizes:

*Effective decision-making is based on knowledge of both actual and perceived areas of need. This requires a rigorous assessment of impacts and the socio-demographic environment regularly. A proactive, open, and equitable approach towards addressing impacts and social issues will reinforce the community's willingness to be involved in setting objectives for mutual benefit. Also, an ongoing program, to a greater extent than a never-to-be-repeated social impact assessment project, is more likely to have a systemic impact, through advising all parts of the business that potentially benefit through social investment, such as human resource, procurement, employee development, and community relations.*

According to the interview result with administrators of mining and energy of Odo Shakiso Woreda and Guji zone, regarding Lega Dambi gold mining, the decision was made unilaterally only by the federal government; the license was given only by FDRE Ministry of Mining and Energy without conducting good communication with regional, zonal and woreda where the gold mining is operated; and different stakeholders, who are explained under Figure 3 below, were not involved to make convincing and all-inclusive decisions. The administrators further argued that such unilateral decision-making gave confidence to the company in disregarding the local community since it was kept by the federal police and national soldiers. However, this created a rough relationship between the local community and the company.



On the other hand, local elders, religious leaders, and *Abbaa Gadaas* argued:

*We wanted to take part and make decisions concerning Lega Dambi gold mining company. We, as local elders, religious leaders, and Abbaa Gadaas of this area, tried to contact the local governors who are found at woreda and zonal levels to mediate the difference between the company and the local community, but they undermined us. We suspected that some of the administrators who used to work at woreda and zonal even Oromia regional levels tried to conceal the truth since they had a relation with the company. Moreover, albeit we attempted to communicate with the manager of the company in 2018, he disregarded us. Then, the local community forced the company to terminate. Now, we wish to discuss with the governments, the company owner, and the local community how to restart the company by maintaining mutual benefits between the company and the local community.*

From this, the researcher summarized that the manager of the company and local governors hesitated with the local elders, religious leaders, and *Abbaa Gadaas* to be incorporated into the mainstream of decision-making to maintain mutual benefits between the company and the local community. Besides, local elders, religious leaders, and *Abbaa Gadaas* blamed government officials for the failure of communications albeit the local governors externalize the issues. Hence, mutual benefits could not be maintained. As a result, the local community forced the company to stop its work nevertheless; the place is rich in gold deposits.

Generally, local community, and elders, religious leaders and *Abbaa Gadaas* focus group discussions and interviews, and government office administrators interview results revealed that to reopen the company and to begin the commencement, different actors such as scholars, civil society, local elders, *Abbaa Gadaas*, youth, investors, representatives of government, landholders and the local community, policymakers and activists need to come together, make a wise decision and arrive at a particular conclusion.



Figure 3: Involvement of Different Stakeholders for Healthy Mining (Own Summary, 2020)

### **Community Development Agreement**

Many countries like Burkina Faso, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Papua New Guinea, Mongolia, Australia, Senegal, and Kenya are launching a community-gold mining company development agreement as part of the legal framework to address issues like unequal bargaining relationships between communities and developers, equity in the distribution of benefits generated by community development agreements, and the enforceability and implementation of agreements *via* negotiation, implementation, monitoring, reporting, funding and grievance procedures details (Ciaran, 2013).

Interview with the local communities of all kebeles revealed that due to the absence of community development agreements between Lega Dambi gold mining company and the local community, they could not negotiate the difference between the company and the local community to address the grievances of the local community. Additionally, “We could not monitor the company as the local administrator since it is directly controlled by the federal government. Thus, we could not bargain the relationship between the company and the local community” as indicated in an interview with Odo Shakiso *Woreda* investment administrator.

Furthermore, interview result with the Guji *Zone* mining and energy administrator exhibited that even though Environment and Community Development Directorate was established in 2007 at

the federal level to follow up and control the environmental damage caused by the miners, and to ensure safety standard of the local community, the role of implementing community development agreements between Lega Dambi gold mining company and the local community is low.

Odo Shakiso *Woreda* mining and energy administrator remarked:

*The community development agreements can maintain mutual benefit between the MIDROC gold mining company and the local community via direct involvement of communities in the fair negotiations. They also formalize the outcome in a written document that binds both parties and includes the agreement provisions which address broader development objectives that can maintain mutual benefits between the company and the local community. Nevertheless, a community development agreement was not developed and implemented in MIDROC Lega Dambi gold mining to sustain mutual benefits between the company and the local community. Finally, to reopen the operation of the company since the place is rich in gold deposits, a community development agreement needs to be designed and fully implemented.*

By the same token, interview results from the Guji *zone* investment office administrator showed that there is a requirement for at least large-scale mines like MIDROC to contribute to a fund that is intended to support the local development initiatives in mining-affected communities currently. Besides, the local communities contribute to the project selection process to apply and implement community development agreements. And in Ethiopia, the current process of a community development agreement is not clear on how projects are selected, procurement is undertaken, oversight is managed to ensure that the projects are implemented in a timely and efficient manner, and most importantly, how well these projects meet community needs (World Bank, 2016).

Generally, the finding revealed that to reopen Lega Dambi gold mining company (either by government or MIDROC gold mining PLC or another investor), it needs a consensus with the local community on job creation, operation restart-up, and growth, safe and affordable housing, community facilities like schools, water, and community wealth creation.

### **Impact and Benefit Agreements**

Impact and benefits agreement (IBA), which is called mutual benefit agreement, and/or participatory and benefits agreement (Munning, 2018), plays a pivotal role to reopen the Lega Dambi gold mining company via maintaining mutual benefit between the company and the local community. The IBAs model is originated in Northern Canada, and nowadays, it is widely used across the world *i.e.*, Australia and South America. According to the interviews with administrators of Guji *Zone* and Odo Shakiso *Woreda* mining and energy, and investment offices, IBAs include local content issues such as quotas for local community participation in contracting opportunities and employment. The administrators also presented that it incorporates the goals, objectives, and mitigation strategies contained in the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment and Management Plan.

Local elder, religious leader, and *Abbaa Gadaa* focus group discussants witnessed that there is no IBA in Lega Dambi gold mining which allows the local community to make a decision both on their costs and benefits to consolidating consensus between the company and the local community. Administrators of investment offices of Guji *Zone* and Odo Shakiso *Woreda* shared the views of local elders, religious leaders, and *Abbaa Gadaas* by stating that the local communities could not get immediate and long-term development needs since the company did not have an IBA strategy which is practically visible. Besides, Rodon *et al.* (2018) argue that many indigenous communities face immediate and long-term development needs. Likewise, local community focus group discussants claimed that “If the company had had IBA and implemented it, we would have not obliged to resist the company and forced it to terminate”. Siebenmorgen & Bradshaw (2011) recommend the three phases of IBA: Initial consultation and negotiation, implementation, and follow-up, which are summarized in Figure 4 below.

In a nutshell, the finding confirms the claim made by Rodon *et al.* (2018) that the local communities are unable to get immediate and long-term development needs since the company did not fully and practically implement the impact and benefit agreement strategy.




Figure 4: Phases of Impacts and Benefits Agreements (Siebenmorgen & Bradshow, 2011)

### **Social and Labor Plan**

The social and labor plan (SPL) was developed in South Africa to achieve social objectives through mining legislation. Odo Shakiso investment, and mining and energy office administrators suggested that SPL maintains mutual benefits between Lega Dambi gold mining company and local community by advancing the social and economic welfare of the community, contributing to the transformation of the mining industry, and ensuring the production rights of the company.

Local community focus group discussants argued that:

*The Company is unwilling to hire the local community. Though the Company is found in Oromia regional state, Guji Zone, Odo Shakiso Woreda, the notices for labor recruitment were not posted in the area where the factory is situated. The notices were posted in Addis Ababa, the capital city of the country, which is far away more than 470kms from the company. The reason behind this is to exclude local laborers from the competition. Further, although Afaan Oromoo is widely spoken in Odo Shakiso Woreda and is the working language of the Oromia region, the notices were posted only in Amharic. This made local laborers out of*

*competitions since they could not write and read Amharic nevertheless they had knowledge and experiences in gold mining.*

In Ethiopia, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA) was established to settle industrial peace, maintain employee health and safety at the workplace, improve working conditions and environment, promote efficient and equitable employment services, and maintain developmental and social welfare of the citizens. Additionally, “the labors and social affairs have been established at Oromia regional, *Zonal*, and *Woreda* levels although all of them are dysfunctional”, as informed by Guji *Zone* mining and energy office administrator. Odo Shakiso *Woreda* Labor and social affairs administrator accepted the claim raised by the Guji *Zone* administrator. The administrator posited that they tried to interfere to solve the disagreement between local laborers and the company, but they failed because the company was unwilling to accept the interference of the labor and social affairs. Guji *Zone* labor and social affairs also stated that Oromia labor and social affairs ordered them to resettle the issues raised by local laborers as soon as they accepted the compliance from local laborers, but the delegates were not allowed to investigate the case since the power of the company was superior to their power because it was protected by national armies.

To sum up, the finding of this research showed that in Lega Dambi gold mining company, there is no detailed skills development plan that outlines how the mine operation intends to offer employees opportunities to be functionally literate and numerate, learner ships, skills program, portable skills and any other training of local community. Abdisa (2020) outlines that the level of transparency is low in Lega Dambi large-scale gold mining company on labor recruitment and wage payment. This upset local laborers and it was responsible for the local community protest in the company which caused the termination of the company by now. The researcher argued that the company should have a clear SLP before its reopening to readdress the grievance of local laborers and to maintain mutual benefits between the local community and the company.

### **Social License to Operate**

The social license to operate (SLO) can maintain the mutual benefit between the local community and the company. SLO is the process through which mining companies engage with communities to acquire free prior and informed consent, negotiate voluntary resettlements, and address the local community’s rights. Organizations need to sustain with long time horizons,

high exposure to global markets, and a wide range of interested stakeholders (Melanie *et al.*, 2014). The SLO is an informal social contract that aims to bridge the gap among the views of the most important stakeholders involved in mining activities (Komnitsas, 2020). Local elders, religious leaders, and *Abbaa Gadaas* suggested that to restore Lega Dambi gold mining, it is the role of the company to contact the local community directly, discuss, convince, and get their consent. The local community focus group discussants explained that “Lega Dambi gold mining company was unwilling to contact them. Albeit the local community tried to contact them, they failed since it was surrounded and protected by the military and federal police.” Hence, the finding revealed that the national military force and federal police were distancing the gap between the company and the local community. Despite this, building trust with local communities was crucial for mining companies to obtain and maintain a social license to operate (Moffat & Zhang, 2014).

In the same vein, local community interviewees claimed that many cattle, goats, and donkeys of the local community died due to the release of hazardous chemicals from the company to surrounded rivers and streams. Besides, the *Woreda* health stations and Adola hospital reported that about 159 women were forced to unexpected miscarriage because of the released chemicals. The *Woreda* investment administrator stated that 600 cattle, 12 goats, and three donkeys died from 200 households due to the released chemicals from the company.

The *Woreda* mining and energy administrator suggested that the company had to protect the rights of the local community and compensate those who were the victims. Also, the means of compensation could be in written form to get the willingness from the local community. An interview and a focus group discussion showed that some of the local communities brought their case into court since the company was unwilling to pay compensation for the victims and the death of their animals. Hence, the relationship between the local community and the company became complicated. To reverse this bad relation and reopen it, the company needs to re-examine, design, and promote long-term socio-economic development, particularly, with promoting the well-being and needs of local communities.

Adonteng-Kissi & Adonteng-Kissi (2017) posit that large-scale mines have attempted to secure SLO and ensure sustainable development by reconciling business interests with local needs and aspirations. Besides, Nguyen *et al.* (2018) argue that transparency of operations and direct

consultation with local people needs to be enhanced overall, and the benefit of mining in a particular location should be independently reviewed before operations commence. Likewise, the finding of this research exhibited that the local community needs to be consulted by the company and neutral body like civil societies before the reopening of the company, and transparency of operation needs to be practically sustained. Generally, concerning Lega Dambi gold mining company, there is no clearly launched and incorporated social and labor plan, impact and benefit agreement, community development agreement, social license to operate, and regional corporate social responsibility that could maintain mutual benefit between the local community and the company.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

Albeit Ethiopia is rich in mining potentials, the country could not fully use the minerals for the development of the country. Disallowing private investors to participate in mining operations for a long time in the country made things more difficult although privatization policy was lately launched in 1992. The only large-scale gold mining which is operated by the private investor so far in the country is MIDROC Lega Dambi Gold Mining PLC. Although the company has produced around 4500kgs gold annually, it has been terminated by local communities since the relationship between the company and the local communities became harsh. The findings of this research showed that the company is far away from the local community in practices albeit the site of production is in the community. The federal government controlled in monopoly so that the Oromia region and local governments could not interfere and mediate the difference between the local communities and the company. Further, the company has gotten full confidence because the federal government guaranteed it by deploying national force and federal police; nevertheless, the federal government could not save the company from termination in the end.

By the same token, the company could not maintain mutual benefits between itself and the local community. Absence of basic tenets of healthy mining like clear national and regional corporate social responsibility, inclusiveness of different stakeholders, community development agreement, impact and benefit agreements, social and labor plan, and social license to operate contributed to the termination of the company. Finally, the researcher recommended that there should be a wide discussion among many stakeholders like the local community of Odo Shakiso *Woreda*, activists, civil society, policymakers, and Odo Shakiso *Woreda*, Guji Zone, Oromia



region, and the federal government officials, MIDROC Lega Dambi gold mining PLC, *Abbaa Gadaas*, and local elders to maintain mutual benefits between the local community and the company, and to arrive at a consensus for the reopening of the company. It is also recommended that national and regional corporate social responsibility that shows the company's specific joint administration of the Central and Oromia regional governments should be designed and fully implemented before reopening.

### **Funding Declaration**

First of all, I would like to thank Bule Hora University for funding this research. Unless the university-funded it, this research would not be completed.

### **References**

- Olkeba, A. (2020). Socioeconomic effects of large scale gold mining on local community in Ethiopia: Empirical evidence from Lega Dambi Gold Mining Company. *Journal of Indigenous Knowledge and Development Studies* 1(2): 1–23.
- Addison, T., Boly, A., & Mveyange, A. (2017). The impact of mining on spatial inequality recent evidence from Africa. In *Policy Research Working Papers*. Retrieved from [http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-7960%](http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-7960%0)
- Adonteng-Kissi, O. (2017). Poverty and mine's compensation package: Experiences of local farmers in Prestea mining community. *Resources Policy* (52): 226–234. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2017.03.007>
- Adonteng-Kissi, O., & Adonteng-Kissi, B. (2017). Living with conflicts in Ghana's Prestea mining area: Is community engagement the answer? *Journal of Sustainable Mining* 16(4): 196–206. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsm.2017.12.005>
- Ciaran, F. (2013). Community development agreements in the mining industry: An emerging global phenomenon. *Community Development* 44(2): 222–238. DOI: <https://doi.org/doi:10.1080/15575330.2012.705872>
- Creswell, J. W. (2003). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Environmental Justice Atlas. (2018). *MIDROC gold mine Lega Dambi, Ethiopia*. Retrieved from <https://ejatlas.org/conflict/midroc-gold-mine-PLC-ethiopia>
- Esteves, A. M. (2008). Mining and social development: Refocusing community investment using multi-criteria decision analysis. *Resources Policy* 33(1), 39–47. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2008.01.002>
- Garvin, T., McGee, T. K., Smoyer-Tomic, K. E., & Aubynn, E. A. (2009). Community-company relations in gold mining in Ghana. *Journal of Environmental Management* 90(1): 571–586. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2007.12.014>
- Hagos, G., Sisay, W., Alem, Z., Niguse, G., & Mekonen, A. (2016). Participation on traditional gold mining and its impact on natural resources , the case of Asgeda Tsimbla. *Journal of Earth Sciences and Geotechnical Engineering* 6(1): 89–97.
- Meaza, H., Ali, M., Tesfamariam, Z., Abebe, N. (2017). Impacts of artisanal gold mining systems on soil and woody vegetation in the semi-arid environment of northern Ethiopia. *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* 38(3): 386–401. DOI:

- <https://doi.org/10.1111/sjtg.12203>
- Hamann, R. (2003). Mining companies' role in sustainable development: the "why" and "how" of corporate social responsibility from a business perspective, development Southern Africa. *Development Southern Africa* 20(2): 237–254. DOI: <https://doi.org/doi:10.1080/03768350302957>
- Inter-American Development Bank. (2018). *Social impact assessment: Integrating social issues in development projects*. Retrieved from [https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Social\\_Impact\\_Assessment\\_Integrating\\_Social\\_Issues\\_in\\_Development\\_Projects.pdf](https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Social_Impact_Assessment_Integrating_Social_Issues_in_Development_Projects.pdf)
- Jenkins, H., & Obara, L. (2008). *Corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the mining industry—the risk of community dependency*, pp.1–23. Retrieved from [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/229002791\\_Corporate\\_Social\\_Responsibility\\_CSR\\_in\\_the\\_mining\\_industry\\_-\\_the\\_risk\\_of\\_community\\_dependency](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/229002791_Corporate_Social_Responsibility_CSR_in_the_mining_industry_-_the_risk_of_community_dependency)
- Kapelus, P. (2002). Mining, corporate social responsibility and the "community": The case of Rio Tinto, Richards Bay Minerals and the Mbonambi. *Journal of Business Ethics* 39(3): 275–296. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016570929359>
- Kemp, D., Owen, J. R., & Van De Graaff, S. (2012). Corporate social responsibility, mining and "audit culture." *Journal of Cleaner Production* (24): 1–10. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2011.11.002>
- Key, J., P. (1997). *Research design in occupational education*. Oklahoma: Oklahoma State University.
- Kitula, A. G. N. (2006). The environmental and socio-economic impacts of mining on local livelihoods in Tanzania: A case study of Geita District. *Journal of Cleaner Production* (14): 405–414. DOI: <https://doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2004.01.012>
- Komnitsas, K. (2020). Social license to operate in mining: Present views and future trends. *Resources* 9(6):79. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3390/resources9060079>
- Kothari, C. H. (2004). *Research methodology: methods and techniques*. New Delhi: New Age International.
- Mancini, L., & Sala, S. (2018). Social impact assessment in the mining sector: Review and comparison of indicators frameworks. *Resources Policy* (57): 98–111. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2018.02.002>
- Meisanti, Ali, M. S. S., Jusoff, K., Salman, D., & Rukmana, D. (2012). The impacts of gold mining on the farmer's community. *American-Eurasian Journal of Sustainable Agriculture* 6(4): 209–214.
- Dare, L.M., Jacki, S., & Vanclay, F. (2014). Community engagement and social licence to operate. *Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal* 32(3): 188–197. DOI: <https://doi.org/doi:10.1080/14615517.2014.927108>
- Mining Journal. (2011). *Special publication - Ethiopia*. Albert House, UK:Aspermont Printing Press
- Mining Operations Proclamation No. 678/2010. *FDRE Mining Operations Proclamation*. Pub. L. No. 678/2010 (2010).
- Ministry of Mines and Energy. (2009). National report on mining to the United Nation Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD). In *Ministry of Mines and Energy*. Retrieved from <http://www.mme.gov.na/directorates/energies/>
- Moffat, K., & Zhang, A. (2014). The paths to social licence to operate: An integrative model explaining community acceptance of mining. *Resources Policy* 39(1): 61–70. DOI:

- <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2013.11.003>
- Munning, A. (2018). *Impact benefit agreements : NALMA National Gathering*. Retrieved from [https://nalma.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ImpactBenefitAgreements\\_AdamMunnings.pdf](https://nalma.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ImpactBenefitAgreements_AdamMunnings.pdf)
- Nguyen, N., Boruff, B., & Tonts, M. (2018). Fool's gold: Understanding social, economic and environmental impacts from gold mining in Quang Nam province, Vietnam. *Sustainability (Switzerland)* 10(5): 6–8. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3390/su10051355>
- Punam, C. P., Andrew D. L., Bryan C. L., Michael L. *et al.* (2017). *Mining in Africa: Are local communities better off?* Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Rodon, T., Schott, S., & Lemus-Lauzon, I. (2018). Impact and benefit agreement (IBA) revenue allocation strategies for indigenous community development. *The Northern Review* (47) 9–29. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.22584/nr47.2018.002>
- Siebenmorgen, P., & Bradshaw, B. (2011). Re-conceiving impact and benefit agreements as instruments of aboriginal community development in Northern Ontario, Canada. *Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence* (9): 0–12.
- Tenkorang, E. Y., & Osei-Kufuor, P. (2013). The impact of small-scale gold mining on mining communities in Ghana. *Journal of Global Initiatives: Policy, Pedagogy, Perspective* 8(1): 25–44.
- Vanclay, F. (2003). International principles for social impact assessment: Their evolution. *Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal* 21(1): 3–4. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3152/147154603781766464>
- Vintró, C., & Comajuncosa, J. (2010). Corporate social responsibility in the mining industry: Criteria and indicators. *Dyna* (77): 31–41.
- Wilson, E. (2017). What is social impact assessment? A discussion paper. *Research Gate*, pp. 1–20.
- World Bank. (2014). *Ethiopia's growth and transformation and its extractive industries sector, forum report*. Retrieved from <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/20585>
- World Bank. (2016). *Ethiopia mining sector development: Policy and legislative options report*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank
- World Gold Council. (2015). *The social and economic impacts of gold mining*. London: Maxwell Stamp PLC.

## **The Ethiopian Legal Frameworks for the Protection of Women and Girls from Gender-Based Violence**

Marew Abebe Salemot\* and Alemtseyahe Birhanu\*\*

### **Abstract**

*The objective of this article is to investigate how legal frameworks address gender-based violence in Ethiopia? The research adopted a qualitative approach that utilized secondary sources and reviewed national legal frameworks promulgated and international instruments ratified by Ethiopia. According to this study, Ethiopia, where gender-based violence persistently exists, has adopted insufficient legal frameworks. Still, gender-sensitive legal frameworks shy away from giving a holistic definition to gender-based violence and did not show the scope of the term violence against women in full-spectrum either. Gender-related laws adopted by Ethiopia are inadequate to give civil remedies to those affected by gender-based violence. There are also neither separate domestic violence acts nor any kind of laws adopted to give specific civil remedies for the victims. This is attributable to the absence of comprehensive anti-violence laws in Ethiopia that affect law enforcement from pursuing incidents of violence within marriage and cohabitation on the premise that there are no clear legal provisions.*

**Keywords:** Ethiopia, Gender, Legal, Violence, Women

### **Introduction**

Gender-Based Violence (GBV) against women and girls is perhaps the most widespread and socially tolerated of human rights violations, cutting across borders, race, class, ethnicity, and religion (Miller, 2004). Gender-based violence has been defined by different scholars and in several international and regional legal instruments. Though not a binding legal instrument, the 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women defined gender-based violence as “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering for women, including threats of such acts, coercion, or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life.”<sup>1</sup>

The 1995 Beijing Platform for Action expanded on this definition, specifying that gender-based violence includes violations of the rights of females in situations of armed conflicts, such as systematic rape, sexual slavery, and forced pregnancy, forced sterilization, forced abortion, coerced or forced use of contraceptives, prenatal sex selection, and female infanticide. It further recognized the particular vulnerabilities of females belonging to minorities: the elderly and the

---

\* Debarq University, Ethiopia. Email: [marewobu@gmail.com](mailto:marewobu@gmail.com)

\*\* Debarq University, Ethiopia. Email: [alemtsehaybirhanu83@gmail.com](mailto:alemtsehaybirhanu83@gmail.com)

<sup>1</sup> UN General Assembly, *Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women*, 20 December 1993, A/RES/48/104.

displaced; indigenous, refugee, and migrant communities; females living in impoverished rural or remote areas; and females in detention (Humphrey, 2000).

Gender-based violence in Africa, as elsewhere in the world, is a complex issue that has its root in the structural inequalities between males and females resulting in the persistence of power differentials between the sexes (Dobbert, 1975). Owing to this problem, the protocol to the African Human and Peoples Rights Charter defined violence against women as, “any act perpetrated against women which cause them sexual, physical, psychological, and economic harm, including the threat to take such acts; or to undertake the imposition of arbitrary restrictions on or deprivation of fundamental freedoms in private or public life in peacetime and during situations of armed conflicts or war.” Thus, gender-based violence is a kind of threat targeted based on their sexual orientation that would result in physical, psychological, sexual harms, or economic harm in every circumstance.

The impact of gender-based violence is devastating. The individual females who are victims of such violence often experience life-long emotional distress, mental health problems, and poor reproductive health, as well as being at higher risk of acquiring HIV and intensive long-term users of health services. Besides, the cost to females, their children, families, and communities is a significant obstacle to reducing poverty, achieving gender equality (Ogato, 2013).

Females’ subordinate status to men in many societies, coupled with a general acceptance of interpersonal violence as a means of resolving conflict, renders them disproportionately vulnerable to violence from all levels of society including individual, family and community, and the state (Akiba, 2002).

The 1993 UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Declaration also states that the definition should encompass, but not be limited to, acts of physical, sexual, and psychological violence in the family, community, or perpetrated or condoned by the state, wherever it occurs. These acts include spousal battery; sexual abuse, including female children; dowry-related violence; rape, including marital rape; female genital mutilation/cutting and other traditional practices harmful to females; non-spousal violence; sexual violence related to exploitation; sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in school and elsewhere; trafficking in females; and forced prostitution.

The 1995 Ethiopian Constitution (under Article 35) recognizes that females shall enjoy equal rights and protections as males. In order to secure fairness and equality throughout the country, Ethiopia has also taken various steps and has recognized various international instruments that safeguard the rights of females including the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDW) and various labor conventions.

### **Statement of the Problem**

Comprehensive legal frameworks are fundamental for an effective and coordinated response to violence against women and girls. States have clear obligations under international law to enact, implement and monitor legislation addressing all forms of violence against women (Martin, 2002). Legislation that criminalizes violence against women codifies the rights of women to live free of violence. Laws can play an important symbolic role, by indicating that such behavior is socially unacceptable. Gender-sensitive legislation can also be responsive to victims, by providing protection and access to support services (Leach, 2003).

Over the past two decades, many countries have adopted or revised legislation on violence against women. However, significant gaps remain as many countries still do not have in place legislative provisions that specifically address violence against women and, even where legislation exists, it is often limited in scope and coverage or is not enforced (Myton, 2009).

Ethiopia is one of the countries where gender-based violence persistently exists and has made a move, although to a limited extent, to adopt and ratify different legal frameworks that address specifically gender-based violence (Browes, 2015). In Ethiopia gender-based violence is prevalent and takes various forms of physical, sexual, and emotional abuse and 50-60 percent of females experience gender-based violence in their lifetime where the perpetrators are mainly classmates, friends, teachers, and close family members (Berhane, 2005). According to the WHO Report (2005), the number is even higher than 71 percent of women who have experienced gender-based violence in Ethiopia. This is further corroborated by The Gender Gap Index<sup>2</sup> by which Ethiopia is found at the bottom line when compared with other countries (Mesfin, 2012).

---

<sup>2</sup> The comprehensive gender gap index developed by the World Economic Forum (WEF), the Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI), was used in evaluating the [gender gap] in every state. GGGI examines gender gap in four fundamental categories (sub-indexes): Economic Participation and Opportunity, Educational Attainment, Health and Survival and Political Empowerment.

According to Tadiwos (2001), there are several reasons including the predominance of the system of patriarchy across the country has meant that females are still perceived of and treated as subordinate to males; violence against females is accepted as the cultural norm in many societies and is often condoned by the community and sometimes state leaders; the stigma attached to female victims of violence has resulted in very low rates of reporting; and often if females do report violence against them, they are either turned away because the authorities see violence against females as a matter to be dealt with privately or within the family, or they struggle to access justice in a criminal justice system that is not informed by or sensitive to the needs of females. The problem is also exacerbated due to the shortcomings of Ethiopian legal frameworks laid down to curb gender-based violence against women and girls.

The researchers, thus, investigate gender-sensitive legal frameworks in Ethiopia in place to address gender-based violence. Unlike other researches which focuses on specific gender-sensitive legal frameworks, this paper deals exhaustively with those gender-sensitive national legal norms adopted and similar regional and international frameworks ratified by Ethiopia. The research investigates those gender-sensitive legal frameworks adopted recently including the Labor Law. It also examines how Ethiopian Ten Years Development Plan (2020-2030) addresses gender-based violence. In a nutshell, the general objective of this article is to investigate the legal frameworks in Ethiopia to address gender-based violence. In the light of general objective, the specific objectives are: i) to investigate Ethiopian national legal frameworks adopted to address gender-based violence, ii) to analyze the conformity of Ethiopian gender-sensitive national legal frameworks with other similar regional and international legal instruments ratified by Ethiopia, and iii) to figure out the limitation of Ethiopian gender-sensitive legal frameworks.

### **Research Methodology**

This article investigates how legal frameworks address gender-based violence in Ethiopia which requires interpreting and analyzing [legal documents] qualitatively. Based on the nature of its topic (analyzing legal documents), this research applied a qualitative approach. As it allows the researcher to accurately describe, decode, and interpret the meanings of phenomena occurring in their normal social contexts (Myton, 2009). Therefore, researchers used this approach to examine the Ethiopian national legal frameworks promulgated and international instruments ratified to address gender-based violence. Secondary sources such as articles, books, book chapters, and

research outputs, national and international legal frameworks were used for this article. However, generalizable of such research finding in its clear prediction of cause and effect (Chadwick BA, 1984) may not be possible as social norms and values differ from country to country.

### **Theoretical Framework on Gender-Based Violence**

Gender-based violence is one of the most widespread forms of violence in the world against women and girls and has devastating consequences not only for victims but also for society as a whole (Morrison, 2004). Ellsberg opined that gender-based violence is any act or practice that results in physical, sexual, psychological, or economic harm or suffering because of a person's gender or socially defined role. It is the manifestation of control and power, mostly by men over women, resulting from unequal power relations between the sexes (Ellsberg, 2005). Historically, unequal power relations between men and women led to discrimination against women by men. The resultant women's lack of social and economic power accepted gender roles and the low value put on women's work perpetuates and reinforces this subordinate position (Johnson, 2004). Such kinds of socially entrenched backgrounds make gender-based violence the most difficult subject to study because of its sensitivity and the silence surrounds it (Alemayehu, 2008).

Gender-based violence is a phenomenon that transcends social, economic, and geographic borders and impacts girls and women all over the world (Megersa, 2007). GBV is rooted in power imbalances between the sexes and fuelled by multiple factors, including cultural norms, social acceptance of harmful practices, and insufficient legal protections. It has been defined in a number of international and regional instruments. One of the most popular such definitions is the 1993 United Nations General Assembly Resolution Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVAW). Art.1 of the Declaration defined violence against women as; "... any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life."

Earlier before the Declaration, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, in its recommendation no. 19, paragraph 6 defined gender-based violence as follows: "violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects woman



disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty.”

Gender-based violence in Ethiopia, like any other poorer country, is a common problem virtually in every part of the country and in each society where culturally-based abuses, including wife-beating and marital rape, are pervasive social problems (Tadiwos, 2001). The study conducted by WHO (2005) concerning gender-based violence in Ethiopia indicated that 49 percent of women have ever experienced physical violence by an intimate partner, rising to 59 percent ever experiencing sexual violence. Another study conducted by the World Bank (2005) also confirmed the above finding and 50-60 percent of women in Ethiopia experience gender-based violence in their lifetime.

### ***International Legal Instruments (Ratified by Ethiopia) in Response to Gender-Based Violence***

Ethiopia has ratified some of international human rights treaties that obligate it to prevent and respond to sexual violence, for example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and other soft laws such as Beijing Platform for Action (BPA) as well as the political declaration and outcome documents post-Beijing +5.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the first human rights legal document, does confer all human beings [men and women] as having an equal and the same status based on the assertion that human beings are born free and with equal dignity and rights. The Committee that was established under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) has adopted the General Recommendation No. 19 in 1992 on violence against women (VAW), which recognizes gender-based violence as a form of discrimination and recommending that states take measures to prevent and respond to violence against women. For example, CEDAW (1979) defines, “discrimination, exclusion or restriction made on the bases of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women irrespective of their marital status, on the bases of equality of men and women, of human right and... in economic, social, cultural, civil, or any other field.”

CEDAW addresses the protection of women's rights and outlines the obligations of states to protect women from discrimination and violations of rights such as all forms of trafficking and the exploitation and prostitution of women. In line with this, the Committee on CEDAW, through its general recommendation mentions that state parties should establish or support services for victims of family violence, rape, sexual assault, and other forms of gender-based violence, including refugees, especially trained health workers, rehabilitation and counseling (Browes, 2015).

Another international agreement signed by Ethiopia that reaffirms its commitment to addressing and eliminating gender-based violence is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICCPR (1966). Accordingly, ICCPR under Article 26 prohibits any discrimination on any grounds by declaring that "All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinions, national or social origin, property, birth, or another status."

As a State Party to the Convention to the Rights of the Child, Ethiopia is obligated to protect children from violence, including sexual violence. This duty compels Ethiopia to "take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect [children] from [any] form of physical or mental violence ... while in the care of parents, legal guardians, or any other person who has the care of the child" (CRC, Article 19). This provision requires protection while in the care of education, school, and early childhood personnel, making the state responsible for the care of children at school. It is an affirmative duty of care, extending to the creation of social programs intended to provide support and treatment for child victims, as well as to prevent child abuse (Allen, 2013). Social programs must also implement reporting, referral, and investigation policies, involving the judiciary wherever appropriate (Durey, 2011).

The 1993 Vienna Declaration on Human Rights has stressed that gender-based violence and all forms of sexual harassment and exploitation, including those resulting from cultural prejudice are incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human person, and must be eliminated. To achieve the full protection of women, the document has called upon all states to adopt the appropriate national and international laws and work in cooperation in such fields as economic

and social developments and education. It also stressed the need to eliminate gender-based violence against women in both public and private lives.

The ICESCR (Article 13) also guarantees the equal rights of girls and boys to education and the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. States must provide free and compulsory education at the primary level and make secondary and higher education equally available to all persons. Furthermore, education is a fundamental right necessary to participate effectively in a free society (Tadiwos, 2001). Therefore, Ethiopia has a responsibility under international law to protect girls from sexual violence and harassment that violates their right to education and interferes with their ability to enjoy the right to health on a basis of equality with boys.

The Beijing Platform for Action (1995), though not legally binding, outlines a number of actions to respond to and prevent gender-based violence against women. It aims at removing all the obstacles to women's active participation in all spheres of public and private life *via* ensuring equal share in economic, social, cultural, and political decision-making.

The Beijing Platform for Action also calls for an increase in the role of States in the elimination of violence against women, ending discrimination, and promoting health, education, and economic opportunities for women. Among the priority areas identified in the 2014 National Report on the Implementation of Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the Outcome of the 23<sup>rd</sup> Special Session of the United Nations of General Assembly (2000) were actions to reduce the prevalence of gender-based violence including harmful traditional practices. Concerning the post-treatment to those affected by the gender-based violence, the Beijing Platform (Section 126 (a)) calls on states to provide well-funded shelters and relief support for girls and women subjected to violence, besides medical, psychological, and other counseling services. It further asserts the free or low-cost legal assistance, where it is needed, to enable them to find a means of subsistence.

### ***Regional Instruments (Ratified by Ethiopia) in Response to Gender-Based Violence***

The existence of gender-based violence against women with severe magnitude and mass violations in Africa necessitated the creation of some of the continental legal frameworks that would spell out their rights and advocate for the protection of those rights by African States (Assefa, 2013). Ethiopia has also voluntarily assumed a number of African regional human rights

obligations including the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (also known as Banjul Charter, 1998) and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. It is, however, yet to ratify the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on Rights of Women in Africa.

The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights also known as the Maputo Protocol is the first of its kind and was adopted in response to these problems in 2003. The Protocol aims to end the continual discrimination, abuse, and marginalization of women in Ethiopia. It acknowledges that women's rights have been guaranteed and are inalienable and indivisible human rights. The Maputo Protocol also pays attention to the equality between the sexes, the elimination of discrimination, and the need to let women participate in all spheres of life. Unlike many legal instruments that deal with gender-based violence, the Maputo Protocol has made a progressive move and tries to give clarity on the private-public dichotomy debate on the manner of women's rights abuse (Letty, 2016). The clarity was in response to the controversies among the scholars, the states, and human rights defenders on the extent to which the states intervened in the 'private' sphere whenever gender-based violence was committed. This is because many women's rights violations including rape, domestic violations, and other forms of abuses committed in the so-called 'private' spheres. And using the shielding of 'private' spheres far from the public scrutiny serves to perpetuate male domination in the family. In recognition of this fact, the Maputo Protocol perhaps for the first time has given due attention to the protection of women's rights against all forms of discrimination wherever it occurs in private or public places.

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Article 18) is one of the most comprehensive clauses concerning the prohibition of discrimination against women by calling member states to end any discrimination, practices that hinder or endanger women's rights. Ethiopia is, thus, obligated under the African Charter to protect children's rights.

The Protocol on the Rights of Women (Article 3) requires signatory States to implement measures that "protect a woman's right to respect for her dignity and ... from all forms of violence, especially sexual violence." States must make an effort to both prevent and punish sexual violence, including educating citizens about traditional and cultural beliefs that enable sexual violence against women (Id. Article 4). Furthermore, States are required to ensure that

judicial, administrative, or legislative actors provide adequate remedies to victims (Id. Article 25).

As part of its obligation to guarantee the right of girls to education without discrimination, Ethiopia is obliged under the Protocol on the Rights of Women to protect female students from every form of sexual abuse, including sexual harassment in schools. This includes providing sanctions against any perpetrator, providing girls who experience such abuse with access to counseling and rehabilitation services, and teaching gender sensitization in schools (Id. Article 12).

The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (Article 16) provides that Ethiopia must pursue legislative, administrative, social, and educational measures to prevent children from being tortured, treated inhumanely, or abused. Additionally, every child has the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical, mental, and spiritual health, a right that is impaired by sexual violence in schools.

In these treaties, sexual violence refers to all harmful practices or behavior which affects negatively the fundamental rights of women and children, such as their right to life, health, dignity, education, and physical integrity. It also includes coercion, acts (or threats of acts) that inflict physical, mental, or sexual harm, and any other deprivations of liberty noted by the CEDAW Committee's General Recommendation 19.

### **The Ethiopian Legal Frameworks in Response to Gender-Based Violence**

In the early times, the issue of gender-based violence had not been given due attention under the Ethiopian national legal frameworks. By the national legal frameworks, the researchers refer to the Ethiopian Constitution, the Revised Family Code, the Criminal Code, and other relevant policies pertinent to combating gender-based violence in Ethiopia. In this part, these national instruments will be discussed.

#### ***Gender-Based Violence under the Ethiopian Constitution***

In addition to ratifying the above international and regional legal instruments, the Ethiopian Constitution (Article 9) has made these treaties to be an integral part of the law of the land. The Constitution (Article 13) also affirms the fundamental rights and freedoms [of the Ethiopian Constitution] shall be interpreted in a manner conforming to the principles of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on Human Rights, and other international instruments adopted by Ethiopia. To meet its commitments to international obligations and to protect the rights of women, Ethiopia has made different gender-sensitive constitutional provisions.

The Ethiopian Constitution (1995) espouses the equality of men and women in the social, legal, economic, and political realms. The Ethiopian Constitution under its chapter of fundamental freedoms and rights proclaimed several rights concerning the rights of women and to protect them from gender-based violence. The Constitution (Article 6) duly recognizes the equal citizenship status to men and women and it [the Ethiopian Constitution] under (Article 7) set out in the masculine gender shall also apply to the feminine gender. The Constitution (Article 25) guarantees equality before the law and prohibits sex-based discrimination. Article 33 addresses citizenship and marriage while guaranteeing the Ethiopian national of either sex to marry to foreign national which shall not annul his or her Ethiopian nationality. Article 34 also addresses marriage rights, affirming women's equal rights during marriage, divorce, and decision-making during the marriage.

The notable provision of the Constitution (Article 35) is devoted exclusively to the rights of women and enlists the specific rights of women. These rights, which the Constitution grants to women *inter alia* includes equal protection of the law, equality in marital affairs, protection from harmful traditional practices, maternity rights in employment, the right to consultation, property rights, employment rights, and access to family planning information and services, *etc.*

The Constitution has made a significant step to take corrective measures and actions in response to past wrong deeds and previous bad legacies imposed on the women's shoulders. As remedies to the historical legacy of inequality and discrimination suffered by women in Ethiopia, women are entitled to affirmative measures. The purpose of such measures shall be to provide special attention to women. It enables them to compete and participate based on equality with men in political, social, and economic life as well as in public and private institutions. The Constitution (Article 35(4)) has made the state to be responsible to protect women from any act of violence and obligates the state to eliminate the influences of harmful customs, laws, and practices that oppress or cause bodily or mental harm to women.

Generally, from the reading of the notable cited Article 35 sub-articles 1-8 of the Ethiopian Constitution, the following gender-sensitive matters are addressed: equal rights in marriage; privileges to affirmative action/measures; protection from harmful traditional practices, right to maternity leave with full pay, right to consultation in projects affecting their lives; property rights (to acquire, administer, control, use and transfer); right to equality in employment (promotion, pay, pension, entitlements) and the right to access to family planning education, information and capacity building. To increase women's political participation, the Constitution (Article 38) addresses their right to vote and to be elected. To avoid disproportionate wages, the Constitution (Article 42) guarantees that women workers have the right to equal pay for equal work.

The fact that poverty has played its role for women being subjected to all aspects of victimization, the Constitution (Article 89) calls upon the government to ensure the participation of women equal with men in all economic and social development endeavors. Despite the tremendous effort, the Ethiopian Constitution has enabled in the march toward gender equality, women are behind men in all parameters used to evaluate the rights achieved.

### ***The Ethiopian Federal Revised Family Code***

In addition to the constitutions, some other more specific gender-based laws have been enacted to protect the rights of women in general and to end gender-based violations. The Ethiopian Federal Revised Family Law which is one of such laws enacted in 2000 and is used to protect and safeguard equality between sexes in their relation concerning marriages (Proc. No. 213/2000). The Revised Family Law has played a great role and has influenced some of the parts of the Civil Code that deal with marriages. Subsequently, it has abolished most of the discriminatory articles in the 1960 Code concerning marriage. For instance, it abolished provisions from the 1960 Code that naturalized gender hierarchy by stating that a wife "owes [her husband] obedience on all lawful things which he orders" (635: 2), that "the husband was to give protection to his wife" (Article 644: 1), and that the husbands "watch over [the wife's] relations and guide her in her conduct" (Article 644: 2).

The 2000 Revised Family Law raised the legal age of marriage from 15 in the 1960 Code to 18, ensured women's equal rights in selecting their family residence, and granted them equal footing in family administration and decisions about family property. The progress in the Family Law

requires respect, support, assistance, faithfulness between the couples and requires the joint management of the family (Revised Family Law, 2000: Articles 49, 50 & 56) (Code, 2000).

The legal age of marriage for women and men is 18 years old (Family Code, Art. 7). The Minister of Justice can allow women and men to enter into marriage at the age of 16 for serious cause (Family Code, Art. 7). Child marriage is prohibited (Family Code, Art. 7 and Criminal Code, Art. 648). Whoever concludes a marriage with a minor apart from circumstances permitted by the relevant provisions of the Family Code is punishable of imprisonment of three years when the victim is 13 years old or older and seven years of imprisonment when the victim is younger than 13 years old (Criminal Code, Art. 648).

### ***Criminal Code of Ethiopia***

The Criminal Code is another instrument that can be referred to make judicial measures and corrective justice on perpetrators in Ethiopia. The Criminal Code has been revised in line with the constitutional provisions and essences in a way to confirm that those articles deal with women's rights and their protection against any form of violence.

Unlike the 1957 Penal Code, the revised Code incorporated explicit provisions tackling violence against women. The Code has elaborated the ambiguous conceptions and provisions of gender-based violence, incorporating new offenses, redefining the elements of these offenses, and revising the penalties applicable in cases of violation.

The whole Chapter III of the Criminal Code of Ethiopia is dedicated to criminalizing harmful traditional practices that cause injuries, health problems, and the deaths of human lives. Though the Chapter is of general application to men and women, it is particularly relevant to violence against girls and women. And the Criminal Code, therefore, has criminalized those forms of violence against women including rape (Articles 620-28), trafficking women (Article 597), prostitution of another for gain (Article 634), and physical violence within marriage or in an irregular union (Article 564), and abduction (Articles 587- 590). Traditional practices including Female Genital Mutilation (Articles 565-6), and early marriage (Article 649) are also considered as harmful traditional practices and lead to a penalty for contraventions.

The Ethiopian government has recently amended its legislation by excluding rape crimes from pardon and amnesty laws as it lengthened jail terms for sex offenders.



*National Policies and other Specific Laws Combating Gender-Based Violence*

Policy frameworks are documents that provide a common vision to guide policy and program development, such as national action plans, ministerial regulations, policy statements, strategic plans, protocols, and other mechanisms (McAslan, 2016). In addition to adopting those international and national gender-sensitive legal instruments, Ethiopia has taken a number of policies to mainstream gender affairs in all areas and each sector. By mainstreaming, it is to mean all institutions are urging to consider the gender aspect while designing and planning their regular tasks. A lot has been done in Ethiopia in terms of putting in place a policy framework providing for the protection of the rights of women and girls that may have direct or indirect relevance to addressing the vulnerability of women and girls to gender-based violence (Tsegahun, 2008).

In line with these premises, major policy formulations have been made to integrate gender dimension in development interventions to augment women's access to resources such as revision of credit rules and the establishment of rural credit systems to reach the marginalized grassroot women. The first Ethiopian National Policy on Women was promulgated in 1991 with the objective of ensuring human and democratic rights of women; modifying and nullifying previous legal instruments, laws, regulations, and customs which exacerbate discrimination against women. The policy also stated to safeguard women's rights and did promise a step-by-step elimination of the abuse. More recently the UN Millennium Development Goal to which Ethiopia acceded, on Gender Equality and Women Empowerment has become an effective way to bridge the gender gap in education, combat feminized poverty, and improve health and HIV/AIDS, and other sectors to stimulate development by the year 2015. But according to the Ethiopian National Plan Commission (2018), while Ethiopia recorded remarkable achievements in a number of the Millennium Development Goals (six of the eight MDGs were successfully achieved), the country did not achieve the two goals related to gender issues including i) gender equality and empowerment and ii) improving maternal health.

The workplace is one of the most common areas where gender-based discrimination is committed and in response to this problem, Ethiopia has incorporated gender-sensitive provisions in various proclamations. The Labor Proclamation No.1156/2019 is one of the laws that address gender-based violence at workplaces. Unlike the repealed Labor Proclamation No.

377/2003, the new Labor Proclamation No.1156/2019 introduced a new regime to regulate workplace sexual harassment and sexual violence. The new Proclamation under Article 1 (11-12) obviates the need for interpretation of sexual harassment and sexual violence by providing definitions. Accordingly, *sexual harassment* means to persuade or convince another through utterances, signs, or any other manner, to submit for sexual favor without his/her consent, and *sexual violence* means sexual harassment accompanied by force or an attempt thereof. The Proclamation also affirms that women shall not be discriminated against in all respects based on their sex (Ar.87).

The Proclamation under Article (14) has prohibited any attempt to commit sexual harassment or sexual violence at the workplace and physically abusing anyone in the workplace. Employees, as per Proclamation 1156/2019, that have suffered sexual harassment or sexual violence will be entitled to terminate their contracts without notice, and will also be eligible for severance payment and compensation. The law provides a higher amount of compensation payment for employees who are forced to terminate their contract, without notice, for reasons of sexual harassment and sexual violence. Forced termination of contracts by employees for reasons that are unlawful acts of the employer will entitle the employee to a one-month compensation payment whereas sexual harassment and sexual violence victims will be granted three months of compensation payment.

Another proclamation that considers gender-sensitive issues in its provisions in the *Federal Civil Servants Proclamation No.1064/2017* which repealed Proclamation No. 515/2007. Unlike the repealed Proclamation No.1064/2017, the New Proclamation No. 515/2007 tried to define *sexual harassment*. According to Article 1(13) of the Federal Civil Servants Proclamation, *sexual harassment* means unwelcome sexual advance or request or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature and includes: a) unwelcome kissing, patting, pinching, or making other similar bodily contacts; b) following the victim or blocking the path of the victim in a manner of sexual nature; and c) putting sexual favor as a prerequisite for employment, promotion, transfer, redeployment, training, education, benefits or for executing or authorizing any human resource management act. The Federal Civil Servants Proclamation under Article 48 obligates any government institution to take affirmative actions that enable female civil servants to improve their competence and to assume decision-making positions.

As per the New Proclamation under Article 70(13), committing sexual harassment or abuse at the workplace is among the offenses that entail rigorous penalties. But the law does not define *sexual violence* nor address the *psychological attack* on females at the workplace.

The Ethiopian Ministry of Women, Children and Youth Affairs - one of the ministries taking the initiatives and mandates of women and youths - has developed in 2013 a National Strategy and Action Plan on Harmful Traditional Practices against Women and Children in Ethiopia. The Ministry also aspires to protect the rights of women and youths in all aspects of activities by educating the people, integrating those developmental initiatives to consider and target these segments of the societies.

The education sectors have also tasked enormous responsibilities to prioritize women's affairs by designing gender-friendly policies including raising the enrolment rate and retention of girls at school; reviewing the educational curricula and capacity building. The formulation of gender indicators in development projects and programs are some of the examples of gender-sensitive interventions and institutions to be evaluated using these indicators like women participation, employment, and appointments (Yohannes, 2017). On the other hand, the institutionalization of gender in all government development programs eventually allows women to benefit from development interventions at all levels. Those different policies formulated by the government at all levels can ensure to protect the basic rights of women and their basic interests: access to higher education with special considerations, prioritize in employment, political participation and appointments, control and manage resources, affirmative actions, etc.

Concerning gender-based violence in educational institutions, the Ministry of Education has taken measure and designing the 2001 "Blue Book" that could be used as a guide book on educational administration, organization, and societal participation including the rights and duties of the students, teachers, and the family to protect the rights of the women and fight against gender-based violence. Among the legal efforts issued by the Ministry of Education against gender-based violence were the directives made in 2010, aimed at reducing and eliminating sexual harassment in higher education institutions by protecting students from harassment and punishing perpetrators.

The Ministry of Education stressed that "any form of harassment and violence against female students is a serious problem and affects female students' wellbeing, academic performance and

also leads to societal problems”. To tackle the problem, the Ministry also outlines to take serious measures on those perpetrators by the higher educational institutions; development of anti-harassment code of conduct for Colleges of Teacher Education Training institutions, and training law enforcement agencies on sexual harassment and substance abuse. Accordingly, the Ministry in collaboration with UNICEF has developed anti-harassment codes of conduct for educational institutions, which are to be adopted by various educational institutions considering their local context. It also aims to institutionalize and create awareness of the society and thereby creating favorable conditions to minimize and eliminate any form of abuse to women and girls at all levels.

While Ethiopia unveiled the Ten Years Economic Development Plan (2020-2030) in mid-2020, the Ministry of Women, Children, and Youths prepared its own respective plans and programs. The plan, which was prepared by the National Planning and Development Commission incorporated, among others, gender-sensitive strategies. The ten-year plan, to reduce gender-based violence in Ethiopia, aspires to have zero tolerance stances on gender-based violence initiative, establishing anti-violence police taskforce and national sex offenders’ registration system. The plan has ambitiously proposed to reduce gender-based violence from 23% in 2016 to 5%.

### **Legal Limitations on Gender-Based Violence in Ethiopia**

In spite of the fact that different legal measures have been adopted and policies reformed to end the plight of gender-based violence in Ethiopia, yet there are still legal gaps that lag the full protection of women's rights and thereby unable to safeguard those women being victimized.

The fact that the Ethiopian constitution has made a paradigm shift to guarantee gender equality, still there exist certain legal limitations regarding women’s rights when it comes to religious legal norms. The constitution empowers religious and customary laws as arbiters of family matters such as divorce and inheritance. For example, the Constitution (Article 34) empowers the adjudication of disputes relating to personal and family laws in accordance with religious or customary laws if both parties arrive in agreement to do so. With the old age men-women power imbalance and societal outlook towards women, such agreement will not be on free will and thus undermines women’s constitutional protection because women are often under cultural and religious pressure to pursue the religious courts and customary elders that tend to uphold

patriarchal values (Berhane, 2005). Women face societal criticism and even exclusion whenever they bring their cases to the formal legal court.

The amount of moral compensation for such victims under Article 2116(3) of the Civil Code of Ethiopian which is 1000 birr (about \$25) is insufficient. If there were any kind of such laws promulgated, it would enable the victims the right to get a protection order, financial compensation relief, custody order, residence order, shelter, or medical benefits. Another legal gap on the protection against gender-based violence, the new Ethiopian Criminal Code did not address the severity and the magnitude of gender-based violence in an adequate manner. The only provision (Article 564) of the Criminal Code - with an exclusive reference to the term domestic violence - has narrowed and reduced the kind of domestic relationships to marriage partner and person cohabiting in a regular union. It also refers back to the provisions dealing with crimes against persons and health (Articles 555-560) for the determination of its criminality and punishments.

The 'legitimacy' nature of gender-based violence in Ethiopia as elsewhere in some other countries where patriarchal societies dominated the everyday life of the people and the scattered nature of the provisions in the Criminal Code complicated the due process of law to bring the perpetrators before justice. Using their economic dominance and acquaintance to resources, males abuse females, and such an aspect of gender-based violence has not been considered by the code.

This is attributed to the absence of comprehensive anti-gender-based violence laws in Ethiopia that affects law enforcement from pursuing incidents of violence within marriage and cohabitation on the premise that there are no clear legal provisions (Allen, 2013). During the presentation of the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> periodic reports concerning the CEDAW in the 49<sup>th</sup> Session of Conference of the Committee held in New York, Ethiopia was recommended for the establishment of victim-friendly benches in federal courts and special units to investigate and prosecute crimes against women in some regional prosecution offices, as well as the steps are taken to train judges, prosecutors and police officers on the application of the Criminal Code and women's rights. However, the Committee also expressed concerns about the lack of conformity of the Regional Family Laws with the Federal Family Law, and recommended for the state to amend the 2005 Criminal Code in a way that will "increase penalties for FGM in Articles 561-

562, 567 and 569-570; repeal Article 563; criminalize marital rape, and exclude the applicability in domestic violence cases of the extenuating circumstances set out in Article 557 (1) (b) (gross provocation, shock, surprise, emotion or passion).

There is no such institution mandated which bears duty for protection, report, or control of problems arising from violence. Another legal gap is the failure to legally recognize marital rape. Ethiopia does not have a law that explicitly outlaws/prohibits marital rape. The criminal code of Ethiopia (Article 620) excludes marital rape, in defining rape as sexual intercourse ‘outside wedlock’ and this is inconsistent with Article 9 of the Ethiopian Constitution that accepts international legal instruments ratified by the country to be part and parcel of the country’s legal practices. There is no single, consolidated law on gender-based violence, but there are various provisions related to specific forms of gender-based violence: general violence protections for women, and sweeping declarations of equality that can be interpreted as protecting women against gender-based violence.

### **Conclusion**

Though Ethiopia’s move to adopt national laws and ratify international legal frameworks to protect the plights of gender-based violence is commendable, there are still legal limitations that impede from protecting women’s rights. None of the national legal instruments gives conclusive definitions to gender-based violence, therefore, unable to show the scope of the term violence against women in full spectrum. Gender-related laws adopted by Ethiopia have not offered sufficient civil remedies protecting those affected by the violence. In Ethiopia, there is neither a separate domestic violence act nor any kind of laws adopted to give specific civil remedies for the victims.

### **Recommendations**

Based on the above findings regarding the Ethiopian legal frameworks protecting women and girls from gender-based violence, this article has the following recommendations.

- Since the current gender-sensitive legal frameworks do not adequately control gender-based violence, nor are consistent with other international instruments, there is a need to revise the legal frameworks.

- Gender-based violence must be incorporated into the national policies, strategies, and action plans that recognize the need for prevention, responses to mitigate its impact.
- There must be significantly changing societal attitudes and perceptions on the place of women in society at the national, regional, local, community, and household levels.

### References

- Akiba, M. L. (2002). School victimization: national and school system effects on school violence in 37 nations. *American Educational Research Journal* 39(4): 829-853.
- Alemayehu, A. (2008). National survey on domestic violence. *Berchi Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association* (7): 8-89.
- Alice, M. M. (2004). Sexuality, Violence against women, and human rights: Women make demands and ladies get protection. *Journal of Health and Human Rights* 7(2): 11-47.
- Allen, M. (2013). Domestic violence in a developing context: The perspectives of women in Northern Ethiopia. *Journal of Women and Social Work*, 12(3): 34-56.
- Assefa, L. (2013). Domestic violence against women in Kersa, Oromia region, Eastern Ethiopia. *Journal of Gender Studies* 23(5): 34-56.
- Berhane, Y. (2004). Ending Domestic Violence against Women in Ethiopia. *Ethiopian Journal of Health Development* 18(3): 131-132.
- Berhane, Y. (2005). Ending Domestic Violence against Women in Ethiopia. *Ethiopian Journal on Health and Development* 12(5): 34-56.
- Bloom, S. (2008). Violence against women and girls: A compendium of monitoring and evaluation indicators. *Agency for the International Development* 32(3): 23-45.
- Bouta, T. (2005). *Gender, conflict and development*. Washington, Dc: World Bank Press.
- Bruce, A. C., Howard, M. B. & Stan, L. A. (1984). *Social science research methods*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc, Englewood Cliffs.
- Burgess, W. A. (2001). *Understanding violence against women*. Washington: Washington: National Academy Press.
- Code, F. R. (2000). The revised family code of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. *Proclamation No. 213/2000* 1(1): 1-56.
- Dobbert, M. L. (1975). Sexual complementarity in the social structure of schools. *Council on Anthropology and Education Quarterly* 6(3): 1-23.
- Durey R. (2011). *Working together against violence: Final project report*. Victoria: Vic Health & Women's Health Victoria.
- Ellsberg, M. A. (2005). *Researching violence against women: A practical guide for researchers and activities*. Washington, DC: WHO Press.
- Fite, M. D. (2007). The Ethiopia's legal framework on domestic violence against women: A critical perspective. *International Journal of Gender and Women's Studies* 34(6): 95-109.
- Hailemariam, T. (2015). *School related gender based violence (SRGBV) in Ethiopia: A desk review*. Addis Ababa: UNICEF.
- Humphrey, S. A. (2000). Fraternities, athletic teams, and rape: Importance of identification with a risky group. *Fraternities, Athle Journal of Interpersonal Violence* 15(12):1313-1322.
- ICCPR. (1966). International covenant on civil and political rights. *UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI)*: 1-26.

- Johnson, T. (2004). Gender based violence. *Journal of Commonwealth Magistrates and Judges Association* 15(3): 22-30.
- Leach, F. (2003). An investigative study of the abuse of girls in African Schools. *Policy Division of the Department for International Development* 12(5): 23-45.
- Letty, C. (2016). *Shelters for women and girls who are survivors of violence in Ethiopia*. Addis Ababa: UNECA.
- Martin, S. A. (2002). Domestic violence across generations: Findings from Northern India. *International Journal of Epidemiology* (31): 560-572.
- McAslan, E. (2016). *Global guidance on addressing school-related gender-based violence*. Paris: UN Women.
- Mesfin, B. (2012). Women's participation in political leadership and Decision making in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press.
- Michau, L. (2007). Approaching old problems in new ways: Community mobilisation as a Primary prevention strategy to combat violence against women. *Gender and Development Journal* 15(1): 95-109.
- Morrison, R. A. (2004). The cost and impacts of gender based violence in developing countries: Methodological considerations and new evidence. *Journal of Gender Studies* 23(6): 23-56.
- Myton, D. (2009). Non- violence and peace psychology: Intrapersonal, interpersonal, social and world peace. *Peace psychology Series*. 4, pp. 89-120. New York: Spring Science Business media.
- Natalie, C. B. (2015). Comprehensive sexuality education, culture and gender: The effect of the cultural setting on a sexuality education programme in Ethiopia. *Sexuality, Society and Learning* 15(6): 655-670.
- Ogato, G. S. (2013). The quest for gender equality and women's empowerment in least developed countries: Policy and strategy implications for achieving millennium development goals in Ethiopia. *International Journal of Social Anthropology* 5(9): 358-372.
- Tadiwos, S. (2001). *Rape in Ethiopia, excerpts from reflections: Documentation of the forum on gender*. Addis Ababa: Panos Ethiopia.
- Tsegahun, T. (2008). The status of gender based violence and related services in four woredas (Woredas surrounding Bahir Dar town, Burayu woreda, Bako woreda and Gulele Sub-city of Addis Ababa. Addis Ababa: CARE Ethiopia.
- UN. (1993). UN declaration on the elimination of violence against women proclaimed by general assembly resolution 48/104 of 20 December 1993. *General Assembly resolution*, pp.1-5.
- UN. (1995). The Beijing declaration and the platform for action, world conference on women, pp. 1-23. Beijing: UN/DPI.
- Yohannes, M. (2017). Sexual violence against female university students in Ethiopia. *UN Women* 23(3): 34-45.



## **The Roles of Political Parties and Their Challenges in Political Transition: The Case of Ethiopia**

Ayeneu Birhanu Worku (Ph.D.)\*

### **Abstract**

*The political parties of any country are expected to remain committed to the political and economic improvement of their country. As one of the main intermediaries between the state and citizens, one would therefore expect political parties to have a key role in achieving a democratic and peaceful transition. This article focuses on the contribution, actual or potential, of political parties to political transitions. The objective of this study is to examine the roles of political parties in ongoing reform efforts and the challenges they face in Ethiopia. The paper reports mainly on the findings of semi-structured interviews with local and national politicians carried out during 2020 as well as an analysis of political parties' programs. This study indicates that political parties are the main agents of political representation, and play a crucial role in articulating and aggregating citizens' demands in democracies. As such, this study argues that political parties have a major role to play in political transitions though, in Ethiopia, they have generally not lived up to expectations. The findings reveal that the very nature of transition and the prevailing character of political parties in Ethiopia have inhibited that role. The study concludes that the unpredictability of post-reform trends, a weak political culture, and inefficiency of political parties, which are in turn related to the nature of party systems, prompted political instability which in turn hampered the anticipated political transition in Ethiopia.*

**Keywords:** *Political Party, Political Reform, Political Transition*

### **Introduction**

It is broadly held that political parties are a necessary part of political systems. The constitution of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) has provided for a representative federal system with a parliamentary democratic government. Yet, Ethiopia remains a one-party dominant system for about three decades of its post-federal arrangement. Evidence indicates that the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) success is largely due to the disorganization and fragmentation of opposition political parties. Recently, after reform, the ruling party has expressed its commitment to a multi-party system and emphasized the need for dealing with opposition political parties, in order to promote dialogue and constructive agreement for a peaceful transition. After the reform, the ruling party began to initiate reforms that involved freeing political prisoners and opening talks with opposition political parties.

---

\* Kotebe Metropolitan University, Ethiopia. Email: [ayeneu1984@gmail.com](mailto:ayeneu1984@gmail.com)

However, it remains highly uncertain how this political change will be translated into a more robust dialogue between political parties. This study attempts to examine the place and the role of the political parties in the Ethiopian transition. It tries also to look at some of the major obstacles to constructive political competition facing the Ethiopian federal system. The broad questions that this study wrestles with are; why are political parties important? What do political parties play in fostering or sustaining democratic political transition? What constraints do political parties in Ethiopia face?

This study relies on key informant interviews and a review of literature and political parties programs. The interviews with key informants are used to gain a general understanding of the current affairs in the country. Unstructured interviews were conducted with leaders of seven major political parties (Prosperity Party (PP), Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (*EZEMA*), Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), *Arena* Tigray for Democracy and Sovereignty Party (*Arena* Tigray), National Congress of Great Tigray (*Baytona*), and National Movement of Amhara (NAMA)). A strong effort is made to make contact with senior party officials, such as the chairperson, deputy chairperson, or spokesperson, of each party as key informants for this study. This paper begins with a discussion of literature that sheds light on various studies dealing with countries that witnessed the democratic transition and the role played by their political parties in the transition process. Following this, the roles and problems associated with political parties in Ethiopia are briefly analyzed.

### **Review of Literature**

This literature review looks at the modes of transition and the roles played by their political parties in the transition process in different countries. The review also focused especially on the roles of political parties and their challenges in Ethiopia.

### **Modes of Transition**

Transition, in its broadest sense, can be defined as the period in between the breakdown of one political regime and the installation of a new regime. More precisely, according to Schneider, if the newly installed regime turns out to be a democracy, one can speak of a democratic transition that involves “a process of liberalization” (Schneider, 2006, p.7).

The most prominent classification of transition modes is the one offered by Karl (1990). This classification yields four different modes of transitions: (i) *Pacts* are elite-dominated compromises; (ii) *Impositions* consist of elites using force unilaterally and effectively to bring about a regime change against the resistance of incumbents forcing the transition; (iii) *Reforms* are present when masses mobilize from below and impose a compromised outcome without resorting to violence; whereas (iv) *Revolutions* consist of masses rising in arms and militarily defeat the previous authoritarian rulers. According to Schneider (2006), *pacts* have a positive impact on the prospects for successfully establishing democracy in a country, mainly because they (a) include all significant political actors whose interests must be respected in order to gain their consent on the new political regime and the new distribution of power it brings with; (b) make participating actors mutually dependent on each other; and (c) exclude certain issues from the negotiation table that are of vital interest to some of the participants in the negotiation (such as securing property rights and non-prosecution of human rights abuses). Similarly, Wolfgang Merkel, quoted in Hafez (2010), distinguishes between a number of ways in which transformation can come about including (a) *gradual evolution* – basically the British model of advancing democratization over several centuries; (b) *change initiated by regimes* – the classic ‘reform from above in the style of Gorbachev; (c) *forced system change* – on the French or Iranian model of world-historical revolutions; (d) *regime collapse* – often following wars, as in Iraq in 2003; (e) *negotiated system change* – on the model of numerous processes of democratization in Southern Europe or Latin America.

In fact, in many countries, rather than a straightforward process corresponding precisely to one of these models, the shift to democracy occurred in a hybrid form. The Ethiopian case is based on a combination of strong pressure from the ‘streets’- youth protests and a political transformation supported by a robust opposition within the regime. As such, the Ethiopian case has integrated elements of both popular uprisings and reform from above. In addition to these routes to transformation, we can distinguish a number of important factors that foster the change in the political system. The role of political parties is our focus in the following section.

### **Political Parties and Political Transitions**

An examination of related literature reveals a set of factors that are primarily responsible for post-transition stability. An assessment of the major schools in the study of transition systems

reveals that they focus on different aspects of the systems, and thereby provide different factors with respect to what constitutes the ideal political transition (Norgaard, 1992).

Literature tends to emphasize the unique functions played by political parties in articulating and aggregating public demands, developing alternative visions and policies for governing the state, and testing the public support for those policies in elections (Lipset, 2000; Svasand, 2002a; Power and Shoot, 2011; Buslenko, 2019). Political parties thus provide a choice to voters, a means of selecting political leaders, and a mechanism for holding the government to account. Randall and Svasand (2002a) suggest analyzing parties' contribution in terms of representation, integration into the democratic process, aggregating and channeling political interests, recruitment and (democratic) training of political leaders, making government accountable, and organizing opposition. According to Randall, Parties are initially seen as potential agents of national integration and political stability.

*Democracies cannot function without political parties. Parties are expected to reflect citizens' concerns, aggregate and mediate diverse interests, project a vision of society, and develop policy options accordingly. They are supposed to inspire and attract supporters to their cause; their membership levels are important for proving their claim to represent the people (Randall, 2007, p.60).*

As one of the main intermediaries between the state and citizens, one would therefore expect parties to have a major role to play in transitions (UNDP, 2012). Parties are unique organizations that fulfill a number of interrelated functions central to the democratic process of governance. Basic party functions include: "Contesting and winning elections; Aggregating and representing social interests; providing policy alternatives; Vetting and training political leaders who will assume a role in governing society" (Power & Shoot, 2011, p.4). Effective political parties need leaders and organizers who understand the role of political parties in a democratic society, and who are able to use modern techniques of organization, communication, fundraising, and training effectively (*Ibid*). Leaders and supporters of political parties have a critical role to play in a successful transition to democracy. To promote democracy in their country, however, political parties themselves must be democratic (*Ibid*). Hence, whether in power or opposition, they have to support and protect democratic values and human rights within their own organizations.

To succeed, a political party needs several attributes, including enthusiastic members, informed and committed leaders along with practical and innovative ideas for improving the country. Moreover, like any organization, an effective political party has a defined purpose and clear organizational structures and procedures for fulfilling its purpose.

From the above, it is clear that political parties are basic to the transition process, as they are principal bodies for representing public concerns, as well as, central to the negotiation of new political structures. In short, the performance of the political parties will be critical in the establishment of the quality and durability of the new political settlement. In general, political parties play a pivotal role during the transition in providing the vehicles to mediate between different shades of political opinion, aggregate public opinion, and provide policy alternatives for governing. The period of transition provides the most extreme stress test of political parties' internal structures and of their ability to respond to the concerns of voters.

Political parties are “the key mediating bodies in this process of change” (UNDP, 2012, p.84). Their effectiveness will go some way to determining the success and durability of the new political system. It is argued that, in successful transitions, political parties play a key role. They “establish regional and territorial networks, build ties with social movements and civil society organizations help, design and implement strategies to counter the authoritarian regime, and mobilized international support” (Strachan,2017, p.95).

UNDP's (2012) analysis of transitions in Brazil, Chile, and Indonesia offers useful comparisons. In Brazil, Chile, and Indonesia, the very pattern of transition has seriously impeded the role of political parties, as well as that of democratic institutions in general. In this country, the party system remained little institutionalized and extraordinarily fragmented, with several parties too weak to have a nationwide presence, which limits their electoral successes to limited constituencies. Elite politics has been at the core of Chile's successful transition. From 1990 onwards, the political system in Chile has been characterized by a supra-party political elite; the negotiation of power-sharing arrangements in the executive branch; and the elite domination of the candidate selection process.

In Indonesia, according to Evans (2011), political parties recognized the need to negotiate with elements of the old regime by offering opportunities for different factions to cooperate towards political solutions. So, as Evans puts it, political parties here represented an integrative

mechanism between the different divisions in society. Transition involves people learning to interact with each other on a different basis and that negotiation and compromise do not constitute weakness, but rather represent a healthy part of living in a democracy. And, from the perspective of parties themselves, that dialogue will often result in different political actors recognizing the extent to which they have common objectives, and are more likely to achieve them by collaboration as opposed to outright hostility. The need to negotiate with elements of the old regime also had a critically important side effect: “it provided an opportunity for different factions to work cooperatively toward political solutions” (Evans, 2011, p.37). In this, political parties played a crucial role.

Serbian party politics has suffered from fractious coalition relations in the post-Milosevic period. Coalitions formed and dissolved repeatedly over the decade following the democratic revolution, leading to instability and uncertainty (Power, 2011, p.96). Based on Serbian experience, Kuzmanovic (2011) argues that establishing clear internal procedures, infrastructure, and strategy are all paramount in the transitional and post-transitional phases. Likewise, the party’s fortunes should not rest with a single or few figureheads. Rather, party members must be willing to change leaders once their roles and performances are becoming ineffective (Kuzmanović, 2011, p.64).

From the experience of the Republic of South Africa, it can be said that democratic transition and subsequent consolidation becomes much easier if there are well-organized political parties that can perform the traditional political party functions of aggregating interests (Lodge, 2011). It can also be learnt that the transitional period is likely to involve a long interval of negotiation between the previous regime and the insurgent social and political forces. According to Lodge, this might involve a decision to pursue truth and reconciliation rather than to prosecute previous leaders for human rights abuses, an interim power-sharing agreement, or the insurgent forces dropping some of their original demands (Lodge, 2011, p.69).

Perhaps the weakness of political institutions in Argentina, Chile, and Brazil has been the major factor contributing to instability (Fulghum, 1985; Arriagada, 2011). The political consensus that was achieved in Mexico after the Revolution has not been developed in Argentina, Chile, or Brazil for any appreciable length of time. As Arriagada maintains, the task for political parties is

to provide vehicles that can help the public to understand, navigate, and shape the process of transition (Arriagada, 2011, p.20).

In his analysis of the case of Egypt, Kasim (2016) argues that, even though Egyptian political parties have a massive scope of freedom, their role in the democratic transition of Egypt was disappointing. Egyptians were let down by the marionette or cardboard political parties which were assumed to perform an active role in the transition process; however, they failed.

Buslenko (2019), in his thorough comparative analysis, the activity of the opposition in East-Central and Eastern Europe, argues that the transition towards democracy in the countries of East-Central and Eastern Europe largely depended on a new alternative political force – the opposition. It was the opposition political forces that created a political alternative and real political competition by undermining the monopoly of the “party of power” and creating thus preconditions for democratization. The constructive activity of the opposition became a foundation for civil society since its initial pluralism gave rise to different groups of political interests, values, programs, ideologies, and so on.

So far, a picture of political party competence and contribution to democratic transitions has been presented. This brief survey reminds us, then, that political parties have contributed to the democratic transitions in different ways, notably by supplying the necessary vision and leadership, by providing an institutional framework for political coordination, and/or by increasing state legitimacy and maintaining political stability. It is suggested that effective and well-functioning political parties can serve as a safety valve by which social tensions and frustrations can be channeled through peaceful means. In this regard, it can be emphasized that political parties can provide avenues for social cohesion, and minimize possibilities of open conflict and facilitate a peaceful resolution of conflict in multinational federations. However, the fluidity and uncertainty that characterizes transitional periods presents distinct challenges and opportunities. Although literature highlights the distinctiveness of each country’s experience, the main themes emerge that reflect the common, often very practical challenges for political parties including building a broad-based political organization, establishing a constructive dialogue between political parties, negotiating space for democratic politics, and responding to and shaping voter expectations.

## **The Roles of Political Parties and Their Challenges in Ethiopia**

### **Introduction**

Ethiopia has an emergent and distinct political spectrum, which can loosely be arranged in terms of regional and national. On the one hand, locally-based groups representing a single ethnic group are common. On the other hand, more liberal, representing coalitions of national parties also appear. At the center, political parties such as Prosperity Party (PP), the ‘continuist’ party constituted from the reform elements of the EPRDF which led the transition. This party would be a roughly centrist grouping that favors national unity but also advocates ethnic-based federalism. But within its ranks, there are wide divergences based on regional and ideological lines.

As hinted above, the political reform in Ethiopia can be considered as a product of regime-initiated policies and societal pressures. However, the reform is fraught with pitfalls. Why should this be? The immediate answer lies in the character of the political parties, which in turn, however, reflects and combines with key features of their context. The challenges can be broadly grouped into ruling party-centered and opposition-centered concerns. The former includes lack of an agreement and internal power struggles, mounting governance deficits, and remnant authoritarianism. The latter includes things like weak institutions and capacity to engage in political struggle, the worsening of political differences, failure to network and form alliances, weak norms of conduct, and a culture of compromise and accommodation among elites.

### **Ruling Party**

In a seminal article reviewing the main political functions associated with political parties in contemporary Ethiopia, Kasahun (2009) attempted to identify the predicaments of Ethiopian opposition parties that are partly caused by the taking shape and consolidation of EPRDF as a dominant actor in Ethiopian politics. The new ruling party, Prosperity Party (PP), has its origin in the umbrella organization of EPRDF, covering a wide spectrum of interests and parties in eight regional states. The reform forced the resignation of TPLF, the ruling party in the Tigray Region, and as a result, EPRDF split into PP and TPLF. The following describes this and other related dilemmas associated with the ruling party.



### ***Lack of an Agreement and Internal Power Struggles***

The reorganization of EPRDF, while it might seem undemocratic for some, has not produced a period of orderly political transition that is free of disorder. Indeed, the reform was first driven by a handful of reformists in EPRDF. Powerful members of the EPRDF are not completely convinced of the reform measures that the new leadership is taking. As will be discussed below, some have questioned the saliency of the reform ideology and the dominance of the Prime Minister. These elements continue to contend that EPRDF is abandoning its ideological foundations of revolutionary democracy and a developmental state in favor of neoliberal and populist tendencies. Divergent views, even among the senior officials, about the ultimate goal of political reform, led to frictions among leaders of EPRDF (Interview with Chairperson, *Baytona*, March 9, 2020).

The new leadership was criticized on the pretext that they failed to swear fidelity to the constitution and the federal system. This issue was apparent in the conflict between "reformers" and "conservatives" that developed as reforms deepened in the last few years. The more conservative elders wanted a controlled gradual reform, while the new group moved beyond limited reforms to implement several political reforms. The TPLF in particular defended previous social privileges and are distressed by their uncertain status after the reform (Abbink, 2019). The Ethiopian case has, therefore, a group of elites (especially members of TPLF) who have been more reluctant in their attitudes toward reform and who are therefore politically less inclined to provide support for the transition process.

To be successful, the transition must be able to muster sufficient political support. Hence, stability is contingent upon reasonable transition agreements with concerned bodies. However, many are skeptical as to how far the ruling party performed these functions (Interview with Deputy Chairman, OFC, March 9, 2020; Spokesperson, NAMA, March 9, 2020). As argued above, interim leaders were naive to embark on the exercise without the backing of the former officials. In other words, they did not have the backing of the TPLF when they established the new PP.

Indeed, following the reform, the government dismissed many of the officials on the basis that they were believed to be corrupt. On the other hand, this has created several concerns regarding the experience of their, largely very young, replacements. On the other hand, there is the concern

that corruption charges have been selectively applied and politically motivated. In this regard, it is argued that the new leadership has used the tools of the executive office to pursue its political enemies.

As to the mass leadership dismissals in government agencies that the government initiated, it is often stated by the PP that, they were caused by requirements of radical reform in the state apparatus and the need to uproot corruption. Conversely, some party representatives, such as Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (*EZEMA*), and the National Movement of Amhara (*NAMA*) – have even accused the new leadership of having compromised too much with the previous officials and not promised fast and full enough transition.

Besides, keeping the PP from tearing itself apart appeared as a mighty task for the new leadership which has proven to be particularly vulnerable to internal dysfunction. As a result, some scholars cautioned that the movement toward political reform in Ethiopia is not universally endorsed (Asebe, 2019; Badwaza, 2018). Much success will probably depend on the quality of leadership at all levels operating during the transitional phase to democracy. Apart from the federal reforms, it is argued, regional leaders have not contributed to the reform through cooperation with the new party of power (Asebe, 2019). At the same time, there are other groups such as different informal youth movements to contend with, which according to some, have weakened the basis for a stable transition (Badwaza, 2018). One of the major defects of the party system is its inability to incorporate the informal youth movement into the official party or related structure. One persistent feature of reform is the existence of a hidden structure of personal relationships that determines critical reform outcomes. It is presumed, in many cases, that the ‘informal political institutions’ have undermined the rules of the game (Interview with Spokesperson, *NAMA*, March 9, 2020).

Among those who may feel aggrieved by the transition, ironically, are the opposition parties who had long lobbied for change. Many political parties call for the new leadership to allow for the orderly creation of a ‘caretaker government’ or power-sharing governments for more stable transitions (Interview with Deputy Chairman, *OFC*, March 9, 2020).

Indeed, the new leadership has encouraged the participation of groups that have not been previously incorporated into the political system. The post-transition period comprised of representatives from banned opposition groups and other political leaders. There is some

oppositional presence with many interlocutors taking part in the few government-sponsored talks to negotiate a way out of the present maelstrom. Many parties called for national dialogue to address the political, economic, and social problems facing the country.

From the above, it is clear that the leadership rivalry and the weakness of the PP in promoting political stability stem primarily from its inability to balance the demands of the competing parties under its umbrella. Regarding the behavior of entrenched leaders, it can be suggested that much will depend on the government leaders who are in power during the transition phase to democracy. They can set the stage for a peaceful and democratic change, or can obstruct the entire process. The process of reform has been complicated by the political actors who continue to compete for power. This struggle among key political parties within the ruling regime has resulted in the reform being stalled (Badwaza, 2018). As a result, many have predicted the break-up of the ruling party over political circumstances.

### ***Remnant Authoritarianism***

The extent to which the reform has maintained a ‘level playing field’ for democratic competition in the country remains debatable. The level of democratic competition and accommodation is still challenged by scholars and opposition actors as not inclusive. Accusations of authoritarianism were shared by an increasing section of the opposition (Badwaza, 2018). It is claimed that, on much of the day-to-day running of the government, opposition parties are progressively excluded from many of the deals and lost some of its earlier importance as an arena of accommodation. The representatives of the opposition stress that the political system has remained as exclusionary as it was.

Indeed, during the initial reform period, the regime went to unusual lengths to accommodate opposition interests. Oppositions’ influence was unusually strong during the initial transition; it waned in the years that followed. While incumbent leaders appeared to cooperate with the opposition, they had no intention of giving up power. They simply intended to use this type of forum to ensure that their hold on power was legitimized by a democratic process (Asebe, 2019).

Stressing the need to change the current political operations in the country, it is often remarked that the reform is a victim of the Prime Minister’s manipulations. It is claimed that the transition to democracy in Ethiopia is hijacked by Prime Minister’s manipulations. He promised and

canceled elections, replaced interim leaders at will, and rejected the call for the national dialogue and caretaker government (Interview with Chairperson, *Baytona*, March 9, 2020).

Oppositions also vehemently complain about the absence of predictable rules of the game. During the interim period leading up to elections, it is also necessary to establish clearly who is really in charge. However, there is no consensus between the party in power and the opposition parties on certain basic rules of political transition. Opposition political leaders and critics forthrightly questioned this move by noting that the new leadership has failed to lay any sound basis for democratic transition.

Indeed, the new political elites only embarked on a few modest reforms, such as releasing prisoners of conscience and allowing political opposition. However, the government's emphasis on preserving the political structures set up by the EPRDF has placed the parties in a subordinated position, which has also increasingly undermined faith in the new leadership. This, according to some, has minimized the role of the opposition parties and prevented deeper and much-needed reforms to the political system (Interview with Spokesperson, OLF, March 9, 2020). This arouses the opposition's suspicions that the core features of the EPRDF party-state remain essentially unchanged. Opposition parties criticize the party built on the remnants of the EPRDF, which threaten the legitimacy of the new reform. It is argued that the model of the political party which is adopted by the incumbent authorities, similar to the model that existed under the previous authorities. The opposition has claimed that the situation is failed to improve under the new authorities (Interview with Spokesperson, OLF, March 9, 2020).

Accordingly, as indicated above, some have even expressed skepticism about the sincerity of the new leadership in allowing a truly open political system. The commitment of the ruling party to democracy appears to be irrational because elites are acting outside the rules of the game, grabbing for power, and purging rivals (Interview with Chairperson, *Baytona*, March 9, 2020).

It is argued that the government has regularly abused its power to harass and assault its enemies and opponents. In this regard, it is alleged that opposition parties continue to be victims of legal and political restrictions designed by the incumbent regime. They blame this for what they see as moves by the state to limit the exercise of some political rights, such as party registration limits, limits on hate articles in the media, which can all themselves be proof for the purging of political

opponents. The issue most frequently mentioned is an abuse of the so-called administrative resources.

In general, doubts about the seriousness of the government and mistrust of the regime prevail amongst large sections of the opposition. Opposition political parties are skeptical about the PP's political will to cater to people's interests. As indicated above, it is often argued that the party's interest in maintaining its political hegemony arguably inhibited the kinds of reforms needed to enhance the democratic system. In other words, the reforms are not gauged to advance democracy or contribute to the overall political transition. The opposition parties allege that abuse of "administrative resources", that is, the lack of a clear separation between the party in power and the state, is a major challenge to fair political competition in the country. Many critical observers are increasingly skeptical, with some of the actions of the new leadership, and are describing the transition as derailed or hijacked by specific interest groups (Asebe, 2019).

In 2018, the new leadership promised to act as a transitional government to steer the country to multiparty elections. Nevertheless, as events unfolded over the years, there were frequent arbitrary changes and adjustments. Considering that two years have passed since the onset of the democratic transition, the significance of election especially in terms of nurturing a democratic system is worth considering. Opposition vehemently complains about the postponement of the national and regional election (Interview with Chairperson, *Baytona*, March 9, 2020). Blaming the government for not holding the election as planned, some lamented that all the values opposition political parties held are being assaulted, and the nation is wracked by tension and despair, as a result of serious crises of legitimacy and challenges to the rulers' hold on power.

### ***Mounting Governance Deficits***

The period after reform was a period in which little progress was made in developing political institutions that would provide stability for the political system. Despite the successful introduction of the reform, the necessary laws and institutions are still largely missing. In this regard, it is argued that institutional failings and the defiance of central government laws and policies by local authorities have undermined the state's capacity (ICG, 2019). Law enforcement authorities are not able to provide the level of protection necessary to guarantee law and order and "people have lost their trust in institutions" (Interview with Chairperson, *EZEMA*, March 5, 2020).

Indeed, the reform resulted in some degree of street violence between those celebrating the change, those opposing it, and those simply seeking to take advantage of the unrest to loot (Abbink, 2019). In addition, there were many separate incidents of violent attacks on parties and their property. The new leadership has been under pressure to maintain law and order during the period of transition and the official party has lost full control of the process (Al Jazeera, 2019). It is recognized that the institutions of government are weaker today than they were in the immediate post-reform period, making the transition to democracy a daunting challenge.

The violent communal politics plagued the ability of the state to govern properly in the late reform period. At the same time, protests can also be viewed as a ‘symptom’ of the frustration of opposition parties at the lack of space for them to play a constructive role in democratic dialogue. These riots not only radicalized ethnic politics but also served as a reminder of pernicious governance. Although most of these failed to bring about the expected results, yet the new leadership did not move to correct these problems. In this respect, promoting a more constructive role for opposition in transition, and enabling greater freedom of expression through peaceful demonstrations and the media could take away much of the impetus for protests.

It is often said that the breakdowns of rule of law and other setbacks highlight the fragility and uncertainty of the transition. The persistent ethnic question and fermenting religious tension became a cause of worry for the march toward the desired transition in Ethiopia. The future of the country could still be explosive if the ethnic question is not dealt with.

From the foregoing discussion, we can conclude that Ethiopia’s attempts at democracy have been fraught with disappointment and uncertainty. Many of the opposition political parties in Ethiopia are skeptical of the conduct of the transition program, and they made this known to the government.

### **Opposition Political Parties**

The political landscape of Ethiopia is littered with opposition parties of different sizes, strengths, and levels of acceptability. Although opposition parties are quite visible after the reform, their viability and effectiveness remain questionable. In this section, an attempt is made to set out the status and dilemmas of opposition political parties in Ethiopia.

As indicated above, some scholars raised a number of factors that may have contributed to the weakness of opposition parties. Some of these are endogenous to the party's organization, profile, and strategy; others are exogenous to it. According to many commentators, the paradox of the majority of Ethiopian opposition parties is that most of them are poorly organized and lack institutional capacity and clear ideological foundations (Merera, 2007; Kassahun, 2009; Lidetu, 2010; Alefe, 2014). Another area where oppositions are often criticized is their failure to cooperate with each other. Most parties are poorly rooted in the societies they seek to represent, equipped with few resources. The other main concern with the political oppositions is that they lack strong administrative and communicative structures and the capacity to compete (Kassahun, 2009; Lidetu, 2010).

### *The Worsening of Political Differences*

Experience has shown that political reforms get off the ground only when political shifts have occurred that necessitate a renegotiation of the political order. Political parties in Ethiopia do not share a broad-based consensus or agreement on many political values. Regarding the nature of the political reform, the range of belief is greater, and disagreement runs deeper among political parties. Since the reform, Ethiopia has suffered from the troubles of sharpening ideological and ethnic contradictions. In addition, the prevalence of personalism in opposition's politics has contributed to a polarization of political forces (Merera, 2007).

It can be observed that the sudden end of EPRDF's unchallenged monopoly on political power has resulted in a period that can be deceptively unsettled. The opposition political parties leap into a political activity under new freedoms with few norms or rules to follow. All this bears heavily on a fragile new leadership struggling to erect a new order.

Accordingly, disruptive propaganda and unethical engagements on social media, and highly partisan networks that have mushroomed over the past two years cast into doubt the sustainability of the progress achieved since the reform. Besides, it is argued that the country has faced persistent elite-level violations of democratic norms which hampered progress. This has been a notable feature of a range of parties in Ethiopia. They have not shown a reasonably strong capacity for responsible political behavior and high levels of commitment to democratic norms (Abbink, 2019).

### ***Weak Institutionalization and Capacity to Engage in Political Struggle***

For democratic change to succeed, political parties must embody political alternatives and possess great potential for mobilization. As indicated above, after the reform, a huge number of parties have sprung up in each of the regions. The party system remains, however, little institutionalized and extraordinarily fragmented, with several parties too weak to have a nationwide presence that limits their electoral successes to limited constituencies. The evidence indicates that though the contemporary party system now provided openness unparalleled in the history of the country, the very plethora of partisan camps and the ethnic cleavages they reflected also created uncertainty about the viability of government in its existing form and about the political directions the nation would pursue (Asebe, 2019).

In addition, an important aspect simply concerns support for the party. Once more with significant exceptions, political parties tend to lack deep social roots. It is argued that very few political parties have any kind of office or other public presence, and therefore, are less connected to their constituencies. Of course, as already observed, political parties and the party system in Ethiopia have been greatly influenced by ethnic and cultural diversity. As a result, only a few political parties have been relatively vibrant at the national level. The point must be made that in practice even ‘national’ parties have only a limited organizational presence in terms of geographical spread.

When it comes to assessing parties’ contribution to democratic transition in practice, there is generally a sense of disappointment. Political parties are upbraided with failing to provide the electorate with meaningful choice, with failing to instill democratic values as well as offering effectual opposition. In most cases, rather than fulfilling their role as intermediaries between the citizens and the state, political parties vied for control of the government and have become instruments for the preservation of elite interests (Interview with Spokesperson at Public and International Relations, PP, March 19, 2020).

### ***Failure to Network and Form Alliances***

The Ethiopian transition tends to suffer from fragmentation of political parties, which hindered effective opposition. The multiplicity of competitive political parties did not provide the legitimizing and stabilizing function for the political reform. Success in coalition talks among the opposition political parties has been minimal and remained largely unsuccessful. The frequent



party splits, mergers, and counter splits increased the number of political parties that now contest elections.

As indicated above, after the reform, many political parties are officially registered, of which few are organized on a national basis. This has weakened opposition political parties' ability to present a unified front to voters, to consolidate the party system – and, ultimately, to advance a cohesive national agenda. Besides, the inability of the opposition political parties to reach formidable alliances and coalitions has only translated to more political capital for the dominant ruling party. In brief, in the Ethiopian case, there is a trend towards increasing fragmentation. According to Randal, highly fragmented systems, whether or not entailing classic ideological polarization, tend to be associated with “fragile coalitions and regime instability, (even) less transparent policy-making and bargains struck behind the scenes” (Randall, 2007, p.648).

A stable and numerically viable opposition is indispensable for democratic progress. Indeed, there have been several attempts at party cooperation pacts and mergers, without much success. The proliferation of opposition parties and the continuous fragmentation have weakened their role in shaping the transition process in Ethiopia. Since the verdict of the political reform, some effective attempts at party unity have been made and several others are in the pipeline. Some of them are increasingly considering alliances as the solution to weak and fragmented opposition political parties. The merging of opposition parties is becoming a novel strategy for strengthening them (Interview with Spokesperson at Public and International Relations, PP, March 19, 2020).

### ***Lack of Culture of Compromise and Accommodation***

The current political instability is also attributed to a lack of compromise and accommodation. Of course, democratic transitions need to involve fully tolerant, inclusive, orderly, and public-minded political parties. Elite consensus, meanwhile, reduces the likelihood that a political party will use ultranationalist claims to gain the upper hand over rivals. However, as already indicated above, there has been a not tacit agreement between the government and opposition on the most appropriate reform measures. The relation between political parties is often characterized by suspicion and antagonism, which often led to a destructive and violent engagement. In addition to the absence of common interests shared by the political elites, political stability also rested on a lack of a spirit of compromise between the government and opposition political parties. Hence,

the prevailing mistrust and lack of tolerance among political parties are among factors that may impede prospects of the stability of the transition process (Temin and Badwaza, 2019).

The reform is under constant threat from disorders and instability. All claims from the ruling party (PP) ascribe this mostly to opposition parties (Interview with Spokesperson at Public and International Relations, PP, March 19, 2020). The reality is that the growing violence resulted in the closure of shops, destruction of property, and a general sense of uncertainty on the reform efforts (Asebe, 2019). Some of the political turbulences are caused by political parties working against the ruling party. To one degree or another, all of the parties involved participated in the strike to discredit the new leadership.

In general, the discussion so far suggests that political parties' contribution to the possibilities of a democratic transition is generally limited, whether in terms of shaping and elaborating the guiding policy discourse, political recruitment, ensuring accountability, monitoring implementation, or providing legitimacy. The analysis presented here suggests that in general, after the reform, the country has suffered from deteriorating law and order, political factionalism, an obstinate bureaucracy, and an ongoing crisis of legitimacy. However, the general assumption must be that the current political reforms underway present opposition political parties with real opportunities to compete for power and provide policy choices for voters. It is clear that the political oppositions have a range of problems. The ruling party has not only made a major contribution to the processes of the reform in terms of either strengthening political parties but also enabling them to play a more constructive role. In this regard, the opposition political parties have not also helped their own situation. The failure to oppose soundly and arguably constitutes the greatest threat to the political reform. The inclination of some to engage in outrageous accusations has undermined their ability to advance the reform agenda and to offer credible policy alternatives. This phenomenon is not particular to Ethiopia and had been previously observed in a number of transitional and democratizing states (for example Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia to name only a few).

In a nutshell, although the political parties are often overlooked, political parties play a critical role in the maintenance of democracy by providing a bridge between all of the different elements in society. Yet, there are severe obstacles to their performance in this role. Some of these constraints include inefficient bureaucracies, fragile institutions, the existence of deeply

antagonistic subgroups that do not trust each other and are not willing to turn over power to the opposition and an undemocratic political culture wherein people live in fear with little trust or pride in government.

The reform in the country degenerated into a bitter power struggle between its supporters and the opposition. In other words, the post-reform period turned into a protracted standoff between the ruling party and oppositions. The problem of Ethiopia's political parties is yet to be resolved, and the future of democracy in the country still remains doubtful.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

This study examined the roles of political parties in political reforms in the post-transitional system using Ethiopia as an empirical case. It is clear from the discussions made so far that political parties are critical to transition as the main barriers against the transition are political. An overall conclusion is that creating an enabling environment for political parties is critical to the success of the ongoing reform efforts. In the case of Ethiopia, the transition is still at a very early stage. Although political parties have a critical role in fostering the creation of a system that encourages dialogue and interaction, they are failing to deliver these benefits. The changes over the past three years have stirred hopes for the future just as continued repression has conjured visions of renewed autocracy and fears of a more aggressive regime. The ultimate outcome of political transition in Ethiopia, therefore, remains in doubt.

Ethiopia's journey towards reform started with great expectations. This picture alludes to some of the dangers which might jeopardize the future of political transition in Ethiopia. One of the most prominent problems is related to weak elite norms of conduct and remnant authoritarianism. The PP and the oppositions have made frequent departures from democratic procedures. In addition, weak traditions of public compromise, a lack of political engagement, have brought about an increase in political instability and failure of the political system to generate stable transition. A major test of the reform will be to maintain the consensus by addressing the needs of all of the political groups in the country. Most crucial will be the need for the interim regime to set out a plan for the new transition. Besides, enhancing the role of the opposition political parties becomes critical to the democratic legitimacy of the reform process. For the political party system to become a more effective institution, the number of political parties must be reduced, and their base of support should be broadened.

## References

- Abbink, J. (2019). Ethiopia's successes under Abiy Ahmed constrained by ethnic divisions. *International Peace Institute (IPI) Global Observatory* [Online] available at: <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2019/04/ethiopias-successes-abiy-constrained-by-ethnic-divisions/html> (Accessed on 15 May 2020).
- Abeje, A. (2014). The role of the federal system on the structure and operation of political parties in Ethiopia. *European Scientific Journal* 10(10): 203-210.  
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2014.v10n10p>.
- Regasa, A. (2019). Ethiopia's political transition at a crossroads. *Social Science Research Council (SSRC)* [Online] available at: <https://kujengamani.ssrc.org/2019/03/19/ethiopias-political-transition-at-a-crossroads/feed/> (Accessed on 20 August 2020).
- Badwaza, Y. (2018). Reform in Ethiopia: Turning promise into progress. U.S. House of Representatives Committee on foreign affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations.
- Chandler, W. M. & A. Chandler. (1987). Federalism and political parties. *European Journal of Political Economy Special Issue* 3(1): 87-109
- Creswell, J.W. (2009). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed approaches*. Los Angeles: Sage Publications Inc.
- Fukuyama, F. (2006). *America at the crossroads. democracy, power, and the neoconservative legacy*. New Haven/London: Yale University Press.
- Hafez, K. (Translated by Alex Skinner). (2010). *Radicalism and political reform in the Islamic and Western Worlds*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Huntington, S.P. (1984). Will more countries become democratic? *Political Science Quarterly* (2): 193-218.
- Huntington, S.P. (1991). *The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. (2014). International obligations for elections: Guidelines for legal frameworks. International IDEA: Stockholm, Sweden.
- Karl, T. L. (1990). Dilemmas of democratization in Latin America. *Comparative Politics* 23(1): 1-21.
- Kassahun Berhanu. (2009). Ethiopia: Beleaguered opposition under a dominant party system. Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa University, (Unpublished Manuscript).
- King, A. (1969). Political parties in western democracies: Some skeptical reflections. *Polity* 2: 111-141.
- Kitschelt, H. (2000). Linkages between citizens and politicians in democratic polities. *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (6/7): 845-79.
- Ayalew, L. (2010). *Medlot: the role of the third alternative in the Ethiopian politics* (Amharic version). Addis Ababa: Progress Printing Press.
- Lipset, S. M. (2000). Cleavages, parties and democracy, in Karvonen L. and Kuhnle S. (eds), *Party systems, and voter realignment revisited*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Scott, M. (1988). Political parties and democratization in Brazil and the southern cone. *Comparative Politics* 21: 91-120.
- Gudina, M. (2007). Party politics, political polarization and the future of Ethiopian democracy. International conference on African development archives center for African development policy research 8.

- Merkel, W. (2004). Embedded and defective democracies. *Democratization* 11(5): 33-58.
- Pei, M. (2006). *China's trapped transition: The limits of developmental autocracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mohammed A. (2019). Abiy's year one: Ethiopia's best hope for stability. *Al Jazeera*, 2 Apr 2019 [Online] available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/abiy-year-ethiopia-hope-stability-190331151858910.html>(Accessed on 13July 2020)
- Norgaard, O. (1992). The political economy of transition in post-socialist systems: The case of the Baltic States. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Bind 15 (1).  
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.1992.tb00130.x>
- Randall, V.(2007). Political parties and democratic developmental states development. *Policy Review* 25(5): 633-652.
- Randall, V. & Svåsand, L. (2002a). Introduction: The contribution of parties to democracy and democratic consolidation. *Democratization* 9 (3):1-10
- Randall, V. & Svåsand, L. (2002b). Party institutionalization in new democracies. *Party Politics* 8 (1): 5-29.
- Schneider, C.Q. (2006). Some notes on how to study the impact of transition modes on the consolidation of democracy. *Estudio*, Working Paper 63
- Strachan, A.L. (2017). *Factors affecting success or failure of political transitions*. K4D Helpdesk Report. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.
- Story, D. (1986). *The Mexican ruling party: Stability and authority*. Westport, CT: Praeger
- Suri, K. C. (2007). *Political parties in South Asia: The challenge of change*. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
- Temin, J. & Yoseph B. (2019). Aspirations and realities in Africa: Ethiopia's quiet revolution. *Journal of Democracy* 30(3): 139-153.
- Thorlakson, L. (2003). Patterns of party integration, influence and autonomy in seven federations. *Party Politics* 15(2): 157–177
- United Nations Development Program. (2012). The political economy of transitions: Analysis for change. Paper for discussion at the UNDP-NOREF Conference “The Political Economy of Transitions – Analysis for Change”, Oslo, 8-9 November 2012
- United Nations Development Program. (2013). The political economy of transitions: Comparative experiences. *UNDP*, 5 March 2013

## **The Status of Democratic Developmental State in Ethiopia: Is It Rolling Back or Rolling Forward?**

Teklie Tesfamariam Berhe\*

### **Abstract**

*The Democratic Developmental State (DDS) model was attempted during the tenure of the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front's (EPRDF) in Ethiopia. In this paper, an effort has been made hence to explore some economic blessings and political curses incurred, cases for launching and now terminating DDS, and the reform-led changes and continuities in the political economy of Ethiopia. In doing so, the researcher has depended on a qualitative approach and in-depth content analysis of secondary data sources. The finding revealed that the ideological confrontations and lusts for power coupled with the fragile institutional and structural profiles of the EPRDF-led government have precipitated the abortion of the embryonic DDS. Indeed, in the pursuit of DDS, a trade-off between promoting democracy and achieving economic development has remained at a tolerable cost. In consequence, protracted popular grievances against the unequal distribution of benefits have been accompanied by paving the birth of a new leadership submissive to the Neo-Liberal recipes. Now, the state seems as it goes to start from scratch despite some belief that the new leadership appears to regurgitate the footsteps of its predecessor EPRDF rebranding the infamous legacy. It has been found that the reformist part of the government has been facing coordination problems to materialize the political and economic reforms. To this effect, early costs of the beginnings of the reform have been encountered. For that reason, the researcher suggests that the incumbent government should constitutionally and inclusively overcome the state-wide leadership crisis to ensure positive synergy.*

**Keywords:** *Democratic Developmental State, Ethiopia, Prosperity Party, Reform*

### **Introduction**

States have played central economic roles in achieving social transformation. Nevertheless, the conventional notion of interventionist state in its present context has been boldly seen in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century during which the unprecedented and remarkable level of economic growth is experienced in East and Southeast Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, China and others (Bagchi, 2000; White, 2006; United Nations [UN], 2011; Routley, 2014). Consequently, the old and pragmatic dictum of “no one size fits all” has helped for the adoption and installation of the developmental state model in different socio-economic and political scenes (Fisseha and Abtweld, 2017).

---

\* Adigrat University, Ethiopia. Email: [teklietesfa27@gmail.com](mailto:teklietesfa27@gmail.com)

Following the end of the cold war, the state-led development model-pursuant Latin American, Asian, and Sub-Saharan African countries were advised to adopt the notorious Structural Adjustment Programs /SAPs/ (Stiglitz, 1998). To this effect, the mere application of Washington Consensus's prescriptions devoid of installing internal necessary governance, institutional and legal frameworks failed to bring about broad-based and ethical development (Pillay, 2002; Bigman, 2007; Rapley, 2010; Asnake, 2011). For this reason, some Less Developed Countries (LDCs) have been engaged in soul searching for another best alternative development path under which they can allocate national resources effectively and efficiently (Stiglitz, 1998). During the states' endeavors, the fashion of the Developmental State (DS) model which enabled the Asian Tigers and some Latin American countries to exhibit a miracle in their economic transformations for about three decades and hitherto has secured attentions and enjoyed precedence (Asnake, 2011).

DS is placed in between the market and plan-rational state seeking to exploit the respective strengths of the market and public sector in securing economic development (Bolesta, 2007). Commonly, DS is identified by the elements of development-oriented leadership, competent and insulated state bureaucracy, production-oriented private sectors, and performance-oriented governance (Musamba, 2010; Tapscot, Halvorsen, and Rosario, 2018). Thus, a typical DS must possess two imperative components: ideological and structural ones. Ideologically, the government leaders' common anthems and practices are required to be ensuring development and eradicating poverty (Mkandawire, 2001). Structurally, DS must enrich with necessary hardware mainly institutional capacities to autonomously implement the development policies in favor of the public interests (Mkandawire, 2001; Fisseha and Abtweld, 2017).

Recognizing the authoritarian nature of the traditional DS, government leaders, policymakers, and scholars sought to see the democratic form of it (Edigheji, 2005). A Democratic Developmental State (DDS) is, therefore, an authoritative, legitimate, autonomous, credible, and strong state to make and enforce its development policies and programs successfully (Edigheji, 2010). In this regard, it is indispensable to mention African democratic developmental attempts of Botswana, Mauritius, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and South Africa (Gedion, 2005; Fesseha and Abtweld, 2017; Clapham, 2018; Tapscot *et al.*, 2018; Hauge and Chang, 2019).

During the power tenure of EPRDF, Ethiopia has commenced its democratic developmental path to mean that it was aspiring not merely to be developmental but also democratic in the multi-national federal contexts. As a matter of commitment, the government has exhibited to reconcile the aforementioned goals reflecting in its consecutive development policy objectives (Eyob, 2017). Undeniably, with all its associated shortcomings including rampant corruption, the economic performance has been a major source of political legitimacy and thus stability in the state (Mehari, 2019). The infrastructural developments, such as the construction of roads, air corridors, railways and buildings, energy generation, housing, provision of health and education, and associated job creation have been relatively entertained (Fesseha and Bizuayehu, 2017; Bereket, 2018; Clapham 2018).

Notwithstanding the economic achievements, there have been popular grievances unleashed from the increasingly undemocratic and rent-seeking behaviors of the party in power which led lastly EPRDF to become the victim of its success (Fesseha and Abteuold, 2017; Government of Regional State of Tigray, 2020). For the last four years, the state is being identified by the prevalent political turmoil. The quest for good governance coupled with the entrenched leadership crisis in the government forced the people, particularly, the youth to seek political and economic reforms. As a consequence, change in the political leadership was a must whereby the deceased EPRDF gave birth to Prosperity Party (PP). A Neo-liberalism-friendly new leadership led by PP has appeared to seize the state power. In the attempt of understanding the dynamics, changes, and continuities related to Ethiopian DDS, the researcher has reviewed literature devoted to the issues under discussion.

Among others, while Jebena (2015) has studied the incompatibility between developmental state and Ethiopian ethnic federalism, Gedion (2015) has only tried to make a comparative analysis on emerging democratic developmental states of South Africa and Ethiopia. Mulu and Daba (2017) on their part have studied the nature of Ethiopian DDS and found that it is dominantly developmental but emerging. Moreover, Fesseha and Abteuold (2017) defended that the DDS paradigm has helped the state as a weapon in the fight against the common enemy, poverty. Alex de Waal (2018) has also shown his doubt that the state is more likely to be the political marketplace of other countries, particularly the USA, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt. Furthermore, Tapscott *et al.* (2018) have analyzed the DDS paradigm from the North-South perspective implying that it differs as per the country-specific contexts. Lastly, Ayele (2018) has



scholarly examined the existence of the developmental state in Ethiopia merely from economic perspectives. Yet, none of the aforementioned authors has flashed light on the current status of DDS ideals substantiating with the emerging realities that occurred in the political economy of Ethiopia where the aim of this study lays on. Therefore, the general objective of the study is to explore the status of the democratic developmental state indicating whether it is rolling back or rolling forward following the current political dynamics in Ethiopia. In the light of general objective, the research aims to realize the following specific objectives: i) To examine the reasons for pursuing the DDS model and associated blessings and curses incurred in Ethiopia, ii) To analyze the aggravating realities for aborting the DDS model in Ethiopia, and iii) To assess some of the reform led changes and continuities in Ethiopia.

### **Research Methodology**

This article supplements the existing discourse on the subject of DDS by critically exploring the ongoing politico-economic realities and dynamics experienced in Ethiopia. It has utilized a qualitative approach. Accordingly, secondary data that were collected through a thorough review of books, journal articles, reports, official documents, and credible internet sources have been qualitatively interpreted and analyzed. During reviewing the secondary data and consultation of the issue-specific literature, a content-based in-depth analysis method has also been employed. Hence, the study has covered the socio-economic and political dynamics encountered since the time EPRDF installed DDS and the realities followed due to the recent reform within the incumbent government hitherto.

### **Review of Related Literature**

#### **The Advent of Ethiopian Democratic Developmental State: The Conditions**

Following the demise of the military regime of Derg in 1991, the forcefully triumphed EPRDF has attempted to employ radical state and nation-building strategies in Ethiopia. From the outset, cognizant of the fact that lifelong intra-state conflicts were caused by the then employed irrelevant policies of the imperial and Derg regimes; EPRDF has brought about some unprecedented organizing principles (Addisalem, 2014). In doing so, in July 1991 EPRDF and others which are about twenty-six political organizations had established the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) and the subsequent Charter convening the Peace and Democracy Conference (TGE, 1991).

Among other things, establishing a constitutional commission, the charter was a seedbed for the making of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia's (FDRE's) Constitution. In accordance, the FDRE constitution has enshrined that the state is a republic, federal, democratic, parliamentary, and aspired to the free-market system in the long run. More importantly, recognizing the two most popular nationality and land questions, EPRDF has tried to respond to the entrenched mass grievances in Articles 39 and 40 of the FDRE constitution respectively though there are continuing controversies hitherto. Despite the fact that the initial commitment of EPRDF was to conform to the free-market economic system, eventually, it has become proactive in soul searching for relevant alternative development path due to the dead ends of Neo-liberal political economy in the LDCs (Meles, 2012; Jebena, 2015).

Then, in the endeavor of altering the extreme poverty image of the state, the EPRDF led government had been engaged in planning and implementing development policies and strategies. In the early 1990s, the government had set Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) to foster agro-processing industries. The other consecutive development policies and strategies include Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP 2001/02-2004/05), Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty (PASDEP 2005/06-2009/10), Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) I (2010/11-2014/15), and GTP II (2015/2016-2019/20) have exhibited the strong aspiration of the government to make the state one of the middle-income countries by 2025 pursuing the DDS path (Eyob, 2017; Fisseha and Abteuold, 2017, Hauge and Chang, 2019). To strengthen, Kenichi Ohno has put the basic condition for undertaking such a development path as follows:

*By adopting DDS, Ethiopia intends to radically transform the state management paradigm politically and economically from the system in which rent-seeking is the overriding behavioral pattern to the system where value creation is dominant despite no ground-breaking change is entertained in the fight against the rent-seeking government (Ohno, 2009, p.1).*

Apart from this, Clapham (2013 as cited in Weldeabrha, 2014) has underlined that there are four conditions for emulating the DS paradigm in Ethiopia. The first is the Ethio-Eritrean war in the sense that it enabled the cooperation of all nations, nationalities, and peoples to struggle against whatever their common enemy including poverty. Secondly, the sharp split within the Tigray

Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF) in which the party leaders who were in support of PM Meles Zenawi had conducted revival motions and declared the commencement of DS of Ethiopia. Third, the irritating result of the 2005 general election was an alarming bell for the ruling party to introduce new developmental policies and programs to win over the peoples' hearts and secure legitimacy. Fourth, the personal traits of Meles through which he had highly engaged in rectifying the failures reflected during the Ethio-Eritrean war and 2005 election realized the search for a relevant political economy paradigm.

To add more, Gedion (2015) has also provided other factors that the dead-end of Neo-liberalism is the case for replicating DS in Ethiopia. The late PM Meles had noted Neo-liberalism had already contained functioning efficiently in Africa and remarked that Africans should be let free to choose and cultivate their own home-grown development path (Meles, 2012). From this, the DDS of Ethiopia has strongly insisted on the truth that government is a dynamic development agent to bring about a systemic change. A systemic change is very impossible in the presence of merely one change driver to allocate resources; rather, it needs other complementarities - the state, market, and other forces of change. For that reason, the Ethiopian DDS has been placed on the multi-national federal contexts, democratization efforts, and coordinated state intervention in the case where the market fails to allocate resources efficiently (Gedion, 2015; Ohno, 2009).

### **Ethiopian Democratic Developmental State: Blessings and Curses Incurred**

#### ***A Glimpse on the Economic Blessings Entertained Under the Fledgling DDS***

Many internal and external forces witnessed that the DDS model installed in Ethiopia for about two decades has undergone remarkable economic transformation (Gedion, 2015; Weis, 2016). From the economic point of view, Ethiopia has become one of the countries that attempted to extricate chronic poverty at the fastest rate which declined from 45.5% in 2000 to 23.5% in 2016/17 (Belachew, 2019). Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rose from \$30 billion to \$80.56 billion in the span of the past eight years (2012-2020) with a steady increase in per capita income which now stands at \$783. This is more than a 50% increase over the past 10 years. Life expectancy has also reached 66 years (Jay, 2019; Office of the Prime Minister-FDRE, 2019). Consequently, Ethiopia's Human Development Index (HDI) value for 2018 is 0.470 which still puts the country in the low human development category positioning it at 173 out of 189

countries and territories. Between 2000 and 2018, Ethiopia's HDI value increased from 0.283 to 0.470, an increase of 65.8% (United Nations Development Program [UNDP], 2019).

Ethiopian National Planning Commission (2015) indicated that the rapid and sustained double-digit economic growth (10.9%) recorded during the past 12 years was the success story of the DDS launched in Ethiopia. The government has achieved in the promotion of educational [where secondary and primary school enrollment reached 31% and 85% respectively in 2015] and health services [where 59/1000 live births under five die of different reasons] coverage in rural and urban areas though this fact shows much yet to be done concertedly (Office of the Prime Minister-FDRE, 2019). Particularly, the remarkable expansion of public universities from two in number in the 1980s to more than fifty today has been contributing strategically in augmenting human capitals. Pertaining to the physical infrastructures such as the construction of roads (121,000km<sup>2</sup>), railways, electricity (44%), and water supply (66%), the government has also delivered encouraging outcomes (Office of the Prime Minister-FDRE, 2019). In connection, the industrial policy measures have brought rapid success in the industrialization process even though the manufacturing sector still constitutes 9.3% of the GDP in 2018 (Hauge and Chang, 2019; Jay, 2019). The consecutive development plans initiated by the government have caused relative positive social transformations although each stage of implementation was accompanied by formidable challenges (UNDP, 2012; Eyob, 2017; Mulu and Daba, 2017; Clapham, 2018).

Moreover, Addisalem (2014) argued that the EPRDF's dual pursuits of promoting democracy and development have helped to restore relative peace, national consensus, and largely establish a strong state. It has been noted that the decade-long consistent economic performances have enabled the state to robustly resist some natural and manmade hazards hitherto (Yared, 2016). Thus, during the EPRDF's tenure, there was a relatively improved national consensus that poverty and backwardness are the embedded enemies and existential threats across the country. Among other things, the undergoing construction of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is the most important precursor of the then efficacious roles of EPRDF in galvanizing the diversified people to a point of common national interest through consensus federalism (Tamrat, 2013).

## **Some Curses Encountered: Trade-off between Democracy and Development**

### ***Democratization Deficit***

Relying on the fact that the notion of a developmental state is adaptive and dynamic to changing circumstances in nature, there has been growing interest to apply it in a democratic scene (Edigheji, 2005). Nevertheless, some issues were experienced in the attempt of making democratization and developmental endeavors compatible in Ethiopia. The EPRDF led government has abused the civil and political rights enshrined in the constitution employing repressive electoral, terrorism, media, civil society, and other laws whereby the state is labeled as 'Not Free' (Freedom House, 2020). To the worst extreme, the miraculous economic achievement enjoyed under the guiding paradigm of DDS has forced the aid donors and advocacy establishments to overlook their inherent purpose of defending democratization and human rights in Ethiopia. They have accepted rather uncritically that the curtailment of democracy and human rights is a necessary and acceptable trade-off (Brown & Fisher, 2020).

To illustrate, Bereket (2018) provided an instance that those citizens who ardently quest for good governance, fair benefit, popular participation, and justice in the occasionally prepared public forum have been forced to give their mobile numbers for the stage leaders thereby put them in the archives of blacklists in Tigray. Those who speak for democracy and community development were branded as enemies of the ruling party and hence faced with subsequent life intimidations and unjust punishments. This worrying incident shows the truth that how much the democratic culture was [is] far from the ruling party's modus operandi and vivendi making the concept of DS malleable whereby the government organs have used and applied it in a very illusive suit. The government's courses of action to promote democratization and human rights have been rationalized and evaluated merely with a reference to the economic success of the developmental state. Pertinent to this, Gedion (2015) and the Government of Regional State of Tigray (2020) confirmed that the Ethiopian state was disreputable in democratization and political liberalization processes, disarming the alleged democratic institutions recognized by the constitution.

The opposition political parties competing in the state usually suggest that EPRDF's move to pursue DDS is aimed at renewing its legitimacy *via* the fake periodic election which enabled

itself to stay in state power. They declared repeatedly that the five regular general elections conducted are not genuine and democratic but window dressing for the election outcomes was predetermined (Asnake, 2011; UNDP, 2012; Freedom House, 2020). By coincidence, Ohno (2009) had predicted that the natural political instability of developing countries and volatile EPRDF's developmental coalitions would appear as the sources of emerging challenges of the DDS of Ethiopia. In sum, as Endalcachew (2018) stated such detrimental effects as the perpetual erosion of the value of pluralism, human rights abuses, and entrenchment of a single party authoritarian rule have been faced during the power tenure of EPRDF.

### *Unequal Distribution of Economic Benefits*

In the economic sphere, some costs were unarguably incurred by Ethiopian citizens. Worst of all, the rampant corruption in which PM Abiy ironically explained it as it was [is] the fifth organ of the government that has distorted the equitable distribution of national wealth among the people. Abiy justified that rule of corruption has been monolithically prevailed for the political leadership, where he was part of it, was plagued by lack of ability to create common dreams, excellence to control emotions, and reluctance to reconcile leadership skills (Abiy, 2019).

In parallel, Tefera (2019) has explicitly placed the prevailing economic fact in Ethiopia as attributed to oligarchization where the few party elites manipulated the economic decision in favor of their exclusive interests. Putting differently, carefully recognizing the political economy traditions entrenched throughout the last two decades, Weis (2016) has pointed that the Ethiopian state is characterized by vanguard capitalism, which combines the incompatible logic of democratic centralism and capitalist markets. After the shocking election result of 2005, EPRDF thus reclaimed its vanguard role in the fusing party, state, and market roles for economic transformation's sake. On the other hand, Bereket (2018) has witnessed that the EPRDF run government has unleashed to flourish plagues of predatory state and state capturing for its leadership part has itself submerged in the ocean of enlarging the respective pocket plundering the state's treasury. Bereket specifically stated that the political economy of rent-seeking has exposed government leaders to surrender their state apparatuses and machinery for very few giant capitalists so that accumulated mutually unfair wealth at the expense of the majority poor.

Most importantly, the economic and social developments achieved by the DDS model lack quality and proportionate distribution among the citizenry thereby the benefits were not

materialized and not necessarily trickled down to reach the poor (Ayele, 2018; Hauge and Chang, 2019). In this regard, Abiy (2019) elaborated that high cost of living, unemployment (around 19%), mismatch of saving and interest for investment, mismanagement of public projects, and weaknesses in the export sector and shortage of foreign exchange, budget deficit, sluggish structural transformation, contrabands, and illegal trades are the hallmarks of lack of quality and ethical development hitherto.

Irrefutably, the deceptive EPRDF's lexicon of "Developmental Capitalists" has produced a small class of capitalists who have exclusively concentrated on wealth establishing collusive interests with the ruling party elites. In support of this fact, Birhane Tsigab, a former member of the Central Committee of TPLF, revealed the embedded form of wealth accumulation and grand corruption within the ruling coalition and how that led to the decay of the coalition party (Birhane, 2020). Consequently, the political clientelism and patronages were widespread forcing EPRDF to change its top leaders in the hope of rectifying the past mistakes and building on its achievements (Government of Regional State of Tigray, 2020).

In this respect, Ayele (2018) further underlined that EPRDF has spoiled the inherent nature of DS and misapplied it in the process of state capture where both crony and political capitalism rooted in Ethiopia for two decades. Remarkably, the double-digit economic growth record reported by the government, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank (WB) were so much exaggerated for a number of ordinary citizens are still unable to afford even their minimum livelihood exemplifying what an elderly man from Oromia has said: "Our body is naked and our stomach empty, but the authorities keep telling us as that we are well dressed and fed!" (Ayele, 2018, p.1).

To the worst, few individuals wrongly argue that the DDS's path instead produced a fertile environment only for Tigrians to plunder the state's resources and exclusively accumulate infinite wealth (Young, 2020). However, the tangible fact is that few political and economic elites who are close to the political status quo irrespective of their ethnic grounds have been equally engaged in economic sabotages. The innocent people of Tigray, however, remain poorer than the other nations, nationalities, and peoples of the state hitherto. As evidence, the poverty level of the National Regional State of Tigray is about 29.6 %, the highest rate as compared to

other regions, while the average rate at the national level is about 23% (United Nations Children's Fund [UNCIEF], 2020).

### **Aggravating Factors for the Abortion of Democratic Developmental State**

#### ***Ideological Division and Power Struggle within the Leadership***

“From a social-scientific viewpoint, an ideology is a more or less coherent set of ideas that provides a basis for organized political action, whether this is intended to preserve, modify or overthrow the existing system of power relationships” (Heywood, 2013, p.28). Ideologically speaking, in a typical DS the government leaders' common anthems and practices are attributed to ensuring development and eradicating poverty (Mkandawire, 2001). Along with this, ideal DDS needs internally cohesive, visionary, and committed leaders considered as the software who can effectively mobilize the human and material resources to realize the envisioned rapid economic development. Hence, the hegemonic development thinking is required to dominantly triumph throughout the party and state apparatuses (Gumede, 2009; Fesseha and Abtewold, 2017).

Normally, the political leadership part of a government puts the lion's fingerprint on the regular mission of a state in guiding the development agents to the required track strategically. Leaders are hopefully expected to be visionary and largely development-oriented particularly in states aspiring to be developmental (UN, 2011). In the case of Asian Tigers, the politicians were highly committed to the opening a fertile scene where the state bureaucracy actually ruled but the former ideally sat on the political chairs. Commonly speaking, the political leaders of these states were disciplined and courageous enough to let their respective countries catch up with the level of economic development where the West has reached (Fritz and Menocal, 2006).

Unfortunately, age-old intraparty sectarian power rivalries within the EPRDF fueled the protest movements dominantly in Oromia and Amhara regions precipitating the breakdown of collective leadership and ruling front in Ethiopia (Østebø and Tronvoll, 2020). To this end, TPLF, the founding member of EPRDF withdrew from Addis Ababa to Mekelle, the Tigray capital, and began coordinated opposition against the new administration. To the worst, rather than employing inclusive measures in the interest of political stability and administrative continuity, the new leadership of the federal government moved aggressively to the extent of removing



TPLF leaders from key federal institutions (The International Institute for Strategic Studies[IISS], 2020).

Most worryingly, this time incumbent Ethiopian government has been categorically divided into two mutually inconsistent blocks, the leftists [the reform leaders] and rightists [the so-called inertia group]. This self-division of the government has resulted in ideological incompatibility and conflict of power interests among the government authorities ruling the same people and state. The first block is known as the Team-Lemma [named after the former Minister of Defense Force] that considers itself as a change agent engaged primarily in blackmailing what has been done by the deceased EPRDF - the dominant party which governed the state for about the last consecutive 28 years entirely. This block needs a change in the political economy status quo and seems ideologically submissive to the Neo-liberal recipes (IISS, 2020). Moreover, the new leadership condemns core tenets of EPRDF, revolutionary democracy, and democratic centralism, for they are timely irrelevant and democratic governance unfriendly (Ayele, 2018).

The second block of the government refers to TPLF [the rightist camp], one of the grand and founding members of EPRDF, which has still an insistent position on the perpetuation of the multi-national federation, revolutionary democracy, democratic and developmental state thinking. This segment of the government is a skeptic of the relevancy of Neo-liberalism arguing that it is dead to function in African existing contexts. TPLF's defense for DDS is an off-shoot of the architect of DDS, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi's position against the dead-end Neo-liberal paradigm that African renaissance in general and Ethiopian in particular can only be possible if the respective states remain democratic and developmental in ideology and structure too (Meles, 2012). Discontented by the unconstitutional, unpredictable, and exclusive political reforms of PP's leadership, government officials from Tigray on different occasions are arguing it is the DDS which assisted this country at least to reduce its level of abject poverty and change its image in a relative sense. Owing to this fact, the government of Tigray is declaring for the consolidation of DDS and adequate ideological, structural, and institutional reforms are being undertaken thereon (Getachew, 2019).

Despite the fact that DS needs unanimous decisions and smooth relationships among the same government organs to realize the dreams of social transformation, ideological division and lack of internal harmony within the incumbent government are entrenched as daunting challenges in

Ethiopia. During the EPRDF's ruling time, there had been an intra-party consensus at least within the political leadership that poverty is the existential threat and number one foe of the Ethiopian people. But now, in addition to the typical loopholes of the government officials to thoroughly and scientifically understand the nature of DDS, the recent ideological-level divisions and unlimited lust for power added fuels to the fire. The nascent DDS model was widely expected by several domestic and international communities to be full-fledged and ripen the already sown seeds of development and might change the economic image of the country. Regrettably, due to the leadership crises explained in the form of ruling party disintegration and political figures' disagreement, the state seems as it is going to embark from the scratch or be entangled in the vicious circle trap, the natural curse (Ayele, 2018).

### ***Structural and Institutional Profile of the Government: Fragile Bureaucracy***

In the successful DSs, capable and independent institutions have played irreplaceable roles in realizing rapid economic development (Edigheji, 2010). In Japan, for example, according to Chalmers Johnson, the independent pilot agency, Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), composed of workers of best minds who have effectively and efficiently planned and executed developmental missions was the engine of the economic miracle (Johnson, 1982). This has happened as the relationship between the state and market, and the associated miraculous economic growths were institutionally founded (Haggard, 2015; Brown and Fisher, 2019).

Among other things, the role played by capable, effective, and autonomous state bureaucracy in the remarkable level of economic development attained by the classical DS preoccupies the vital place (Mynes and Musamba, 2010). According to Evans, the highly selective meritocratic recruitment and long-term career rewards create commitment and a sense of corporate coherence. Nevertheless, state bureaucracy should withstand the pressures imposed by interest groups and at the same time genuinely be connected with the society to derive popular legitimacy concurrently-embedded autonomy (Evans, 1995).

In most of the LDCs in general and Africans in particular, the institutional capacity flaw of the civil service is taken as the major source of the political economy crises. African countries including Ethiopia have feeble, fragile, ineffective, and vulnerable institutions identified by lack of managerial, administrative, and technical skills (United National Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2009). Cognizant of this truth, over the last three decades, many

countries have been acquainting themselves with fundamental reforms in the structure and framework of their civil service sectors. Ethiopia, as part of its general political and economic restructuring programs, has undertaken comprehensive measures to restructure its bureaucracy (Chanie, 2001). Despite the reforms, it still lacks meritocratic and apolitical civil service in public sectors. In this respect, it has been argued that the power and strong organizational capabilities of the EPRDF were used to compensate for deficiencies of the bureaucracy (Oqubay, 2015).

In some cases, the bureaucrats in Ethiopia have been ethnically and politically affiliated in their routine public services delivery duties. This directly implies that public sectors are not independent of patronage and neo-patrimonial linkages whereby ultimately hindered the perpetuation of DDS. To mention a few, the land administration, customs and revenue authority, construction, telecommunication, trade, industry, and the like state sectors are found to be more susceptible to governance lacunas (Gedion, 2015; Jebena, 2015). Needless to say, the democratic institutions of the Parliament, Judiciary, Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, Ombudsman, media organization, and civil societies have constitutional recognition to exist and function for enhancing the democratic and developmental efforts. Conversely, their arms have been deliberately paralyzed to control the government (Mesgna, 2015; Transparency International (TI), 2015; Yohannes, 2019).

According to PM Abiy, one of the reasons why the attempt to build DS in Ethiopia for the last 27 years was not successful is the limitation to install capable institutions. The institutions on which the state has based have problems of intermingling the roles of party and government, lack of capacity and independence, and lack of adaptability to the social and economic changes (Abiy, 2019). In congruent, closely examining the institutional profile of the government, Clapham (2018) showed that clearly, Ethiopia ranks as one of the examples in Africa which applied developmental state beyond the East Asian experience so that meets Kelsall's criteria for what he terms 'Developmental Patrimonialism'. Thus, one cannot find a DS-friendly and compatible institution that can be considered as a pilot agency to direct and mobilize the state's activities in a coordinated way to achieve the grand goal of ensuring development and eradicating poverty under a democratic context (Alemayehu, 2019).

## **Current Political Dynamics: Changes and Continuities Followed**

### ***Reform Led Mushrooming Political Realities***

The rampant unequal distribution of wealth, lack of freedom, widespread unemployment, corruption, and self-enrichment on a grand scale coupled with the leadership crisis encountered in EPRDF has made a change not just desirable, but a necessity (Melaku, 2019). Particularly, in Amhara and Oromia regions, the violent youth protests and grievances had the form of ethnic conflicts for about three consecutive years (2015-18) consuming human lives and destructing development projects. Consequently, PM Abiy Ahmed succeeded in the ineffective leadership of Hailemariam Desalegn (IISS, 2020). Once PM Abiy Ahmed has controversially secured the state power, he promised that his government will unprecedentedly work to change the infamous deep-rooted conventional political economy of Ethiopia.

Initially, the new leadership camp has undertaken extraordinary courses of decisions to open up the previously narrow form of political and democratic space inviting several exiled political parties to come into their home state and become important stakeholders to ceiling the launched reform (Endalcachew, 2018). Thousands of political prisoners, particularly, members of opposition parties, journalists, bloggers, and activists who were considered criminals according to the then draconian Press, Electoral, and Anti-Terrorism Proclamations have been released on the legal measures of amnesty and pardon. The government has repealed repressive laws such as the Charities and Societies Proclamation and the Anti-terrorism Proclamation that had been used formerly since 2009 to paralyze local media, civil society, and opposition political parties (Amnesty International, 2020; Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2020). Moreover, a landmark peace deal despite its associated complicated issues was signed with Eritrea, important political and economic reforms were put in place, and corrupt officials and human rights abusers were prosecuted (Yohannes, 2019; HRW, 2020). Following the new leadership's ambitious official promises, many observers have hopefully expected the new leadership will promote and fasten Ethiopia's path towards democracy (De Waal, 2018; Mohamed *et al.*, 2018).

In contrast to the aspirations of and trust rested on the new leadership, many responsible citizens of the state and other external actors have currently begun to doubt the internal strength and consistency of the change leaders. Among others, Abebe (2019) and Wendimu (2019) have plainly shown the incumbent government has no coherent, clear, and sustainable political and

economic road maps which can scatter seeds to the alleged reform. Now, the government lacks thoughtful decisions and an agreed guiding philosophy through which the plagues of poverty, conflicts, and undemocratic culture could be dismantled persistently from the state (Mehari, 2019). Shockingly, the unifying glues of the multi-national federation and the constitution have been reminded subject to frequent violations.

Wendimu (2019) in his book entitled ‘Beyond the Square’ has scholarly debunked that the change-leaders two years’ long rhetoric promises do not hold water in the sense that they failed to capture the existing state’s thirsty for development, democracy, and peace. The change leaders have been rather aggressively working to defame the legacy of EPRDF led government in all possible words. Despite PM Abiy officially and repeatedly has been declaring that his ‘*Medemer*’ ideology emphasizes ameliorating the loopholes of the previously held dominant DDS model, his government has engaged in deconstructing what has been successfully achieved to start from scratch (*Ibid*).

The legacy of the undemocratic assumption of state paternalism and the old dictum of “I know best for you” has been explicitly manifested under the new leadership’s behaviors (Abebe, 2019; Assefa, 2019). In this respect, it has been noted that it is difficult to denote ‘*Medemer*’ as whether it is incremental of the previous path or radical in nature. ‘*Medemer*’, an idea which seems as a surrogate of DDS notion, is merely limited to window dressing preach of the affirmative values of love, forgiveness, unity, fraternity, and synergy. These values are essential to ensure coordinated development, peace, and democracy, but they cannot stand alone in the absence of grand and overarching ideology which shows how to go forward to realize them. That is why the practice of the alleged change leaders is different from what they always proclaim publicly despite their claim that any reform is accompanied by path-dependent forces’ resistances in nature (Wendimu, 2019). To this effect, ethno-nationalist forces argue that ‘*Medemer*’, the PP’s guiding doctrine, is largely devoid of substance and may be a fig leaf over an emerging cult of personality (Reuters , 2019; IISS, 2020).

Unleashed from the unconstitutional and undemocratic decisions of the government, human and democratic rights violations have been faced by Ethiopian citizenry. Now, internal peoples’ displacement (about 3 million), ethnic conflicts and balkanization, and mass killings by security forces, and arrest have become the new normal phenomenon of the state (Mehari, 2019; HRW,

2020). There are no coordinated and institutionalized responses from the incumbent government towards such grave democratic culture deficits so that a number of people have doubt on the effectiveness of the government and predictability of the democratic system in the state (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2019; Amnesty International, 2020). In the worst case, vindicating the COVID-19 pandemic and interpreting the constitutional provisions, PP has postponed the general election formerly scheduled for August 2020 and inevitably resorted to some of the strong-arm tactics of its predecessors to prevent a loss at the ballot box. Both regional and federal government parliaments end their power tenure on October 10, 2020. Ethiopians speak threateningly of an inevitable civil war, state collapse, or both (Amnesty International, 2020). Unluckily, after the past two years' long reciprocal war of words and media propaganda undertaken between TPLF and PP, an actual war has been broken out in October 2020. The subsequent campaign of the Federal government to uphold the "Rule of Law" in Tigray has changed its form into unprecedented war. Owing to the war, the humanitarian crisis is being experienced by millions of civilians and several people have been exposed to displacements, killings, organized plundering, and hunger.

### ***Burgeoning Economic Policy-Oriented Confusions***

After the coming of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on April 2, 2018, to the state power, the Ethiopian government has unveiled a new economic reform blueprint, named "Homegrown Economic Reform Agenda", with a major aspiration to unlock the country's development potentials. The newly introduced initiative, among other things, outlined macroeconomic, structural, and sectoral reforms that are said to pave the way for job creation, poverty reduction, and inclusive growth (Office of the Prime Minister, 2019; Xinhua, 2019). In the name of "Home Grown" economic policy reform, the new leadership has officially embarked to conform to the typical recipes of International Financial Institutions (IFIs). In fact, the so-called "Home Grown" economic policy has failed to reflect and understand the real and structural economic problems defined in terms of economic and social infrastructure, research capability, technological know-how and human resource development, and socio-political organization that the country has at home. In a nutshell, it prescribes a solution without identifying the root causes of the problem around which remedial policies should have been proposed (Alemayehu, 2019).

Shockingly, without making adequate study, the commanding heights of the economy and sources of the state capacity including the Ethio-Telecom, financial sectors, power, and Ethiopian Airlines which were previously under the state control, are now going to be privatized to either foreign or domestic companies [if any] in the hope of securing foreign capital for development (Sara, 2019). Nevertheless, Belachew (2019) here recommends the state both as regulator and, in some instances, as an active player in developmental projects, which is still needed with some adjustment only on its highly centrist approach.

Deferred from the age-old EPRDF led government experience, Abiy's leadership has exhibited policy change in line with long-standing recommendations from the WB and IMF which boosted financial support for Ethiopia in subsequent months. In late 2019, the IMF announced a preliminary agreement with Abiy's administration for a loan of nearly \$3 billion that demanded gradual liberalization of the exchange-rate regime, among other conditions. At the same time, the government restarted talks to join the World Trade Organization (Jay, 2019; IISS, 2020). This proves the fact argued by Belachew (2019) that Ethiopian economic policy has been in constant fluidity as the regimes change.

After a closer examination of the reformists' leadership in EPRDF, Alex De Waal has hence the doubt that the Ethiopian state could be the political marketplace of some other foreign state and non-state actors. This implies that the national interest of the Ethiopian state is being overlooked. This is because the reform lacks domestic institutional readiness and succinct strategy of state-directed economic growth, commitment to pro-poor welfare policies, and nature of the state institutions (De Waal, 2018). Thus, once critically analyzing the prevailing political and economic situations of the state, Mehari (2019) has scholarly put five possible scenarios which are consensus federalism, establishing a transitional government, prevailing dictatorship, confederate Ethiopia, or fragmentation/disintegration.

Despite PM Abiy has shown in his book entitled '*Medemer*' that there are three causes for the fracture of the Ethiopian economic system which include inadequacy of market, government, and system, his government still becomes unable to fill them adequately. He also noted healthy economic development will be achieved with the participation of the government, private sector, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and educational institutions (Abiy, 2019). Put differently, the already dead EPRDF led democratic developmental state had identified that its

social base was relayed on the political coalitions of small landholder farmers, laborers, and urban dwellers mainly taking effective experiences from Scandinavians and Japan (Meles, 2012; Kidanemariam, 2014; Tapscott *et al.*, 2018). Here, a vivid change in the ideological social base has also been observed.

On the other hand, the PM repeats EPRDF's approach to achieving development through Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI). He says economic development is the prerequisite for peace and security of Ethiopia echoing EPRDF's policy of DS. In this vein, the PM's perspective of economic development seems not different from that of EPRDF. In his 'Medemer' book, the PM stated that Ethiopia should pursue youth oriented-economic development for the jobless youth to maintain the peace and security of the country. In addition, he confirms agriculture is the backbone of the economy which needs to be modernized and market-focused. It seems that PM Abiy is trying to sell EPRDF's ideas by rebranding and repackaging them (Assefa, 2019). Relying on these facts, it remains safe to argue the incumbent government lacks internal coherence and faces confusions of ideological emphasis which may in the long run costs the state a lot.

In the 2019-World Economic Forum, as a clear manifestation of ideological confusions of the incumbent government, PM Abiy has boldly appreciated the economic performance achieved by EPRDF and delivered his speech in the languages of the developmental state formerly used by his predecessor PM Meles (Jay, 2019). Nevertheless, in practical words, the development partners of Abiy's government tend to be a western world dominated. Now, China, the former development and political economy-ally of the Ethiopian government appears to have fewer places in the current government of Ethiopia. Anyway, the IMF had forecasted per capita GDP growth to drop to 5.5% in 2020 due to COVID-19 (IISS, 2020). The ongoing war within the state might worsen the economic crisis incurred too. Depending on the above realities, one can infer that the two-decades-long launched DDS has reached its pinnacle of premature death and subsequent replacement by Neo-liberal orientations in the state.

### **Conclusion and Recommendation**

Ethiopia has been serving as the laboratory room for different politico-economic ideologies. The deceased EPRDF led government has acquainted Ethiopia with the DDS model on the fact that both democracy and development are equally important existential values. Many domestic and



international observers hence witnessed that the DDS development path has made Ethiopia paint rosy economic pictures on the global community's eye. The trade-off between democracy and economic development has been considered as a tolerable cost. Principally, the ideological split, needless lusts for power in the political leadership, and the flimsy institutions have in tandem triggered the abortion of the embryonic but far-sighted DDS. Explicitly, the new leadership has brought a shift in ideology to conform itself to the Neo-liberal recipes although it lacks self-harmony and consistency. Nevertheless, some argue that the new leadership appears to regurgitate the footsteps of its predecessor EPRDF rebranding its infamous legacy. It is suggested that the reform desperately seeks coordinated political and economic road maps to transform the state into the democratic scene and development avenues. In sum, the reformist group should tackle its leadership lacunas *via* consistent national dialogue to that they secure positive synergy and rescue the state from its natural destiny of vicious circle trap.

### References

- Abebe, T. (2019). *Ethiopian politics: From where to where*. Addis Ababa: Mankusa Printing House.
- Abiy, A. (2019). መደመር (*Medemer*) (Amharic Edition). Addis Ababa: Tsehai Publishers.
- Gebremariam, M. F., Bayu, M. A. (2017). Ethiopia: A democratic developmental state ? *ILIRIA International Review* 7(2): 10-26.
- Balema, A. A. (2014). *Democracy and economic development in Ethiopia*. New Jersey: The Red Sea Press.
- Geda, A. (2005). The political economy of growth in Ethiopia. Retrieved May 03, 2020, from [http://www.alemayehu.com/AA%20Recent%20Publication/Growth\\_CambChap\\_Sept2006.pdf](http://www.alemayehu.com/AA%20Recent%20Publication/Growth_CambChap_Sept2006.pdf)
- Geda, A. (2005). 'Macroeconomic performance in post-reform Ethiopia' *Journal of Northeast African Studies* 8(1): 159-185.
- Geda, A. (2019). *Ethiopia's "homegrown" reform: If the diagnosis is not right, it may end-up a wish list*. Addis Ababa: AAU. Retrieved May 03, 2020, from <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335972270>
- Altenburg, T. (2010). Industrial policy in Ethiopia: Discussion paper. *German Development Institute*.
- Amaha, D. T. (2012). The impact of policies and strategies on Ethiopia's development challenges. Pretoria: University of South Africa.
- Amnesty International. (2020). *Beyond law enforcement: Human rights violation by Ethiopian security forces in Amhara and Oromia*. London: Amnesty International Ltd.
- Asnake, K. (2011). Narratives of developmentalsim and development in Ethiopia. *Addis Ababa University*: PP.1-14.

- Assefa, L. A. (2019). *Satenawnews*. Retrieved February 19, 2020, from <https://www.satenaw.com/book-review-medemer-a-book-by-dr-abiy-ahmed/>
- Ayele, G. (2018). Commentary: What is happening to EPRDF'S developmental state? Addisstandard, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Retrieved February 19, 2020, from <https://addisstandard.com/commentary-what-is-happening-to-eprdfs-developmental-state/>
- Bagchi, A. K. (2000). The past and the future of the developmental state. *Journal of World-Systems Research* 6(2): 398-442.
- Belachew, M. (2019). Economic analysis: Ethiopia's developmental state: Dead or alive? Addis Standard. Addis Ababa. Retrieved February 19, 2020, from <https://addisstandard.com/economic-analysis-ethiopias-developmental-state-dead-or-alive/>
- Bereket, S. (2018). *Rebirth of Ethiopia from a cross roads ( Translated From Amharic Version)*. Angkor Publishers Pvt.Ltd, India.
- Bichaka, F. (1992). Rent seeking behaviors of Ethiopian rulers as a constraint for the economic developmennt of Oromo people . *Oromo Commentary*.
- Bigman, D. (2007). *Globalization and the least developed countries: Potentials and pitfalls*. UK: Bidless Ltd KIngs Lynn.
- Birhane, T. (2020). *Twin roads' conversation* . Addis Ababa: Fareast Publishing Trading.
- Bolesta, A. (2007). China as a developmental state. *Montenegrin Journal of Economics No 5*: 106-108.
- Brown, S., & Fisher, J. (2020). Aid donors, democracy and the developmental state in Ethiopia. *Democratization* 27(2): 185-203.
- Chanie, P. (2001). The challenges of civil service reform in Ethiopia: Initial observations. *Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review* (17): 79-102.
- Chris Tapscott, T. H.D. (2018). *The democratic developmental state: North-south perspective*. Stuttgart, Germany: CROP International Poverty Studies .
- Clapham, C. (2018). The Ethiopian developmental state. *Third World Quarterly* 39(6):1151-1165.
- Creswel, J. W. (2009). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methedos*. London: SAGE Publications. Inc.
- Edigheji, O. (2005). *A democratic developmental state in Africa?* Johannesburg, South Africa: Centre for Policy Studies.
- Edigheji, O. (2010). *Constructing democratic developmental state in South Africa: Potentials and challenges*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
- Endalcachew, B. (2018). Developmental state of Ethiopia : Reflections on the benefits obtained and costs incurred. *Ethiopian Journal of the Social Sciences and Humanities* 14 (2): 72-92.
- Evans, P. B. (1995). *Embedded autonomy : States and industrial transformation in the United Kingdom*. West Sussex: Princeton University Press.
- Eyob, G. B. (2018). The carrot and stick of Ethiopian democratic developmentalism: Ideological, legal and policy frameworks, 62-86. In Tapscott Chris, Halvorsen Tor & Rosario Teresita Cruz-del (eds.). *The democratic developmental state: North-south perspectives*. Germany: Ibidem Presss.
- Fantini, E. (2013). Developmental state, economic transformation and social diversification in Ethiopia. *ISPI (Analysis No. 163)*: 1-7.

- Fesseha, M., & Bizuayehu, D. (2017). In defense of Ethiopia's adoption of "democratic developmental state" – issues and challenges. *Üniversitepark Bülten* 6(2): 66-73.
- Freedom House. (2020). *Freedom in the world-2020 - Ethiopia* .
- Fritz, V., & Menocal, A. R. (2006). (Re) building developmental states: From theory to practice. *Overseas Development Institute: Working Paper*.
- Gedion, J. G. (2005). An African developmental state: Ethiopia's emergent experience. *Regional Conference on Building Democratic Developmentalstate for Economic Transformation in Sothern Africa*, pp.1-35.
- Getachew, R. (2019). *Current issue*. (T. Television, Interview)
- Gumede, W. (2009). Delivering the democratic developmental state in South Africa: Development planning division. *Working Paper Series No 9*.
- Haggard, S. (2015). The developmental state is dead: Long live the developmental state! *Researchgate*, pp. 40-66.
- Hauge, J., & Chang, H. J. (2019). The concept of a 'developmental state' in Ethiopia: Part.vi. In Fantu Cheru, Christopher Cramer (eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of the Ethiopian Economy*. Oxford: OUP.
- Heywood, A. (2013). *Politics*. New York: The Palgrave Macmillan.
- Human Rights Watch(HRW). (2020). *World report events of 2019*. USA: Human Rights Watch.
- International Crisis Group (ICG). (2019). *Keeping Ethiopia's transition on the rails*. Brussels, Belgium : International Crisis Group.
- Jay, S. (2019). The new scramble for Ethiopia. Retrieved February 12, 2020, from <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/06/ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-meles-zenawi/>
- Jebena, B. A. (2015). Ethnic federalism and democratic developmental state in Ethiopia: Some points of contradictions. *International Journal of Political Science and Development* 3(7): 291-300.
- Kidanemariam, B. H. (2014). Democratic developmental state. *National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies*. Retrieved February 12, 2020, from [https://www.grips.ac.jp/forum/IzumiOhno/lectures/2014\\_Lecture\\_texts/Lec7\\_DDS\\_Kidu.pdf](https://www.grips.ac.jp/forum/IzumiOhno/lectures/2014_Lecture_texts/Lec7_DDS_Kidu.pdf)
- Lidetu, A. (2020). Ethio-forum. (T. Television, Interview)
- Mehari, M. T. (2019). In-depth-analysis: Can Ethiopia make the transit to stability. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Retrieved February 12, 2020, from <https://addisstandard.com/in-depth-analysis-can-ethiopia-make-the-transit-to-stability/>
- Melaku, H. (2019). *Ethiopian insight*. Retrieved February 12, 2020, from <http://www.ethiopiainsight.com>
- Meles, Z. (2012). *States and markets: Neoliberal limitation and the case for developmental state*. DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698561.003.0005
- Mesgna, G. (2015). *Challenges and prospects of building the developmental state in Africa: A comparative study of Botswana and Ethiopia*. MA Thesis. Addis Ababa: AAU.
- Mkandawire, T. (2001). Thinking about developmental states in Africa. *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 25(3): 289-313.
- Salih, M., Eshete, A., Assefa, S. (2018). Reflections on expanding Ethiopia's democratic space: Aspirations, opportunities, choices. Addis Ababa: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
- Musamba, P. M. (2010). *The developmental state in Africa: Problems and prospects* . University of Duisburg-Essen: Institute for Development and Peace.

- Mathebula, N. E. (2016). An impossible developmental state in the South African context: A true reflection of the Asian Tigers? *Bangladesh e-journal of sociology* 13(1): 46-55.
- National Planning Commission. (2015). *Growth and Transformation Plan II (2015/16-2019/20)*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia .
- Office of the Prime Minister. (2019). *A homegrown economic reform agenda: A path way to prosperity*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia .
- Ohno, K. (2009). *Ethiopia: Political regime and development policies*. Tokyo: Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS). Presented at Policy Dialogue on Industrial Development in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa.
- Oqubay, A. (2015). *Made in Africa: Industrial policy in Ethiopia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pillay, P. (2002). The role of the state in economic development in southern Africa: Dialogue on globalization. Berlin: Department for Development Policy, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
- Rapley, J. (2010). *Understanding development: Theory and practice in the third world*. New Delhi: Lynne Rienner.
- Reuters. (2019). *Ethiopia's ruling coalition agrees to form single party ahead of 2020 vote*. Reuters.
- Routley, L. (2014). Developmental states in Africa? A review of ongoing debates and buzzwords. *Development Policy Review* 32(2): 159-177.
- Sara, M. (2019). Abiy Ahmed's 'Medemer' reforms: Can it ensure sustainable growth for Ethiopia and what are the challenges facing the new government? *Policy Center for the New South* (PB-19/08): 1-9.
- Solomon, I. (2007). *Tigray: The agony and the ecstasy*. Ethiopia: Berhanena Selam Printing.
- Stiglitz, J. E. (1998). *Towards a new paradigm for development: Strategies, policies and processes*. Geneva: UNCTAD .
- Tamrat, D. D. (2013). Emergence of democratic developmental state in Africa : The experience from Ethiopia. DOI: <https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2329040>
- Tefera, G. N. (2019). *The party that consumes the state: The rise of oligarch in post 1991 Ethiopia*. Rotterdam: Legatron Electronic Publishing.
- Østebø T. & Tronvoll K. (2020). Interpreting contemporary Oromo politics in Ethiopia: An ethnographic approach. *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 14(4): 613-632. DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2020.1796255
- TGE. (1991). *Peaceful and democratic transitional conference of Ethiopia: Negarit Gazeta*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia .
- The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). (2020). Ethiopia's factional politics. *Strategic Comments* 26 (2):10-12.
- Tigray, G. O. (2020). *Memorandum on averting the looming constitutional and political crisis in Ethiopia*. Mekelle: The Government of Regional State of Tigray.
- Transparency International (TI). (2015). *Corruption perception index*. Berlin: TI
- UN. (2011). *Governing development in Africa - The role of state in economic transformation*. Addis Ababa: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.
- Tsegaye R. and Sehen B. (2012). *Democratization in a developmental state: The case of Ethiopia: Issues, challenges and prospects*. Ethiopia: Governance and Human Rights Unit, UNDP.
- HDR. (2019). *Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today: Inequalities in human development in the 21<sup>st</sup> century*. New York: UNDP.

- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). (2009). *The least developed countries report : The state and development governance*. New York: United Nations.
- Waal, A. D. (2018). The future of Ethiopia: Developmental state or the political market place. *World Peace Foundation*, pp.1-19.
- Weis, T. (2016). *Vanguard capitalism: Party, state and market in the EPRDF's Ethiopia*. (Doctoral dissertation, University of Oxford).
- Weldeabrha, N. (2014). *Democratic developmental state from local governance perspective: The case of Hawzen Woreda, Masters Thesis*. Mekelle University, Mekelle.
- Wendimu, A. (2019). *Beyond the Square*. Addis Ababa.
- White, G. (2006). Towards a democratic developmental state. *Institute of Development Studies Bulletin* 37(4): 60-70.
- Xinhua. (2019, 09 10). *Roundup: Ethiopia's newly unveiled economic reform aims to unlock major dev't potentials*. Retrieved 02 20, 2020, from [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/10/c\\_138381691.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/10/c_138381691.htm)
- Yared, G. (2016). *Ethiopia continues to grow amid challenges*. Addis Ababa: Ethiopian Herald News Paper .
- Yohannes, G. (2019, 12 18). *Aljazeera*. Retrieved January 7, 2020, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/abiy-ahmed-prosperity-party-good-news-ethiopia>
- Young, J. (2020, May 23). *Ethio-forum*. (T. Television, Interview)

## **The Effects of Teachers' Training on Professional Development and Teaching Practice: A Case Study of Two Selected Colleges in Bangladesh**

Mohammad Jahangir Hossain Mojumder (Ph.D.)\*

### **Abstract**

*Nowadays, demands are growing for outcome-based and transferable learning, particularly in higher education. Being the terminal formal schooling, it needs facilitation of pupils' achievement of problem-solving skills for real-life by teachers. To this end, this qualitative research employs a case study approach, which is suitable to test an event with small samples, and a phenomenological method to analyze respondents' perceptions and activities thematically and descriptively to assess changes. In-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and class observations are used to collect data from two selected colleges to examine the extent of professional development and methodological shift in teaching as effects of training to include active learning strategies for better learning outcomes. The data though reveals that the selected flagship training program offers a bunch of pedagogical methods (not need-based) to imbibe, yet reject the idea that the nationally arranged training remains a successful effort to increase trainees' knowledge, skills, and polish attitudes except disseminating a few concepts superficially. Moreover, trainees lack the motivation to shift their teaching habits and are unconvinced that the application of these newly learned strategies will transform anything. Likewise, they are discontented about training contents and unenthusiastic in consort with unfavorable opinions about training procedures and trainers to some extent. Therefore, the results suggest limited or no significant professional development and modification in teaching practice, rather teachers continue conventional teacher-centered method, and the effort stays insufficient, extraneous, 'fragmented', and 'intellectually superficial'. Additionally, at the colleges, large class size, inappropriate sitting arrangement, pervasive traditionality, absenteeism, and other analogous challenges limited them to change their practice. Considering all these, this study suggests that alternations should be initiated at a micro (teachers & college) and macro-level (training providers & policymakers) to offer tailor-made, autonomous, and need-based training. Last but not the least, this endeavor is limited by being entirely qualitative with small sample size and not eliciting the views of any of the trainers and policymakers and which can be an indication of points of departure for future study.*

**Keywords:** *Bangladesh, Professional Development, Teacher, Leadership, Training*

### **Introduction**

Given that better learning outcomes of students stay as key targets of the teaching-learning process,—they require continuous meticulous demarches to ensure the achievements. In this

---

\* Chowmuhani Government SA College, Bangladesh. Email: [jahangirhm@gmail.com](mailto:jahangirhm@gmail.com)

alignment, teachers need to be aware and familiarized with different customs of innovative and effective pedagogic and andragogic knowledge and skills to practice a wide range of teaching strategies and methods in and outside of classrooms depending on contexts (Ulla & Winitkun, 2018). For this, teachers are provided with multidimensional job-implanted professional development (PD) opportunities (Wilson & Berne, 1999), such as – formal and informal training, instructions related courses, participation in national and international conferences and workshops. By and large, expectations by pupils are to change teaching practices, develop educational institutions and accelerate the embodiment of higher-order skills of Bloom's Taxonomy (Borko, 2004; Mizell, 2010). Nonetheless, to be effective, the processes need to be continuous and adaptable, based on reflections of the programs and practices that followed (OECD, 2005).

Despite wider acceptability and being practiced globally, the obligation of prior training for the teaching profession is not mandated in Bangladesh (Raqib, 2019). That is, the government, in National Educational Policy-2010, categorically mentioned the appointment of skilled teachers and the proposition of training for further improvement (GoB, 2010). Here, though different types of arrangements for in-service PD are offered, yet diverse provisions of teachers' training are available at different levels (Chowdhury & Sarkar, 2018). For instance, elementary school teachers go for one-year-long training at PTI (Primary Teachers' Training Institute) and then are offered regular other training and monthly cluster meetings at the sub-district level. Likewise, for secondary education, B.Ed. (Bachelor of Education), a one-year-long formal course is promoted, and other regular and donor-aided training are arranged (Karim & Mohamed, 2019); however, the outcome regarding accruing of knowledge on contents remains insignificant (Asadullah, 2017). In this regard, the initiatives for teachers of about 2,272 colleges (National University, 2020) remain few, though high eminence in instructions by teachers at these colleges stands truncated (Raqib, 2019). Amongst these teachers, who belong to government colleges encounter a lack of initiatives for training or other types of PD, except mandatory four-month-long, nationally conducted, flagship program, Foundation Training Course (FTC), against the demands for incessant training. As a rule, these teachers are recruited first and then sent to selected colleges for classroom teaching without any pre-service orientation/training; and after serving for several years, they receive a call for joining FTC and the process bears the risk of being comfortable to traditional teaching methods by the beginners (Johannes, *et al.*, 2013). At the

regimented FTC, around 250 teachers, divided into three large groups, from all over Bangladesh, take part. However, the efficacy of this training program is scarcely explored. In this regard, Ali and Mawa (2019) did one, but that covered the foundation training only for university teachers.

Nevertheless, the training provider and government must reflect on the programs to identify the training outcomes, select skills to be entrenched, and set the methods of delivery. Therefore, understanding the insights and requirements of teachers and the relevance of the program to such demands stays crucial for the efficacy of the training in a resource-constrained country. These surely open the chances for redesigning the program and can engender critical discussions on the challenges teachers have been facing in classrooms and probable solutions to such obstacles. Moreover, the number of studies in Bangladesh on the effects of PD remains low, and found to reveal conflicting results with some positive and no visible outcomes. Thus, this study is believed to be worthy of merit and is going to offer insights regarding the compatibility of the program to teachers' PD and the degree of improvement in teaching. To explore the extent of relevance and effects of training, this study has selected FTC as the training to examine because, for many respondents, it is the only training opportunity in their service life.

Under the given background and stated problem, the objective of this research is to explore the effects of training for college teachers in Bangladesh, particularly, the effects of FTC on PD and shifts in teaching strategies at college-level education. In this alignment, this research endeavor has envisioned to set the specific objectives: (i) to investigate the teaching strategies provided by NAEM (National Academy for Educational Management) through FTC, (ii) to find out the magnitude of attainment of PD and implementation of the teaching strategies learned at FTC in their classrooms by teachers at the selected colleges, and (iii) to identify the weaknesses of FTC alongside the barriers teachers face while implementing learned teaching strategies at the respective colleges.

This research is not only significant to the context of Bangladesh, but also to other countries where the passion for 'didactic career' is dying intensely over the period, the teachers require to receive increased pedagogical training continuously and resourceful supports to work with aptitude and devotion to teach their students (Drăghicescu, *et al.*, 2018). Similarly, the meaningfulness of such cannot be glossed over and need to be seriously explored. However, as studies remain scarce in Bangladesh, it is little known, whether or not FTC brings changes in



teaching practice. Thus, this study is anticipated to add value to understand the perceptions of teachers regarding the relevance and effects of FTC for PD that translated into the inclusion of modern teaching strategies to didactical improvement. The results of this study are also expected to contribute to the growing knowledge on PD in Bangladesh by examining diverse modalities of FTC-related outcomes, teachers' perceptions, and reflections of FTC in their teaching practice. Likewise, the outcomes of the research - inputs, and insights - have implications for teachers, the authorities of colleges and NAEM, and policymakers to revisit and reform FTC, and the academia across the globe can be benefited from fresh results if pedagogical settings and frameworks are more or less similar in nature of implementation.

Theoretically, however, this research has not included the approaches of adult learning to explore the effects of training. Equally, methodologically, it has not relied much on quantification and statistical tools to gather and examine data, analyzed resources used for training, and elicited trainers' and policymakers' views and trainers' proficiency. Moreover, the numbers of colleges and respondents counted in the study are as low as suggested by Creswell (2013). Hence, these lacunas can be points of departure for further exploration on the issue. However, this study follows the qualitative method which is persistent in educational research, for example, Karim and Mohamed (2019) observed that the process though does not end in generalization yet stays prominent to deliver phenomenological insights of a training program. Moreover, being completely qualitative with a limited sample size, this research is not substantial enough to offer decisive suggestions. However, it is believed to suffice, through the application of methodological triangulation (Morse, 1991) and quantifying some qualitative data, to a satisfactory notch in warranting indicative recommendations for teachers of the government colleges to be reinforced with training to cope up with the needs of the digital era and the situation like Covid-19 pandemic.

## **Literature Review**

### **FTC – An Overview**

At FTC, both male and female teachers, most of the same age and salary scale, from government colleges of Bangladesh are trained once in a lifetime mandatorily under a common curriculum. These teachers are almost automatically chosen according to their age and batch at recruitment for civil service. At the beginning of a batch, comparatively older teachers are called first, if not

for anything but to get their job permanent. Housed in the capital city - Dhaka, NAEM, the training provider is resourced with facilitators from mainly General Education Cadre Service, and partly from direct recruitment. However, these two sets of trainers are not enough, and thus, the institution regularly invites renowned professionals from other sectors. Additionally, the institute with various resource constraints bears the responsibility of training thousands of teachers and administrators from a plethora of colleges, secondary schools, and educational departments from regional and national levels. Thus, it becomes difficult to accomplish FTC for all new teachers timely. Nonetheless, FTC maintains homogeneity to a great extent with the curriculum of a similar type of training program organized by BPATC (Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centers) (NAEM, 2019). However, that does deny the dissimilar needs of professionals across services, predominantly of teachers.

In this government-paid four-month-long residential training, the participants of different disciplines are trained together on varied development, administrative, pedagogic, and andragogic theories and methods, and education-related issues based on a common curriculum without focusing on subject contents. In total, they must accomplish 22 modules and of which number 22 (education and related contemporary issues) is dedicated to the teaching-learning purposes. It includes training sessions of about 30-40 hours; the key topics related to this study are – educational issues and different pedagogic and andragogic concepts and strategies. During the course, the participants are evaluated through formative and summative assessments, offering 25 marks for each category (NAEM, 2019).

### **Conceptual and Theoretical Framework**

The investigative literature on the learning processes of a teacher is relatively new. According to Borko (2004), evidence on teacher PD and its outcomes has been researched for nearly four decades. To this end, Desimone *et al.* (2002) stated that researchers are working very recently on identifying the contents and the process of learning by teachers and the links between PD and change in teaching and then on student learning outcomes.

Provided that teachers play key roles to augmented learning outcomes of understudies, Hawley and Rosenholtz (1984) confirm that amongst wide-ranging reasons that influence learning of students irrespective of their types – below average, average or above-average – teacher stands as the principal factor in every context. Thus, for a better student learning experience, teachers'

PD remains imperative. For this, treating ‘teaching’ and ‘teacher’ as ‘profession’ and ‘professional,’ respectively carries value. Hence, the question stands – what does PD mean? Though in reality, PD means many things to many, Joyce and Showers (1988) relate this with an accumulation of knowledge on subject matter and skills in teaching-learning. In this line, Day (1999) extends a comprehensive definition, to him PD....

*is the process by which, alone and with others, teachers review, renew and extend their commitment as change agents to the moral purposes of teaching; and by which they acquire and develop critically the knowledge, skills, and emotional intelligence essential to good professional thinking, planning, and practice with the children, young people and colleagues through each phase of their teaching lives (p. 4).*

Apart from the aforementioned views, Borko, *et al.* (2010) emphasize the ‘constructivist’ and ‘situative’ approaches, instead of behavioral models; and thus, against, mandatory, common, and periodical traditional efforts for PD. According to Smylie (1995), teachers learn more from their colleagues at workstations, when they obtain control over the processes (Sykes, 1996). Moving forward, Garet *et al.* (2001) underline process and materials - collective and active participation of teachers, and focus on contents for effective PD. However, the success of this type of program depends on the relatively shorter length of the course (Kennedy, 1998), which is able to integrate teachers’ experiences and offers prospects for receiving knowledge and skills with and from colleagues - but not from someone in authority (Sandholtz, 2002) - without separating from institutions (Lieberman, 1995).

Now, the question is - ‘what is PD for?’ In reply, Corrigan and Haberman (1990) argue that teachers must be professionally skilled enough to make use of four basic components of teaching - enhancing knowledge, ensuring quality, supporting with necessary resources, and congenial atmosphere - to intelligently deliver better teaching. Inspired by these, researchers, for example, Pezaro (n.d.) suggests that teachers need to focus on students' varied outcomes by modifying their teaching practices to be well conversant and smart. Thus, nowadays, according to Borko and Putnam (1995), the inclusion of sophisticated teaching strategies becomes necessary to impart intricate knowledge and skills, and the process needs to be included in school vision. However, academicians like Tang (2018) does not want teaching-learning to remain locked in four-wall of schools, rather include teachers’ attainment of basic soft life-skills - ‘teamwork’,

'communication', 'critical thinking' and 'problem-solving skill' - which are important for improved teaching and learning. For this, PD, according to OECD (1998), contributes to adapting, developing, and applying new teaching strategies of 'active learning'.

Here, PD is the key to assist the teacher in replacing conventional methods with active learning. Being important for bringing about changes – receiving a sense of the way forward, reinvigorating confidence, developing reflective and positive attitudes, motivating for employing critical stances, taking risks – PD needs varied types of intended efforts (Kohonen, 2001). Some notable efforts of PD are – pre-service and in-service training, various courses, reading related books and articles, participating in workshops, seminars, conferences, distant courses, engaging with professional groups, receiving foreign training, doing classroom-based action research, observing classroom activities, coaching or mentoring, and integrating technologies (Khan, 2008). Amongst these different measures of PD, in-service training stays important and well-practiced.

Though teachers do not categorize in-service training as the most successful effort (Smylie, 1989), it has been yet treated as one of the key mechanisms for PD. Again, Smylie (1996) argued that against other mechanisms - education-related policies and projects for guiding tutor activities - for shifting classroom practice, in-service training stays as the most effective one. Because policymakers sometimes stay incompetent (Spillane & Thompson, 1997) and in other cases, teachers disregard the modifications (Cohen & Ball, 1990) at the policy level that planned to touch their classroom activities. However, the outcomes of such shifts can be 'additive' or 'transformative' through the proliferation of new knowledge and skills or fine-tuning of attitudes and practice respectively (Day, 1999).

What does the empirical evidence reveal? Supovitz *et al.* (2000) identify that if the training becomes concentrated, 'inquiry-based plus need-based (Sandholtz, 2002), then teaching practices to shift sustainably to include intended strategies. Likewise, Desimone *et al.* (2002) find evidence of change in instructions of teachers when professional learning stays active. Recent studies suggest that the application of modern technologies and methods for teachers' training brings noticeable changes in teaching practice (Gómez-Carrasco *et al.*, 2020). From another point of view, a study in India presents that the efforts for PD resulted in building teachers' awareness to notice students' needs and development of conducive school atmosphere (Goel,

2019). Likewise, in a study conducted on the secondary level in Bangladesh, Asadullah (2017) argues that those who receive training exhibit comparatively better teaching skills than those who do not. However, he discovers that in real-time teaching, teachers do not practice the learned strategies to the full extent. Similarly, Karim and Mohamed (2019) divulge that trainees learned a lot at the programs, but when it comes to implementation, the examples remain few.

Hence, the pertinent question is – ‘what does PD need to be successful’? Kennedy (1998) moves ahead and suggests that PD develops teacher ability, and that translates into students’ better achievement, but it needs to be ‘intensive’ and ‘sustained.’ Then again, Shields *et al.* (1998) also forward arguments in favor of concentration and length of PD as they influence the extent of change in teachers. Although, there stays a debate – whether PD needs to work for behavioral change or focus on enhancing familiarity with subject contents and student learning. Rebutting the arguments, Asadullah (2017), and Kennedy (1998) argue that training on behavior obtains little effect, rather training on the subject matter and student learning results in better outcomes. Additionally, suggestions are offered to work simultaneously on teachers’ PD and institutional development as in isolation, efforts for improving both remain abortive (Fullan, 1991). Apparently, revealing the complexity, Van Driel & Berry (2012) mention that PD is not a ‘linear process’, rather it depends on contexts, school cultures, teacher attitudes, and beliefs.

### **Teaching Methods/Strategies**

Though teaching strategies encompass a set of actions – processes, methods, and techniques – a teacher uses while offering instructions, yet in this study, the terms methods and strategies have been used interchangeably. Teaching methods can be divided into two categories – teacher and student-centered (Teach.com, n.d.). In the teacher-centered model, the teacher remains the key figure and students stay as passive receivers of instructions, while assessment becomes a separate and end process (Tularam & Machisella, 2018). Reversely, in the student-centered model, pupils stay in the center and learn by doing, while assessment is continuous and considered as learning processes (Freeman *et al.*, 2014). Nowadays, for its effectiveness to achieve higher-order thinking skills of Bloom’s Taxonomy, the student-centered method has been recognized as a modern method. This study, with an aim to explaining the effects on teaching strategies, focuses on teaching strategies through employing modern teaching. Asaolusam (n.d.) describes modern learning methods as:

*A learner-centered and activity-based teaching method is used to get learners fully involved. ... It is called a constructivist approach because it enables the learner to construct her/his knowledge and skills through active participation in the teaching-learning process. The teacher only acts as a guide, leading the learners to achieve the teaching objectives of the topics through the activities the learners are engaged in during classroom interactions.*

The chalk-talk and teacher-centered methods, which promote rote learning and are used commonly by many teachers, have become dysfunctional to a great extent (Poirier, 2017). Moreover, the use of modern teaching methods has become important because of transformational change in knowledge and information on a global and national perspectives. These points of departure demand such people who with their creativity and criticality explore new knowledge horizons, identify missing links, and offer innovative concepts for development in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. To reach this level, pupils are needed to be made knowledgeable and skillful to be creative, problem-solver, self-dependent, and employable for macro-level development through modern teaching methods (Harari, 2019). Features of modern teaching practices stay diverse, such as, student-centered, task-based, resource-based, interactive, integrative, collaborative, use of real-life examples, applicable for all students along with comprehensive assessment for learning (Asaolusam, n.d.), which bring 'constructivism' and 'active learning' in the center.

Though it has significant role in higher education, teacher-centered method is losing prominence rather, when learning outcomes are considered, for treating students as passive actors due partly to its inherent focus on teachers (Poirier, 2017). Reversely, active learning, a concept with high potentials, demanding engagement of learners is being promoted (Felder & Brent, 2009). From the scholars who advocate this method, for examples, Chi & Wylie (2014) indicate that the tool, instead of encouraging rote learning, necessitates learners' 'cognitive and meaningful engagement' with materials and resources and activation of three learning domains - affective, psychomotor and cognitive (Clark & Mayer, 2008). In that case, students can be involved in varied activities – engagement, demonstration, presentation, memorization, or a mixture of activities. However, the determination of usage of a method and activities depends on the subject matter and nature of students and their way of learning (Westwood, 2008), and needed to be creative.

## **Teachers' PD in Bangladesh**

Though 'deficiency in teaching' has been identified as one of the key barriers for ensuring quality education (Asadullah, 2017); yet in Bangladesh, PD initiatives for teachers of varying levels, particularly for higher level, stays limited (Chowdhury & Sarkar, 2018), because of huge numbers of teachers and scarce opportunity to provide training timely. According to BANBEIS (2018), in 2018, 1.22 million teachers were working at wide-ranging educational institutes, and the number of teacher training institutes remained only 216. Moreover, there was no evidence of learning communities, teacher leadership, learning experience sharing, coaching, and mentoring while in-service training stayed limited (Thornton, 2006). In this backdrop, the government in collaboration with development partners takes varied measures through different projects - College Education Development Project (CEDP), Teaching Quality Improvement (TQI) in Secondary Education, Secondary Education Sector Investment Program (SESIP), plus Secondary Education Quality and Access Enhancement Project (SEQAEP) - for PD (Hamid & Baldauf, 2008). In the majority of the cases, the topics for training under these programs are selected by authorities and conducted by outside experts. Moreover, PD efforts for teachers of secondary level remain good in numbers, comparing to that for higher-secondary and tertiary level teachers, particularly for teachers at government colleges. For many, FTC remains the solitary program in career, except ICT (Information Communication Technology) training for some. At the same time, Hoque *et al.* (2010) claimed that they identified positive effects of PD on institutional development. They reveal that the outcomes have been significant when the focus is less on 'individual action inquiry' and more on teamwork, classroom reflection, and in-service training. Equally, Sarma *et al.* (2013) revealed shifts in teaching practice upon participating in training. However, Ali and Mawa (2019) identified that FTC for university teachers though revealed positive outcomes yet failed to enhance knowledge and skills and shape attitudes of teachers due to lack of variation of trainers and offering training detached from workstations. Moreover, while implementing learned skills, teachers encountered resistance from senior teachers.

## **Conceptual Framework**

*Figure 1* below shows that teacher's PD can be observed through teachers' competence and overturning of teaching practices in classrooms, as it is expected that PD contributes to the

adoption of modern teaching strategies – student-oriented methods – for students' better learning outcomes.




Figure 1: Theoretical Connection of PD and Teachers' Teaching Practice

Moreover, the processes of adoption of modern teaching strategies need to be supported by institutional culture and educational policy. Here, it is exhibited that nationally conducted FTC is a part of a state agenda and the study includes a single mode for PD training because of limited scopes and resource constraints. To identify the effects of FTC on teachers' professional competence and teaching practice, which can mutually influence each other; this study aims at examining teachers' teaching practice in the given context through analyzing methods of instructions and nature of activities and learning and perceptions of teachers.

### **Implications of Literature Review**

The literature review illustrates that PD remains a complex process and consists of varied formal and informal methods. The principal target of PD is to enhance teacher knowledge and skills on contents of subjects, teaching-learning practice. It is also revealed that PD becomes effective when it is conducted based on needs and when teachers learn from their colleagues, rather than from persons in authority with direct instructions. Thus, efforts for PD isolating teachers from institutional settings stay a little operative. The review also confirms that the PD of teachers does



not stand enough to bring transformation in teaching practice, as the process depends greatly on the institutional culture and national agenda. Thus, without changing school culture, efforts for PD to change teaching practice stay unsuccessful. The review concludes that between two methods of teaching - teacher and student-centered - the most desirable one is a student-centered style for its proven effectiveness to ensure better learning experiences for students. In this line, this study has mostly concentrated on examining the extent to which teachers practice student-centered teaching-learning strategies in classrooms.

### **Research Methodology**

The technique of the case study method, that is, a qualitative research design (Creswell, 2014) was employed for this study. The method, according to Yin (1984, p. 13), stays appropriate to test a phenomenon, program, event, individual, and/or other issues in its context and offers evidence, based on collected data from different sources. The method promotes in-depth analysis to obtain insights of the studied subjects and their relation when assimilating line of context and phenomenon becomes undetectable (*ibid.*, p. 23). The analysis remained dependent on cross-sectional data, which were collected from January to February 2020, a short and specified period to collect this type of data (Levin, 2006). This phenomenological approach steered scrutiny of perspectives of teachers and activities performed mostly in classrooms (Pringle, *et al.*, 2011).

### **Research Contexts**

Amongst two purposively selected government colleges, college-1 is at semi-urban sub-district level, college-2 is at the urban district level. The 77-year-old college-1 houses one two-storied building and two three-storied buildings of 21 classrooms for nearly 16,000 students (760 pupils per classroom) and 66 teachers (less than stipulated 96 posts). Likewise, college-2 has passed its centenary and houses 12 multi-storied buildings with about 150 classrooms for approximately 29,000 students (200 students per classroom) and 174 teachers (more than created 155 posts). However, encountering teacher shortage with high teacher-student ratio, both colleges offer higher secondary, undergraduate - degree pass, honors (13 & 18 disciplines for college-1 & college-2 respectively) - and postgraduate (2 & 18 disciplines respectively) general courses of science, business studies, and humanities. Moreover, conventionally from the onset, these institutions have been experiencing teacher-centered learning, and chalk-talk stayed as the supreme tool. Likewise, the national policy dictates no formative assessment, so these

institutions do not follow any till now. Though teachers learn best from their colleagues, there are no such pedagogical improvement efforts; for example, the presence of professional learning communities, the practice of teacher leadership, and other tailor-made college-based training except in-house ICT training.

### Sampling Process

The participants of FTC, who received training within the last five years and presently working for the selected colleges, were the population.

Table 1: Samples of the Study

Selected colleges	Number of teachers (who obtained training within last 5 years)	Samples	Percent
College-1 (Sub-district level)	12	8	67%
College-2 (District level)	18	12	67%
Total	30	20	67%

To select interviewees of both sexes, two government colleges from two different areas - semi-urban and urban - were selected purposively for easy access, and from those institutions, eight (8) respondents from college-1 and 12 from college-2, *i.e.*, the total of 20 were purposively selected to obtain relatively fresh experiences (*Table 1 above*). The small number of respondents conforms to Creswell's (2013) suggestion for the inclusion of four to five samples in a case study method.

### Data Collection

Being small-scale, this study employed in-depth interviews, observation, and focus group discussions to elicit perceptions and insights. In each case study area, the interviews were conducted with the help of a schedule, which was developed based on the constructs derived from literature and was checked and piloted to make error-free. The interviews lasted for 40 to 45 minutes, and during progress, notes were taken and conversations were audio-recorded obtaining earlier permission. Moreover, two focus group discussion (FGD) sessions, one for each college, using a protocol, were organized by including five mid-level teachers, for each session, of both genders, other than interview respondents. During the discussion, notes were written and sessions were recorded. This tool assisted the researcher to crosscheck the interviewees'

assertions and to explore further insights on the topic. Moreover, activities in four live classrooms have been observed to examine methodological practice by respondents. Notably, in every step of data collection, the researcher has maintained an ethical standards of research.

### **Data Analysis**

The audio records of the interview, first, were transcribed and checked thoroughly to find and remove inconsistencies. Secondly, depending on varied key points, data were codified and used for thematic analyses. Similarly, FGD data were checked thoroughly and significant issues were codified to use for reinforcing descriptive in-depth analysis. Likewise, observational data and notes were used to illustrate narratives of the effects. In some cases, qualitative data were quantified for underpinning descriptive-analytical results. Moreover, obtaining the opinions, the recording was finalized in four categories - significant, moderate, little, and no change - to understand the achievement of PD.

### **Reliability and Validity of the Processes**

The researcher offered, ‘thick description’ of the context, methods, and tools used for the research to warrant re-research. The interview schedule was developed based on the constructs derived from the literature. Before an interview, the respondents, chosen for obtaining valid data, were well-informed about the research topic and ways of data collection. Besides, the researcher obtained a trust-relationship with respondents as colleagues in a familiar context that warranted reliable data. To ensure creditability, the data, findings, and discussions were revisited by some respondents, and peers’ comments were sought on the results to remove errors. Moreover, for validation of results, the researcher compared the outcomes with evidence from other studies.

### **Findings and Discussions**


This section was prepared based mostly on the interview data and partly on FGD and observation data that sought teachers’ experiences, perceptions, assessments, and knowledge of teaching strategies, FTC, and NAEM. The organization of this part developed descriptively on varied themes obtained from the three key questions provided in the introductory section and maintained the sequence of the questions.

### Teaching Strategies Offered by NAEM

The participating teachers were offered varied types of theoretical and practical knowledge and skills for PD on education and teaching by NAEM. Amongst them curriculum development and implementation, education policy and finance, tools and techniques of assessment, adult learning theories and effectiveness of training, developing a creative question, teaching methods, teaching-learning materials, classroom management, are prominent. Besides, other theoretical, practical knowledge and skills include innovation for teaching, inclusive education, teachers' professionalism, co-curricular activities, prospect of higher education, students' problems, time management, micro-teaching and simulation, modern learning theories, institutional role on socialization, quality education and plans (NAEM, 2019). Moreover, during training periods, the participants were expected to familiarize themselves with varied learner-centered teaching methods and tools used by facilitators. According to some of the key informants and participants of FGDs, the methods and tools included collaborative learning (peer review, pair and group work, and group presentation). Others informed that the micro-teaching, brainstorming, mind mapping, jigsaw, snowball, demonstration, inquiry-based instruction, debriefing (resolving participants queries), mentoring and coaching, integration of technologies, and varied methods of formative assessment were prominent.

### Perception of Teachers towards Instruction Methods

Commonly, teachers hold the belief that these methods stay difficult to implement, and thus, they remain unenthusiastic.



**Graph 1: Seriousness of Trainees during Training Sessions**

They assumed, as FGD data revealed, they were not conversant with the mechanisms of these methods; and even remained skeptical about the success of them. Furthermore, they indicated,

they did not learn theories and methods to that extent to which they would be able to apply in classrooms by themselves because lack of seriousness emanated from rooted undesirable beliefs. While data showed only one of each five participants was very serious, one of each two trainees remained lackadaisical (*Graph 1 above*). Some mentioned during FGD sessions that they completed FTC as an obligatory task with low expectation.

### **Implementation of Taught Teaching Strategies**

This section investigated the teaching practices the teachers were employed in their classrooms. This would allow everyone to understand the extent and nature of the effects of FTC on teaching practice.

#### ***Practice of Teacher-Centered Methods***

Data revealed, teachers of the selected colleges dominantly follow teacher-centered methods and strategies, like lecturing, particularly, plain lecture, chalk-talk, and question-answer – ignoring or focusing little on varied processes of making lecturing attractive and engaging students in the process (Classroom observation, 2020). Respondents, during the interview, unanimously mentioned for managing a large number of students, teacher-centered strategies stayed appropriate. The issue of an increased number of learners was true in a sense, but it did not disclose the whole scenario; as at the beginning of a session students came in huge numbers, even classrooms failed to accommodate them all. However, after several months, the number of students declined dramatically from a few hundred to only 30-40 in both colleges (Context observation, 2020). Interestingly, gaining a reduced number of students and being habituated, teachers did not shift teacher-centered methods and exhibited averseness to practice participatory and student-centered active learning; hence no discernible effect of FTC was observed in both colleges.

#### ***Engaging Student with Activities***

Table 2: Activities Facilitated in the Classrooms

<b>Activities</b>	<b>Frequencies</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Quizzes	20	100%
Questions/Answers	20	100%

Formal assessment for learning	0	0.0%
Debriefs	6	30%
PowerPoint presentation	9	45%

Student-engaging activities in classrooms remain few in both colleges (*Table 2 above*). The common activities students performed were responding to teachers' questions and making inquiries (very few). Moreover, the assessment of students for learning remained low or almost absent. For informal formative assessment, according to classroom observation, all teachers, though not regularly, asked varied quizzes to the whole class, and interview data revealed that some teachers declared about written class-test, but on the exam day the number of students reduced to one-quarter of the regular. Two respondents confirmed assigning homework (accomplished by very few) and measuring development, and one of them credited FTC's micro-teaching. The other further added that all the internal exams for summative assessment, uncounted for the formal results, conducted untrustworthily, and remained unreliable. Therefore, extending instructions based on this type of assessment stayed defective. Some 30% of teachers, according to interview and classroom observation, allowed students to raise questions before finishing classes, but very few did so, and what had been asked was debriefed.

Data revealed that most of the student-engaging activities remained absent. Teachers were, as FGD participants disclosed, hindered by challenges emanated from varied corners, institutional culture, and lack of obligation to practice participatory activities. All respondents unusually blamed large class-size (100-200 students) for limited participatory performance. They told that it stood impossible for a teacher to apply many of the engaging strategies in such classrooms. Thus, they frequently brimmed students with traditional lectures. However, FGD data revealed, when the number of students reduced after a few months of the beginning of sessions, teachers did not increase student engagement for lack of true intention and goodwill, and skills. More than one-third of respondents disclosed that they had never tried to implement any of the teaching strategies learned at FTC due to, generally, lack of true intention. One respondent disclosed his belief while interviewing, "*if we want, we can implement student-centered methods. Here, teachers lack the integrity to implement. In demo class (during training period), we performed varied teaching strategies quite well, but after returning to workstation we gave up all.*"

The respondents' interview data revealed that many of the students remained incapable of accomplishing their activities given in the classrooms expectedly and believed that engaging in activities stayed waste of time. At sub-district level college, comparatively poor graders got admitted failing at renowned colleges; however, at the district level, the scenario remained unchanged. Respondents also blamed traditional classroom design for not offering engagement activities. They, in FGD sessions, mentioned – in classrooms, it remained difficult to form groups and pairs with immovable long tables and to move students to different parts of the classrooms. Additionally, they believed there was a lack of an amicable environment with frequent noises from loitering students outside to practice quality teaching in these colleges, as authorities failed to establish a congenial environment for effective teaching.

Another issue, the respondents brought forward was student absenteeism and the erratic nature of presence. Most respondents disclosed that students came to college at their will, and there was no pattern of their coming. Many times, they identified that those who came that day might come another day with a gap of several days. All these plunged them, as told in interviews, into confusion and frustration to maintain continuity of their teaching contents and methods. They added, each day they needed a new beginning and became upset with students' little learning and became discouraged to be involved seriously with teaching-learning.

The use of technology, according to interview data, stood limited and infrequent. While at college-1 only one respondent mentioned using multimedia and PowerPoint, at college-2, two out of three respondents did the same, but irregularly. Direct observation revealed the same and identified that only three classrooms were equipped with multimedia systems, but two of them remained dysfunctional at college-1. In this regard, college-2 was more developed in its infrastructure.

Moreover, the length of a session for each class hour remained 45 minutes mostly. Respondents, in FGD sessions, mentioned that this short period caused difficulty to practice varied methods of student-centered teaching strategies. Additionally, usually, no classes were held after lunch break at both colleges. Therefore, the working hour became limited and thus, effective and efficient teaching with the presence of students stayed difficult.

### Attainment of Professional Development

Having been a flagship in-service training (Khan, 2008), FTC is in a position to modify behavior, knowledge on the subject matter, emotional intelligence, instruction methods. It also enhances the commitment for a better learning experience of learners through increased collaboration, networking, critical thinking and problem solving, planning, and practicing with both pupils and colleagues as results of PD.

Table 3: The Extent of PD as an Outcome of FTC

Indicators	Levels of change	Frequencies	Percent
Change in pedagogic and andragogic knowledge level	Significant change	0	0.0%
	Moderate change	10	50%
	Little change	8	40%
	No change	2	10%
Change in skills	Significant change	0	0.0%
	Moderate change	6	30%
	Little change	8	40%
	No change	6	30%
Change in attitudes	Significant change	0	0.0%
	Moderate change	3	15%
	Little change	10	50%
	No change	7	35%
Change in teaching practice to include student-centered teaching methods	Significant change	0	0.0%
	Moderate change	2	10%
	Little change	2	10%
	No change	16	80%
Change in ability on subject contents	No change	20	100%
Change in thinking, planning, practicing with students and colleagues	Significant change	0	0.0%
	Moderate change	2	10%



	Little change	3	15%
	No change	16	75%
Change in students learning	Significant change	0	0.0%
	Moderate change	4	20%
	Little change	4	20%
	No change	12	60%

Against these expectations, however, *Table 3* above displays rather a gloomy scenario, as quantification of qualitative data reveals there has not been much change in the given areas. While knowledge on pedagogy and andragogy has not much improved, the skills for implementing active learning methods were limited, and every four out of five respondents acknowledged ‘no change’ in teaching practice. However, during the interview, some respondents mentioned that they have exercised some of the methods at NAEM and if they become serious, they can conduct student-centered classes. In reality, they require a changed attitude; however, half of the respondents indicated no change in this respect. Moreover, increased knowledge on the subject matter can be an indicator of PD; contrarily, subject contents usually are not part of FTC, so no change is observed in this regard. Likewise, integration of colleagues and students for thinking, planning, and practicing is important to improve learning outcomes. In this regard, every three out of four respondents confessed that they did not perform much though initially after returning from training they had enthusiasm gradually it dispersed. Consequently, the majority of the respondents (60%) specified ‘no change’ in students’ learning experiences in both colleges. In short, corroborating Karim and Mohamed (2019), the study revealed limited or no application of learned (though limited) methods in classrooms. In essence, a remarkably limited level of PD was achieved as outcomes of FTC.

### **Challenges in Achieving PD and Implementing Projected Teaching Strategies**

The findings indicated a gloomy picture of the effects of FTC on teaching practice. The questions remained – why did such melancholy outcomes are achieved from such a big-budget-training program? The following issues, which are discussed elaborately following *Table 4*, offered the answers to this question.

Table 4: Challenges of Applying Learned Student-Centered Teaching Methods

---

- Absence of instruction for, a few examples of, and seniors' resistance for, implementing student-centered methods at the college level (85%)
  - Absence of local level coaching and mentoring after joining (75%)
  - Absence of pre-service training (100%)
  - Absenteeism (80%)
  - Habituated with teaching styles of respondents' own teachers & colleagues (80%)
  - High teacher-student ratio (100%)
  - Inappropriate curricula and syllabi for the teaching profession (70%)
  - Lack of dedication to apply new methods (40%)
  - Lack of informal connectivity with trainers and trainees (80%)
  - Lack of skilled trainers (50%)
  - Little learning at FTC (50%)
  - Long routine disciplined training (25%)
  - Unenthusiastic attitude towards training (65%)
  - Unfavorable institutional infrastructure, sitting arrangement & culture (85%)
- 

### ***Teachers' Low Level of Learning at NAEM***

Having been in teaching for several years, for many, FTC stood as the first formal opportunity for learning about educational instructions and related concepts. Half of the respondents declared they learned new methods at FTC (*Table 4 above*). One respondent, during the interview, mentioned, “*Before going to NAEM, I have not heard the concepts – ‘pedagogy’ and ‘andragogy.’ I knew nothing about teaching methods and the learning process of students.*” That means the program has the potentials to offer the understanding of teaching-learning related concepts, issues, and strategies. Though trainees became oriented, data revealed that teachers had not become conversant on teaching strategies and did not share any imparted concepts with colleagues after their return. While mentioning the names of the strategies, they faltered and could not pronounce many. According to one of the key informants:

*I have forgotten (many of them) what those were. We were taught varied teaching methods and strategies at NAEM. You know, the trainers also employed different types of*

*teaching approach, such as – group and pair work, poster presentation, question-answer between groups. ... but ... the teaching-learning was cursory and not in-depth.*

Now a question – why has this truncated knowledge? Firstly, the curriculum of the program, though for teachers, yet was not exhaustive for the teaching profession. Only one comprehensive module of the program was designated for education-related issues, as the respondents found the program is a mixture of varied types of administrative and development-related issues dominantly and teaching contents partly. One respondent shed light on the issues during the interview and mentioned, “*As teachers, our FTC must be teaching-oriented, but it includes many issues unrelated with our profession. (Thus,) it becomes burdensome and unexciting and doesn’t feel attached.*”

Secondly, no participants obtained any pre-service training (*Table 4 above*), and most of them participated in FTC after two to three years of teaching practice. Thirdly, these teachers were not offered any mentoring or coaching at the institution after joining as mentioned by two-thirds of the respondents. Therefore, they developed their own ways of teaching methods derived from learning by doing, which confirmed the continuation of customary teaching methods they experienced as learners previously (Seidel & Hoppert, 2011, cited in Johannes, *et al.*, 2013). Fourthly, in training sessions, according to interview data, they mostly exhibited reluctant attitudes and a lack of seriousness towards learning and adopting new strategies. Fifthly, a dichotomy in characteristics as member of cadre service and teaching professionals – several participants hesitated to be teachers unreservedly. One interviewee said, “*Through cadre service we are officers and by profession we are teachers – actually we are not any of them to the full extent.*” Therefore, with this gulf in feelings, achieving FTC targeted knowledge and skills remained elusive and unaccomplished to a great extent.

Along this line, one out of two respondents exposed that they learned nothing special from FTC and no change was observed in teaching practice. One of them argued that he participated to confirm his job, as FTC stayed mandatory. Another one revealed he learned few techniques but never tried in classrooms. Additionally, during the interview, he added “*we received some allowance, and they received some remuneration,*” which was another face of the training. The findings of the study suggest that the FTC failed to secure teachers’ PD. Very few respondents recognized the notable professional change in them which made them knowledgeable and skilled

to employ modern teaching strategies but did not translate into actions. Consequently, teachers continued practicing traditional methods and tried to defend their stance.

### ***Negative Feelings towards FTC***

The perceptions of majority respondents (65%) towards NAEM and its training program, FTC, displayed inconsequentiality (*Table 4 above*). One respondent revealed that NAEM and its training seemed quite beneficial for the teachers of secondary level. As mentioned in the interview, according to him, for college teachers, the training program was not appropriate, and methods and contents would not fit them, and finally, the methods would make their students confused.

Similarly, FTC is branded by quarter of respondents as a disciplined routine task to be completed, and the intention of being benefitted professionally did not manifest during interviews (*Table 4 above*). They thought, in Bangladesh, people possess inherited escaping attitudes. During the interview, one respondent revealed:

*We just sat as stones, heard, and forgot. (We) stored nothing in our notebooks or our head, and when came back to the workstation we did not bring anything. ... Our engagement in different activities during training sessions remained low and many of us displayed reluctant attitudes to participate in group activities and when got the chance evaded responsibility.*

Two-fifth of respondents (*Table 4 above*) believed that these methods were not applicable and did not want to implement in their class, as they noticed low morality of the students and use of unfair means for completing their assigned tasks. According to one of the informants, “*It won't be effective. I do not want to implement it. If we want, we can, but I think there is no scope to implement these at the college level.*” Equally, 65% of participants mentioned that what they lacked most was true intention to learn from FTC and to implement in classrooms. In this line, as revealed by FGD and interview data, it is learned from 85% of respondents that colleges remained indifferent; neither promoted nor hindered, regarding implementation of new teaching strategies, except resistive attitudes from some seniors, and perceived that if college showed eagerness and offered a congenial environment, these could be implemented.

### ***Mismatched Contents***

The contents of FTC at NAEM were matched with the same of other cadre services. Only one module has been developed for education-related concepts without inquiries and considering the needs of teachers. Thus, according to seven out of 10 respondents, PD intended for improving teachers' teaching quality with the inclusion of varied teaching strategies and methods for effective instructions and solving students' problems remained unfocused (*Table 4 above*). The common module was prepared for all irrespective of disciplines though extensive with issues except subject contents; however, trainers failed to cover all of them efficiently for the time constraints. One respondent, during the interview, recalled, "*the module ... erred... did not attract as much. ... The number of sessions for teaching remained limited. The teaching methods remained inadequate. We expected more, but the program stayed packed with contents that did not match much with our profession.*" Such situations, marked by irrelevance and incompatibility of training contents for professional needs, as opined by Drăghicescu *et al.* (2018), can distract the focus of the trainees. However, one respondent, in his interview, wished that if they had to maintain similarity at FTC with the training of other services then there should be a separate specialized training focusing on teaching.

### ***Inept Trainers and Failure of Opportunities***

The respondents disclosed that half of the trainers were not quite competent to facilitate them (*Table 4 above*). A few of them, as exhibited, according to FGD data, conducted sessions without being prepared well; and thus, the trainees became irritated and lost interest. The responses of a respondent in the interview can be summarized, "*some of the faculties with visible weaknesses failed to show their true capacity to train us. Moreover, their performance revealed that they did not make their preparation well, and these made their presentations weedy and nonchalant. Additionally, sessions remained non-participative to a great extent and adopted few theoretical paradigms and andragogic techniques; thus, participants got unenthusiastic, terming the sessions monotonous.*" However, comparatively, they liked some of the regular faculties and the lectures of guest speakers who were invited from various other institutions.

Then again, some trainers did not follow the strategies and methods they taught at FTC. Therefore, to trainees, it seemed to be insincerity and demotivated them to apply these in their classrooms. Some trainers were inexpert, inexperienced, and unenthusiastic, as they were not

placed scrupulously at the training institute by judging their expertise. One respondent termed the institute as a workstation for privileged sections; and added that some of them were not equipped enough to train others, and just managing their routines cursorily.

Lieberman (1995) argues that training can be successful if it is conducted by and with colleagues mostly informally at working institutions because success is relatively low from formal authoritative training centers (Sandholtz, 2002). Accordingly, though the participants were trained by their senior colleagues, yet they failed to bring expected outcomes. While interviewing, four out of five respondents mentioned that they were not engaged informally with trainers, for instance, the dining tables, playgrounds, *etc.* (Table 4 above). On the other hand, it stays tough to be informal with so many participants. Moreover, a quarter of the respondents indicated that incessant training for a long time produced tediousness, rather short training courses around the year would yield better results. Then again, the trainees were almost of the same age group and the same grade of pay scale; that means, they formed a homogenous group, in which trainees are supposed to learn well (Desimone *et al.*, 2002). Moreover, FTC remains as a residential course for quite a long period that offers ample time to concentrate on the course contents; however, these did not make expected results except an extension of networks.

### ***Improper Institutional Settings***

Back in colleges, both institutions failed, according to 85% of responses from interview data (Table 4 above), to provide required scopes for practicing student-centered teaching strategies. Thus, the interests of respondents waned gradually, and they started to believe that these western methods were not applicable here. The colleges tended to admit students beyond their capacity; therefore, there remained a high teacher-student ratio, and lack of resources made it degenerated as echoed by Ulla and Winitkun (2018). According to 85% of respondents, the culture of the colleges was not favorable to promote and practice student-centered methods. One respondent, during the interview, included, *“I stuck to traditional methods. ... Nothing has been changed notably (after FTC). Like my predecessors, I also continue the traditional methods.”* To her, there goes the idea that *“no change will occur; it will move as it was. Whatever is done students will not come regularly.”*

Accordingly, four out of five respondents termed absenteeism as curse. In another end, the respondents mentioned, during FGD sessions and interviews that they never thought of

innovative ideas to tackle the problems; just looked for the weaknesses and discussed them negatively. However, returnees suggested for introduction of reward and multidimensional penalty systems for them based on continuous teaching evaluation by students and monitoring of principal instead of one annual summative assessment by the confidential report.

### **Conclusion, Implications and Suggestions**

#### **Conclusion**

While demands are growing for outcome-based and transferable learning, particularly at higher education, as being the terminal formal schooling, the educational system needs to be capable of preparing students for real-life contexts and problems. This study searching for effects of FTC on PD and teaching practice of teachers at two selected government colleges explores several significant outcomes. In Bangladesh, for teachers at government colleges, initiatives for PD remain few and FTC is an important one of them. To assess the effects of FTC, a case study was used, and data were collected through interviews, FGDs, and observations. Considering all aspects, it has been learned that FTC offers a bunch of learner-centered and participatory teaching strategies to be implemented at colleges. However, the data reject the idea that the compulsory FTC remains a successful effort to increase knowledge, skills, and polish attitudes – like the findings of Ali and Mawa (2019), and Sykes (1996). Hence, the results suggest, corroborating the findings of Karim and Mohamed (2019), with limited or no observable shift in teaching to apply theoretical approaches and active learning techniques in the study area. Thus, the effort stays insufficient, irrelevant, ‘meaningless’, ‘fragmented’ and ‘intellectually superficial’ substantiating the findings of Ball & Cohen (1999). Here, the important issues - amplified participation, spaced autonomy, refined skills for manipulating diverse learning styles, augmented commitment for embodying learning, and increased theoretical underpinning - for a training to be successful, are missing (Gómez-Carrasco, 2020). Therefore, FTC returnees, though trained mostly by their senior colleagues, continue the traditional teacher-centered methods, mostly ‘chalk-talk’ inertly in classrooms with a high teacher-student ratio, unpredictable absenteeism, and teachers’ low skills for applying new strategies, though they believe they can practice if there is willingness. Likewise, their dispirited belief goes that nothing will change with shifts in teaching and classroom activities.

The results deliver that 'no shift in teaching' at both colleges, having difference only in infrastructure, has commenced with low learning from FTC with the presence of negative perceptions. Validating the findings of Miller (1998), the results suggest that teachers do not hold positive attitudes towards this regimented program and find it uninteresting, unconnected, and monotonous. Similarly, some trainers remain amateurish and exhibit weakness and low-quality performance, and interestingly, do not practice strategies they proliferate. Moreover, the common curriculum and contents for all, accompanied by the absence of subject knowledge, do not fulfill the needs of all participants; and thus, FTC stays unattractive. As adult learners, trainees show interest in useful and applicable issues, so, at FTC, isolating from their institutions, teachers sit 'silent as stones' and become insensible finding the contents irrelevant (Glathorn, 1990). Lastly, the trainees remain skeptical about the implementation and success of the taught strategies in their classrooms as they are not supported by institutional culture with inappropriate class size and classroom design, incapable students, lack of instructional leadership, and supervision.

### **Implications and Suggestions**

As this study reveals, FTC fails to yield to ignite changes in teaching practice and the process of PD stays a long-term procedure, which demands a great deal of passionate actions and active supports from all corners; and without such assistance, the process stays susceptible to produce negative results (Kohonen, 2001). Accordingly, in Bangladesh, many of these conditions remain unfulfilled. Thus, the study offers the following four sets of underlying suggestions.

Firstly, teachers should be inspired for the development of self-professionalism with enhanced knowledge, skills, and assimilation of technologies to lead the institution academically with innovation by seeking high-performance, short time, tailor-made training on expressed needs and from workable professional learning bodies.

Secondly, colleges need to develop a vision and integrate stakeholders in the planning and implementation process; particularly, teachers should be bestowed with transformative leadership aligned with responsibilities (Fullan, 1991). As teachers learn best at institutional setting formally and/or informally with and from colleagues, the college should arrange comprehensive and continuous programs - teacher leadership, team-teaching, research group, learning communities, in-house training, workshop, and seminar - for PD to develop an enabling



ambiance for innovative student-centered teaching practice. The principal and senior colleagues should offer regular instruction/coaching/mentoring, necessary resources, and manageable students, and increase the performance evaluation process.

Thirdly, NAEM necessitates to redesign its curriculum and contents, and to develop a new model of training for more in-depth and focused PD assessing the needs of the trainees and following successful models of densely populated countries. Moreover, efforts should be made to appoint competent trainers through rigorous selection procedures and to build the capacity of existing facilitators. More can be done through visiting renowned institutions, increasing frequencies of short-term training, and decentralizing facilities to the grassroots level.

Finally, policymakers should focus on incessant, short, and trainee-centered training to fulfill the necessities of participants. Moreover, curricula and syllabi of subjects at colleges should be redesigned to enable student-centered methods, and instructions should be given to institutions to begin practicing modern teaching strategies and locally expand self-directed and autonomous efforts for PD. Besides, teacher recruitment policy should be changed to offer increased amenities to those who received pre-service training and/or degree on education.

### **Acknowledgement**

The researcher would like to duly acknowledge College Education Development Project (CEDP), Ministry of Education, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, the University of Nottingham Malaysia, and Dr. Rajeevnath Ramnath, Associate Professor at CAPE, UNMC for their supports in conducting this study.

### **References**

- Ali, M. M., & Mawa, B. (2019). Impact of 'Foundation training for university teachers' conducted by Bangladesh Agricultural University. *Bangladesh Journal of Extension Education* 31(1&2): 1-12.
- Asadullah, S. (2017). Teaching practices and teacher education: Evidence from secondary schools of Dhaka, Bangladesh. *Global Journal of Human-Social Science: (G) Linguistics & Education* 17(1): 69-82.
- Asaolusam. (n.d.). Modern teaching method. Retrieved from <https://asaolusam.wordpress.com/2016/09/03/modern-teaching-method/> on January 20, 2020.
- Ball, D. L., & Cohen, D. K. (1999). Developing practice, developing practitioners: Toward a practice-based theory of professional education. In L. Darling-Hammond and G. Sykes (Eds.), *Teaching as the learning profession*, pp.3–31. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- BANBEIS. (2018). Retrieved from <http://data.banbeis.gov.bd/> on December 19, 2019.

- Borko, H. (2004). Professional development and teacher learning. *Educational Researcher* 33(8): 3–15.
- Borko, H., & Putnam, R.T. (1995). Expanding a teacher's knowledge base: A cognitive psychological perspective on professional development. In T.R. Guskey and M. Huberman (eds), *Professional development in education: New paradigms and practices*, pp. 35-65. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Borko, H., Jacobs, J., & Koellner, K. (2010). Contemporary approaches to teacher professional development. *International Encyclopedia of Education* 7(2): 548-556.
- Chi, M. T., & Wylie, R. (2014). The ICAP framework: Linking cognitive engagement to active learning outcomes. *Educational Psychologist* 49(4): 219-243.
- Chowdhury, R., & Sarkar, M. (2018). Education in Bangladesh: Changing contexts and emerging realities. In Chowdhury *et al.* (eds.), *Engaging in educational research: Revisiting policy and practice in Bangladesh*, pp. 1-18. Singapore: Springer Nature.
- Clark, R. C., & Mayer, R. E. (2008). Learning by viewing versus learning by doing: Evidence-based guidelines for principled learning environments. *Performance Improvement* 47:5-13.
- Cohen, D. K., & Ball, D. L. (1990). Policy and practice: An overview. *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis* 12(3): 233–239.
- Corrigan, D., & Haberman, M. (1990). The context of teacher education. In Houston, W., M. Haberman and J. Sikula (eds.), *Handbook of research on teacher education: A project of the association of teacher educator*, pp.195-211. New York and London: Macmillan.
- Creswell, J. W. (2013). *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Creswell, J. W. (2014). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches* (4<sup>th</sup> ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Day, C. (1999). *Continuing professional development*. London: Falmer Press.
- Desimone, L. M., Porter, A. C., Garet, M. S., Yoon, K. S., & Birman, B. F. (2002). Effects of professional development on teachers' instruction: Results from a three-year longitudinal study. *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis* 24 (2): 81-112.
- Drăghicescu, L. M., Petrescu, A. M. A., Stăncescu, I., & Gorghiu, L. M. (2018). The relevance of continuous training programmes dedicated for teachers from pre-university education. *Revista Romaneasca Pentru Educatie Multidimensionala*, 10(3): 6-16.
- Felder, R. M., & Brent, R. (2009). Active learning: An introduction. *ASQ Higher Education Brief* 2(4): 1-5.
- Freeman, S., Eddy, S. L., McDonough, M., Smith, M. K., Okoroafor, N., Jordt, H., & Wenderoth, M. P. (2014). Active learning increases student performance in science, engineering, and mathematics. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 111(23): 8410-8415.
- Fullan, M. G. (1991). *The new meaning of educational change*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Garet, M., Porter, A., Desimone, L. Birman, B., & Yoon, K. (2001). What makes professional development effective? Analysis of a national sample of teachers. *American Education Research Journal* 38(4): 915-945.
- Glathorn, A. (1990). *Supervisory leadership: An introduction to instructional supervision*. Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman.
- GoB. (2010). *National education policy*. Dhaka: Ministry of Education.

- Goel, C. (2019). Improving professional practices of in-service teachers in Delhi. *IOJET* 6(3): 432-441.
- Gómez-Carrasco, C. J., Monteagudo-Fernández, J., Moreno-Vera, J. R., & Sainz-Gómez, M. (2020). Evaluation of a gamification and flipped-classroom program used in teacher training: Perception of learning and outcome. *PloS one* 15(7): 1-19.
- Hamid, M. O., & Baldauf, R. B. (2008). Will CLT bail out the bogged down ELT in Bangladesh?. *English Today* 24(3): 16-24.
- Harari, Y. N. (2019). *21 Lessons for the 21st Century*. London: Jonathan Cape.
- Hawley, W.D., & Rosenholtz, S. (1984). Good schools: A synthesis of research on how schools influence student achievement. *Peabody Journal of Education* 4(1): 1-178.
- Hoque, K. E., Alam, G. M., & Abdullah, A. G. K. (2010). Impact of teachers' professional development on school improvement—an analysis at Bangladesh standpoint. *Asia Pacific Education Review* 12(3): 337–348.
- Johannes, C., Fendler, J., & Seidel, T. (2013). Teachers' perceptions of the learning environment and their knowledge base in a training program for novice university teachers. *International Journal for Academic Development* 18(2): 152-165.
- Joyce, B., & Showers, B. (1988). *Information processing: Models of teaching*. Apots CA: Booksend Laboratories.
- Karim, A., & Mohamed, A. R. (2019). Examining the impact of an English in action training program on secondary-school English teachers' classroom practice in Bangladesh. *The Qualitative Report* 24(3): 441-469.
- Kennedy, M. (1998). *Form and substance in in-service teacher education*. Madison, WI: National Institute for Science Education.
- Khan, R. (2008). Developing professionally. *The Dhaka University Journal of Linguistics* 1(2): 169-180.
- Kohonen, V. (2001). From isolation to interdependence in ELT: Supporting teacher development through a school-university partnership. In Edge, J (ed.), *Continuing professional development: Some of our perspectives*, pp. 40-49. London: IATEFL publications.
- Levin, K. A. (2006). Study design III: Cross-sectional studies. *Evidence-based dentistry* 7(1): 24-25.
- Lieberman, A. (1995). Practices that support teacher development: Transforming conceptions of professional learning. *Phi Delta Kappan* 76(8): 591–596.
- Miller, E. (1998). The old model of staff development survives in a world where everything else has changed. *Harvard education letter focus series no. 11*: 2-4.
- Mizell, H. (2010). Why professional development matters. Retrieved from <https://learningforward.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/professional-development-matters.pdf> on February 18, 2020.
- Morse, J. M. (1991). Approaches to qualitative-quantitative methodological triangulation. *Nursing Research* 40(2): 120-123.
- NAEM. (2019). Training brochure. Dhaka: NAEM.
- National University. (2020). College details. Retrieved from [http://www.nubd.info/college/college\\_details.php](http://www.nubd.info/college/college_details.php) on September 25, 2020.
- OECD. (1998). *Lifelong learning to maintain employability*. Paris: OECD.
- OECD. (2005). *Teachers matter: Attracting, developing, and retaining effective teachers*. Education and Training Policy. Paris: OECD.

- Pezaro, C. (n.d.). The role of a teacher and the purpose of education: How can evidence inform classroom practice? Retrieved from <https://npjscilearncommunity.nature.com/users/19567-charlotte-pezaro/posts/13089-the-role-of-a-teacher-and-the-purpose-of-education> on January 20, 2020).
- Poirier, T. I. (2017). Is lecturing obsolete? Advocating for high value transformative lecturing. *American Journal of Pharmaceutical Education* 81(5): 1-2.
- Pringle, J., Hendry, C., & McLafferty, E. (2011). Phenomenological approaches: Challenges and choices. *Nurse Researcher* 18(2): 7-18.
- Raqib, A. A. (2019). Innovations in Teacher Training at Higher Education in Bangladesh. *Social Science Review* 36(1): 221-231.
- Sandholtz, J. H. (2002). Inservice training or professional development: Contrasting opportunities in a school/university partnership. *Teaching and Teacher Education* 18(7): 815-830.
- Sarma, H., Islam, M. A., & Gazi, R. (2013). Impact of training of teachers on their ability, skills, and confidence to teach HIV/AIDS in classroom: A qualitative assessment. *BMC Public Health* 13(1): 1-9.
- Seidel, T., & Hoppert, A. (2011). Merkmale von Lehren der Hochschule [Characteristics of teaching at the university]. *Unterrichtswissenschaft* 39(2): 154-172.
- Shields, P. M., Marsh, J. A., & Adelman, N. E. (1998). Evaluation of NSF's State-wide Systemic Initiatives (SSI) Program: The SSIs' impacts on classroom practice. Menlo Park, CA: SRI.
- Smylie, M. A. (1995). Teacher learning in the workplace: Implications for school reform. In T. R. Guskey, & M. Huberman (Eds.), *Professional development in education: New paradigms and practices*, pp. 92–113. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Smylie, M.A. (1989). Teachers' views of the effectiveness of sources of learning to teach. *The Elementary School Journal* 89(5): 543-558.
- Smylie, M.A. (1996). From bureaucratic control to building human capital: The importance of teacher learning in education reform. *Educational Researcher* 25(9): 9-11.
- Spillane, J. P., & Thompson, C. L. (1997). Reconstructing conceptions of local capacity: The local education agency's capacity for ambitious instructional reform. *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis*: 19(2): 185-203.
- Supovitz, J. A., Mayer, D. P., & Kahle, J. B. (2000). Promoting inquiry-based instructional practice: The longitudinal impact of professional development in the context of systemic reform. *Educational Policy* 14(3): 331-356.
- Sykes, G. (1996). Reform of and as professional development. *Phi Delta Kappan* 77(7): 465-467.
- Tang, K. N. (2018). The importance of soft skills acquisition by teachers in higher education institutions. *Kasetsart Journal of Social Sciences* 30: 1-6.
- Teach.com. (n.d). Teaching methods. Retrieved from Teach.com on January 20, 2020.
- Thornton, H. (2006). Teachers talking: The role of collaboration in secondary schools in Bangladesh. *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education* 36(2): 181-196.
- Tularam, G. A., & Machisella, P. (2018). Traditional vs non-traditional teaching and learning strategies--the case of e-learning!. *International Journal for Mathematics Teaching & Learning* 19(1): 129-158.

- Ulla, M. B., & Winitkun, D. (2018). In-service teacher training program in Thailand: Teachers' beliefs, needs, and challenges. *Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities* 26(3): 1579-1594.
- Van Driel, J. H., & Berry, A. (2012). Teacher professional development focusing on pedagogical content knowledge. *Educational Researcher* 41(1): 26–28.
- Westwood, P. (2008). *What teachers need to know about teaching methods*. Australia: Victoria ACER Press.
- Wilson, S. M., & Berne, J. (1999). Teacher learning and the acquisition of professional knowledge: An examination of research on contemporary professional development. In A. Iran-Nejad and P. D. Pearson (Eds.), *Review of Research in Education* 24: 173-209.
- Yin, R. K. (1984). *Case study research: Design and methods*. London: Sage Publication.