

The Process for Provision of Humanitarian Aid and Sustainable Peace and Development in Central Equatorial and the Other States in South Sudan: Post 2005 to 2020

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Abstract

Humanitarian aid aims to mitigate the suffering of people, alleviate poverty, and lay a firm foundation for sustainable peace and development. This research paper aims to assess the impact of humanitarian aid in two counties of Central Equatoria State of South Sudan. The provision of humanitarian aid is one of the pillars in the process of peace-building. Understanding the provision of humanitarian aid helps assess the impact of humanitarian activities on post-conflict communities. It contributes to understanding the practical process of peace-building to prevent a resumption of conflict in post-conflict communities. The outbreak of intra-conflict in December 2013 in Juba shows that the process of peace-building was not effective. A qualitative method was applied for data collection and analysis. Primary data was gathered through in-depth interviews of key informants, including selected community leaders, civil society organizations, national and international non-governmental organizations, staff of UN agencies, and key national and state officials. Stratified purposive interviews were conducted in Juba and Kajokeji Counties. Two focus group discussions were held in Juba and the other in Kajokeji. Secondary data from various academic and policy institutions were used to supplement the primary data. The data were analyzed using methods of ethnography and discourse interpretation, observation, and interaction. Coordinating the processes of recovery and development requires humanitarian principles. Development partners, host communities, policymakers, and others underestimated the challenges in delivering humanitarian aid. The democratic system that the national government of South Sudan advocated was not based on principles of good governance and on the engagement of civil society organizations, which are the custodian of the social contract between the citizen and the national government. The process for the provision of humanitarian aid did not relieve much suffering in communities. It contributed less effective effort to the process of peace-building to prevent the reoccurrence of conflict in Central Equatoria and the other states of South Sudan. The process would require the practice of good governance.

Keywords: Humanitarian Aid, Civil Society Organization, Governance, Protection, Policy

Introduction

This paper analyses the process for the provision of humanitarian aid in the process of peace-building in Central Equatorial State - South Sudan.¹ Central Equatorial is one of the Ten States in South Sudan. It is located south of the country. The importance of this study is to improve the process for the provision of humanitarian aid. The paper is divided into two time periods: interim

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¹ while the research focused on Juba and Kajo Keji counties of South Sudan as case studies. Its findings can be generalized to the whole country as the context is more or less similar.


(2005-2010) and post-independence (from 2011-2020). The outbreak of conflict in December 2013 in Juba-South Sudan shows a failure in the process of peace-building. Therefore, the paper aims to investigate how the activities in the process for providing humanitarian aid were conducted in Central Equatoria State.²The paper investigates whether the process for the provision of humanitarian aid was effective in alleviating poverty and laying a solid base for sustainable peace and development. The finding in this study reflects the situation in South Sudan. Policies made in Central Equatorial in Juba affect communities in the whole country. Adequate provision of humanitarian aid is vital for achieving the goal of post-war recovery. It can lead to the reduction of poverty in the communities affected by conflict. Its effectiveness will relieve distress in post-conflict communities and help to ease the management of violence, exclusion, and conflict (Weismann, 2004, p. 310).

This study aims to understand how the process for the provision of humanitarian aid was conducted and to know if it was effective in contributing to peace-building. Based on the findings, the paper is to help improve the process for the provision of humanitarian aid in the process of peace-building to prevent the resumption of conflict. The failed process of peace-building increases chances for renewal of the conflict, and the continuity of a system of a fragile government, as is the case at present. Success in the process of peace-building in Central Equatorial and other States will also be determined by the capability of the National Government in providing core functions of security, law, and order, public services, and mobilization of revenue for sustainable development. The humanitarian aid is to facilitate the better performance of the function of the National Government in establishing the policies required for its agenda of National Development, which includes an effective process in the provision of humanitarian aid.

² South Sudan was known as Southern Sudan until it became an independent country from Sudan on July 9, 2011. GOSS = Government of Southern Sudan. GOSS administered Southern Sudan from July 9, 2005, to July 9, 2011. This was the Interim Period of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which prepared Southern Sudan for the referendum that led to the separation of Southern Sudan from Sudan.

Conceptual Framework

Figure 1:



The conceptual framework for the study outlined in figure 1 shows that the analysis of the finding is expected to lead to theory development. Humanitarian aid agencies play a vital role in providing food, water, sanitation to returning refugees and internally displaced persons, and securing their protection (The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Dispute (ACCORD), 2013, pp. 87-92). Provisions of humanitarian aid in South Sudan have been mainly the work of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Program (WFP), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC), United Nations International Children Education Fund (UNICEF), Catholic Relief Service (CRS), Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) and the other Non-governmental and church organizations such as the American Refugee Committee (ARC), Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC) and the Islamic Relief Agency (IRA), among others.

These groups of actors in the process of peace-building have their organizations working closely with the agencies of the South Sudan government and International and National non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in carrying out their assistance. The broad series of their activities included the provision of temporary accommodation, tracing of missing persons, and providing medical assistance, besides the organization of assistance for reconstruction and economic support to returnees. Humanitarian agencies were expected to provide recovery services such as food, water, sanitation, return of refugees and internally displaced people, and to secure their protection (Accord, 2013, pp. 87-92). There can be no development in a country when there is conflict. Development also requires the practice of good governance.

Methodology

According to the nature of the set objectives, the paper delimited to investigate the problems from interim time (2005- 2010) to post-independence South Sudan in 2011. A qualitative method

was applied for data collection and analysis for this study. Purposive sampling was applied for the data on the process for the provision of humanitarian aid, and the secondary sources of data were reviewed and analyzed to have the result. This study gathered information from people affected directly and indirectly by conflict in South Sudan. In addition to personal experience, more data was collected by notes-taking on observed and encountered situations, recording events from conversation and meetings, and written information (documents, products, and artifacts), in line with what is proposed by Miles and Huberman (1994, pp. 6-10; Alexander *et al.*, (2014, pp.7-9). Primary sources included interviews with government administrators and peace-building actors such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) in Juba. Interviews were also conducted with members of local and international organizations who have experience in peace-building activities. These included members of women unions, youths and civil society organizations, and community leaders. The interviews have helped the researcher get first-hand information and have insight from the key informants directly engaged in the issues and decision-making processes in the National government (total number of interviewees: male 83, female 31).

Literature from secondary sources in the process for the provision of humanitarian aid was drawn from the available resource centers such as the University of Juba library, electronic libraries, United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and in Agencies such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and (Accord) in Juba. The process also involved comparing and asking questions throughout the sampling process (Berg, 2001, pp. 30-35).

Before data gathering, a letter of ethical clearance from the University of Hawassa, Ethiopia, and the University of Juba was obtained to undertake the study for academic purposes easily. Respondents for this research were selected from participants and stakeholders involved in humanitarian aid activities in the process of peace-building. This involves a sample of different groups of age 18 and above, males and females, working and non-working-class of different occupations and officeholders. Among them are academics, community leaders, members of

civil society organizations, church members, women and youth associations, and staff in the peace and reconciliation commission. Data was also generated and validated by one focus group discussion in Juba County (11 participants) and one in Kajokeji County (7 participants). Workshops were held to serve as a means of triangulation for reliability and validity of the collected data and for plugging in information gaps from the other states of South Sudan (9 Workshops were conducted).

Limitations to this study were the fear by interviewees to provide information because national security prevents freedom of expression. More data would have been obtained in a conducive security environment. However, the researcher tried to convince them by producing the letters.

Results and Discussion

The provision of humanitarian aid is one of the requirements in the pillars of peace-building. The objective of the process for the provision of humanitarian aid is to ensure that basic human needs are met in South Sudan. Empirical literature (UNHCR, (2020); Bagshaw, (2012); Sphere project, (2004), show that the process of peace-building requires the effective application of the provision of humanitarian aid through the following four humanitarian principles: (i) humanity - issues of human suffering are to be addressed to protect the life of people and for respect of human beings; (ii) neutrality – humanitarian workers, in theory, are not supposed to engage in any political activities, but conditions in work environment sometimes make this principle challenging to obey; (iii) impartiality – activities for humanitarian aid are to be carried out based on priority and not on nationality, religion, race, and gender, or differences in social class; (iv) independence – activities for humanitarian aid need to be free from politics, economic interest, and military influence.

Based on the Organization of Economic Corporation and Development (OECD, 2008, pp. 11-12), there is a concern in Central Equatorial and other States in South Sudan in peace-building. The following section will look at the process of humanitarian aid for post-conflict recovery in Juba and Kajo Keji Counties of Central Equatorial State. It includes the process to deliver humanitarian aid - how the process was conducted, the choice of the institutions or sectors to work with through practice of good governance, the activities that need support, and the sequencing of the activities for the delivery of humanitarian aid, and the impact of such processes on communities in Central Equatorial and other States.

Provision of Humanitarian Aid for Post-Conflict Recovery in Central Equatorial and other States in South Sudan

Empirical literature (Cedric de Coning & Mateja, 2019) shows that in the Interim period (2005-2010), the (UNDP) made an effort to support activities for post-conflict recovery through the dissemination of information and engagement of communities in activities for conflict transformation. UNICEF provided support for social services such as infrastructure, activities for local NGOs and civic education, promotion of humanitarian principles, and compliance to human rights values. The UNDP, UNICEF, and many other UN agencies were working in collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP) before the outbreak of intra-conflict in December 2013 (Agensky, in Cedric de Coning & Mateja, 2019, p. 288; Cochrane, 2020). The Government of Southern Sudan's (GOSS) priorities for funding post-conflict recovery are indicated in table 1 below. Between the years 2008 to 2010, both GOSS and the donor communities were engaged in budget planning to meet the priorities of GOSS for post-war reconstruction. The views of the donor communities in 2010, based on analysis of conflict in Southern Sudan in post Comprehensive Peace Agreement, were that conflict was possible in Southern Sudan because of some of the following issues: (i) historical under-development, (ii) lack of inclusivity in the process of decision-making for policies (iii) urban-rural bias, and (iv) the system of centralization in the National Government (Bennett *et al.*, 2010).

According to the Overseas Development Institute (ODI, 2010; Bennett *et al.*, 2010, pp.47-55), the National Government revised its priorities for post-war reconstruction in the year 2010 to include the following areas: first, security is to develop effective and efficient armed forces to safeguard the security of the country and to implement the resolutions of Comprehensive Peace Agreement fully. Second, construction of road is to rehabilitate and to promote development in socio-economic recovery activities and private sectors. Third, primary healthcare provides primary healthcare units to improve the status of health of communities. Fourth, primary education is to provide equitable access to facilities for education. Fifth, water is to increase access to clean water and facilities for sanitation. Six, production is to improve livelihood and income of communities who live in rural areas of Central Equatorial and other States. Priorities such as security and roads are connected to activities for humanitarian aid. They facilitate easy

access on an urgent basis to provide humanitarian aid to people in need of recovery from the effect of conflict.

This paper observes differences in opinion between GOSS in Juba, and the donor communities, over the budget to pay for the priorities required for post-conflict recovery in South Sudan (see Table 1). The National Government in the year 2010 and the donors estimated the required funding as listed in table 1.

Table 1: Priorities and Estimates of Required Fund by GOSS and Donors

Priorities	GOSS estimates	Donor's estimates
Security	US\$ 438 million	US\$ 12 million
Road	US\$ 184 million	US\$ 39 million
Primary Healthcare	US\$ 52 million	US\$ 94 million
Basic Education	US\$ 99 million	US\$ 27 million
Water	US\$ 28 million	US\$ 25 million
Production	US\$ 29 million	US\$ 47 million

Source: (Bennett & Pantuliano *et al*, 2010)

There are differences in demand between the government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and the donor countries over the estimated budget in table 1. This was based on the priority of demanded items. Those items were based on assumption than field assessment, and the donors were concerned with priorities. More explanation of the differences in GOSS and the Donors' estimates is shown in Table 2, which shows the donor countries contributed to the budget in Table 1.

The level of expenditure of the budget varies by donors - from Belgium's high of 93% to 58% for the United States. The percentage of grants by the United States expended has been low because of the many substantial multi-year projects with complex phases of design funded by the United States (Bennett *et al.*, 2010).

The table shows variation in the way donors respond to funding for humanitarian aid, based on the high demand for humanitarian needs, priorities, and interests of the donors. As many of these large projects were carried out using contractors, the disbursement rate (contractors are paid in arrears while the UN agencies paid in advance) is considerably slower than grants. This makes

funding for humanitarian aid limited, which does not lead to an effective process for providing humanitarian aid.

Table 2: The Donor Countries That Contributed For the Budgeted Amount For Southern Sudan (2005-2009)

Donors	Budget for Southern Sudan (US\$ Million), excluding US\$ 1 billion for UNMIS	As the percentage of the total by donors	Percentage of which reported expended
USA	1,730	42.7%	58%
EC	487	12.0%	90%
Netherland	486	12.0%	70%
UK	480	11.9%	88%
Norway	277	6.8%	99%
Canada	230	5.7%	69%
Sweden	158	3.9%	88%
Denmark	103	2.5%	79%
Germany	94	2.3%	79%
Belgium	8	0.2%	93%
Total	4,052		73%

Source: Bennett & Pantuliano *et al*, 2010

The impact of large projects on overall expenditure reduced the US's share of expended funds to just over one-third of the expended funds. Although the share of the US reduced, it was still more than twice that of any other single donor if other aid programs of the United States are taken into account. During the Interim Period (2005-2011), other prominent actors in the process for the provision of humanitarian aid in Southern Sudan at large included the World Food Program (WFP), the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations International Children's Education Fund (UNICEF), the Catholic Relief Service (CRS), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Community Leaders, Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) and other church organizations such as the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) and Islamic Relief Agency (IRA). The figure given in 2019 by the Swedish International Development Cooperation

Agency (SIDA) of the organizations operating in the whole country was 177, of which there were 84 NGOs, 77 INGOs, 7 UN Agencies, and 9 others. According to Cochrane (2020), the figure for registered organizations working in Southern Sudan later rose to 194.

Empirical literature (SIDA, 2019; Balikuddembe *et al.*, 2014; OCHA, 2014) shows that humanitarian organizations, during the interim period, were providing both food and non-food items to refugees returning from the neighboring countries of Southern Sudan and internally displaced people. These numbers of organizations working in Southern Sudan were expected to significantly impact the outcome of the process for the provision of humanitarian. However, because of insecurity, where access to provide aid to people in need is denied, and natural hazards such as heavy rains and floods, their work has been slow and ineffective during the interim period. The following section will discuss literature on the return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced people in the interim period.

Return and Reintegration of Refugees and Internally Displaced People, and Those in Protection of Civilian Areas (POC)

Returnees

Data obtained from the fieldwork and the UNHCR office in 2006 had shown that, when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005, more than two million refugees and internally displaced persons returned to Southern Sudan. The number provided by UNHCR for both refugees and internally displaced people returning to South Sudan in 2006 was 366 430 (UNHCR, 2006). UNHCR and IOM overwhelmed many who were either returning refugees or internally displaced. The agencies responsible for their process of return had insufficient logistics. There was a requirement for more logistics. Apart from the World Food Program (WFP), the other agencies of the United Nations halted their support to spontaneous returnees before the end of 2008 because of a lack of funding (Duffield, 2008). However, the number of organized returnees was less than 13% compared to returnees who organized for their transport (Spontaneous Returnees). There were 60,000 organized IDPs, 482,000 spontaneous IDPs and 140,000 registered refugees returnees in 2006 (UNHCE, 2006).

The following are some priorities for providing services required by returnees and residents for them to live together cohesively: security, good services, economic and support to livelihood. However, all these required priorities had been lacking in Central Equatorial and other states of

Southern Sudan (interview with member staff of Central Equatorial State Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, 2016, Juba). Based on the UNHCR evaluation report in 2008 (Duffield, 2008), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, during the interim period, appeared not to have adequately incorporated a program of protection into its process of operation for returnees. The immediate needs of the returnees had been addressed by providing a collaborative package for three months. WFP took up the responsibility of supply of food aid. The non-food items for households were supplied by UNHCR, UNICEF, and other logistics provisions by other United Nations agencies such as the IOM. However, these services had also been poorly provided because the package's components and quality were based on assumption rather than need assessment. For example, the agencies involved in the program for the return of internally displaced persons from Khartoum and reintegration in Southern Sudan did not fully realize the scale and complexity of the operation situation to assist internally displaced persons in the process for return and reintegration.

A staff of UNHCR noted it, the work started well, but when staff realized the enormous amount of the work needed, with fewer logistics, many staff bowed out, leaving the internally displaced persons in a state of limbo, forcing them to find their own ways to Southern Sudan through spontaneous return (Duffield, 2008, p. 20). Before the independence in 2011, the process in stages of verification and registration of organized returnees at the point of departure took many months – bypassing timeline and predictability of the assistance needed by the returnees at the time of arrival to their final destination in different locations in Southern Sudan as such UNHCR office could have been more predictable and more engaged in the process of return and integration. This could be achieved by providing more protection input to inter-agency efforts during the planning stage, with good coordination responsibility on monitoring returnees on route to Southern Sudan and in final major locations of their return (Duffield, *ibid* p.20). In doing so, UNHCR could more significantly contribute to continuous monitoring of the outcome of the process of return and integration, the fulfillment of long-standing commitment *vis-à-vis* the humanitarian donors' community, and consolidation of its position as a prime interlocutor in search for a solution to the resettlement of returnees and internally displaced person in Southern

Sudan. Similarly, it was important to examine issues of local integration from the perspective of internally displaced persons (Duffield, *ibid*, p. 21).

The returnees were provided with non-food items such as tents and cooking utensils, while the food items included cooking oil, lentil, maize grain, and medicine during their time of arrival into transit centers. They were given food ration for three months but no medicine on departure from transit centers to their final location. The ration of food for three months was not enough to reintegrate fully into communities in their final location. Further, (Duffield, *ibid*; UNHCR, 2006 *op., cit.*, p.4) wrote that the UNHCR staff rarely have a follow-up visit to the permanent settlements of returnees to evaluate if they have settled well into their final locations, as part of their requirement for protection, and whether their work was satisfactorily conducted. They only followed up when the returnees themselves requested them.

Empirical literature (Emma & Jéssica, 2019) shows a problem in coordinating humanitarian aid work between the actors, the non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, and the government agency (SSRRC) because of lack of willingness from the side of the National Government. It was due to practices of corruption by elites in the National Government significantly caused the lack of sufficient finance, denial of humanitarian aid access to the suffering population by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) forces, poor infrastructure in the road to facilitate speedy work of humanitarian aid, particularly during the rainy seasons, and that caused a delay in the process to deliver humanitarian aid to places such as Leer and Bentiu. It forced the beneficiaries to suffer from starvation. As such, there was displeasure by the National Government in the work of humanitarian aid to help the post-conflict community of Central Equatoria and other States. The National Government did not consider that the restrictions of access for humanitarian aid by Sudan People's Liberation Army / Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA / SPLA-IO) to the suffering communities in South Sudan violated the practice for good governance.

According to (Lauren, 2013, pp 11-12; Nyadera, 2018, p.63), the limitation to fully effective work of humanitarian aid, other than by UNHCR and IOM between 2006 and 2008, regarding the return of refugees and internally displaced people, was due to unfavorable condition that made it extremely difficult for provision of effective humanitarian aid. Returnees have suffered secondary displacement by the outbreak of intra-conflict in December 2013. As noted by Lauren

(2013), more than 63,000 took refuge in UNMIS' protection of civilians (POC), and 121,600 others were internally displaced outside the (POC). The following section discusses the process for the reintegration of the returning refugees and internally displaced persons.

Reintegration of Returned Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

The reintegration of returning refugees and internally displaced people was achieved to some extent in Central Equatorial State. However, insufficient follow-up programs exist to evaluate how well the returning refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) were resettled to their communities. In the evaluation of UNHCR in 2008, Duffield et al. (2008, pp.19-21, 29-31) noted that there were problems in the process to reintegrate internally displaced persons and refugee returnees to places such as Western and Central Equatorial State because of land mines that required clearance. The available land requires the agreement of the local communities. It was also confirmed in the interview with the staff member of South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, 2017, Juba. Therefore, the reintegration process for returning refugees and internally displaced persons was only successful to some extent. The reintegration process was unevenly distributed because some returnees were left out in the process, and there were food shortages and a lack of shelters because of the lack of enough operation funds.

The following statement by a respondent captured the reintegration problems during the field interview; *'the CPA created discrimination, disunity, tribalism, and nepotism instead of peace-building. A female respondent commented that; the only benefit from the CPA is the freedom of movement and the ability to meet again with relatives'*. A former soldier commented that; *'before the CPA they had high hope for the country to deliver services, but they have become disillusioned and marginalized by the National government...The expectations that men marry and provide for their families have created a feeling of frustration and stress, particularly those expectations from relatives and friends are enormous. However, there has been an inability to deliver or meet such expectations'* (interview with a member of civil society organization, Women Union, Former Combatant, 2016, Juba). The comment by these respondents shows a lack of adequate delivery of services during the process of reintegration of returnees. There was a lack of access to economic opportunities, and there was a competition over scarce resources - making it difficult to meet the expectations of relatives and friends for support. There was greater

understanding and acceptance of people from different backgrounds to settle in Juba as a capital city, mainly because of their skills for employment.

However, the community in Juba has been experiencing and reflecting economic changes in their living standards. The urban poor people with no skills for work have been slowly pushed to the outskirts of the inner city, and the well-off people with skills for work occupied the center. An increase in inequality in living standards between the well-off and poor people in the capital, Juba, has created a feeling amongst many poor people that they are not benefiting from the provision of humanitarian aid, particularly in the process of development through the reintegration of returnees. People who have been pushed into the outskirts of the city require assistance from the IOM, but the process also takes long (interview with a member of displaced person, 2017, Juba).

The process for integration of returnees during the interim period was characterized by humanitarian aid problems that continued to shape experience later on after 2011 (Ajak, 2015, p. 2). Ajak (2015) noted that one of the difficulties meeting the expectations of relatives and friends relates to a lack of coordination, leading to inadequate provision of services. Further, the government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) did not know the exact number of humanitarian aid agencies available during the interim period. Although several meeting places were established, such as the GOSS-Donor forum and NGO forum to improve coordination between GOSS and aid agencies, progress in such meeting places was slow.

Engagement of returning refugees and internally displaced people youths to work in activities for building roads would provide skills for employment and good livelihood, which will lead to the creation of useful infrastructure in communities. It could easily help in the process of integration for returnees. To (Bennett *et al.*, 2010), there was also tension between the donor communities and the National Government of Southern Sudan on the policy to construct roads. Some organizations such as the German Agency for International Cooperation (GTZ) and non-governmental organization of Catholic Relief Service considered repair of tertiary roads, which are constructed with the labor of local communities (food or cash for work) suitable to respond to the more immediate problem of food security. Nevertheless, the National Government of Southern Sudan was opposed to the idea. However, empirical literature (GOSS, 2008; GOSS, 2017; Bennett *et al.*, *op.cit.*, p. 91) shows that the World Food Program (WFP) was given

contracts to repair and construct some feeder roads through, for example, the existing GOSS Commitments. These included the Lainya - Jambo road (costing US\$ 13.5M), the WFP Contract for Road Maintenance and De-mining (costing US\$ 66.0M), Kajo Keji-Juba, Faraksika-Chukudum, Wau-Kwajock-Abyei, Narus-Buma-Raad, Juba Bridge Delaunching and Launching (costing US\$1.9M).

This study finds that engagement of integrated returnees to work in activities for the building of roads would provide skills for employment and to have a good livelihood, which will lead to easy adaptability for the reintegration of returnees to their new place of settlement and creation of good infrastructure, facilitating relationship between integrated returnees and the host communities. This study also finds that one of the contributing factors to a less effective process for reintegration in Central Equatorial and other states was the lack of evaluation of the work of GOSS *vis-à-vis* the process to provide humanitarian aid. It is a process that requires a willingness by the responsible stakeholders, good coordination between the actors working in humanitarian aid, and a system of practice for good governance by GOSS to ensure coordination procedure for transparency and accountability. The process also requires consideration of the importance of the full contribution by reliable civil society organizations to the work of humanitarian aid. As a result, the lack of a participatory approach, where ideas are shared in the process of providing humanitarian aid, has contributed to the ineffective work of humanitarian aid. It also fails to identify if their work was progressing well or needs further improvement (interview with a member of civil society organization, 2017, Juba; interview with staff member, Central Equatorial State Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, 2017, Juba; Duffield, *op.cit.*). The reintegration process for returnees was also made ineffective due to the limited availability of suitable geographical location (with no insecurity problems), for non-governmental organizations and agencies of the United Nations in the vicinity, to partner with the UNHCR in the effort for the reintegration of returnees.

This study also finds a lack of understanding by workers in the process of providing humanitarian aid to communities in need. Provision of humanitarian aid, as one of the pillars of peace-building, requires knowledge in the following issues: (i) the understanding by the actors in the process of peace-building that flawed process of reintegration of returnees may result in

destabilizing communities and in exacerbating tension. For example, conflicts over the issue of natural resources such as water. Such tensions in communities can be exploited by the politicians in the National and State governments for personal interests. For that, it is vital to consider activities to develop the process of peace-building with reference to recognition of the key drivers of conflict. (ii) To consider the appropriate geographical placement of the work of humanitarian aid to avoid the areas which are most prone to violence, and (iii) to have the provision of support necessary for institutions to encourage peaceful relations in communities (Bennett *et al.*, 2010, p. 80).

Empirical literature (McCallum & Okech, in Pantuliano *et al.*, 2013, p.16) shows that there was a high need for more provision of humanitarian aid, for example to communities in places such as Akobo and Pibor, with 200, 000 people in need, and Jonglei State, with 201,000 people in need. According to (Bailey & Harragin, 2009; Bennett *et al.*, pp. 81- 82; Wageman & Langholtz, 2017, pp. 100-103), reliance on organized reintegration of returned refugees and internally displaced persons have strengthened the view of actors in the process for the provision of humanitarian aid on the ground, for the need of more logistics. The little progress that had been made in the process to deliver humanitarian aid by the United Nations (UN) agencies combined quick recovery impact in institutions for the development of the local government, paid for by donors such as Norway and Canada, but the process was not much effective (Conway, 2013). There was no relationship between the delivery of humanitarian aid to demonstrate effective work in the process of recovery and the efforts to strengthen the capacity and ownership of Central Equatorial and other State governments through the civil society organization. There was a lack of coordination. The process of recovery in humanitarian aid appeared to have undermined the credibility of the government of Central Equatorial and other States because the objectives to expand the presence and visibility of activities in humanitarian aid have not been fully met during the interim time, due to lack of coordination and capacity building (Conway, 2013, p. 24). The following section will present results and discussion on the process for the provision of humanitarian aid in post-2011 in Central Equatorial and other States.

Provision of Humanitarian Aid in the Post-Independence Period

As mentioned earlier, the primary aim of humanitarian aid is to respond to recovery problems in post-conflict South Sudan. However, this paper found that activities for the provision of

humanitarian aid did not fully benefit entire communities. It did not contribute to providing basic services such as water and sanitation, education, and health (interview with the commissioner, Kajokeji County; Village Assessment Report, 2013).

In the context of intra-conflict in 2013 (Omer, 2018, p.3), no refugees returned to the country, but there were 1.8 million internally displaced persons and 2 million people seeking refuge again in the neighboring countries. The non-governmental organizations working in humanitarian aid/agencies of the United Nations and the donor community have been concerned with the lack of progress in implementing the peace agreement in the country. The programs for funding of government building shifted to provisions of activities for protection, and that also created a bad relationship between the international community and the National Government of South Sudan (there was a lack of trust between the two). The life of internally displaced people, particularly those communities who live in the remote rural areas of Juba, became polarized further by the presence of armed groups.

According to (Balikuddembe *et al.*, 2014), the insecurity situation after December 2013 made the provision of humanitarian aid difficult. As noted by Balikuddembe *et al.* (2014), there were 26 recorded incidents of confiscation of relief assets, occupation of humanitarian premises, physical assault of the staff of different humanitarian agencies, and restriction to provide humanitarian services to reach the communities in need. Six humanitarian compounds were raided, properties were looted, members of national security beaten fourteen humanitarian staff, and the military forces occupied six schools. All of these activities against humanitarian agencies were conducted by the military and national security forces, which made the process of providing humanitarian aid ineffective.

Emma & Jéssica (2019) noted that Oxfam and other non-governmental organizations working in the provision of humanitarian aid tried to meet the immediate need of the communities affected by conflict in the Western Bahr el Ghazal region in 2017. The project provided cash transfer, food vouchers, borehole rehabilitation, and goats distribution. The project also equipped communities with skills, knowledge, and assets to earn money for themselves to build their resilience for the future. Nevertheless, it has been observed by Erol (2018, p. 2) that the program faced challenges to work because it lacked sufficient practices for coordination, collaboration,

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cooperation, and communication within a framework of multi-stakeholders - States, communities (CSO), aid agencies, private sectors, NGOs, National, and Local actors. The project was forced to stop because of conflict. Further, the increasing population requiring humanitarian assistance made the provision of services not enough to cater to all people in need. There were conflicts in various areas such as Jonglei and Upper Nile States (interview with a member of civil society organization, 2017 Juba).


The work of humanitarian aid in the country, whether independently or in collaboration with the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), was supposed to coordinate with the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) to conduct their work. However, the researcher experienced during the fieldwork that when soldiers are out of their barrack on a mission, they are not easily controlled until they return to their barrack, where they will obey the rules of their commander. As noted by Balikuddembe *et al.* (2014), humanitarian aid agencies have been facing problems of denial of access to deliver aid to people in need because of the violent attitude of the SPLA and SPLA-IO against some of the workers in humanitarian aid, which consisted of harassment or intimidation, attacks, robbery, hijacking of properties, arrest, abduction, and commandeering of vehicles of humanitarian agencies (Balikuddembe *et al.*, 2014).

The violent attitude of the SPLA and SPLA-IO against the humanitarian aid workers extended country-wide to places such as Jonglei and Upper Nile states. It was a violation of the United Nations resolution A/RES/82, where full access and no hindrance to humanitarian aid and other services is a precondition for an effective provision of humanitarian aid, whether in armed conflict or natural disaster. Prevention of access to humanitarian aid has led to a less effective process to deliver humanitarian aid (Balikuddembe, 2014). However, the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan has provided freedom of movement for foreign travelers and repatriation of refugees and internally displaced people.

IOM (2016) noted that the conflicts in December 2013 and July 2016 created more internally displaced persons searching for protection in United Nations compounds in South Sudan. Hence, internally displaced people by conflict included those in the United Nations Protection of Civilian (POC) camps. The report of the IOM in 2016 painted a worrying situation for the displaced number of people in POC; the number for Juba town was 38,874, Wau town was


42,384, Bentiu town was 101,570, Malakal town was 33,057, and Melut town was 700 IDPs (IOM, 2016). Yet, the SPLA and SPLA-IO hindered an activity for providing humanitarian aid. The increasing number of internally displaced people and those who received humanitarian aid is shown in figure 1 for the number of internally displaced persons by conflict and figure 2 for those who managed to receive aid. Figures 1 and 2 show the changes in the figures of internally displaced people during the first eight months of the conflict that broke out in December 2013. Figure 1 shows that the conflict intensified for the first two months, from December 2013 to January 2014, when Dr. Riek Marcher was forced out of Juba with his forces. The situation was reduced to normal. Fighting increased when the forces of Dr. Riek Marcher regained strength and President Salva Kiir gained the support of the Ugandan army, which also increased the number of internally displaced people from February to July 2014 to 2,400,000.

Figure 1: The Number of Internally Displaced People by Violence in South Sudan from December 2013 to July 2014



Source: Balikuddembe & Ejeta, 2014

Figure 2: The Number of Internally Displaced People Reached by Humanitarian Aid Agencies and Received Assistance in South Sudan from December 2013 to July 2014



Source: Balikuddembe & Ejeta, 2014

Links in Recovery, Transition, and Rehabilitation in the Work of Humanitarian Aid

This study found a link between recovery and transition to rehabilitation. Better development reduces the difficulties in future recovery, and better recovery facilitates the process of transition to sustainable development. In order to have an effective process for the provision of humanitarian aid, its workers have to structure their activities with an understanding that the

activities for humanitarian aid also reinforce respect for development. It may be more effective if humanitarian aid workers, together with Central Equatorial State and others, coordinate and collaborate their work with the private sector to leverage capacity and resources available for post-conflict recovery. However, as noted during the interview with a member of a civil society organization in Juba in 2017, there was no effective process for coordination and collaboration, making the transition in the link from recovery to rehabilitation and development not fully effective (interview with a member of civil society organization, 2017, Juba).

Oxfam (2019) emphasized that sustainable advocacy is required for reforms in economic policy, which focus on the most economically vulnerable people. In particular, the participation of women would be vital to ensure fair distribution of opportunities and activities that reduce practices of inequality and promote self-reliance through engagement in activities for the market (Oxfam, 2019, p. 23). Speedy access to provide humanitarian aid facilitates the key operations of humanitarian aid of movement of goods and aid workers where they are needed to implement the provision of health services and to conduct the needed activities for humanitarian aid to benefit the affected communities (Balikuddembe, 2014, p. 16). However, some challenges made the provision of humanitarian aid not so effective in Central Equatorial and other States.

Challenges in the Process for Provision of Humanitarian Aid After 2013

Empirical literature (Balikuddembe *et al.*, 2014, p. 20) and data (interview with staff, Central Equatorial State Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, 2017, Juba) show challenges in the process for the provision of effective humanitarian aid to include the following: the bureaucratic policies of the National government created delays in getting working visas for the aid workers, approval of travel permits to affected areas and clearance of relief. For example, the National government does not fully respect humanitarian principles by allowing temporary corridors to facilitate easy access for humanitarian aid to reach the people in need. It is particularly in violation of the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Convention and the additional protocol of 1949, which South Sudan accepted in 2012.

The other challenges include rainy seasons in South Sudan. From July to December every year, roads to key locations of need for humanitarian aid are sometimes cut off. Access to such areas

becomes minimal or impossible. It is a physical challenge for humanitarian aid workers - a high cost for humanitarian aid during the rainy season. High risks of movement during rainy seasons make some humanitarian aid workers face problems of looting, ambushes, and destruction of humanitarian aid assets, leading to fluctuating prices and continued increase in cost for humanitarian operation (interview with staff, Central Equatorial State Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, 2017, Juba).

To Balikuddembe *et al.* (2014, pp. 20-23), the companies providing humanitarian freights services increased the transport charges, making it difficult for some humanitarian agencies to distribute aid to many people in need. The affected people may get cut off from receiving aid services such as health, food distribution, and education facilities. It has happened in Central Equatoria and other states such as Jonglei, Warrap, Lakes, Unity, and Upper Nile. It is because of the lack of development of a sound infrastructure system all over the country.


The insecurity problems have made humanitarian workers find alternative ways to reach people in need through local civilians. But civilians are also armed, hungry for food, lack money as salaries are not paid some time for four to six months. They need vehicles and food supplies from NGOs that provide humanitarian aid. Moreover, if they are not provided, they take it by force. It adds to the access constraints to provide humanitarian aid (interview with the staff member, Central Equatorial State Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, 2017, Juba).

Empirical literature (Cockrane, 2020) shows an urgent need by the National government in the work of humanitarian aid. Further, data from the fieldwork revealed that the National government did not consider that increase in well-being of beneficiaries, and the quality of their life, are determined by the frequent use of the following associated concepts; commonality, united effort, and partnership or harmonious teamwork for effective results (interview with a staff member, Central Equatorial State Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, 2017, Juba). These concepts are not limited to the process for the provision of humanitarian aid; it includes armed forces that hinder access for effective provision of humanitarian aid to people in need. These associated concepts have the following four characteristics, cooperation, coordination, collaboration, and communication. All the four characteristics above are vital in the effective delivery of humanitarian aid. It is argued that the quality of information that has not been shared, trusted, respected, and valued is doomed to fail. Hence, the diverse mandates that add to the four

successful concepts above require ongoing patience, diplomacy, transparency, listening, classifications, confidence, and no assumption.

These are skills that lead further to having characteristics that include; experience, academic preparedness, a clear understanding of the objectives and work of humanitarian aid at micro and macro levels. Therefore, poor cooperation, coordination, collaboration, and communication have risked working relations, and it impedes progress to meet the intended objectives for success in humanitarian aid work (Cochrane, 2020, pp. 27-29; Kopinak, 2013). Figure 3 below illustrates the required United Nations cluster of the approach for effective work in the process of providing humanitarian aid.

Figure 3: Illustration of the United Nations Cluster Approach for Humanitarian Aid Work in 2005



Source: Kopinak (2013)

Empirical literature (Kopinak, 2013) shows the cluster approach adopted by the United Nations in 2005 to improve the working relationship between stakeholders and host government (Central Equatorial and other State) in communication, cooperation, coordination, and collaboration. It is to minimize high cost, duplication, and conflicting activities in work to provide humanitarian aid. It can be through maximizing the exchange and flow of information. Although the cluster

approach has significant potential for improvement of work in activities for the provision of humanitarian aid and the well-being of the beneficiaries, the skills required for implementation have been lacking in Central Equatorial and other States in the country. It was because of elitism in the National and State governments in South Sudan at large. Elites in both levels of government took administrative responsibilities for providing humanitarian aid without technical know-how, consideration to expectations of the vulnerable communities, and respect for their rights to the provision of humanitarian aid. It raises the question; what are the rights of communities to the provision of humanitarian aid? The answer would require further research on the practice of human rights education and advocacy in Central Equatorial and other States.

Limitations in the process for the provision of humanitarian aid are due to the neglected role of civil society organizations, youths, women and religious groups, academics, and traditional authorities. All of them are stakeholders that need to be fully considered in the process to provide humanitarian aid. Some humanitarian aid challenges for easy reaching to affected communities can be transferred to civil society organizations that operate in the most affected areas. Hence, a holistic approach is needed for the different players in the process of providing humanitarian aid (Balikuddembe *et al.*, 2014, pp. 24-25).

A well-researched design process for implementing humanitarian aid is a vital requirement regarding the events to be carried out, the environment in which the work is to be taken, and the location of head offices of the providing agencies, field staff, donors, and national and local government stakeholders. At the same time, successful implementation of activities in the process for the provision of humanitarian aid in post-conflict communities would require an understanding of the nature, scope, and practical relevance of the programs for recovery. Successful activities in the process for providing humanitarian aid would require the collaboration of stakeholders, time, reliability of the donor in funding for both short and long-term, and recruitment of skilled staff with required knowledge, and long-enough duration to provide for continuity of the activities in the process for the provision of humanitarian aid (Kopinak, *op.cit.*; Oxfam, 2019).

The researcher considers that the foremost step in providing humanitarian aid in Central Equatorial and other States would be promoting cooperation, collaboration, coordination, and communication between stakeholders investing in providing food, education, and health. The

process would be effective through a flexible transition to enhance sharing of ideas - a participatory approach. It will also be cost-effective to beneficiaries and the donors because participants in the provision of humanitarian aid will have a chance to learn new skills from one another. According to Prentice *et al.* (2020), the benefit of the participatory process leads to the following. First is the development of social networks - a chance to meet other people, make new friends, and increase connections. Second, learning comes in different forms - through participation, people will learn many new skills, have openness to other new experiences, and have the confidence to learn. Third, participants will develop self-efficacy - people will believe in their capability to do things that influence events that affect their lives; how people feel, think, and motivate themselves (Prentice *et al.*, 2020, p. 4). Further research would be needed on the same topic regarding freedom of movement and expression.

Conclusions

This study finds that the process for the provision of humanitarian aid in Central Equatorial and other States is not effective enough to prevent the resumption of conflict. Workers in the provision of humanitarian aid play different roles, but mainly under a single universal principle to protect the vulnerable communities, by decreasing their suffering, including enhancement of their well-being in the process for post-conflict recovery. This study shows that provision of humanitarian aid in Central Equatoria and other States was not effective because of a lack of systematic planning and evaluation at the early stages of the process. After attaining peace, careful planning is vital for the effective provision of humanitarian aid.

The provision of humanitarian aid was more effective during the Interim Period than the time after the intra-South Sudanese conflict from December 2013. The conflict in 2013 made the provision of humanitarian aid not very effective, mainly due to a lack of practices for good governance by elites in the National and State governments. It led to disrespect of human rights values, leading to an increase in conflict. The behavior of armed forces against humanitarian aid workers has prevented the effective supply of aid for recovery to people in need. The SPLA/SPLA-IO often denied access for humanitarian aid workers to provide services to people affected by the conflict. The rainy season and the poor road infrastructure also affected the process for speedy provision of humanitarian aid. If the authorities in South Sudan were

committed to the process, these other factors, such as infrastructure and natural hazards, could be easily surmounted.

Sustainable peace can be consolidated by building the authorities' capacity and legitimacy in governments. It can be done by provision of basic services, consideration of problems of security, good policing, and provision of the rule of law. The process of intervention by the international community in activities for peace-building was a high priority in Central Equatorial and other States. However, the effectiveness and sustainability of such intervention depend on elites' willingness in the National and State governments to provide reasonable security to the communities on the ground.

The process for the provision of humanitarian aid was not effective enough to contribute to the process of peace-building to prevent the resumption of conflict in South Sudan. The National government did not encourage respect for principles of humanitarian aid to produce effective results. Such a failure has prevented the efforts to deliver effective humanitarian aid for recovery.

Recommendations

The problems in providing humanitarian aid require the National and State governments and partners in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to design together programs that address short-to long-term needs and build the communities' resilience.

More efforts are needed to build a constructive relationship with authorities in the National and State governments and strengthen and rebuild trust and understanding in institutions of the governments. Good policies and principles of good governance would be necessary for effective work.

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