



Full Length Research Paper

Clash of Politics over the Border: Moyale, Ethio-Kenya/Somale

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Abstract

This research presents the history of conflict among the Moyale border communities by revisiting the roots of the colonial project. The researcher employed qualitative and quantitative methods and analyzed challenges exerted upon the communities, hermeneutically. Thus, the report presents legacies corollary to the establishment of the border and the surviving culture of ethnic distrust between the Boorana Oromoo and Somali people. The researcher approached the history of border conflict from successive phases in order to address states- community confrontation and administrative instability over the border. Taking the current standoff back to the movement of the 1960s, young republic of Somalia state, and the research explores historical causes of the border crisis and subsequent replications in the post-colonial ideologies. The researcher discusses colonial mistakes and the dynamism of states' errors across historical incidents. It addresses political vacuums resulted from states' constant appropriations of border politics and how it mark serialized coercion upon the communities. It makes a conclusive suggestion in that the colonial project of border setting lacked basic attributes that the concept 'border' implies. Adopting colonial functionaries and serving stand-in roles, post-colonial states' leadership relapsed in an unsecured collection of combatant border communities. States promote the mission of producing fervent loyalists to its nationalistic motto and territorial sovereignty against communities' demands. Localization of the colonial legacies moved from ideology of state building to politics of ethnic federation without solving prior conflicts. Accordingly, the border communities remain victims of an artificial ethnic polarization through the politics of "us" and "them" (identity contentions) and "ours" and "their" (resource competition). Finally, the research calls for rethinking nature of distractive conflict among the bordering communities so as to effectively construe why the border region remained undeveloped for a long period of time. The states' longstanding deliberate absences from bringing important developmental public institutions such as universities, national factories and other considerable projects but huge military camps, should be reversed

Key Terms: Border politics, Ethio-Kenya. new solution, old standoff, referendum,

Axereeraa

Qorannichii seenaa walitti dhufeenna uummattoota daangaa kan dhiheessu ta'ee, argannoon qorannichaa sakatta'iinsaa ragaalee seenaa kan bara Kolonummaa Afrikaa irraa ka'uun walitti-bu'iinsa naannoo Mooyale ofi-duuba deebi'ee ragaalee seenaatin ilaala. Qorannichi ragaalee jiran sakatta'uun maloota odeeffannoo faffaca'an funaanutti fayyadame. Ragaalee funaanamanirratti hundaa'un haallii siyaasa daangaa xiinxalame. Qorannichii 'Hadhaa' kolonummaan awwaaltef dhibee daangaa Kolonummaan sarartee walitti fiduun Siyaasaa waltti bu'iinsaatif walitti gaarifannaa Booranaafi Soomalee gidduutti gosummaan faalamee baballachaa dhufe xiinxala. Qorataan kun waldhibdee uummata daangaa kan amalaaf qabannaa sirnoota waljijjirraa dhufaniitti xiyyeefannaa boqonnaa boqonnaan kennuun sababa walti-bu'iinsaa, walitti gaarifannaafi tasgabbi dhabiinsa siyaasaa daangaa xiixala. Kun ammoo furmaata odoohintaanee, walitti gagaarifannaafi walitii bu'iinsa uummata daangaa waggaa dheeran boodad eeb'ianii haaromsuu jedhee lafa kaa'a. Adeemsii kun siyaasa sirna federaalaa jalatti 'Mirga ofiin ofibulchuu' jedhu mirga gara-tokkee (pro-Somali) qofa tolchuun uummattoota hafan maqaa mirga ofiin of bulchuutiin kan mirga irraa mulqe jedhee gabaasa qoratichii. 'Qaawa uumame' kana akkacarraatti itti fayyadamuun 'Leellistoota gosaatiifi saamtota misooma daangaa' haala kana hammeessa akka dhufan dubbata. Siyaasan 'Daldalootafi Maxxantoota gosaatin' guutame kun ilaalcha "Nuufi Isan/ Keennaafi keessan" jedhuun walitti bu'iinsa daangaa kan Me'eesso ohanga Mooyyale, Mandheeraa dabalatee lubbuufi qabeenna akka mancaase lafa kaa'aqorataan kun. Dhumaratti, qorannichii adeemsi ifurmaata haarawa rakkoo dullattiif kennuu kun bifa qorannootiifi ija siyaasatiin akka irra deebi'amee gad-fageennafi bilchinnaan qoratamuu qabu yaada furmaataa dhiheessa. Dabalataanis, biyyootni waldaangessan kun naannoo daangaa kan akka Mooyalee kanatti misooma walootiif dhaabbilee bu'uura kan akka Yuniversiitiifi Misoomaa daangaa uumuun uummata gama siyaasatiin walitti gaarrifatu kan akka misoomaan walitti hidhan yaada dhiheessa. Hundaa ol, rakkoon uummata daangaa kun adeemsa siyaasa dullachaa kanaafi waldorgommii humna waraanatiin aodoo hintaane, 'Marii uummataatiifi hirmaannaa dhaabbilee aadaatiin akka furamu gaafata.

Jechoota Ijoo: *Siyaasa daangaa, Itiyoo-Keeniyaa, furamaata haarawa, dhiibbaa dullacha, referendamii,*

1. Introduction

Introduction: The Ethio-Kenya border was demarcated by the three competing powers. Fixing the frontiers was done between the colonial power (British) and the internal expansionist project (the Abyssinians) and later on shaped by the Italians. In the process of demarcation, which was political motivated, dispersed the communities into several countries. This project of border colonial establishment left historic-political grievance among the Border communities, mainly the Boorana Oromoo and the Somali people. The Somalis used the concept of "Euro-Abyssinian colonialism"

(Greenfield 1965: 108) to define Ethiopia as an empire no different from that of the Europeans. Oromoo scholars in due course developed the concept of dependent colonialism (Holcomb and Ibssa 1990) to designate Abyssinia as the local surrogate of Western imperialists. It was in 1902-3 that the first Anglo-Abyssinian border commission established what came to be known as the "Red line," which defined the borders of Ethiopian jurisdiction (Oba 1996, p.131). A second commission (1908-9) established the 'Gwynne line or the blue-line,' which delimited the areas under the jurisdiction of the British (Farson 1950:261, in Oba, *ibid.*). Accordingly, the historic-political impact of the border on the communities goes back to this earlier encounter, both from external and internal powers. Since then, thereby, the border area remained a significant geopolitical region, as it connects, at least two internationally recognized states in terms of trade and successive political strategies. This research traces geopolitical significance of the border regime back to those colonial times and discusses phases of interconnected shifts.

Area's historical image in commercial and geopolitical activities has many things to be considered locally, nationally and globally. Several literatures trace the global history of the area back to a Greek person by the name of Zaphiro who had a station called "Fort Harrington" As this source explains that the fort Harrington was well placed as a health administration post and as a possible commercial center (*ibid.*) It seems that introduction of commercial activities was coterminous and coincident with the project of colonization and hence one can hardly see the area's geopolitical strategic influence and significance from a colonial mission. As a result, historical encounters and happenstance were not clear right from the start. Philip Zaphio, whom I described as a Greek trader was also appointed border Agent by the British whose clear mission can hardly be considered as a commercial agent. There was a time when ordered the Boorana to evacuate Wajir and move to Buna (Oba 1996 in Aguilar, 1996, p.131). It must have been from this that with the development of British East Africa now known as Kenya, Boorana trade across the southern frontier increased in importance, particularly after the opening of the road from Moyale to Nairobi (Belletech Deressa, 1993 p.31, in JOS1993). This argument makes the earlier mission clear in that that the shift of community's life into commerce itself was a colonial design. According to Mario I Aguilar, the goal of the British administration was to pacify the administrative areas, to "disarm the tribes;" to establish centers of trade, to support the administration and to halt any Ethiopian expansion into Kenya colony (1992, 3). By 1909, the administration of the Northern Frontier District (at that time centered in Marsabit and Moyale) had opened a police station at Waso Nyiro, later to be called Archer's Post "While there were only one Arab, one Indian and one Swahili merchant in Garba Tulla by 1919, the actual relocation of the British administration in 1917/1918 from Bulesa into Garba Tulla helped the growth of the trading center (Mario I Aguilar, 1992, p.4.).

Geographically, Moyale district is located at the frontier between the Somali and Oromoo peoples, Southwestern Ethiopia. The current administrative boundary lies; on the South by Kenya, on the West by the Oromiya Region, and on the North and East by the Dawa and Dolo Odo. The area is dominantly a pastoral area that received bimodal rainfall. The communities used to have their own coping mechanisms to sustain their life. Strategically, among the others, they use mobility as a means of surviving the situations. The mobility they use, though sometimes misunderstood and misnamed as nomadic or 'Zelan) is a carefully managed process and relies on large social networks and the rapid gatherings of information on the conditions of pasture and water, both quantity and quality (Oba, 1998). It enables livestock to take advantage of the ever-changing diversity of dry-land ecology by tracking the random concentrations of nutrients in space and time (Omolo, 2009). Mobility is important to escape from the outbreak diseases and conflicts driven by either climate change or other factors (Nori, 2007). However, recently, rainfall becoming very much unreliable

both in amount and time of arrival, consequently, makes them very vulnerable to climatic change as a result of which the communities are combining small-scale crop farming with animal husbandry. As a result of this climatic shift and strategic transition, one may consider them as agro-pastoralist (Mario I Aguilar, 1992, p.4.).

The article begins by clarifying what I mean by post-colonial clash of politics from the specifics of Moyale district is. It focuses on-premise that colonial demarcation of Ethio-Kenyan border and post-colonial ideology of the young independent republic of Somalia changed the customary relationships among the groups. Alfred G.Nhema (2004:12), emphasizing the post-colonial socio-economic and political circumstances states that “although historical legacies can be traced in some of the African conflicts, the bottom-line is the root causes of the conflicts are found in the socio-economic and exclusionary configuration”. What confirms this, is, since its inception, the Moyale area is known for overlapping, conflicting, fluctuating and clashing of colonial (post) states and ceaseless ethnic clashes, dominantly; the Boran, Garrii, Gabra, Burjji, Dogodi, etc. This research finding discusses how the Moyale district political situation, since it was affected by colonial legacies, relapsed into long-aged history of warfare for defense along resources with the involvement of colonial mentality that considers the areas as key geo-political strategy.

The research presents finding by arranging phases of border political encounters and their impact on the inhabitants in four major periods, i.e. (1) period of colonial designing, (2) period of the ideology of State building, (3) Period of nationalism and the Rise of identity politics and (4) the recent period of Ethnic Political crisis of. It draws a political lesson for the states regarding how the continuity of clash of politics over the border has its deep root (causes) in the earlier colonial setting and continuously shaping communities life from generation to generation. Specifically, the report emphasis on the nature and impacts of states’ political direction on the artificial confrontation created by colonial project between communities and above all, ideologically imposition and political systematization of post-colonial hostility between the Boorana Oromoo and Somali clans.

Historical Development of Border Politics

Historical background and political legacies, as well as the dynamism of Moyale border political situations, can be understood from successive phases. Accordingly, this report discusses Moyale border politics and its impact on the inhabitants in four interconnected phases.

Phase One: Colonial Designing: The importance of starting such a particular border from wider angle must be clear. Scholars consider African countries as the Berlin states in Africa when they mean those states that were carved out at the Berlin conference in 1884. The very foundation of African state formation was laid in the rich European archives that emancipated from the delimitation and demarcation followed from the infamous era of the European scrambling for the partition of Africa,” (Asiwaju 2011:4).The imperialists had put the project public secret as history witness from their slogans that the French wanted to create black French in Africa whereas the British wanted to prove that the “sun never set on its empire. “Considering the issues from this generality, the research finding discovered that the border division by foreigner designers exerted cross-generational impact on the Moyale communities. May be sad to say, what was invented and exerted was not only border land demarcation, but also humanity which is essentially inhuman. Long before the external power coalesced groups of people of the same community into regimes of governances (Mainly the Boorana of Kenya and Ethiopian, as well the Migo and Malbe Gabra of Northern Province of Kenyan, can be cited) the communities used to live together under various indigenous and customary institutions under one leadership (Gadaa system and Teliya) can be cited).

The British 'invention' of tribes, for the colonial nation building, left historical scar upon the Boran, Garri, Gabra, Burji, Dogodi, Marean, etc. The trend was common to the modern state system in the horn of Africa, like in the rest of the continent. "The political boundaries were carved the former colonial power dividing the same ethno cultural groups into different political /legal jurisdiction (Tafesse, 208:3). The trend which divided the lands divided the humanities at the first place. But this project of dividing the humanities along the division of land did not stop there. It also destroyed customs and traditions that used to hold them together. The projects of ethnic arrangement undermined pre-existing community customary ties by underrating indigenous leaderships.

Districts imposed boundaries and restrictions on the customs and movements of the Somaliland Boorana In 1909 Jubaland (transferred to Italy in 1925), Moyale, Wajir, Garre(Mandera),Telernugger(Garissa) and Isiolo were set as administrative districts. The goal of the British administration was to pacify the administrative areas, to "disarm the tribes;" to establish centers of trade, to support the administration and to halt any Ethiopian expansion into the Kenya colony (Mario I Aguilar, 1992, 3).

Furthermore, the border commissions' imposition of what they called redline in 1902-3, blue-line in 1908-8 and above its community version came to known as Seer-Daawwee which blocked of active Gada leaders from crossing certain defined limit are all among the worst to remain in memory and practice. Legesse put; "active Gada leaders in Dirre and Liban, Ethiopia, cannot go to Marsabet for any purpose whatsoever. They are prohibited by Gada laws from traveling beyond a defined perimeter within Dirre and Liban in Ethiopia" (2005:57). The restriction made the Boorana loss their identity.

After 1934 the Somali trespassed into the Garba Tulla area, the events of Wajir had created some cohesion among the Boorana It is during those years of British administration that the Waso Boorana were gradually converted to Islam The new boundaries of 1934 created an isolated group of Boorana, the Waso Boorana, who lost all their contacts with their traditional religious system and their religious leaders (the Kaifu) in Ethiopia "Isolated from Ethiopia and the celebration of initiation and ritual life with the rest of the Boorana, the Waso Boorana adopted Muslim practices Somalization and Conversion (Mario I Aguilar, 1992, 4).

The British colonial arrangements over the Moyale border succeed much in restricting the leaders first and turning leaderless communities into victims as a result of which the divided leaderless communities were finally forced to be refugees at the geographically planned camps in accordance with the calculated distances from the border.

Phase Two: Ideology of State building Project: The research addresses geopolitical history of Moyale border from three interconnected angles. Firstly, the community confinement to Marsabet-Waso-Wajir and Moyale was done in favor of the British military Administration when the British replaced the Italian power (which captured Moyale from Ethiopia in 1940) on July 15 1941. Following this colonial intervention, ideological competition between the US, the Soviet Union, Communist China, as well as the missionary projects galvanized the tension. The trend continued. Anglo-American security interests carried out by UN in collaboration with AU and IGAD contributed to border unrest when they jointly interrupted Somalia politics (Zenawi-Kibaki-Museveni).

Secondly, The states 'ideological aphorisms kept on bottle upping political tension among the border communities: i.e. Kenya's sticks to 'Harambe,' Ethiopia's vision right up to 'Tikdem,' and the

Somalia's pursuit of 'Greatness,' The current spate of ethnic conflict in Ethiopia were not the product of the expansion of the Ethiopian state at the turn of the 20th century but rather the result of the process of modernization and integration in to the world economy (Demise Fantahun,2004:142). Leaving border communities at no man's land, each of these states continued dogmatizing principle of 'dying as tribes to born as nations'

Thirdly, the rise of issue of identity politics which became pervasive in the post-cold war period, influenced community politics as the community issue fall under politics of identity and ethnicity. As I have said, geopolitical influence which categorically put into three, are not exclusive. One pushes the other as other pull the next.

Phase Three: Nationalism and the Rise of Identity politics: The research finding indicate that the rise of identity, in the case of these communities, is deeply rooted in the greater politics of colonial arrangements, shaped by ideology of state building and alarmed by the movement of nationalism refueled by politics of ethnicity. To this end, the finding recourses how the covetous eyes of Ziad Barre (Hararge-Boorana (Russian sponsored), and the politics of Somalizing the Boorana (Mogadishu sponsored) opened a worst chapter of turning the communities against one another's. Throughout their history in Northern Kenya, the Boorana and Somali have gone through a process of symbiosis and conflict Both groups have cooperated and fought each other according to their responses to situations concerning grazing water for their animals, trade possibilities. The root of this political animosity trace back to Somali nationalism in the early 1960s, the Oromoo people were divided and made leaderless refuge due to the British political strategies observed on the Kenyan side. Accordingly, the colonial project came to the scene when the effects of colonial structuring relapsed into community politics of causal dumping of Political marker to ethnicity. Historically, a strange culture of assassination occurred to these communities in 1963 when the Somali gunmen assassinated the District Commissioner Daudi Dabaso Wabera and Chief Hajji Galma Diida. Historical processes related to religious affiliation, and post-colonial expectations concerning ethnic status exacerbated ceaseless ethnic confrontation. AS suggested by ER Tunon,"relations between the Baran and Somalia appear to have been unduly complex and they were far from conforming to a pattern of simple hostility," "Norwest a matter of the Somali versus the Boran"

Phase Four: Political crisis of Ethnicity: The recent politics of Ethiopian ethnic federalism resulted contest unprecedented intensity. Be it deliberate or not, prime minister Tamirat Layne gave answer to both Ali Sharmarke's (Somalia Prime Minister) request in the 1960s and Sultan Ali Gababa's letter (1969) in 1994 (referendum). This shows that, just like the border itself, the communities around the border have been affected by state politics and how the bordering states adjust their relationship across time. The above-mentioned case of referendum indicates how sometimes the state invented new solution for the old problem. In his work "The Political Viability of Boorana Pastoralism" Johan Helland clearly indicated how successive regimes play on an older historic-political ground thereby sometimes invented a new tactics for older strategies at the expense of indigenous community; "The Boorana lost Dirre, their sacred land, to the Somali Nomads because of the pressure of the Somali state in the 1970s and 1980s ... Recently, lost Liban, their sacred land by its inclusion"...within the boundaries of the newly defined Somali region of Ethiopia"(p 149). Moreover, in the research I found that communities are not ignorant or unaware of successive consequences of states' action, nor totally healed from memories of colonial scar. Here what one may take as counter response from the victim community view point is; the Boorana denounced one of the core elements of colonial sanction on the Gada law which forbids their leaders from traveling beyond a defined perimeter within Dirre and Liban in Ethiopia during the recent (40th Gumi Gayo).

The critical narration I obtained from my informant indicates how the community is conscious of political flexibility. As an observer participant of the 40th Gumii Gaayoo, I came to understand that the Boorana came up with such decision due to the timely political lesson from their in relation to the neighboring communities and the manner of state response. This informant mentioned the following points as pushing factors for the Boorana denouncement of the mentioned law; 1st the Boorana learned from acts of Hassan Gababa who was representative of OLF (Oromoo Liberation Front) during the transitional government and withdrew immediately from it and joined the Somali region as the OLF withdrew from the charter. 2nd The Boorana learned from Hasan Kalla who immediately followed Hassen Gababa's footsteps in shifting from his status of Gabra's Abba Gada to Teliya. The Boorana also learned from decision of Shenu Godana who immediately joined the Somali region when the government removed him from zonal position. Finally, the immediate factor that forced the Boorana to denounce the law was the formation of REGGABU alliance with two suspicious characteristics: (1) it attached to geo-political map of Garre land Republic which claimed beyond the border zone. (2) The alliance fighters wore earlier Somalia's secessionists uniform (camel marked military capes). From the Garri side, the alliance overt attempt to create a safe platform from which 'Islamization' and Caliphate creation agenda can be launched to influence the surroundings regions put the Boorana back to the fear they had faced during 1960s. From the Gabra side, overt inspiration of alliance leader to realize their dream of joining both the Migo and Malbe Gabra nations with no any other community in between reminds the Boorana of the happenstance back to 1960s. As results, border political crisis became highly characterized by sporadic attacks against isolated villages and armed ambush targeting vehicles travelling on Marsabit-Moyale road, frequent cases of individuals being kidnapped and killed, a tirade of accusations and counter accusations traded between antagonists' leaders of different communities, Harassment and intimidation of communities' leaders, etc. Although key actors, in border Conflict are often associated with communities, i.e. Garre Gabra Burji and Boran, security forces from Ethiopia and Kenya, as well as OLF fighters, Al-shabby and Business speculators are commonly considered as faceless participants.

Moreover, border fighters' use of modern war weapons such as AK47 and G-3 made the nature of border conflict unusual. Attacker's new strategy of targeting, damaging, looting and burning houses as well destroying learning Institutions worsen border conflict. The major round of conflicts in August 2013, for instance damaged looted and closed down the following learning institutions: Butiye primary school (1 classroom was completely destroyed), Moyale girls' secondary school (Libraries, classrooms, computer Lab were broken into and learning materials destroyed/looted), St. Mary's primary school (Gate and fence destroyed), Iladu and Mansile primary school's (building broken into, learning materials destroyed and school meals programmed food stolen) and Sessi academy, a private school was burnt. Above all, Human right activist who came to their office to interview the commandant was shot right in front of their office. It was long after all these happened that the Boorana elders, Gadaa leader including Boorana elders participants coming from Mombasa jointly called for the urgency of denouncing the afro-mentioned restrictive law during the 40th Gumii Gaayoo.

Objective of the research

The objective of this research is to undertake detailed assessment of the colonial aspects and post-colonial situations haunting the Borona-Garrii and Gabra. It explores historic political aspects of the conflict and the current issues of border confrontation. The study specifically set to enhance; Hermeneutical understanding of the Moyale bordering town vis-à-vis state's-communities relationships, Rational investigation of the lived actuality of the three selected communities' vis-à-

vis the colonial (post) politics among the three bordering states and Possibility of having practical lessons for all interested researchers.

Methodology of the Study

The study reviewed the available documents (assessment reports, baseline surveys, evaluation documents, training manuals and guidelines), discussion with major stakeholders (Regional, Zonal and woreda administration offices and line offices, NGOs that are implanting peace activities in the zone/woreda, customary institution leaders, and the various peace committees Conduct assessment on peace building and conflict resolution activities with the community using focus group discussion (semi structured interviews, key informant interview, etc.) and other participatory methodologies to collect feedback...

Discussion and Result: Major Background Mistakes

Project of colonialism: To begin with, the project of colonialism which designed its mission in its own way is conceptually wrong and humanely immoral. The evolution of border is the result of this project. The case of Moyale border establishment can be considered from what scholars such as Mudimbe explained in his the three complementary hypotheses that systems of colonialization involve, i.e. domination of physical spaces, the reformation of natives' mind and the integration of local economic histories. Habermas, 1988:72) put that colonization is linked to the rise of new social movements in at least three ways; Firstly, and most obviously, it has generated a range of problems and strains which, if not sufficient, have at least constituted necessary causes of mobilization (on the problems of strain based theories of social movements.

Secondly, by disturbing traditional forms of life and the taken for-granted or habitual legitimizations they presuppose, colonization has served to bring many previously unquestioned aspects of society into question. Finally, however, colonization, qua both bureaucratization and commodification, contributes to the shrinking of the public sphere. Having stirred up a hornets' reduces the formal opportunity for issues to be discussed, thereby prompting interested parties to set up their own discussion forums (and protests) outside of the formal political channels. The British force when it established what was known as British east African province (currently Kenya) used all of the above mentioned elements of colonization. Rooted in the ethos of Berlin's political alchemy and ideological sophistry that concocted in the subtle poison of colonialism Africa, they very much legitimated a political economy of accumulation extraction, and control in the same manner as their French structuralism counterpart did with policy of assimilation (Anthony L.Asiwaju, 2011:4) In its displacing and restructuring the Boran, Garri, Gabra, Burji, Dogodi and Marean in the eastern province of Kenya, it imposed its own administrations, identity and forced its own "civilization. Therefore, since what it did to these communities constitutes of all that scholars call colonizing structures, the very evolution of Moyale border is wrong. Thus, from the very project the British project is responsible for producing marginal societies, cultures, and human beings in the Kenyan province.

The British act of restricting the indigenous leaders such as forbidding the Boorana Abbaa Gadaa not to cross what it called the red line is mistake. It must be British which must be held responsible for the assassination of District Commissioner Daudi Dabaso Wabera and Chief Hajji Galma Diida in 1963 which on the other hand make it responsible for the opening historical chapter of hostility between the Somali and Boorana Oromoo. The British had created the institution of headmen among the Boorana, "while they had incorporated Somali into the police and the army those colonial images and division of labor meant that when the clashes intensified the Somali had to their

advantage some influence in the opinion and interpretation of the clashes by the police (Mario I Aguilar, 1992, 5).

In fact British must have learnt from other mistake; In Kenya, for instance, British authorities first used the term “terrorism” to refer to the activities of the Mau-Mau, who are now days widely regarded as freedom fighters (Woldeselasia Woldemihael 2006:34). Likewise, the British mistake around 1940 was clearly justified after many years when the Boorana of Kenya and Ethiopia recently denounced the red line that British put in 1940 by the Gumii Gaayoo held in 2011. This must be a big historical lesson.

The colonial lesson and experience that African state builders used is wrong. The states ‘ideological aphorisms kept on bottle upping political tension among the border communities: i.e. Kenya’s sticks to ‘Harambe,’ Ethiopia’s vision right up to ‘Tikdem,’ and the Somalia’s pursuit of ‘Greatness,’ was simply imperialistic strategy which disregard issue of identity and ethnicity in the name of building nation. The ideology of dying as a tribe to be born a nation is by nature imperialistic which cannot be sustained. The British, which used to say that the sun will never set on my empire, must have learned without going so far, i.e. the lesson we should learn from UK politics must be critical, i.e. today, love for independence of peoples has been putting Britain’s unity under question. Scotland and Wales are demanding independent existence after hundreds of years. When we take this back to the border community that the British born ideology divided between two states, no matter how they are victimized, in terms of politics for unity, it’s not the community that lost the game in the long run but British. Even today, the Kenyan Boorana appeal to the Gadaa leaders who are in Ethiopia and solving the Kenyan politics related to community by crossing the border that the British forbade many years ago. Unknowingly, what British did to the Boorana (dividing into two different states) helped the Kenyan when viewed from state view point. It must be because of the Boorana contribution, as they don’t fight each other that the Kenyan state, unlike other neighboring countries, stayed in peace for long period of time. Even in the future, it’s most unlikely for Ethiopian and Kenya to wage war on each other so long as the Boorana are there on each side

State Mistake: the Somalia strategic vision and Ethiopia’s border game

Historic-political relationships of various African communities had been influenced by foreign hand even long before formal colonization. In Ethiopian context, this encounters trace back to 1916 when the Abyssinian elite, Great Britain, France and Italy cooperated and brought down Iyasu government in the name of religion (Mekuria 2002). The Moyale historical establishment and the border related claims among the surrounding communities began in the colonial period where the same colonial powers (Britain and Italy) intensively involved. Foreign hands’ extension continued whereby external interests of Soviet Union and its allies support for the Derg regime in 1970 and 1980’s against various national liberationists. The present conditions in which the USA assist EPRDF against others ethnic groups attests to historical continuity of the conflicts. Crucial issues which indicate border political crisis and its impacts upon border communities can best be considered from the views of people of Somalia, Oromoo people that the border divided.

In the 1960’s the young independent republic of Somalia set out to unit all Somali in northern Africa in one state. With this mission it went to claim territories in which people of Somali ethnic origin live from its neighbors mainly Ethiopia and Kenya. The Somali nationalist claims and response from Ethiopia and Kenya resulted in protected secessionist guerrilla warfare in southern and eastern Ethiopia as well. As in northern Kenya to win the support of the politically marginalized pastoralist groups, among others the Boorana, Garrii and Gabra, the Somali nationalists evoked relatedness in

terms of cultural markers and kinship relation and categorized all the three groups as Somali(Fikadu 2008-9:87).

When it comes to the case of Moyale, these historic-political communities' relationships highly revolves around the relationship between the Somali people and Boorana Oromoo. The dynamism of states politics and their strategic shifts reflect itself upon the community's life. At each state's political and ideological shifts, the communities' life is affected. This ranges from the 1960s, rise of the Somali nationalism (Somali young republic), the 1963 strange culture of assassination, The 1977/78 Ethio-Somali war which ended in Somali internal cohesion and multiplied shift bandits, the early part of 1990s political unrest in Ethiopia around the downfall of Derg regime to the 2011 border community conflicts followed from the rumors about the deteriorating health condition of Prime Minister MelesZenawi and Kenya's controversial election. The two latter events rived the community cohesion in the name of ethnicity and self-determination. The dates and precise details of the 'rise and fall' of the Boorana and Somali conflict differ among the successive regimes and in particularity of political contexts. The general picture, however, is the same throughout states' political shift. One of the key historical changes facilitating the rise and fall of conflict was the increasing differentiation of ideological and political shift at the states level along foreign influences. This was constituted, in part, through the centralization of political power in the national state, a process which made effective power remote, and also by the recent shift of politics to ethnicity and identity. However, still the Somali secessionist formally organized themselves under the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF in 1964), despite some ideological modifications, various Somali secessionist organizations such as Somali Abo Liberation Front, Somali national Movement (SNM),Ogaden National Liberation Front, etc. have been promoting critical spirit of old problem for which the Ethiopia recently offered new political solution. The Boorana-Somali relationships undergo four critical phases.

The Rise of Nationalism and scrambling for border communities

Prior to the rise of the Somali nationalism, the relationship was not influenced by state-ideology, it was characterized by peaceful communities' relationship. State influenced on the communities' life was started by the rise of young Somali republic. If one critically views the starting point from the Somali view point and investigates the situation from the concept of state building, then the inspiration of young Somali republic was relatively positive. As a political movement, the Somali nationalism did not start its project from eliminative or dismissive strategy. The movement of Somali young republic wanted not only the Boorana territory but also the Boorana community. It was not eliminative in that the movement wanted to annex the Boorana Oromoo to the greater Somalia without removing the community from the territory. It was also not reductive in that the movement did not aim at limiting scope of its national inspiration to the Somali ethnic groups. Thus from the view point of state building, the Somali strategy was better than its neighboring state in this phase. The movement did not focus on establishing ethnic hostility but state building project through assimilation. The reason for why I consider the movement as comparatively better than the other neighboring states is, the Somali movement did not use exclusive strategy either to divide the same community into different border or remove other ethnic communities from the territory it claimed. But this was not without mistake. The strategic mistake committed by the Somali movement was not its claim to annex the other communities to the greater Somalia but the manner of inclusion, i.e. assimilation approach was not less negative than the French approach to create black French in Africa. The young Somali republic movement used religion as big marker of inclusion. The mistake is therefore, its strategic aim to build Islamic states by assimilating other groups like the Boorana.

This letter is written by the Somali Prime minister to the Ethiopia in demanding Boorana land in 1969

Despite this strategic mistake, the movement gained support from large section of the Boorana who wanted to avoid coercive assimilations policy of Christian project both in Kenya and Ethiopia. To understand this one must consider fundamental mistake committed by the Ethiopian project of state building. Thus, to mention the Somalia national mistake is at the same time to offer clues about the Ethiopian state mistake in this phase. Accordingly, there are two important factors that helped the Somali movement in its approach to the Boorana; first, Ethiopian state wanted to converted the Boorana to Orthodox Christianity by force while the Boorana hate use of force in their Gadaa system. The Ethiopian project of state building strategically faced big challenge from the Boorana at its inception whereby the projectors used force as a result of which the Boorana preferred Islamic to Christianity or the Somalia approach to the Ethiopian project. The Boran made this decision when they were sandwiched in between the two worst.

therefore be ignored that Islam acted as a unifying factor between the Somali and the WasoBoorana, as the WasoBoorana were also told by public speakers of Somali origin who visited Garba Tulia, that Bantu Christians from the south would come, they would baptize all of them and take away their children to schools in Nairob Its approach towards It seems that one of the critical markers, by which both the Boorana and Ghari refer to each Other's identity, is religion ((Mario I Aguilar, 1992, 8).

Except for the choice made in between the two worst, the Boorana did not honestly admitted Somali use of religion as a means for the unification of state building.

The history of the Oromoo speaking peoples of Kenya has been one of conflict with their neighbors In the case of the Boorana of the Waso area of Eastern Kenya, a conflict with the Somali has been a constant feature since the setting of colonial boundaries in the 1930s However, that constant fight for resources has also been a pointer towards their sense of identity After all, and in the words of the Boorana, "we are Boorana, not Somali.

But still the Ethiopian mistake was too high at this phase and that was why the Boorana preferred the Somali approach. It was during the Minilik that the Abyssinian forces were able to isolate and defeat the raaba-gadaa and conquer Boorana land. Consequently, power shifted from the Booranagadaa to the invaders and to the qaalluu that appeared to assist the former gain the upper hand (Waqo 2008; Bule 2008; Madha 2008, in Osa 19,1\$2,p.43).Likewise the Kenyan Boorana, as the Boorana unity is always under the Gadaa leadership, preferred the Somali approach to the Kenyan administration, at least on the base of religion.

Psycho-religious Project for unification: The second phase of Boorana-Somali relationship was relatively the extension of the first phase. But unlike the first phase the second phase was characterized by ethnic suspicion. The initial cause for the suspicion trace back to some strange event occurred to the Boorana community in the first phase, particularly since the 1960s. From the Kenyan side, for instance; historically, strange culture of assassination occurred to these communities in 1963 when the Somali gunmen assassinated the District Commissioner Daudi Dabaso Wabera and Chief Hajji Galma Diida. It was with suspicion relationship that the Boorana-Somali entered into second phase. The Boorana began to resist Somali project due to for its creation agenda from which 'Islamization' and Caliphate was launched a means of unification. The covetous eyes of Ziad Barre (Hararge-Boorana(Russian sponsored),and the politics of Somalizing the Boorana (Mogadishu sponsored) opened worst chapter of turning the communities against one and others. As

a mistake the Somali nationalism created religious and Psychological war between the Somali ethnic groups and the Boorana. The very ideology and psycho-religious war divided the communities whereby the Garrii started to claim different ethnic origin against the Boorana.

Like many Other African Muslims, they trace their genealogy to the family of the prophet Mohammed. They are divided into mater sub-clans Tuf and Quran (Quranyowa). According to Gharri Oral traditions, almost all of the Garri elders agree including sheik Abdicuahid, one of the well-respected Gharri elders from Gharri Konfur, Garri was an Arab immigrant who came from the Gulf of Aden or possibly from “Yemen.”

The Garrii started to call the Boorana with pejorative concept “Kuffer” while in response the Boorana began to use the concept “Safara” as a marker for the converted groups. Accordingly, suspicious relation occurred to the communities in which religious affiliation became critical markers by which both the Boorana and Ghari refer to each Other’s. Guther Schelle argued that both Garre and Gabra use their Islamic religion as an important aspect of their ethnic marker and vital factor that unites them with other Somali clans (Schele 1998:143). However still, there was no ethnic based concrete hatred and hostility among these communities despite scattered reservation resulted from spontaneous public assassinations and internal secrete elimination of some outstanding community leaders. The Boorana refer even to their fellow Boorana, who were converted to Islam, as “Safara” This shows that this phase was not marked by concrete hostility and political animosity between the Boorana and Somali.

Guther Schelle argued that both Garre and Gabra use their Islamic religion as an important aspect of their ethnic marker and vital factor that unites them with other Somali clans (Schele 1998:143). On the other hands, the Boorana elders argue that the Gharri refer to the Boorana as “Kuffer” to mean pagan, people without culture and Islamic tradition. The concept “Safara” also includes the Gabra people.

On the other hand, the Somali nationalism played an out sizing role when compared to the neighboring states., unlike Ethiopian state or even Kenya relatively, two strategic moves helped Somali nationalism in launching its unifying project over the Boorana, i.e. peaceful and systematic religious conversion and struggle to incorporate the Boorana people along with their land, i.e. without removing them from areas it claimed. As I have said so far, the Boorana preferred the Somali nationalism to Ethiopian state politics, only from the very choice made in between the two worst. Ethiopian continued to eliminate the Gadaa system and imposed Orthodox Christianity by force. In Ethiopia, still the relation between the state and Boorana continued and state’s strategies worsen the situation. What was put in place by Menelik was further strengthened as Haile Sellassie who serious took measures to undermine the gadaa system. Hence, the Boorana-state relationship was a straight ford confrontation on the side of Ethiopia which is relatively a big mistake.

To that end, the emperor instructed his appointees to build arks (tabot) on Boorana sacred ritual sites and sent in priests to convert the Boorana people to Orthodox Christianity. As such, the emperor proceeded to build churches precisely on sites where Boorana religious shrines once stood. For instance, they setup Orthodox churches on the gadaa ritual sites at Arero and Guto though the latter was burnt down by the people organized by the raabagadaa leaders, namely Boru Lalo, Jaldessa Liban, Borbor Jilo, Guyyo Boru, and Arero Doyyo (Boro and Kokko2008; Waqo 2008,in Osa 19,1&2 p50).

Here one can conclude that the Somali nationalism movement used a smarter strategy than Ethiopian state in promoting ideology of state building. There is an example which clarifies Ethiopia’s strategic defeat ,i.e. it was around the mid-1950s, when Emperor Haile Sellassie summoned the then

Boorana abbaa gadaa Madha Galma (1952-60) to meet with him in his palace and allegedly told the abbaagadaa that “everyone should have a religion, either [Orthodox] Christianity or Islam, but believing in Oromoo indigenous religion is backwardness.” And, subsequently commanded the abbaa gadaa that Boorana should follow either of these religions as they ‘wished,’ (Waqo 2008; Bule 2008, in JOS 19, 1&2 p51). The abbaa gadaa Madha stood up and courageously told the emperor his position as narrated below:

[After all], I would not consult with you on issues pertaining to the governance of my people [Boorana]; nor would I with the qaalluu or with anyone else. Ask why, I would say I am the sovereign leader of gadaa. I am not bestowed with authority to direct Boorana to become [Orthodox] Christians or Muslims. Hence, don’t pretend that you summoned me for consultation. Tell me the truth that you called me to your palace to kill me. I would rather die than see the demise of gadaa because I would be a martyr. That day, it shall be known to the world that Boorana people were eradicated from the earth by the Habesha. Accepting death for truth is to be immortalized; let history be made, he called out, and abbaa gadaa Madha Galma left the room (ibid.)

Politics of inclusion and Community mobilization: In politics, it is not easy task to divide the same community, especially the Boran who hardly give their unity under the Gadaa system, politically. Thus despite some strange events ranging from assassination and scattered religious and psychological war, the Boorana continued preferring the Somalia movement, as compare to the Ethiopian project. There was a time even when the Somali nationalism created pro-Somali Boorana who used to fight on behalf of the Somali militia. The Boorana elders still narrate this. One of their known legends is the story about Sallessa Jalo Boqo whom the Boorana considered as pro-Somali by then;

Aaba Boru Haphii narrated the issue as follows;

Salleessii Nama Booranaa ka Somaliitti gale Boorna hadhaa ture. Booranni waan gaafasii sun sirba ittiin dubbatuqaba. Waan isaa kan namii guddaalleen akkan jedhee dhawata. Salleessii Jaloo Boqoo hiyeessa mangiftiin guddatee; Oomacha Gaalaa quufee Salleessii fuujjoo nuti nutti dubbatee gaafa irmijjaan kaatee matarraa klaashiitti dubbatee.

Translation; Salleessa was a Boorana person who collaborated with the Somali army and fought against the Boorana. People used to sing a song about him; SalleessiiJalooBoqoo was a destitute brought up by the government. Satiated with the foam of camel (milk), he reproachfully talks to us, when the war break out Kalashnikov will be blowing against his head.

My informant mentioned personalities such as Diida Guy Rude, Balanbalii Faayoo, and Guyyoo Galgaloo Konee among the others. He went on narrating the Boorana war song which goes; Diida Guyo urdee garaan Booranaciisaa, Salleessa Jaloo Boqoo garaan garaa Soomalii ciisaa... (Diida Guyyoo Urdee was pro Boorana thinker and Salleessa Jaloo Boqoo was pro Somali fighter...).

On the other hand, other group of the Boorana, whom the Somali national movement divided into pro-Somali and Pro-Boorana, used to express their dissent against the Somali project. My informant narrated how the Boorana women used to express their grievances about their fellow women whom the Somali force captured and mistreated.

Walee walee wallisoo’ Aayyoontiyoon naadhaltee, kaadhaltee duddatti naabaattee, guddisoo kiyyaan rafaaddeekaa uleen ormaa siin yaattee waleen Aayyaa ammannii garoo haahoo waleenaayyaha!(Walee Walee wallisoo (name of song, leitmotif), my mum begotten me, begotten and carried me on her back, suffered from my nurturing, but (bitten)eaten by the stick of enemies walee of mum, mum mine haahoo waleen mum!)

My informant Boru Roba told me that there was a time when the Somali force annexed huge party of the Boorana community to Somalia by using pro-Somali Boorana fighters. The Boorana Somali relationship was not hostile up to this time. According to the informant, the incorporated Boorana was returned by the Ethiopian force during the period known as “Gaafa Irmijaan Booran deebis,” (literally mean the period when measure returned the Boorana” Here come, on the other hand, Ethiopia’s historical mistake; i.e. the Somali regime wanted to annex the Booran to greater Somali land without removing them from their territory while the Ethiopian returned the Boorana without their original territory. The informant argued that the Somali wanted us with our land while the Ethiopia wanted as without our land; they returned us back from the Somali force by leaving our land behind. The narration of my informant traces the Boorana loss of land back to this period. It seems that the Ethiopian political success in returning back the community is a great loss for the community. The defeated Somali lost politics but the returned Boorana lost land. Unlike the case of Ethiopia, the success for the Somali would have partially been success for the Boorana since they could have stayed on their land despite religious threat. If the community perception is true, then the state success is really the loss for the Boorana. As Lenco put, “Respecting the peoples’ right of self-disposal was, however, apparently unpalatable if it implied loss of territory and population(2004 p.33). Thus the mistake is with state struggle to own landless community at the expense of community’s indigenous perception of land. This indicates that the Boraana blamed the Ethiopian government for the project of wanting the community without caring for their land, it wanted landless community. This can be another grave mistake committed by the Ethiopian state

The first complication that the Oromoo struggle faced was the redefinition of the area targeted for annexation to realize Greater Somalia. Mohammed Siad Barre’s regime staked claim not only to the Ogaden but also to the Oromoo-inhabited areas east of the Great Rift Valley, which constitutes almost half of the Oromoo country (Lenco 2004:15).

Even there exist suspicious between the pro-Somali Boorana and the Somale regime although they agreed on the greater state politics and wider ideology. This led the Somali nationalists to a grave mistake, which turned the Boorana against the movement. My informant narrated this by lamenting the systematic assassination of Sallesa Jalo who himself was accused by colonel Abdullah Yousuf, given false witness by Nuuraa Areeroo(Somali agent) and finally killed by agents from Marian people for his refusal to draw operation plan to assist Somali soldiers to capture Nagellee Booranaa. He mentioned many other personalities such as Boruu Dinnee Sakkoo, Maammad Tuuttoo, Saara Jaarsoo Moluu and...etc. He also narrated how the Boorana women used to express their grievances about their fellow women whom the Somali force captured and mistreated. Accordingly, the Somali national movement committed big mistake which turned the Ethiopian Boorana against the movement. Since the 1963 assassination of the Kenyan Boorana district Commissioner Daudi Dabaso Wabera and Chief Hajji Galma Diida by the Somali gunmen in Kenya, this one is the second gravest mistake committed by Somali regime to the Ethiopian Boorana.

The Rising of Identity, Ethnicity and Politics of self determination

The politics of self-determination, which was banished from Europe, was strangely implemented in Africa after the Second World War. Vague and inadequate principles on how to exercise self-determination were articulated by the international community at the end of the First and Second World Wars (LencoLeta 2004 p.92). With this, The present Ethiopian forces got international legitimacy in crossing international border (Ethio-Kenyan) which reconfirm that the government is getting its helping hand from the international powers (West’s support). Markakis precisely put this issue as follow;

Since those who control the state used its power to defend their own privileged position, the state has become the object of conflict and the principal means by which it is waged. This is the real bone of contention and root causes of conflict in the horn, whether it is fought in the name of nation, religion, religion, ethnicity, or clan ship (In Tefeseolika 2008:11)

Focusing on the C. Eze's quotation of Richard Bell, Guyo explained similar issues to what Tafese Forwarded in the above discussion as follow;

The Africans have been victims of their own post-colonial situation turned Africans against themselves and created killing fields with the importation weepers for masses of people. This in turn resulted in drought, Famine and unprecedented migration due to armed conflict sponsored by western cold war ideological and economic preoccupation (Guyo 2001:59)

Recent government's politics of ethnic federalism favored longstanding hostile relationship among the three groups in at least two major ways. Firstly, it created conducive environment for the earlier historic political claim of the Somali nationalists which is known for evoking issue of identity (relatedness) among the three groups in terms of cultural markers and kinship relation. Secondly,

EPRDF associated longstanding problems of pastoral resource ownership with the complementing issue of identity contention whereby right ownership and legitimate access to basic pastoral resources such as water wells and grazing land depends upon local political loyalty. In both regions-Oromia and Somali regional officials at all levels neither behave as part of the federal system nor take responsibility to protect the welfare of all Ethiopians particularly the lives and properties of people of the neighboring regions they rather consider themselves as "good" ethnic /clan/ leaders and "defenders" of their ethnic territories (Merara, 2003:66).

Accordingly, the finding indicates that the border conflict among the Boorana, Gabra and Garri is relapsed into artificial ethnic polarization through the politics of "us" and "them" (identity contentions) and "ours" and "their" (resource competition). The losses of grazing lands to other Ethnic groups in some pastoral areas like the Boorana as well as the Claims to land in gerrymandered localities are yet unsettled issues that continue to attract part of the Oromoo people (Merera 2011: p131). The antagonistic tendencies of the communities have been promoted by the government politics over the border town that considers Moyale town as 'Normans' land. The area (current district) is known for perpetual crisis, historically rooted in ceaseless political chaos. With the study indicates that the calculative and opportunistic tendency of the three groups rolls the historic political balance showed among the Somali force, OLF struggle and Ethiopian government whereby the Boorana, who are considered as less loyal group continuously lost the border benefit. The act of favoring one group against the other lead to serious ethnic political confrontation which turns group such as the Boorana against the existing state politics.

As a result, the bordering town of Moyale remained a bone of contentions among these groups whereby ethnic dispute over political and administrative boundary, competition over resource and ethnic rivals become constant feature characterizing the ethnic relationships and ethnic-state relationships. Furthermore, the antagonistic tendency and the state's favoritism led the Boorana's challenge to the colonial (post) states' politics and Garri's new project of having new border land. The allied project of partnership building among the Rendille, Garri, Gabra and Burji lead to the formation of new ethnic based political identity by the Garre. This project refueled the conflict and brought new political dimension by forming 'REGGABU' alliance along with geo-political map of Garre land Republic which claimed beyond the border zone. The formation of allies also brought new possibilities of actual danger where nature of the conflict is determined by groups' access to modern war technologies including small arms and motorized transportation. As A response to the

new political shift, the Boorana denounced one of the core elements of Gada law (Seera Daawwee) which used to forbid them from traveling beyond a defined perimeter within Dirre and Liban in Ethiopia during the 40th Gumi Gayo. The Boorana consider formation of the REGGABU as a politically sponsored project of ethnic war campaign against Boorana community across the two states.

The new shift of ethnic politics sounds like states' political return back to earlier post-colonial situations, at least for some possible reasons. Firstly, the formation of REGGABU and Garri's claiming new map of the Garri land republic is similar to the 1960s Somalia's project of having Northern Frontier District (NFD) is similar to the then Somalia's quest for the NDF (The rise of Somali nationalist sentiment), the REGGABU focuses on re-drawing of Border between region four (in Ethiopia) and region five (in Somalia). The Garri and Gabra's cooperation and their joint political operation on similar strategies and supporting each other through REGGABU also brought a new response to an older political demand of the 1960s Somali secessionists that called for such a political unity among all Somali blooded groups. Secondly, the Boorana's return back to their customary unity by denouncing the old law is similar to their situation of colonial time whereby they suspected states' political favor to the Somalian nationalists as a political task of weakening the Boorana of the two states. Recently, the Boorana started to have such a feeling when the Ethiopian government planned for the Moyale referendum. Forecasting possible consequences of the plan and comparing it to earlier Somalia 'as political and ethnic project of forming a greater Somali nation-state, the Boorana assumed that the plan for referendum would lead to a loss of Boorana territorial.

Conclusion and Recommendation

The study draws a political lesson for the states in that the continuity of clash of politics over the border town of Moyale has its deep root (causes) in the earlier colonial setting. The Moyale town, as a border town, has much geopolitical significance for the three and states, Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia. The town also plays enormous socio-economic role for these states since a major road connects these three states over the border. Although the reality on the ground indicates that the vast majority of the residents are largely other people from distance parties of the countries, the longstanding political claims remained among the three Afaan Oromoo sole eking communities (the Boorana, Garri and Gabra). These communities have been competing among each other's for the control of Moyale town for long period of time.

The competition revolves around the elusive concept of identify along the resources. It discusses the border clash of politics as an old but seemingly new product of earlier external colonial setting and complex historical process of post-colonial states' empire building projects advanced by three states (Ethio-Kenya and Somalia). Specifically, the study chiefly underlined how various successive regimes failed to transcend political trends of conditioning by an earlier post-colonial ideology set by the young republic of Somalia secessionists in the 1960s. History of conflicts and situations of 'the sometimes favored' and 'other time disfavored,' groups witness that the three states are responsible in undermining the border communities' socio-political and economic contribution to the states' unity. Accordingly, the finding put that the recent distractive conflict among the bordering communities attests to why the border region remained undeveloped for long period of time. The states' longstanding deliberate absences from bringing important developmental public institutions such as universities, state factories and other considerable projects, but huge military camps has many things to do with this.

To sum up, currently, as the result, the politics of "us" and "them" and "ours" and "their" characterizes government appointees whose votes appear as marketing commodity. (1) The inflow of

fire arms resulted asymmetric access to security. (2) States' favoring/disfavoring of the communities against their fellow is rampant. (3) Community losses of strategic resources remain silenced, reserved evil. (4) Politico- economic crisis and identity flux continue spreading revenge that begets cross-generational revenge. (5) Neither temporary cross-border campaigns nor quick-fix approach (military uses helicopter gunship) solve this. The path to solution should revisit methodological and moral limitations of political border demarcation which arbitrarily isolate the same community into contradictory political dimensions. To this end, therefore, so many concerned bodies should share the following remedial tasks.

To the new generation of African leaders should struggle to open fresh anti-colonial, anti-post-colonial residences (legitimization of border communities; dashed hopes, unfulfilled border political promises) and bottom up hermeneutic task of holistic self-searching chapter of border phase of states' politics.

To the three bordering states' leaders; The Ethio-Kenya and Somalia states should learn from dangers of ideological trap in the historical trauma throughout which historic, lived and felt actualities of border communities confirm consecutive regimes' playing a political dice against older post-colonial ideologies of the young republic of Somalia for whatever challenges come across their political paths.

To the experienced states' politicians and expertise: States politicians, border related political expertise, and local elites should learn from longstanding journeys of border political failure and set new holistic dimension of inclusive politics so as to prevent new generation of politics from historic-political repetition of border crisis. Their genuine conceptions of the lesson must underline anti-colonial view that even if pro-colonial project of border demarcation were succeeded for long period of time, it would not bring about normalization of ethnic relations over the border.

To the pro-federalist peace lovers and other NGOs: The community based approaches of border peace rebuilding and historic-political reconciliation of border communities, as well as deconstructive and reconstructive tasks of Ethio-Kenyan and Somalia states must carefully developed hermeneutic understanding and holistic approach from the bottom. This task should be hermeneutic in teaching and re-teaching local elites against their grave opportunistic tendencies, sluggish decision making over border incidents, dislodging and suspending acts like referendum, and polarizations of border issues in the name ethnic self-relating and identity dichotomization along competitive resources.

To the states' house of Federation and equivalent bodies working on conflict resolution: governments of the three states should re-examine their central power of portraying the border town as no man's land so as to fully develop sense of right ownership, true unity and inclusive sense of full citizenships of their respective countries. Democratization of state-community, state's declining from the 'border conception' as twilight zone and holistic tolerance among the communities are imperative. This must teach all involving actors that political tasks such as referendum can hardly be a solution but reconciliatory approach. With this, communities could learn the truth that border coexistence is different from political task of mutual robbing (social Darwinism trend) of social-economic benefit across dynamic nature and structure of successive regimes. To this end, the states, especially, Ethiopia should fully put its constitutional provisions such as article 78(5) and article 34(5) into practice so as to realize state-communities joint functioning (full recognition for traditional and religious courts and procedures) over the border disputes. The three states should seriously reconsider political consequences of not yet establishing developmental public institutions such as university-colleges, accelerating project of urbanization, and national factories with the

genuine assumption that such public and developmental institutions would play enormous role of peace building/making and peace keeping to the local communities that must be considered in the task of projects design and possible foundation.

To the developmental public institutions: The old assumption of considering border town as key geo-political and economic strategy must be reconsidered from the new political point in that establishment of such institutions can be realized only if the three states pay more attention to strategic advancement of bringing reconciliatory and developmental public institutions (For instance; Ethio-Kenyan University, Ethio-Somali research center, etc. over the border, just like Ethiopia's ongoing project of cross countries high way) down to the places as key channels of connecting local communities both among themselves and to the wider national sentiment. Above all, such an inclusive bottom up orientation would help many actors such as donors (who are less interested to invest in this area due to their longstanding sense of border lands isolation, insecurity and region's hitherto marginal productivity)and foreign traders (who must learn to refrain from transferring anti-peace factors such as illicit arms and drug trafficking).The Moyale political resolution must, therefore, be ensured when multitude actors are holistically and hermeneutically participated through anti-colonial deconstructive and reconstructive, as well as reconciliatory bottom up approach.

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- Of course historical encounters and happenstance were not clear right from the start. Phillip Zaphio, whom described as a Greek trader was also appointed border Agent By the British whose clear mission can hardly be considered as commercial agent. There was a time when ordered the Boorana

to evacuate Wajir and move to Buna(see Gufu Oba 1996 in MJ.Aguilar, "Keeping the Peace of the WasoBoorana: becoming Oromoo through religious diversification, "in Being and Becoming Oromoo, ends Paul. Baxter Haultin and An Iriulzi,NordiskaAfrikainstitute,Uppsala1996.p.131.

³C.W.GWYNN.1911. A journey in southern Abyssinia; Geographical Journal, 38, 1911, British Institute of Geographers, p.122.

⁴Mario I Aguilar, 1992. By 1921-1925 the military forces controlled the administration of the Northern Frontier Province and the headquarters for the Waso area were located in Garba Tulla a settlement that in 1928 had seven shops(duka), 24 residential plots and a traffic of 15 cars per week passing through the town,

⁵Mario I Aguilar, 1992Isiolo Handing Over Report(HOR),GarbaTulla District,5/11/28

⁶Here the border demarcation was by the colonialists which in this include: the Abyssinians in Ethiopia side, Italians on Somali side and British in the Kenya side

⁷The law that forbids their movement is known as 'SeeraDawe.' I will discuss this law as what was systematically done by the than politics by using socio- cultural system of the Boorana Oromoo.

⁸The MarsabetBoorana are marginal refugee population that was moved en masse from one location to another by the British military Administration in order to keep them away from Ethiopian borderlands and to separate them from their mounted and armed kinsmen in Ethiopia (A.Legesse,2000:56).

⁹As different Somali groups gained territory during the 19th Century, groups of Boorana advanced in search of grazing from Southern Ethiopia towards Wajir. As a result, in the years 1870 to 1890 groups of Boorana and Somali began to concentrate around the wells of EI-Wak and Wajir. The Orma who had been at the wells before, crossed the Tana river escaping from the Somali "till in 1909 the British Government finally moved the Ormaa and the Warded-? Across the river to the south-west corner of Garissa District(Mario I Aguilar, 1992. Historical and Cultural Interaction, Symbiosis and Clientage: WasoBoorana and Somali in Eastern Kenya (1932-1992),JOS,NO.3.Vol.1&2,1996,p.2).

¹⁰The British administration encouraged the development of the trading centers where goods could be sold many places as Merit, Sericho and GarbaTulla became small centers for trade where due to the British presence. Nomads and merchants would bring their products while merchants and nomads used those centers in order to trade with the colonial forces. The British encouraged the development of those centers in order to help the process of sedentarization of peoples. By providing opportunities for trading in an orderly manner The British perception of African societies was that of socially organized groups with clear tribal borders and with a traditional ("rigid") outlook, but with no central places for the exchange of goods. Therefore, the creation of trading centers was perceived as necessary in order to keep the different ethnic groups("tribes)in peace On the other hand, colonial officers suggested that an orderly way of being had to be protected and any prospect of detribalization" discouraged(Mario I Aguilar, 1992. Historical and Cultural Interaction, Symbiosis and Clientage: WasoBoorana and Somali in Eastern Kenya (1932-1992),JOS,NO.3.Vol.1&2,1996,p.4).

¹¹let us pull together(The Pastoral Tribes ofNorthernKenya,1800-1916:' unpublished PhD Thesis, London

University1970, 278

¹² Ethiopia's first (1974-91).The politics of federalism seemly made a shift but in reality

¹³The Young Republic of Somalia's National claim to annex all related ethnic groups in the horn of Africa, (symbolic value of five stars).

¹⁴ Journal Of Oromoo Studies, Volume III Numbers1&2 Winter/Summer1996,p.i

¹⁵In the 1960's the young independent republic of Somalia set out to unit all Somali in northern Africa in one state. With this mission it went to claim territories in which people of Somali ethnic origin live from its neighbors mainly Ethiopia and Kenya. The Somali nationalist claims and response from Ethiopia and Kenya resulted in protected secessionist guerrilla warfare in southern and eastern Ethiopia as well. As in northern Kenya to win the support of the politically marginalized pastoralist groups, among others the Boorana, Garrii and Gabra, the Somali nationalists evoked relatedness in terms of cultural markers and kinship relation and categorized all the three groups as Somali.(Fikadu 2008-9:87).

^aPT Dalleo, "Trade and Pastoralism: Economic Factors in the History of the Somali of North eastern Kenya, 1892-1948," PhD Thesis, Syracuse University 1975, 79

^aThe Boorana almost lost the central areas of Dirre, the heartland of Boorana pastoralism containing the great well complexes" (p, 148),

^aP.r:W. Baxter, Jan Hultin and Alessandro Iruilzi, (ed.) 1996. Being and Becoming Oromoo Historical and Anthropological Enquiries, Uppsala: Nordissa Afrika Instltut et.), pp. 310

^aThe new shift of ethnic politics sounds like states' political return back to earlier post-colonial situations, at least for some possible reasons. Firstly, the formation of REGGABU and Garri's claiming new map of the Garri land republic is similar to the 1960s Somalia's project of having Northern Frontier District (NFD) is Similar to the then Somalia's quest for the NDF (The rise of Somali nationalist sentiment), the REGGABU focuses on re-drawing of Border between region four (in Ethiopia) and region five (in Somalia). The Garri and Gabra's cooperation and their joint political operation on similar strategies and supporting each other through REGGABU also brought a new response to an older political demand of the 1960s Somali secessionists that called for such a political unity among all Somali blooded groups

^aThe perception held by several people in Moyale is that Marsabit county governor^a is credited to have used his influence and probably the networks within the Kenya government previously established and used by the late Bonaya Godana (Former MP of North Horr and minister in Moi government) to secure support for his community's war campaign against Boorana community in both Kenya and Ethiopia

^aAUTHOR: Anonymus. MOYALE CONFLICTS: The Actors, the Contests and the Interest, MOYALE CONFLICTS:

The Actors, the Contests and the Interest, THE STORY BEHIND STORIES, February 18, 2014, 2014, p.22. <http://www.Standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=200009249>,

^aThe Boorana's return back to their customary unity by denouncing the old law is similar to their situation of colonial time whereby they suspected states' political favor to the Somalian nationalists as a political task of weakening the Boorana of the two states. Recently, the Boorana started to have such a feeling when the Ethiopian government planned for the Moyale referendum which I discussed as the new political solution for the earlier political claim of the Somalia secessionists. Forecasting possible consequences of the plan and comparing it to earlier Somalia 'as political and ethnic project of forming a greater Somali nation-state, the Boorana assumed that the plan for referendum over the town would lead to a loss of Boorana territorial and political rights.

^aReferring to Christopher, 1984:27-87, Mudimbe argued that these complementary projects constitute what might be called colonizing structures. This colonizing structure embraces the physical, Human and spiritual aspects of the colonizing experiences.

^aThe British administration did not manage to understand the fact that during the dry season, Somali herders would ask the WasoBoorana for protection, so as to water their herds at the WasoNyirorivert? The WasoBoorana

had a strong allegiance with the Somali, who in their turn stressed their common religious affiliation with the WasoBoorana, rather than the British administrative boundaries politically imposed on them

^a let us pull together (ibid,p.6).

^a Ethiopia's first (1974-91). The politics of federalism seemly made a shift but in reality

^aThe Kenyan Boorana often denigrated themselves to me as only being part Boorana, because of their separation from their ritual leaders and their remoteness generation set rituals were performed," (Legesse 2000:56).

^a Mario I Aguilar, 1992. Historical and Cultural Interaction, Symbiosis and Clientage: WasoBoorana and Somali in Eastern Kenya (1932-1992), JOS, NO.3. Vol.1&2, 1996, p.1.

^a <http://www.africanewsonline.com/Gharri4.jpgline.com/Gharri4.jpg>

^aIt derogatorily refer to Muslim Borans as 'kufar' infidels.

^aLeus, well known scholar in the Boorana culture, defined the word; Safara refers to the Somali people. The word is a widely used Swahili. Arabic word for journey. The Somali were called Safari because those became known in the Boorana land were peripatetic traders (2006:570)

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^aAlthough Emperor Haile Sellassie presented the two religions as options, he implicitly pushed the abbaagadaa to accept Orthodox Christianity from his very awareness of the of existing conflicts between Boorana and the neighboring Muslim ethnic groups and, given a choice, the Boorana would undoubtedly turn to Orthodox Christianity(ibid.)

^a

^aHaphii Boru,67,Dubuliq,jun 23,2013

^aIt basically focused on forcefully removing Boorana out of all the lands that lies in eastern parts of Kenya